X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?p=pve-access-control.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=PVE%2FAccessControl.pm;h=013226819579cb79be45d8749f478a5d88bc21e3;hp=db311213f170a3eea679ee3f4627e285e85e3f4d;hb=e770e6672fdb54c30a787d71043a84b010a8e67f;hpb=3e5bfdf60f255a432956ba0f77d6f840708d9619 diff --git a/PVE/AccessControl.pm b/PVE/AccessControl.pm index db31121..0132268 100644 --- a/PVE/AccessControl.pm +++ b/PVE/AccessControl.pm @@ -9,12 +9,15 @@ use Net::SSLeay; use Net::IP; use MIME::Base64; use Digest::SHA; -use Digest::HMAC_SHA1; -use URI::Escape; -use LWP::UserAgent; +use IO::File; +use File::stat; +use JSON; + +use PVE::OTP; +use PVE::Ticket; use PVE::Tools qw(run_command lock_file file_get_contents split_list safe_print); use PVE::Cluster qw(cfs_register_file cfs_read_file cfs_write_file cfs_lock_file); -use PVE::JSONSchema; +use PVE::JSONSchema qw(register_standard_option get_standard_option); use PVE::Auth::Plugin; use PVE::Auth::AD; @@ -22,8 +25,6 @@ use PVE::Auth::LDAP; use PVE::Auth::PVE; use PVE::Auth::PAM; -use Data::Dumper; # fixme: remove - # load and initialize all plugins PVE::Auth::AD->register(); @@ -35,18 +36,28 @@ PVE::Auth::Plugin->init(); # $authdir must be writable by root only! my $confdir = "/etc/pve"; my $authdir = "$confdir/priv"; -my $authprivkeyfn = "$authdir/authkey.key"; -my $authpubkeyfn = "$confdir/authkey.pub"; + my $pve_www_key_fn = "$confdir/pve-www.key"; -my $ticket_lifetime = 3600*2; # 2 hours +my $pve_auth_key_files = { + priv => "$authdir/authkey.key", + pub => "$confdir/authkey.pub", + pubold => "$confdir/authkey.pub.old", +}; + +my $pve_auth_key_cache = {}; + +my $ticket_lifetime = 3600 * 2; # 2 hours +my $authkey_lifetime = 3600 * 24; # rotate every 24 hours Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->import_random_seed(); cfs_register_file('user.cfg', \&parse_user_config, \&write_user_config); - +cfs_register_file('priv/tfa.cfg', + \&parse_priv_tfa_config, + \&write_priv_tfa_config); sub verify_username { PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username(@_); @@ -65,16 +76,136 @@ sub lock_user_config { } } -my $pve_auth_pub_key; +my $cache_read_key = sub { + my ($type) = @_; + + my $path = $pve_auth_key_files->{$type}; + + my $read_key_and_mtime = sub { + my $fh = IO::File->new($path, "r"); + + return undef if !defined($fh); + + my $st = stat($fh); + my $pem = PVE::Tools::safe_read_from($fh, 0, 0, $path); + + close $fh; + + my $key; + if ($type eq 'pub' || $type eq 'pubold') { + $key = eval { Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_public_key($pem); }; + } elsif ($type eq 'priv') { + $key = eval { Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($pem); }; + } else { + die "Invalid authkey type '$type'\n"; + } + + return { key => $key, mtime => $st->mtime }; + }; + + if (!defined($pve_auth_key_cache->{$type})) { + $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type} = $read_key_and_mtime->(); + } else { + my $st = stat($path); + if (!$st || $st->mtime != $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type}->{mtime}) { + $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type} = $read_key_and_mtime->(); + } + } + + return $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type}; +}; + sub get_pubkey { + my ($old) = @_; - return $pve_auth_pub_key if $pve_auth_pub_key; + my $type = $old ? 'pubold' : 'pub'; - my $input = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents($authpubkeyfn); + my $res = $cache_read_key->($type); + return undef if !defined($res); - $pve_auth_pub_key = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_public_key($input); + return wantarray ? ($res->{key}, $res->{mtime}) : $res->{key}; +} + +sub get_privkey { + my $res = $cache_read_key->('priv'); + + if (!defined($res) || !check_authkey(1)) { + rotate_authkey(); + $res = $cache_read_key->('priv'); + } + + return wantarray ? ($res->{key}, $res->{mtime}) : $res->{key}; +} + +sub check_authkey { + my ($quiet) = @_; + + # skip check if non-quorate, as rotation is not possible anyway + return 1 if !PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1); - return $pve_auth_pub_key; + my ($pub_key, $mtime) = get_pubkey(); + if (!$pub_key) { + warn "auth key pair missing, generating new one..\n" if !$quiet; + return 0; + } else { + if (time() - $mtime >= $authkey_lifetime) { + warn "auth key pair too old, rotating..\n" if !$quiet;; + return 0; + } else { + warn "auth key new enough, skipping rotation\n" if !$quiet;; + return 1; + } + } +} + +sub rotate_authkey { + return if $authkey_lifetime == 0; + + PVE::Cluster::cfs_lock_authkey(undef, sub { + # re-check with lock to avoid double rotation in clusters + return if check_authkey(); + + my $old = get_pubkey(); + my $new = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key(2048); + + if ($old) { + eval { + my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string(); + PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pubold}, $pem); + }; + die "Failed to store old auth key: $@\n" if $@; + } + + eval { + my $pem = $new->get_public_key_x509_string(); + PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem); + }; + if ($@) { + if ($old) { + warn "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n"; + warn "Reverting to previous auth key\n"; + eval { + my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string(); + PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem); + }; + die "Failed to restore old auth key: $@\n" if $@; + } else { + die "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n"; + } + } + + eval { + my $pem = $new->get_private_key_string(); + PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{priv}, $pem); + }; + if ($@) { + warn "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n"; + warn "Deleting auth key to force regeneration\n"; + unlink $pve_auth_key_files->{pub}; + unlink $pve_auth_key_files->{priv}; + } + }); + die $@ if $@; } my $csrf_prevention_secret; @@ -89,85 +220,122 @@ my $get_csrfr_secret = sub { sub assemble_csrf_prevention_token { my ($username) = @_; - my $timestamp = sprintf("%08X", time()); - - my $digest = Digest::SHA::sha1_base64("$timestamp:$username", &$get_csrfr_secret()); + my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret(); - return "$timestamp:$digest"; + return PVE::Ticket::assemble_csrf_prevention_token ($secret, $username); } sub verify_csrf_prevention_token { my ($username, $token, $noerr) = @_; - if ($token =~ m/^([A-Z0-9]{8}):(\S+)$/) { - my $sig = $2; - my $timestamp = $1; - my $ttime = hex($timestamp); + my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret(); - my $digest = Digest::SHA::sha1_base64("$timestamp:$username", &$get_csrfr_secret()); + return PVE::Ticket::verify_csrf_prevention_token( + $secret, $username, $token, -300, $ticket_lifetime, $noerr); +} - my $age = time() - $ttime; - return if ($digest eq $sig) && ($age > -300) && ($age < $ticket_lifetime); - } +my $get_ticket_age_range = sub { + my ($now, $mtime, $rotated) = @_; - die "Permission denied - invalid csrf token\n" if !$noerr; + my $key_age = $now - $mtime; + $key_age = 0 if $key_age < 0; - return undef; -} + my $min = -300; + my $max = $ticket_lifetime; -my $pve_auth_priv_key; -sub get_privkey { + if ($rotated) { + # ticket creation after rotation is not allowed + $min = $key_age - 300; + } else { + if ($key_age > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0) { + if (PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1)) { + # key should have been rotated, clamp range accordingly + $min = $key_age - $authkey_lifetime; + } else { + warn "Cluster not quorate - extending auth key lifetime!\n"; + } + } - return $pve_auth_priv_key if $pve_auth_priv_key; + $max = $key_age + 300 if $key_age < $ticket_lifetime; + } + + return undef if $min > $ticket_lifetime; + return ($min, $max); +}; - my $input = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents($authprivkeyfn); +sub assemble_ticket { + my ($data) = @_; - $pve_auth_priv_key = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($input); + my $rsa_priv = get_privkey(); - return $pve_auth_priv_key; + return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket($rsa_priv, 'PVE', $data); } -sub assemble_ticket { - my ($username) = @_; +sub verify_ticket { + my ($ticket, $noerr) = @_; - my $rsa_priv = get_privkey(); + my $now = time(); - my $timestamp = sprintf("%08X", time()); + my $check = sub { + my ($old) = @_; - my $plain = "PVE:$username:$timestamp"; + my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey($old); + return undef if !$rsa_pub; - my $ticket = $plain . "::" . encode_base64($rsa_priv->sign($plain), ''); + my ($min, $max) = $get_ticket_age_range->($now, $rsa_mtime, $old); + return undef if !defined($min); - return $ticket; -} + return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket( + $rsa_pub, 'PVE', $ticket, undef, $min, $max, 1); + }; -sub verify_ticket { - my ($ticket, $noerr) = @_; + my ($data, $age) = $check->(); - if ($ticket && $ticket =~ m/^(PVE:\S+)::([^:\s]+)$/) { - my $plain = $1; - my $sig = $2; + # check with old, rotated key if current key failed + ($data, $age) = $check->(1) if !defined($data); - my $rsa_pub = get_pubkey(); - if ($rsa_pub->verify($plain, decode_base64($sig))) { - if ($plain =~ m/^PVE:(\S+):([A-Z0-9]{8})$/) { - my $username = $1; - my $timestamp = $2; - my $ttime = hex($timestamp); + my $auth_failure = sub { + if ($noerr) { + return undef; + } else { + # raise error via undef ticket + PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(undef, 'PVE'); + } + }; - my $age = time() - $ttime; + if (!defined($data)) { + return $auth_failure->(); + } - if (PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username, 1) && - ($age > -300) && ($age < $ticket_lifetime)) { - return wantarray ? ($username, $age) : $username; - } - } + my ($username, $tfa_info); + if ($data =~ m{^u2f!([^!]+)!([0-9a-zA-Z/.=_\-+]+)$}) { + # Ticket for u2f-users: + ($username, my $challenge) = ($1, $2); + if ($challenge eq 'verified') { + # u2f challenge was completed + $challenge = undef; + } elsif (!wantarray) { + # The caller is not aware there could be an ongoing challenge, + # so we treat this ticket as invalid: + return $auth_failure->(); } + $tfa_info = { + type => 'u2f', + challenge => $challenge, + }; + } elsif ($data =~ /^tfa!(.*)$/) { + # TOTP and Yubico don't require a challenge so this is the generic + # 'missing 2nd factor ticket' + $username = $1; + $tfa_info = { type => 'tfa' }; + } else { + # Regular ticket (full access) + $username = $data; } - die "permission denied - invalid ticket\n" if !$noerr; + return undef if !PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username, $noerr); - return undef; + return wantarray ? ($username, $age, $tfa_info) : $username; } # VNC tickets @@ -178,108 +346,48 @@ sub assemble_vnc_ticket { my $rsa_priv = get_privkey(); - my $timestamp = sprintf("%08X", time()); - - my $plain = "PVEVNC:$timestamp"; - $path = normalize_path($path); - my $full = "$plain:$username:$path"; + my $secret_data = "$username:$path"; - my $ticket = $plain . "::" . encode_base64($rsa_priv->sign($full), ''); - - return $ticket; + return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket( + $rsa_priv, 'PVEVNC', undef, $secret_data); } sub verify_vnc_ticket { my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_; - if ($ticket && $ticket =~ m/^(PVEVNC:\S+)::([^:\s]+)$/) { - my $plain = $1; - my $sig = $2; - my $full = "$plain:$username:$path"; - - my $rsa_pub = get_pubkey(); - # Note: sign only match if $username and $path is correct - if ($rsa_pub->verify($full, decode_base64($sig))) { - if ($plain =~ m/^PVEVNC:([A-Z0-9]{8})$/) { - my $ttime = hex($1); - - my $age = time() - $ttime; + my $secret_data = "$username:$path"; - if (($age > -20) && ($age < 40)) { - return 1; - } - } + my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey(); + if (!$rsa_pub || (time() - $rsa_mtime > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0)) { + if ($noerr) { + return undef; + } else { + # raise error via undef ticket + PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket($rsa_pub, 'PVEVNC'); } } - die "permission denied - invalid vnc ticket\n" if !$noerr; - - return undef; + return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket( + $rsa_pub, 'PVEVNC', $ticket, $secret_data, -20, 40, $noerr); } sub assemble_spice_ticket { my ($username, $vmid, $node) = @_; - my $rsa_priv = get_privkey(); - - my $timestamp = sprintf("%08x", time()); - - my $randomstr = "PVESPICE:$timestamp:$vmid:$node:" . rand(10); - - # this should be uses as one-time password - # max length is 60 chars (spice limit) - # we pass this to qemu set_pasword and limit lifetime there - # keep this secret - my $ticket = Digest::SHA::sha1_hex($rsa_priv->sign($randomstr)); - - # Note: spice proxy connects with HTTP, so $proxyticket is exposed to public - # we use a signature/timestamp to make sure nobody can fake such ticket - # an attacker can use this $proxyticket, but he will fail because $ticket is - # private. - # The proxy need to be able to extract/verify the ticket - # Note: data needs to be lower case only, because virt-viewer needs that - # Note: RSA signature are too long (>=256 charaters) and makes problems with remote-viewer - my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret(); - my $plain = "pvespiceproxy:$timestamp:$vmid:" . lc($node); - - # produces 40 characters - my $sig = unpack("H*", Digest::SHA::sha1($plain, &$get_csrfr_secret())); - - #my $sig = unpack("H*", $rsa_priv->sign($plain)); # this produce too long strings (512) - - my $proxyticket = $plain . "::" . $sig; - return ($ticket, $proxyticket); + return PVE::Ticket::assemble_spice_ticket( + $secret, $username, $vmid, $node); } sub verify_spice_connect_url { my ($connect_str) = @_; - # Note: we pass the spice ticket as 'host', so the - # spice viewer connects with "$ticket:$port" - - return undef if !$connect_str; - - if ($connect_str =~m/^pvespiceproxy:([a-z0-9]{8}):(\d+):(\S+)::([a-z0-9]{40}):(\d+)$/) { - my ($timestamp, $vmid, $node, $hexsig, $port) = ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6); - my $ttime = hex($timestamp); - my $age = time() - $ttime; - - # use very limited lifetime - is this enough? - return undef if !(($age > -20) && ($age < 40)); - - my $plain = "pvespiceproxy:$timestamp:$vmid:$node"; - my $sig = unpack("H*", Digest::SHA::sha1($plain, &$get_csrfr_secret())); - - if ($sig eq $hexsig) { - return ($vmid, $node, $port); - } - } + my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret(); - return undef; + return PVE::Ticket::verify_spice_connect_url($secret, $connect_str); } sub read_x509_subject_spice { @@ -287,8 +395,15 @@ sub read_x509_subject_spice { # read x509 subject my $bio = Net::SSLeay::BIO_new_file($filename, 'r'); + die "Could not open $filename using OpenSSL\n" + if !$bio; + my $x509 = Net::SSLeay::PEM_read_bio_X509($bio); Net::SSLeay::BIO_free($bio); + + die "Could not parse X509 certificate in $filename\n" + if !$x509; + my $nameobj = Net::SSLeay::X509_get_subject_name($x509); my $subject = Net::SSLeay::X509_NAME_oneline($nameobj); Net::SSLeay::X509_free($x509); @@ -325,7 +440,7 @@ sub remote_viewer_config { 'release-cursor' => "Ctrl+Alt+R", type => 'spice', title => $title, - host => $proxyticket, # this break tls hostname verification, so we need to use 'host-subject' + host => $proxyticket, # this breaks tls hostname verification, so we need to use 'host-subject' proxy => "http://$proxy:3128", 'tls-port' => $port, 'host-subject' => $subject, @@ -364,28 +479,25 @@ sub check_user_enabled { } sub verify_one_time_pw { - my ($usercfg, $username, $tfa_cfg, $otp) = @_; + my ($type, $username, $keys, $tfa_cfg, $otp) = @_; - my $type = $tfa_cfg->{type}; - - die "missing one time password for Factor-two authentication '$type'\n" if !$otp; + die "missing one time password for two-factor authentication '$type'\n" if !$otp; # fixme: proxy support? my $proxy; if ($type eq 'yubico') { - my $keys = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{keys}; - yubico_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{url}, $tfa_cfg->{id}, $tfa_cfg->{key}, $proxy); + PVE::OTP::yubico_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{url}, + $tfa_cfg->{id}, $tfa_cfg->{key}, $proxy); } elsif ($type eq 'oath') { - my $keys = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{keys}; - oath_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{step}, $tfa_cfg->{digits}); + PVE::OTP::oath_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{step}, $tfa_cfg->{digits}); } else { die "unknown tfa type '$type'\n"; } } # password should be utf8 encoded -# Note: some pluging delay/sleep if auth fails +# Note: some plugins delay/sleep if auth fails sub authenticate_user { my ($username, $password, $otp) = @_; @@ -411,12 +523,32 @@ sub authenticate_user { my $plugin = PVE::Auth::Plugin->lookup($cfg->{type}); $plugin->authenticate_user($cfg, $realm, $ruid, $password); - if ($cfg->{tfa}) { - my $tfa_cfg = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($cfg->{tfa}); - verify_one_time_pw($usercfg, $username, $tfa_cfg, $otp); + my ($type, $tfa_data) = user_get_tfa($username, $realm); + if ($type) { + if ($type eq 'u2f') { + # Note that if the user did not manage to complete the initial u2f registration + # challenge we have a hash containing a 'challenge' entry in the user's tfa.cfg entry: + $tfa_data = undef if exists $tfa_data->{challenge}; + } elsif (!defined($otp)) { + # The user requires a 2nd factor but has not provided one. Return success but + # don't clear $tfa_data. + } else { + my $keys = $tfa_data->{keys}; + my $tfa_cfg = $tfa_data->{config}; + verify_one_time_pw($type, $username, $keys, $tfa_cfg, $otp); + $tfa_data = undef; + } + + # Return the type along with the rest: + if ($tfa_data) { + $tfa_data = { + type => $type, + data => $tfa_data, + }; + } } - return $username; + return wantarray ? ($username, $tfa_data) : $username; } sub domain_set_password { @@ -427,7 +559,7 @@ sub domain_set_password { my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg'); my $cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm}; - die "auth domain '$realm' does not exists\n" if !$cfg; + die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$cfg; my $plugin = PVE::Auth::Plugin->lookup($cfg->{type}); $plugin->store_password($cfg, $realm, $username, $password); } @@ -481,7 +613,7 @@ sub delete_pool_acl { # into 3 groups (per category) # root: only root is allowed to do that # admin: an administrator can to that -# user: a normak user/customer can to that +# user: a normal user/customer can to that my $privgroups = { VM => { root => [], @@ -497,6 +629,7 @@ my $privgroups = { 'VM.Migrate', 'VM.Monitor', 'VM.Snapshot', + 'VM.Snapshot.Rollback', ], user => [ 'VM.Config.CDROM', # change CDROM media @@ -561,8 +694,8 @@ my $privgroups = { my $valid_privs = {}; my $special_roles = { - 'NoAccess' => {}, # no priviledges - 'Administrator' => $valid_privs, # all priviledges + 'NoAccess' => {}, # no privileges + 'Administrator' => $valid_privs, # all privileges }; sub create_roles { @@ -593,6 +726,22 @@ sub create_roles { create_roles(); +sub create_priv_properties { + my $properties = {}; + foreach my $priv (keys %$valid_privs) { + $properties->{$priv} = { + type => 'boolean', + optional => 1, + }; + } + return $properties; +} + +sub role_is_special { + my ($role) = @_; + return (exists $special_roles->{$role}) ? 1 : 0; +} + sub add_role_privs { my ($role, $usercfg, $privs) = @_; @@ -604,7 +753,7 @@ sub add_role_privs { if (defined ($valid_privs->{$priv})) { $usercfg->{roles}->{$role}->{$priv} = 1; } else { - die "invalid priviledge '$priv'\n"; + die "invalid privilege '$priv'\n"; } } } @@ -625,7 +774,6 @@ sub normalize_path { return $path; } - PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-groupid', \&verify_groupname); sub verify_groupname { my ($groupname, $noerr) = @_; @@ -654,7 +802,7 @@ sub verify_rolename { return $rolename; } -PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-poolid', \&verify_groupname); +PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-poolid', \&verify_poolname); sub verify_poolname { my ($poolname, $noerr) = @_; @@ -673,7 +821,7 @@ sub verify_privname { my ($priv, $noerr) = @_; if (!$valid_privs->{$priv}) { - die "invalid priviledge '$priv'\n" if !$noerr; + die "invalid privilege '$priv'\n" if !$noerr; return undef; } @@ -952,7 +1100,7 @@ sub write_user_config { } foreach my $user (keys %{$d->{users}}) { - # no need to save, because root is always 'Administartor' + # no need to save, because root is always 'Administrator' next if $user eq 'root@pam'; my $l0 = ''; @@ -984,6 +1132,64 @@ sub write_user_config { return $data; } +# The TFA configuration in priv/tfa.cfg format contains one line per user of +# the form: +# USER:TYPE:DATA +# DATA is a base64 encoded json string and its format depends on the type. +sub parse_priv_tfa_config { + my ($filename, $raw) = @_; + + my $users = {}; + my $cfg = { users => $users }; + + $raw = '' if !defined($raw); + while ($raw =~ /^\s*(.+?)\s*$/gm) { + my $line = $1; + my ($user, $type, $data) = split(/:/, $line, 3); + + my (undef, undef, $realm) = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($user, 1); + if (!$realm) { + warn "user tfa config - ignore user '$user' - invalid user name\n"; + next; + } + + $data = decode_json(decode_base64($data)); + + $users->{$user} = { + type => $type, + data => $data, + }; + } + + return $cfg; +} + +sub write_priv_tfa_config { + my ($filename, $cfg) = @_; + + my $output = ''; + + my $users = $cfg->{users}; + foreach my $user (sort keys %$users) { + my $info = $users->{$user}; + next if !%$info; # skip empty entries + + $info = {%$info}; # copy to verify contents: + + my $type = delete $info->{type}; + my $data = delete $info->{data}; + + if (my @keys = keys %$info) { + die "invalid keys in TFA config for user $user: " . join(', ', @keys) . "\n"; + } + + $data = encode_base64(encode_json($data), ''); + $output .= "${user}:${type}:${data}\n"; + } + + return $output; +} + sub roles { my ($cfg, $user, $path) = @_; @@ -1166,136 +1372,129 @@ sub remove_vm_from_pool { lock_user_config($delVMfromPoolFn, "pool cleanup for VM $vmid failed"); } -# experimental code for yubico OTP verification +my $USER_CONTROLLED_TFA_TYPES = { + u2f => 1, + oath => 1, +}; -sub yubico_compute_param_sig { - my ($param, $api_key) = @_; +# Delete an entry by setting $data=undef in which case $type is ignored. +# Otherwise both must be valid. +sub user_set_tfa { + my ($userid, $realm, $type, $data, $cached_usercfg, $cached_domaincfg) = @_; - my $paramstr = ''; - foreach my $key (sort keys %$param) { - $paramstr .= '&' if $paramstr; - $paramstr .= "$key=$param->{$key}"; + if (defined($data) && !defined($type)) { + # This is an internal usage error and should not happen + die "cannot set tfa data without a type\n"; } - my $sig = uri_escape(encode_base64(Digest::HMAC_SHA1::hmac_sha1($paramstr, decode_base64($api_key || '')), '')); - - return ($paramstr, $sig); -} - -sub yubico_verify_otp { - my ($otp, $keys, $url, $api_id, $api_key, $proxy) = @_; - - die "yubico: missing password\n" if !defined($otp); - die "yubico: missing API ID\n" if !defined($api_id); - die "yubico: missing API KEY\n" if !defined($api_key); - die "yubico: no associated yubico keys\n" if $keys =~ m/^\s+$/; - - die "yubico: wrong OTP lenght\n" if (length($otp) < 32) || (length($otp) > 48); - - # we always use http, because https cert verification always make problem, and - # some proxies does not work with https. - - $url = 'http://api2.yubico.com/wsapi/2.0/verify' if !defined($url); - - my $params = { - nonce => Digest::HMAC_SHA1::hmac_sha1_hex(time(), rand()), - id => $api_id, - otp => uri_escape($otp), - timestamp => 1, - }; - - my ($paramstr, $sig) = yubico_compute_param_sig($params, $api_key); - - $paramstr .= "&h=$sig" if $api_key; - - my $req = HTTP::Request->new('GET' => "$url?$paramstr"); + my $user_cfg = $cached_usercfg || cfs_read_file('user.cfg'); + my $user = $user_cfg->{users}->{$userid} + or die "user '$userid' not found\n"; + + my $domain_cfg = $cached_domaincfg || cfs_read_file('domains.cfg'); + my $realm_cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm}; + die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$realm_cfg; + + my $realm_tfa = $realm_cfg->{tfa}; + if (defined($realm_tfa)) { + $realm_tfa = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($realm_tfa); + # If the realm has a TFA setting, we're only allowed to use that. + if (defined($data)) { + my $required_type = $realm_tfa->{type}; + if ($required_type ne $type) { + die "realm '$realm' only allows TFA of type '$required_type\n"; + } - my $ua = LWP::UserAgent->new(protocols_allowed => ['http'], timeout => 30); + if (defined($data->{config})) { + # XXX: Is it enough if the type matches? Or should the configuration also match? + } - if ($proxy) { - $ua->proxy(['http'], $proxy); + # realm-configured tfa always uses a simple key list, so use the user.cfg + $user->{keys} = $data->{keys}; + } else { + die "realm '$realm' does not allow removing the 2nd factor\n"; + } } else { - $ua->env_proxy; - } - - my $response = $ua->request($req); - my $code = $response->code; - - if ($code != 200) { - my $msg = $response->message || 'unknown'; - die "Invalid response from server: $code $msg\n"; - } - - my $raw = $response->decoded_content; - - my $result = {}; - foreach my $kvpair (split(/\n/, $raw)) { - chomp $kvpair; - if($kvpair =~ /^\S+=/) { - my ($k, $v) = split(/=/, $kvpair, 2); - $v =~ s/\s//g; - $result->{$k} = $v; - } + # Without a realm-enforced TFA setting the user can add a u2f or totp entry by themselves. + # The 'yubico' type requires yubico server settings, which have to be configured on the + # realm, so this is not supported here: + die "domain '$realm' does not support TFA type '$type'\n" + if defined($data) && !$USER_CONTROLLED_TFA_TYPES->{$type}; } - my $rsig = $result->{h}; - delete $result->{h}; + # Custom TFA entries are stored in priv/tfa.cfg as they can be more complet: u2f uses a + # public key and a key handle, TOTP requires the usual totp settings... - if ($api_key) { - my ($datastr, $vsig) = yubico_compute_param_sig($result, $api_key); - $vsig = uri_unescape($vsig); - die "yubico: result signature verification failed\n" if $rsig ne $vsig; - } + my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg'); + my $tfa = ($tfa_cfg->{users}->{$userid} //= {}); - die "yubico auth failed: $result->{status}\n" if $result->{status} ne 'OK'; + if (defined($data)) { + $tfa->{type} = $type; + $tfa->{data} = $data; + cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg); - my $publicid = $result->{publicid} = substr(lc($result->{otp}), 0, 12); + $user->{keys} = "x!$type"; + } else { + delete $tfa_cfg->{users}->{$userid}; + cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg); - my $found; - foreach my $k (PVE::Tools::split_list($keys)) { - if ($k eq $publicid) { - $found = 1; - last; - } + delete $user->{keys}; } - die "yubico auth failed: key does not belong to user\n" if !$found; - - return $result; + cfs_write_file('user.cfg', $user_cfg); } -sub oath_verify_otp { - my ($otp, $keys, $step, $digits) = @_; +sub user_get_tfa { + my ($username, $realm) = @_; - die "oath: missing password\n" if !defined($otp); - die "oath: no associated oath keys\n" if $keys =~ m/^\s+$/; + my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg'); + my $user = $user_cfg->{users}->{$username} + or die "user '$username' not found\n"; - $step = 30 if !$step; - $digits = 6 if !$digits; + my $keys = $user->{keys}; - my $found; + my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg'); + my $realm_cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm}; + die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$realm_cfg; - my $parser = sub { - my $line = shift; + my $realm_tfa = $realm_cfg->{tfa}; + $realm_tfa = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($realm_tfa) + if $realm_tfa; - if ($line =~ m/^\d{6}$/) { - $found = 1 if $otp eq $line; + if (!$keys) { + return if !$realm_tfa; + die "missing required 2nd keys\n"; + } + + # new style config starts with an 'x' and optionally contains a ! suffix + if ($keys !~ /^x(?:!.*)?$/) { + # old style config, find the type via the realm + return if !$realm_tfa; + return ($realm_tfa->{type}, { + keys => $keys, + config => $realm_tfa, + }); + } else { + my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg'); + my $tfa = $tfa_cfg->{users}->{$username}; + return if !$tfa; # should not happen (user.cfg wasn't cleaned up?) + + if ($realm_tfa) { + # if the realm has a tfa setting we need to verify the type: + die "auth domain '$realm' and user have mismatching TFA settings\n" + if $realm_tfa && $realm_tfa->{type} ne $tfa->{type}; } - }; - foreach my $k (PVE::Tools::split_list($keys)) { - # Note: we generate 3 values to allow small time drift - my $now = localtime(time() - $step); - my $cmd = ['oathtool', '--totp', '--digits', $digits, '-N', $now, '-s', $step, '-w', '2', '-b', $k]; - eval { run_command($cmd, outfunc => $parser, errfunc => sub {}); }; - last if $found; + return ($tfa->{type}, $tfa->{data}); } - - die "oath auth failed\n" if !$found; } # bash completion helpers +register_standard_option('userid-completed', + get_standard_option('userid', { completion => \&complete_username}), +); + sub complete_username { my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');