X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?p=mirror_edk2.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=SecurityPkg%2FLibrary%2FDxeTpmMeasureBootLib%2FDxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c;h=f3e486eadc7a97bb9d129c0ec7b40c63abe9296d;hp=c012f130d98d0e0d860b09948f0209a10b1c9080;hb=6dbdb1914d293d9abd378bf4f035d6f38809eaf3;hpb=0c18794ea4289f03fefc7117b56740414cc0536c
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
index c012f130d9..f3e486eadc 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
@@ -1,7 +1,21 @@
/** @file
The library instance provides security service of TPM measure boot.
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ Caution: This file requires additional review when modified.
+ This library will have external input - PE/COFF image and GPT partition.
+ This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like
+ buffer overflow, integer overflow.
+
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content
+ read is within the image buffer.
+
+ TcgMeasurePeImage() function will accept untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its
+ data structure within this image buffer before use.
+
+ TcgMeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse
+ partition data carefully.
+
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
This program and the accompanying materials
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
@@ -15,10 +29,12 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
#include
#include
-#include
#include
#include
#include
+#include
+
+#include
#include
#include
@@ -29,6 +45,7 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
#include
#include
#include
+#include
//
// Flag to check GPT partition. It only need be measured once.
@@ -36,10 +53,21 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
BOOLEAN mMeasureGptTableFlag = FALSE;
EFI_GUID mZeroGuid = {0, 0, 0, {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}};
UINTN mMeasureGptCount = 0;
+VOID *mFileBuffer;
+UINTN mImageSize;
+//
+// Measured FV handle cache
+//
+EFI_HANDLE mCacheMeasuredHandle = NULL;
+UINT32 *mGuidHobData = NULL;
/**
Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will make sure the PE/COFF image content
+ read is within the image buffer.
+
@param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.
@param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.
@param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.
@@ -50,20 +78,43 @@ UINTN mMeasureGptCount = 0;
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
-ImageRead (
+DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead (
IN VOID *FileHandle,
IN UINTN FileOffset,
IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,
OUT VOID *Buffer
)
{
+ UINTN EndPosition;
+
+ if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ EndPosition = FileOffset + *ReadSize;
+ if (EndPosition > mImageSize) {
+ *ReadSize = (UINT32)(mImageSize - FileOffset);
+ }
+
+ if (FileOffset >= mImageSize) {
+ *ReadSize = 0;
+ }
+
CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);
+
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
/**
Measure GPT table data into TPM log.
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ The GPT partition table is external input, so this function should parse partition data carefully.
+
@param TcgProtocol Pointer to the located TCG protocol instance.
@param GptHandle Handle that GPT partition was installed.
@@ -155,15 +206,15 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
if (!CompareGuid (&PartitionEntry->PartitionTypeGUID, &mZeroGuid)) {
NumberOfPartition++;
}
- PartitionEntry++;
+ PartitionEntry = (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *)((UINT8 *)PartitionEntry + PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);
}
//
- // Parepare Data for Measurement
+ // Prepare Data for Measurement
//
EventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions)
+ NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);
- TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *) AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT));
+ TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *) AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR));
if (TcgEvent == NULL) {
FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
FreePool (EntryPtr);
@@ -188,13 +239,13 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
for (Index = 0; Index < PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries; Index++) {
if (!CompareGuid (&PartitionEntry->PartitionTypeGUID, &mZeroGuid)) {
CopyMem (
- (UINT8 *)&GptData->Partitions + NumberOfPartition * sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY),
+ (UINT8 *)&GptData->Partitions + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry,
(UINT8 *)PartitionEntry,
- sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY)
+ PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry
);
NumberOfPartition++;
}
- PartitionEntry++;
+ PartitionEntry =(EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *)((UINT8 *)PartitionEntry + PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);
}
//
@@ -225,6 +276,10 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
Measure PE image into TPM log based on the authenticode image hashing in
PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A.
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure
+ within this image buffer before use.
+
@param[in] TcgProtocol Pointer to the located TCG protocol instance.
@param[in] ImageAddress Start address of image buffer.
@param[in] ImageSize Image size
@@ -234,7 +289,9 @@ TcgMeasureGptTable (
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully measure image.
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure image.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED ImageType is unsupported or PE image is mal-format.
@retval other error value
+
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
@@ -247,27 +304,31 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
IN EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *FilePath
)
{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- TCG_PCR_EVENT *TcgEvent;
- EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoad;
- UINT32 FilePathSize;
- VOID *Sha1Ctx;
- UINTN CtxSize;
- EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;
- UINT32 PeCoffHeaderOffset;
- EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
- UINT8 *HashBase;
- UINTN HashSize;
- UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;
- EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;
- UINTN Index, Pos;
- UINT16 Magic;
- UINT32 EventSize;
- UINT32 EventNumber;
- EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ TCG_PCR_EVENT *TcgEvent;
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoad;
+ UINT32 FilePathSize;
+ VOID *Sha1Ctx;
+ UINTN CtxSize;
+ EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;
+ UINT32 PeCoffHeaderOffset;
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
+ UINT8 *HashBase;
+ UINTN HashSize;
+ UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINTN Pos;
+ UINT16 Magic;
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+ UINT32 EventNumber;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;
EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION Hdr;
+ UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
+ BOOLEAN HashStatus;
+ UINT32 CertSize;
- Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
ImageLoad = NULL;
SectionHeader = NULL;
Sha1Ctx = NULL;
@@ -304,9 +365,6 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
"TcgMeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d",
ImageType
));
- ASSERT (FALSE);
- TcgEvent->EventType = ImageType;
- Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
goto Finish;
}
@@ -324,8 +382,9 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
PeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;
}
- if (((EFI_TE_IMAGE_HEADER *)((UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + PeCoffHeaderOffset))->Signature
- == EFI_TE_IMAGE_HEADER_SIGNATURE) {
+
+ Hdr.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)((UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + PeCoffHeaderOffset);
+ if (Hdr.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {
goto Finish;
}
@@ -347,14 +406,29 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
goto Finish;
}
- Sha1Init (Sha1Ctx);
+ HashStatus = Sha1Init (Sha1Ctx);
+ if (!HashStatus) {
+ goto Finish;
+ }
//
// Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;
// But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded
//
- Hdr.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)((UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + PeCoffHeaderOffset);
- Magic = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
+ if (Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
+ // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
+ // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
+ // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
+ //
+ Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
+ //
+ Magic = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
+ }
//
// 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.
@@ -365,58 +439,99 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
//
// Use PE32 offset
//
+ NumberOfRvaAndSizes = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
} else {
//
// Use PE32+ offset
//
+ NumberOfRvaAndSizes = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
}
- Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!HashStatus) {
+ goto Finish;
+ }
//
// 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).
- // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.
- // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.
//
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
//
- // Use PE32 offset
+ // 6. Since there is no Cert Directory in optional header, hash everything
+ // from the end of the checksum to the end of image header.
//
- HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
- HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - ImageAddress);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - ImageAddress);
+ }
+
+ if (HashSize != 0) {
+ HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!HashStatus) {
+ goto Finish;
+ }
+ }
} else {
//
- // Use PE32+ offset
- //
- HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
- HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
- }
+ // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.
+ //
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
+ }
- Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (HashSize != 0) {
+ HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!HashStatus) {
+ goto Finish;
+ }
+ }
- //
- // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)
- // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.
- //
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
//
- // Use PE32 offset
- //
- HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
- HashSize = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders -
- (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress);
- } else {
- //
- // Use PE32+ offset
+ // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)
+ // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.
//
- HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
- HashSize = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders -
- (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress);
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
+ HashSize = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - ImageAddress);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
+ HashSize = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) (HashBase - ImageAddress);
+ }
+
+ if (HashSize != 0) {
+ HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!HashStatus) {
+ goto Finish;
+ }
+ }
}
-
- Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
//
// 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header
@@ -439,7 +554,7 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
// header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any
// IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.
//
- SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *)AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);
+ SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);
if (SectionHeader == NULL) {
Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
goto Finish;
@@ -483,7 +598,10 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
HashBase = (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + Section->PointerToRawData;
HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;
- Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!HashStatus) {
+ goto Finish;
+ }
SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;
}
@@ -496,29 +614,42 @@ TcgMeasurePeImage (
//
if (ImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {
HashBase = (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + SumOfBytesHashed;
- if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
- //
- // Use PE32 offset
- //
- HashSize = (UINTN)(ImageSize -
- Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -
- SumOfBytesHashed);
+
+ if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
+ CertSize = 0;
} else {
- //
- // Use PE32+ offset
- //
- HashSize = (UINTN)(ImageSize -
- Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -
- SumOfBytesHashed);
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ CertSize = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ CertSize = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size;
+ }
}
- Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (ImageSize > CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {
+ HashSize = (UINTN) (ImageSize - CertSize - SumOfBytesHashed);
+
+ HashStatus = Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!HashStatus) {
+ goto Finish;
+ }
+ } else if (ImageSize < CertSize + SumOfBytesHashed) {
+ goto Finish;
+ }
}
//
// 17. Finalize the SHA hash.
//
- Sha1Final (Sha1Ctx, (UINT8 *)&TcgEvent->Digest);
+ HashStatus = Sha1Final (Sha1Ctx, (UINT8 *) &TcgEvent->Digest);
+ if (!HashStatus) {
+ goto Finish;
+ }
//
// Log the PE data
@@ -571,51 +702,46 @@ Finish:
might be possible to use it at a future time, then EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is
returned.
- @param[in, out] AuthenticationStatus This is the authentication status returned
+ @param[in] AuthenticationStatus This is the authentication status returned
from the securitymeasurement services for the
input file.
@param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
@param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.
@param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.
+ @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by File did authenticate, and the
- platform policy dictates that the DXE Core may use File.
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER File is NULL.
- @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
- the platform policy dictates that File should be placed
- in the untrusted state. A file may be promoted from
- the untrusted to the trusted state at a future time
- with a call to the Trust() DXE Service.
- @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
- the platform policy dictates that File should not be
- used for any purpose.
-
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL
+ FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates
+ that the DXE Foundation may use the file.
+ @retval other error value
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler (
- IN OUT UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
+ IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,
- IN VOID *FileBuffer OPTIONAL,
- IN UINTN FileSize OPTIONAL
+ IN VOID *FileBuffer,
+ IN UINTN FileSize,
+ IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
)
{
- EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol;
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- TCG_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY ProtocolCapability;
- UINT32 TCGFeatureFlags;
- EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLocation;
- EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;
- EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePathNode;
- EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *OrigDevicePathNode;
- EFI_HANDLE Handle;
- BOOLEAN ApplicationRequired;
- PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;
-
- if (File == NULL) {
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
+ EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ TCG_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY ProtocolCapability;
+ UINT32 TCGFeatureFlags;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLocation;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePathNode;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *OrigDevicePathNode;
+ EFI_HANDLE Handle;
+ EFI_HANDLE TempHandle;
+ BOOLEAN ApplicationRequired;
+ PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;
+ EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_BLOCK_PROTOCOL *FvbProtocol;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS FvAddress;
+ EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB *TrustedFvBuf;
+ UINT32 Index;
Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiTcgProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **) &TcgProtocol);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
@@ -645,7 +771,6 @@ DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler (
// Copy File Device Path
//
OrigDevicePathNode = DuplicateDevicePath (File);
- ASSERT (OrigDevicePathNode != NULL);
//
// 1. Check whether this device path support BlockIo protocol.
@@ -658,6 +783,7 @@ DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler (
// Find the gpt partion on the given devicepath
//
DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;
+ ASSERT (DevicePathNode != NULL);
while (!IsDevicePathEnd (DevicePathNode)) {
//
// Find the Gpt partition
@@ -709,10 +835,10 @@ DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler (
ApplicationRequired = FALSE;
//
- // Check whether this device path support FV2 protocol.
+ // Check whether this device path support FVB protocol.
//
DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;
- Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (&gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid, &DevicePathNode, &Handle);
+ Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (&gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid, &DevicePathNode, &Handle);
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
// Don't check FV image, and directly return EFI_SUCCESS.
@@ -722,13 +848,51 @@ DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler (
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
//
- // The image from Firmware image will not be mearsured.
- // Current policy doesn't measure PeImage from Firmware if it is driver
- // If the got PeImage is application, it will be still be measured.
+ // The PE image from untrusted Firmware volume need be measured
+ // The PE image from trusted Firmware volume will be mearsured according to policy below.
+ // if it is driver, do not measure
+ // If it is application, still measure.
//
ApplicationRequired = TRUE;
+
+ if (mCacheMeasuredHandle != Handle && mGuidHobData != NULL) {
+ //
+ // Search for Root FV of this PE image
+ //
+ TempHandle = Handle;
+ do {
+ Status = gBS->HandleProtocol(
+ TempHandle,
+ &gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid,
+ (VOID**)&FvbProtocol
+ );
+ TempHandle = FvbProtocol->ParentHandle;
+ } while (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && FvbProtocol->ParentHandle != NULL);
+
+ //
+ // Search in measured FV Hob
+ //
+ Status = FvbProtocol->GetPhysicalAddress(FvbProtocol, &FvAddress);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)){
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ TrustedFvBuf = (EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB *)(mGuidHobData + 1);
+ ApplicationRequired = FALSE;
+
+ for (Index = 0; Index < *mGuidHobData; Index++) {
+ if(TrustedFvBuf[Index].BlobBase == FvAddress) {
+ //
+ // Cache measured FV for next measurement
+ //
+ mCacheMeasuredHandle = Handle;
+ ApplicationRequired = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
-
+
//
// File is not found.
//
@@ -737,13 +901,16 @@ DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler (
goto Finish;
}
+ mImageSize = FileSize;
+ mFileBuffer = FileBuffer;
+
//
// Measure PE Image
//
DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;
ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));
ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;
- ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) ImageRead;
+ ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) DxeTpmMeasureBootLibImageRead;
//
// Get information about the image being loaded
@@ -802,7 +969,9 @@ DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler (
// Done, free the allocated resource.
//
Finish:
- FreePool (OrigDevicePathNode);
+ if (OrigDevicePathNode != NULL) {
+ FreePool (OrigDevicePathNode);
+ }
return Status;
}
@@ -823,7 +992,17 @@ DxeTpmMeasureBootLibConstructor (
IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
)
{
- return RegisterSecurityHandler (
+ EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE *GuidHob;
+
+ GuidHob = NULL;
+
+ GuidHob = GetFirstGuidHob (&gTrustedFvHobGuid);
+
+ if (GuidHob != NULL) {
+ mGuidHobData = GET_GUID_HOB_DATA (GuidHob);
+ }
+
+ return RegisterSecurity2Handler (
DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler,
EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_MEASURE_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED
);