use Net::IP;
use MIME::Base64;
use Digest::SHA;
+use IO::File;
+use File::stat;
+use JSON;
use PVE::OTP;
use PVE::Ticket;
# $authdir must be writable by root only!
my $confdir = "/etc/pve";
my $authdir = "$confdir/priv";
-my $authprivkeyfn = "$authdir/authkey.key";
-my $authpubkeyfn = "$confdir/authkey.pub";
+
my $pve_www_key_fn = "$confdir/pve-www.key";
-my $ticket_lifetime = 3600*2; # 2 hours
+my $pve_auth_key_files = {
+ priv => "$authdir/authkey.key",
+ pub => "$confdir/authkey.pub",
+ pubold => "$confdir/authkey.pub.old",
+};
+
+my $pve_auth_key_cache = {};
+
+my $ticket_lifetime = 3600 * 2; # 2 hours
+my $authkey_lifetime = 3600 * 24; # rotate every 24 hours
Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->import_random_seed();
cfs_register_file('user.cfg',
\&parse_user_config,
\&write_user_config);
+cfs_register_file('priv/tfa.cfg',
+ \&parse_priv_tfa_config,
+ \&write_priv_tfa_config);
sub verify_username {
PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username(@_);
}
}
-my $pve_auth_pub_key;
+my $cache_read_key = sub {
+ my ($type) = @_;
+
+ my $path = $pve_auth_key_files->{$type};
+
+ my $read_key_and_mtime = sub {
+ my $fh = IO::File->new($path, "r");
+
+ return undef if !defined($fh);
+
+ my $st = stat($fh);
+ my $pem = PVE::Tools::safe_read_from($fh, 0, 0, $path);
+
+ close $fh;
+
+ my $key;
+ if ($type eq 'pub' || $type eq 'pubold') {
+ $key = eval { Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_public_key($pem); };
+ } elsif ($type eq 'priv') {
+ $key = eval { Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($pem); };
+ } else {
+ die "Invalid authkey type '$type'\n";
+ }
+
+ return { key => $key, mtime => $st->mtime };
+ };
+
+ if (!defined($pve_auth_key_cache->{$type})) {
+ $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type} = $read_key_and_mtime->();
+ } else {
+ my $st = stat($path);
+ if (!$st || $st->mtime != $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type}->{mtime}) {
+ $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type} = $read_key_and_mtime->();
+ }
+ }
+
+ return $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type};
+};
+
sub get_pubkey {
+ my ($old) = @_;
+
+ my $type = $old ? 'pubold' : 'pub';
+
+ my $res = $cache_read_key->($type);
+ return undef if !defined($res);
+
+ return wantarray ? ($res->{key}, $res->{mtime}) : $res->{key};
+}
- return $pve_auth_pub_key if $pve_auth_pub_key;
+sub get_privkey {
+ my $res = $cache_read_key->('priv');
+
+ if (!defined($res) || !check_authkey(1)) {
+ rotate_authkey();
+ $res = $cache_read_key->('priv');
+ }
+
+ return wantarray ? ($res->{key}, $res->{mtime}) : $res->{key};
+}
- my $input = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents($authpubkeyfn);
+sub check_authkey {
+ my ($quiet) = @_;
- $pve_auth_pub_key = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_public_key($input);
+ # skip check if non-quorate, as rotation is not possible anyway
+ return 1 if !PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1);
- return $pve_auth_pub_key;
+ my ($pub_key, $mtime) = get_pubkey();
+ if (!$pub_key) {
+ warn "auth key pair missing, generating new one..\n" if !$quiet;
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ if (time() - $mtime >= $authkey_lifetime) {
+ warn "auth key pair too old, rotating..\n" if !$quiet;;
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ warn "auth key new enough, skipping rotation\n" if !$quiet;;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+sub rotate_authkey {
+ return if $authkey_lifetime == 0;
+
+ PVE::Cluster::cfs_lock_authkey(undef, sub {
+ # re-check with lock to avoid double rotation in clusters
+ return if check_authkey();
+
+ my $old = get_pubkey();
+ my $new = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key(2048);
+
+ if ($old) {
+ eval {
+ my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string();
+ # mtime is used for caching and ticket age range calculation
+ PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pubold}, $pem);
+ };
+ die "Failed to store old auth key: $@\n" if $@;
+ }
+
+ eval {
+ my $pem = $new->get_public_key_x509_string();
+ # mtime is used for caching and ticket age range calculation,
+ # should be close to that of pubold above
+ PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem);
+ };
+ if ($@) {
+ if ($old) {
+ warn "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n";
+ warn "Reverting to previous auth key\n";
+ eval {
+ my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string();
+ PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem);
+ };
+ die "Failed to restore old auth key: $@\n" if $@;
+ } else {
+ die "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n";
+ }
+ }
+
+ eval {
+ my $pem = $new->get_private_key_string();
+ PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{priv}, $pem);
+ };
+ if ($@) {
+ warn "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n";
+ warn "Deleting auth key to force regeneration\n";
+ unlink $pve_auth_key_files->{pub};
+ unlink $pve_auth_key_files->{priv};
+ }
+ });
+ die $@ if $@;
}
my $csrf_prevention_secret;
+my $csrf_prevention_secret_legacy;
my $get_csrfr_secret = sub {
if (!$csrf_prevention_secret) {
my $input = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents($pve_www_key_fn);
- $csrf_prevention_secret = Digest::SHA::sha1_base64($input);
+ $csrf_prevention_secret = Digest::SHA::hmac_sha256_base64($input);
+ $csrf_prevention_secret_legacy = Digest::SHA::sha1_base64($input);
}
return $csrf_prevention_secret;
};
sub verify_csrf_prevention_token {
my ($username, $token, $noerr) = @_;
- my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret();
+ my $secret = $get_csrfr_secret->();
+
+ # FIXME: remove with PVE 7 and/or refactor all into PVE::Ticket ?
+ if ($token =~ m/^([A-Z0-9]{8}):(\S+)$/) {
+ my $sig = $2;
+ if (length($sig) == 27) {
+ # the legacy secret got populated by above get_csrfr_secret call
+ $secret = $csrf_prevention_secret_legacy;
+ }
+ }
return PVE::Ticket::verify_csrf_prevention_token(
$secret, $username, $token, -300, $ticket_lifetime, $noerr);
}
-my $pve_auth_priv_key;
-sub get_privkey {
+my $get_ticket_age_range = sub {
+ my ($now, $mtime, $rotated) = @_;
+
+ my $key_age = $now - $mtime;
+ $key_age = 0 if $key_age < 0;
- return $pve_auth_priv_key if $pve_auth_priv_key;
+ my $min = -300;
+ my $max = $ticket_lifetime;
- my $input = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents($authprivkeyfn);
+ if ($rotated) {
+ # ticket creation after rotation is not allowed
+ $min = $key_age - 300;
+ } else {
+ if ($key_age > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0) {
+ if (PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1)) {
+ # key should have been rotated, clamp range accordingly
+ $min = $key_age - $authkey_lifetime;
+ } else {
+ warn "Cluster not quorate - extending auth key lifetime!\n";
+ }
+ }
- $pve_auth_priv_key = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($input);
+ $max = $key_age + 300 if $key_age < $ticket_lifetime;
+ }
- return $pve_auth_priv_key;
-}
+ return undef if $min > $ticket_lifetime;
+ return ($min, $max);
+};
sub assemble_ticket {
- my ($username) = @_;
+ my ($data) = @_;
my $rsa_priv = get_privkey();
- return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket($rsa_priv, 'PVE', $username);
+ return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket($rsa_priv, 'PVE', $data);
}
sub verify_ticket {
my ($ticket, $noerr) = @_;
- my $rsa_pub = get_pubkey();
+ my $now = time();
+
+ my $check = sub {
+ my ($old) = @_;
+
+ my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey($old);
+ return undef if !$rsa_pub;
+
+ my ($min, $max) = $get_ticket_age_range->($now, $rsa_mtime, $old);
+ return undef if !defined($min);
+
+ return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(
+ $rsa_pub, 'PVE', $ticket, undef, $min, $max, 1);
+ };
+
+ my ($data, $age) = $check->();
- my ($username, $age) = PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(
- $rsa_pub, 'PVE', $ticket, undef, -300, $ticket_lifetime, $noerr);
+ # check with old, rotated key if current key failed
+ ($data, $age) = $check->(1) if !defined($data);
- return undef if $noerr && !defined($username);
+ my $auth_failure = sub {
+ if ($noerr) {
+ return undef;
+ } else {
+ # raise error via undef ticket
+ PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(undef, 'PVE');
+ }
+ };
+
+ if (!defined($data)) {
+ return $auth_failure->();
+ }
+
+ my ($username, $tfa_info);
+ if ($data =~ m{^u2f!([^!]+)!([0-9a-zA-Z/.=_\-+]+)$}) {
+ # Ticket for u2f-users:
+ ($username, my $challenge) = ($1, $2);
+ if ($challenge eq 'verified') {
+ # u2f challenge was completed
+ $challenge = undef;
+ } elsif (!wantarray) {
+ # The caller is not aware there could be an ongoing challenge,
+ # so we treat this ticket as invalid:
+ return $auth_failure->();
+ }
+ $tfa_info = {
+ type => 'u2f',
+ challenge => $challenge,
+ };
+ } elsif ($data =~ /^tfa!(.*)$/) {
+ # TOTP and Yubico don't require a challenge so this is the generic
+ # 'missing 2nd factor ticket'
+ $username = $1;
+ $tfa_info = { type => 'tfa' };
+ } else {
+ # Regular ticket (full access)
+ $username = $data;
+ }
return undef if !PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username, $noerr);
- return wantarray ? ($username, $age) : $username;
+ return wantarray ? ($username, $age, $tfa_info) : $username;
}
# VNC tickets
sub verify_vnc_ticket {
my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
- my $rsa_pub = get_pubkey();
-
my $secret_data = "$username:$path";
+ my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey();
+ if (!$rsa_pub || (time() - $rsa_mtime > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0)) {
+ if ($noerr) {
+ return undef;
+ } else {
+ # raise error via undef ticket
+ PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket($rsa_pub, 'PVEVNC');
+ }
+ }
+
return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(
$rsa_pub, 'PVEVNC', $ticket, $secret_data, -20, 40, $noerr);
}
}
sub verify_one_time_pw {
- my ($usercfg, $username, $tfa_cfg, $otp) = @_;
-
- my $type = $tfa_cfg->{type};
+ my ($type, $username, $keys, $tfa_cfg, $otp) = @_;
die "missing one time password for two-factor authentication '$type'\n" if !$otp;
my $proxy;
if ($type eq 'yubico') {
- my $keys = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{keys};
PVE::OTP::yubico_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{url},
$tfa_cfg->{id}, $tfa_cfg->{key}, $proxy);
} elsif ($type eq 'oath') {
- my $keys = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{keys};
PVE::OTP::oath_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{step}, $tfa_cfg->{digits});
} else {
die "unknown tfa type '$type'\n";
my $plugin = PVE::Auth::Plugin->lookup($cfg->{type});
$plugin->authenticate_user($cfg, $realm, $ruid, $password);
- if ($cfg->{tfa}) {
- my $tfa_cfg = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($cfg->{tfa});
- verify_one_time_pw($usercfg, $username, $tfa_cfg, $otp);
+ my ($type, $tfa_data) = user_get_tfa($username, $realm);
+ if ($type) {
+ if ($type eq 'u2f') {
+ # Note that if the user did not manage to complete the initial u2f registration
+ # challenge we have a hash containing a 'challenge' entry in the user's tfa.cfg entry:
+ $tfa_data = undef if exists $tfa_data->{challenge};
+ } elsif (!defined($otp)) {
+ # The user requires a 2nd factor but has not provided one. Return success but
+ # don't clear $tfa_data.
+ } else {
+ my $keys = $tfa_data->{keys};
+ my $tfa_cfg = $tfa_data->{config};
+ verify_one_time_pw($type, $username, $keys, $tfa_cfg, $otp);
+ $tfa_data = undef;
+ }
+
+ # Return the type along with the rest:
+ if ($tfa_data) {
+ $tfa_data = {
+ type => $type,
+ data => $tfa_data,
+ };
+ }
}
- return $username;
+ return wantarray ? ($username, $tfa_data) : $username;
}
sub domain_set_password {
create_roles();
+sub create_priv_properties {
+ my $properties = {};
+ foreach my $priv (keys %$valid_privs) {
+ $properties->{$priv} = {
+ type => 'boolean',
+ optional => 1,
+ };
+ }
+ return $properties;
+}
+
sub role_is_special {
my ($role) = @_;
return (exists $special_roles->{$role}) ? 1 : 0;
}
foreach my $ug (split_list($uglist)) {
- if ($ug =~ m/^@(\S+)$/) {
- my $group = $1;
+ my ($group) = $ug =~ m/^@(\S+)$/;
+
+ if ($group && verify_groupname($group, 1)) {
if ($cfg->{groups}->{$group}) { # group exists
$cfg->{acl}->{$path}->{groups}->{$group}->{$role} = $propagate;
} else {
my $data = '';
- foreach my $user (keys %{$cfg->{users}}) {
+ foreach my $user (sort keys %{$cfg->{users}}) {
my $d = $cfg->{users}->{$user};
my $firstname = $d->{firstname} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{firstname}) : '';
my $lastname = $d->{lastname} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{lastname}) : '';
$data .= "\n";
- foreach my $group (keys %{$cfg->{groups}}) {
+ foreach my $group (sort keys %{$cfg->{groups}}) {
my $d = $cfg->{groups}->{$group};
my $list = join (',', keys %{$d->{users}});
my $comment = $d->{comment} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{comment}) : '';
$data .= "\n";
- foreach my $pool (keys %{$cfg->{pools}}) {
+ foreach my $pool (sort keys %{$cfg->{pools}}) {
my $d = $cfg->{pools}->{$pool};
my $vmlist = join (',', keys %{$d->{vms}});
my $storelist = join (',', keys %{$d->{storage}});
$data .= "\n";
- foreach my $role (keys %{$cfg->{roles}}) {
+ foreach my $role (sort keys %{$cfg->{roles}}) {
next if $special_roles->{$role};
my $d = $cfg->{roles}->{$role};
return $data;
}
+# The TFA configuration in priv/tfa.cfg format contains one line per user of
+# the form:
+# USER:TYPE:DATA
+# DATA is a base64 encoded json string and its format depends on the type.
+sub parse_priv_tfa_config {
+ my ($filename, $raw) = @_;
+
+ my $users = {};
+ my $cfg = { users => $users };
+
+ $raw = '' if !defined($raw);
+ while ($raw =~ /^\s*(.+?)\s*$/gm) {
+ my $line = $1;
+ my ($user, $type, $data) = split(/:/, $line, 3);
+
+ my (undef, undef, $realm) = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($user, 1);
+ if (!$realm) {
+ warn "user tfa config - ignore user '$user' - invalid user name\n";
+ next;
+ }
+
+ $data = decode_json(decode_base64($data));
+
+ $users->{$user} = {
+ type => $type,
+ data => $data,
+ };
+ }
+
+ return $cfg;
+}
+
+sub write_priv_tfa_config {
+ my ($filename, $cfg) = @_;
+
+ my $output = '';
+
+ my $users = $cfg->{users};
+ foreach my $user (sort keys %$users) {
+ my $info = $users->{$user};
+ next if !%$info; # skip empty entries
+
+ $info = {%$info}; # copy to verify contents:
+
+ my $type = delete $info->{type};
+ my $data = delete $info->{data};
+
+ if (my @keys = keys %$info) {
+ die "invalid keys in TFA config for user $user: " . join(', ', @keys) . "\n";
+ }
+
+ $data = encode_base64(encode_json($data), '');
+ $output .= "${user}:${type}:${data}\n";
+ }
+
+ return $output;
+}
+
sub roles {
my ($cfg, $user, $path) = @_;
lock_user_config($delVMfromPoolFn, "pool cleanup for VM $vmid failed");
}
+my $USER_CONTROLLED_TFA_TYPES = {
+ u2f => 1,
+ oath => 1,
+};
+
+# Delete an entry by setting $data=undef in which case $type is ignored.
+# Otherwise both must be valid.
+sub user_set_tfa {
+ my ($userid, $realm, $type, $data, $cached_usercfg, $cached_domaincfg) = @_;
+
+ if (defined($data) && !defined($type)) {
+ # This is an internal usage error and should not happen
+ die "cannot set tfa data without a type\n";
+ }
+
+ my $user_cfg = $cached_usercfg || cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
+ my $user = $user_cfg->{users}->{$userid}
+ or die "user '$userid' not found\n";
+
+ my $domain_cfg = $cached_domaincfg || cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
+ my $realm_cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
+ die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$realm_cfg;
+
+ my $realm_tfa = $realm_cfg->{tfa};
+ if (defined($realm_tfa)) {
+ $realm_tfa = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($realm_tfa);
+ # If the realm has a TFA setting, we're only allowed to use that.
+ if (defined($data)) {
+ my $required_type = $realm_tfa->{type};
+ if ($required_type ne $type) {
+ die "realm '$realm' only allows TFA of type '$required_type\n";
+ }
+
+ if (defined($data->{config})) {
+ # XXX: Is it enough if the type matches? Or should the configuration also match?
+ }
+
+ # realm-configured tfa always uses a simple key list, so use the user.cfg
+ $user->{keys} = $data->{keys};
+ } else {
+ die "realm '$realm' does not allow removing the 2nd factor\n";
+ }
+ } else {
+ # Without a realm-enforced TFA setting the user can add a u2f or totp entry by themselves.
+ # The 'yubico' type requires yubico server settings, which have to be configured on the
+ # realm, so this is not supported here:
+ die "domain '$realm' does not support TFA type '$type'\n"
+ if defined($data) && !$USER_CONTROLLED_TFA_TYPES->{$type};
+ }
+
+ # Custom TFA entries are stored in priv/tfa.cfg as they can be more complet: u2f uses a
+ # public key and a key handle, TOTP requires the usual totp settings...
+
+ my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
+ my $tfa = ($tfa_cfg->{users}->{$userid} //= {});
+
+ if (defined($data)) {
+ $tfa->{type} = $type;
+ $tfa->{data} = $data;
+ cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
+
+ $user->{keys} = "x!$type";
+ } else {
+ delete $tfa_cfg->{users}->{$userid};
+ cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
+
+ delete $user->{keys};
+ }
+
+ cfs_write_file('user.cfg', $user_cfg);
+}
+
+sub user_get_tfa {
+ my ($username, $realm) = @_;
+
+ my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
+ my $user = $user_cfg->{users}->{$username}
+ or die "user '$username' not found\n";
+
+ my $keys = $user->{keys};
+
+ my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
+ my $realm_cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
+ die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$realm_cfg;
+
+ my $realm_tfa = $realm_cfg->{tfa};
+ $realm_tfa = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($realm_tfa)
+ if $realm_tfa;
+
+ if (!$keys) {
+ return if !$realm_tfa;
+ die "missing required 2nd keys\n";
+ }
+
+ # new style config starts with an 'x' and optionally contains a !<type> suffix
+ if ($keys !~ /^x(?:!.*)?$/) {
+ # old style config, find the type via the realm
+ return if !$realm_tfa;
+ return ($realm_tfa->{type}, {
+ keys => $keys,
+ config => $realm_tfa,
+ });
+ } else {
+ my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
+ my $tfa = $tfa_cfg->{users}->{$username};
+ return if !$tfa; # should not happen (user.cfg wasn't cleaned up?)
+
+ if ($realm_tfa) {
+ # if the realm has a tfa setting we need to verify the type:
+ die "auth domain '$realm' and user have mismatching TFA settings\n"
+ if $realm_tfa && $realm_tfa->{type} ne $tfa->{type};
+ }
+
+ return ($tfa->{type}, $tfa->{data});
+ }
+}
+
# bash completion helpers
register_standard_option('userid-completed',
projects / pve-access-control.git / blobdiff