From b92b1209f71519bea2ae237088d586726605882e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lgao4 Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2012 01:30:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Add PI1.2.1 SAP2 support and UEFI231B mantis 896 1. Add SAP2 protocol definition in MdePkg Signed-off-by: Liming Gao Reviewed-by: Guo Dong git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@13658 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524 --- MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Security2.h | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ MdePkg/Include/Uefi/UefiSpec.h | 9 ++- MdePkg/MdePkg.dec | 6 ++ 3 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Security2.h diff --git a/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Security2.h b/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Security2.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d282837b39 --- /dev/null +++ b/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Security2.h @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/** @file + Security2 Architectural Protocol as defined in PI Specification1.2.1 VOLUME 2 DXE + + Abstracts security-specific functions from the DXE Foundation of UEFI Image Verification, + Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, and User Identity policy for image loading and + consoles. This protocol must be produced by a boot service or runtime DXE driver. + + This protocol is optional and must be published prior to the EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL. + As a result, the same driver must publish both of these interfaces. + + When both Security and Security2 Architectural Protocols are published, LoadImage must use + them in accordance with the following rules: + The Security2 protocol must be used on every image being loaded. + The Security protocol must be used after the Securiy2 protocol and only on images that + have been read using Firmware Volume protocol. + + When only Security architectural protocol is published, LoadImage must use it on every image + being loaded. + + Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ This program and the accompanying materials + are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License + which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at + http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php + + THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. + +**/ + +#ifndef __ARCH_PROTOCOL_SECURITY2_H__ +#define __ARCH_PROTOCOL_SECURITY2_H__ + +/// +/// Global ID for the Security2 Code Architectural Protocol +/// +#define EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL_GUID \ + { 0x94ab2f58, 0x1438, 0x4ef1, {0x91, 0x52, 0x18, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0x68 } } + +typedef struct _EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL; + +/** + The DXE Foundation uses this service to measure and/or verify a UEFI image. + + This service abstracts the invocation of Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, UEFI + Secure boot, and UEFI User Identity infrastructure. For the former two, the DXE Foundation + invokes the FileAuthentication() with a DevicePath and corresponding image in + FileBuffer memory. The TCG measurement code will record the FileBuffer contents into the + appropriate PCR. The image verification logic will confirm the integrity and provenance of the + image in FileBuffer of length FileSize . The origin of the image will be DevicePath in + these cases. + If the FileBuffer is NULL, the interface will determine if the DevicePath can be connected + in order to support the User Identification policy. + + @param This The EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance. + @param File A pointer to the device path of the file that is + being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging. + @param FileBuffer A pointer to the buffer with the UEFI file image. + @param FileSize The size of the file. + @param BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service. If + FileAuthentication() is invoked not from the LoadImage(), + BootPolicy must be set to FALSE. + + @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL + FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates + that the DXE Foundation may use the file. + @retval EFI_SUCCESS The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath + and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform + policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in + FileBuffer. + @retval EFI_SUCCESS FileBuffer is NULL and current user has permission to start + UEFI device drivers on the device path specified by DevicePath. + @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by DevicePath and FileBuffer did not + authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the file should be + placed in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file + execution table. + @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not + authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE + Foundation may not use File. + @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION FileBuffer is NULL and the user has no + permission to start UEFI device drivers on the device path specified + by DevicePath. + @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION FileBuffer is not NULL and the user has no permission to load + drivers from the device path specified by DevicePath. The + image has been added into the list of the deferred images. +**/ +typedef EFI_STATUS (EFIAPI *EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION) ( + IN CONST EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL *This, + IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath, + IN VOID *FileBuffer, + IN UINTN FileSize, + IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy +); + +/// +/// The EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL is used to abstract platform-specific policy from the +/// DXE Foundation. This includes measuring the PE/COFF image prior to invoking, comparing the +/// image against a policy (whether a white-list/black-list of public image verification keys +/// or registered hashes). +/// +struct _EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL { + EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION FileAuthentication; +}; + +extern EFI_GUID gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid; + +#endif diff --git a/MdePkg/Include/Uefi/UefiSpec.h b/MdePkg/Include/Uefi/UefiSpec.h index f389693845..ffdfcd6398 100644 --- a/MdePkg/Include/Uefi/UefiSpec.h +++ b/MdePkg/Include/Uefi/UefiSpec.h @@ -281,7 +281,9 @@ EFI_STATUS @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND 1) There are no EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL instances present in the system. 2) No drivers were connected to ControllerHandle. - + @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION + The user has no permission to start UEFI device drivers on the device path + associated with the ControllerHandle or specified by the RemainingDevicePath. **/ typedef EFI_STATUS @@ -848,8 +850,9 @@ EFI_STATUS @param ExitData The pointer to a pointer to a data buffer that includes a Null-terminated string, optionally followed by additional binary data. - @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ImageHandle is either an invalid image handle or the image - has already been initialized with StartImage. + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ImageHandle is either an invalid image handle or the image + has already been initialized with StartImage. + @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The current platform policy specifies that the image should not be started. @return Exit code from image **/ diff --git a/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec b/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec index 59b7ac4838..b29cb01c27 100644 --- a/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec +++ b/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec @@ -886,6 +886,12 @@ gEfiExtendedSalCacheServicesProtocolGuid = { 0xedc9494, 0x2743, 0x4ba5, { 0x88, 0x18, 0x0a, 0xef, 0x52, 0x13, 0xf1, 0x88 } } gEfiExtendedSalMcaLogServicesProtocolGuid = { 0xcb3fd86e, 0x38a3, 0x4c03, {0x9a, 0x5c, 0x90, 0xcf, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xab, 0x7a } } + # + # Protocols defined in PI1.2.1 + # + ## Include/Protocol/Security2.h + gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid = { 0x94ab2f58, 0x1438, 0x4ef1, {0x91, 0x52, 0x18, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0x68 } } + # # Protocols defined in UEFI2.1/UEFI2.0/EFI1.1 # -- 2.39.2