rebase patches on top of Ubuntu-4.15.0-35.38
authorThomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
Thu, 13 Sep 2018 07:03:03 +0000 (09:03 +0200)
committerThomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
Mon, 17 Sep 2018 09:46:13 +0000 (11:46 +0200)
(generated with debian/scripts/import-upstream-tag)

Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
patches/kernel/0003-pci-Enable-overrides-for-missing-ACS-capabilities-4..patch
patches/kernel/0009-x86-speculation-Protect-against-userspace-userspace-.patch [deleted file]

index b4807be3f3309e495a52b9d9e21b6333e9e6795b..e254152d943c10faab27ef2f39ef307487c77a31 100644 (file)
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Fabian Gr├╝nbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
  2 files changed, 110 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
-index e1c10a202abe..e40248310433 100644
+index 51210d10d905..ceb1b471d249 100644
 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
 @@ -3049,6 +3049,15 @@
diff --git a/patches/kernel/0009-x86-speculation-Protect-against-userspace-userspace-.patch b/patches/kernel/0009-x86-speculation-Protect-against-userspace-userspace-.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 4202dd6..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
-Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2018 19:17:40 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace
- spectreRSB
-
-The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack
-Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks,
-making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to
-BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).
-
-Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
-context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.
-
-[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf
-
-Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
-Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
-Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
-Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
-Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
-Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
-Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
-Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1807261308190.997@cbobk.fhfr.pm
-
-CVE-2017-5715 (SpectreRSB sub-variant)
-
-(cherry picked from commit fdf82a7856b32d905c39afc85e34364491e46346)
-Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
----
- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 38 +++++++-------------------------------
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
-index 700b4c0a93a2..edfc64a8a154 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
-@@ -322,23 +322,6 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
-       return cmd;
- }
--/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
--static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
--{
--      if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
--          boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
--              switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
--              case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
--              case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
--              case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
--              case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
--              case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
--                      return true;
--              }
--      }
--      return false;
--}
--
- static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
- {
-       enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
-@@ -399,22 +382,15 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
-       pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
-       /*
--       * If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
--       * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
--       * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
--       * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
-+       * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
-+       * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
-+       * issues:
-        *
--       * Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
--       * RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
--       * The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
--       * or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
--       * switch is required.
-+       *      - RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
-+       *      - SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
-        */
--      if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) &&
--           !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
--              setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
--              pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
--      }
-+      setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
-+      pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
-       /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
-       if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {