{EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }\r
};\r
\r
+//\r
+// Secure Boot Mode state machine\r
+//\r
+SECURE_BOOT_MODE mSecureBootState[SecureBootModeTypeMax] = {\r
+ // USER MODE\r
+ {\r
+ AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode\r
+ FALSE, // IsAuditModeRO, AuditMode is RW\r
+ DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode\r
+ FALSE, // IsDeployedModeRO, DeployedMode is RW\r
+ SETUP_MODE_DISABLE, // SetupMode\r
+ // SetupMode is always RO\r
+ SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE // SecureBoot\r
+ },\r
+ // SETUP MODE\r
+ {\r
+ AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode\r
+ FALSE, // IsAuditModeRO, AuditMode is RW\r
+ DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode\r
+ TRUE, // IsDeployedModeRO, DeployedMode is RO\r
+ SETUP_MODE_ENABLE, // SetupMode\r
+ // SetupMode is always RO\r
+ SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE // SecureBoot\r
+ },\r
+ // AUDIT MODE\r
+ {\r
+ AUDIT_MODE_ENABLE, // AuditMode\r
+ TRUE, // AuditModeValAttr RO, AuditMode is RO\r
+ DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode\r
+ TRUE, // DeployedModeValAttr RO, DeployedMode is RO\r
+ SETUP_MODE_ENABLE, // SetupMode\r
+ // SetupMode is always RO\r
+ SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE // SecureBoot\r
+ },\r
+ // DEPLOYED MODE\r
+ {\r
+ AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode, AuditMode is RO\r
+ TRUE, // AuditModeValAttr RO\r
+ DEPLOYED_MODE_ENABLE, // DeployedMode\r
+ TRUE, // DeployedModeValAttr RO, DeployedMode is RO\r
+ SETUP_MODE_DISABLE, // SetupMode\r
+ // SetupMode is always RO\r
+ SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE // SecureBoot\r
+ }\r
+};\r
+\r
+SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE mSecureBootMode;\r
+\r
/**\r
Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.\r
\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
- Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
+ Update the variable region with Variable information.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
+ @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
+ @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
+ @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
+ @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
+ @param[in] TimeStamp Value of associated TimeStamp.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
+ @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
+ IN VOID *Data,\r
+ IN UINTN DataSize,\r
+ IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
+ IN EFI_TIME *TimeStamp\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r
+ VOID *OrgData;\r
+ UINTN OrgDataSize;\r
+ AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
+\r
+ FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ VendorGuid,\r
+ &OrgData,\r
+ &OrgDataSize\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable\r
+ //\r
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != 0)) {\r
+ if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
+ ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
+ (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||\r
+ (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {\r
+ //\r
+ // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall not perform an append of\r
+ // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing variable value.\r
+ //\r
+ FilterSignatureList (\r
+ OrgData,\r
+ OrgDataSize,\r
+ Data,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
+ AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;\r
+ return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
+ &AuthVariableInfo\r
+ );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Initialize Secure Boot variables.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+InitSecureBootVariables (\r
+ VOID\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT8 *Data;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ UINT32 SecureBoot;\r
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
+ SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE SecureBootMode;\r
+ BOOLEAN IsPkPresent;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Find "PK" variable\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ IsPkPresent = FALSE;\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
+ } else {\r
+ IsPkPresent = TRUE;\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Init "SecureBootMode" variable.\r
+ // Initial case\r
+ // SecureBootMode doesn't exist. Init it with PK state\r
+ // 3 inconsistency cases need to sync\r
+ // 1.1 Add PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var\r
+ // 1.2 Delete PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var\r
+ // 1.3 Set AuditMode ->Delete PK -> system break -> Update SecureBootMode Var\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid, (VOID **)&Data, &DataSize);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Variable driver Initial Case\r
+ //\r
+ if (IsPkPresent) {\r
+ SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeUserMode;\r
+ } else {\r
+ SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode;\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // 3 inconsistency cases need to sync\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootMode = (SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE)*Data;\r
+ ASSERT(SecureBootMode < SecureBootModeTypeMax);\r
+\r
+ if (IsPkPresent) {\r
+ //\r
+ // 3.1 Add PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var\r
+ //\r
+ if (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) {\r
+ SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeUserMode;\r
+ } else if (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {\r
+ SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode;\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // 3.2 Delete PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var\r
+ // 3.3 Set AuditMode ->Delete PK -> system break -> Update SecureBootMode Var. Reinit to be SetupMode\r
+ //\r
+ if ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {\r
+ SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || (SecureBootMode != (SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE)*Data)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Update SecureBootMode Var\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootMode,\r
+ sizeof (UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Init "AuditMode"\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].AuditMode,\r
+ sizeof(UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Init "DeployedMode"\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].DeployedMode,\r
+ sizeof(UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Init "SetupMode"\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].SetupMode,\r
+ sizeof(UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.\r
+ // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in User Mode or Deployed Mode, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.\r
+ // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID **)&Data, &DataSize);\r
+ if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ if (!IsPkPresent) {\r
+ //\r
+ // PK is cleared in runtime. "SecureBootMode" is not updated before reboot\r
+ // Delete "SecureBootMode"\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootEnable,\r
+ 0,\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+ } else {\r
+ SecureBootEnable = *Data;\r
+ }\r
+ } else if ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in User Mode or Deployed Mode.\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootEnable,\r
+ sizeof (UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.\r
+ //\r
+ if ((SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) \r
+ && ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode))) {\r
+ SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
+ } else {\r
+ SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
+ }\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBoot,\r
+ sizeof (UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootMode is %x\n", SecureBootMode));\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBoot));\r
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Save SecureBootMode in global space\r
+ //\r
+ mSecureBootMode = SecureBootMode;\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Update SecureBootMode variable.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+UpdateSecureBootMode(\r
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Update "SecureBootMode" variable to new Secure Boot Mode\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid,\r
+ &NewMode,\r
+ sizeof (UINT8),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootMode Update to %x\n", NewMode));\r
+ mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
+ } else {\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootMode Update failure %x\n", Status));\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Current secure boot mode is AuditMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition\r
+ to a new mode.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+TransitionFromAuditMode(\r
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT8 *AuditVarData;\r
+ UINT8 *DeployedVarData;\r
+ UINT8 *SetupVarData;\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBootVarData;\r
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
+ // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &AuditVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &DeployedVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &SetupVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC\r
+ // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.\r
+ // other tranisition logic are all memory operations.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (NewMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Since PK is enrolled, can't rollback, always update SecureBootMode in memory\r
+ //\r
+ mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // AuditMode ----> DeployedMode\r
+ // Side Effects\r
+ // AuditMode =: 0 / DeployedMode := 1 / SetupMode := 0\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of DeployedMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+\r
+ if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
+ //\r
+ // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
+ // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
+ // Variable in runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
+ AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootEnable,\r
+ sizeof (SecureBootEnable),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+ } else {\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode, NewMode));\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Current secure boot mode is DeployedMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition\r
+ to a new mode.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+TransitionFromDeployedMode(\r
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT8 *DeployedVarData;\r
+ UINT8 *SetupVarData;\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBootVarData;\r
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
+ // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &DeployedVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &SetupVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC\r
+ // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.\r
+ // other tranisition logic are all memory operations.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ switch(NewMode) {\r
+ case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:\r
+ //\r
+ // DeployedMode ----> UserMode\r
+ // Side Effects\r
+ // DeployedMode := 0\r
+ //\r
+ // Platform Specific DeployedMode clear. UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition\r
+ //\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+ CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:\r
+ //\r
+ // Since PK is processed before, can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory\r
+ //\r
+ mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // DeployedMode ----> SetupMode\r
+ //\r
+ // Platform Specific PKpub clear or Delete Pkpub\r
+ // Side Effects\r
+ // DeployedMode := 0 / SetupMode := 1 / SecureBoot := 0\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of DeployedMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+\r
+ if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
+ //\r
+ // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
+ // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
+ // Variable in runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is Disabled.\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
+ AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootEnable,\r
+ 0,\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ default:\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode, NewMode));\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Current secure boot mode is UserMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition\r
+ to a new mode.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+TransitionFromUserMode(\r
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT8 *AuditVarData;\r
+ UINT8 *DeployedVarData;\r
+ UINT8 *SetupVarData;\r
+ UINT8 *PkVarData;\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBootVarData;\r
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+ VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableEntry;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
+ // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &AuditVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &DeployedVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &SetupVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC\r
+ // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow. \r
+ // Other tranisition logic are all memory operations and PK delete is assumed to be always successful.\r
+ //\r
+ if (NewMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {\r
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // UserMode -----> AuditMode. Check RemainingSpace for SecureBootMode var first.\r
+ // Will update SecureBootMode after DeletePK logic\r
+ //\r
+ VariableEntry.VariableSize = sizeof(UINT8);\r
+ VariableEntry.Guid = &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid;\r
+ VariableEntry.Name = EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME;\r
+ if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry, NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ switch(NewMode) {\r
+ case SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode:\r
+ //\r
+ // UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition\r
+ //\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // UserMode ----> DeployedMode\r
+ // Side Effects\r
+ // DeployedMode := 1\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:\r
+ //\r
+ // UserMode ----> AuditMode\r
+ // Side Effects\r
+ // Delete PKpub / SetupMode := 1 / SecureBoot := 0\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete PKpub without verification. Should always succeed.\r
+ //\r
+ PkVarData = NULL;\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ PkVarData,\r
+ 0,\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "UserMode -> AuditMode. Delete PK fail %x\n", Status));\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable\r
+ //\r
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Since PK is deleted successfully, Doesn't break, continue to update other variable.\r
+ //\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
+ }\r
+ CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Fall into SetupMode logic\r
+ //\r
+ case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:\r
+ //\r
+ // Since PK is deleted before , can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory\r
+ //\r
+ mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // UserMode ----> SetupMode\r
+ // Side Effects\r
+ // DeployedMode :=0 / SetupMode :=1 / SecureBoot :=0\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+\r
+ if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
+ //\r
+ // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
+ // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
+ // Variable in runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is Disabled.\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
+ AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootEnable,\r
+ 0,\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ default:\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeUserMode, NewMode));\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ Current secure boot mode is SetupMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition\r
+ to a new mode.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+TransitionFromSetupMode(\r
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT8 *AuditVarData;\r
+ UINT8 *SetupVarData;\r
+ UINT8 *SecureBootVarData;\r
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
+ UINTN DataSize;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
+ // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &AuditVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &SetupVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootVarData,\r
+ &DataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC\r
+ // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.\r
+ // Other tranisition logic are all memory operations and PK delete is assumed to be always successful.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ switch(NewMode) {\r
+ case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:\r
+ //\r
+ // UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition\r
+ //\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // SetupMode ----> AuditMode\r
+ // Side Effects\r
+ // AuditMode := 1\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:\r
+ //\r
+ // Since PK is enrolled before, can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory\r
+ //\r
+ mSecureBootMode = NewMode;\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // SetupMode ----> UserMode\r
+ // Side Effects\r
+ // SetupMode := 0 / SecureBoot := 1\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+\r
+ if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
+ //\r
+ // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
+ // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
+ // Variable in runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ return Status;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
+ //\r
+ CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
+ //\r
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
+ AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
+ &SecureBootEnable,\r
+ sizeof (SecureBootEnable),\r
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
+ );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ default:\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode, NewMode));\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
+/**\r
+ This function performs main secure boot mode transition logic.\r
\r
- @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.\r
- @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.\r
- @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
- @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.\r
- @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.\r
- @param[in] TimeStamp Value of associated TimeStamp.\r
+ @param[in] CurMode Current Secure Boot Mode.\r
+ @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.\r
\r
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.\r
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
- @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.\r
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.\r
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The Current Secure Boot Mode is wrong.\r
\r
**/\r
EFI_STATUS\r
-AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
- IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
- IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
- IN VOID *Data,\r
- IN UINTN DataSize,\r
- IN UINT32 Attributes,\r
- IN EFI_TIME *TimeStamp\r
+SecureBootModeTransition(\r
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE CurMode,\r
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode\r
)\r
{\r
- EFI_STATUS FindStatus;\r
- VOID *OrgData;\r
- UINTN OrgDataSize;\r
- AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;\r
-\r
- FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- VariableName,\r
- VendorGuid,\r
- &OrgData,\r
- &OrgDataSize\r
- );\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
\r
//\r
- // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable\r
+ // SecureBootMode transition\r
//\r
- if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != 0)) {\r
- if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&\r
- ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||\r
- (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||\r
- (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {\r
- //\r
- // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall not perform an append of\r
- // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing variable value.\r
- //\r
- FilterSignatureList (\r
- OrgData,\r
- OrgDataSize,\r
- Data,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- }\r
+ switch (CurMode) {\r
+ case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:\r
+ Status = TransitionFromUserMode(NewMode);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:\r
+ Status = TransitionFromSetupMode(NewMode);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:\r
+ Status = TransitionFromAuditMode(NewMode);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode:\r
+ Status = TransitionFromDeployedMode(NewMode);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ default:\r
+ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
}\r
\r
- ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));\r
- AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;\r
- AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;\r
- AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;\r
- AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;\r
- AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;\r
- AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;\r
- return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (\r
- &AuthVariableInfo\r
- );\r
+ return Status;\r
+\r
}\r
\r
/**\r
}\r
}\r
\r
-/**\r
- Update platform mode.\r
-\r
- @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.\r
-\r
- @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.\r
- @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.\r
-\r
-**/\r
-EFI_STATUS\r
-UpdatePlatformMode (\r
- IN UINT32 Mode\r
- )\r
-{\r
- EFI_STATUS Status;\r
- VOID *Data;\r
- UINTN DataSize;\r
- UINT8 SecureBootMode;\r
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;\r
- UINTN VariableDataSize;\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &Data,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible\r
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.\r
- //\r
- mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;\r
- CopyMem (Data, &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));\r
-\r
- if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {\r
- //\r
- // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating\r
- // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot\r
- // Variable in runtime.\r
- //\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.\r
- // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,\r
- // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &Data,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
- //\r
- // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.\r
- // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.\r
- // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.\r
- //\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
- } else {\r
- if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
- SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;\r
- } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {\r
- SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;\r
- } else {\r
- return EFI_NOT_FOUND;\r
- }\r
- }\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
- &SecureBootMode,\r
- sizeof(UINT8),\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
- );\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- return Status;\r
- }\r
-\r
- //\r
- // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.\r
- //\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
- &Data,\r
- &DataSize\r
- );\r
-\r
- if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
- //\r
- // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.\r
- //\r
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;\r
- VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);\r
- } else {\r
- //\r
- // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"\r
- // variable is not in secure boot state.\r
- //\r
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
- return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
- }\r
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;\r
- VariableDataSize = 0;\r
- }\r
-\r
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (\r
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,\r
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,\r
- &SecureBootEnable,\r
- VariableDataSize,\r
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS\r
- );\r
- return Status;\r
-}\r
\r
/**\r
Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.\r
);\r
}\r
\r
+/**\r
+ Process Secure Boot Mode variable.\r
+\r
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
+ This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.\r
+ This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.\r
+ This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like\r
+ buffer overflow, integer overflow.\r
+ This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.\r
+ @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.\r
+ @param[in] Data Data pointer.\r
+ @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less than the\r
+ data, this value contains the required size.\r
+ @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable\r
+\r
+ @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter\r
+ @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation\r
+ check carried out by the firmware.\r
+ @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is Read-Only.\r
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation successfully.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+ProcessSecureBootModeVar (\r
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,\r
+ IN VOID *Data,\r
+ IN UINTN DataSize,\r
+ IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT8 *VarData;\r
+ UINTN VarDataSize;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check "AuditMode", "DeployedMode" Variable ReadWrite Attributes\r
+ // if in Runtime, Always RO\r
+ // if in Boottime, Depends on current Secure Boot Mode\r
+ //\r
+ if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime()) {\r
+ return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete not OK\r
+ //\r
+ if ((DataSize != sizeof(UINT8)) || (Attributes == 0)) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0) {\r
+ if(mSecureBootState[mSecureBootMode].IsAuditModeRO) {\r
+ return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Platform specific deployedMode clear. Set DeployedMode = RW\r
+ //\r
+ if (!InCustomMode() || !UserPhysicalPresent() || mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {\r
+ if(mSecureBootState[mSecureBootMode].IsDeployedModeRO) {\r
+ return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (*(UINT8 *)Data != 0 && *(UINT8 *)Data != 1) {\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver\r
+ // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (\r
+ VariableName,\r
+ VendorGuid,\r
+ &VarData,\r
+ &VarDataSize\r
+ );\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ ASSERT(FALSE);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // If AuditMode/DeployedMode is assigned same value. Simply return EFI_SUCCESS\r
+ //\r
+ if (*VarData == *(UINT8 *)Data) {\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Perform SecureBootMode transition\r
+ //\r
+ if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0) {\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode));\r
+ return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode);\r
+ } else if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME) == 0) {\r
+ if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Platform specific DeployedMode clear. InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent() is checked before\r
+ //\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x. Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode));\r
+ return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode);\r
+ } else {\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x. Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode));\r
+ return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode);\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+}\r
+\r
/**\r
Process variable with platform key for verification.\r
\r
BOOLEAN Del;\r
UINT8 *Payload;\r
UINTN PayloadSize;\r
+ VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableEntry[2];\r
\r
if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||\r
(Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {\r
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
}\r
\r
+ //\r
+ // Init state of Del. State may change due to secure check\r
+ //\r
Del = FALSE;\r
- if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {\r
- Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
- PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
- if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
- Del = TRUE;\r
- }\r
+ Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
+ PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);\r
+ if (PayloadSize == 0) {\r
+ Del = TRUE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the variable space for both PKpub and SecureBootMode variable.\r
+ //\r
+ VariableEntry[0].VariableSize = PayloadSize;\r
+ VariableEntry[0].Guid = &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid;\r
+ VariableEntry[0].Name = EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME;\r
+\r
+ VariableEntry[1].VariableSize = sizeof(UINT8);\r
+ VariableEntry[1].Guid = &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid;\r
+ VariableEntry[1].Name = EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME;\r
+\r
+ if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || \r
+ (((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) && !IsPk)) {\r
\r
Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
+ //\r
+ // If delete PKpub, only check for "SecureBootMode" only\r
+ // if update / add PKpub, check both NewPKpub & "SecureBootMode"\r
+ //\r
+ if (IsPk) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete PKpub\r
+ //\r
+ if (Del && ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) \r
+ && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[1], NULL)){\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ //\r
+ // Add PKpub\r
+ //\r
+ } else if (!Del && ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode))\r
+ && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[0], &VariableEntry[1], NULL)) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (\r
VariableName,\r
VendorGuid,\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
- if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {\r
+ if (((mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) && (mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) || IsPk) {\r
Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
}\r
- } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {\r
+ } else if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode || mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {\r
+ //\r
+ // If delete PKpub, check "SecureBootMode" only\r
+ //\r
+ if (IsPk && Del && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[1], NULL)){\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+\r
//\r
// Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.\r
//\r
);\r
} else {\r
//\r
+ // SetupMode or AuditMode to add PK\r
// Verify against the certificate in data payload.\r
//\r
+ //\r
+ // Check PKpub & SecureBootMode variable space consistency\r
+ //\r
+ if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[0], &VariableEntry[1], NULL)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // No enough variable space to set PK successfully.\r
+ //\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+\r
Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (\r
VariableName,\r
VendorGuid,\r
}\r
\r
if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {\r
- if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {\r
- //\r
- // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.\r
- //\r
- Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);\r
- } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){\r
- //\r
- // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.\r
- //\r
- Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);\r
+ //\r
+ // Delete or Enroll PK causes SecureBootMode change\r
+ //\r
+ if (!Del) {\r
+ if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) {\r
+ //\r
+ // If enroll PK in setup mode, change to user mode.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode);\r
+ } else if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {\r
+ //\r
+ // If enroll PK in Audit mode, change to Deployed mode.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode);\r
+ } else {\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "PK is updated in %x mode. No SecureBootMode change.\n", mSecureBootMode));\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ if ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // If delete PK in User Mode or DeployedMode, change to Setup Mode.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode);\r
+ }\r
}\r
}\r
\r
}\r
\r
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
- if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
+ if ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode || mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)\r
+ && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {\r
//\r
// Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.\r
//\r
return Status;\r
}\r
\r
- if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {\r
+ if ((mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) && (mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) {\r
Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();\r
}\r
}\r
return TotalSize;\r
}\r
\r
+/**\r
+ Create signature list based on input signature data and certificate type GUID. Caller is reposible \r
+ to free new created SignatureList.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] SignatureData Signature data in SignatureList.\r
+ @param[in] SignatureDataSize Signature data size.\r
+ @param[in] CertType Certificate Type.\r
+ @param[out] SignatureList Created SignatureList.\r
+ @param[out] SignatureListSize Created SignatureListSize.\r
+\r
+ @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of resources.\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully create signature list.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+CreateSignatureList(\r
+ IN UINT8 *SignatureData,\r
+ IN UINTN SignatureDataSize,\r
+ IN EFI_GUID *CertType,\r
+ OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **SignatureList,\r
+ OUT UINTN *SignatureListSize\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignList;\r
+ UINTN SignListSize;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;\r
+\r
+ SignList = NULL;\r
+ *SignatureList = NULL;\r
+\r
+ SignListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureDataSize;\r
+ SignList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignListSize);\r
+ if (SignList == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ SignList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;\r
+ SignList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignListSize;\r
+ SignList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) SignatureDataSize + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1;\r
+ CopyMem (&SignList->SignatureType, CertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));\r
+\r
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "SignatureDataSize %x\n", SignatureDataSize));\r
+ Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));\r
+ CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, SignatureData, SignatureDataSize);\r
+\r
+ *SignatureList = SignList;\r
+ *SignatureListSize = SignListSize;\r
+\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+\r
+}\r
+\r
/**\r
Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.\r
\r
UINTN NewImageExeInfoEntrySize;\r
UINTN NameStringLen;\r
UINTN DevicePathSize;\r
+ CHAR16 *NameStr;\r
\r
ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r
NewImageExeInfoTable = NULL;\r
ImageExeInfoEntry = NULL;\r
NameStringLen = 0;\r
+ NameStr = NULL;\r
\r
if (DevicePath == NULL) {\r
return ;\r
}\r
\r
DevicePathSize = GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath);\r
- NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Signature size can be odd. Pad after signature to ensure next EXECUTION_INFO entry align\r
+ //\r
+ NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;\r
+\r
NewImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r
if (NewImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {\r
return ;\r
WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) ImageExeInfoEntry, Action);\r
WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION)), (UINT32) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);\r
\r
+ NameStr = (CHAR16 *)(ImageExeInfoEntry + 1);\r
if (Name != NULL) {\r
- CopyMem ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION) + sizeof (UINT32), Name, NameStringLen);\r
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *) NameStr, Name, NameStringLen);\r
} else {\r
- ZeroMem ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION) + sizeof (UINT32), sizeof (CHAR16));\r
+ ZeroMem ((UINT8 *) NameStr, sizeof (CHAR16));\r
}\r
+\r
CopyMem (\r
- (UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION) + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen,\r
+ (UINT8 *) NameStr + NameStringLen,\r
DevicePath,\r
DevicePathSize\r
);\r
if (Signature != NULL) {\r
CopyMem (\r
- (UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION) + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,\r
+ (UINT8 *) NameStr + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,\r
Signature,\r
SignatureSize\r
);\r
return FALSE;\r
}\r
\r
+/**\r
+ Record multiple certificate list & verification state of a verified image to \r
+ IMAGE_EXECUTION_TABLE.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] CertBuf Certificate list buffer.\r
+ @param[in] CertBufLength Certificate list buffer.\r
+ @param[in] Action Certificate list action to be record.\r
+ @param[in] ImageName Image name.\r
+ @param[in] ImageDevicePath Image device path.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+VOID \r
+RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(\r
+ IN UINT8 *CertBuf,\r
+ IN UINTN CertBufLength,\r
+ IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *ImageName OPTIONAL,\r
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ UINT8 CertNumber;\r
+ UINT8 *CertPtr;\r
+ UINTN Index;\r
+ UINT8 *Cert;\r
+ UINTN CertSize;\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;\r
+ UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
+\r
+ CertNumber = (UINT8) (*CertBuf);\r
+ CertPtr = CertBuf + 1;\r
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertNumber; Index++) {\r
+ CertSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)CertPtr);\r
+ Cert = (UINT8 *)CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Record all cert in cert chain to be passed\r
+ //\r
+ Status = CreateSignatureList(Cert, CertSize, &gEfiCertX509Guid, &SignatureList, &SignatureListSize);\r
+ if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ AddImageExeInfo (Action, ImageName, ImageDevicePath, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);\r
+ FreePool (SignatureList);\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+}\r
+\r
+\r
/**\r
Check whether the timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is also earlier than \r
the revocation time.\r
Check whether the image signature is forbidden by the forbidden database (dbx).\r
The image is forbidden to load if any certificates for signing are revoked before signing time.\r
\r
- @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.\r
- @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r
+ @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.\r
+ @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r
+ @param[in] IsAuditMode Whether system Secure Boot Mode is in AuditMode.\r
+ @param[in] ImageName Name of the image to verify.\r
+ @param[in] ImageDevicePath DevicePath of the image to verify.\r
\r
@retval TRUE Image is forbidden by dbx.\r
@retval FALSE Image is not forbidden by dbx.\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
IsForbiddenByDbx (\r
- IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r
- IN UINTN AuthDataSize\r
+ IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r
+ IN UINTN AuthDataSize,\r
+ IN BOOLEAN IsAuditMode,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *ImageName OPTIONAL,\r
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL\r
)\r
{\r
EFI_STATUS Status;\r
UINT8 *Cert;\r
UINTN CertSize;\r
EFI_TIME RevocationTime;\r
-\r
+ UINT8 *SignerCert;\r
+ UINTN SignerCertLength;\r
+ UINT8 *UnchainCert;\r
+ UINTN UnchainCertLength;\r
//\r
// Variable Initialization\r
//\r
BufferLength = 0;\r
TrustedCert = NULL;\r
TrustedCertLength = 0;\r
+ SignerCert = NULL;\r
+ SignerCertLength = 0;\r
+ UnchainCert = NULL;\r
+ UnchainCertLength = 0;\r
\r
//\r
// The image will not be forbidden if dbx can't be got.\r
}\r
\r
Done:\r
+ if (IsForbidden && IsAuditMode) {\r
+ Pkcs7GetCertificatesList(AuthData, AuthDataSize, &SignerCert, &SignerCertLength, &UnchainCert, &UnchainCertLength);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Record all certs in image to be failed\r
+ //\r
+ if ((SignerCertLength != 0) && (SignerCert != NULL)) {\r
+ RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(\r
+ SignerCert,\r
+ SignerCertLength,\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,\r
+ ImageName,\r
+ ImageDevicePath\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if ((UnchainCertLength != 0) && (UnchainCert != NULL)) {\r
+ RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(\r
+ UnchainCert,\r
+ UnchainCertLength,\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,\r
+ ImageName,\r
+ ImageDevicePath\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
if (Data != NULL) {\r
FreePool (Data);\r
}\r
\r
Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer);\r
Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert);\r
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCert);\r
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (UnchainCert);\r
\r
return IsForbidden;\r
}\r
\r
+\r
/**\r
Check whether the image signature can be verified by the trusted certificates in DB database.\r
\r
- @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.\r
- @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r
+ @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.\r
+ @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.\r
+ @param[in] IsAuditMode Whether system Secure Boot Mode is in AuditMode.\r
+ @param[in] ImageName Name of the image to verify.\r
+ @param[in] ImageDevicePath DevicePath of the image to verify.\r
\r
@retval TRUE Image passed verification using certificate in db.\r
@retval FALSE Image didn't pass verification using certificate in db.\r
**/\r
BOOLEAN\r
IsAllowedByDb (\r
- IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r
- IN UINTN AuthDataSize\r
+ IN UINT8 *AuthData,\r
+ IN UINTN AuthDataSize,\r
+ IN BOOLEAN IsAuditMode,\r
+ IN CHAR16 *ImageName OPTIONAL,\r
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL\r
)\r
{\r
EFI_STATUS Status;\r
BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;\r
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;\r
- EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;\r
UINTN DataSize;\r
UINT8 *Data;\r
UINT8 *RootCert;\r
UINTN DbxDataSize;\r
UINT8 *DbxData;\r
EFI_TIME RevocationTime;\r
+ UINT8 *SignerCert;\r
+ UINTN SignerCertLength;\r
+ UINT8 *UnchainCert;\r
+ UINTN UnchainCertLength;\r
\r
- Data = NULL;\r
- CertList = NULL;\r
- Cert = NULL;\r
- RootCert = NULL;\r
- DbxData = NULL;\r
- RootCertSize = 0;\r
- VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
+ Data = NULL;\r
+ CertList = NULL;\r
+ CertData = NULL;\r
+ RootCert = NULL;\r
+ DbxData = NULL;\r
+ RootCertSize = 0;\r
+ VerifyStatus = FALSE;\r
+ SignerCert = NULL;\r
+ SignerCertLength = 0;\r
+ UnchainCert = NULL;\r
+ UnchainCertLength = 0;\r
\r
DataSize = 0;\r
Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);\r
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;\r
while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {\r
if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {\r
- Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
- CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
+ CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);\r
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;\r
\r
for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {\r
//\r
// Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.\r
//\r
- RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;\r
+ RootCert = CertData->SignatureData;\r
RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);\r
\r
//\r
goto Done;\r
}\r
\r
- Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
+ CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertData + CertList->SignatureSize);\r
}\r
}\r
\r
}\r
\r
Done:\r
+\r
if (VerifyStatus) {\r
- SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, Cert);\r
+ SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, CertData);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (IsAuditMode) {\r
+\r
+ Pkcs7GetCertificatesList(AuthData, AuthDataSize, &SignerCert, &SignerCertLength, &UnchainCert, &UnchainCertLength);\r
+ if (VerifyStatus) {\r
+ if ((SignerCertLength != 0) && (SignerCert != NULL)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Record all cert in signer's cert chain to be passed\r
+ //\r
+ RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(\r
+ SignerCert,\r
+ SignerCertLength,\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,\r
+ ImageName,\r
+ ImageDevicePath\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if ((UnchainCertLength != 0) && (UnchainCert != NULL)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Record all certs in unchained certificates lists to be failed\r
+ //\r
+ RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(\r
+ UnchainCert,\r
+ UnchainCertLength,\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,\r
+ ImageName,\r
+ ImageDevicePath\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Record all certs in image to be failed\r
+ //\r
+ if ((SignerCertLength != 0) && (SignerCert != NULL)) {\r
+ RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(\r
+ SignerCert,\r
+ SignerCertLength,\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,\r
+ ImageName,\r
+ ImageDevicePath\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if ((UnchainCertLength != 0) && (UnchainCert != NULL)) {\r
+ RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(\r
+ UnchainCert,\r
+ UnchainCertLength,\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,\r
+ ImageName,\r
+ ImageDevicePath\r
+ );\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
}\r
\r
+\r
if (Data != NULL) {\r
FreePool (Data);\r
}\r
FreePool (DbxData);\r
}\r
\r
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCert);\r
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (UnchainCert);\r
+\r
return VerifyStatus;\r
}\r
\r
+/**\r
+ Provide verification service for signed images in AuditMode, which include both signature validation\r
+ and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and\r
+ MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported. \r
+\r
+ In this implementation, only verify external executables when in AuditMode.\r
+ Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored. Other authentication status\r
+ are record into IMAGE_EXECUTION_TABLE.\r
+\r
+ The image verification policy is:\r
+ If the image is signed,\r
+ At least one valid signature or at least one hash value of the image must match a record\r
+ in the security database "db", and no valid signature nor any hash value of the image may\r
+ be reflected in the security database "dbx".\r
+ Otherwise, the image is not signed,\r
+ The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db", and\r
+ not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".\r
+\r
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.\r
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure\r
+ within this image buffer before use.\r
+\r
+ @param[in] AuthenticationStatus\r
+ This is the authentication status returned from the security\r
+ measurement services for the input file.\r
+ @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is\r
+ being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.\r
+ @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.\r
+ @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.\r
+ @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.\r
+\r
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The authenticate info is sucessfully stored for the file \r
+ specified by DevicePath and non-NULL FileBuffer \r
+ @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not\r
+ authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE\r
+ Foundation many not use File.\r
+\r
+**/\r
+EFI_STATUS\r
+EFIAPI\r
+ImageVerificationInAuditMode (\r
+ IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,\r
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,\r
+ IN VOID *FileBuffer,\r
+ IN UINTN FileSize,\r
+ IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy\r
+ )\r
+{\r
+ EFI_STATUS Status;\r
+ UINT16 Magic;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;\r
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;\r
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;\r
+ UINT32 Policy;\r
+ PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;\r
+ UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *WinCertUefiGuid;\r
+ UINT8 *AuthData;\r
+ UINTN AuthDataSize;\r
+ EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *SecDataDir;\r
+ UINT32 OffSet;\r
+ CHAR16 *FilePathStr;\r
+ UINTN SignatureListSize;\r
+\r
+ SignatureList = NULL;\r
+ WinCertificate = NULL;\r
+ SecDataDir = NULL;\r
+ PkcsCertData = NULL;\r
+ FilePathStr = NULL;\r
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;\r
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
+\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the image type and get policy setting.\r
+ //\r
+ switch (GetImageType (File)) {\r
+\r
+ case IMAGE_FROM_FV:\r
+ Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:\r
+ Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:\r
+ Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:\r
+ Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ default:\r
+ Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.\r
+ //\r
+ if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get Image Device Path Str\r
+ //\r
+ FilePathStr = ConvertDevicePathToText (File, FALSE, TRUE);\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Authentication failed because of (unspecified) firmware security policy\r
+ //\r
+ if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {\r
+ //\r
+ // No signature, record FilePath/FilePathStr only\r
+ //\r
+ AddImageExeInfo (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_POLICY_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED, FilePathStr, File, NULL, 0);\r
+ goto END;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION\r
+ // violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.\r
+ //\r
+ ASSERT (Policy != QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION && Policy != ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION);\r
+ if (Policy == QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION || Policy == ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {\r
+ CpuDeadLoop ();\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Read the Dos header.\r
+ //\r
+ if (FileBuffer == NULL) {\r
+ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;\r
+ goto END;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;\r
+ mImageSize = FileSize;\r
+\r
+ ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));\r
+ ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;\r
+ ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Get information about the image being loaded\r
+ //\r
+ Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage\r
+ //\r
+ goto END;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+\r
+ DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;\r
+ if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {\r
+ //\r
+ // DOS image header is present,\r
+ // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.\r
+ //\r
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;\r
+ } else {\r
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check PE/COFF image.\r
+ //\r
+ mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {\r
+ //\r
+ // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
+ goto END;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value\r
+ // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the\r
+ // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC\r
+ // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC\r
+ //\r
+ Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header\r
+ //\r
+ Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32 offset.\r
+ //\r
+ NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
+ if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r
+ SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r
+ }\r
+ } else {\r
+ //\r
+ // Use PE32+ offset.\r
+ //\r
+ NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
+ if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {\r
+ SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Start Image Validation.\r
+ //\r
+ if (SecDataDir == NULL || SecDataDir->Size == 0) {\r
+ //\r
+ // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db",\r
+ // and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".\r
+ //\r
+ if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {\r
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
+ goto END;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).\r
+ //\r
+ if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).\r
+ //\r
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Add HASH digest for image without signature\r
+ //\r
+ Status = CreateSignatureList(mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize, &mCertType, &SignatureList, &SignatureListSize);\r
+ if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ AddImageExeInfo (Action, FilePathStr, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);\r
+ FreePool (SignatureList);\r
+ }\r
+ goto END;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7\r
+ // "Attribute Certificate Table".\r
+ // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from the start of the file.\r
+ //\r
+ for (OffSet = SecDataDir->VirtualAddress;\r
+ OffSet < (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size);\r
+ OffSet += (WinCertificate->dwLength + ALIGN_SIZE (WinCertificate->dwLength))) {\r
+ WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet);\r
+ if ((SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE) ||\r
+ (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) < WinCertificate->dwLength) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7 signed data is supported.\r
+ //\r
+ if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {\r
+ //\r
+ // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the\r
+ // Authenticode specification.\r
+ //\r
+ PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) WinCertificate;\r
+ if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength <= sizeof (PkcsCertData->Hdr)) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ AuthData = PkcsCertData->CertData;\r
+ AuthDataSize = PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr);\r
+ } else if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {\r
+ //\r
+ // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID which is described in UEFI Spec.\r
+ //\r
+ WinCertUefiGuid = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) WinCertificate;\r
+ if (WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength <= OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData)) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ if (!CompareGuid (&WinCertUefiGuid->CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+ AuthData = WinCertUefiGuid->CertData;\r
+ AuthDataSize = WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength - OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);\r
+ } else {\r
+ if (WinCertificate->dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE)) {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Status = HashPeImageByType (AuthData, AuthDataSize);\r
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).\r
+ // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).\r
+ //\r
+ if (!IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize, TRUE, FilePathStr, File)) {\r
+ IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize, TRUE, FilePathStr, File);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Check the image's hash value.\r
+ //\r
+ if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {\r
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED; \r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ //\r
+ // Add HASH digest for image with signature\r
+ //\r
+ Status = CreateSignatureList(mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize, &mCertType, &SignatureList, &SignatureListSize);\r
+\r
+ if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {\r
+ AddImageExeInfo (Action, FilePathStr, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);\r
+ FreePool (SignatureList);\r
+ } else {\r
+ goto END;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+\r
+ if (OffSet != (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size)) {\r
+ //\r
+ // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certicate table is corrupted.\r
+ //\r
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
+ } else {\r
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+END:\r
+\r
+ if (FilePathStr != NULL) {\r
+ FreePool(FilePathStr);\r
+ FilePathStr = NULL;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return Status;\r
+}\r
+\r
/**\r
Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation\r
and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and\r
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;\r
WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;\r
UINT32 Policy;\r
- UINT8 *SecureBoot;\r
+ UINT8 *VarData;\r
+ UINT8 SecureBoot;\r
+ UINT8 AuditMode;\r
PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;\r
UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;\r
WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;\r
Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
\r
+ GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&VarData, NULL);\r
+ //\r
+ // Skip verification if AuditMode variable doesn't exist. AuditMode should always exist\r
+ //\r
+ if (VarData == NULL) {\r
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
+ }\r
+ AuditMode = *VarData;\r
+ FreePool(VarData);\r
+\r
+ if (AuditMode == AUDIT_MODE_ENABLE) {\r
+ return ImageVerificationInAuditMode(AuthenticationStatus, File, FileBuffer, FileSize, BootPolicy);\r
+ }\r
+\r
//\r
// Check the image type and get policy setting.\r
//\r
CpuDeadLoop ();\r
}\r
\r
- GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);\r
+ GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&VarData, NULL);\r
//\r
// Skip verification if SecureBoot variable doesn't exist.\r
//\r
- if (SecureBoot == NULL) {\r
+ if (VarData == NULL) {\r
return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
+ SecureBoot = *VarData;\r
+ FreePool(VarData);\r
\r
//\r
- // Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled.\r
+ // Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled but not AuditMode\r
//\r
- if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {\r
- FreePool (SecureBoot);\r
+ if (SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {\r
return EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
- FreePool (SecureBoot);\r
\r
//\r
// Read the Dos header.\r
//\r
// Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).\r
//\r
- if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {\r
+ if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize, FALSE, NULL, NULL)) {\r
Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;\r
VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;\r
break;\r
// Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).\r
//\r
if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {\r
- if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {\r
+ if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize, FALSE, NULL, NULL)) {\r
VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;\r
}\r
}\r
projects / mirror_edk2.git / commitdiff