ptp: fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

ptp: fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

pin_index can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c:253 ptp_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'ops->pin_config' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing pin_index before using it to index
ops->pin_config, and before passing it as an argument to
function ptp_set_pinfunc(), in which it is used to index
info->pin_config.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CVE-2017-5753

(cherry picked from commit efa61c8cf2950ab5c0e66cff3cabe2a2b24e81ba)
Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>