use Net::SSLeay;
use Net::IP;
use MIME::Base64;
-use MIME::Base32; #libmime-base32-perl
use Digest::SHA;
-use URI::Escape;
-use LWP::UserAgent;
+use IO::File;
+use File::stat;
+use JSON;
+
+use PVE::OTP;
+use PVE::Ticket;
use PVE::Tools qw(run_command lock_file file_get_contents split_list safe_print);
use PVE::Cluster qw(cfs_register_file cfs_read_file cfs_write_file cfs_lock_file);
-use PVE::JSONSchema;
+use PVE::JSONSchema qw(register_standard_option get_standard_option);
use PVE::Auth::Plugin;
use PVE::Auth::AD;
use PVE::Auth::PVE;
use PVE::Auth::PAM;
-use Data::Dumper; # fixme: remove
-
# load and initialize all plugins
PVE::Auth::AD->register();
# $authdir must be writable by root only!
my $confdir = "/etc/pve";
my $authdir = "$confdir/priv";
-my $authprivkeyfn = "$authdir/authkey.key";
-my $authpubkeyfn = "$confdir/authkey.pub";
+
my $pve_www_key_fn = "$confdir/pve-www.key";
+my $pve_auth_key_files = {
+ priv => "$authdir/authkey.key",
+ pub => "$confdir/authkey.pub",
+ pubold => "$confdir/authkey.pub.old",
+};
+
+my $pve_auth_key_cache = {};
+
my $ticket_lifetime = 3600*2; # 2 hours
+# TODO: set to 24h for PVE 6.0
+my $authkey_lifetime = 3600*0; # rotation disabled
Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->import_random_seed();
cfs_register_file('user.cfg',
\&parse_user_config,
\&write_user_config);
-
+cfs_register_file('priv/tfa.cfg',
+ \&parse_priv_tfa_config,
+ \&write_priv_tfa_config);
sub verify_username {
PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username(@_);
}
}
-my $pve_auth_pub_key;
+my $cache_read_key = sub {
+ my ($type) = @_;
+
+ my $path = $pve_auth_key_files->{$type};
+
+ my $read_key_and_mtime = sub {
+ my $fh = IO::File->new($path, "r");
+
+ return undef if !defined($fh);
+
+ my $st = stat($fh);
+ my $pem = PVE::Tools::safe_read_from($fh, 0, 0, $path);
+
+ close $fh;
+
+ my $key;
+ if ($type eq 'pub' || $type eq 'pubold') {
+ $key = eval { Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_public_key($pem); };
+ } elsif ($type eq 'priv') {
+ $key = eval { Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($pem); };
+ } else {
+ die "Invalid authkey type '$type'\n";
+ }
+
+ return { key => $key, mtime => $st->mtime };
+ };
+
+ if (!defined($pve_auth_key_cache->{$type})) {
+ $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type} = $read_key_and_mtime->();
+ } else {
+ my $st = stat($path);
+ if (!$st || $st->mtime != $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type}->{mtime}) {
+ $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type} = $read_key_and_mtime->();
+ }
+ }
+
+ return $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type};
+};
+
sub get_pubkey {
+ my ($old) = @_;
+
+ my $type = $old ? 'pubold' : 'pub';
+
+ my $res = $cache_read_key->($type);
+ return undef if !defined($res);
- return $pve_auth_pub_key if $pve_auth_pub_key;
+ return wantarray ? ($res->{key}, $res->{mtime}) : $res->{key};
+}
- my $input = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents($authpubkeyfn);
+sub get_privkey {
+ my $res = $cache_read_key->('priv');
- $pve_auth_pub_key = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_public_key($input);
+ if (!defined($res) || !check_authkey(1)) {
+ rotate_authkey();
+ $res = $cache_read_key->('priv');
+ }
- return $pve_auth_pub_key;
+ return wantarray ? ($res->{key}, $res->{mtime}) : $res->{key};
+}
+
+sub check_authkey {
+ my ($quiet) = @_;
+
+ # skip check if non-quorate, as rotation is not possible anyway
+ return 1 if !PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1);
+
+ my ($pub_key, $mtime) = get_pubkey();
+ if (!$pub_key) {
+ warn "auth key pair missing, generating new one..\n" if !$quiet;
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ if (time() - $mtime >= $authkey_lifetime) {
+ warn "auth key pair too old, rotating..\n" if !$quiet;;
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ warn "auth key new enough, skipping rotation\n" if !$quiet;;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+sub rotate_authkey {
+ return if $authkey_lifetime == 0;
+
+ PVE::Cluster::cfs_lock_authkey(undef, sub {
+ # re-check with lock to avoid double rotation in clusters
+ return if check_authkey();
+
+ my $old = get_pubkey();
+
+ if ($old) {
+ eval {
+ my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string();
+ PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pubold}, $pem);
+ };
+ die "Failed to store old auth key: $@\n" if $@;
+ }
+
+ my $new = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key(2048);
+ eval {
+ my $pem = $new->get_public_key_x509_string();
+ PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem);
+ };
+ if ($@) {
+ if ($old) {
+ warn "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n";
+ warn "Reverting to previous auth key\n";
+ eval {
+ my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string();
+ PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem);
+ };
+ die "Failed to restore old auth key: $@\n" if $@;
+ } else {
+ die "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n";
+ }
+ }
+
+ eval {
+ my $pem = $new->get_private_key_string();
+ PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{priv}, $pem);
+ };
+ if ($@) {
+ warn "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n";
+ warn "Deleting auth key to force regeneration\n";
+ unlink $pve_auth_key_files->{pub};
+ unlink $pve_auth_key_files->{priv};
+ }
+ });
+ die $@ if $@;
}
my $csrf_prevention_secret;
sub assemble_csrf_prevention_token {
my ($username) = @_;
- my $timestamp = sprintf("%08X", time());
-
- my $digest = Digest::SHA::sha1_base64("$timestamp:$username", &$get_csrfr_secret());
+ my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret();
- return "$timestamp:$digest";
+ return PVE::Ticket::assemble_csrf_prevention_token ($secret, $username);
}
sub verify_csrf_prevention_token {
my ($username, $token, $noerr) = @_;
- if ($token =~ m/^([A-Z0-9]{8}):(\S+)$/) {
- my $sig = $2;
- my $timestamp = $1;
- my $ttime = hex($timestamp);
-
- my $digest = Digest::SHA::sha1_base64("$timestamp:$username", &$get_csrfr_secret());
+ my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret();
- my $age = time() - $ttime;
- return if ($digest eq $sig) && ($age > -300) && ($age < $ticket_lifetime);
- }
-
- die "Permission denied - invalid csrf token\n" if !$noerr;
-
- return undef;
+ return PVE::Ticket::verify_csrf_prevention_token(
+ $secret, $username, $token, -300, $ticket_lifetime, $noerr);
}
-my $pve_auth_priv_key;
-sub get_privkey {
+my $get_ticket_age_range = sub {
+ my ($now, $mtime, $rotated) = @_;
- return $pve_auth_priv_key if $pve_auth_priv_key;
+ my $key_age = $now - $mtime;
+ $key_age = 0 if $key_age < 0;
- my $input = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents($authprivkeyfn);
+ my $min = -300;
+ my $max = $ticket_lifetime;
- $pve_auth_priv_key = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($input);
+ if ($rotated) {
+ # ticket creation after rotation is not allowed
+ $min = $key_age - 300;
+ } else {
+ if ($key_age > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0) {
+ if (PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1)) {
+ # key should have been rotated, clamp range accordingly
+ $min = $key_age - $authkey_lifetime;
+ } else {
+ warn "Cluster not quorate - extending auth key lifetime!\n";
+ }
+ }
- return $pve_auth_priv_key;
-}
+ $max = $key_age + 300 if $key_age < $ticket_lifetime;
+ }
+
+ return undef if $min > $ticket_lifetime;
+ return ($min, $max);
+};
sub assemble_ticket {
my ($username) = @_;
my $rsa_priv = get_privkey();
- my $timestamp = sprintf("%08X", time());
-
- my $plain = "PVE:$username:$timestamp";
-
- my $ticket = $plain . "::" . encode_base64($rsa_priv->sign($plain), '');
-
- return $ticket;
+ return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket($rsa_priv, 'PVE', $username);
}
sub verify_ticket {
my ($ticket, $noerr) = @_;
- if ($ticket && $ticket =~ m/^(PVE:\S+)::([^:\s]+)$/) {
- my $plain = $1;
- my $sig = $2;
+ my $now = time();
- my $rsa_pub = get_pubkey();
- if ($rsa_pub->verify($plain, decode_base64($sig))) {
- if ($plain =~ m/^PVE:(\S+):([A-Z0-9]{8})$/) {
- my $username = $1;
- my $timestamp = $2;
- my $ttime = hex($timestamp);
+ my $check = sub {
+ my ($old) = @_;
- my $age = time() - $ttime;
+ my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey($old);
+ return undef if !$rsa_pub;
- if (PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username, 1) &&
- ($age > -300) && ($age < $ticket_lifetime)) {
- return wantarray ? ($username, $age) : $username;
- }
- }
+ my ($min, $max) = $get_ticket_age_range->($now, $rsa_mtime, $old);
+ return undef if !$min;
+
+ return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(
+ $rsa_pub, 'PVE', $ticket, undef, $min, $max, 1);
+ };
+
+ my ($username, $age) = $check->();
+
+ # check with old, rotated key if current key failed
+ ($username, $age) = $check->(1) if !defined($username);
+
+ if (!defined($username)) {
+ if ($noerr) {
+ return undef;
+ } else {
+ # raise error via undef ticket
+ PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(undef, 'PVE');
}
}
- die "permission denied - invalid ticket\n" if !$noerr;
+ return undef if !PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username, $noerr);
- return undef;
+ return wantarray ? ($username, $age) : $username;
}
# VNC tickets
my $rsa_priv = get_privkey();
- my $timestamp = sprintf("%08X", time());
-
- my $plain = "PVEVNC:$timestamp";
-
$path = normalize_path($path);
- my $full = "$plain:$username:$path";
-
- my $ticket = $plain . "::" . encode_base64($rsa_priv->sign($full), '');
+ my $secret_data = "$username:$path";
- return $ticket;
+ return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket(
+ $rsa_priv, 'PVEVNC', undef, $secret_data);
}
sub verify_vnc_ticket {
my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
- if ($ticket && $ticket =~ m/^(PVEVNC:\S+)::([^:\s]+)$/) {
- my $plain = $1;
- my $sig = $2;
- my $full = "$plain:$username:$path";
+ my $secret_data = "$username:$path";
- my $rsa_pub = get_pubkey();
- # Note: sign only match if $username and $path is correct
- if ($rsa_pub->verify($full, decode_base64($sig))) {
- if ($plain =~ m/^PVEVNC:([A-Z0-9]{8})$/) {
- my $ttime = hex($1);
-
- my $age = time() - $ttime;
-
- if (($age > -20) && ($age < 40)) {
- return 1;
- }
- }
+ my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey();
+ if (!$rsa_pub || (time() - $rsa_mtime > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0)) {
+ if ($noerr) {
+ return undef;
+ } else {
+ # raise error via undef ticket
+ PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket($rsa_pub, 'PVEVNC');
}
}
- die "permission denied - invalid vnc ticket\n" if !$noerr;
-
- return undef;
+ return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(
+ $rsa_pub, 'PVEVNC', $ticket, $secret_data, -20, 40, $noerr);
}
sub assemble_spice_ticket {
my ($username, $vmid, $node) = @_;
- my $rsa_priv = get_privkey();
-
- my $timestamp = sprintf("%08x", time());
-
- my $randomstr = "PVESPICE:$timestamp:$vmid:$node:" . rand(10);
-
- # this should be used as one-time password
- # max length is 60 chars (spice limit)
- # we pass this to qemu set_pasword and limit lifetime there
- # keep this secret
- my $ticket = Digest::SHA::sha1_hex($rsa_priv->sign($randomstr));
-
- # Note: spice proxy connects with HTTP, so $proxyticket is exposed to public
- # we use a signature/timestamp to make sure nobody can fake such a ticket
- # an attacker can use this $proxyticket, but he will fail because $ticket is
- # private.
- # The proxy needs to be able to extract/verify the ticket
- # Note: data needs to be lower case only, because virt-viewer needs that
- # Note: RSA signature are too long (>=256 charaters) and make problems with remote-viewer
-
my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret();
- my $plain = "pvespiceproxy:$timestamp:$vmid:" . lc($node);
-
- # produces 40 characters
- my $sig = unpack("H*", Digest::SHA::sha1($plain, &$get_csrfr_secret()));
- #my $sig = unpack("H*", $rsa_priv->sign($plain)); # this produce too long strings (512)
-
- my $proxyticket = $plain . "::" . $sig;
-
- return ($ticket, $proxyticket);
+ return PVE::Ticket::assemble_spice_ticket(
+ $secret, $username, $vmid, $node);
}
sub verify_spice_connect_url {
my ($connect_str) = @_;
- # Note: we pass the spice ticket as 'host', so the
- # spice viewer connects with "$ticket:$port"
-
- return undef if !$connect_str;
-
- if ($connect_str =~m/^pvespiceproxy:([a-z0-9]{8}):(\d+):(\S+)::([a-z0-9]{40}):(\d+)$/) {
- my ($timestamp, $vmid, $node, $hexsig, $port) = ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6);
- my $ttime = hex($timestamp);
- my $age = time() - $ttime;
-
- # use very limited lifetime - is this enough?
- return undef if !(($age > -20) && ($age < 40));
-
- my $plain = "pvespiceproxy:$timestamp:$vmid:$node";
- my $sig = unpack("H*", Digest::SHA::sha1($plain, &$get_csrfr_secret()));
-
- if ($sig eq $hexsig) {
- return ($vmid, $node, $port);
- }
- }
+ my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret();
- return undef;
+ return PVE::Ticket::verify_spice_connect_url($secret, $connect_str);
}
sub read_x509_subject_spice {
}
sub verify_one_time_pw {
- my ($usercfg, $username, $tfa_cfg, $otp) = @_;
-
- my $type = $tfa_cfg->{type};
+ my ($type, $username, $keys, $tfa_cfg, $otp) = @_;
die "missing one time password for two-factor authentication '$type'\n" if !$otp;
my $proxy;
if ($type eq 'yubico') {
- my $keys = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{keys};
- yubico_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{url}, $tfa_cfg->{id}, $tfa_cfg->{key}, $proxy);
+ PVE::OTP::yubico_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{url},
+ $tfa_cfg->{id}, $tfa_cfg->{key}, $proxy);
} elsif ($type eq 'oath') {
- my $keys = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{keys};
- oath_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{step}, $tfa_cfg->{digits});
+ PVE::OTP::oath_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{step}, $tfa_cfg->{digits});
} else {
die "unknown tfa type '$type'\n";
}
my $plugin = PVE::Auth::Plugin->lookup($cfg->{type});
$plugin->authenticate_user($cfg, $realm, $ruid, $password);
- if ($cfg->{tfa}) {
- my $tfa_cfg = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($cfg->{tfa});
- verify_one_time_pw($usercfg, $username, $tfa_cfg, $otp);
+ my $u2f;
+
+ my ($type, $tfa_data) = user_get_tfa($username, $realm);
+ if ($type) {
+ if ($type eq 'u2f') {
+ # Note that if the user did not manage to complete the initial u2f registration
+ # challenge we have a hash containing a 'challenge' entry in the user's tfa.cfg entry:
+ $u2f = $tfa_data if !exists $tfa_data->{challenge};
+ } else {
+ my $keys = $tfa_data->{keys};
+ my $tfa_cfg = $tfa_data->{config};
+ verify_one_time_pw($type, $username, $keys, $tfa_cfg, $otp);
+ }
}
- return $username;
+ return wantarray ? ($username, $u2f) : $username;
}
sub domain_set_password {
'VM.Migrate',
'VM.Monitor',
'VM.Snapshot',
+ 'VM.Snapshot.Rollback',
],
user => [
'VM.Config.CDROM', # change CDROM media
create_roles();
+sub create_priv_properties {
+ my $properties = {};
+ foreach my $priv (keys %$valid_privs) {
+ $properties->{$priv} = {
+ type => 'boolean',
+ optional => 1,
+ };
+ }
+ return $properties;
+}
+
+sub role_is_special {
+ my ($role) = @_;
+ return (exists $special_roles->{$role}) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
sub add_role_privs {
my ($role, $usercfg, $privs) = @_;
return $path;
}
-
PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-groupid', \&verify_groupname);
sub verify_groupname {
my ($groupname, $noerr) = @_;
return $rolename;
}
-PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-poolid', \&verify_groupname);
+PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-poolid', \&verify_poolname);
sub verify_poolname {
my ($poolname, $noerr) = @_;
return $data;
}
+# The TFA configuration in priv/tfa.cfg format contains one line per user of
+# the form:
+# USER:TYPE:DATA
+# DATA is a base64 encoded json string and its format depends on the type.
+sub parse_priv_tfa_config {
+ my ($filename, $raw) = @_;
+
+ my $users = {};
+ my $cfg = { users => $users };
+
+ $raw = '' if !defined($raw);
+ while ($raw =~ /^\s*(.+?)\s*$/gm) {
+ my $line = $1;
+ my ($user, $type, $data) = split(/:/, $line, 3);
+
+ my (undef, undef, $realm) = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($user, 1);
+ if (!$realm) {
+ warn "user tfa config - ignore user '$user' - invalid user name\n";
+ next;
+ }
+
+ $data = decode_json(decode_base64($data));
+
+ $users->{$user} = {
+ type => $type,
+ data => $data,
+ };
+ }
+
+ return $cfg;
+}
+
+sub write_priv_tfa_config {
+ my ($filename, $cfg) = @_;
+
+ my $output = '';
+
+ my $users = $cfg->{users};
+ foreach my $user (sort keys %$users) {
+ my $info = $users->{$user};
+ next if !%$info; # skip empty entries
+
+ $info = {%$info}; # copy to verify contents:
+
+ my $type = delete $info->{type};
+ my $data = delete $info->{data};
+
+ if (my @keys = keys %$info) {
+ die "invalid keys in TFA config for user $user: " . join(', ', @keys) . "\n";
+ }
+
+ $data = encode_base64(encode_json($data), '');
+ $output .= "${user}:${type}:${data}\n";
+ }
+
+ return $output;
+}
+
sub roles {
my ($cfg, $user, $path) = @_;
lock_user_config($delVMfromPoolFn, "pool cleanup for VM $vmid failed");
}
-# hotp/totp code
-
-sub hotp($$;$) {
- my ($binsecret, $number, $digits) = @_;
-
- $digits = 6 if !defined($digits);
-
- my $bincounter = pack('Q>', $number);
- my $hmac = Digest::SHA::hmac_sha1($bincounter, $binsecret);
-
- my $offset = unpack('C', substr($hmac,19) & pack('C', 0x0F));
- my $part = substr($hmac, $offset, 4);
- my $otp = unpack('N', $part);
- my $value = ($otp & 0x7fffffff) % (10**$digits);
- return sprintf("%0${digits}d", $value);
-}
-
-# experimental code for yubico OTP verification
+my $CUSTOM_TFA_TYPES = {
+ u2f => 1,
+ oath => 1,
+};
-sub yubico_compute_param_sig {
- my ($param, $api_key) = @_;
+# Delete an entry by setting $data=undef in which case $type is ignored.
+# Otherwise both must be valid.
+sub user_set_tfa {
+ my ($userid, $realm, $type, $data, $cached_usercfg, $cached_domaincfg) = @_;
- my $paramstr = '';
- foreach my $key (sort keys %$param) {
- $paramstr .= '&' if $paramstr;
- $paramstr .= "$key=$param->{$key}";
+ if (defined($data) && !defined($type)) {
+ # This is an internal usage error and should not happen
+ die "cannot set tfa data without a type\n";
}
- # hmac_sha1_base64 does not add '=' padding characters, so we use encode_base64
- my $sig = uri_escape(encode_base64(Digest::SHA::hmac_sha1($paramstr, decode_base64($api_key || '')), ''));
-
- return ($paramstr, $sig);
-}
-
-sub yubico_verify_otp {
- my ($otp, $keys, $url, $api_id, $api_key, $proxy) = @_;
-
- die "yubico: missing password\n" if !defined($otp);
- die "yubico: missing API ID\n" if !defined($api_id);
- die "yubico: missing API KEY\n" if !defined($api_key);
- die "yubico: no associated yubico keys\n" if $keys =~ m/^\s+$/;
-
- die "yubico: wrong OTP length\n" if (length($otp) < 32) || (length($otp) > 48);
-
- $url = 'http://api2.yubico.com/wsapi/2.0/verify' if !defined($url);
-
- my $params = {
- nonce => Digest::SHA::hmac_sha1_hex(time(), rand()),
- id => $api_id,
- otp => uri_escape($otp),
- timestamp => 1,
- };
-
- my ($paramstr, $sig) = yubico_compute_param_sig($params, $api_key);
-
- $paramstr .= "&h=$sig" if $api_key;
-
- my $req = HTTP::Request->new('GET' => "$url?$paramstr");
+ my $user_cfg = $cached_usercfg || cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
+ my $user = $user_cfg->{users}->{$userid}
+ or die "user '$userid' not found\n";
+
+ my $domain_cfg = $cached_domaincfg || cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
+ my $realm_cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
+ die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$realm_cfg;
+
+ my $realm_tfa = $realm_cfg->{tfa};
+ if (defined($realm_tfa)) {
+ $realm_tfa = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($realm_tfa);
+ # If the realm has a TFA setting, we're only allowed to use that.
+ if (defined($data)) {
+ my $required_type = $realm_tfa->{type};
+ if ($required_type ne $type) {
+ die "realm '$realm' only allows TFA of type '$required_type\n";
+ }
- my $ua = LWP::UserAgent->new(protocols_allowed => ['http', 'https'], timeout => 30);
+ if (defined($data->{config})) {
+ # XXX: Is it enough if the type matches? Or should the configuration also match?
+ }
- if ($proxy) {
- $ua->proxy(['http', 'https'], $proxy);
+ # realm-configured tfa always uses a simple key list, so use the user.cfg
+ $user->{keys} = $data->{keys};
+ } else {
+ die "realm '$realm' does not allow removing the 2nd factor\n";
+ }
} else {
- $ua->env_proxy;
- }
-
- my $response = $ua->request($req);
- my $code = $response->code;
-
- if ($code != 200) {
- my $msg = $response->message || 'unknown';
- die "Invalid response from server: $code $msg\n";
- }
-
- my $raw = $response->decoded_content;
-
- my $result = {};
- foreach my $kvpair (split(/\n/, $raw)) {
- chomp $kvpair;
- if($kvpair =~ /^\S+=/) {
- my ($k, $v) = split(/=/, $kvpair, 2);
- $v =~ s/\s//g;
- $result->{$k} = $v;
- }
+ # Without a realm-enforced TFA setting the user can add a u2f or totp entry by themselves.
+ # The 'yubico' type requires yubico server settings, which have to be configured on the
+ # realm, so this is not supported here:
+ die "domain '$realm' does not support TFA type '$type'\n"
+ if defined($data) && !$CUSTOM_TFA_TYPES->{$type};
}
- my $rsig = $result->{h};
- delete $result->{h};
+ # Custom TFA entries are stored in priv/tfa.cfg as they can be more complet: u2f uses a
+ # public key and a key handle, TOTP requires the usual totp settings...
- if ($api_key) {
- my ($datastr, $vsig) = yubico_compute_param_sig($result, $api_key);
- $vsig = uri_unescape($vsig);
- die "yubico: result signature verification failed\n" if $rsig ne $vsig;
- }
+ my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
+ my $tfa = ($tfa_cfg->{users}->{$userid} //= {});
- die "yubico auth failed: $result->{status}\n" if $result->{status} ne 'OK';
+ if (defined($data)) {
+ $tfa->{type} = $type;
+ $tfa->{data} = $data;
+ cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
- my $publicid = $result->{publicid} = substr(lc($result->{otp}), 0, 12);
+ $user->{keys} = 'x';
+ } else {
+ delete $tfa_cfg->{users}->{$userid};
+ cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
- my $found;
- foreach my $k (PVE::Tools::split_list($keys)) {
- if ($k eq $publicid) {
- $found = 1;
- last;
- }
+ delete $user->{keys};
}
- die "yubico auth failed: key does not belong to user\n" if !$found;
-
- return $result;
+ cfs_write_file('user.cfg', $user_cfg);
}
-sub oath_verify_otp {
- my ($otp, $keys, $step, $digits) = @_;
+sub user_get_tfa {
+ my ($username, $realm) = @_;
- die "oath: missing password\n" if !defined($otp);
- die "oath: no associated oath keys\n" if $keys =~ m/^\s+$/;
+ my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
+ my $user = $user_cfg->{users}->{$username}
+ or die "user '$username' not found\n";
- $step = 30 if !$step;
- $digits = 6 if !$digits;
+ my $keys = $user->{keys};
+ return if !$keys;
- my $found;
- foreach my $k (PVE::Tools::split_list($keys)) {
- # Note: we generate 3 values to allow small time drift
- my $binkey;
- if ($k =~ /^[A-Z2-7=]{16}$/) {
- $binkey = MIME::Base32::decode_rfc3548($k);
- } elsif ($k =~ /^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$/) {
- $binkey = pack('H*', $k);
- } else {
- die "unrecognized key format, must be hex or base32 encoded\n";
+ my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
+ my $realm_cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
+ die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$realm_cfg;
+
+ my $realm_tfa = $realm_cfg->{tfa};
+ $realm_tfa = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($realm_tfa)
+ if $realm_tfa;
+
+ if ($keys ne 'x') {
+ # old style config, find the type via the realm
+ return if !$realm_tfa;
+ return ($realm_tfa->{type}, {
+ keys => $keys,
+ config => $realm_tfa,
+ });
+ } else {
+ my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
+ my $tfa = $tfa_cfg->{users}->{$username};
+ return if !$tfa; # should not happen (user.cfg wasn't cleaned up?)
+
+ if ($realm_tfa) {
+ # if the realm has a tfa setting we need to verify the type:
+ die "auth domain '$realm' and user have mismatching TFA settings\n"
+ if $realm_tfa && $realm_tfa->{type} ne $tfa->{type};
}
- # force integer division for time/step
- use integer;
- my $now = time()/$step - 1;
- $found = 1 if $otp eq hotp($binkey, $now+0, $digits);
- $found = 1 if $otp eq hotp($binkey, $now+1, $digits);
- $found = 1 if $otp eq hotp($binkey, $now+2, $digits);
- last if $found;
+ return ($tfa->{type}, $tfa->{data});
}
-
- die "oath auth failed\n" if !$found;
}
# bash completion helpers
+register_standard_option('userid-completed',
+ get_standard_option('userid', { completion => \&complete_username}),
+);
+
sub complete_username {
my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
projects / pve-access-control.git / blobdiff