X-Git-Url: https://git.proxmox.com/?p=pve-access-control.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=PVE%2FAccessControl.pm;h=19d008c0be94fc14130d2d1420a0f4912583b007;hp=e7f057e332df79f1ccda2b24870ef62992e60355;hb=21800a71a79c7cf49108e22781d2f34be87b1efd;hpb=a1f8aaae84c0526eeecb47441f94494e41230d70 diff --git a/PVE/AccessControl.pm b/PVE/AccessControl.pm index e7f057e..19d008c 100644 --- a/PVE/AccessControl.pm +++ b/PVE/AccessControl.pm @@ -8,15 +8,15 @@ use Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA; use Net::SSLeay; use Net::IP; use MIME::Base64; -use MIME::Base32; #libmime-base32-perl use Digest::SHA; +use IO::File; +use File::stat; +use PVE::OTP; use PVE::Ticket; -use URI::Escape; -use LWP::UserAgent; use PVE::Tools qw(run_command lock_file file_get_contents split_list safe_print); use PVE::Cluster qw(cfs_register_file cfs_read_file cfs_write_file cfs_lock_file); -use PVE::JSONSchema; +use PVE::JSONSchema qw(register_standard_option get_standard_option); use PVE::Auth::Plugin; use PVE::Auth::AD; @@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ use PVE::Auth::LDAP; use PVE::Auth::PVE; use PVE::Auth::PAM; -use Data::Dumper; # fixme: remove - # load and initialize all plugins PVE::Auth::AD->register(); @@ -37,11 +35,20 @@ PVE::Auth::Plugin->init(); # $authdir must be writable by root only! my $confdir = "/etc/pve"; my $authdir = "$confdir/priv"; -my $authprivkeyfn = "$authdir/authkey.key"; -my $authpubkeyfn = "$confdir/authkey.pub"; + my $pve_www_key_fn = "$confdir/pve-www.key"; +my $pve_auth_key_files = { + priv => "$authdir/authkey.key", + pub => "$confdir/authkey.pub", + pubold => "$confdir/authkey.pub.old", +}; + +my $pve_auth_key_cache = {}; + my $ticket_lifetime = 3600*2; # 2 hours +# TODO: set to 24h for PVE 6.0 +my $authkey_lifetime = 3600*0; # rotation disabled Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->import_random_seed(); @@ -49,7 +56,6 @@ cfs_register_file('user.cfg', \&parse_user_config, \&write_user_config); - sub verify_username { PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username(@_); } @@ -67,16 +73,136 @@ sub lock_user_config { } } -my $pve_auth_pub_key; +my $cache_read_key = sub { + my ($type) = @_; + + my $path = $pve_auth_key_files->{$type}; + + my $read_key_and_mtime = sub { + my $fh = IO::File->new($path, "r"); + + return undef if !defined($fh); + + my $st = stat($fh); + my $pem = PVE::Tools::safe_read_from($fh, 0, 0, $path); + + close $fh; + + my $key; + if ($type eq 'pub' || $type eq 'pubold') { + $key = eval { Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_public_key($pem); }; + } elsif ($type eq 'priv') { + $key = eval { Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($pem); }; + } else { + die "Invalid authkey type '$type'\n"; + } + + return { key => $key, mtime => $st->mtime }; + }; + + if (!defined($pve_auth_key_cache->{$type})) { + $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type} = $read_key_and_mtime->(); + } else { + my $st = stat($path); + if (!$st || $st->mtime != $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type}->{mtime}) { + $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type} = $read_key_and_mtime->(); + } + } + + return $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type}; +}; + sub get_pubkey { + my ($old) = @_; + + my $type = $old ? 'pubold' : 'pub'; - return $pve_auth_pub_key if $pve_auth_pub_key; + my $res = $cache_read_key->($type); + return undef if !defined($res); - my $input = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents($authpubkeyfn); + return wantarray ? ($res->{key}, $res->{mtime}) : $res->{key}; +} - $pve_auth_pub_key = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_public_key($input); +sub get_privkey { + my $res = $cache_read_key->('priv'); - return $pve_auth_pub_key; + if (!defined($res) || !check_authkey(1)) { + rotate_authkey(); + $res = $cache_read_key->('priv'); + } + + return wantarray ? ($res->{key}, $res->{mtime}) : $res->{key}; +} + +sub check_authkey { + my ($quiet) = @_; + + # skip check if non-quorate, as rotation is not possible anyway + return 1 if !PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1); + + my ($pub_key, $mtime) = get_pubkey(); + if (!$pub_key) { + warn "auth key pair missing, generating new one..\n" if !$quiet; + return 0; + } else { + if (time() - $mtime >= $authkey_lifetime) { + warn "auth key pair too old, rotating..\n" if !$quiet;; + return 0; + } else { + warn "auth key new enough, skipping rotation\n" if !$quiet;; + return 1; + } + } +} + +sub rotate_authkey { + return if $authkey_lifetime == 0; + + cfs_lock_authkey(undef, sub { + # re-check with lock to avoid double rotation in clusters + return if check_authkey(); + + my $old = get_pubkey(); + + if ($old) { + eval { + my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string(); + PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pubold}, $pem); + }; + die "Failed to store old auth key: $@\n" if $@; + } + + my $new = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key(2048); + eval { + my $pem = $new->get_public_key_x509_string(); + PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem); + }; + if ($@) { + if ($old) { + warn "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n"; + warn "Reverting to previous auth key\n"; + eval { + my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string(); + PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem); + }; + die "Failed to restore old auth key: $@\n" if $@; + } else { + die "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n"; + } + } + + eval { + my $pem = $new->get_private_key_string(); + PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{priv}, $pem); + }; + if ($@) { + warn "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n"; + warn "Deleting auth key to force regeneration\n"; + unlink $pve_auth_key_files->{pub}; + unlink $pve_auth_key_files->{priv}; + } + }); + die $@ if $@; } my $csrf_prevention_secret; @@ -105,17 +231,34 @@ sub verify_csrf_prevention_token { $secret, $username, $token, -300, $ticket_lifetime, $noerr); } -my $pve_auth_priv_key; -sub get_privkey { +my $get_ticket_age_range = sub { + my ($now, $mtime, $rotated) = @_; - return $pve_auth_priv_key if $pve_auth_priv_key; + my $key_age = $now - $mtime; + $key_age = 0 if $key_age < 0; - my $input = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents($authprivkeyfn); + my $min = -300; + my $max = $ticket_lifetime; - $pve_auth_priv_key = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($input); + if ($rotated) { + # ticket creation after rotation is not allowed + $min = $key_age - 300; + } else { + if ($key_age > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0) { + if (PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1)) { + # key should have been rotated, clamp range accordingly + $min = $key_age - $authkey_lifetime; + } else { + warn "Cluster not quorate - extending auth key lifetime!\n"; + } + } - return $pve_auth_priv_key; -} + $max = $key_age + 300 if $key_age < $ticket_lifetime; + } + + return undef if $min > $ticket_lifetime; + return ($min, $max); +}; sub assemble_ticket { my ($username) = @_; @@ -128,12 +271,34 @@ sub assemble_ticket { sub verify_ticket { my ($ticket, $noerr) = @_; - my $rsa_pub = get_pubkey(); + my $now = time(); + + my $check = sub { + my ($old) = @_; - my ($username, $age) = PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket( - $rsa_pub, 'PVE', $ticket, undef, -300, $ticket_lifetime, $noerr); + my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey($old); + return undef if !$rsa_pub; - return undef if $noerr && !defined($username); + my ($min, $max) = $get_ticket_age_range->($now, $rsa_mtime, $old); + return undef if !$min; + + return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket( + $rsa_pub, 'PVE', $ticket, undef, $min, $max, 1); + }; + + my ($username, $age) = $check->(); + + # check with old, rotated key if current key failed + ($username, $age) = $check->(1) if !defined($username); + + if (!defined($username)) { + if ($noerr) { + return undef; + } else { + # raise error via undef ticket + PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(undef, 'PVE'); + } + } return undef if !PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username, $noerr); @@ -159,10 +324,18 @@ sub assemble_vnc_ticket { sub verify_vnc_ticket { my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_; - my $rsa_pub = get_pubkey(); - my $secret_data = "$username:$path"; + my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey(); + if (!$rsa_pub || (time() - $rsa_mtime > $authkey_lifetime)) { + if ($noerr) { + return undef; + } else { + # raise error via undef ticket + PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket($rsa_pub, 'PVEVNC'); + } + } + return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket( $rsa_pub, 'PVEVNC', $ticket, $secret_data, -20, 40, $noerr); } @@ -176,7 +349,6 @@ sub assemble_spice_ticket { $secret, $username, $vmid, $node); } - sub verify_spice_connect_url { my ($connect_str) = @_; @@ -285,10 +457,11 @@ sub verify_one_time_pw { if ($type eq 'yubico') { my $keys = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{keys}; - yubico_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{url}, $tfa_cfg->{id}, $tfa_cfg->{key}, $proxy); + PVE::OTP::yubico_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{url}, + $tfa_cfg->{id}, $tfa_cfg->{key}, $proxy); } elsif ($type eq 'oath') { my $keys = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{keys}; - oath_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{step}, $tfa_cfg->{digits}); + PVE::OTP::oath_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{step}, $tfa_cfg->{digits}); } else { die "unknown tfa type '$type'\n"; } @@ -407,6 +580,7 @@ my $privgroups = { 'VM.Migrate', 'VM.Monitor', 'VM.Snapshot', + 'VM.Snapshot.Rollback', ], user => [ 'VM.Config.CDROM', # change CDROM media @@ -503,6 +677,22 @@ sub create_roles { create_roles(); +sub create_priv_properties { + my $properties = {}; + foreach my $priv (keys %$valid_privs) { + $properties->{$priv} = { + type => 'boolean', + optional => 1, + }; + } + return $properties; +} + +sub role_is_special { + my ($role) = @_; + return (exists $special_roles->{$role}) ? 1 : 0; +} + sub add_role_privs { my ($role, $usercfg, $privs) = @_; @@ -535,7 +725,6 @@ sub normalize_path { return $path; } - PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-groupid', \&verify_groupname); sub verify_groupname { my ($groupname, $noerr) = @_; @@ -564,7 +753,7 @@ sub verify_rolename { return $rolename; } -PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-poolid', \&verify_groupname); +PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-poolid', \&verify_poolname); sub verify_poolname { my ($poolname, $noerr) = @_; @@ -1076,154 +1265,12 @@ sub remove_vm_from_pool { lock_user_config($delVMfromPoolFn, "pool cleanup for VM $vmid failed"); } -# hotp/totp code - -sub hotp($$;$) { - my ($binsecret, $number, $digits) = @_; - - $digits = 6 if !defined($digits); - - my $bincounter = pack('Q>', $number); - my $hmac = Digest::SHA::hmac_sha1($bincounter, $binsecret); - - my $offset = unpack('C', substr($hmac,19) & pack('C', 0x0F)); - my $part = substr($hmac, $offset, 4); - my $otp = unpack('N', $part); - my $value = ($otp & 0x7fffffff) % (10**$digits); - return sprintf("%0${digits}d", $value); -} - -# experimental code for yubico OTP verification - -sub yubico_compute_param_sig { - my ($param, $api_key) = @_; - - my $paramstr = ''; - foreach my $key (sort keys %$param) { - $paramstr .= '&' if $paramstr; - $paramstr .= "$key=$param->{$key}"; - } - - # hmac_sha1_base64 does not add '=' padding characters, so we use encode_base64 - my $sig = uri_escape(encode_base64(Digest::SHA::hmac_sha1($paramstr, decode_base64($api_key || '')), '')); - - return ($paramstr, $sig); -} - -sub yubico_verify_otp { - my ($otp, $keys, $url, $api_id, $api_key, $proxy) = @_; - - die "yubico: missing password\n" if !defined($otp); - die "yubico: missing API ID\n" if !defined($api_id); - die "yubico: missing API KEY\n" if !defined($api_key); - die "yubico: no associated yubico keys\n" if $keys =~ m/^\s+$/; - - die "yubico: wrong OTP length\n" if (length($otp) < 32) || (length($otp) > 48); - - $url = 'http://api2.yubico.com/wsapi/2.0/verify' if !defined($url); - - my $params = { - nonce => Digest::SHA::hmac_sha1_hex(time(), rand()), - id => $api_id, - otp => uri_escape($otp), - timestamp => 1, - }; - - my ($paramstr, $sig) = yubico_compute_param_sig($params, $api_key); - - $paramstr .= "&h=$sig" if $api_key; - - my $req = HTTP::Request->new('GET' => "$url?$paramstr"); - - my $ua = LWP::UserAgent->new(protocols_allowed => ['http', 'https'], timeout => 30); - - if ($proxy) { - $ua->proxy(['http', 'https'], $proxy); - } else { - $ua->env_proxy; - } - - my $response = $ua->request($req); - my $code = $response->code; - - if ($code != 200) { - my $msg = $response->message || 'unknown'; - die "Invalid response from server: $code $msg\n"; - } - - my $raw = $response->decoded_content; - - my $result = {}; - foreach my $kvpair (split(/\n/, $raw)) { - chomp $kvpair; - if($kvpair =~ /^\S+=/) { - my ($k, $v) = split(/=/, $kvpair, 2); - $v =~ s/\s//g; - $result->{$k} = $v; - } - } - - my $rsig = $result->{h}; - delete $result->{h}; - - if ($api_key) { - my ($datastr, $vsig) = yubico_compute_param_sig($result, $api_key); - $vsig = uri_unescape($vsig); - die "yubico: result signature verification failed\n" if $rsig ne $vsig; - } - - die "yubico auth failed: $result->{status}\n" if $result->{status} ne 'OK'; - - my $publicid = $result->{publicid} = substr(lc($result->{otp}), 0, 12); - - my $found; - foreach my $k (PVE::Tools::split_list($keys)) { - if ($k eq $publicid) { - $found = 1; - last; - } - } - - die "yubico auth failed: key does not belong to user\n" if !$found; - - return $result; -} - -sub oath_verify_otp { - my ($otp, $keys, $step, $digits) = @_; - - die "oath: missing password\n" if !defined($otp); - die "oath: no associated oath keys\n" if $keys =~ m/^\s+$/; - - $step = 30 if !$step; - $digits = 6 if !$digits; - - my $found; - foreach my $k (PVE::Tools::split_list($keys)) { - # Note: we generate 3 values to allow small time drift - my $binkey; - if ($k =~ /^[A-Z2-7=]{16}$/) { - $binkey = MIME::Base32::decode_rfc3548($k); - } elsif ($k =~ /^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$/) { - $binkey = pack('H*', $k); - } else { - die "unrecognized key format, must be hex or base32 encoded\n"; - } - - # force integer division for time/step - use integer; - my $now = time()/$step - 1; - $found = 1 if $otp eq hotp($binkey, $now+0, $digits); - $found = 1 if $otp eq hotp($binkey, $now+1, $digits); - $found = 1 if $otp eq hotp($binkey, $now+2, $digits); - last if $found; - } - - die "oath auth failed\n" if !$found; -} - # bash completion helpers +register_standard_option('userid-completed', + get_standard_option('userid', { completion => \&complete_username}), +); + sub complete_username { my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');