X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?p=mirror_edk2.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=SecurityPkg%2FVariableAuthenticated%2FSecureBootConfigDxe%2FSecureBootConfigImpl.c;h=c8f4d977d92a5506d7a4cdd2c556276d9a5087ae;hp=e8beecbf583526bdc7a15a2f89b06f083286de91;hb=126f3b1de02c71fde8e28abc35a46ac5f135b527;hpb=ee79ac8d0e3da408073fc6ac07b69b880cbfac73 diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c index e8beecbf58..c8f4d977d9 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /** @file HII Config Access protocol implementation of SecureBoot configuration module. -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2016, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. CHAR16 mSecureBootStorageName[] = L"SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION"; SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA mSecureBootConfigPrivateDateTemplate = { - SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE, + SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE, { SecureBootExtractConfig, SecureBootRouteConfig, @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ HII_VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath = { }; +BOOLEAN mIsEnterSecureBootForm = FALSE; +BOOLEAN mIsSelectedSecureBootModeForm = FALSE; +BOOLEAN mIsSecureBootModeChanged = FALSE; + // // OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms // @@ -61,16 +65,16 @@ UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = { }; HASH_TABLE mHash[] = { - { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final }, - { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }, - { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final}, - { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }, - { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL } + { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final }, + { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }, + { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final}, + { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, Sha384GetContextSize, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final}, + { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, Sha512GetContextSize, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final} }; // -// Variable Definitions -// +// Variable Definitions +// UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0; WIN_CERTIFICATE *mCertificate = NULL; IMAGE_TYPE mImageType; @@ -93,6 +97,8 @@ CHAR16* mDerEncodedSuffix[] = { }; CHAR16* mSupportX509Suffix = L"*.cer/der/crt"; +SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *gSecureBootPrivateData = NULL; + /** This code checks if the FileSuffix is one of the possible DER-encoded certificate suffix. @@ -107,7 +113,7 @@ IsDerEncodeCertificate ( IN CONST CHAR16 *FileSuffix ) { - UINTN Index; + UINTN Index; for (Index = 0; mDerEncodedSuffix[Index] != NULL; Index++) { if (StrCmp (FileSuffix, mDerEncodedSuffix[Index]) == 0) { return TRUE; @@ -145,14 +151,14 @@ SaveSecureBootVariable ( /** Create a time based data payload by concatenating the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor with the input data. NO authentication is required in this function. - + @param[in, out] DataSize On input, the size of Data buffer in bytes. On output, the size of data returned in Data buffer in bytes. - @param[in, out] Data On input, Pointer to data buffer to be wrapped or + @param[in, out] Data On input, Pointer to data buffer to be wrapped or pointer to NULL to wrap an empty payload. On output, Pointer to the new payload date buffer allocated from pool, - it's caller's responsibility to free the memory when finish using it. + it's caller's responsibility to free the memory when finish using it. @retval EFI_SUCCESS Create time based payload successfully. @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to create time based payload. @@ -173,20 +179,20 @@ CreateTimeBasedPayload ( EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *DescriptorData; UINTN DescriptorSize; EFI_TIME Time; - + if (Data == NULL || DataSize == NULL) { return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; } - + // - // In Setup mode or Custom mode, the variable does not need to be signed but the + // In Setup mode or Custom mode, the variable does not need to be signed but the // parameters to the SetVariable() call still need to be prepared as authenticated // variable. So we create EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_2 descriptor without certificate // data in it. // Payload = *Data; PayloadSize = *DataSize; - + DescriptorSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2, AuthInfo) + OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData); NewData = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DescriptorSize + PayloadSize); if (NewData == NULL) { @@ -211,16 +217,16 @@ CreateTimeBasedPayload ( Time.Daylight = 0; Time.Pad2 = 0; CopyMem (&DescriptorData->TimeStamp, &Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME)); - + DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength = OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData); DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wRevision = 0x0200; DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID; CopyGuid (&DescriptorData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid); - + if (Payload != NULL) { FreePool(Payload); } - + *DataSize = DescriptorSize + PayloadSize; *Data = NewData; return EFI_SUCCESS; @@ -285,17 +291,17 @@ DeleteVariable ( @param[in] SecureBootMode New secure boot mode: STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE or CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE. - + @return EFI_SUCCESS The platform has switched to the special mode successfully. @return other Fail to operate the secure boot mode. - + **/ EFI_STATUS SetSecureBootMode ( IN UINT8 SecureBootMode ) { - return gRT->SetVariable ( + return gRT->SetVariable ( EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS, @@ -309,26 +315,26 @@ SetSecureBootMode ( @param[in] X509File FileHandle of X509 Certificate storing file. @param[out] PkCert Point to the data buffer to store the signature list. - + @return EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported Key Length. @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to form the signature list. - + **/ EFI_STATUS CreatePkX509SignatureList ( - IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE X509File, - OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **PkCert + IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE X509File, + OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **PkCert ) { - EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_STATUS Status; UINT8 *X509Data; UINTN X509DataSize; EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *PkCertData; X509Data = NULL; PkCertData = NULL; - X509DataSize = 0; - + X509DataSize = 0; + Status = ReadFileContent (X509File, (VOID**) &X509Data, &X509DataSize, 0); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { goto ON_EXIT; @@ -348,32 +354,32 @@ CreatePkX509SignatureList ( goto ON_EXIT; } - (*PkCert)->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + (*PkCert)->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize); (*PkCert)->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize); (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize = 0; CopyGuid (&(*PkCert)->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid); - PkCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINTN)(*PkCert) + PkCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINTN)(*PkCert) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize); - CopyGuid (&PkCertData->SignatureOwner, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid); + CopyGuid (&PkCertData->SignatureOwner, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid); // // Fill the PK database with PKpub data from X509 certificate file. - // + // CopyMem (&(PkCertData->SignatureData[0]), X509Data, X509DataSize); - + ON_EXIT: - + if (X509Data != NULL) { FreePool (X509Data); } - + if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && *PkCert != NULL) { FreePool (*PkCert); *PkCert = NULL; } - + return Status; } @@ -387,19 +393,20 @@ ON_EXIT: @retval EFI_SUCCESS New PK enrolled successfully. @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid. @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources. - + **/ EFI_STATUS EnrollPlatformKey ( IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA* Private - ) + ) { EFI_STATUS Status; UINT32 Attr; UINTN DataSize; EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *PkCert; UINT16* FilePostFix; - + UINTN NameLength; + if (Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) { return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; } @@ -414,7 +421,11 @@ EnrollPlatformKey ( // // Parse the file's postfix. Only support DER encoded X.509 certificate files. // - FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4; + NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName); + if (NameLength <= 4) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4; if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) { DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Unsupported file type, only DER encoded certificate (%s) is supported.", mSupportX509Suffix)); return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; @@ -426,18 +437,18 @@ EnrollPlatformKey ( // Prase the selected PK file and generature PK certificate list. // Status = CreatePkX509SignatureList ( - Private->FileContext->FHandle, - &PkCert + Private->FileContext->FHandle, + &PkCert ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { goto ON_EXIT; } ASSERT (PkCert != NULL); - + // // Set Platform Key variable. - // - Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS + // + Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; DataSize = PkCert->SignatureListSize; Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &PkCert); @@ -445,12 +456,12 @@ EnrollPlatformKey ( DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); goto ON_EXIT; } - + Status = gRT->SetVariable( - EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, - &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, - Attr, - DataSize, + EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + Attr, + DataSize, PkCert ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { @@ -459,13 +470,13 @@ EnrollPlatformKey ( } goto ON_EXIT; } - + ON_EXIT: if (PkCert != NULL) { FreePool(PkCert); } - + if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) { CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle); Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL; @@ -479,7 +490,7 @@ ON_EXIT: @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete PK successfully. @retval Others Could not allow to delete PK. - + **/ EFI_STATUS DeletePlatformKey ( @@ -525,7 +536,7 @@ EnrollRsa2048ToKek ( CPL_KEY_INFO *KeyInfo; EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData; UINTN KekSigListSize; - UINT8 *KeyBuffer; + UINT8 *KeyBuffer; UINTN KeyLenInBytes; Attr = 0; @@ -537,11 +548,11 @@ EnrollRsa2048ToKek ( KEKSigData = NULL; KekSigList = NULL; KekSigListSize = 0; - + // // Form the KeKpub certificate list into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type. // First, We have to parse out public key data from the pbk key file. - // + // Status = ReadFileContent ( Private->FileContext->FHandle, (VOID**) &KeyBlob, @@ -558,10 +569,10 @@ EnrollRsa2048ToKek ( Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; goto ON_EXIT; } - + // // Convert the Public key to fix octet string format represented in RSA PKCS#1. - // + // KeyLenInBytes = KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8; KeyBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (KeyLenInBytes); if (KeyBuffer == NULL) { @@ -569,13 +580,13 @@ EnrollRsa2048ToKek ( goto ON_EXIT; } Int2OctStr ( - (UINTN*) (KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO)), - KeyLenInBytes / sizeof (UINTN), - KeyBuffer, + (UINTN*) (KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO)), + KeyLenInBytes / sizeof (UINTN), + KeyBuffer, KeyLenInBytes ); CopyMem(KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO), KeyBuffer, KeyLenInBytes); - + // // Form an new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. // @@ -595,7 +606,7 @@ EnrollRsa2048ToKek ( KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0; KekSigList->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE; CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid); - + KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)KekSigList + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)); CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID); CopyMem ( @@ -603,13 +614,13 @@ EnrollRsa2048ToKek ( KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO), WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE ); - + // - // Check if KEK entry has been already existed. - // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the + // Check if KEK entry has been already existed. + // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the // new KEK to original variable. - // - Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS + // + Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { @@ -618,10 +629,10 @@ EnrollRsa2048ToKek ( } Status = gRT->GetVariable( - EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, - &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, - NULL, - &DataSize, + EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + NULL, + &DataSize, NULL ); if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { @@ -629,26 +640,30 @@ EnrollRsa2048ToKek ( } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { goto ON_EXIT; } - + // // Done. Now we have formed the correct KEKpub database item, just set it into variable storage, - // + // Status = gRT->SetVariable( - EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, - &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, - Attr, - KekSigListSize, + EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + Attr, + KekSigListSize, KekSigList ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { goto ON_EXIT; } - + ON_EXIT: CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle); Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL; - Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL; + + if (Private->FileContext->FileName != NULL){ + FreePool(Private->FileContext->FileName); + Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL; + } if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) { FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID); @@ -664,7 +679,7 @@ ON_EXIT: if (KekSigList != NULL) { FreePool (KekSigList); } - + return Status; } @@ -682,7 +697,7 @@ ON_EXIT: EFI_STATUS EnrollX509ToKek ( IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private - ) + ) { EFI_STATUS Status; UINTN X509DataSize; @@ -720,7 +735,7 @@ EnrollX509ToKek ( // // Fill Certificate Database parameters. - // + // KekSigList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) KekSigListSize; KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0; KekSigList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize); @@ -731,35 +746,35 @@ EnrollX509ToKek ( CopyMem (KEKSigData->SignatureData, X509Data, X509DataSize); // - // Check if KEK been already existed. - // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the + // Check if KEK been already existed. + // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the // new kek to original variable - // - Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS + // + Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); goto ON_EXIT; } - + Status = gRT->GetVariable( - EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, - &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, - NULL, - &DataSize, + EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + NULL, + &DataSize, NULL ); if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE; } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { goto ON_EXIT; - } + } Status = gRT->SetVariable( - EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, - &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, - Attr, + EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + Attr, KekSigListSize, KekSigList ); @@ -770,7 +785,11 @@ EnrollX509ToKek ( ON_EXIT: CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle); - Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL; + if (Private->FileContext->FileName != NULL){ + FreePool(Private->FileContext->FileName); + Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL; + } + Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL; if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) { @@ -788,22 +807,23 @@ ON_EXIT: /** Enroll new KEK into the System without PK's authentication. The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID. - + @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data. - + @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successful. @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid. @retval others Fail to enroll KEK data. - + **/ EFI_STATUS EnrollKeyExchangeKey ( IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private - ) + ) { UINT16* FilePostFix; EFI_STATUS Status; - + UINTN NameLength; + if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) { return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; } @@ -814,10 +834,14 @@ EnrollKeyExchangeKey ( } // - // Parse the file's postfix. Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate, + // Parse the file's postfix. Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate, // and .pbk as RSA public key file. // - FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4; + NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName); + if (NameLength <= 4) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4; if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) { return EnrollX509ToKek (Private); } else if (CompareMem (FilePostFix, L".pbk",4) == 0) { @@ -828,13 +852,13 @@ EnrollKeyExchangeKey ( } /** - Enroll a new X509 certificate into Signature Database (DB or DBX) without + Enroll a new X509 certificate into Signature Database (DB or DBX or DBT) without KEK's authentication. @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data. - @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be + @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1. - + @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully. @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources. @@ -843,7 +867,7 @@ EFI_STATUS EnrollX509toSigDB ( IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private, IN CHAR16 *VariableName - ) + ) { EFI_STATUS Status; UINTN X509DataSize; @@ -884,7 +908,7 @@ EnrollX509toSigDB ( // // Fill Certificate Database parameters. - // + // SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data; SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize; SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0; @@ -896,11 +920,11 @@ EnrollX509toSigDB ( CopyMem ((UINT8* ) (SigDBCertData->SignatureData), X509Data, X509DataSize); // - // Check if signature database entry has been already existed. - // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the + // Check if signature database entry has been already existed. + // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the // new signature data to original variable - // - Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS + // + Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { @@ -909,22 +933,22 @@ EnrollX509toSigDB ( } Status = gRT->GetVariable( - VariableName, - &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, - NULL, - &DataSize, + VariableName, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, + NULL, + &DataSize, NULL ); if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE; } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { goto ON_EXIT; - } + } Status = gRT->SetVariable( - VariableName, - &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, - Attr, + VariableName, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, + Attr, SigDBSize, Data ); @@ -935,7 +959,11 @@ EnrollX509toSigDB ( ON_EXIT: CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle); - Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL; + if (Private->FileContext->FileName != NULL){ + FreePool(Private->FileContext->FileName); + Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL; + } + Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL; if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) { @@ -955,173 +983,804 @@ ON_EXIT: } /** - Load PE/COFF image information into internal buffer and check its validity. + Check whether signature is in specified database. - @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successful - @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Invalid PE/COFF file - @retval EFI_ABORTED Serious error occurs, like file I/O error etc. + @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in. + @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for. + @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature. + + @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database. + @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database. **/ -EFI_STATUS -LoadPeImage ( - VOID - ) +BOOLEAN +IsSignatureFoundInDatabase ( + IN CHAR16 *VariableName, + IN UINT8 *Signature, + IN UINTN SignatureSize + ) { - EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr; - EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *NtHeader32; - EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *NtHeader64; + EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList; + EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert; + UINTN DataSize; + UINT8 *Data; + UINTN Index; + UINTN CertCount; + BOOLEAN IsFound; - NtHeader32 = NULL; - NtHeader64 = NULL; // - // Read the Dos header + // Read signature database variable. // - DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)(mImageBase); - if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) - { - // - // DOS image header is present, - // So read the PE header after the DOS image header - // - mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew; - } - else - { - mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0; + IsFound = FALSE; + Data = NULL; + DataSize = 0; + Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL); + if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + return FALSE; } - // - // Read PE header and check the signature validity and machine compatibility - // - NtHeader32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32*) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset); - if (NtHeader32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) - { - return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize); + if (Data == NULL) { + return FALSE; } - mNtHeader.Pe32 = NtHeader32; + Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + goto Done; + } // - // Check the architecture field of PE header and get the Certificate Data Directory data - // Note the size of FileHeader field is constant for both IA32 and X64 arch + // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists. // - if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA32) - || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_EBC)) { - // - // IA-32 Architecture - // - mImageType = ImageType_IA32; - mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]); + CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data; + while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) { + CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize; + Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize); + if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid))) { + for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) { + if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) { + // + // Find the signature in database. + // + IsFound = TRUE; + break; + } + Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize); + } + + if (IsFound) { + break; + } + } + + DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize; + CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize); } - else if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA64) - || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_X64)) { - // - // 64-bits Architecture - // - mImageType = ImageType_X64; - NtHeader64 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset); - mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader64->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]); - } else { - return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + +Done: + if (Data != NULL) { + FreePool (Data); } - return EFI_SUCCESS; + return IsFound; } /** - Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in - PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A + Calculate the hash of a certificate data with the specified hash algorithm. - @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type. - - @retval TRUE Successfully hash image. - @retval FALSE Fail in hash image. + @param[in] CertData The certificate data to be hashed. + @param[in] CertSize The certificate size in bytes. + @param[in] HashAlg The specified hash algorithm. + @param[out] CertHash The output digest of the certificate + + @retval TRUE Successfully got the hash of the CertData. + @retval FALSE Failed to get the hash of CertData. **/ -BOOLEAN -HashPeImage ( - IN UINT32 HashAlg +BOOLEAN +CalculateCertHash ( + IN UINT8 *CertData, + IN UINTN CertSize, + IN UINT32 HashAlg, + OUT UINT8 *CertHash ) { BOOLEAN Status; - UINT16 Magic; - EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section; VOID *HashCtx; UINTN CtxSize; - UINT8 *HashBase; - UINTN HashSize; - UINTN SumOfBytesHashed; - EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader; - UINTN Index; - UINTN Pos; + UINT8 *TBSCert; + UINTN TBSCertSize; - HashCtx = NULL; - SectionHeader = NULL; - Status = FALSE; + HashCtx = NULL; + Status = FALSE; - if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) { + if (HashAlg >= HASHALG_MAX) { return FALSE; } - + // - // Initialize context of hash. + // Retrieve the TBSCertificate for Hash Calculation. // - ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); - - if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) { - mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; - mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid; - } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) { - mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; - mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid; + if (!X509GetTBSCert (CertData, CertSize, &TBSCert, &TBSCertSize)) { + return FALSE; } - CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize(); - + // + // 1. Initialize context of hash. + // + CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize (); HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize); ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL); - // 1. Load the image header into memory. - - // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context. - Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx); + // + // 2. Initialize a hash context. + // + Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx); if (!Status) { goto Done; } + // - // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header; - // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded + // 3. Calculate the hash. // - if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { - // - // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value - // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the - // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC - // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC - // - Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC; - } else { - // - // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header - // - Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic; + Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, TBSCert, TBSCertSize); + if (!Status) { + goto Done; } - + // - // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address. - // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum. + // 4. Get the hash result. // - HashBase = mImageBase; - if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { - // - // Use PE32 offset. - // - HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase); - } else { - // - // Use PE32+ offset. - // - HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase); + ZeroMem (CertHash, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength); + Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertHash); + +Done: + if (HashCtx != NULL) { + FreePool (HashCtx); + } + + return Status; +} + +/** + Check whether the hash of an X.509 certificate is in forbidden database (DBX). + + @param[in] Certificate Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched for. + @param[in] CertSize Size of X.509 Certificate. + + @return TRUE Found the certificate hash in the forbidden database. + @return FALSE Certificate hash is Not found in the forbidden database. + +**/ +BOOLEAN +IsCertHashFoundInDbx ( + IN UINT8 *Certificate, + IN UINTN CertSize + ) +{ + BOOLEAN IsFound; + EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *DbxList; + EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertHash; + UINTN CertHashCount; + UINTN Index; + UINT32 HashAlg; + UINT8 CertDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + UINT8 *DbxCertHash; + UINTN SiglistHeaderSize; + UINT8 *Data; + UINTN DataSize; + + IsFound = FALSE; + HashAlg = HASHALG_MAX; + Data = NULL; + + // + // Read signature database variable. + // + DataSize = 0; + Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL); + if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + return FALSE; + } + + Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize); + if (Data == NULL) { + return FALSE; + } + + Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + goto Done; + } + + // + // Check whether the certificate hash exists in the forbidden database. + // + DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data; + while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= DbxList->SignatureListSize)) { + // + // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database. + // + if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) { + HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA256; + } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) { + HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA384; + } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) { + HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA512; + } else { + DataSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize; + DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize); + continue; + } + + // + // Calculate the hash value of current db certificate for comparision. + // + if (!CalculateCertHash (Certificate, CertSize, HashAlg, CertDigest)) { + goto Done; + } + + SiglistHeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + DbxList->SignatureHeaderSize; + CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + SiglistHeaderSize); + CertHashCount = (DbxList->SignatureListSize - SiglistHeaderSize) / DbxList->SignatureSize; + for (Index = 0; Index < CertHashCount; Index++) { + // + // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify. + // + DbxCertHash = CertHash->SignatureData; + if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash, CertDigest, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength) == 0) { + // + // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database. + // + IsFound = TRUE; + goto Done; + } + CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertHash + DbxList->SignatureSize); + } + + DataSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize; + DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList + DbxList->SignatureListSize); + } + +Done: + if (Data != NULL) { + FreePool (Data); + } + + return IsFound; +} + +/** + Check whether the signature list exists in given variable data. + + It searches the signature list for the ceritificate hash by CertType. + If the signature list is found, get the offset of Database for the + next hash of a certificate. + + @param[in] Database Variable data to save signature list. + @param[in] DatabaseSize Variable size. + @param[in] SignatureType The type of the signature. + @param[out] Offset The offset to save a new hash of certificate. + + @return TRUE The signature list is found in the forbidden database. + @return FALSE The signature list is not found in the forbidden database. +**/ +BOOLEAN +GetSignaturelistOffset ( + IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Database, + IN UINTN DatabaseSize, + IN EFI_GUID *SignatureType, + OUT UINTN *Offset + ) +{ + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigList; + UINTN SiglistSize; + + if ((Database == NULL) || (DatabaseSize == 0)) { + *Offset = 0; + return FALSE; + } + + SigList = Database; + SiglistSize = DatabaseSize; + while ((SiglistSize > 0) && (SiglistSize >= SigList->SignatureListSize)) { + if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType, SignatureType)) { + *Offset = DatabaseSize - SiglistSize; + return TRUE; + } + SiglistSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize; + SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList + SigList->SignatureListSize); + } + *Offset = 0; + return FALSE; +} + +/** + Enroll a new X509 certificate hash into Signature Database (dbx) without + KEK's authentication. + + @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data. + @param[in] HashAlg The hash algorithm to enroll the certificate. + @param[in] RevocationDate The revocation date of the certificate. + @param[in] RevocationTime The revocation time of the certificate. + @param[in] AlwaysRevocation Indicate whether the certificate is always revoked. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully. + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid. + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources. + +**/ +EFI_STATUS +EnrollX509HashtoSigDB ( + IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private, + IN UINT32 HashAlg, + IN EFI_HII_DATE *RevocationDate, + IN EFI_HII_TIME *RevocationTime, + IN BOOLEAN AlwaysRevocation + ) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINTN X509DataSize; + VOID *X509Data; + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList; + UINTN SignatureListSize; + UINT8 *Data; + UINT8 *NewData; + UINTN DataSize; + UINTN DbSize; + UINT32 Attr; + EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SignatureData; + UINTN SignatureSize; + EFI_GUID SignatureType; + UINTN Offset; + UINT8 CertHash[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + UINT16* FilePostFix; + UINTN NameLength; + EFI_TIME *Time; + + X509DataSize = 0; + DbSize = 0; + X509Data = NULL; + SignatureData = NULL; + SignatureList = NULL; + Data = NULL; + NewData = NULL; + + if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return Status; + } + + // + // Parse the file's postfix. + // + NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName); + if (NameLength <= 4) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4; + if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) { + // + // Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate. + // + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + // + // Get the certificate from file and calculate its hash. + // + Status = ReadFileContent ( + Private->FileContext->FHandle, + &X509Data, + &X509DataSize, + 0 + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + goto ON_EXIT; + } + ASSERT (X509Data != NULL); + + if (!CalculateCertHash (X509Data, X509DataSize, HashAlg, CertHash)) { + goto ON_EXIT; + } + + // + // Get the variable for enrollment. + // + DataSize = 0; + Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL); + if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize); + if (Data == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + + Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + goto ON_EXIT; + } + } + + // + // Allocate memory for Signature and fill the Signature + // + SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + sizeof (EFI_TIME) + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength; + SignatureData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureSize); + if (SignatureData == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + CopyGuid (&SignatureData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID); + CopyMem (SignatureData->SignatureData, CertHash, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength); + + // + // Fill the time. + // + if (!AlwaysRevocation) { + Time = (EFI_TIME *)(&SignatureData->SignatureData + mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength); + Time->Year = RevocationDate->Year; + Time->Month = RevocationDate->Month; + Time->Day = RevocationDate->Day; + Time->Hour = RevocationTime->Hour; + Time->Minute = RevocationTime->Minute; + Time->Second = RevocationTime->Second; + } + + // + // Determine the GUID for certificate hash. + // + switch (HashAlg) { + case HASHALG_SHA256: + SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid; + break; + case HASHALG_SHA384: + SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid; + break; + case HASHALG_SHA512: + SignatureType = gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid; + break; + default: + return FALSE; + } + + // + // Add signature into the new variable data buffer + // + if (GetSignaturelistOffset((EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data, DataSize, &SignatureType, &Offset)) { + // + // Add the signature to the found signaturelist. + // + DbSize = DataSize + SignatureSize; + NewData = AllocateZeroPool (DbSize); + if (NewData == NULL) { + Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + goto ON_EXIT; + } + + SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset); + SignatureListSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)&SignatureList->SignatureListSize); + CopyMem (NewData, Data, Offset + SignatureListSize); + + SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(NewData + Offset); + WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &SignatureList->SignatureListSize, (UINT32)(SignatureListSize + SignatureSize)); + + Offset += SignatureListSize; + CopyMem (NewData + Offset, SignatureData, SignatureSize); + CopyMem (NewData + Offset + SignatureSize, Data + Offset, DataSize - Offset); + + FreePool (Data); + Data = NewData; + DataSize = DbSize; + } else { + // + // Create a new signaturelist, and add the signature into the signaturelist. + // + DbSize = DataSize + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SignatureSize; + NewData = AllocateZeroPool (DbSize); + if (NewData == NULL) { + Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + goto ON_EXIT; + } + // + // Fill Certificate Database parameters. + // + SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) (NewData + DataSize); + SignatureListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SignatureSize; + WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &SignatureList->SignatureListSize, (UINT32) SignatureListSize); + WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &SignatureList->SignatureSize, (UINT32) SignatureSize); + CopyGuid (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &SignatureType); + CopyMem ((UINT8* ) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST), SignatureData, SignatureSize); + if ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL)) { + CopyMem (NewData, Data, DataSize); + FreePool (Data); + } + Data = NewData; + DataSize = DbSize; + } + + Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &Data); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + goto ON_EXIT; + } + + Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS + | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; + Status = gRT->SetVariable( + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, + Attr, + DataSize, + Data + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + goto ON_EXIT; + } + +ON_EXIT: + CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle); + if (Private->FileContext->FileName != NULL){ + FreePool(Private->FileContext->FileName); + Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL; + } + + Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL; + + if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) { + FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID); + Private->SignatureGUID = NULL; + } + + if (Data != NULL) { + FreePool (Data); + } + + if (SignatureData != NULL) { + FreePool (SignatureData); + } + + if (X509Data != NULL) { + FreePool (X509Data); + } + + return Status; +} + +/** + Check whether a certificate from a file exists in dbx. + + @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data. + @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1. + + @retval TRUE The X509 certificate is found in dbx successfully. + @retval FALSE The X509 certificate is not found in dbx. +**/ +BOOLEAN +IsX509CertInDbx ( + IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private, + IN CHAR16 *VariableName + ) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINTN X509DataSize; + VOID *X509Data; + BOOLEAN IsFound; + + // + // Read the certificate from file + // + X509DataSize = 0; + X509Data = NULL; + Status = ReadFileContent ( + Private->FileContext->FHandle, + &X509Data, + &X509DataSize, + 0 + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return FALSE; + } + + // + // Check the raw certificate. + // + IsFound = FALSE; + if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, X509Data, X509DataSize)) { + IsFound = TRUE; + goto ON_EXIT; + } + + // + // Check the hash of certificate. + // + if (IsCertHashFoundInDbx (X509Data, X509DataSize)) { + IsFound = TRUE; + goto ON_EXIT; + } + +ON_EXIT: + if (X509Data != NULL) { + FreePool (X509Data); + } + + return IsFound; +} + +/** + Load PE/COFF image information into internal buffer and check its validity. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successful + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Invalid PE/COFF file + @retval EFI_ABORTED Serious error occurs, like file I/O error etc. + +**/ +EFI_STATUS +LoadPeImage ( + VOID + ) +{ + EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr; + EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *NtHeader32; + EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *NtHeader64; + + NtHeader32 = NULL; + NtHeader64 = NULL; + // + // Read the Dos header + // + DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)(mImageBase); + if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) + { + // + // DOS image header is present, + // So read the PE header after the DOS image header + // + mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew; + } + else + { + mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0; + } + + // + // Read PE header and check the signature validity and machine compatibility + // + NtHeader32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32*) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset); + if (NtHeader32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) + { + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + mNtHeader.Pe32 = NtHeader32; + + // + // Check the architecture field of PE header and get the Certificate Data Directory data + // Note the size of FileHeader field is constant for both IA32 and X64 arch + // + if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA32) + || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_EBC) + || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_ARMTHUMB_MIXED)) { + // + // 32-bits Architecture + // + mImageType = ImageType_IA32; + mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]); + } + else if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA64) + || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_X64) + || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_AARCH64)) { + // + // 64-bits Architecture + // + mImageType = ImageType_X64; + NtHeader64 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset); + mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader64->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]); + } else { + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in + PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A + + @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type. + + @retval TRUE Successfully hash image. + @retval FALSE Fail in hash image. + +**/ +BOOLEAN +HashPeImage ( + IN UINT32 HashAlg + ) +{ + BOOLEAN Status; + UINT16 Magic; + EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section; + VOID *HashCtx; + UINTN CtxSize; + UINT8 *HashBase; + UINTN HashSize; + UINTN SumOfBytesHashed; + EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader; + UINTN Index; + UINTN Pos; + + HashCtx = NULL; + SectionHeader = NULL; + Status = FALSE; + + if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) { + return FALSE; + } + + // + // Initialize context of hash. + // + ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); + + if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) { + mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; + mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid; + } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) { + mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid; + } + + CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize(); + + HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize); + ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL); + + // 1. Load the image header into memory. + + // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context. + Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx); + if (!Status) { + goto Done; + } + // + // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header; + // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded + // + if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { + // + // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value + // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the + // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC + // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC + // + Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC; + } else { + // + // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header + // + Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic; + } + + // + // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address. + // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum. + // + HashBase = mImageBase; + if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { + // + // Use PE32 offset. + // + HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase); + } else { + // + // Use PE32+ offset. + // + HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase); } Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize); @@ -1142,7 +1801,7 @@ HashPeImage ( } else { // // Use PE32+ offset. - // + // HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32); HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase); } @@ -1265,7 +1924,7 @@ HashPeImage ( HashSize = (UINTN)( mImageSize - mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size - - SumOfBytesHashed); + SumOfBytesHashed); } Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize); @@ -1287,15 +1946,15 @@ Done: } /** - Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of - Pe/Coff image based on the authenticated image hashing in PE/COFF Specification + Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and calculate hash of + Pe/Coff image based on the authenticated image hashing in PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported. @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully. **/ -EFI_STATUS +EFI_STATUS HashPeImageByType ( VOID ) @@ -1305,10 +1964,10 @@ HashPeImageByType ( PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset); - for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) { + for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) { // // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode. - // According to PKCS#7 Definition: + // According to PKCS#7 Definition: // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { // version Version, // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers, @@ -1325,7 +1984,7 @@ HashPeImageByType ( continue; } - // + // if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) { break; } @@ -1346,11 +2005,12 @@ HashPeImageByType ( } /** - Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database. + Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database. @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data. - @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be - EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1. + @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1 + or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2. @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature is enrolled successfully. @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid. @@ -1376,6 +2036,10 @@ EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB ( Data = NULL; GuidCertData = NULL; + if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0) { + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + // // Form the SigDB certificate list. // Format the data item into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type. @@ -1390,13 +2054,13 @@ EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB ( // Status = ReadFileContent( Private->FileContext->FHandle, - (VOID **) &mImageBase, - &mImageSize, + (VOID **) &mImageBase, + &mImageSize, 0 ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { goto ON_EXIT; - } + } ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL); Status = LoadPeImage (); @@ -1410,7 +2074,7 @@ EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB ( goto ON_EXIT; } } else { - + // // Read the certificate data // @@ -1427,7 +2091,7 @@ EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB ( Status = EFI_ABORTED; goto ON_EXIT;; } - + } else if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) { Status = HashPeImageByType (); @@ -1443,7 +2107,7 @@ EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB ( // // Create a new SigDB entry. // - SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize; @@ -1452,10 +2116,10 @@ EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB ( Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; goto ON_EXIT; } - + // // Adjust the Certificate Database parameters. - // + // SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data; SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize; SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0; @@ -1466,41 +2130,41 @@ EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB ( CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID); CopyMem (SigDBCertData->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize); - Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS + Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status)); goto ON_EXIT; } - + // - // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed. - // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the + // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed. + // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the // new signature data to original variable - // + // DataSize = 0; Status = gRT->GetVariable( - VariableName, - &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, - NULL, - &DataSize, + VariableName, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, + NULL, + &DataSize, NULL ); if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE; } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { goto ON_EXIT; - } + } // // Enroll the variable. // Status = gRT->SetVariable( - VariableName, - &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, - Attr, - SigDBSize, + VariableName, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, + Attr, + SigDBSize, Data ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { @@ -1511,7 +2175,11 @@ ON_EXIT: CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle); Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL; - Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL; + + if (Private->FileContext->FileName != NULL){ + FreePool(Private->FileContext->FileName); + Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL; + } if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) { FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID); @@ -1531,41 +2199,46 @@ ON_EXIT: } /** - Enroll signature into DB/DBX without KEK's authentication. + Enroll signature into DB/DBX/DBT without KEK's authentication. The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID. - + @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data. - @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be + @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1. - + @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature enrolled successfully. @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid. @retval others Fail to enroll signature data. - + **/ EFI_STATUS EnrollSignatureDatabase ( IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private, IN CHAR16 *VariableName - ) + ) { UINT16* FilePostFix; EFI_STATUS Status; + UINTN NameLength; if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) { return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; } - Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); + Status = SetSecureBootMode (CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { return Status; } - + // - // Parse the file's postfix. + // Parse the file's postfix. // - FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4; - if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) { + NameLength = StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName); + if (NameLength <= 4) { + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + NameLength - 4; + if (IsDerEncodeCertificate (FilePostFix)) { // // Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate. // @@ -1576,7 +2249,7 @@ EnrollSignatureDatabase ( } /** - List all signatures in specified signature database (e.g. KEK/DB/DBX) + List all signatures in specified signature database (e.g. KEK/DB/DBX/DBT) by GUID in the page for user to select and delete as needed. @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data. @@ -1588,7 +2261,7 @@ EnrollSignatureDatabase ( @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources. - + **/ EFI_STATUS UpdateDeletePage ( @@ -1607,7 +2280,7 @@ UpdateDeletePage ( VOID *StartOpCodeHandle; VOID *EndOpCodeHandle; EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartLabel; - EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel; + EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel; UINTN DataSize; UINT8 *Data; EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList; @@ -1623,20 +2296,20 @@ UpdateDeletePage ( GuidStr = NULL; StartOpCodeHandle = NULL; EndOpCodeHandle = NULL; - + // // Initialize the container for dynamic opcodes. // StartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle (); if (StartOpCodeHandle == NULL) { Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; - goto ON_EXIT; + goto ON_EXIT; } EndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle (); if (EndOpCodeHandle == NULL) { Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; - goto ON_EXIT; + goto ON_EXIT; } // @@ -1664,7 +2337,7 @@ UpdateDeletePage ( // Read Variable. // DataSize = 0; - Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data); + Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data); if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { goto ON_EXIT; } @@ -1703,6 +2376,12 @@ UpdateDeletePage ( Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA1_GUID); } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) { Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA256_GUID); + } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) { + Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA256_GUID); + } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid)) { + Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA384_GUID); + } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid)) { + Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_X509_SHA512_GUID); } else { // // The signature type is not supported in current implementation. @@ -1714,26 +2393,26 @@ UpdateDeletePage ( CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize; for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) { - Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList - + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize + Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize + Index * CertList->SignatureSize); // - // Display GUID and help + // Display GUID and help // GuidToString (&Cert->SignatureOwner, GuidStr, 100); GuidID = HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, GuidStr, NULL); HiiCreateCheckBoxOpCode ( StartOpCodeHandle, (EFI_QUESTION_ID) (QuestionIdBase + GuidIndex++), - 0, - 0, - GuidID, + 0, + 0, + GuidID, Help, EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK, 0, NULL - ); + ); } ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize; @@ -1756,7 +2435,7 @@ ON_EXIT: if (EndOpCodeHandle != NULL) { HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (EndOpCodeHandle); } - + if (Data != NULL) { FreePool (Data); } @@ -1769,14 +2448,14 @@ ON_EXIT: } /** - Delete a KEK entry from KEK database. + Delete a KEK entry from KEK database. @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data. @param[in] QuestionId Question id of the KEK item to delete. @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete kek item successfully. @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources. - + **/ EFI_STATUS DeleteKeyExchangeKey ( @@ -1804,18 +2483,18 @@ DeleteKeyExchangeKey ( OldData = NULL; CertList = NULL; Cert = NULL; - Attr = 0; + Attr = 0; DeleteKekIndex = QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID; Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { return Status; } - + // // Get original KEK variable. - // - DataSize = 0; + // + DataSize = 0; Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL); if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { goto ON_EXIT; @@ -1823,7 +2502,7 @@ DeleteKeyExchangeKey ( OldData = (UINT8*)AllocateZeroPool(DataSize); if (OldData == NULL) { - Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; goto ON_EXIT; } @@ -1833,7 +2512,7 @@ DeleteKeyExchangeKey ( } // - // Allocate space for new variable. + // Allocate space for new variable. // Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize); if (Data == NULL) { @@ -1863,7 +2542,7 @@ DeleteKeyExchangeKey ( // Find it! Skip it! // NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize; - IsKEKItemFound = TRUE; + IsKEKItemFound = TRUE; } else { // // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer. @@ -1881,7 +2560,7 @@ DeleteKeyExchangeKey ( CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize); Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize; } - + KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize; CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) ((UINT8*) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize); } @@ -1903,11 +2582,11 @@ DeleteKeyExchangeKey ( ZeroMem (OldData, KekDataSize); while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) { CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize; - DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount)); + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount)); if (CertCount != 0) { CopyMem (OldData + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize); Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize; - } + } KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize; CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize); } @@ -1922,17 +2601,17 @@ DeleteKeyExchangeKey ( } Status = gRT->SetVariable( - EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, - &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, - Attr, - DataSize, + EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + Attr, + DataSize, OldData ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status)); goto ON_EXIT; } - + ON_EXIT: if (Data != NULL) { FreePool(Data); @@ -1943,7 +2622,7 @@ ON_EXIT: } return UpdateDeletePage ( - PrivateData, + PrivateData, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, LABEL_KEK_DELETE, @@ -1962,7 +2641,7 @@ ON_EXIT: @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page. @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list. @param[in] DeleteIndex Signature index to delete. - + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete siganture successfully. @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't find the signature item, @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources. @@ -1997,7 +2676,7 @@ DeleteSignature ( OldData = NULL; CertList = NULL; Cert = NULL; - Attr = 0; + Attr = 0; Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { @@ -2006,7 +2685,7 @@ DeleteSignature ( // // Get original signature list data. - // + // DataSize = 0; Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL); if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { @@ -2015,17 +2694,17 @@ DeleteSignature ( OldData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize); if (OldData == NULL) { - Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; goto ON_EXIT; } Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData); if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { goto ON_EXIT; - } + } // - // Allocate space for new variable. + // Allocate space for new variable. // Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize); if (Data == NULL) { @@ -2045,7 +2724,10 @@ DeleteSignature ( if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) || CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid) || CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid) || - CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid) + CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid) || + CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid) || + CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid) || + CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid) ) { // // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header then calculate the signature count in this list. @@ -2061,7 +2743,7 @@ DeleteSignature ( // Find it! Skip it! // NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize; - IsItemFound = TRUE; + IsItemFound = TRUE; } else { // // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer. @@ -2079,7 +2761,7 @@ DeleteSignature ( CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize); Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize; } - + ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize; CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize); } @@ -2101,11 +2783,11 @@ DeleteSignature ( ZeroMem (OldData, ItemDataSize); while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) { CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize; - DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount)); + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount)); if (CertCount != 0) { CopyMem (OldData + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize); Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize; - } + } ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize; CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize); } @@ -2120,17 +2802,17 @@ DeleteSignature ( } Status = gRT->SetVariable( - VariableName, - VendorGuid, - Attr, - DataSize, + VariableName, + VendorGuid, + Attr, + DataSize, OldData ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status)); goto ON_EXIT; } - + ON_EXIT: if (Data != NULL) { FreePool(Data); @@ -2141,7 +2823,7 @@ ON_EXIT: } return UpdateDeletePage ( - PrivateData, + PrivateData, VariableName, VendorGuid, LabelNumber, @@ -2150,40 +2832,342 @@ ON_EXIT: ); } +/** + Perform secure boot mode transition from User Mode by setting AuditMode + or DeployedMode variable. + + @param[in] NewMode New secure boot mode. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Secure Boot mode transition is successful. +**/ +EFI_STATUS +TransitionFromUserMode( + IN UINT8 NewMode + ) +{ + UINT8 Data; + EFI_STATUS Status; + + if (NewMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_AUDIT_MODE) { + Data = 1; + Status = gRT->SetVariable( + EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, + sizeof(UINT8), + &Data + ); + return Status; + } else if (NewMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DEPLOYED_MODE) { + Data = 1; + Status = gRT->SetVariable( + EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, + sizeof(UINT8), + &Data + ); + return Status; + } + + // + // Other case do nothing here. May Goto enroll PK page. + // + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + Perform secure boot mode transition from Setup Mode by setting AuditMode + variable. + + @param[in] NewMode New secure boot mode. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Secure Boot mode transition is successful. +**/ +EFI_STATUS +TransitionFromSetupMode( + IN UINT8 NewMode + ) +{ + UINT8 Data; + EFI_STATUS Status; + + Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + + if (NewMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_AUDIT_MODE) { + Data = 1; + Status = gRT->SetVariable( + EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, + sizeof(UINT8), + &Data + ); + return Status; + } + + // + // Other case do nothing here. May Goto enroll PK page. + // + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + Perform secure boot mode transition from Audit Mode. Nothing is done here, + should goto enroll PK page. + + @param[in] NewMode New secure boot mode. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Secure Boot mode transition is successful. +**/ +EFI_STATUS +TransitionFromAuditMode( + IN UINT8 NewMode + ) +{ + // + // Other case do nothing here. Should Goto enroll PK page. + // + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + Perform secure boot mode transition from Deployed Mode by setting Deployed Mode + variable to 0. + + @param[in] NewMode New secure boot mode. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Secure Boot mode transition is successful. +**/ +EFI_STATUS +TransitionFromDeployedMode( + IN UINT8 NewMode + ) +{ + UINT8 Data; + EFI_STATUS Status; + + // + // Platform specific logic. when physical presence, Allow to set DeployedMode =:0 + // to switch back to UserMode + // + if (NewMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_USER_MODE) { + Data = 0; + Status = gRT->SetVariable( + EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME, + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, + sizeof(UINT8), + &Data + ); + DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "DeployedMode Status %x\n", Status)); + return Status; + } + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + Perform main secure boot mode transition. + + @param[in] CurMode New secure boot mode. + @param[in] NewMode New secure boot mode. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Secure Boot mode transition is successful. +**/ +EFI_STATUS +SecureBootModeTransition( + IN UINT8 CurMode, + IN UINT8 NewMode + ) +{ + EFI_STATUS Status; + + // + // Set platform to be customized mode to ensure platform specific mode switch sucess + // + Status = SetSecureBootMode(CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + return Status; + } + + // + // SecureBootMode transition + // + switch (CurMode) { + case SECURE_BOOT_MODE_USER_MODE: + Status = TransitionFromUserMode(NewMode); + break; + + case SECURE_BOOT_MODE_SETUP_MODE: + Status = TransitionFromSetupMode(NewMode); + break; + + case SECURE_BOOT_MODE_AUDIT_MODE: + Status = TransitionFromAuditMode(NewMode); + break; + + case SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DEPLOYED_MODE: + Status = TransitionFromDeployedMode(NewMode); + break; + + default: + Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + ASSERT(FALSE); + } + + return Status; +} + +/** + Get current secure boot mode by retrieve data from SetupMode/AuditMode/DeployedMode. + + @param[out] SecureBootMode Current secure boot mode. + +**/ +VOID +ExtractSecureBootModeFromVariable( + OUT UINT8 *SecureBootMode + ) +{ + UINT8 *SetupMode; + UINT8 *AuditMode; + UINT8 *DeployedMode; + + SetupMode = NULL; + AuditMode = NULL; + DeployedMode = NULL; + + // + // Get AuditMode/DeployedMode from variable + // + GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL); + GetVariable2 (EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&AuditMode, NULL); + GetVariable2 (EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&DeployedMode, NULL); + if (SetupMode != NULL && AuditMode != NULL && DeployedMode != NULL) { + if (*SetupMode == 0 && *AuditMode == 0 && *DeployedMode == 0) { + // + // User Mode + // + *SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_USER_MODE; + } else if (*SetupMode == 1 && *AuditMode == 0 && *DeployedMode == 0) { + // + // Setup Mode + // + *SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_SETUP_MODE; + } else if (*SetupMode == 1 && *AuditMode == 1 && *DeployedMode == 0) { + // + // Audit Mode + // + *SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_AUDIT_MODE; + } else if (*SetupMode == 0 && *AuditMode == 0 && *DeployedMode == 1) { + // + // Deployed Mode + // + *SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DEPLOYED_MODE; + } else { + ASSERT(FALSE); + } + }else { + ASSERT(FALSE); + } + + if (SetupMode != NULL) { + FreePool (SetupMode); + } + if (DeployedMode != NULL) { + FreePool (DeployedMode); + } + if (AuditMode != NULL) { + FreePool (AuditMode); + } +} + +/** + + Update SecureBoot strings based on new Secure Boot Mode State. String includes STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT + and STR_CUR_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_CONTENT. + + @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data. + + @return EFI_SUCCESS Update secure boot strings successfully. + @return other Fail to update secure boot strings. + +**/ +EFI_STATUS +UpdateSecureBootString( + IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private + ) +{ + UINT8 CurSecureBootMode; + UINT8 *SecureBoot; + + SecureBoot = NULL; + + // + // Get current secure boot state. + // + GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL); + if (SecureBoot == NULL) { + return EFI_NOT_FOUND; + } + + if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) { + HiiSetString (Private->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Enabled", NULL); + } else { + HiiSetString (Private->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Disabled", NULL); + } + // + // Get current secure boot mode. + // + ExtractSecureBootModeFromVariable(&CurSecureBootMode); + + if (CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_USER_MODE) { + HiiSetString (Private->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_CUR_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_CONTENT), L"UserMode", NULL); + } else if (CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_SETUP_MODE) { + HiiSetString (Private->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_CUR_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_CONTENT), L"SetupMode", NULL); + } else if (CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_AUDIT_MODE) { + HiiSetString (Private->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_CUR_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_CONTENT), L"AuditMode", NULL); + } else if (CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DEPLOYED_MODE) { + HiiSetString (Private->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_CUR_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_CONTENT), L"DeployedMode", NULL); + } + + FreePool(SecureBoot); + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + /** This function extracts configuration from variable. - + @param[in, out] ConfigData Point to SecureBoot configuration private data. **/ VOID SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable ( IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *ConfigData - ) + ) { - UINT8 *SecureBootEnable; - UINT8 *SetupMode; - UINT8 *SecureBootMode; + UINT8 *SecureBootEnable; + UINT8 *SecureBootMode; + EFI_TIME CurrTime; SecureBootEnable = NULL; - SetupMode = NULL; SecureBootMode = NULL; - + // - // If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable - // Checkbox. + // Initilize the Date and Time using system time. // - ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = FALSE; - GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL); - if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) { - ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE; - } else { - ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE; - if ((*SecureBootEnable) == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) { - ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = TRUE; - } - } - + ConfigData->CertificateFormat = HASHALG_RAW; + ConfigData->AlwaysRevocation = TRUE; + gRT->GetTime (&CurrTime, NULL); + ConfigData->RevocationDate.Year = CurrTime.Year; + ConfigData->RevocationDate.Month = CurrTime.Month; + ConfigData->RevocationDate.Day = CurrTime.Day; + ConfigData->RevocationTime.Hour = CurrTime.Hour; + ConfigData->RevocationTime.Minute = CurrTime.Minute; + ConfigData->RevocationTime.Second = 0; + + // // If it is Physical Presence User, set the PhysicalPresent to true. // @@ -2192,33 +3176,55 @@ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable ( } else { ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = FALSE; } - + + // + // Get the SecureBootMode from CustomMode variable. + // + GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL); + if (SecureBootMode == NULL) { + ConfigData->SecureBootMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE; + } else { + ConfigData->SecureBootMode = *(SecureBootMode); + } + + // + // Extact current Secure Boot Mode + // + ExtractSecureBootModeFromVariable(&ConfigData->CurSecureBootMode); + // // If there is no PK then the Delete Pk button will be gray. // - GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL); - if (SetupMode == NULL || (*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE) { + if (ConfigData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_SETUP_MODE || ConfigData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_AUDIT_MODE) { ConfigData->HasPk = FALSE; } else { ConfigData->HasPk = TRUE; } // - // Get the SecureBootMode from CustomMode variable. + // Check SecureBootEnable & Pk status, fix the inconsistence. + // If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable + // Checkbox. // - GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL); - if (SecureBootMode == NULL) { - ConfigData->SecureBootMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE; + ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = FALSE; + GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL); + + // + // Fix Pk, SecureBootEnable inconsistence + // + if (ConfigData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_USER_MODE || ConfigData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DEPLOYED_MODE) { + ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE; + if ((SecureBootEnable != NULL) && (*SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE)) { + ConfigData->AttemptSecureBoot = TRUE; + } } else { - ConfigData->SecureBootMode = *(SecureBootMode); + ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE; } if (SecureBootEnable != NULL) { FreePool (SecureBootEnable); } - if (SetupMode != NULL) { - FreePool (SetupMode); - } + if (SecureBootMode != NULL) { FreePool (SecureBootMode); } @@ -2267,22 +3273,20 @@ SecureBootExtractConfig ( EFI_STRING ConfigRequestHdr; SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData; BOOLEAN AllocatedRequest; - UINT8 *SecureBoot; if (Progress == NULL || Results == NULL) { return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; } - + AllocatedRequest = FALSE; ConfigRequestHdr = NULL; ConfigRequest = NULL; Size = 0; - SecureBoot = NULL; - + ZeroMem (&Configuration, sizeof (Configuration)); PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This); *Progress = Request; - + if ((Request != NULL) && !HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Request, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) { return EFI_NOT_FOUND; } @@ -2292,19 +3296,6 @@ SecureBootExtractConfig ( // SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (&Configuration); - // - // Update current secure boot state. - // - GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL); - if (SecureBoot != NULL && *SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) { - HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Enabled", NULL); - } else { - HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT), L"Disabled", NULL); - } - if (SecureBoot != NULL) { - FreePool (SecureBoot); - } - BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION); ConfigRequest = Request; if ((Request == NULL) || (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL)) { @@ -2378,11 +3369,10 @@ SecureBootRouteConfig ( OUT EFI_STRING *Progress ) { - UINT8 *SecureBootEnable; SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION IfrNvData; UINTN BufferSize; EFI_STATUS Status; - + if (Configuration == NULL || Progress == NULL) { return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; } @@ -2392,6 +3382,14 @@ SecureBootRouteConfig ( return EFI_NOT_FOUND; } + // + // Get Configuration from Variable. + // + SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (&IfrNvData); + + // + // Map the Configuration to the configuration block. + // BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION); Status = gHiiConfigRouting->ConfigToBlock ( gHiiConfigRouting, @@ -2407,10 +3405,7 @@ SecureBootRouteConfig ( // // Store Buffer Storage back to EFI variable if needed // - SecureBootEnable = NULL; - GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL); - if (NULL != SecureBootEnable) { - FreePool (SecureBootEnable); + if (!IfrNvData.HideSecureBoot) { Status = SaveSecureBootVariable (IfrNvData.AttemptSecureBoot); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { return Status; @@ -2455,33 +3450,30 @@ SecureBootCallback ( ) { EFI_INPUT_KEY Key; - EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_STATUS Status; SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private; UINTN BufferSize; SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *IfrNvData; UINT16 LabelId; UINT8 *SecureBootEnable; + UINT8 *Pk; UINT8 *SecureBootMode; - UINT8 *SetupMode; CHAR16 PromptString[100]; + UINT8 CurSecureBootMode; + EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File; + Status = EFI_SUCCESS; SecureBootEnable = NULL; SecureBootMode = NULL; - SetupMode = NULL; + File = NULL; if ((This == NULL) || (Value == NULL) || (ActionRequest == NULL)) { return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; } - - if ((Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) && - (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) && - (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_CLOSE) && - (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_DEFAULT_STANDARD)) { - return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; - } - Private = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This); + gSecureBootPrivateData = Private; + // // Retrieve uncommitted data from Browser // @@ -2491,10 +3483,51 @@ SecureBootCallback ( return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; } - Status = EFI_SUCCESS; + HiiGetBrowserData (&gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName, BufferSize, (UINT8 *) IfrNvData); + + if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_OPEN) { + if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) { + // + // Update secure boot strings when opening this form + // + Status = UpdateSecureBootString(Private); + SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (IfrNvData); + mIsEnterSecureBootForm = TRUE; + } else if (QuestionId == KEY_TRANS_SECURE_BOOT_MODE){ + // + // Secure Boot Policy variable changes after transition. Re-sync CurSecureBootMode + // + ExtractSecureBootModeFromVariable(&IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode); + mIsSelectedSecureBootModeForm = TRUE; + mIsSecureBootModeChanged = FALSE; + } + goto EXIT; + } + + if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_RETRIEVE) { + Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) { + if (mIsEnterSecureBootForm) { + Value->u8 = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_STANDARD; + Status = EFI_SUCCESS; + } + } else if (QuestionId == KEY_TRANS_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) { + if (mIsSelectedSecureBootModeForm) { + Value->u8 = IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode; + Status = EFI_SUCCESS; + } + } + goto EXIT; + } + + if ((Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) && + (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) && + (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_CLOSE) && + (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_DEFAULT_STANDARD)) { + Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + goto EXIT; + } - HiiGetBrowserData (NULL, NULL, BufferSize, (UINT8 *) IfrNvData); - if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) { switch (QuestionId) { @@ -2521,14 +3554,10 @@ SecureBootCallback ( } break; - case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION: - FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu); - FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu); - break; - case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION: case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION: case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION: + case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION: // // Clear Signature GUID. // @@ -2544,6 +3573,8 @@ SecureBootCallback ( LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB; } else if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION) { LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX; + } else if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION) { + LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBT; } else { LabelId = FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM; } @@ -2551,29 +3582,37 @@ SecureBootCallback ( // // Refresh selected file. // - CleanUpPage (LabelId, Private); + CleanUpPage (LabelId, Private); break; - - case SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID: + case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION: + LabelId = FORMID_ENROLL_PK_FORM; + // + // Refresh selected file. + // + CleanUpPage (LabelId, Private); + break; + + case FORMID_ENROLL_PK_FORM: + ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdatePKFromFile, &File); + break; + case FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM: + ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdateKEKFromFile, &File); + break; + case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB: + ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdateDBFromFile, &File); + break; + case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX: - if (QuestionId == SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID) { - Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollPkFile; - } else if (QuestionId == FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM) { - Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollKekFile; - } else if (QuestionId == SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB) { - Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDb; - } else { - Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbx; - } + ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdateDBXFromFile, &File); + break; - Private->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayUnknown; - CleanUpPage (FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID, Private); - UpdateFileExplorer (Private, 0); + case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBT: + ChooseFile (NULL, NULL, UpdateDBTFromFile, &File); break; - case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK: + case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK: if (Value->u8) { CreatePopUp ( EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, @@ -2598,16 +3637,16 @@ SecureBootCallback ( case KEY_DELETE_KEK: UpdateDeletePage ( - Private, + Private, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, LABEL_KEK_DELETE, FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM, - OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID ); break; - case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB: + case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB: UpdateDeletePage ( Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, @@ -2630,6 +3669,18 @@ SecureBootCallback ( break; + case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBT: + UpdateDeletePage ( + Private, + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, + LABEL_DBT_DELETE, + SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBT, + OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID + ); + + break; + case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK: Status = EnrollKeyExchangeKey (Private); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { @@ -2657,7 +3708,27 @@ SecureBootCallback ( break; case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX: - Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1); + if (IsX509CertInDbx (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1)) { + CreatePopUp ( + EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, + &Key, + L"Enrollment failed! Same certificate had already been in the dbx!", + NULL + ); + break; + } + + if ((IfrNvData != NULL) && (IfrNvData->CertificateFormat < HASHALG_MAX)) { + Status = EnrollX509HashtoSigDB ( + Private, + IfrNvData->CertificateFormat, + &IfrNvData->RevocationDate, + &IfrNvData->RevocationTime, + IfrNvData->AlwaysRevocation + ); + } else { + Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1); + } if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { CreatePopUp ( EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, @@ -2669,10 +3740,89 @@ SecureBootCallback ( } break; + case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBT: + Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + CreatePopUp ( + EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, + &Key, + L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!", + L"Only supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.", + NULL + ); + } + break; + case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK: + Status = EnrollPlatformKey (Private); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + UnicodeSPrint ( + PromptString, + sizeof (PromptString), + L"Only DER encoded certificate file (%s) is supported.", + mSupportX509Suffix + ); + CreatePopUp ( + EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, + &Key, + L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!", + PromptString, + NULL + ); + } + break; + case KEY_TRANS_SECURE_BOOT_MODE: + // + // Pop up to alert user want to change secure boot mode + // + if ((IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_USER_MODE && + (Value->u8 == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_AUDIT_MODE || Value->u8 == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DEPLOYED_MODE)) + ||(IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_SETUP_MODE && + Value->u8 == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_AUDIT_MODE) + ||(IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DEPLOYED_MODE && + Value->u8 == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_USER_MODE && IfrNvData->PhysicalPresent == 1)){ + CreatePopUp ( + EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, + &Key, + L"Are you sure you want to switch secure boot mode?", + L"Press 'Y' to switch secure boot mode, 'N' to discard change and return", + NULL + ); + if (Key.UnicodeChar != 'y' && Key.UnicodeChar != 'Y') { + // + // If not 'Y'/''y' restore to defualt secure boot mode + // + Value->u8 = IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode; + goto EXIT; + } + } else if ((IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_SETUP_MODE && Value->u8 == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_USER_MODE) + ||(IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_USER_MODE && Value->u8 == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_SETUP_MODE) + ||(IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_AUDIT_MODE && Value->u8 == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DEPLOYED_MODE) + ||(IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DEPLOYED_MODE && Value->u8 == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_SETUP_MODE)) { + CreatePopUp ( + EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, + &Key, + L"Secure boot mode transition requires PK change", + L"Please go to link below to update PK", + NULL + ); + } else { + Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto EXIT; + } + + Status = SecureBootModeTransition(IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode, Value->u8); + // + // Secure Boot Policy variable may change after transition. Re-sync CurSecureBootMode + // + ExtractSecureBootModeFromVariable(&CurSecureBootMode); + if (IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode != CurSecureBootMode) { + IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode = CurSecureBootMode; + mIsSecureBootModeChanged = TRUE; + } + break; + default: - if (QuestionId >= FILE_OPTION_OFFSET) { - UpdateFileExplorer (Private, QuestionId); - } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID) && + if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID) && (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) { DeleteKeyExchangeKey (Private, QuestionId); } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID) && @@ -2681,7 +3831,7 @@ SecureBootCallback ( Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, - LABEL_DB_DELETE, + LABEL_DB_DELETE, SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB, OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID, QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID @@ -2692,76 +3842,64 @@ SecureBootCallback ( Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, - LABEL_DBX_DELETE, + LABEL_DBX_DELETE, SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX, OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID, QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID ); - } - break; - } - } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) { - switch (QuestionId) { - case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE: - *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY; - break; - case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK: - Status = EnrollPlatformKey (Private); - if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { - UnicodeSPrint ( - PromptString, - sizeof (PromptString), - L"Only DER encoded certificate file (%s) is supported.", - mSupportX509Suffix - ); - CreatePopUp ( - EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, - &Key, - L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!", - PromptString, - NULL + } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID) && + (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) { + DeleteSignature ( + Private, + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2, + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, + LABEL_DBT_DELETE, + SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBT, + OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID, + QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DBT_QUESTION_ID ); - } else { - *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_RESET; - } + } break; case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK: case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK: case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB: case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX: + case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBT: if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) { CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle); Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL; - Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL; + if (Private->FileContext->FileName!= NULL){ + FreePool(Private->FileContext->FileName); + Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL; + } } - + if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) { FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID); Private->SignatureGUID = NULL; } - *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_EXIT; break; - + } + } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) { + switch (QuestionId) { + case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE: + *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY; + break; case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE: - GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL); - if (NULL != SecureBootMode) { - Status = gRT->SetVariable ( - EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, - &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, - EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS, - sizeof (UINT8), - &Value->u8 - ); - *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY; - IfrNvData->SecureBootMode = Value->u8; - FreePool (SecureBootMode); - } + mIsEnterSecureBootForm = FALSE; + break; + case KEY_TRANS_SECURE_BOOT_MODE: + mIsSelectedSecureBootModeForm = FALSE; + if (mIsSecureBootModeChanged) { + *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_RESET; + } + mIsSecureBootModeChanged = FALSE; break; - case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_GUID: case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DB: case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBX: + case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBT: ASSERT (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL); Status = StringToGuid ( IfrNvData->SignatureGuid, @@ -2776,8 +3914,7 @@ SecureBootCallback ( break; case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK: - GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL); - if (SetupMode == NULL || (*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE) { + if (IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_USER_MODE || IfrNvData->CurSecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DEPLOYED_MODE) { IfrNvData->DeletePk = TRUE; IfrNvData->HasPk = FALSE; *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT; @@ -2786,18 +3923,17 @@ SecureBootCallback ( IfrNvData->HasPk = TRUE; *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY; } - if (SetupMode != NULL) { - FreePool (SetupMode); - } - break; + break; + default: + break; } } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_DEFAULT_STANDARD) { if (QuestionId == KEY_HIDE_SECURE_BOOT) { - GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL); - if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) { + GetVariable2 (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&Pk, NULL); + if (Pk == NULL) { IfrNvData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE; } else { - FreePool (SecureBootEnable); + FreePool (Pk); IfrNvData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE; } Value->b = IfrNvData->HideSecureBoot; @@ -2815,13 +3951,21 @@ SecureBootCallback ( FreePool (SecureBootMode); } } - + +EXIT: + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION); - HiiSetBrowserData (NULL, NULL, BufferSize, (UINT8*) IfrNvData, NULL); + HiiSetBrowserData (&gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName, BufferSize, (UINT8*) IfrNvData, NULL); } + FreePool (IfrNvData); - + + if (File != NULL){ + FreePool(File); + File = NULL; + } + return EFI_SUCCESS; } @@ -2886,18 +4030,11 @@ InstallSecureBootConfigForm ( PrivateData->HiiHandle = HiiHandle; PrivateData->FileContext = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT)); - PrivateData->MenuEntry = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY)); - - if (PrivateData->FileContext == NULL || PrivateData->MenuEntry == NULL) { + + if (PrivateData->FileContext == NULL) { UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData); return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; } - - PrivateData->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateInActive; - PrivateData->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayUnknown; - - InitializeListHead (&FsOptionMenu.Head); - InitializeListHead (&DirectoryMenu.Head); // // Init OpCode Handle and Allocate space for creation of Buffer @@ -2936,7 +4073,7 @@ InstallSecureBootConfigForm ( ); mEndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL; mEndLabel->Number = LABEL_END; - + return EFI_SUCCESS; } @@ -2978,19 +4115,12 @@ UninstallSecureBootConfigForm ( FreePool (PrivateData->SignatureGUID); } - if (PrivateData->MenuEntry != NULL) { - FreePool (PrivateData->MenuEntry); - } - if (PrivateData->FileContext != NULL) { FreePool (PrivateData->FileContext); } FreePool (PrivateData); - FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu); - FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu); - if (mStartOpCodeHandle != NULL) { HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mStartOpCodeHandle); }