From 2184ededd36b5221699087a8e084e82ee3b3908a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dandan Bi Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 15:08:26 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the caller in PlatformDriOverrideDxe which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Jian J Wang Cc: Hao A Wu Cc: Liming Gao Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude --- .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c index 2d3736b468..f91f038b7a 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /** @file Implementation of the shared functions to do the platform driver vverride mapping. - Copyright (c) 2007 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2007 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent **/ @@ -1486,6 +1486,15 @@ GetDriverFromMapping ( DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = ImageHandle; } } else { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } DriverImageInfo->UnLoadable = TRUE; DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = NULL; } -- 2.39.2