//\r
// "dbx" updates in "dbxtool" are signed with a key derived from this KEK.\r
//\r
-STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftKEK[] = {\r
+STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftKek[] = {\r
0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xd0, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,\r
0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x0a, 0xd1, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x30,\r
0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,\r
// Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 R2 boot loaders are signed with a chain\r
// rooted in this certificate.\r
//\r
-STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftPCA[] = {\r
+STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftPca[] = {\r
0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xd7, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xbf, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,\r
0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x07, 0x76, 0x56, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x30,\r
0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,\r
//\r
// To verify the "shim" binary and PCI expansion ROMs with.\r
//\r
-STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftUefiCA[] = {\r
+STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftUefiCa[] = {\r
0x30, 0x82, 0x06, 0x10, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,\r
0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30,\r
0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,\r
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,\r
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,\r
&gEfiCertX509Guid,\r
- mMicrosoftPCA, sizeof mMicrosoftPCA, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,\r
- mMicrosoftUefiCA, sizeof mMicrosoftUefiCA, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,\r
+ mMicrosoftPca, sizeof mMicrosoftPca, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,\r
+ mMicrosoftUefiCa, sizeof mMicrosoftUefiCa, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,\r
NULL);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return 1;\r
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,\r
&gEfiCertX509Guid,\r
mRedHatPkKek1, sizeof mRedHatPkKek1, &gEfiCallerIdGuid,\r
- mMicrosoftKEK, sizeof mMicrosoftKEK, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,\r
+ mMicrosoftKek, sizeof mMicrosoftKek, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,\r
NULL);\r
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {\r
return 1;\r