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1da177e4 LT |
1 | /* |
2 | * random.c -- A strong random number generator | |
3 | * | |
b169c13d JD |
4 | * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All |
5 | * Rights Reserved. | |
6 | * | |
9e95ce27 | 7 | * Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005 |
1da177e4 LT |
8 | * |
9 | * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All | |
10 | * rights reserved. | |
11 | * | |
12 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
13 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
14 | * are met: | |
15 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
16 | * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, | |
17 | * including the disclaimer of warranties. | |
18 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
19 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
20 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
21 | * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote | |
22 | * products derived from this software without specific prior | |
23 | * written permission. | |
24 | * | |
25 | * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of | |
26 | * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are | |
27 | * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is | |
28 | * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and | |
29 | * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) | |
30 | * | |
31 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED | |
32 | * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES | |
33 | * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF | |
34 | * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE | |
35 | * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR | |
36 | * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT | |
37 | * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR | |
38 | * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF | |
39 | * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT | |
40 | * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE | |
41 | * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH | |
42 | * DAMAGE. | |
43 | */ | |
44 | ||
45 | /* | |
46 | * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....) | |
47 | * | |
48 | * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc., | |
49 | * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use. | |
50 | * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good | |
51 | * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is | |
52 | * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to | |
53 | * predict by an attacker. | |
54 | * | |
55 | * Theory of operation | |
56 | * =================== | |
57 | * | |
58 | * Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard | |
59 | * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to | |
60 | * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a | |
61 | * algorithm. Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess | |
62 | * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some | |
63 | * applications this is not acceptable. So instead, we must try to | |
64 | * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which | |
65 | * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to | |
66 | * generate random numbers. In a Unix environment, this is best done | |
67 | * from inside the kernel. | |
68 | * | |
69 | * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard | |
70 | * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other | |
71 | * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an | |
72 | * outside observer to measure. Randomness from these sources are | |
73 | * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function. | |
74 | * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming | |
75 | * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that | |
76 | * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable. | |
77 | * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep | |
78 | * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into | |
79 | * the random number generator's internal state. | |
80 | * | |
81 | * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA | |
82 | * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids | |
83 | * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to | |
84 | * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information | |
85 | * about the input of SHA from its output. Even if it is possible to | |
86 | * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data | |
87 | * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in | |
88 | * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this | |
89 | * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many | |
90 | * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it | |
91 | * outputs random numbers. | |
92 | * | |
93 | * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate | |
94 | * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be | |
95 | * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior | |
96 | * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is | |
97 | * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility. | |
98 | * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority | |
99 | * of purposes. | |
100 | * | |
101 | * Exported interfaces ---- output | |
102 | * =============================== | |
103 | * | |
104 | * There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to | |
105 | * be used from within the kernel: | |
106 | * | |
107 | * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); | |
108 | * | |
109 | * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes, | |
110 | * and place it in the requested buffer. | |
111 | * | |
112 | * The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and | |
113 | * /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high | |
114 | * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or | |
115 | * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of | |
116 | * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator) | |
117 | * contained in the entropy pool. | |
118 | * | |
119 | * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return | |
120 | * as many bytes as are requested. As more and more random bytes are | |
121 | * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge, | |
122 | * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically | |
123 | * strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable. | |
124 | * | |
125 | * Exported interfaces ---- input | |
126 | * ============================== | |
127 | * | |
128 | * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise | |
129 | * from the devices are: | |
130 | * | |
a2080a67 | 131 | * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); |
1da177e4 LT |
132 | * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, |
133 | * unsigned int value); | |
775f4b29 | 134 | * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags); |
442a4fff | 135 | * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); |
1da177e4 | 136 | * |
a2080a67 LT |
137 | * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that |
138 | * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). | |
139 | * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the | |
140 | * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the | |
141 | * pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices | |
142 | * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy | |
143 | * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world). | |
144 | * | |
1da177e4 LT |
145 | * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as |
146 | * the event type information from the hardware. | |
147 | * | |
775f4b29 TT |
148 | * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random |
149 | * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source | |
150 | * as inputs, it feeds the randomness roughly once a second. | |
442a4fff JW |
151 | * |
152 | * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block | |
153 | * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the | |
154 | * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low | |
155 | * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek | |
156 | * times are usually fairly consistent. | |
1da177e4 LT |
157 | * |
158 | * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a | |
159 | * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the | |
160 | * first and second order deltas of the event timings. | |
161 | * | |
162 | * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup | |
163 | * ============================================ | |
164 | * | |
165 | * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence | |
166 | * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially | |
167 | * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator. | |
168 | * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the | |
169 | * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count. In order to | |
170 | * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the | |
171 | * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups. To do this, put the | |
172 | * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot | |
173 | * sequence: | |
174 | * | |
175 | * echo "Initializing random number generator..." | |
176 | * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed | |
177 | * # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up | |
178 | * # Load and then save the whole entropy pool | |
179 | * if [ -f $random_seed ]; then | |
180 | * cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom | |
181 | * else | |
182 | * touch $random_seed | |
183 | * fi | |
184 | * chmod 600 $random_seed | |
185 | * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512 | |
186 | * | |
187 | * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as | |
188 | * the system is shutdown: | |
189 | * | |
190 | * # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up | |
191 | * # Save the whole entropy pool | |
192 | * echo "Saving random seed..." | |
193 | * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed | |
194 | * touch $random_seed | |
195 | * chmod 600 $random_seed | |
196 | * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512 | |
197 | * | |
198 | * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init | |
199 | * scripts, such code fragments would be found in | |
200 | * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random. On older Linux systems, the correct script | |
201 | * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0. | |
202 | * | |
203 | * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool | |
204 | * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at | |
205 | * start-up. (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to | |
206 | * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up, | |
207 | * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.) Even with | |
208 | * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state | |
209 | * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of | |
210 | * the system. | |
211 | * | |
212 | * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux | |
213 | * ============================================== | |
214 | * | |
215 | * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of | |
216 | * the /dev/mem major number (#1). So if your system does not have | |
217 | * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created | |
218 | * by using the commands: | |
219 | * | |
220 | * mknod /dev/random c 1 8 | |
221 | * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9 | |
222 | * | |
223 | * Acknowledgements: | |
224 | * ================= | |
225 | * | |
226 | * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived | |
227 | * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private | |
228 | * discussions with Phil Karn. Colin Plumb provided a faster random | |
229 | * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy | |
230 | * pool, taken from PGPfone. Dale Worley has also contributed many | |
231 | * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver. | |
232 | * | |
233 | * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should | |
234 | * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP. | |
235 | * | |
236 | * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from | |
237 | * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald | |
238 | * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller. | |
239 | */ | |
240 | ||
241 | #include <linux/utsname.h> | |
1da177e4 LT |
242 | #include <linux/module.h> |
243 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
244 | #include <linux/major.h> | |
245 | #include <linux/string.h> | |
246 | #include <linux/fcntl.h> | |
247 | #include <linux/slab.h> | |
248 | #include <linux/random.h> | |
249 | #include <linux/poll.h> | |
250 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
251 | #include <linux/fs.h> | |
252 | #include <linux/genhd.h> | |
253 | #include <linux/interrupt.h> | |
27ac792c | 254 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
dd0f0cf5 | 255 | #include <linux/nodemask.h> |
1da177e4 | 256 | #include <linux/spinlock.h> |
c84dbf61 | 257 | #include <linux/kthread.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
258 | #include <linux/percpu.h> |
259 | #include <linux/cryptohash.h> | |
5b739ef8 | 260 | #include <linux/fips.h> |
775f4b29 | 261 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
e6d4947b | 262 | #include <linux/kmemcheck.h> |
6265e169 | 263 | #include <linux/workqueue.h> |
0244ad00 | 264 | #include <linux/irq.h> |
c6e9d6f3 TT |
265 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
266 | #include <linux/completion.h> | |
8da4b8c4 | 267 | #include <linux/uuid.h> |
e192be9d | 268 | #include <crypto/chacha20.h> |
d178a1eb | 269 | |
1da177e4 | 270 | #include <asm/processor.h> |
7c0f6ba6 | 271 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> |
1da177e4 | 272 | #include <asm/irq.h> |
775f4b29 | 273 | #include <asm/irq_regs.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
274 | #include <asm/io.h> |
275 | ||
00ce1db1 TT |
276 | #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS |
277 | #include <trace/events/random.h> | |
278 | ||
43759d4f TT |
279 | /* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */ |
280 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
281 | /* |
282 | * Configuration information | |
283 | */ | |
30e37ec5 PA |
284 | #define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12 |
285 | #define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) | |
286 | #define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10 | |
287 | #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) | |
288 | #define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512 | |
289 | #define EXTRACT_SIZE 10 | |
1da177e4 | 290 | |
392a546d | 291 | #define DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT 0 |
1da177e4 | 292 | |
d2e7c96a PA |
293 | #define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long)) |
294 | ||
a283b5c4 | 295 | /* |
95b709b6 TT |
296 | * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is |
297 | * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. | |
30e37ec5 PA |
298 | * |
299 | * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + log2(poolbits)) must <= 31, or the multiply in | |
300 | * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide. | |
a283b5c4 PA |
301 | */ |
302 | #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 | |
303 | #define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) | |
304 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
305 | /* |
306 | * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on | |
307 | * /dev/random. Should be enough to do a significant reseed. | |
308 | */ | |
2132a96f | 309 | static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64; |
1da177e4 LT |
310 | |
311 | /* | |
312 | * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we | |
313 | * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write | |
314 | * access to /dev/random. | |
315 | */ | |
2132a96f | 316 | static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS; |
1da177e4 | 317 | |
1da177e4 | 318 | /* |
6e9fa2c8 TT |
319 | * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords |
320 | * over GF(2). The taps for various sizes are defined below. They | |
321 | * were chosen to be evenly spaced except for the last tap, which is 1 | |
322 | * to get the twisting happening as fast as possible. | |
323 | * | |
324 | * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as | |
325 | * well to make a (modified) twisted Generalized Feedback Shift | |
326 | * Register. (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992. Twisted GFSR | |
327 | * generators. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation | |
328 | * 2(3):179-194. Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994. Twisted | |
dfd38750 | 329 | * GFSR generators II. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer |
6e9fa2c8 TT |
330 | * Simulation 4:254-266) |
331 | * | |
332 | * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this. | |
333 | * | |
334 | * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash, | |
335 | * where we use SHA-1. All that we want of mixing operation is that | |
336 | * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions | |
337 | * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see. As long as | |
338 | * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the | |
339 | * input entropy and done a good job. The fact that an intelligent | |
340 | * attacker can construct inputs that will produce controlled | |
341 | * alterations to the pool's state is not important because we don't | |
342 | * consider such inputs to contribute any randomness. The only | |
343 | * property we need with respect to them is that the attacker can't | |
344 | * increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state. Since all | |
345 | * additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the input, | |
346 | * you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has any | |
347 | * uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle that | |
348 | * uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would | |
349 | * decrease the uncertainty). | |
350 | * | |
351 | * Our mixing functions were analyzed by Lacharme, Roeck, Strubel, and | |
352 | * Videau in their paper, "The Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator | |
353 | * Revisited" (see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/251.pdf). In their | |
354 | * paper, they point out that we are not using a true Twisted GFSR, | |
355 | * since Matsumoto & Kurita used a trinomial feedback polynomial (that | |
356 | * is, with only three taps, instead of the six that we are using). | |
357 | * As a result, the resulting polynomial is neither primitive nor | |
358 | * irreducible, and hence does not have a maximal period over | |
359 | * GF(2**32). They suggest a slight change to the generator | |
360 | * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be | |
361 | * irreducible, which we have made here. | |
1da177e4 LT |
362 | */ |
363 | static struct poolinfo { | |
a283b5c4 PA |
364 | int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits; |
365 | #define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5) | |
1da177e4 LT |
366 | int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; |
367 | } poolinfo_table[] = { | |
6e9fa2c8 TT |
368 | /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ |
369 | /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ | |
370 | { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 }, | |
371 | /* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ | |
372 | /* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ | |
373 | { S(32), 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 }, | |
1da177e4 LT |
374 | #if 0 |
375 | /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 376 | { S(2048), 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
377 | |
378 | /* x^1024 + x^817 + x^615 + x^412 + x^204 + x + 1 -- 290 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 379 | { S(1024), 817, 615, 412, 204, 1 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
380 | |
381 | /* x^1024 + x^819 + x^616 + x^410 + x^207 + x^2 + 1 -- 115 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 382 | { S(1024), 819, 616, 410, 207, 2 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
383 | |
384 | /* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 + x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 385 | { S(512), 411, 308, 208, 104, 1 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
386 | |
387 | /* x^512 + x^409 + x^307 + x^206 + x^102 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 388 | { S(512), 409, 307, 206, 102, 2 }, |
1da177e4 | 389 | /* x^512 + x^409 + x^309 + x^205 + x^103 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */ |
9ed17b70 | 390 | { S(512), 409, 309, 205, 103, 2 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
391 | |
392 | /* x^256 + x^205 + x^155 + x^101 + x^52 + x + 1 -- 125 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 393 | { S(256), 205, 155, 101, 52, 1 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
394 | |
395 | /* x^128 + x^103 + x^78 + x^51 + x^27 + x^2 + 1 -- 70 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 396 | { S(128), 103, 78, 51, 27, 2 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
397 | |
398 | /* x^64 + x^52 + x^39 + x^26 + x^14 + x + 1 -- 15 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 399 | { S(64), 52, 39, 26, 14, 1 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
400 | #endif |
401 | }; | |
402 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
403 | /* |
404 | * Static global variables | |
405 | */ | |
406 | static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait); | |
407 | static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait); | |
9a6f70bb | 408 | static struct fasync_struct *fasync; |
1da177e4 | 409 | |
205a525c HX |
410 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); |
411 | static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); | |
412 | ||
e192be9d TT |
413 | struct crng_state { |
414 | __u32 state[16]; | |
415 | unsigned long init_time; | |
416 | spinlock_t lock; | |
417 | }; | |
418 | ||
419 | struct crng_state primary_crng = { | |
420 | .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock), | |
421 | }; | |
422 | ||
423 | /* | |
424 | * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized | |
425 | * 1 --> Initialized | |
426 | * 2 --> Initialized from input_pool | |
427 | * | |
428 | * crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, and only increases | |
429 | * its value (from 0->1->2). | |
430 | */ | |
431 | static int crng_init = 0; | |
432 | #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 0)) | |
433 | static int crng_init_cnt = 0; | |
434 | #define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) | |
1e7f583a TT |
435 | static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, |
436 | __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]); | |
c92e040d TT |
437 | static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, |
438 | __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); | |
e192be9d TT |
439 | static void process_random_ready_list(void); |
440 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
441 | /********************************************************************** |
442 | * | |
443 | * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle | |
444 | * storing entropy in an entropy pool. | |
445 | * | |
446 | **********************************************************************/ | |
447 | ||
448 | struct entropy_store; | |
449 | struct entropy_store { | |
43358209 | 450 | /* read-only data: */ |
30e37ec5 | 451 | const struct poolinfo *poolinfo; |
1da177e4 LT |
452 | __u32 *pool; |
453 | const char *name; | |
1da177e4 | 454 | struct entropy_store *pull; |
6265e169 | 455 | struct work_struct push_work; |
1da177e4 LT |
456 | |
457 | /* read-write data: */ | |
f5c2742c | 458 | unsigned long last_pulled; |
43358209 | 459 | spinlock_t lock; |
c59974ae TT |
460 | unsigned short add_ptr; |
461 | unsigned short input_rotate; | |
cda796a3 | 462 | int entropy_count; |
775f4b29 | 463 | int entropy_total; |
775f4b29 | 464 | unsigned int initialized:1; |
c59974ae | 465 | unsigned int last_data_init:1; |
e954bc91 | 466 | __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; |
1da177e4 LT |
467 | }; |
468 | ||
e192be9d TT |
469 | static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, |
470 | size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd); | |
471 | static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, | |
472 | size_t nbytes, int fips); | |
473 | ||
474 | static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r); | |
6265e169 | 475 | static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work); |
0766f788 ER |
476 | static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; |
477 | static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; | |
1da177e4 LT |
478 | |
479 | static struct entropy_store input_pool = { | |
480 | .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0], | |
481 | .name = "input", | |
eece09ec | 482 | .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), |
1da177e4 LT |
483 | .pool = input_pool_data |
484 | }; | |
485 | ||
486 | static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = { | |
487 | .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1], | |
488 | .name = "blocking", | |
1da177e4 | 489 | .pull = &input_pool, |
eece09ec | 490 | .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(blocking_pool.lock), |
6265e169 TT |
491 | .pool = blocking_pool_data, |
492 | .push_work = __WORK_INITIALIZER(blocking_pool.push_work, | |
493 | push_to_pool), | |
1da177e4 LT |
494 | }; |
495 | ||
775f4b29 TT |
496 | static __u32 const twist_table[8] = { |
497 | 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, | |
498 | 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; | |
499 | ||
1da177e4 | 500 | /* |
e68e5b66 | 501 | * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not |
1da177e4 | 502 | * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call |
adc782da | 503 | * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate. |
1da177e4 LT |
504 | * |
505 | * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate | |
506 | * degree, and then twisted. We twist by three bits at a time because | |
507 | * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where | |
508 | * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits. | |
509 | */ | |
00ce1db1 | 510 | static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, |
85608f8e | 511 | int nbytes) |
1da177e4 | 512 | { |
85608f8e | 513 | unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; |
feee7697 | 514 | int input_rotate; |
1da177e4 | 515 | int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1; |
e68e5b66 | 516 | const char *bytes = in; |
6d38b827 | 517 | __u32 w; |
1da177e4 | 518 | |
1da177e4 LT |
519 | tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1; |
520 | tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2; | |
521 | tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3; | |
522 | tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4; | |
523 | tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5; | |
1da177e4 | 524 | |
91fcb532 TT |
525 | input_rotate = r->input_rotate; |
526 | i = r->add_ptr; | |
1da177e4 | 527 | |
e68e5b66 MM |
528 | /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */ |
529 | while (nbytes--) { | |
c59974ae | 530 | w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate); |
993ba211 | 531 | i = (i - 1) & wordmask; |
1da177e4 LT |
532 | |
533 | /* XOR in the various taps */ | |
993ba211 | 534 | w ^= r->pool[i]; |
1da177e4 LT |
535 | w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask]; |
536 | w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask]; | |
537 | w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask]; | |
538 | w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask]; | |
539 | w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask]; | |
993ba211 MM |
540 | |
541 | /* Mix the result back in with a twist */ | |
1da177e4 | 542 | r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; |
feee7697 MM |
543 | |
544 | /* | |
545 | * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool. | |
546 | * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits | |
547 | * rotation, so that successive passes spread the | |
548 | * input bits across the pool evenly. | |
549 | */ | |
c59974ae | 550 | input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31; |
1da177e4 LT |
551 | } |
552 | ||
91fcb532 TT |
553 | r->input_rotate = input_rotate; |
554 | r->add_ptr = i; | |
1da177e4 LT |
555 | } |
556 | ||
00ce1db1 | 557 | static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, |
85608f8e | 558 | int nbytes) |
00ce1db1 TT |
559 | { |
560 | trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_); | |
85608f8e | 561 | _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes); |
00ce1db1 TT |
562 | } |
563 | ||
564 | static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, | |
85608f8e | 565 | int nbytes) |
1da177e4 | 566 | { |
902c098a TT |
567 | unsigned long flags; |
568 | ||
00ce1db1 | 569 | trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_); |
902c098a | 570 | spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); |
85608f8e | 571 | _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes); |
902c098a | 572 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); |
1da177e4 LT |
573 | } |
574 | ||
775f4b29 TT |
575 | struct fast_pool { |
576 | __u32 pool[4]; | |
577 | unsigned long last; | |
ee3e00e9 | 578 | unsigned short reg_idx; |
840f9507 | 579 | unsigned char count; |
775f4b29 TT |
580 | }; |
581 | ||
582 | /* | |
583 | * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness | |
584 | * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any | |
585 | * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller. | |
586 | */ | |
43759d4f | 587 | static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f) |
775f4b29 | 588 | { |
43759d4f TT |
589 | __u32 a = f->pool[0], b = f->pool[1]; |
590 | __u32 c = f->pool[2], d = f->pool[3]; | |
591 | ||
592 | a += b; c += d; | |
19acc77a | 593 | b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); |
43759d4f TT |
594 | d ^= a; b ^= c; |
595 | ||
596 | a += b; c += d; | |
19acc77a | 597 | b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); |
43759d4f TT |
598 | d ^= a; b ^= c; |
599 | ||
600 | a += b; c += d; | |
19acc77a | 601 | b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); |
43759d4f TT |
602 | d ^= a; b ^= c; |
603 | ||
604 | a += b; c += d; | |
19acc77a | 605 | b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); |
43759d4f TT |
606 | d ^= a; b ^= c; |
607 | ||
608 | f->pool[0] = a; f->pool[1] = b; | |
609 | f->pool[2] = c; f->pool[3] = d; | |
655b2264 | 610 | f->count++; |
775f4b29 TT |
611 | } |
612 | ||
205a525c HX |
613 | static void process_random_ready_list(void) |
614 | { | |
615 | unsigned long flags; | |
616 | struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp; | |
617 | ||
618 | spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); | |
619 | list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) { | |
620 | struct module *owner = rdy->owner; | |
621 | ||
622 | list_del_init(&rdy->list); | |
623 | rdy->func(rdy); | |
624 | module_put(owner); | |
625 | } | |
626 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); | |
627 | } | |
628 | ||
1da177e4 | 629 | /* |
a283b5c4 PA |
630 | * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy. |
631 | * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace | |
632 | * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values. | |
1da177e4 | 633 | */ |
adc782da | 634 | static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) |
1da177e4 | 635 | { |
902c098a | 636 | int entropy_count, orig; |
30e37ec5 PA |
637 | const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits; |
638 | int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT; | |
1da177e4 | 639 | |
adc782da MM |
640 | if (!nbits) |
641 | return; | |
642 | ||
902c098a TT |
643 | retry: |
644 | entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count); | |
30e37ec5 PA |
645 | if (nfrac < 0) { |
646 | /* Debit */ | |
647 | entropy_count += nfrac; | |
648 | } else { | |
649 | /* | |
650 | * Credit: we have to account for the possibility of | |
651 | * overwriting already present entropy. Even in the | |
652 | * ideal case of pure Shannon entropy, new contributions | |
653 | * approach the full value asymptotically: | |
654 | * | |
655 | * entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) * | |
656 | * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) | |
657 | * | |
658 | * For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then | |
659 | * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >= | |
660 | * (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869... | |
661 | * so we can approximate the exponential with | |
662 | * 3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the | |
663 | * safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time. | |
664 | * | |
665 | * The use of pool_size-2 in the while statement is to | |
666 | * prevent rounding artifacts from making the loop | |
667 | * arbitrarily long; this limits the loop to log2(pool_size)*2 | |
668 | * turns no matter how large nbits is. | |
669 | */ | |
670 | int pnfrac = nfrac; | |
671 | const int s = r->poolinfo->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2; | |
672 | /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ | |
673 | ||
674 | do { | |
675 | unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2); | |
676 | unsigned int add = | |
677 | ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s; | |
678 | ||
679 | entropy_count += add; | |
680 | pnfrac -= anfrac; | |
681 | } while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac)); | |
682 | } | |
00ce1db1 | 683 | |
79a84687 | 684 | if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) { |
f80bbd8b TT |
685 | pr_warn("random: negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n", |
686 | r->name, entropy_count); | |
687 | WARN_ON(1); | |
8b76f46a | 688 | entropy_count = 0; |
30e37ec5 PA |
689 | } else if (entropy_count > pool_size) |
690 | entropy_count = pool_size; | |
902c098a TT |
691 | if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) |
692 | goto retry; | |
1da177e4 | 693 | |
6265e169 | 694 | r->entropy_total += nbits; |
0891ad82 LT |
695 | if (!r->initialized && r->entropy_total > 128) { |
696 | r->initialized = 1; | |
697 | r->entropy_total = 0; | |
775f4b29 TT |
698 | } |
699 | ||
a283b5c4 PA |
700 | trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits, |
701 | entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, | |
00ce1db1 TT |
702 | r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_); |
703 | ||
6265e169 | 704 | if (r == &input_pool) { |
7d1b08c4 | 705 | int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; |
6265e169 | 706 | |
e192be9d TT |
707 | if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) { |
708 | crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r); | |
709 | entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; | |
710 | } | |
711 | ||
6265e169 | 712 | /* should we wake readers? */ |
2132a96f | 713 | if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits) { |
6265e169 TT |
714 | wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait); |
715 | kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); | |
716 | } | |
717 | /* If the input pool is getting full, send some | |
e192be9d | 718 | * entropy to the blocking pool until it is 75% full. |
6265e169 | 719 | */ |
2132a96f | 720 | if (entropy_bits > random_write_wakeup_bits && |
6265e169 | 721 | r->initialized && |
2132a96f | 722 | r->entropy_total >= 2*random_read_wakeup_bits) { |
6265e169 TT |
723 | struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool; |
724 | ||
6265e169 | 725 | if (other->entropy_count <= |
e192be9d TT |
726 | 3 * other->poolinfo->poolfracbits / 4) { |
727 | schedule_work(&other->push_work); | |
6265e169 TT |
728 | r->entropy_total = 0; |
729 | } | |
730 | } | |
9a6f70bb | 731 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
732 | } |
733 | ||
86a574de | 734 | static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) |
a283b5c4 PA |
735 | { |
736 | const int nbits_max = (int)(~0U >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 1)); | |
737 | ||
86a574de TT |
738 | if (nbits < 0) |
739 | return -EINVAL; | |
740 | ||
a283b5c4 PA |
741 | /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */ |
742 | nbits = min(nbits, nbits_max); | |
a283b5c4 PA |
743 | |
744 | credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits); | |
86a574de | 745 | return 0; |
a283b5c4 PA |
746 | } |
747 | ||
e192be9d TT |
748 | /********************************************************************* |
749 | * | |
750 | * CRNG using CHACHA20 | |
751 | * | |
752 | *********************************************************************/ | |
753 | ||
754 | #define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ) | |
755 | ||
756 | static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); | |
757 | ||
1e7f583a TT |
758 | #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA |
759 | /* | |
760 | * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying | |
761 | * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost | |
762 | * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around | |
763 | * their brain damage. | |
764 | */ | |
765 | static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly; | |
766 | #endif | |
767 | ||
b169c13d JD |
768 | static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); |
769 | ||
e192be9d TT |
770 | static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) |
771 | { | |
772 | int i; | |
773 | unsigned long rv; | |
774 | ||
775 | memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); | |
776 | if (crng == &primary_crng) | |
777 | _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], | |
778 | sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); | |
779 | else | |
780 | get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); | |
781 | for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { | |
782 | if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && | |
783 | !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) | |
784 | rv = random_get_entropy(); | |
785 | crng->state[i] ^= rv; | |
786 | } | |
787 | crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; | |
788 | } | |
789 | ||
790 | static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) | |
791 | { | |
792 | unsigned long flags; | |
793 | char *p; | |
794 | ||
795 | if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) | |
796 | return 0; | |
797 | if (crng_ready()) { | |
798 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); | |
799 | return 0; | |
800 | } | |
801 | p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4]; | |
802 | while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { | |
803 | p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; | |
804 | cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; | |
805 | } | |
4a072c71 | 806 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); |
e192be9d | 807 | if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { |
b169c13d | 808 | invalidate_batched_entropy(); |
e192be9d TT |
809 | crng_init = 1; |
810 | wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); | |
811 | pr_notice("random: fast init done\n"); | |
812 | } | |
e192be9d TT |
813 | return 1; |
814 | } | |
815 | ||
816 | static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) | |
817 | { | |
818 | unsigned long flags; | |
819 | int i, num; | |
820 | union { | |
821 | __u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; | |
822 | __u32 key[8]; | |
823 | } buf; | |
824 | ||
825 | if (r) { | |
826 | num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0); | |
827 | if (num == 0) | |
828 | return; | |
c92e040d | 829 | } else { |
1e7f583a | 830 | _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block); |
c92e040d TT |
831 | _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block, |
832 | CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE); | |
833 | } | |
e192be9d TT |
834 | spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); |
835 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { | |
836 | unsigned long rv; | |
837 | if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && | |
838 | !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) | |
839 | rv = random_get_entropy(); | |
840 | crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv; | |
841 | } | |
842 | memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); | |
843 | crng->init_time = jiffies; | |
4a072c71 | 844 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); |
e192be9d | 845 | if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) { |
b169c13d | 846 | invalidate_batched_entropy(); |
e192be9d TT |
847 | crng_init = 2; |
848 | process_random_ready_list(); | |
849 | wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); | |
850 | pr_notice("random: crng init done\n"); | |
851 | } | |
e192be9d TT |
852 | } |
853 | ||
854 | static inline void crng_wait_ready(void) | |
855 | { | |
856 | wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready()); | |
857 | } | |
858 | ||
1e7f583a TT |
859 | static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, |
860 | __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) | |
e192be9d TT |
861 | { |
862 | unsigned long v, flags; | |
e192be9d TT |
863 | |
864 | if (crng_init > 1 && | |
865 | time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) | |
1e7f583a | 866 | crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? &input_pool : NULL); |
e192be9d TT |
867 | spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); |
868 | if (arch_get_random_long(&v)) | |
869 | crng->state[14] ^= v; | |
870 | chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out); | |
871 | if (crng->state[12] == 0) | |
872 | crng->state[13]++; | |
873 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); | |
874 | } | |
875 | ||
1e7f583a TT |
876 | static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) |
877 | { | |
878 | struct crng_state *crng = NULL; | |
879 | ||
880 | #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA | |
881 | if (crng_node_pool) | |
882 | crng = crng_node_pool[numa_node_id()]; | |
883 | if (crng == NULL) | |
884 | #endif | |
885 | crng = &primary_crng; | |
886 | _extract_crng(crng, out); | |
887 | } | |
888 | ||
c92e040d TT |
889 | /* |
890 | * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is | |
891 | * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. | |
892 | */ | |
893 | static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, | |
894 | __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) | |
895 | { | |
896 | unsigned long flags; | |
897 | __u32 *s, *d; | |
898 | int i; | |
899 | ||
900 | used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32)); | |
901 | if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { | |
902 | extract_crng(tmp); | |
903 | used = 0; | |
904 | } | |
905 | spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); | |
906 | s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used]; | |
907 | d = &crng->state[4]; | |
908 | for (i=0; i < 8; i++) | |
909 | *d++ ^= *s++; | |
910 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); | |
911 | } | |
912 | ||
913 | static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) | |
914 | { | |
915 | struct crng_state *crng = NULL; | |
916 | ||
917 | #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA | |
918 | if (crng_node_pool) | |
919 | crng = crng_node_pool[numa_node_id()]; | |
920 | if (crng == NULL) | |
921 | #endif | |
922 | crng = &primary_crng; | |
923 | _crng_backtrack_protect(crng, tmp, used); | |
924 | } | |
925 | ||
e192be9d TT |
926 | static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) |
927 | { | |
c92e040d | 928 | ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; |
e192be9d TT |
929 | __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
930 | int large_request = (nbytes > 256); | |
931 | ||
932 | while (nbytes) { | |
933 | if (large_request && need_resched()) { | |
934 | if (signal_pending(current)) { | |
935 | if (ret == 0) | |
936 | ret = -ERESTARTSYS; | |
937 | break; | |
938 | } | |
939 | schedule(); | |
940 | } | |
941 | ||
942 | extract_crng(tmp); | |
943 | i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); | |
944 | if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { | |
945 | ret = -EFAULT; | |
946 | break; | |
947 | } | |
948 | ||
949 | nbytes -= i; | |
950 | buf += i; | |
951 | ret += i; | |
952 | } | |
c92e040d | 953 | crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, i); |
e192be9d TT |
954 | |
955 | /* Wipe data just written to memory */ | |
956 | memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); | |
957 | ||
958 | return ret; | |
959 | } | |
960 | ||
961 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
962 | /********************************************************************* |
963 | * | |
964 | * Entropy input management | |
965 | * | |
966 | *********************************************************************/ | |
967 | ||
968 | /* There is one of these per entropy source */ | |
969 | struct timer_rand_state { | |
970 | cycles_t last_time; | |
90b75ee5 | 971 | long last_delta, last_delta2; |
1da177e4 LT |
972 | unsigned dont_count_entropy:1; |
973 | }; | |
974 | ||
644008df TT |
975 | #define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, }; |
976 | ||
a2080a67 | 977 | /* |
e192be9d TT |
978 | * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help |
979 | * initialize it. | |
a2080a67 | 980 | * |
e192be9d TT |
981 | * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of |
982 | * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely | |
983 | * identical devices. | |
a2080a67 LT |
984 | */ |
985 | void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size) | |
986 | { | |
61875f30 | 987 | unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies; |
3ef4cb2d | 988 | unsigned long flags; |
a2080a67 | 989 | |
5910895f | 990 | trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_); |
3ef4cb2d | 991 | spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); |
85608f8e TT |
992 | _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size); |
993 | _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time)); | |
3ef4cb2d | 994 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); |
a2080a67 LT |
995 | } |
996 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); | |
997 | ||
644008df | 998 | static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE; |
3060d6fe | 999 | |
1da177e4 LT |
1000 | /* |
1001 | * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing | |
1002 | * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate | |
1003 | * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. | |
1004 | * | |
1005 | * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe | |
1006 | * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for | |
1007 | * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts. | |
1008 | * | |
1009 | */ | |
1010 | static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) | |
1011 | { | |
40db23e5 | 1012 | struct entropy_store *r; |
1da177e4 | 1013 | struct { |
1da177e4 | 1014 | long jiffies; |
cf833d0b | 1015 | unsigned cycles; |
1da177e4 LT |
1016 | unsigned num; |
1017 | } sample; | |
1018 | long delta, delta2, delta3; | |
1019 | ||
1020 | preempt_disable(); | |
1da177e4 LT |
1021 | |
1022 | sample.jiffies = jiffies; | |
61875f30 | 1023 | sample.cycles = random_get_entropy(); |
1da177e4 | 1024 | sample.num = num; |
e192be9d | 1025 | r = &input_pool; |
85608f8e | 1026 | mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample)); |
1da177e4 LT |
1027 | |
1028 | /* | |
1029 | * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added. | |
1030 | * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas | |
1031 | * in order to make our estimate. | |
1032 | */ | |
1033 | ||
1034 | if (!state->dont_count_entropy) { | |
1035 | delta = sample.jiffies - state->last_time; | |
1036 | state->last_time = sample.jiffies; | |
1037 | ||
1038 | delta2 = delta - state->last_delta; | |
1039 | state->last_delta = delta; | |
1040 | ||
1041 | delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2; | |
1042 | state->last_delta2 = delta2; | |
1043 | ||
1044 | if (delta < 0) | |
1045 | delta = -delta; | |
1046 | if (delta2 < 0) | |
1047 | delta2 = -delta2; | |
1048 | if (delta3 < 0) | |
1049 | delta3 = -delta3; | |
1050 | if (delta > delta2) | |
1051 | delta = delta2; | |
1052 | if (delta > delta3) | |
1053 | delta = delta3; | |
1054 | ||
1055 | /* | |
1056 | * delta is now minimum absolute delta. | |
1057 | * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, | |
1058 | * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits. | |
1059 | */ | |
40db23e5 | 1060 | credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11)); |
1da177e4 | 1061 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
1062 | preempt_enable(); |
1063 | } | |
1064 | ||
d251575a | 1065 | void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, |
1da177e4 LT |
1066 | unsigned int value) |
1067 | { | |
1068 | static unsigned char last_value; | |
1069 | ||
1070 | /* ignore autorepeat and the like */ | |
1071 | if (value == last_value) | |
1072 | return; | |
1073 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1074 | last_value = value; |
1075 | add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state, | |
1076 | (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value); | |
f80bbd8b | 1077 | trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); |
1da177e4 | 1078 | } |
80fc9f53 | 1079 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness); |
1da177e4 | 1080 | |
775f4b29 TT |
1081 | static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness); |
1082 | ||
43759d4f TT |
1083 | #ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH |
1084 | static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation; | |
1085 | ||
1086 | #define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */ | |
1087 | #define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1)) | |
1088 | ||
1089 | static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start) | |
1090 | { | |
1091 | long delta = random_get_entropy() - start; | |
1092 | ||
1093 | /* Use a weighted moving average */ | |
1094 | delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); | |
1095 | avg_cycles += delta; | |
1096 | /* And average deviation */ | |
1097 | delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); | |
1098 | avg_deviation += delta; | |
1099 | } | |
1100 | #else | |
1101 | #define add_interrupt_bench(x) | |
1102 | #endif | |
1103 | ||
ee3e00e9 TT |
1104 | static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) |
1105 | { | |
1106 | __u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs; | |
92e75428 | 1107 | unsigned int idx; |
ee3e00e9 TT |
1108 | |
1109 | if (regs == NULL) | |
1110 | return 0; | |
92e75428 TT |
1111 | idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx); |
1112 | if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32)) | |
1113 | idx = 0; | |
1114 | ptr += idx++; | |
1115 | WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx); | |
9dfa7bba | 1116 | return *ptr; |
ee3e00e9 TT |
1117 | } |
1118 | ||
775f4b29 | 1119 | void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) |
1da177e4 | 1120 | { |
775f4b29 | 1121 | struct entropy_store *r; |
1b2a1a7e | 1122 | struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); |
775f4b29 TT |
1123 | struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); |
1124 | unsigned long now = jiffies; | |
655b2264 | 1125 | cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); |
43759d4f | 1126 | __u32 c_high, j_high; |
655b2264 | 1127 | __u64 ip; |
83664a69 | 1128 | unsigned long seed; |
91fcb532 | 1129 | int credit = 0; |
3060d6fe | 1130 | |
ee3e00e9 TT |
1131 | if (cycles == 0) |
1132 | cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); | |
655b2264 TT |
1133 | c_high = (sizeof(cycles) > 4) ? cycles >> 32 : 0; |
1134 | j_high = (sizeof(now) > 4) ? now >> 32 : 0; | |
43759d4f TT |
1135 | fast_pool->pool[0] ^= cycles ^ j_high ^ irq; |
1136 | fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high; | |
655b2264 | 1137 | ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; |
43759d4f | 1138 | fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip; |
ee3e00e9 TT |
1139 | fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 : |
1140 | get_reg(fast_pool, regs); | |
3060d6fe | 1141 | |
43759d4f | 1142 | fast_mix(fast_pool); |
43759d4f | 1143 | add_interrupt_bench(cycles); |
3060d6fe | 1144 | |
e192be9d TT |
1145 | if (!crng_ready()) { |
1146 | if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) && | |
1147 | crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool, | |
1148 | sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) { | |
1149 | fast_pool->count = 0; | |
1150 | fast_pool->last = now; | |
1151 | } | |
1152 | return; | |
1153 | } | |
1154 | ||
ee3e00e9 TT |
1155 | if ((fast_pool->count < 64) && |
1156 | !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) | |
1da177e4 LT |
1157 | return; |
1158 | ||
e192be9d | 1159 | r = &input_pool; |
840f9507 | 1160 | if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock)) |
91fcb532 | 1161 | return; |
83664a69 | 1162 | |
91fcb532 | 1163 | fast_pool->last = now; |
85608f8e | 1164 | __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)); |
83664a69 PA |
1165 | |
1166 | /* | |
1167 | * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and | |
48d6be95 TT |
1168 | * add it to the pool. For the sake of paranoia don't let the |
1169 | * architectural seed generator dominate the input from the | |
1170 | * interrupt noise. | |
83664a69 PA |
1171 | */ |
1172 | if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) { | |
85608f8e | 1173 | __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed)); |
48d6be95 | 1174 | credit = 1; |
83664a69 | 1175 | } |
91fcb532 | 1176 | spin_unlock(&r->lock); |
83664a69 | 1177 | |
ee3e00e9 | 1178 | fast_pool->count = 0; |
83664a69 | 1179 | |
ee3e00e9 TT |
1180 | /* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */ |
1181 | credit_entropy_bits(r, credit + 1); | |
1da177e4 | 1182 | } |
4b44f2d1 | 1183 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness); |
1da177e4 | 1184 | |
9361401e | 1185 | #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK |
1da177e4 LT |
1186 | void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) |
1187 | { | |
1188 | if (!disk || !disk->random) | |
1189 | return; | |
1190 | /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ | |
f331c029 | 1191 | add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk)); |
f80bbd8b | 1192 | trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); |
1da177e4 | 1193 | } |
bdcfa3e5 | 1194 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); |
9361401e | 1195 | #endif |
1da177e4 | 1196 | |
1da177e4 LT |
1197 | /********************************************************************* |
1198 | * | |
1199 | * Entropy extraction routines | |
1200 | * | |
1201 | *********************************************************************/ | |
1202 | ||
1da177e4 | 1203 | /* |
25985edc | 1204 | * This utility inline function is responsible for transferring entropy |
1da177e4 LT |
1205 | * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make |
1206 | * sure we pull enough for a 'catastrophic reseed'. | |
1207 | */ | |
6265e169 | 1208 | static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes); |
1da177e4 LT |
1209 | static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) |
1210 | { | |
cff85031 TT |
1211 | if (!r->pull || |
1212 | r->entropy_count >= (nbytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) || | |
1213 | r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits) | |
1214 | return; | |
1215 | ||
cff85031 | 1216 | _xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); |
6265e169 TT |
1217 | } |
1218 | ||
1219 | static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) | |
1220 | { | |
1221 | __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS]; | |
1222 | ||
6265e169 TT |
1223 | int bytes = nbytes; |
1224 | ||
2132a96f GP |
1225 | /* pull at least as much as a wakeup */ |
1226 | bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8); | |
6265e169 TT |
1227 | /* but never more than the buffer size */ |
1228 | bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp)); | |
1229 | ||
f80bbd8b TT |
1230 | trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, |
1231 | ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull)); | |
6265e169 | 1232 | bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes, |
43d8a72c | 1233 | random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0); |
85608f8e | 1234 | mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes); |
6265e169 TT |
1235 | credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8); |
1236 | } | |
1237 | ||
1238 | /* | |
1239 | * Used as a workqueue function so that when the input pool is getting | |
1240 | * full, we can "spill over" some entropy to the output pools. That | |
1241 | * way the output pools can store some of the excess entropy instead | |
1242 | * of letting it go to waste. | |
1243 | */ | |
1244 | static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work) | |
1245 | { | |
1246 | struct entropy_store *r = container_of(work, struct entropy_store, | |
1247 | push_work); | |
1248 | BUG_ON(!r); | |
2132a96f | 1249 | _xfer_secondary_pool(r, random_read_wakeup_bits/8); |
6265e169 TT |
1250 | trace_push_to_pool(r->name, r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, |
1251 | r->pull->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT); | |
1da177e4 LT |
1252 | } |
1253 | ||
1254 | /* | |
19fa5be1 GP |
1255 | * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the |
1256 | * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly. | |
1da177e4 | 1257 | */ |
1da177e4 LT |
1258 | static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min, |
1259 | int reserved) | |
1260 | { | |
43d8a72c | 1261 | int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes; |
79a84687 | 1262 | size_t ibytes, nfrac; |
1da177e4 | 1263 | |
a283b5c4 | 1264 | BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits); |
1da177e4 LT |
1265 | |
1266 | /* Can we pull enough? */ | |
10b3a32d | 1267 | retry: |
a283b5c4 | 1268 | entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count); |
a283b5c4 | 1269 | ibytes = nbytes; |
43d8a72c SM |
1270 | /* never pull more than available */ |
1271 | have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); | |
e33ba5fa | 1272 | |
43d8a72c SM |
1273 | if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0) |
1274 | have_bytes = 0; | |
1275 | ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes); | |
0fb7a01a | 1276 | if (ibytes < min) |
a283b5c4 | 1277 | ibytes = 0; |
79a84687 HFS |
1278 | |
1279 | if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) { | |
1280 | pr_warn("random: negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n", | |
1281 | r->name, entropy_count); | |
1282 | WARN_ON(1); | |
1283 | entropy_count = 0; | |
1284 | } | |
1285 | nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); | |
1286 | if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac) | |
1287 | entropy_count -= nfrac; | |
1288 | else | |
e33ba5fa | 1289 | entropy_count = 0; |
f9c6d498 | 1290 | |
0fb7a01a GP |
1291 | if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) |
1292 | goto retry; | |
1da177e4 | 1293 | |
f80bbd8b | 1294 | trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes); |
0fb7a01a | 1295 | if (ibytes && |
2132a96f | 1296 | (r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) < random_write_wakeup_bits) { |
b9809552 TT |
1297 | wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); |
1298 | kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); | |
1299 | } | |
1300 | ||
a283b5c4 | 1301 | return ibytes; |
1da177e4 LT |
1302 | } |
1303 | ||
19fa5be1 GP |
1304 | /* |
1305 | * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy and | |
1306 | * extract_entropy_user. | |
1307 | * | |
1308 | * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words. | |
1309 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1310 | static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out) |
1311 | { | |
602b6aee | 1312 | int i; |
d2e7c96a PA |
1313 | union { |
1314 | __u32 w[5]; | |
85a1f777 | 1315 | unsigned long l[LONGS(20)]; |
d2e7c96a PA |
1316 | } hash; |
1317 | __u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS]; | |
902c098a | 1318 | unsigned long flags; |
1da177e4 | 1319 | |
85a1f777 | 1320 | /* |
dfd38750 | 1321 | * If we have an architectural hardware random number |
46884442 | 1322 | * generator, use it for SHA's initial vector |
85a1f777 | 1323 | */ |
46884442 | 1324 | sha_init(hash.w); |
85a1f777 TT |
1325 | for (i = 0; i < LONGS(20); i++) { |
1326 | unsigned long v; | |
1327 | if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) | |
1328 | break; | |
46884442 | 1329 | hash.l[i] = v; |
85a1f777 TT |
1330 | } |
1331 | ||
46884442 TT |
1332 | /* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */ |
1333 | spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); | |
1334 | for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16) | |
1335 | sha_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace); | |
1336 | ||
1da177e4 | 1337 | /* |
1c0ad3d4 MM |
1338 | * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking |
1339 | * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool | |
1340 | * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous | |
1341 | * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By | |
1342 | * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make | |
1343 | * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the | |
1344 | * hash. | |
1da177e4 | 1345 | */ |
85608f8e | 1346 | __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w)); |
902c098a | 1347 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); |
1da177e4 | 1348 | |
d4c5efdb | 1349 | memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace)); |
1da177e4 LT |
1350 | |
1351 | /* | |
1c0ad3d4 MM |
1352 | * In case the hash function has some recognizable output |
1353 | * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back | |
1354 | * twice as much data as we output. | |
1da177e4 | 1355 | */ |
d2e7c96a PA |
1356 | hash.w[0] ^= hash.w[3]; |
1357 | hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4]; | |
1358 | hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16); | |
1359 | ||
d2e7c96a | 1360 | memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE); |
d4c5efdb | 1361 | memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash)); |
1da177e4 LT |
1362 | } |
1363 | ||
e192be9d TT |
1364 | static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, |
1365 | size_t nbytes, int fips) | |
1366 | { | |
1367 | ssize_t ret = 0, i; | |
1368 | __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; | |
1369 | unsigned long flags; | |
1370 | ||
1371 | while (nbytes) { | |
1372 | extract_buf(r, tmp); | |
1373 | ||
1374 | if (fips) { | |
1375 | spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); | |
1376 | if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE)) | |
1377 | panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n"); | |
1378 | memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); | |
1379 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); | |
1380 | } | |
1381 | i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); | |
1382 | memcpy(buf, tmp, i); | |
1383 | nbytes -= i; | |
1384 | buf += i; | |
1385 | ret += i; | |
1386 | } | |
1387 | ||
1388 | /* Wipe data just returned from memory */ | |
1389 | memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); | |
1390 | ||
1391 | return ret; | |
1392 | } | |
1393 | ||
19fa5be1 GP |
1394 | /* |
1395 | * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and | |
1396 | * returns it in a buffer. | |
1397 | * | |
1398 | * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before | |
1399 | * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the | |
1400 | * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the | |
1401 | * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers. | |
1402 | */ | |
90b75ee5 | 1403 | static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, |
902c098a | 1404 | size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved) |
1da177e4 | 1405 | { |
1da177e4 | 1406 | __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; |
1e7e2e05 | 1407 | unsigned long flags; |
1da177e4 | 1408 | |
ec8f02da | 1409 | /* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */ |
1e7e2e05 JW |
1410 | if (fips_enabled) { |
1411 | spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); | |
1412 | if (!r->last_data_init) { | |
c59974ae | 1413 | r->last_data_init = 1; |
1e7e2e05 JW |
1414 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); |
1415 | trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE, | |
a283b5c4 | 1416 | ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); |
1e7e2e05 JW |
1417 | xfer_secondary_pool(r, EXTRACT_SIZE); |
1418 | extract_buf(r, tmp); | |
1419 | spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); | |
1420 | memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); | |
1421 | } | |
1422 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); | |
1423 | } | |
ec8f02da | 1424 | |
a283b5c4 | 1425 | trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); |
1da177e4 LT |
1426 | xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); |
1427 | nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved); | |
1428 | ||
e192be9d | 1429 | return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled); |
1da177e4 LT |
1430 | } |
1431 | ||
19fa5be1 GP |
1432 | /* |
1433 | * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and | |
1434 | * returns it in a userspace buffer. | |
1435 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1436 | static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf, |
1437 | size_t nbytes) | |
1438 | { | |
1439 | ssize_t ret = 0, i; | |
1440 | __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; | |
c6e9d6f3 | 1441 | int large_request = (nbytes > 256); |
1da177e4 | 1442 | |
a283b5c4 | 1443 | trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); |
1da177e4 LT |
1444 | xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); |
1445 | nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0); | |
1446 | ||
1447 | while (nbytes) { | |
c6e9d6f3 | 1448 | if (large_request && need_resched()) { |
1da177e4 LT |
1449 | if (signal_pending(current)) { |
1450 | if (ret == 0) | |
1451 | ret = -ERESTARTSYS; | |
1452 | break; | |
1453 | } | |
1454 | schedule(); | |
1455 | } | |
1456 | ||
1457 | extract_buf(r, tmp); | |
1458 | i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); | |
1459 | if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { | |
1460 | ret = -EFAULT; | |
1461 | break; | |
1462 | } | |
1463 | ||
1464 | nbytes -= i; | |
1465 | buf += i; | |
1466 | ret += i; | |
1467 | } | |
1468 | ||
1469 | /* Wipe data just returned from memory */ | |
d4c5efdb | 1470 | memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); |
1da177e4 LT |
1471 | |
1472 | return ret; | |
1473 | } | |
1474 | ||
1475 | /* | |
1476 | * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some | |
c2557a30 | 1477 | * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding |
18e9cea7 GP |
1478 | * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random |
1479 | * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG | |
1480 | * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). | |
1da177e4 LT |
1481 | */ |
1482 | void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) | |
c2557a30 | 1483 | { |
e192be9d TT |
1484 | __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
1485 | ||
392a546d | 1486 | #if DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT > 0 |
e192be9d | 1487 | if (!crng_ready()) |
392a546d | 1488 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_bytes called " |
e192be9d | 1489 | "with crng_init = %d\n", (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init); |
392a546d | 1490 | #endif |
5910895f | 1491 | trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); |
e192be9d TT |
1492 | |
1493 | while (nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { | |
1494 | extract_crng(buf); | |
1495 | buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; | |
1496 | nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; | |
1497 | } | |
1498 | ||
1499 | if (nbytes > 0) { | |
1500 | extract_crng(tmp); | |
1501 | memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes); | |
c92e040d TT |
1502 | crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes); |
1503 | } else | |
1504 | crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); | |
1505 | memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); | |
c2557a30 TT |
1506 | } |
1507 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); | |
1508 | ||
205a525c HX |
1509 | /* |
1510 | * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking | |
1511 | * pool is initialised. | |
1512 | * | |
1513 | * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added | |
1514 | * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called) | |
1515 | * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive | |
1516 | */ | |
1517 | int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) | |
1518 | { | |
1519 | struct module *owner; | |
1520 | unsigned long flags; | |
1521 | int err = -EALREADY; | |
1522 | ||
e192be9d | 1523 | if (crng_ready()) |
205a525c HX |
1524 | return err; |
1525 | ||
1526 | owner = rdy->owner; | |
1527 | if (!try_module_get(owner)) | |
1528 | return -ENOENT; | |
1529 | ||
1530 | spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); | |
e192be9d | 1531 | if (crng_ready()) |
205a525c HX |
1532 | goto out; |
1533 | ||
1534 | owner = NULL; | |
1535 | ||
1536 | list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list); | |
1537 | err = 0; | |
1538 | ||
1539 | out: | |
1540 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); | |
1541 | ||
1542 | module_put(owner); | |
1543 | ||
1544 | return err; | |
1545 | } | |
1546 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback); | |
1547 | ||
1548 | /* | |
1549 | * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function. | |
1550 | */ | |
1551 | void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) | |
1552 | { | |
1553 | unsigned long flags; | |
1554 | struct module *owner = NULL; | |
1555 | ||
1556 | spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); | |
1557 | if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) { | |
1558 | list_del_init(&rdy->list); | |
1559 | owner = rdy->owner; | |
1560 | } | |
1561 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); | |
1562 | ||
1563 | module_put(owner); | |
1564 | } | |
1565 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback); | |
1566 | ||
c2557a30 TT |
1567 | /* |
1568 | * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random | |
1569 | * number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will | |
1570 | * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it | |
1571 | * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as | |
1572 | * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a | |
1573 | * key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but | |
1574 | * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to | |
1575 | * have put in a back door. | |
1576 | */ | |
1577 | void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) | |
1da177e4 | 1578 | { |
63d77173 PA |
1579 | char *p = buf; |
1580 | ||
5910895f | 1581 | trace_get_random_bytes_arch(nbytes, _RET_IP_); |
63d77173 PA |
1582 | while (nbytes) { |
1583 | unsigned long v; | |
1584 | int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long)); | |
c2557a30 | 1585 | |
63d77173 PA |
1586 | if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) |
1587 | break; | |
1588 | ||
bd29e568 | 1589 | memcpy(p, &v, chunk); |
63d77173 PA |
1590 | p += chunk; |
1591 | nbytes -= chunk; | |
1592 | } | |
1593 | ||
c2557a30 | 1594 | if (nbytes) |
e192be9d | 1595 | get_random_bytes(p, nbytes); |
1da177e4 | 1596 | } |
c2557a30 TT |
1597 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); |
1598 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1599 | |
1600 | /* | |
1601 | * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data | |
1602 | * | |
1603 | * @r: pool to initialize | |
1604 | * | |
1605 | * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system | |
1606 | * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared | |
1607 | * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool. | |
1608 | */ | |
1609 | static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) | |
1610 | { | |
3e88bdff | 1611 | int i; |
902c098a TT |
1612 | ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); |
1613 | unsigned long rv; | |
1da177e4 | 1614 | |
f5c2742c | 1615 | r->last_pulled = jiffies; |
85608f8e | 1616 | mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now)); |
9ed17b70 | 1617 | for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { |
83664a69 PA |
1618 | if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && |
1619 | !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) | |
ae9ecd92 | 1620 | rv = random_get_entropy(); |
85608f8e | 1621 | mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv)); |
3e88bdff | 1622 | } |
85608f8e | 1623 | mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); |
1da177e4 LT |
1624 | } |
1625 | ||
cbc96b75 TL |
1626 | /* |
1627 | * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness() | |
1628 | * long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools | |
1629 | * with some platform dependent data very early in the boot | |
1630 | * process. But it limits our options here. We must use | |
1631 | * statically allocated structures that already have all | |
1632 | * initializations complete at compile time. We should also | |
1633 | * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data | |
1634 | * we were given. | |
1635 | */ | |
53c3f63e | 1636 | static int rand_initialize(void) |
1da177e4 | 1637 | { |
1e7f583a TT |
1638 | #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA |
1639 | int i; | |
1e7f583a TT |
1640 | struct crng_state *crng; |
1641 | struct crng_state **pool; | |
1642 | #endif | |
1643 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1644 | init_std_data(&input_pool); |
1645 | init_std_data(&blocking_pool); | |
e192be9d | 1646 | crng_initialize(&primary_crng); |
1e7f583a TT |
1647 | |
1648 | #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA | |
dd0f0cf5 | 1649 | pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL); |
59b8d4f1 | 1650 | for_each_online_node(i) { |
1e7f583a TT |
1651 | crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state), |
1652 | GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i); | |
1653 | spin_lock_init(&crng->lock); | |
1654 | crng_initialize(crng); | |
1655 | pool[i] = crng; | |
1e7f583a TT |
1656 | } |
1657 | mb(); | |
1658 | crng_node_pool = pool; | |
1659 | #endif | |
1da177e4 LT |
1660 | return 0; |
1661 | } | |
ae9ecd92 | 1662 | early_initcall(rand_initialize); |
1da177e4 | 1663 | |
9361401e | 1664 | #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK |
1da177e4 LT |
1665 | void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) |
1666 | { | |
1667 | struct timer_rand_state *state; | |
1668 | ||
1669 | /* | |
f8595815 | 1670 | * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy |
1da177e4 LT |
1671 | * source. |
1672 | */ | |
f8595815 | 1673 | state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL); |
644008df TT |
1674 | if (state) { |
1675 | state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES; | |
1da177e4 | 1676 | disk->random = state; |
644008df | 1677 | } |
1da177e4 | 1678 | } |
9361401e | 1679 | #endif |
1da177e4 LT |
1680 | |
1681 | static ssize_t | |
c6e9d6f3 | 1682 | _random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes) |
1da177e4 | 1683 | { |
12ff3a51 | 1684 | ssize_t n; |
1da177e4 LT |
1685 | |
1686 | if (nbytes == 0) | |
1687 | return 0; | |
1688 | ||
12ff3a51 GP |
1689 | nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, SEC_XFER_SIZE); |
1690 | while (1) { | |
1691 | n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, nbytes); | |
1692 | if (n < 0) | |
1693 | return n; | |
f80bbd8b TT |
1694 | trace_random_read(n*8, (nbytes-n)*8, |
1695 | ENTROPY_BITS(&blocking_pool), | |
1696 | ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); | |
12ff3a51 GP |
1697 | if (n > 0) |
1698 | return n; | |
331c6490 | 1699 | |
12ff3a51 | 1700 | /* Pool is (near) empty. Maybe wait and retry. */ |
c6e9d6f3 | 1701 | if (nonblock) |
12ff3a51 GP |
1702 | return -EAGAIN; |
1703 | ||
1704 | wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait, | |
1705 | ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= | |
2132a96f | 1706 | random_read_wakeup_bits); |
12ff3a51 GP |
1707 | if (signal_pending(current)) |
1708 | return -ERESTARTSYS; | |
1da177e4 | 1709 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
1710 | } |
1711 | ||
c6e9d6f3 TT |
1712 | static ssize_t |
1713 | random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) | |
1714 | { | |
1715 | return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes); | |
1716 | } | |
1717 | ||
1da177e4 | 1718 | static ssize_t |
90b75ee5 | 1719 | urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) |
1da177e4 | 1720 | { |
e192be9d | 1721 | unsigned long flags; |
9b4d0087 | 1722 | static int maxwarn = 10; |
301f0595 TT |
1723 | int ret; |
1724 | ||
e192be9d | 1725 | if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) { |
9b4d0087 TT |
1726 | maxwarn--; |
1727 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s: uninitialized urandom read " | |
e192be9d TT |
1728 | "(%zd bytes read)\n", |
1729 | current->comm, nbytes); | |
1730 | spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); | |
1731 | crng_init_cnt = 0; | |
1732 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); | |
9b4d0087 | 1733 | } |
79a84687 | 1734 | nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)); |
e192be9d TT |
1735 | ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes); |
1736 | trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); | |
f80bbd8b | 1737 | return ret; |
1da177e4 LT |
1738 | } |
1739 | ||
1740 | static unsigned int | |
1741 | random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) | |
1742 | { | |
1743 | unsigned int mask; | |
1744 | ||
1745 | poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait); | |
1746 | poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait); | |
1747 | mask = 0; | |
2132a96f | 1748 | if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits) |
1da177e4 | 1749 | mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; |
2132a96f | 1750 | if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits) |
1da177e4 LT |
1751 | mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM; |
1752 | return mask; | |
1753 | } | |
1754 | ||
7f397dcd MM |
1755 | static int |
1756 | write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count) | |
1da177e4 | 1757 | { |
1da177e4 LT |
1758 | size_t bytes; |
1759 | __u32 buf[16]; | |
1760 | const char __user *p = buffer; | |
1da177e4 | 1761 | |
7f397dcd MM |
1762 | while (count > 0) { |
1763 | bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf)); | |
1764 | if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes)) | |
1765 | return -EFAULT; | |
1da177e4 | 1766 | |
7f397dcd | 1767 | count -= bytes; |
1da177e4 LT |
1768 | p += bytes; |
1769 | ||
85608f8e | 1770 | mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes); |
91f3f1e3 | 1771 | cond_resched(); |
1da177e4 | 1772 | } |
7f397dcd MM |
1773 | |
1774 | return 0; | |
1775 | } | |
1776 | ||
90b75ee5 MM |
1777 | static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, |
1778 | size_t count, loff_t *ppos) | |
7f397dcd MM |
1779 | { |
1780 | size_t ret; | |
7f397dcd | 1781 | |
e192be9d | 1782 | ret = write_pool(&input_pool, buffer, count); |
7f397dcd MM |
1783 | if (ret) |
1784 | return ret; | |
1785 | ||
7f397dcd | 1786 | return (ssize_t)count; |
1da177e4 LT |
1787 | } |
1788 | ||
43ae4860 | 1789 | static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) |
1da177e4 LT |
1790 | { |
1791 | int size, ent_count; | |
1792 | int __user *p = (int __user *)arg; | |
1793 | int retval; | |
1794 | ||
1795 | switch (cmd) { | |
1796 | case RNDGETENTCNT: | |
43ae4860 | 1797 | /* inherently racy, no point locking */ |
a283b5c4 PA |
1798 | ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool); |
1799 | if (put_user(ent_count, p)) | |
1da177e4 LT |
1800 | return -EFAULT; |
1801 | return 0; | |
1802 | case RNDADDTOENTCNT: | |
1803 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
1804 | return -EPERM; | |
1805 | if (get_user(ent_count, p)) | |
1806 | return -EFAULT; | |
86a574de | 1807 | return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count); |
1da177e4 LT |
1808 | case RNDADDENTROPY: |
1809 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
1810 | return -EPERM; | |
1811 | if (get_user(ent_count, p++)) | |
1812 | return -EFAULT; | |
1813 | if (ent_count < 0) | |
1814 | return -EINVAL; | |
1815 | if (get_user(size, p++)) | |
1816 | return -EFAULT; | |
7f397dcd MM |
1817 | retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p, |
1818 | size); | |
1da177e4 LT |
1819 | if (retval < 0) |
1820 | return retval; | |
86a574de | 1821 | return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count); |
1da177e4 LT |
1822 | case RNDZAPENTCNT: |
1823 | case RNDCLEARPOOL: | |
ae9ecd92 TT |
1824 | /* |
1825 | * Clear the entropy pool counters. We no longer clear | |
1826 | * the entropy pool, as that's silly. | |
1827 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1828 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1829 | return -EPERM; | |
ae9ecd92 | 1830 | input_pool.entropy_count = 0; |
ae9ecd92 | 1831 | blocking_pool.entropy_count = 0; |
1da177e4 LT |
1832 | return 0; |
1833 | default: | |
1834 | return -EINVAL; | |
1835 | } | |
1836 | } | |
1837 | ||
9a6f70bb JD |
1838 | static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) |
1839 | { | |
1840 | return fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &fasync); | |
1841 | } | |
1842 | ||
2b8693c0 | 1843 | const struct file_operations random_fops = { |
1da177e4 LT |
1844 | .read = random_read, |
1845 | .write = random_write, | |
1846 | .poll = random_poll, | |
43ae4860 | 1847 | .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, |
9a6f70bb | 1848 | .fasync = random_fasync, |
6038f373 | 1849 | .llseek = noop_llseek, |
1da177e4 LT |
1850 | }; |
1851 | ||
2b8693c0 | 1852 | const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { |
1da177e4 LT |
1853 | .read = urandom_read, |
1854 | .write = random_write, | |
43ae4860 | 1855 | .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, |
9a6f70bb | 1856 | .fasync = random_fasync, |
6038f373 | 1857 | .llseek = noop_llseek, |
1da177e4 LT |
1858 | }; |
1859 | ||
c6e9d6f3 TT |
1860 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, |
1861 | unsigned int, flags) | |
1862 | { | |
1863 | if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM)) | |
1864 | return -EINVAL; | |
1865 | ||
1866 | if (count > INT_MAX) | |
1867 | count = INT_MAX; | |
1868 | ||
1869 | if (flags & GRND_RANDOM) | |
1870 | return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count); | |
1871 | ||
e192be9d | 1872 | if (!crng_ready()) { |
c6e9d6f3 TT |
1873 | if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) |
1874 | return -EAGAIN; | |
e192be9d | 1875 | crng_wait_ready(); |
c6e9d6f3 TT |
1876 | if (signal_pending(current)) |
1877 | return -ERESTARTSYS; | |
1878 | } | |
1879 | return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL); | |
1880 | } | |
1881 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1882 | /******************************************************************** |
1883 | * | |
1884 | * Sysctl interface | |
1885 | * | |
1886 | ********************************************************************/ | |
1887 | ||
1888 | #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL | |
1889 | ||
1890 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> | |
1891 | ||
1892 | static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh; | |
8c2aa339 | 1893 | static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; |
1da177e4 | 1894 | static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; |
db61ffe3 | 1895 | static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60; |
1da177e4 LT |
1896 | static char sysctl_bootid[16]; |
1897 | ||
1898 | /* | |
f22052b2 | 1899 | * This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random |
1da177e4 LT |
1900 | * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is, |
1901 | * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user. | |
1902 | * | |
f22052b2 GP |
1903 | * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be |
1904 | * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the | |
1905 | * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data. | |
1da177e4 | 1906 | */ |
a151427e | 1907 | static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, |
1da177e4 LT |
1908 | void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) |
1909 | { | |
a151427e | 1910 | struct ctl_table fake_table; |
1da177e4 LT |
1911 | unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid; |
1912 | ||
1913 | uuid = table->data; | |
1914 | if (!uuid) { | |
1915 | uuid = tmp_uuid; | |
1da177e4 | 1916 | generate_random_uuid(uuid); |
44e4360f MD |
1917 | } else { |
1918 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootid_spinlock); | |
1919 | ||
1920 | spin_lock(&bootid_spinlock); | |
1921 | if (!uuid[8]) | |
1922 | generate_random_uuid(uuid); | |
1923 | spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock); | |
1924 | } | |
1da177e4 | 1925 | |
35900771 JP |
1926 | sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid); |
1927 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1928 | fake_table.data = buf; |
1929 | fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf); | |
1930 | ||
8d65af78 | 1931 | return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); |
1da177e4 LT |
1932 | } |
1933 | ||
a283b5c4 PA |
1934 | /* |
1935 | * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits | |
1936 | */ | |
5eb10d91 | 1937 | static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write, |
a283b5c4 PA |
1938 | void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) |
1939 | { | |
5eb10d91 | 1940 | struct ctl_table fake_table; |
a283b5c4 PA |
1941 | int entropy_count; |
1942 | ||
1943 | entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; | |
1944 | ||
1945 | fake_table.data = &entropy_count; | |
1946 | fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count); | |
1947 | ||
1948 | return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); | |
1949 | } | |
1950 | ||
1da177e4 | 1951 | static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; |
a151427e JP |
1952 | extern struct ctl_table random_table[]; |
1953 | struct ctl_table random_table[] = { | |
1da177e4 | 1954 | { |
1da177e4 LT |
1955 | .procname = "poolsize", |
1956 | .data = &sysctl_poolsize, | |
1957 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), | |
1958 | .mode = 0444, | |
6d456111 | 1959 | .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, |
1da177e4 LT |
1960 | }, |
1961 | { | |
1da177e4 LT |
1962 | .procname = "entropy_avail", |
1963 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), | |
1964 | .mode = 0444, | |
a283b5c4 | 1965 | .proc_handler = proc_do_entropy, |
1da177e4 LT |
1966 | .data = &input_pool.entropy_count, |
1967 | }, | |
1968 | { | |
1da177e4 | 1969 | .procname = "read_wakeup_threshold", |
2132a96f | 1970 | .data = &random_read_wakeup_bits, |
1da177e4 LT |
1971 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
1972 | .mode = 0644, | |
6d456111 | 1973 | .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, |
1da177e4 LT |
1974 | .extra1 = &min_read_thresh, |
1975 | .extra2 = &max_read_thresh, | |
1976 | }, | |
1977 | { | |
1da177e4 | 1978 | .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold", |
2132a96f | 1979 | .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits, |
1da177e4 LT |
1980 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
1981 | .mode = 0644, | |
6d456111 | 1982 | .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, |
1da177e4 LT |
1983 | .extra1 = &min_write_thresh, |
1984 | .extra2 = &max_write_thresh, | |
1985 | }, | |
f5c2742c TT |
1986 | { |
1987 | .procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs", | |
1988 | .data = &random_min_urandom_seed, | |
1989 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), | |
1990 | .mode = 0644, | |
1991 | .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, | |
1992 | }, | |
1da177e4 | 1993 | { |
1da177e4 LT |
1994 | .procname = "boot_id", |
1995 | .data = &sysctl_bootid, | |
1996 | .maxlen = 16, | |
1997 | .mode = 0444, | |
6d456111 | 1998 | .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid, |
1da177e4 LT |
1999 | }, |
2000 | { | |
1da177e4 LT |
2001 | .procname = "uuid", |
2002 | .maxlen = 16, | |
2003 | .mode = 0444, | |
6d456111 | 2004 | .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid, |
1da177e4 | 2005 | }, |
43759d4f TT |
2006 | #ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH |
2007 | { | |
2008 | .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_cycles", | |
2009 | .data = &avg_cycles, | |
2010 | .maxlen = sizeof(avg_cycles), | |
2011 | .mode = 0444, | |
2012 | .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, | |
2013 | }, | |
2014 | { | |
2015 | .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_deviation", | |
2016 | .data = &avg_deviation, | |
2017 | .maxlen = sizeof(avg_deviation), | |
2018 | .mode = 0444, | |
2019 | .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, | |
2020 | }, | |
2021 | #endif | |
894d2491 | 2022 | { } |
1da177e4 LT |
2023 | }; |
2024 | #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ | |
2025 | ||
f5b98461 JD |
2026 | struct batched_entropy { |
2027 | union { | |
c440408c JD |
2028 | u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)]; |
2029 | u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; | |
f5b98461 JD |
2030 | }; |
2031 | unsigned int position; | |
2032 | }; | |
b169c13d | 2033 | static rwlock_t batched_entropy_reset_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_reset_lock); |
b1132dea | 2034 | |
1da177e4 | 2035 | /* |
f5b98461 JD |
2036 | * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random |
2037 | * number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the | |
2038 | * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. | |
1da177e4 | 2039 | */ |
c440408c JD |
2040 | static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64); |
2041 | u64 get_random_u64(void) | |
1da177e4 | 2042 | { |
c440408c | 2043 | u64 ret; |
4a072c71 JD |
2044 | bool use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2; |
2045 | unsigned long flags = 0; | |
f5b98461 | 2046 | struct batched_entropy *batch; |
8a0a9bd4 | 2047 | |
c440408c JD |
2048 | #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 |
2049 | if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret)) | |
63d77173 | 2050 | return ret; |
c440408c JD |
2051 | #else |
2052 | if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret) && | |
2053 | arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret + 1)) | |
2054 | return ret; | |
2055 | #endif | |
63d77173 | 2056 | |
c440408c | 2057 | batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64); |
b169c13d JD |
2058 | if (use_lock) |
2059 | read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); | |
c440408c JD |
2060 | if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) { |
2061 | extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); | |
f5b98461 JD |
2062 | batch->position = 0; |
2063 | } | |
c440408c | 2064 | ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; |
b169c13d JD |
2065 | if (use_lock) |
2066 | read_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); | |
c440408c | 2067 | put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64); |
8a0a9bd4 | 2068 | return ret; |
1da177e4 | 2069 | } |
c440408c | 2070 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64); |
1da177e4 | 2071 | |
c440408c JD |
2072 | static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32); |
2073 | u32 get_random_u32(void) | |
f5b98461 | 2074 | { |
c440408c | 2075 | u32 ret; |
4a072c71 JD |
2076 | bool use_lock = READ_ONCE(crng_init) < 2; |
2077 | unsigned long flags = 0; | |
f5b98461 | 2078 | struct batched_entropy *batch; |
ec9ee4ac | 2079 | |
f5b98461 | 2080 | if (arch_get_random_int(&ret)) |
ec9ee4ac DC |
2081 | return ret; |
2082 | ||
c440408c | 2083 | batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32); |
b169c13d JD |
2084 | if (use_lock) |
2085 | read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); | |
c440408c JD |
2086 | if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) { |
2087 | extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); | |
f5b98461 JD |
2088 | batch->position = 0; |
2089 | } | |
c440408c | 2090 | ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; |
b169c13d JD |
2091 | if (use_lock) |
2092 | read_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); | |
c440408c | 2093 | put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32); |
ec9ee4ac DC |
2094 | return ret; |
2095 | } | |
c440408c | 2096 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); |
ec9ee4ac | 2097 | |
b169c13d JD |
2098 | /* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might |
2099 | * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by | |
2100 | * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the | |
2101 | * next usage. */ | |
2102 | static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void) | |
2103 | { | |
2104 | int cpu; | |
2105 | unsigned long flags; | |
2106 | ||
2107 | write_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); | |
2108 | for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { | |
2109 | per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = 0; | |
2110 | per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = 0; | |
2111 | } | |
2112 | write_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); | |
2113 | } | |
2114 | ||
99fdafde JC |
2115 | /** |
2116 | * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address | |
2117 | * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take. | |
2118 | * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the | |
2119 | * random address must fall. | |
2120 | * | |
2121 | * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped. | |
2122 | * | |
2123 | * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that | |
2124 | * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless. | |
2125 | * | |
2126 | * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error, | |
2127 | * @start is returned. | |
2128 | */ | |
2129 | unsigned long | |
2130 | randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) | |
2131 | { | |
2132 | if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) { | |
2133 | range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start; | |
2134 | start = PAGE_ALIGN(start); | |
2135 | } | |
2136 | ||
2137 | if (start > ULONG_MAX - range) | |
2138 | range = ULONG_MAX - start; | |
2139 | ||
2140 | range >>= PAGE_SHIFT; | |
2141 | ||
2142 | if (range == 0) | |
2143 | return start; | |
2144 | ||
2145 | return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT); | |
2146 | } | |
2147 | ||
c84dbf61 TD |
2148 | /* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs. |
2149 | * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled | |
2150 | * when our pool is full. | |
2151 | */ | |
2152 | void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, | |
2153 | size_t entropy) | |
2154 | { | |
2155 | struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool; | |
2156 | ||
e192be9d TT |
2157 | if (!crng_ready()) { |
2158 | crng_fast_load(buffer, count); | |
2159 | return; | |
3371f3da | 2160 | } |
e192be9d TT |
2161 | |
2162 | /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold. | |
2163 | * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, | |
2164 | * or when the calling thread is about to terminate. | |
2165 | */ | |
2166 | wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() || | |
2167 | ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits); | |
c84dbf61 TD |
2168 | mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count); |
2169 | credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy); | |
2170 | } | |
2171 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); |