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031e5cce SM |
1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */ |
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
3 | * All rights reserved. | |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
8 | * | |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
15 | * | |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
40 | * | |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
d3819813 | 52 | * |
031e5cce SM |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
3e575651 SL |
57 | */ |
58 | ||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | |
60 | #include <ctype.h> | |
031e5cce | 61 | #include "cryptlib.h" |
3e575651 SL |
62 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
63 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
64 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
65 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
66 | ||
67 | int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) | |
d3819813 MTL |
68 | { |
69 | int i; | |
031e5cce | 70 | X509_CINF *ai, *bi; |
d3819813 | 71 | |
031e5cce SM |
72 | ai = a->cert_info; |
73 | bi = b->cert_info; | |
74 | i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); | |
d3819813 MTL |
75 | if (i) |
76 | return (i); | |
77 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); | |
78 | } | |
3e575651 SL |
79 | |
80 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 | |
81 | unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) | |
d3819813 MTL |
82 | { |
83 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
031e5cce | 84 | EVP_MD_CTX ctx; |
d3819813 MTL |
85 | unsigned char md[16]; |
86 | char *f; | |
87 | ||
031e5cce SM |
88 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
89 | f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0); | |
90 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) | |
d3819813 | 91 | goto err; |
031e5cce | 92 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) |
d3819813 MTL |
93 | goto err; |
94 | OPENSSL_free(f); | |
95 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate | |
031e5cce SM |
96 | (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, |
97 | (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) | |
d3819813 | 98 | goto err; |
031e5cce | 99 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) |
d3819813 MTL |
100 | goto err; |
101 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
102 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
103 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
104 | err: | |
031e5cce | 105 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
d3819813 MTL |
106 | return (ret); |
107 | } | |
3e575651 | 108 | #endif |
d3819813 | 109 | |
3e575651 | 110 | int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) |
d3819813 | 111 | { |
031e5cce | 112 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); |
d3819813 | 113 | } |
3e575651 SL |
114 | |
115 | int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) | |
d3819813 | 116 | { |
031e5cce | 117 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); |
d3819813 | 118 | } |
3e575651 SL |
119 | |
120 | int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) | |
d3819813 | 121 | { |
031e5cce | 122 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); |
d3819813 MTL |
123 | } |
124 | ||
031e5cce | 125 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
d3819813 MTL |
126 | int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) |
127 | { | |
128 | return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); | |
129 | } | |
031e5cce | 130 | #endif |
3e575651 | 131 | |
031e5cce | 132 | X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) |
d3819813 | 133 | { |
031e5cce | 134 | return (a->cert_info->issuer); |
d3819813 | 135 | } |
3e575651 SL |
136 | |
137 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) | |
d3819813 | 138 | { |
031e5cce | 139 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
d3819813 MTL |
140 | } |
141 | ||
142 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 | |
143 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | |
144 | { | |
031e5cce | 145 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); |
d3819813 MTL |
146 | } |
147 | #endif | |
3e575651 | 148 | |
031e5cce | 149 | X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) |
d3819813 | 150 | { |
031e5cce | 151 | return (a->cert_info->subject); |
d3819813 | 152 | } |
3e575651 SL |
153 | |
154 | ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) | |
d3819813 | 155 | { |
031e5cce | 156 | return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); |
d3819813 | 157 | } |
3e575651 SL |
158 | |
159 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) | |
d3819813 | 160 | { |
031e5cce | 161 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); |
d3819813 MTL |
162 | } |
163 | ||
164 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 | |
165 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | |
166 | { | |
031e5cce | 167 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); |
d3819813 MTL |
168 | } |
169 | #endif | |
3e575651 | 170 | |
031e5cce | 171 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
d3819813 MTL |
172 | /* |
173 | * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: | |
174 | * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" | |
175 | * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these | |
176 | * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring | |
177 | * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the | |
178 | * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. | |
3e575651 SL |
179 | */ |
180 | int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) | |
181 | { | |
d3819813 MTL |
182 | int rv; |
183 | /* ensure hash is valid */ | |
184 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); | |
185 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); | |
186 | ||
187 | rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
188 | if (rv) | |
189 | return rv; | |
190 | /* Check for match against stored encoding too */ | |
031e5cce SM |
191 | if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) { |
192 | rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len); | |
193 | if (rv) | |
194 | return rv; | |
195 | return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc, | |
196 | a->cert_info->enc.len); | |
d3819813 MTL |
197 | } |
198 | return rv; | |
3e575651 | 199 | } |
031e5cce | 200 | #endif |
3e575651 | 201 | |
d3819813 | 202 | int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) |
3e575651 | 203 | { |
d3819813 | 204 | int ret; |
3e575651 | 205 | |
d3819813 | 206 | /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ |
3e575651 | 207 | |
d3819813 MTL |
208 | if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { |
209 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); | |
210 | if (ret < 0) | |
211 | return -2; | |
212 | } | |
3e575651 | 213 | |
d3819813 MTL |
214 | if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { |
215 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); | |
216 | if (ret < 0) | |
217 | return -2; | |
218 | } | |
3e575651 | 219 | |
d3819813 | 220 | ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; |
3e575651 | 221 | |
d3819813 MTL |
222 | if (ret) |
223 | return ret; | |
3e575651 | 224 | |
d3819813 | 225 | return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); |
3e575651 | 226 | |
d3819813 | 227 | } |
3e575651 | 228 | |
d3819813 MTL |
229 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) |
230 | { | |
231 | unsigned long ret = 0; | |
232 | unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | |
233 | ||
234 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | |
235 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | |
236 | if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), | |
237 | NULL)) | |
238 | return 0; | |
239 | ||
240 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | |
241 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
242 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
243 | return (ret); | |
244 | } | |
3e575651 SL |
245 | |
246 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 | |
d3819813 MTL |
247 | /* |
248 | * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, | |
249 | * this is reasonably efficient. | |
250 | */ | |
251 | ||
252 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) | |
253 | { | |
031e5cce | 254 | EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
d3819813 MTL |
255 | unsigned long ret = 0; |
256 | unsigned char md[16]; | |
257 | ||
258 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | |
259 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | |
031e5cce SM |
260 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
261 | EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); | |
262 | if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) | |
263 | && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) | |
264 | && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) | |
d3819813 MTL |
265 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | |
266 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L) | |
267 | ) & 0xffffffffL; | |
031e5cce | 268 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
d3819813 MTL |
269 | |
270 | return (ret); | |
271 | } | |
3e575651 SL |
272 | #endif |
273 | ||
274 | /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ | |
275 | X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, | |
d3819813 MTL |
276 | ASN1_INTEGER *serial) |
277 | { | |
278 | int i; | |
031e5cce | 279 | X509_CINF cinf; |
d3819813 MTL |
280 | X509 x, *x509 = NULL; |
281 | ||
282 | if (!sk) | |
283 | return NULL; | |
284 | ||
031e5cce SM |
285 | x.cert_info = &cinf; |
286 | cinf.serialNumber = serial; | |
287 | cinf.issuer = name; | |
d3819813 MTL |
288 | |
289 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
290 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
291 | if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) | |
292 | return (x509); | |
293 | } | |
294 | return (NULL); | |
295 | } | |
3e575651 SL |
296 | |
297 | X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) | |
d3819813 MTL |
298 | { |
299 | X509 *x509; | |
300 | int i; | |
301 | ||
302 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
303 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
304 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) | |
305 | return (x509); | |
306 | } | |
307 | return (NULL); | |
308 | } | |
3e575651 | 309 | |
031e5cce | 310 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) |
d3819813 | 311 | { |
031e5cce SM |
312 | if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) |
313 | return (NULL); | |
314 | return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); | |
d3819813 | 315 | } |
3e575651 | 316 | |
031e5cce | 317 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) |
d3819813 | 318 | { |
031e5cce | 319 | if (!x) |
d3819813 | 320 | return NULL; |
031e5cce | 321 | return x->cert_info->key->public_key; |
d3819813 | 322 | } |
3e575651 | 323 | |
031e5cce | 324 | int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) |
d3819813 | 325 | { |
031e5cce | 326 | EVP_PKEY *xk; |
d3819813 MTL |
327 | int ret; |
328 | ||
031e5cce | 329 | xk = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
d3819813 MTL |
330 | |
331 | if (xk) | |
332 | ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); | |
333 | else | |
334 | ret = -2; | |
335 | ||
336 | switch (ret) { | |
337 | case 1: | |
338 | break; | |
339 | case 0: | |
340 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); | |
341 | break; | |
342 | case -1: | |
343 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); | |
344 | break; | |
345 | case -2: | |
346 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); | |
347 | } | |
031e5cce SM |
348 | if (xk) |
349 | EVP_PKEY_free(xk); | |
d3819813 MTL |
350 | if (ret > 0) |
351 | return 1; | |
352 | return 0; | |
353 | } | |
354 | ||
355 | /* | |
356 | * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID | |
357 | * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a | |
358 | * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags. | |
359 | */ | |
360 | ||
3e575651 | 361 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
3e575651 | 362 | |
d3819813 MTL |
363 | static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags) |
364 | { | |
365 | const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL; | |
366 | int curve_nid; | |
031e5cce SM |
367 | if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
368 | grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec); | |
d3819813 MTL |
369 | if (!grp) |
370 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM; | |
371 | curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); | |
372 | /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */ | |
373 | if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */ | |
374 | /* | |
375 | * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve. | |
376 | */ | |
377 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384) | |
378 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
379 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS)) | |
380 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
381 | /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */ | |
382 | *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; | |
383 | } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */ | |
384 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) | |
385 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
386 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY)) | |
387 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
388 | } else | |
389 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE; | |
390 | ||
391 | return X509_V_OK; | |
392 | } | |
393 | ||
394 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, | |
395 | unsigned long flags) | |
396 | { | |
397 | int rv, i, sign_nid; | |
031e5cce SM |
398 | EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; |
399 | unsigned long tflags; | |
d3819813 MTL |
400 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) |
401 | return X509_V_OK; | |
031e5cce | 402 | tflags = flags; |
d3819813 MTL |
403 | /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */ |
404 | if (x == NULL) { | |
405 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); | |
406 | i = 1; | |
407 | } else | |
408 | i = 0; | |
409 | ||
410 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { | |
411 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; | |
412 | /* Correct error depth */ | |
413 | i = 0; | |
414 | goto end; | |
415 | } | |
416 | ||
031e5cce | 417 | pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); |
d3819813 MTL |
418 | /* Check EE key only */ |
419 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags); | |
420 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
421 | /* Correct error depth */ | |
422 | i = 0; | |
423 | goto end; | |
424 | } | |
425 | for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
426 | sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); | |
427 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
428 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) { | |
429 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION; | |
430 | goto end; | |
431 | } | |
031e5cce SM |
432 | EVP_PKEY_free(pk); |
433 | pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); | |
d3819813 MTL |
434 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags); |
435 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) | |
436 | goto end; | |
437 | } | |
438 | ||
439 | /* Final check: root CA signature */ | |
440 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags); | |
441 | end: | |
031e5cce SM |
442 | if (pk) |
443 | EVP_PKEY_free(pk); | |
d3819813 MTL |
444 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) { |
445 | /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */ | |
446 | if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM | |
447 | || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i) | |
448 | i--; | |
449 | /* | |
450 | * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384 | |
031e5cce | 451 | * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error. |
d3819813 MTL |
452 | */ |
453 | if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags) | |
454 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256; | |
455 | if (perror_depth) | |
456 | *perror_depth = i; | |
457 | } | |
458 | return rv; | |
459 | } | |
460 | ||
461 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) | |
462 | { | |
463 | int sign_nid; | |
464 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)) | |
465 | return X509_V_OK; | |
031e5cce | 466 | sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm); |
d3819813 MTL |
467 | return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags); |
468 | } | |
469 | ||
470 | #else | |
471 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, | |
472 | unsigned long flags) | |
473 | { | |
474 | return 0; | |
475 | } | |
476 | ||
477 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags) | |
478 | { | |
479 | return 0; | |
480 | } | |
481 | ||
482 | #endif | |
483 | /* | |
484 | * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference | |
485 | * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of | |
486 | * each X509 structure. | |
487 | */ | |
488 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | |
489 | { | |
490 | STACK_OF(X509) *ret; | |
491 | int i; | |
492 | ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); | |
493 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { | |
494 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i); | |
031e5cce | 495 | CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
d3819813 MTL |
496 | } |
497 | return ret; | |
498 | } |