According to UEFI spec,for ACPI Expanded Device Path
when HID=PNP0A03 or CID=PNP0A03 and HID != PNP0A08,
the device path node can be displayed as: PciRoot(UID|UIDSTR)
When HID=PNP0A08 or CID=PNP0A08, the device path node can be
displayed as: PcieRoot(UID|UIDSTR). But current code miss the
code logic.
This commit is to do the enhancement.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
According to UEFI Spec, for ACPI Expanded Device Path,
when HIDSTR=empty, CIDSTR=empty, UID STR!=empty,
the ACPI Expanded Device Path node can be displayed as
AcpiExp(HID,CID,UIDSTR) format.
And if UID is 0 and UIDSTR is empty, then use AcpiEx format.
This patch is to correct the condition check to follow UEFI
Spec when convert the device path node to the AcpiExp text
format.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
According to UEFI Spec, ACPI Expanded Device Path can be display
AcpiEx(HID|HIDSTR,(CID|CIDSTR,UID|UIDSTR)), but current code display
UID|UIDSTR before CID|CIDSTR.
This patch is to fix this issue.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
According to UEFI spec, the string expression of UTF8 vendor
device node should be displayed as: VenUtf8(). Current code
display it as: VenUft8() by mistake when convert device
path node to text.
This commit is to fix this bug.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
When covert IFR binary to EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX structure,
Current code has following incorrect code logic:
IfrCheckBox = (EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX *) (IfrOpHdr + 1);
The correct one should be:
IfrCheckBox = (EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX *) IfrOpHdr;
1. The bug is in function "UpdateDefaultSettingInFormPackage()"
which is to update the default setting of some HII Questions
in the IFR binary data. So it only has impact when platform
overrides default setting in HII VarStore through DynamicHii
PCD setting in Platform DSC file. If platform doesn't
override default setting, it has no impact.
2. The implementation updates the "Flags" filed in the
EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX structure to update the default
setting of checkbox.
If using "IfrCheckBox = (EFI_IFR_CHECKBOX *) (IfrOpHdr + 1);"
when wants to update the " Flags" filed in checkbox,
but in fact it will update the opcode binary
data(opcode binary length) behind checkbox binary.
And then it will cause Browser can't parse the IFR
binary data correctly. And then the possible symptom
is that some HII Question and forms may be not parsed
and then cannot be shown.
This is for conformance with the TCG "Platform Reset Attack Mitigation
Specification". Because clearing the CPU caches at boot doesn't impact
performance significantly, do it unconditionally, for simplicity's
sake.
Flush the cache on all logical processors, thanks to
EFI_PEI_MP_SERVICES_PPI and CacheMaintenanceLib.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com> Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Tested-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: remove bogus Message-Id line from commit msg]
ShellPkg: Create a homefilesystem environment variable
Create a homefilesystem environment variable whose value is the file
system on which the executing shell is located. For example: "FS14:".
This eliminates the need for people to have to try and find the "boot"
file system in their startup script. After this change they can simply
execute %homefilesystem% to set the cwd to the root of the file system
where the shell is located.
A future enhancement could be to add "homefilesystem" to the list of
predefined, read-only variables listed in the EfiShellSetEnv function of
file ShellProtocol.c
Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for
data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the
processor may speculate as to what will be executed.
If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions
might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into
cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code
gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have
been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not
otherwise be accessed.
It is possible for SMI handler(s) to call EFI_SMM_CPU_PROTOCOL service
ReadSaveState() and use the content in the 'CommBuffer' (controlled
external inputs) as the 'CpuIndex'. So this commit will insert AsmLfence
API to mitigate the bounds check bypass issue within SmmReadSaveState().
For SmmReadSaveState():
The 'CpuIndex' will be passed into function ReadSaveStateRegister(). And
then in to ReadSaveStateRegisterByIndex().
With the call:
ReadSaveStateRegisterByIndex (
CpuIndex,
SMM_SAVE_STATE_REGISTER_IOMISC_INDEX,
sizeof(IoMisc.Uint32),
&IoMisc.Uint32
);
The 'IoMisc' can be a cross boundary access during speculative execution.
Later, 'IoMisc' is used as the index to access buffers 'mSmmCpuIoWidth'
and 'mSmmCpuIoType'. One can observe which part of the content within
those buffers was brought into cache to possibly reveal the value of
'IoMisc'.
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the check of 'CpuIndex'
within function SmmReadSaveState() to prevent the speculative execution.
A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the
'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
And the document at:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for
data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the
processor may speculate as to what will be executed.
If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions
might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into
cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code
gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have
been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not
otherwise be accessed.
This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the
Variable\RuntimeDxe driver and insert AsmLfence API to mitigate the
bounds check bypass issue.
For SMI handler SmmVariableHandler():
Under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE:",
'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' can be a potential cross boundary access of
the 'CommBuffer' (controlled external input) during speculative execution.
This cross boundary access is later used as the index to access array
'SmmVariableHeader->Name' by code:
"SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1]"
One can observe which part of the content within array was brought into
cache to possibly reveal the value of 'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize'.
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the boundary/range checks of
'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution.
And there are 2 similar cases under
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:" and
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_GET:" as well.
This commits also handles them.
Also, under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:",
'(UINT8 *)SmmVariableHeader->Name + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' points to
the 'CommBuffer' (with some offset) and then passed as parameter 'Data' to
function VariableServiceSetVariable().
Within function VariableServiceSetVariable(), there is a sanity check for
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor for the data pointed by 'Data'.
If this check is speculatively bypassed, potential cross-boundary data
access for 'Data' is possible to be revealed via the below function calls
sequence during speculative execution:
AuthVariableLibProcessVariable()
ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek()
Within function ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek(), for the code
"PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);", 'AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data)'
can be a cross boundary access during speculative execution.
Then, 'PayloadSize' is possible to be revealed by the function call
sequence:
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the sanity check for
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor upon 'Data' within function
VariableServiceSetVariable() to prevent the speculative execution.
Also, please note that the change made within function
VariableServiceSetVariable() will affect DXE as well. However, since we
only focuses on the SMM codes, the commit will introduce a new module
internal function called VariableLoadFence() to handle this. This internal
function will have 2 implementations (1 for SMM, 1 for DXE). For the SMM
implementation, it is a wrapper to call the AsmLfence() API; for the DXE
implementation, it is empty.
A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the
'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
And the document at:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for
data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the
processor may speculate as to what will be executed.
If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions
might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into
cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code
gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have
been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not
otherwise be accessed.
This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the
SmmLockBox driver and insert AsmLfence API to mitigate the
bounds check bypass issue.
For SMI handler SmmLockBoxHandler():
Under "case EFI_SMM_LOCK_BOX_COMMAND_SAVE:", the 'CommBuffer' (controlled
external inputs) is passed to function SmmLockBoxSave().
'TempLockBoxParameterSave.Length' can be a potential cross boundary access
of the 'CommBuffer' during speculative execution. This cross boundary
access is later passed as parameter 'Length' into function SaveLockBox().
Within function SaveLockBox(), the value of 'Length' can be inferred by
code:
"CopyMem ((VOID *)(UINTN)SmramBuffer, (VOID *)(UINTN)Buffer, Length);".
One can observe which part of the content within 'Buffer' was brought into
cache to possibly reveal the value of 'Length'.
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the boundary/range checks of
'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution.
And there is a similar case under "case EFI_SMM_LOCK_BOX_COMMAND_UPDATE:"
function SmmLockBoxUpdate() as well. This commits also handles it.
A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the
'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
And the document at:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for
data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the
processor may speculate as to what will be executed.
If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions
might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into
cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code
gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have
been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not
otherwise be accessed.
This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the
FaultTolerantWriteDxe driver and insert AsmLfence API to mitigate the
bounds check bypass issue.
For SMI handler SmmFaultTolerantWriteHandler():
Under "case FTW_FUNCTION_WRITE:", 'SmmFtwWriteHeader->Length' can be a
potential cross boundary access of the 'CommBuffer' (controlled external
inputs) during speculative execution. This cross boundary access is later
passed as parameter 'Length' into function FtwWrite().
Within function FtwWrite(), the value of 'Length' can be inferred by code:
"CopyMem (MyBuffer + Offset, Buffer, Length);". One can observe which part
of the content within 'Buffer' was brought into cache to possibly reveal
the value of 'Length'.
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the boundary/range checks of
'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution.
A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the
'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
And the document at:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
This commit will add a new BaseLib API AsmLfence(). This API will perform
a serializing operation on all load-from-memory instructions that were
issued prior to the call of this function. Please note that this API is
only available on IA-32 and x64.
The purpose of adding this API is to mitigate of the [CVE-2017-5753]
Bounds Check Bypass issue when untrusted data are being processed within
SMM. More details can be referred at the 'Bounds check bypass mitigation'
section at the below link:
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellFileOperationSize
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMaximumUnicodeStringLength
shenglei [Tue, 28 Aug 2018 02:57:55 +0000 (10:57 +0800)]
ShellPkg/DpDynamicCommand: Remove unused PCDs
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize in DpApp.inf
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdUefiLibMaxPrintBufferSize in
DpDynamicCommand.inf
shenglei [Tue, 28 Aug 2018 02:55:09 +0000 (10:55 +0800)]
ShellPkg/Shell: Remove unused PCDs
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellLibAutoInitialize
gEfiShellPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShellMapNameLength
shenglei [Tue, 28 Aug 2018 02:22:19 +0000 (10:22 +0800)]
SecurityPkg/Tcg2Dxe: Remove unused PCDs
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmBaseAddress
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdAcpiDefaultOemId
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdAcpiDefaultOemTableId
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdAcpiDefaultOemRevision
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdAcpiDefaultCreatorId
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdAcpiDefaultCreatorRevision
shenglei [Tue, 28 Aug 2018 02:44:32 +0000 (10:44 +0800)]
MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: Remove unused PCDs
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleMax
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSystemRebootAfterCapsuleProcessFlag
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassCapsule
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleStatusCodeProcessCapsulesBegin
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleStatusCodeProcessCapsulesEnd
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleStatusCodeUpdatingFirmware
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleStatusCodeUpdateFirmwareSuccess
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleStatusCodeUpdateFirmwareFailed
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCapsuleStatusCodeResettingSystem
The library Pcdlib is not linked， so "#include <Library/PcdLib.h>"
is deleted.
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: shenglei <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
The input param String of AsciiStrStr() requires a pointer to
Null-terminated string, however in HttpUtilitiesParse(),
the Buffersize before AllocateZeroPool() is equal to the size
of TCP header, after the CopyMem(), it might not end with
Null-terminator. It might cause memory access overflow.
Cc: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Cc: Wu Jiaxin <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1204
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Songpeng Li <songpeng.li@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Songpeng Li [Fri, 28 Sep 2018 03:02:34 +0000 (11:02 +0800)]
NetworkPkg/HttpDxe: fix read memory access overflow in HTTPBoot.
The input param String of AsciiStrStr() requires a pointer to
Null-terminated string, however in HttpTcpReceiveHeader(),
the Buffersize before AllocateZeroPool() is equal to the size
of TCP header, after the CopyMem(), it might not end with
Null-terminator. It might cause memory access overflow.
Cc: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Cc: Wu Jiaxin <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1204
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Songpeng Li <songpeng.li@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
UPD header files generated by GenCfgOpt.py may have
tailing white space from some of the UPD description in DSC,
especially when python script automatically switching lines
for long description string. This patch will always remove
tailing white space for UPD header files.
Test: Verified the patch can remove tailing space in
output header files when UPD DSC contains intentional
tailing white space.
For reducing maintenance effort, the UPD offset can be
automatic assigned by GenCfgOpt.py following by alignment
requirements.
The usage model as below:
. If UPD offset in DSC file are all '*', GenCfgOpt.py will
assign offset for all UPD automatically. In this case no
need to manually hardcode offset to all UPD in DSC.
. If UPD offset in DSC file are all not '*', GenCfgOpt.py
will use hardcoded offset directly (original usage model)
. Tool does not support mixing scenario so UPD offset in DSC
should be all '*' or all hardcoded but not mixed.
In auto mode UPD offset will be assigned following natural
alignment (size aligned) rule and the whole structure size
will align to either 32bits or 64bits depends on maximal UPD
size in the structure.
Test: Verified by both UPD offset hardcoded or '*' in DSC and
generated UPD header files are correct.
Star Zeng [Thu, 27 Sep 2018 01:46:17 +0000 (09:46 +0800)]
MdeModulePkg Variable: Fix comment typo 'end' to 'start'
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1214
This patch only updates comment and function description, so has
no functionality impact.
This patch fixes comment typo 'end' to 'start' in GetStartPointer.
GetStartPointer for PEI and DXE has aligned function description,
but GetEndPointer does not.
This patch also aligns GetEndPointer's function description for
PEI and DXE.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTemporaryRamBase
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTemporaryRamSize
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPatchEntry
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPerfEntry
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGlobalDataPointerAddress
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTemporaryRamBase
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTemporaryRamSize
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspTemporaryRamSize
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPatchEntry
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPerfEntry
shenglei [Tue, 28 Aug 2018 01:57:00 +0000 (09:57 +0800)]
IntelFsp2Pkg/BaseFspCommonLib: Remove unused PCDs
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPatchEntry
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPerfEntry
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTemporaryRamBase
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTemporaryRamSize
shenglei [Tue, 28 Aug 2018 01:54:52 +0000 (09:54 +0800)]
IntelFsp2Pkg/FspSecCore: Remove unused PCDs
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciExpressBaseAddress
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGlobalDataPointerAddress
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPatchEntry
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPerfEntry
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciExpressBaseAddress
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGlobalDataPointerAddress
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTemporaryRamBase
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTemporaryRamSize
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspTemporaryRamSize
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciExpressBaseAddress
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPatchEntry
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPerfEntry
The reason is this commit changed the condition of building page table
in DxeIpl. The code before it will only build page table for the sake
of PcdSetNxForStack. This commit added PcdImageProtectionPolicy and
PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy into the logic. But the default value of
PcdImageProtectionPolicy is 02, which means the DxeIpl should build page
table. Due to the fact that EmulatorPkg doesn't support page table at all,
this will cause exception on Windows OS.
This patch solves this issue by setting PcdImageProtectionPolicy to 0
explicitly in EmulatorPkg.dsc.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
The reason is this commit changed the condition of building page table
in DxeIpl. The code before it will only build page table for the sake
of PcdSetNxForStack. This commit added PcdImageProtectionPolicy and
PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy into the logic. But the default value of
PcdImageProtectionPolicy is 02, which means the DxeIpl should build page
table. Due to the fact that Nt32Pkg doesn't support page table at all,
this will cause exception on Windows OS.
This patch solves this issue by setting PcdImageProtectionPolicy to 0
explicitly in Nt32Pkg.dsc.
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com> Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
UPD header files generated by GenCfgOpt.py may have
tailing white space from some of the UPD description in DSC,
especially when python script automatically switching lines
for long description string. This patch will always remove
tailing white space for UPD header files.
Test: Verified the patch can remove tailing space in
output header files when UPD DSC contains intentional
tailing white space.
For reducing maintenance effort, the UPD offset can be
automatic assigned by GenCfgOpt.py following by alignment
requirements.
The usage model as below:
. If UPD offset in DSC file are all '*', GenCfgOpt.py will
assign offset for all UPD automatically. In this case no
need to manually hardcode offset to all UPD in DSC.
. If UPD offset in DSC file are all not '*', GenCfgOpt.py
will use hardcoded offset directly (original usage model)
. Tool does not support mixing scenario so UPD offset in DSC
should be all '*' or all hardcoded but not mixed.
In auto mode UPD offset will be assigned following natural
alignment (size aligned) rule and the whole structure size
will align to either 32bits or 64bits depends on maximal UPD
size in the structure.
Test: Verified by both UPD offset hardcoded or '*' in DSC and
generated UPD header files are correct.
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTemporaryRamBase
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTemporaryRamSize
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPatchEntry
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPerfEntry
The PCDs below are unused, so they have been removed from inf.
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGlobalDataPointerAddress
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTemporaryRamBase
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTemporaryRamSize
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspTemporaryRamSize
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPatchEntry
gIntelFsp2PkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFspMaxPerfEntry
Star Zeng [Fri, 8 Jun 2018 08:41:07 +0000 (16:41 +0800)]
UefiCpuPkg PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Use new EfiLocateFirstAcpiTable()
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=967
Request to add a library function for GetAcpiTable() in order
to get ACPI table using signature as input.
After evaluation, we found there are many duplicated code to
find ACPI table by signature in different modules.
This patch updates PiSmmCpuDxeSmm to use new
EfiLocateFirstAcpiTable() and remove the duplicated code.
Cc: Younas khan <pmdyounaskhan786@gmail.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Star Zeng [Fri, 8 Jun 2018 08:40:40 +0000 (16:40 +0800)]
ShellPkg DpDynamicCommand: Use new EfiLocateFirstAcpiTable()
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=967
Request to add a library function for GetAcpiTable() in order
to get ACPI table using signature as input.
After evaluation, we found there are many duplicated code to
find ACPI table by signature in different modules.
This patch updates DpDynamicCommand to use new
EfiLocateFirstAcpiTable() and remove the duplicated code.
Cc: Younas khan <pmdyounaskhan786@gmail.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Star Zeng [Fri, 8 Jun 2018 08:40:09 +0000 (16:40 +0800)]
PcAtChipsetPkg PcRtc: Use new EfiLocateFirstAcpiTable()
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=967
Request to add a library function for GetAcpiTable() in order
to get ACPI table using signature as input.
After evaluation, we found there are many duplicated code to
find ACPI table by signature in different modules.
This patch updates PcatRealTimeClockRuntimeDxe to use new
EfiLocateFirstAcpiTable() and remove the duplicated code.
Cc: Younas khan <pmdyounaskhan786@gmail.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Star Zeng [Fri, 8 Jun 2018 08:39:38 +0000 (16:39 +0800)]
MdeModulePkg S3SaveStateDxe: Use new EfiLocateFirstAcpiTable()
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=967
Request to add a library function for GetAcpiTable() in order
to get ACPI table using signature as input.
After evaluation, we found there are many duplicated code to
find ACPI table by signature in different modules.
This patch updates S3SaveStateDxe to use new
EfiLocateFirstAcpiTable() and remove the duplicated code.
Cc: Younas khan <pmdyounaskhan786@gmail.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Star Zeng [Fri, 8 Jun 2018 08:38:46 +0000 (16:38 +0800)]
IntelSiliconPkg IntelVTdDxe: Use new EfiLocateFirstAcpiTable()
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=967
Request to add a library function for GetAcpiTable() in order
to get ACPI table using signature as input.
After evaluation, we found there are many duplicated code to
find ACPI table by signature in different modules.
This patch updates IntelVTdDxe to use new
EfiLocateFirstAcpiTable() and remove the duplicated code.
Cc: Younas khan <pmdyounaskhan786@gmail.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Star Zeng [Wed, 19 Sep 2018 00:55:33 +0000 (08:55 +0800)]
IntelFrameworkPkg FrameworkUefiLib: Add new EfiLocateXXXAcpiTable APIs
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=967
Request to add a library function for GetAcpiTable() in order
to get ACPI table using signature as input.
After evaluation, we found there are many duplicated code to
find ACPI table by signature in different modules.
This patch adds new EfiLocateXXXAcpiTable() APIs in UefiLib
for the request and also the following patch to remove the
duplicated code.
V2:
ASSERT(FALSE) and return NULL instead of real implementation for the
new APIs as the IntelFrameworkPkg is a to-be-deprecated packages.
Cc: Younas khan <pmdyounaskhan786@gmail.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Star Zeng [Fri, 8 Jun 2018 09:12:01 +0000 (17:12 +0800)]
MdePkg UefiLib: Add new EfiLocateXXXAcpiTable() APIs
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=967
Request to add a library function for GetAcpiTable() in order
to get ACPI table using signature as input.
After evaluation, we found there are many duplicated code to
find ACPI table by signature in different modules.
This patch adds new EfiLocateXXXAcpiTable() APIs in UefiLib
for the request and also the following patch to remove the
duplicated code.
Cc: Younas khan <pmdyounaskhan786@gmail.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe: Use the specified MTFTP windowsize.
*v2: Since the new PCD (PcdPxeTftpWindowSize) was renamed/defined in
NetworkPkg instead of MdeModulePkg, this new version is to update the
consuming PXE driver.
This patch is to define one new PCD for PXE driver to specify MTFTP windowsize so as
to improve the PXE download performance. The default value is set to 4.
Cc: Ye Ting <ting.ye@intel.com> Cc: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Cc: Shao Ming <ming.shao@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Wu Jiaxin <jiaxin.wu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ye Ting <ting.ye@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
This patch is to define one new option for TFTP shell command to specify the
windowsize option as defined in RFC 7440. Valid range is between 1 and 64,
default value is 1.
Note that: RFC 7440 does not mention max window size value, but for the
stability reason, the value is limited to 64.
Cc: Ye Ting <ting.ye@intel.com> Cc: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Cc: Carsey Jaben <jaben.carsey@intel.com> Cc: Shao Ming <ming.shao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Wu Jiaxin <jiaxin.wu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jaben Carsey <jaben.carsey@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ye Ting <ting.ye@intel.com>
This patch is to support the TFTP windowsize option described in RFC 7440.
The feature allows the client and server to negotiate a window size of
consecutive blocks to send as an alternative for replacing the single-block
lockstep schema.
Currently, the windowsize for write request operation is not supported since
there is no real use cases.
Cc: Ye Ting <ting.ye@intel.com> Cc: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Cc: Shao Ming <ming.shao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Wu Jiaxin <jiaxin.wu@intel.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ye Ting <ting.ye@intel.com>
This patch is to support the TFTP windowsize option described in RFC 7440.
The feature allows the client and server to negotiate a window size of
consecutive blocks to send as an alternative for replacing the single-block
lockstep schema.
Currently, the windowsize for write request operation is not supported since
there is no real use cases.
Cc: Ye Ting <ting.ye@intel.com> Cc: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Cc: Shao Ming <ming.shao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Wu Jiaxin <jiaxin.wu@intel.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ye Ting <ting.ye@intel.com>
MdePkg/BaseSynchronizationLib: fix XADD operands in GCC IA32/X64 assembly
Currently, "gcc-4.8.5-28.el7_5.1.x86_64" generates the following code for
me, from the XADD inline assembly added to "X64/GccInline.c" in commit 17634d026f96:
The MOV $0X1,%EAX instruction corrupts the address of Value in %RAX before
we reach the XADD instruction. In fact, it makes no sense for XADD to use
%EAX as source operand and (%RAX) as destination operand at the same time.
The XADD instruction's destination operand is a read-write operand. The
GCC documentation states:
> The ordinary output operands must be write-only; GCC will assume that
> the values in these operands before the instruction are dead and need
> not be generated. Extended asm supports input-output or read-write
> operands. Use the constraint character `+' to indicate such an operand
> and list it with the output operands. You should only use read-write
> operands when the constraints for the operand (or the operand in which
> only some of the bits are to be changed) allow a register.
(The above is intentionally quoted from the oldest GCC release that edk2
supports, namely gcc-4.4:
<https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.4.7/gcc/Extended-Asm.html>.)
Note that some other bugs remain in
"BaseSynchronizationLib/*/GccInline.c"; those should be addressed later,
under <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1208>.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1207 Fixes: 17634d026f968c404b039a8d8431b6389dd396ea
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
V3 changes include:
1. Keep the ReservedX not change if bit info not changed for this field.
V2 changes include:
1. Use X in ReservedX fields from totally new value if MSR structure definition changed.
For example, if in current structure, the max reserved variable is Reserved2, in new
definition, reserved variable is begin with Reserved3.
V1 Changes:
Changes includes:
1. Update MSR structure definition, change some reserved fields to useful fields:
1. MSR_XEON_PHI_PKG_CST_CONFIG_CONTROL_REGISTER
2. MSR_XEON_PHI_SMM_MCA_CAP_REGISTER
2. For MSR_XEON_PHI_PMG_IO_CAPTURE_BASE_REGISTER structure, it expand the field range.
Old definition like below:
typedef union {
///
/// Individual bit fields
///
struct {
///
/// [Bits 15:0] LVL_2 Base Address (R/W).
///
UINT32 Lvl2Base:16;
///
/// [Bits 18:16] C-state Range (R/W) Specifies the encoding value of the
/// maximum C-State code name to be included when IO read to MWAIT
/// redirection is enabled by MSR_PKG_CST_CONFIG_CONTROL[bit10]: 100b - C4
/// is the max C-State to include 110b - C6 is the max C-State to include.
///
UINT32 CStateRange:3;
UINT32 Reserved1:13;
UINT32 Reserved2:32;
} Bits;
///
/// All bit fields as a 32-bit value
///
UINT32 Uint32;
///
/// All bit fields as a 64-bit value
///
UINT64 Uint64;
} MSR_XEON_PHI_PMG_IO_CAPTURE_BASE_REGISTER;
This patch make below changes for this data structure, it expand "CStateRange" field width.
old one:
UINT32 CStateRange:3;
UINT32 Reserved1:13;
new one:
UINT32 CStateRange:7;
UINT32 Reserved1:9;
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
V3 changes include:
1. Keep ReservedX not change if bit info not changed for this field.
V2 changes include:
1. Use X in ReservedX fields from totally new value if MSR structure definition changed.
For example, if in current structure, the max reserved variable is Reserved2, in new
definition, reserved variable is begin with Reserved3.
V1 Changes includes:
1. Change fields which is reserved in old version: MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL_REGISTER
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Latest SDM has moved MSR related content from volume 3 chapter 35 to volume 4
chapter 2. Current MSR's comments need to be updated to reference the new
chapter info.
Changes includes:
1. Update referenced chapter info from some MSRs.
2. Update referenced SDM version info.
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Microsoft Windows will report an error in event manager if MTRR
usage is different across hibernate even when the difference is
in an non valid MTRR pair. This seems like a bug in Windows but
for compatibility and servicing reasons we think a change in UEFI
would wise.
A Windows change has already been submitted for the next iteration
(2019 time frame).
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
Ruiyu Ni [Tue, 25 Sep 2018 02:58:56 +0000 (10:58 +0800)]
MdeModulePkg/PciHostBridge: Move declaration of mIoMmu to header file
The change doesn't have functionality impact.
It just renames the mIoMmuProtocol to mIoMmu and moves the
declaration from PciRootBridgeIo.c to PciHostBridge.h.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Suggested-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
RootBridgeIoCheckParameter() verifies that the requested MMIO access
can fit in any of the MEM/PMEM 32/64 ranges. But today's logic
somehow only checks the requested access against MEM 32/64 ranges.
It should also check the requested access against PMEM 32/64 ranges.
projects / mirror_edk2.git / log