x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
CVE-2017-5715
CVE-2017-5754
CVE-2018-3639
CVE-2018-3620
CVE-2018-3646

(cherry picked from commit d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git)
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 811a524411a8a0f03d8a0a181926be02785d98bc..399f3cca28953a7b7c579d8d70ceb83e993e2e43 100644 (file)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2424,15 +2424,20 @@
                        http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
        mitigations=
-                       Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
-                       This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
-                       of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
-                       options.
+                       [X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+                       vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+                       arch-independent options, each of which is an
+                       aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
                        off
                                Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
                                improves system performance, but it may also
                                expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+                               Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
+                                              nospectre_v2 [X86]
+                                              spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+                                              spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+                                              l1tf=off [X86]
 
                        auto (default)
                                Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2440,12 +2445,13 @@
                                users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
                                getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
                                have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
-                               This is the default behavior.
+                               Equivalent to: (default behavior)
 
                        auto,nosmt
                                Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
                                if needed.  This is for users who always want to
                                be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+                               Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
 
        mminit_loglevel=
                        [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b6c09732698fb6fdca5477b89c2fe0b843ba193d..415f841ec4c007ea7d84f38ce421bf704a57d19e 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -504,7 +504,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
        char arg[20];
        int ret, i;
 
-       if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+       if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+           cpu_mitigations_off())
                return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
        ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -765,7 +766,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
        char arg[20];
        int ret, i;
 
-       if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+       if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+           cpu_mitigations_off()) {
                return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
        } else {
                ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
@@ -1090,6 +1092,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
                return;
 
+       if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+               l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+       else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+               l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+
        override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 
        switch (l1tf_mitigation) {

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 3858b97e0965e6e3f5193760a2884578d9f88637..9f5a04ea80151fe9986f1ca449403e2d6870e69d 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
                }
        }
 
-       if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
+       if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+           cpu_mitigations_off()) {
                pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
                pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
                return;