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1da177e4 LT |
1 | /* |
2 | * random.c -- A strong random number generator | |
3 | * | |
9e95ce27 | 4 | * Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005 |
1da177e4 LT |
5 | * |
6 | * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All | |
7 | * rights reserved. | |
8 | * | |
9 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
10 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
11 | * are met: | |
12 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
13 | * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, | |
14 | * including the disclaimer of warranties. | |
15 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
16 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
17 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
18 | * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote | |
19 | * products derived from this software without specific prior | |
20 | * written permission. | |
21 | * | |
22 | * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of | |
23 | * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are | |
24 | * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is | |
25 | * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and | |
26 | * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) | |
27 | * | |
28 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED | |
29 | * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES | |
30 | * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF | |
31 | * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE | |
32 | * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR | |
33 | * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT | |
34 | * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR | |
35 | * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF | |
36 | * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT | |
37 | * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE | |
38 | * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH | |
39 | * DAMAGE. | |
40 | */ | |
41 | ||
42 | /* | |
43 | * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....) | |
44 | * | |
45 | * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc., | |
46 | * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use. | |
47 | * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good | |
48 | * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is | |
49 | * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to | |
50 | * predict by an attacker. | |
51 | * | |
52 | * Theory of operation | |
53 | * =================== | |
54 | * | |
55 | * Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard | |
56 | * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to | |
57 | * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a | |
58 | * algorithm. Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess | |
59 | * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some | |
60 | * applications this is not acceptable. So instead, we must try to | |
61 | * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which | |
62 | * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to | |
63 | * generate random numbers. In a Unix environment, this is best done | |
64 | * from inside the kernel. | |
65 | * | |
66 | * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard | |
67 | * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other | |
68 | * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an | |
69 | * outside observer to measure. Randomness from these sources are | |
70 | * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function. | |
71 | * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming | |
72 | * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that | |
73 | * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable. | |
74 | * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep | |
75 | * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into | |
76 | * the random number generator's internal state. | |
77 | * | |
78 | * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA | |
79 | * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids | |
80 | * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to | |
81 | * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information | |
82 | * about the input of SHA from its output. Even if it is possible to | |
83 | * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data | |
84 | * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in | |
85 | * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this | |
86 | * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many | |
87 | * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it | |
88 | * outputs random numbers. | |
89 | * | |
90 | * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate | |
91 | * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be | |
92 | * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior | |
93 | * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is | |
94 | * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility. | |
95 | * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority | |
96 | * of purposes. | |
97 | * | |
98 | * Exported interfaces ---- output | |
99 | * =============================== | |
100 | * | |
101 | * There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to | |
102 | * be used from within the kernel: | |
103 | * | |
104 | * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); | |
105 | * | |
106 | * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes, | |
107 | * and place it in the requested buffer. | |
108 | * | |
109 | * The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and | |
110 | * /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high | |
111 | * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or | |
112 | * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of | |
113 | * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator) | |
114 | * contained in the entropy pool. | |
115 | * | |
116 | * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return | |
117 | * as many bytes as are requested. As more and more random bytes are | |
118 | * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge, | |
119 | * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically | |
120 | * strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable. | |
121 | * | |
122 | * Exported interfaces ---- input | |
123 | * ============================== | |
124 | * | |
125 | * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise | |
126 | * from the devices are: | |
127 | * | |
a2080a67 | 128 | * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); |
1da177e4 LT |
129 | * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, |
130 | * unsigned int value); | |
775f4b29 | 131 | * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags); |
442a4fff | 132 | * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); |
1da177e4 | 133 | * |
a2080a67 LT |
134 | * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that |
135 | * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). | |
136 | * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the | |
137 | * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the | |
138 | * pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices | |
139 | * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy | |
140 | * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world). | |
141 | * | |
1da177e4 LT |
142 | * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as |
143 | * the event type information from the hardware. | |
144 | * | |
775f4b29 TT |
145 | * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random |
146 | * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source | |
147 | * as inputs, it feeds the randomness roughly once a second. | |
442a4fff JW |
148 | * |
149 | * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block | |
150 | * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the | |
151 | * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low | |
152 | * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek | |
153 | * times are usually fairly consistent. | |
1da177e4 LT |
154 | * |
155 | * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a | |
156 | * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the | |
157 | * first and second order deltas of the event timings. | |
158 | * | |
159 | * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup | |
160 | * ============================================ | |
161 | * | |
162 | * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence | |
163 | * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially | |
164 | * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator. | |
165 | * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the | |
166 | * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count. In order to | |
167 | * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the | |
168 | * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups. To do this, put the | |
169 | * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot | |
170 | * sequence: | |
171 | * | |
172 | * echo "Initializing random number generator..." | |
173 | * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed | |
174 | * # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up | |
175 | * # Load and then save the whole entropy pool | |
176 | * if [ -f $random_seed ]; then | |
177 | * cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom | |
178 | * else | |
179 | * touch $random_seed | |
180 | * fi | |
181 | * chmod 600 $random_seed | |
182 | * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512 | |
183 | * | |
184 | * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as | |
185 | * the system is shutdown: | |
186 | * | |
187 | * # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up | |
188 | * # Save the whole entropy pool | |
189 | * echo "Saving random seed..." | |
190 | * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed | |
191 | * touch $random_seed | |
192 | * chmod 600 $random_seed | |
193 | * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512 | |
194 | * | |
195 | * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init | |
196 | * scripts, such code fragments would be found in | |
197 | * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random. On older Linux systems, the correct script | |
198 | * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0. | |
199 | * | |
200 | * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool | |
201 | * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at | |
202 | * start-up. (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to | |
203 | * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up, | |
204 | * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.) Even with | |
205 | * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state | |
206 | * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of | |
207 | * the system. | |
208 | * | |
209 | * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux | |
210 | * ============================================== | |
211 | * | |
212 | * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of | |
213 | * the /dev/mem major number (#1). So if your system does not have | |
214 | * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created | |
215 | * by using the commands: | |
216 | * | |
217 | * mknod /dev/random c 1 8 | |
218 | * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9 | |
219 | * | |
220 | * Acknowledgements: | |
221 | * ================= | |
222 | * | |
223 | * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived | |
224 | * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private | |
225 | * discussions with Phil Karn. Colin Plumb provided a faster random | |
226 | * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy | |
227 | * pool, taken from PGPfone. Dale Worley has also contributed many | |
228 | * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver. | |
229 | * | |
230 | * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should | |
231 | * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP. | |
232 | * | |
233 | * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from | |
234 | * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald | |
235 | * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller. | |
236 | */ | |
237 | ||
238 | #include <linux/utsname.h> | |
1da177e4 LT |
239 | #include <linux/module.h> |
240 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
241 | #include <linux/major.h> | |
242 | #include <linux/string.h> | |
243 | #include <linux/fcntl.h> | |
244 | #include <linux/slab.h> | |
245 | #include <linux/random.h> | |
246 | #include <linux/poll.h> | |
247 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
248 | #include <linux/fs.h> | |
249 | #include <linux/genhd.h> | |
250 | #include <linux/interrupt.h> | |
27ac792c | 251 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
1da177e4 | 252 | #include <linux/spinlock.h> |
c84dbf61 | 253 | #include <linux/kthread.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
254 | #include <linux/percpu.h> |
255 | #include <linux/cryptohash.h> | |
5b739ef8 | 256 | #include <linux/fips.h> |
775f4b29 | 257 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
e6d4947b | 258 | #include <linux/kmemcheck.h> |
6265e169 | 259 | #include <linux/workqueue.h> |
0244ad00 | 260 | #include <linux/irq.h> |
c6e9d6f3 TT |
261 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
262 | #include <linux/completion.h> | |
8da4b8c4 | 263 | #include <linux/uuid.h> |
e192be9d | 264 | #include <crypto/chacha20.h> |
d178a1eb | 265 | |
1da177e4 LT |
266 | #include <asm/processor.h> |
267 | #include <asm/uaccess.h> | |
268 | #include <asm/irq.h> | |
775f4b29 | 269 | #include <asm/irq_regs.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
270 | #include <asm/io.h> |
271 | ||
00ce1db1 TT |
272 | #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS |
273 | #include <trace/events/random.h> | |
274 | ||
43759d4f TT |
275 | /* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */ |
276 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
277 | /* |
278 | * Configuration information | |
279 | */ | |
30e37ec5 PA |
280 | #define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12 |
281 | #define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) | |
282 | #define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10 | |
283 | #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) | |
284 | #define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512 | |
285 | #define EXTRACT_SIZE 10 | |
1da177e4 | 286 | |
392a546d | 287 | #define DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT 0 |
1da177e4 | 288 | |
d2e7c96a PA |
289 | #define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long)) |
290 | ||
a283b5c4 | 291 | /* |
95b709b6 TT |
292 | * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is |
293 | * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. | |
30e37ec5 PA |
294 | * |
295 | * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + log2(poolbits)) must <= 31, or the multiply in | |
296 | * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide. | |
a283b5c4 PA |
297 | */ |
298 | #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 | |
299 | #define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) | |
300 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
301 | /* |
302 | * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on | |
303 | * /dev/random. Should be enough to do a significant reseed. | |
304 | */ | |
2132a96f | 305 | static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64; |
1da177e4 LT |
306 | |
307 | /* | |
308 | * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we | |
309 | * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write | |
310 | * access to /dev/random. | |
311 | */ | |
2132a96f | 312 | static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS; |
1da177e4 LT |
313 | |
314 | /* | |
dfd38750 | 315 | * The minimum number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding. We |
f5c2742c TT |
316 | * do this to limit the amount of entropy that can be drained from the |
317 | * input pool even if there are heavy demands on /dev/urandom. | |
1da177e4 | 318 | */ |
f5c2742c | 319 | static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60; |
1da177e4 LT |
320 | |
321 | /* | |
6e9fa2c8 TT |
322 | * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords |
323 | * over GF(2). The taps for various sizes are defined below. They | |
324 | * were chosen to be evenly spaced except for the last tap, which is 1 | |
325 | * to get the twisting happening as fast as possible. | |
326 | * | |
327 | * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as | |
328 | * well to make a (modified) twisted Generalized Feedback Shift | |
329 | * Register. (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992. Twisted GFSR | |
330 | * generators. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation | |
331 | * 2(3):179-194. Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994. Twisted | |
dfd38750 | 332 | * GFSR generators II. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer |
6e9fa2c8 TT |
333 | * Simulation 4:254-266) |
334 | * | |
335 | * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this. | |
336 | * | |
337 | * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash, | |
338 | * where we use SHA-1. All that we want of mixing operation is that | |
339 | * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions | |
340 | * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see. As long as | |
341 | * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the | |
342 | * input entropy and done a good job. The fact that an intelligent | |
343 | * attacker can construct inputs that will produce controlled | |
344 | * alterations to the pool's state is not important because we don't | |
345 | * consider such inputs to contribute any randomness. The only | |
346 | * property we need with respect to them is that the attacker can't | |
347 | * increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state. Since all | |
348 | * additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the input, | |
349 | * you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has any | |
350 | * uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle that | |
351 | * uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would | |
352 | * decrease the uncertainty). | |
353 | * | |
354 | * Our mixing functions were analyzed by Lacharme, Roeck, Strubel, and | |
355 | * Videau in their paper, "The Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator | |
356 | * Revisited" (see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/251.pdf). In their | |
357 | * paper, they point out that we are not using a true Twisted GFSR, | |
358 | * since Matsumoto & Kurita used a trinomial feedback polynomial (that | |
359 | * is, with only three taps, instead of the six that we are using). | |
360 | * As a result, the resulting polynomial is neither primitive nor | |
361 | * irreducible, and hence does not have a maximal period over | |
362 | * GF(2**32). They suggest a slight change to the generator | |
363 | * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be | |
364 | * irreducible, which we have made here. | |
1da177e4 LT |
365 | */ |
366 | static struct poolinfo { | |
a283b5c4 PA |
367 | int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits; |
368 | #define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5) | |
1da177e4 LT |
369 | int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; |
370 | } poolinfo_table[] = { | |
6e9fa2c8 TT |
371 | /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ |
372 | /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ | |
373 | { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 }, | |
374 | /* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ | |
375 | /* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ | |
376 | { S(32), 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 }, | |
1da177e4 LT |
377 | #if 0 |
378 | /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 379 | { S(2048), 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
380 | |
381 | /* x^1024 + x^817 + x^615 + x^412 + x^204 + x + 1 -- 290 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 382 | { S(1024), 817, 615, 412, 204, 1 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
383 | |
384 | /* x^1024 + x^819 + x^616 + x^410 + x^207 + x^2 + 1 -- 115 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 385 | { S(1024), 819, 616, 410, 207, 2 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
386 | |
387 | /* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 + x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 388 | { S(512), 411, 308, 208, 104, 1 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
389 | |
390 | /* x^512 + x^409 + x^307 + x^206 + x^102 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 391 | { S(512), 409, 307, 206, 102, 2 }, |
1da177e4 | 392 | /* x^512 + x^409 + x^309 + x^205 + x^103 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */ |
9ed17b70 | 393 | { S(512), 409, 309, 205, 103, 2 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
394 | |
395 | /* x^256 + x^205 + x^155 + x^101 + x^52 + x + 1 -- 125 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 396 | { S(256), 205, 155, 101, 52, 1 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
397 | |
398 | /* x^128 + x^103 + x^78 + x^51 + x^27 + x^2 + 1 -- 70 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 399 | { S(128), 103, 78, 51, 27, 2 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
400 | |
401 | /* x^64 + x^52 + x^39 + x^26 + x^14 + x + 1 -- 15 */ | |
9ed17b70 | 402 | { S(64), 52, 39, 26, 14, 1 }, |
1da177e4 LT |
403 | #endif |
404 | }; | |
405 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
406 | /* |
407 | * Static global variables | |
408 | */ | |
409 | static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait); | |
410 | static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait); | |
c6e9d6f3 | 411 | static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(urandom_init_wait); |
9a6f70bb | 412 | static struct fasync_struct *fasync; |
1da177e4 | 413 | |
205a525c HX |
414 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); |
415 | static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); | |
416 | ||
e192be9d TT |
417 | struct crng_state { |
418 | __u32 state[16]; | |
419 | unsigned long init_time; | |
420 | spinlock_t lock; | |
421 | }; | |
422 | ||
423 | struct crng_state primary_crng = { | |
424 | .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock), | |
425 | }; | |
426 | ||
427 | /* | |
428 | * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized | |
429 | * 1 --> Initialized | |
430 | * 2 --> Initialized from input_pool | |
431 | * | |
432 | * crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, and only increases | |
433 | * its value (from 0->1->2). | |
434 | */ | |
435 | static int crng_init = 0; | |
436 | #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 0)) | |
437 | static int crng_init_cnt = 0; | |
438 | #define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) | |
1e7f583a TT |
439 | static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, |
440 | __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]); | |
c92e040d TT |
441 | static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, |
442 | __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); | |
e192be9d TT |
443 | static void process_random_ready_list(void); |
444 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
445 | /********************************************************************** |
446 | * | |
447 | * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle | |
448 | * storing entropy in an entropy pool. | |
449 | * | |
450 | **********************************************************************/ | |
451 | ||
452 | struct entropy_store; | |
453 | struct entropy_store { | |
43358209 | 454 | /* read-only data: */ |
30e37ec5 | 455 | const struct poolinfo *poolinfo; |
1da177e4 LT |
456 | __u32 *pool; |
457 | const char *name; | |
1da177e4 | 458 | struct entropy_store *pull; |
6265e169 | 459 | struct work_struct push_work; |
1da177e4 LT |
460 | |
461 | /* read-write data: */ | |
f5c2742c | 462 | unsigned long last_pulled; |
43358209 | 463 | spinlock_t lock; |
c59974ae TT |
464 | unsigned short add_ptr; |
465 | unsigned short input_rotate; | |
cda796a3 | 466 | int entropy_count; |
775f4b29 | 467 | int entropy_total; |
775f4b29 | 468 | unsigned int initialized:1; |
c59974ae TT |
469 | unsigned int limit:1; |
470 | unsigned int last_data_init:1; | |
e954bc91 | 471 | __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; |
1da177e4 LT |
472 | }; |
473 | ||
e192be9d TT |
474 | static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, |
475 | size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd); | |
476 | static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, | |
477 | size_t nbytes, int fips); | |
478 | ||
479 | static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r); | |
6265e169 | 480 | static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work); |
1da177e4 LT |
481 | static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS]; |
482 | static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS]; | |
1da177e4 LT |
483 | |
484 | static struct entropy_store input_pool = { | |
485 | .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0], | |
486 | .name = "input", | |
487 | .limit = 1, | |
eece09ec | 488 | .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), |
1da177e4 LT |
489 | .pool = input_pool_data |
490 | }; | |
491 | ||
492 | static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = { | |
493 | .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1], | |
494 | .name = "blocking", | |
495 | .limit = 1, | |
496 | .pull = &input_pool, | |
eece09ec | 497 | .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(blocking_pool.lock), |
6265e169 TT |
498 | .pool = blocking_pool_data, |
499 | .push_work = __WORK_INITIALIZER(blocking_pool.push_work, | |
500 | push_to_pool), | |
1da177e4 LT |
501 | }; |
502 | ||
775f4b29 TT |
503 | static __u32 const twist_table[8] = { |
504 | 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, | |
505 | 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; | |
506 | ||
1da177e4 | 507 | /* |
e68e5b66 | 508 | * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not |
1da177e4 | 509 | * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call |
adc782da | 510 | * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate. |
1da177e4 LT |
511 | * |
512 | * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate | |
513 | * degree, and then twisted. We twist by three bits at a time because | |
514 | * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where | |
515 | * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits. | |
516 | */ | |
00ce1db1 | 517 | static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, |
85608f8e | 518 | int nbytes) |
1da177e4 | 519 | { |
85608f8e | 520 | unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; |
feee7697 | 521 | int input_rotate; |
1da177e4 | 522 | int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1; |
e68e5b66 | 523 | const char *bytes = in; |
6d38b827 | 524 | __u32 w; |
1da177e4 | 525 | |
1da177e4 LT |
526 | tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1; |
527 | tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2; | |
528 | tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3; | |
529 | tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4; | |
530 | tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5; | |
1da177e4 | 531 | |
91fcb532 TT |
532 | input_rotate = r->input_rotate; |
533 | i = r->add_ptr; | |
1da177e4 | 534 | |
e68e5b66 MM |
535 | /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */ |
536 | while (nbytes--) { | |
c59974ae | 537 | w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate); |
993ba211 | 538 | i = (i - 1) & wordmask; |
1da177e4 LT |
539 | |
540 | /* XOR in the various taps */ | |
993ba211 | 541 | w ^= r->pool[i]; |
1da177e4 LT |
542 | w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask]; |
543 | w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask]; | |
544 | w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask]; | |
545 | w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask]; | |
546 | w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask]; | |
993ba211 MM |
547 | |
548 | /* Mix the result back in with a twist */ | |
1da177e4 | 549 | r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; |
feee7697 MM |
550 | |
551 | /* | |
552 | * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool. | |
553 | * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits | |
554 | * rotation, so that successive passes spread the | |
555 | * input bits across the pool evenly. | |
556 | */ | |
c59974ae | 557 | input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31; |
1da177e4 LT |
558 | } |
559 | ||
91fcb532 TT |
560 | r->input_rotate = input_rotate; |
561 | r->add_ptr = i; | |
1da177e4 LT |
562 | } |
563 | ||
00ce1db1 | 564 | static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, |
85608f8e | 565 | int nbytes) |
00ce1db1 TT |
566 | { |
567 | trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_); | |
85608f8e | 568 | _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes); |
00ce1db1 TT |
569 | } |
570 | ||
571 | static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, | |
85608f8e | 572 | int nbytes) |
1da177e4 | 573 | { |
902c098a TT |
574 | unsigned long flags; |
575 | ||
00ce1db1 | 576 | trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_); |
902c098a | 577 | spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); |
85608f8e | 578 | _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes); |
902c098a | 579 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); |
1da177e4 LT |
580 | } |
581 | ||
775f4b29 TT |
582 | struct fast_pool { |
583 | __u32 pool[4]; | |
584 | unsigned long last; | |
ee3e00e9 | 585 | unsigned short reg_idx; |
840f9507 | 586 | unsigned char count; |
775f4b29 TT |
587 | }; |
588 | ||
589 | /* | |
590 | * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness | |
591 | * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any | |
592 | * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller. | |
593 | */ | |
43759d4f | 594 | static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f) |
775f4b29 | 595 | { |
43759d4f TT |
596 | __u32 a = f->pool[0], b = f->pool[1]; |
597 | __u32 c = f->pool[2], d = f->pool[3]; | |
598 | ||
599 | a += b; c += d; | |
19acc77a | 600 | b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); |
43759d4f TT |
601 | d ^= a; b ^= c; |
602 | ||
603 | a += b; c += d; | |
19acc77a | 604 | b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); |
43759d4f TT |
605 | d ^= a; b ^= c; |
606 | ||
607 | a += b; c += d; | |
19acc77a | 608 | b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27); |
43759d4f TT |
609 | d ^= a; b ^= c; |
610 | ||
611 | a += b; c += d; | |
19acc77a | 612 | b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14); |
43759d4f TT |
613 | d ^= a; b ^= c; |
614 | ||
615 | f->pool[0] = a; f->pool[1] = b; | |
616 | f->pool[2] = c; f->pool[3] = d; | |
655b2264 | 617 | f->count++; |
775f4b29 TT |
618 | } |
619 | ||
205a525c HX |
620 | static void process_random_ready_list(void) |
621 | { | |
622 | unsigned long flags; | |
623 | struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp; | |
624 | ||
625 | spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); | |
626 | list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) { | |
627 | struct module *owner = rdy->owner; | |
628 | ||
629 | list_del_init(&rdy->list); | |
630 | rdy->func(rdy); | |
631 | module_put(owner); | |
632 | } | |
633 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); | |
634 | } | |
635 | ||
1da177e4 | 636 | /* |
a283b5c4 PA |
637 | * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy. |
638 | * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace | |
639 | * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values. | |
1da177e4 | 640 | */ |
adc782da | 641 | static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) |
1da177e4 | 642 | { |
902c098a | 643 | int entropy_count, orig; |
30e37ec5 PA |
644 | const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits; |
645 | int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT; | |
1da177e4 | 646 | |
adc782da MM |
647 | if (!nbits) |
648 | return; | |
649 | ||
902c098a TT |
650 | retry: |
651 | entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count); | |
30e37ec5 PA |
652 | if (nfrac < 0) { |
653 | /* Debit */ | |
654 | entropy_count += nfrac; | |
655 | } else { | |
656 | /* | |
657 | * Credit: we have to account for the possibility of | |
658 | * overwriting already present entropy. Even in the | |
659 | * ideal case of pure Shannon entropy, new contributions | |
660 | * approach the full value asymptotically: | |
661 | * | |
662 | * entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) * | |
663 | * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) | |
664 | * | |
665 | * For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then | |
666 | * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >= | |
667 | * (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869... | |
668 | * so we can approximate the exponential with | |
669 | * 3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the | |
670 | * safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time. | |
671 | * | |
672 | * The use of pool_size-2 in the while statement is to | |
673 | * prevent rounding artifacts from making the loop | |
674 | * arbitrarily long; this limits the loop to log2(pool_size)*2 | |
675 | * turns no matter how large nbits is. | |
676 | */ | |
677 | int pnfrac = nfrac; | |
678 | const int s = r->poolinfo->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2; | |
679 | /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ | |
680 | ||
681 | do { | |
682 | unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2); | |
683 | unsigned int add = | |
684 | ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s; | |
685 | ||
686 | entropy_count += add; | |
687 | pnfrac -= anfrac; | |
688 | } while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac)); | |
689 | } | |
00ce1db1 | 690 | |
79a84687 | 691 | if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) { |
f80bbd8b TT |
692 | pr_warn("random: negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n", |
693 | r->name, entropy_count); | |
694 | WARN_ON(1); | |
8b76f46a | 695 | entropy_count = 0; |
30e37ec5 PA |
696 | } else if (entropy_count > pool_size) |
697 | entropy_count = pool_size; | |
902c098a TT |
698 | if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) |
699 | goto retry; | |
1da177e4 | 700 | |
6265e169 | 701 | r->entropy_total += nbits; |
0891ad82 LT |
702 | if (!r->initialized && r->entropy_total > 128) { |
703 | r->initialized = 1; | |
704 | r->entropy_total = 0; | |
775f4b29 TT |
705 | } |
706 | ||
a283b5c4 PA |
707 | trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits, |
708 | entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, | |
00ce1db1 TT |
709 | r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_); |
710 | ||
6265e169 | 711 | if (r == &input_pool) { |
7d1b08c4 | 712 | int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; |
6265e169 | 713 | |
e192be9d TT |
714 | if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) { |
715 | crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r); | |
716 | entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; | |
717 | } | |
718 | ||
6265e169 | 719 | /* should we wake readers? */ |
2132a96f | 720 | if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits) { |
6265e169 TT |
721 | wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait); |
722 | kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); | |
723 | } | |
724 | /* If the input pool is getting full, send some | |
e192be9d | 725 | * entropy to the blocking pool until it is 75% full. |
6265e169 | 726 | */ |
2132a96f | 727 | if (entropy_bits > random_write_wakeup_bits && |
6265e169 | 728 | r->initialized && |
2132a96f | 729 | r->entropy_total >= 2*random_read_wakeup_bits) { |
6265e169 TT |
730 | struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool; |
731 | ||
6265e169 | 732 | if (other->entropy_count <= |
e192be9d TT |
733 | 3 * other->poolinfo->poolfracbits / 4) { |
734 | schedule_work(&other->push_work); | |
6265e169 TT |
735 | r->entropy_total = 0; |
736 | } | |
737 | } | |
9a6f70bb | 738 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
739 | } |
740 | ||
a283b5c4 PA |
741 | static void credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) |
742 | { | |
743 | const int nbits_max = (int)(~0U >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 1)); | |
744 | ||
745 | /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */ | |
746 | nbits = min(nbits, nbits_max); | |
747 | nbits = max(nbits, -nbits_max); | |
748 | ||
749 | credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits); | |
750 | } | |
751 | ||
e192be9d TT |
752 | /********************************************************************* |
753 | * | |
754 | * CRNG using CHACHA20 | |
755 | * | |
756 | *********************************************************************/ | |
757 | ||
758 | #define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ) | |
759 | ||
760 | static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); | |
761 | ||
1e7f583a TT |
762 | #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA |
763 | /* | |
764 | * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying | |
765 | * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost | |
766 | * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around | |
767 | * their brain damage. | |
768 | */ | |
769 | static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly; | |
770 | #endif | |
771 | ||
e192be9d TT |
772 | static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) |
773 | { | |
774 | int i; | |
775 | unsigned long rv; | |
776 | ||
777 | memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16); | |
778 | if (crng == &primary_crng) | |
779 | _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], | |
780 | sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0); | |
781 | else | |
782 | get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); | |
783 | for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { | |
784 | if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && | |
785 | !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) | |
786 | rv = random_get_entropy(); | |
787 | crng->state[i] ^= rv; | |
788 | } | |
789 | crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; | |
790 | } | |
791 | ||
792 | static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) | |
793 | { | |
794 | unsigned long flags; | |
795 | char *p; | |
796 | ||
797 | if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) | |
798 | return 0; | |
799 | if (crng_ready()) { | |
800 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); | |
801 | return 0; | |
802 | } | |
803 | p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4]; | |
804 | while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { | |
805 | p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; | |
806 | cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; | |
807 | } | |
808 | if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { | |
809 | crng_init = 1; | |
810 | wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); | |
811 | pr_notice("random: fast init done\n"); | |
812 | } | |
813 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); | |
814 | return 1; | |
815 | } | |
816 | ||
817 | static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) | |
818 | { | |
819 | unsigned long flags; | |
820 | int i, num; | |
821 | union { | |
822 | __u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; | |
823 | __u32 key[8]; | |
824 | } buf; | |
825 | ||
826 | if (r) { | |
827 | num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0); | |
828 | if (num == 0) | |
829 | return; | |
c92e040d | 830 | } else { |
1e7f583a | 831 | _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block); |
c92e040d TT |
832 | _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block, |
833 | CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE); | |
834 | } | |
e192be9d TT |
835 | spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); |
836 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { | |
837 | unsigned long rv; | |
838 | if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && | |
839 | !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) | |
840 | rv = random_get_entropy(); | |
841 | crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv; | |
842 | } | |
843 | memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); | |
844 | crng->init_time = jiffies; | |
845 | if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) { | |
846 | crng_init = 2; | |
847 | process_random_ready_list(); | |
848 | wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); | |
849 | pr_notice("random: crng init done\n"); | |
850 | } | |
851 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); | |
852 | } | |
853 | ||
1e7f583a TT |
854 | static inline void maybe_reseed_primary_crng(void) |
855 | { | |
856 | if (crng_init > 2 && | |
857 | time_after(jiffies, primary_crng.init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) | |
858 | crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool); | |
859 | } | |
860 | ||
e192be9d TT |
861 | static inline void crng_wait_ready(void) |
862 | { | |
863 | wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready()); | |
864 | } | |
865 | ||
1e7f583a TT |
866 | static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, |
867 | __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) | |
e192be9d TT |
868 | { |
869 | unsigned long v, flags; | |
e192be9d TT |
870 | |
871 | if (crng_init > 1 && | |
872 | time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) | |
1e7f583a | 873 | crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? &input_pool : NULL); |
e192be9d TT |
874 | spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); |
875 | if (arch_get_random_long(&v)) | |
876 | crng->state[14] ^= v; | |
877 | chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out); | |
878 | if (crng->state[12] == 0) | |
879 | crng->state[13]++; | |
880 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); | |
881 | } | |
882 | ||
1e7f583a TT |
883 | static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) |
884 | { | |
885 | struct crng_state *crng = NULL; | |
886 | ||
887 | #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA | |
888 | if (crng_node_pool) | |
889 | crng = crng_node_pool[numa_node_id()]; | |
890 | if (crng == NULL) | |
891 | #endif | |
892 | crng = &primary_crng; | |
893 | _extract_crng(crng, out); | |
894 | } | |
895 | ||
c92e040d TT |
896 | /* |
897 | * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is | |
898 | * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. | |
899 | */ | |
900 | static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, | |
901 | __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) | |
902 | { | |
903 | unsigned long flags; | |
904 | __u32 *s, *d; | |
905 | int i; | |
906 | ||
907 | used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32)); | |
908 | if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { | |
909 | extract_crng(tmp); | |
910 | used = 0; | |
911 | } | |
912 | spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); | |
913 | s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used]; | |
914 | d = &crng->state[4]; | |
915 | for (i=0; i < 8; i++) | |
916 | *d++ ^= *s++; | |
917 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); | |
918 | } | |
919 | ||
920 | static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) | |
921 | { | |
922 | struct crng_state *crng = NULL; | |
923 | ||
924 | #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA | |
925 | if (crng_node_pool) | |
926 | crng = crng_node_pool[numa_node_id()]; | |
927 | if (crng == NULL) | |
928 | #endif | |
929 | crng = &primary_crng; | |
930 | _crng_backtrack_protect(crng, tmp, used); | |
931 | } | |
932 | ||
e192be9d TT |
933 | static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) |
934 | { | |
c92e040d | 935 | ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; |
e192be9d TT |
936 | __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
937 | int large_request = (nbytes > 256); | |
938 | ||
939 | while (nbytes) { | |
940 | if (large_request && need_resched()) { | |
941 | if (signal_pending(current)) { | |
942 | if (ret == 0) | |
943 | ret = -ERESTARTSYS; | |
944 | break; | |
945 | } | |
946 | schedule(); | |
947 | } | |
948 | ||
949 | extract_crng(tmp); | |
950 | i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); | |
951 | if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { | |
952 | ret = -EFAULT; | |
953 | break; | |
954 | } | |
955 | ||
956 | nbytes -= i; | |
957 | buf += i; | |
958 | ret += i; | |
959 | } | |
c92e040d | 960 | crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, i); |
e192be9d TT |
961 | |
962 | /* Wipe data just written to memory */ | |
963 | memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); | |
964 | ||
965 | return ret; | |
966 | } | |
967 | ||
968 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
969 | /********************************************************************* |
970 | * | |
971 | * Entropy input management | |
972 | * | |
973 | *********************************************************************/ | |
974 | ||
975 | /* There is one of these per entropy source */ | |
976 | struct timer_rand_state { | |
977 | cycles_t last_time; | |
90b75ee5 | 978 | long last_delta, last_delta2; |
1da177e4 LT |
979 | unsigned dont_count_entropy:1; |
980 | }; | |
981 | ||
644008df TT |
982 | #define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, }; |
983 | ||
a2080a67 | 984 | /* |
e192be9d TT |
985 | * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help |
986 | * initialize it. | |
a2080a67 | 987 | * |
e192be9d TT |
988 | * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of |
989 | * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely | |
990 | * identical devices. | |
a2080a67 LT |
991 | */ |
992 | void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size) | |
993 | { | |
61875f30 | 994 | unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies; |
3ef4cb2d | 995 | unsigned long flags; |
a2080a67 | 996 | |
5910895f | 997 | trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_); |
3ef4cb2d | 998 | spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); |
85608f8e TT |
999 | _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size); |
1000 | _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time)); | |
3ef4cb2d | 1001 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags); |
a2080a67 LT |
1002 | } |
1003 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness); | |
1004 | ||
644008df | 1005 | static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE; |
3060d6fe | 1006 | |
1da177e4 LT |
1007 | /* |
1008 | * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing | |
1009 | * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate | |
1010 | * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. | |
1011 | * | |
1012 | * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe | |
1013 | * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for | |
1014 | * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts. | |
1015 | * | |
1016 | */ | |
1017 | static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num) | |
1018 | { | |
40db23e5 | 1019 | struct entropy_store *r; |
1da177e4 | 1020 | struct { |
1da177e4 | 1021 | long jiffies; |
cf833d0b | 1022 | unsigned cycles; |
1da177e4 LT |
1023 | unsigned num; |
1024 | } sample; | |
1025 | long delta, delta2, delta3; | |
1026 | ||
1027 | preempt_disable(); | |
1da177e4 LT |
1028 | |
1029 | sample.jiffies = jiffies; | |
61875f30 | 1030 | sample.cycles = random_get_entropy(); |
1da177e4 | 1031 | sample.num = num; |
e192be9d | 1032 | r = &input_pool; |
85608f8e | 1033 | mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample)); |
1da177e4 LT |
1034 | |
1035 | /* | |
1036 | * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added. | |
1037 | * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas | |
1038 | * in order to make our estimate. | |
1039 | */ | |
1040 | ||
1041 | if (!state->dont_count_entropy) { | |
1042 | delta = sample.jiffies - state->last_time; | |
1043 | state->last_time = sample.jiffies; | |
1044 | ||
1045 | delta2 = delta - state->last_delta; | |
1046 | state->last_delta = delta; | |
1047 | ||
1048 | delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2; | |
1049 | state->last_delta2 = delta2; | |
1050 | ||
1051 | if (delta < 0) | |
1052 | delta = -delta; | |
1053 | if (delta2 < 0) | |
1054 | delta2 = -delta2; | |
1055 | if (delta3 < 0) | |
1056 | delta3 = -delta3; | |
1057 | if (delta > delta2) | |
1058 | delta = delta2; | |
1059 | if (delta > delta3) | |
1060 | delta = delta3; | |
1061 | ||
1062 | /* | |
1063 | * delta is now minimum absolute delta. | |
1064 | * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, | |
1065 | * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits. | |
1066 | */ | |
40db23e5 | 1067 | credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11)); |
1da177e4 | 1068 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
1069 | preempt_enable(); |
1070 | } | |
1071 | ||
d251575a | 1072 | void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, |
1da177e4 LT |
1073 | unsigned int value) |
1074 | { | |
1075 | static unsigned char last_value; | |
1076 | ||
1077 | /* ignore autorepeat and the like */ | |
1078 | if (value == last_value) | |
1079 | return; | |
1080 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1081 | last_value = value; |
1082 | add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state, | |
1083 | (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value); | |
f80bbd8b | 1084 | trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); |
1da177e4 | 1085 | } |
80fc9f53 | 1086 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness); |
1da177e4 | 1087 | |
775f4b29 TT |
1088 | static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness); |
1089 | ||
43759d4f TT |
1090 | #ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH |
1091 | static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation; | |
1092 | ||
1093 | #define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */ | |
1094 | #define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1)) | |
1095 | ||
1096 | static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start) | |
1097 | { | |
1098 | long delta = random_get_entropy() - start; | |
1099 | ||
1100 | /* Use a weighted moving average */ | |
1101 | delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); | |
1102 | avg_cycles += delta; | |
1103 | /* And average deviation */ | |
1104 | delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); | |
1105 | avg_deviation += delta; | |
1106 | } | |
1107 | #else | |
1108 | #define add_interrupt_bench(x) | |
1109 | #endif | |
1110 | ||
ee3e00e9 TT |
1111 | static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) |
1112 | { | |
1113 | __u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs; | |
1114 | ||
1115 | if (regs == NULL) | |
1116 | return 0; | |
1117 | if (f->reg_idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32)) | |
1118 | f->reg_idx = 0; | |
1119 | return *(ptr + f->reg_idx++); | |
1120 | } | |
1121 | ||
775f4b29 | 1122 | void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) |
1da177e4 | 1123 | { |
775f4b29 | 1124 | struct entropy_store *r; |
1b2a1a7e | 1125 | struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); |
775f4b29 TT |
1126 | struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); |
1127 | unsigned long now = jiffies; | |
655b2264 | 1128 | cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); |
43759d4f | 1129 | __u32 c_high, j_high; |
655b2264 | 1130 | __u64 ip; |
83664a69 | 1131 | unsigned long seed; |
91fcb532 | 1132 | int credit = 0; |
3060d6fe | 1133 | |
ee3e00e9 TT |
1134 | if (cycles == 0) |
1135 | cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); | |
655b2264 TT |
1136 | c_high = (sizeof(cycles) > 4) ? cycles >> 32 : 0; |
1137 | j_high = (sizeof(now) > 4) ? now >> 32 : 0; | |
43759d4f TT |
1138 | fast_pool->pool[0] ^= cycles ^ j_high ^ irq; |
1139 | fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high; | |
655b2264 | 1140 | ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; |
43759d4f | 1141 | fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip; |
ee3e00e9 TT |
1142 | fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 : |
1143 | get_reg(fast_pool, regs); | |
3060d6fe | 1144 | |
43759d4f | 1145 | fast_mix(fast_pool); |
43759d4f | 1146 | add_interrupt_bench(cycles); |
3060d6fe | 1147 | |
e192be9d TT |
1148 | if (!crng_ready()) { |
1149 | if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) && | |
1150 | crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool, | |
1151 | sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) { | |
1152 | fast_pool->count = 0; | |
1153 | fast_pool->last = now; | |
1154 | } | |
1155 | return; | |
1156 | } | |
1157 | ||
ee3e00e9 TT |
1158 | if ((fast_pool->count < 64) && |
1159 | !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) | |
1da177e4 LT |
1160 | return; |
1161 | ||
e192be9d | 1162 | r = &input_pool; |
840f9507 | 1163 | if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock)) |
91fcb532 | 1164 | return; |
83664a69 | 1165 | |
91fcb532 | 1166 | fast_pool->last = now; |
85608f8e | 1167 | __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)); |
83664a69 PA |
1168 | |
1169 | /* | |
1170 | * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and | |
48d6be95 TT |
1171 | * add it to the pool. For the sake of paranoia don't let the |
1172 | * architectural seed generator dominate the input from the | |
1173 | * interrupt noise. | |
83664a69 PA |
1174 | */ |
1175 | if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) { | |
85608f8e | 1176 | __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed)); |
48d6be95 | 1177 | credit = 1; |
83664a69 | 1178 | } |
91fcb532 | 1179 | spin_unlock(&r->lock); |
83664a69 | 1180 | |
ee3e00e9 | 1181 | fast_pool->count = 0; |
83664a69 | 1182 | |
ee3e00e9 TT |
1183 | /* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */ |
1184 | credit_entropy_bits(r, credit + 1); | |
1da177e4 | 1185 | } |
4b44f2d1 | 1186 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness); |
1da177e4 | 1187 | |
9361401e | 1188 | #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK |
1da177e4 LT |
1189 | void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) |
1190 | { | |
1191 | if (!disk || !disk->random) | |
1192 | return; | |
1193 | /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ | |
f331c029 | 1194 | add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk)); |
f80bbd8b | 1195 | trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); |
1da177e4 | 1196 | } |
bdcfa3e5 | 1197 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness); |
9361401e | 1198 | #endif |
1da177e4 | 1199 | |
1da177e4 LT |
1200 | /********************************************************************* |
1201 | * | |
1202 | * Entropy extraction routines | |
1203 | * | |
1204 | *********************************************************************/ | |
1205 | ||
1da177e4 | 1206 | /* |
25985edc | 1207 | * This utility inline function is responsible for transferring entropy |
1da177e4 LT |
1208 | * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make |
1209 | * sure we pull enough for a 'catastrophic reseed'. | |
1210 | */ | |
6265e169 | 1211 | static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes); |
1da177e4 LT |
1212 | static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) |
1213 | { | |
cff85031 TT |
1214 | if (!r->pull || |
1215 | r->entropy_count >= (nbytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) || | |
1216 | r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits) | |
1217 | return; | |
1218 | ||
f5c2742c TT |
1219 | if (r->limit == 0 && random_min_urandom_seed) { |
1220 | unsigned long now = jiffies; | |
1da177e4 | 1221 | |
f5c2742c TT |
1222 | if (time_before(now, |
1223 | r->last_pulled + random_min_urandom_seed * HZ)) | |
1224 | return; | |
1225 | r->last_pulled = now; | |
1da177e4 | 1226 | } |
cff85031 TT |
1227 | |
1228 | _xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); | |
6265e169 TT |
1229 | } |
1230 | ||
1231 | static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) | |
1232 | { | |
1233 | __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS]; | |
1234 | ||
2132a96f GP |
1235 | /* For /dev/random's pool, always leave two wakeups' worth */ |
1236 | int rsvd_bytes = r->limit ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_bits / 4; | |
6265e169 TT |
1237 | int bytes = nbytes; |
1238 | ||
2132a96f GP |
1239 | /* pull at least as much as a wakeup */ |
1240 | bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8); | |
6265e169 TT |
1241 | /* but never more than the buffer size */ |
1242 | bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp)); | |
1243 | ||
f80bbd8b TT |
1244 | trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, |
1245 | ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull)); | |
6265e169 | 1246 | bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes, |
2132a96f | 1247 | random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, rsvd_bytes); |
85608f8e | 1248 | mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes); |
6265e169 TT |
1249 | credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8); |
1250 | } | |
1251 | ||
1252 | /* | |
1253 | * Used as a workqueue function so that when the input pool is getting | |
1254 | * full, we can "spill over" some entropy to the output pools. That | |
1255 | * way the output pools can store some of the excess entropy instead | |
1256 | * of letting it go to waste. | |
1257 | */ | |
1258 | static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work) | |
1259 | { | |
1260 | struct entropy_store *r = container_of(work, struct entropy_store, | |
1261 | push_work); | |
1262 | BUG_ON(!r); | |
2132a96f | 1263 | _xfer_secondary_pool(r, random_read_wakeup_bits/8); |
6265e169 TT |
1264 | trace_push_to_pool(r->name, r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, |
1265 | r->pull->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT); | |
1da177e4 LT |
1266 | } |
1267 | ||
1268 | /* | |
19fa5be1 GP |
1269 | * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the |
1270 | * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly. | |
1da177e4 | 1271 | */ |
1da177e4 LT |
1272 | static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min, |
1273 | int reserved) | |
1274 | { | |
a283b5c4 | 1275 | int entropy_count, orig; |
79a84687 | 1276 | size_t ibytes, nfrac; |
1da177e4 | 1277 | |
a283b5c4 | 1278 | BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits); |
1da177e4 LT |
1279 | |
1280 | /* Can we pull enough? */ | |
10b3a32d | 1281 | retry: |
a283b5c4 | 1282 | entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count); |
a283b5c4 | 1283 | ibytes = nbytes; |
0fb7a01a | 1284 | /* If limited, never pull more than available */ |
e33ba5fa TT |
1285 | if (r->limit) { |
1286 | int have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); | |
1287 | ||
1288 | if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0) | |
1289 | have_bytes = 0; | |
1290 | ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes); | |
1291 | } | |
0fb7a01a | 1292 | if (ibytes < min) |
a283b5c4 | 1293 | ibytes = 0; |
79a84687 HFS |
1294 | |
1295 | if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) { | |
1296 | pr_warn("random: negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n", | |
1297 | r->name, entropy_count); | |
1298 | WARN_ON(1); | |
1299 | entropy_count = 0; | |
1300 | } | |
1301 | nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); | |
1302 | if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac) | |
1303 | entropy_count -= nfrac; | |
1304 | else | |
e33ba5fa | 1305 | entropy_count = 0; |
f9c6d498 | 1306 | |
0fb7a01a GP |
1307 | if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) |
1308 | goto retry; | |
1da177e4 | 1309 | |
f80bbd8b | 1310 | trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes); |
0fb7a01a | 1311 | if (ibytes && |
2132a96f | 1312 | (r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) < random_write_wakeup_bits) { |
b9809552 TT |
1313 | wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); |
1314 | kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); | |
1315 | } | |
1316 | ||
a283b5c4 | 1317 | return ibytes; |
1da177e4 LT |
1318 | } |
1319 | ||
19fa5be1 GP |
1320 | /* |
1321 | * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy and | |
1322 | * extract_entropy_user. | |
1323 | * | |
1324 | * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words. | |
1325 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1326 | static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out) |
1327 | { | |
602b6aee | 1328 | int i; |
d2e7c96a PA |
1329 | union { |
1330 | __u32 w[5]; | |
85a1f777 | 1331 | unsigned long l[LONGS(20)]; |
d2e7c96a PA |
1332 | } hash; |
1333 | __u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS]; | |
902c098a | 1334 | unsigned long flags; |
1da177e4 | 1335 | |
85a1f777 | 1336 | /* |
dfd38750 | 1337 | * If we have an architectural hardware random number |
46884442 | 1338 | * generator, use it for SHA's initial vector |
85a1f777 | 1339 | */ |
46884442 | 1340 | sha_init(hash.w); |
85a1f777 TT |
1341 | for (i = 0; i < LONGS(20); i++) { |
1342 | unsigned long v; | |
1343 | if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) | |
1344 | break; | |
46884442 | 1345 | hash.l[i] = v; |
85a1f777 TT |
1346 | } |
1347 | ||
46884442 TT |
1348 | /* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */ |
1349 | spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); | |
1350 | for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16) | |
1351 | sha_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace); | |
1352 | ||
1da177e4 | 1353 | /* |
1c0ad3d4 MM |
1354 | * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking |
1355 | * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool | |
1356 | * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous | |
1357 | * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By | |
1358 | * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make | |
1359 | * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the | |
1360 | * hash. | |
1da177e4 | 1361 | */ |
85608f8e | 1362 | __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w)); |
902c098a | 1363 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); |
1da177e4 | 1364 | |
d4c5efdb | 1365 | memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace)); |
1da177e4 LT |
1366 | |
1367 | /* | |
1c0ad3d4 MM |
1368 | * In case the hash function has some recognizable output |
1369 | * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back | |
1370 | * twice as much data as we output. | |
1da177e4 | 1371 | */ |
d2e7c96a PA |
1372 | hash.w[0] ^= hash.w[3]; |
1373 | hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4]; | |
1374 | hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16); | |
1375 | ||
d2e7c96a | 1376 | memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE); |
d4c5efdb | 1377 | memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash)); |
1da177e4 LT |
1378 | } |
1379 | ||
e192be9d TT |
1380 | static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, |
1381 | size_t nbytes, int fips) | |
1382 | { | |
1383 | ssize_t ret = 0, i; | |
1384 | __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; | |
1385 | unsigned long flags; | |
1386 | ||
1387 | while (nbytes) { | |
1388 | extract_buf(r, tmp); | |
1389 | ||
1390 | if (fips) { | |
1391 | spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); | |
1392 | if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE)) | |
1393 | panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n"); | |
1394 | memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); | |
1395 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); | |
1396 | } | |
1397 | i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); | |
1398 | memcpy(buf, tmp, i); | |
1399 | nbytes -= i; | |
1400 | buf += i; | |
1401 | ret += i; | |
1402 | } | |
1403 | ||
1404 | /* Wipe data just returned from memory */ | |
1405 | memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); | |
1406 | ||
1407 | return ret; | |
1408 | } | |
1409 | ||
19fa5be1 GP |
1410 | /* |
1411 | * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and | |
1412 | * returns it in a buffer. | |
1413 | * | |
1414 | * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before | |
1415 | * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the | |
1416 | * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the | |
1417 | * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers. | |
1418 | */ | |
90b75ee5 | 1419 | static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, |
902c098a | 1420 | size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved) |
1da177e4 | 1421 | { |
1da177e4 | 1422 | __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; |
1e7e2e05 | 1423 | unsigned long flags; |
1da177e4 | 1424 | |
ec8f02da | 1425 | /* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */ |
1e7e2e05 JW |
1426 | if (fips_enabled) { |
1427 | spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); | |
1428 | if (!r->last_data_init) { | |
c59974ae | 1429 | r->last_data_init = 1; |
1e7e2e05 JW |
1430 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); |
1431 | trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE, | |
a283b5c4 | 1432 | ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); |
1e7e2e05 JW |
1433 | xfer_secondary_pool(r, EXTRACT_SIZE); |
1434 | extract_buf(r, tmp); | |
1435 | spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); | |
1436 | memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); | |
1437 | } | |
1438 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); | |
1439 | } | |
ec8f02da | 1440 | |
a283b5c4 | 1441 | trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); |
1da177e4 LT |
1442 | xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); |
1443 | nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved); | |
1444 | ||
e192be9d | 1445 | return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled); |
1da177e4 LT |
1446 | } |
1447 | ||
19fa5be1 GP |
1448 | /* |
1449 | * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and | |
1450 | * returns it in a userspace buffer. | |
1451 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1452 | static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf, |
1453 | size_t nbytes) | |
1454 | { | |
1455 | ssize_t ret = 0, i; | |
1456 | __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE]; | |
c6e9d6f3 | 1457 | int large_request = (nbytes > 256); |
1da177e4 | 1458 | |
a283b5c4 | 1459 | trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_); |
1da177e4 LT |
1460 | xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); |
1461 | nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0); | |
1462 | ||
1463 | while (nbytes) { | |
c6e9d6f3 | 1464 | if (large_request && need_resched()) { |
1da177e4 LT |
1465 | if (signal_pending(current)) { |
1466 | if (ret == 0) | |
1467 | ret = -ERESTARTSYS; | |
1468 | break; | |
1469 | } | |
1470 | schedule(); | |
1471 | } | |
1472 | ||
1473 | extract_buf(r, tmp); | |
1474 | i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE); | |
1475 | if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { | |
1476 | ret = -EFAULT; | |
1477 | break; | |
1478 | } | |
1479 | ||
1480 | nbytes -= i; | |
1481 | buf += i; | |
1482 | ret += i; | |
1483 | } | |
1484 | ||
1485 | /* Wipe data just returned from memory */ | |
d4c5efdb | 1486 | memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); |
1da177e4 LT |
1487 | |
1488 | return ret; | |
1489 | } | |
1490 | ||
1491 | /* | |
1492 | * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some | |
c2557a30 | 1493 | * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding |
18e9cea7 GP |
1494 | * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random |
1495 | * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG | |
1496 | * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). | |
1da177e4 LT |
1497 | */ |
1498 | void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) | |
c2557a30 | 1499 | { |
e192be9d TT |
1500 | __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
1501 | ||
392a546d | 1502 | #if DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT > 0 |
e192be9d | 1503 | if (!crng_ready()) |
392a546d | 1504 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_bytes called " |
e192be9d | 1505 | "with crng_init = %d\n", (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init); |
392a546d | 1506 | #endif |
5910895f | 1507 | trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); |
e192be9d TT |
1508 | |
1509 | while (nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { | |
1510 | extract_crng(buf); | |
1511 | buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; | |
1512 | nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; | |
1513 | } | |
1514 | ||
1515 | if (nbytes > 0) { | |
1516 | extract_crng(tmp); | |
1517 | memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes); | |
c92e040d TT |
1518 | crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes); |
1519 | } else | |
1520 | crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); | |
1521 | memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); | |
c2557a30 TT |
1522 | } |
1523 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); | |
1524 | ||
205a525c HX |
1525 | /* |
1526 | * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking | |
1527 | * pool is initialised. | |
1528 | * | |
1529 | * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added | |
1530 | * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called) | |
1531 | * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive | |
1532 | */ | |
1533 | int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) | |
1534 | { | |
1535 | struct module *owner; | |
1536 | unsigned long flags; | |
1537 | int err = -EALREADY; | |
1538 | ||
e192be9d | 1539 | if (crng_ready()) |
205a525c HX |
1540 | return err; |
1541 | ||
1542 | owner = rdy->owner; | |
1543 | if (!try_module_get(owner)) | |
1544 | return -ENOENT; | |
1545 | ||
1546 | spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); | |
e192be9d | 1547 | if (crng_ready()) |
205a525c HX |
1548 | goto out; |
1549 | ||
1550 | owner = NULL; | |
1551 | ||
1552 | list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list); | |
1553 | err = 0; | |
1554 | ||
1555 | out: | |
1556 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); | |
1557 | ||
1558 | module_put(owner); | |
1559 | ||
1560 | return err; | |
1561 | } | |
1562 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback); | |
1563 | ||
1564 | /* | |
1565 | * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function. | |
1566 | */ | |
1567 | void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy) | |
1568 | { | |
1569 | unsigned long flags; | |
1570 | struct module *owner = NULL; | |
1571 | ||
1572 | spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); | |
1573 | if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) { | |
1574 | list_del_init(&rdy->list); | |
1575 | owner = rdy->owner; | |
1576 | } | |
1577 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags); | |
1578 | ||
1579 | module_put(owner); | |
1580 | } | |
1581 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback); | |
1582 | ||
c2557a30 TT |
1583 | /* |
1584 | * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random | |
1585 | * number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will | |
1586 | * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it | |
1587 | * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as | |
1588 | * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a | |
1589 | * key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but | |
1590 | * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to | |
1591 | * have put in a back door. | |
1592 | */ | |
1593 | void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) | |
1da177e4 | 1594 | { |
63d77173 PA |
1595 | char *p = buf; |
1596 | ||
5910895f | 1597 | trace_get_random_bytes_arch(nbytes, _RET_IP_); |
63d77173 PA |
1598 | while (nbytes) { |
1599 | unsigned long v; | |
1600 | int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long)); | |
c2557a30 | 1601 | |
63d77173 PA |
1602 | if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) |
1603 | break; | |
1604 | ||
bd29e568 | 1605 | memcpy(p, &v, chunk); |
63d77173 PA |
1606 | p += chunk; |
1607 | nbytes -= chunk; | |
1608 | } | |
1609 | ||
c2557a30 | 1610 | if (nbytes) |
e192be9d | 1611 | get_random_bytes(p, nbytes); |
1da177e4 | 1612 | } |
c2557a30 TT |
1613 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); |
1614 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1615 | |
1616 | /* | |
1617 | * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data | |
1618 | * | |
1619 | * @r: pool to initialize | |
1620 | * | |
1621 | * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system | |
1622 | * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared | |
1623 | * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool. | |
1624 | */ | |
1625 | static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) | |
1626 | { | |
3e88bdff | 1627 | int i; |
902c098a TT |
1628 | ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); |
1629 | unsigned long rv; | |
1da177e4 | 1630 | |
f5c2742c | 1631 | r->last_pulled = jiffies; |
85608f8e | 1632 | mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now)); |
9ed17b70 | 1633 | for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { |
83664a69 PA |
1634 | if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && |
1635 | !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) | |
ae9ecd92 | 1636 | rv = random_get_entropy(); |
85608f8e | 1637 | mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv)); |
3e88bdff | 1638 | } |
85608f8e | 1639 | mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); |
1da177e4 LT |
1640 | } |
1641 | ||
cbc96b75 TL |
1642 | /* |
1643 | * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness() | |
1644 | * long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools | |
1645 | * with some platform dependent data very early in the boot | |
1646 | * process. But it limits our options here. We must use | |
1647 | * statically allocated structures that already have all | |
1648 | * initializations complete at compile time. We should also | |
1649 | * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data | |
1650 | * we were given. | |
1651 | */ | |
53c3f63e | 1652 | static int rand_initialize(void) |
1da177e4 | 1653 | { |
1e7f583a TT |
1654 | #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA |
1655 | int i; | |
1656 | int num_nodes = num_possible_nodes(); | |
1657 | struct crng_state *crng; | |
1658 | struct crng_state **pool; | |
1659 | #endif | |
1660 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1661 | init_std_data(&input_pool); |
1662 | init_std_data(&blocking_pool); | |
e192be9d | 1663 | crng_initialize(&primary_crng); |
1e7f583a TT |
1664 | |
1665 | #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA | |
1666 | pool = kmalloc(num_nodes * sizeof(void *), | |
1667 | GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL|__GFP_ZERO); | |
1668 | for (i=0; i < num_nodes; i++) { | |
1669 | crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state), | |
1670 | GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i); | |
1671 | spin_lock_init(&crng->lock); | |
1672 | crng_initialize(crng); | |
1673 | pool[i] = crng; | |
1674 | ||
1675 | } | |
1676 | mb(); | |
1677 | crng_node_pool = pool; | |
1678 | #endif | |
1da177e4 LT |
1679 | return 0; |
1680 | } | |
ae9ecd92 | 1681 | early_initcall(rand_initialize); |
1da177e4 | 1682 | |
9361401e | 1683 | #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK |
1da177e4 LT |
1684 | void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) |
1685 | { | |
1686 | struct timer_rand_state *state; | |
1687 | ||
1688 | /* | |
f8595815 | 1689 | * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy |
1da177e4 LT |
1690 | * source. |
1691 | */ | |
f8595815 | 1692 | state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL); |
644008df TT |
1693 | if (state) { |
1694 | state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES; | |
1da177e4 | 1695 | disk->random = state; |
644008df | 1696 | } |
1da177e4 | 1697 | } |
9361401e | 1698 | #endif |
1da177e4 LT |
1699 | |
1700 | static ssize_t | |
c6e9d6f3 | 1701 | _random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes) |
1da177e4 | 1702 | { |
12ff3a51 | 1703 | ssize_t n; |
1da177e4 LT |
1704 | |
1705 | if (nbytes == 0) | |
1706 | return 0; | |
1707 | ||
12ff3a51 GP |
1708 | nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, SEC_XFER_SIZE); |
1709 | while (1) { | |
1710 | n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, nbytes); | |
1711 | if (n < 0) | |
1712 | return n; | |
f80bbd8b TT |
1713 | trace_random_read(n*8, (nbytes-n)*8, |
1714 | ENTROPY_BITS(&blocking_pool), | |
1715 | ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); | |
12ff3a51 GP |
1716 | if (n > 0) |
1717 | return n; | |
331c6490 | 1718 | |
12ff3a51 | 1719 | /* Pool is (near) empty. Maybe wait and retry. */ |
c6e9d6f3 | 1720 | if (nonblock) |
12ff3a51 GP |
1721 | return -EAGAIN; |
1722 | ||
1723 | wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait, | |
1724 | ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= | |
2132a96f | 1725 | random_read_wakeup_bits); |
12ff3a51 GP |
1726 | if (signal_pending(current)) |
1727 | return -ERESTARTSYS; | |
1da177e4 | 1728 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
1729 | } |
1730 | ||
c6e9d6f3 TT |
1731 | static ssize_t |
1732 | random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) | |
1733 | { | |
1734 | return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes); | |
1735 | } | |
1736 | ||
1da177e4 | 1737 | static ssize_t |
90b75ee5 | 1738 | urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) |
1da177e4 | 1739 | { |
e192be9d | 1740 | unsigned long flags; |
9b4d0087 | 1741 | static int maxwarn = 10; |
301f0595 TT |
1742 | int ret; |
1743 | ||
e192be9d | 1744 | if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) { |
9b4d0087 TT |
1745 | maxwarn--; |
1746 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s: uninitialized urandom read " | |
e192be9d TT |
1747 | "(%zd bytes read)\n", |
1748 | current->comm, nbytes); | |
1749 | spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags); | |
1750 | crng_init_cnt = 0; | |
1751 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); | |
9b4d0087 | 1752 | } |
79a84687 | 1753 | nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)); |
e192be9d TT |
1754 | ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes); |
1755 | trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); | |
f80bbd8b | 1756 | return ret; |
1da177e4 LT |
1757 | } |
1758 | ||
1759 | static unsigned int | |
1760 | random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) | |
1761 | { | |
1762 | unsigned int mask; | |
1763 | ||
1764 | poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait); | |
1765 | poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait); | |
1766 | mask = 0; | |
2132a96f | 1767 | if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits) |
1da177e4 | 1768 | mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; |
2132a96f | 1769 | if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits) |
1da177e4 LT |
1770 | mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM; |
1771 | return mask; | |
1772 | } | |
1773 | ||
7f397dcd MM |
1774 | static int |
1775 | write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count) | |
1da177e4 | 1776 | { |
1da177e4 LT |
1777 | size_t bytes; |
1778 | __u32 buf[16]; | |
1779 | const char __user *p = buffer; | |
1da177e4 | 1780 | |
7f397dcd MM |
1781 | while (count > 0) { |
1782 | bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf)); | |
1783 | if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes)) | |
1784 | return -EFAULT; | |
1da177e4 | 1785 | |
7f397dcd | 1786 | count -= bytes; |
1da177e4 LT |
1787 | p += bytes; |
1788 | ||
85608f8e | 1789 | mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes); |
91f3f1e3 | 1790 | cond_resched(); |
1da177e4 | 1791 | } |
7f397dcd MM |
1792 | |
1793 | return 0; | |
1794 | } | |
1795 | ||
90b75ee5 MM |
1796 | static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, |
1797 | size_t count, loff_t *ppos) | |
7f397dcd MM |
1798 | { |
1799 | size_t ret; | |
7f397dcd | 1800 | |
e192be9d | 1801 | ret = write_pool(&input_pool, buffer, count); |
7f397dcd MM |
1802 | if (ret) |
1803 | return ret; | |
1804 | ||
7f397dcd | 1805 | return (ssize_t)count; |
1da177e4 LT |
1806 | } |
1807 | ||
43ae4860 | 1808 | static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) |
1da177e4 LT |
1809 | { |
1810 | int size, ent_count; | |
1811 | int __user *p = (int __user *)arg; | |
1812 | int retval; | |
1813 | ||
1814 | switch (cmd) { | |
1815 | case RNDGETENTCNT: | |
43ae4860 | 1816 | /* inherently racy, no point locking */ |
a283b5c4 PA |
1817 | ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool); |
1818 | if (put_user(ent_count, p)) | |
1da177e4 LT |
1819 | return -EFAULT; |
1820 | return 0; | |
1821 | case RNDADDTOENTCNT: | |
1822 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
1823 | return -EPERM; | |
1824 | if (get_user(ent_count, p)) | |
1825 | return -EFAULT; | |
a283b5c4 | 1826 | credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count); |
1da177e4 LT |
1827 | return 0; |
1828 | case RNDADDENTROPY: | |
1829 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
1830 | return -EPERM; | |
1831 | if (get_user(ent_count, p++)) | |
1832 | return -EFAULT; | |
1833 | if (ent_count < 0) | |
1834 | return -EINVAL; | |
1835 | if (get_user(size, p++)) | |
1836 | return -EFAULT; | |
7f397dcd MM |
1837 | retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p, |
1838 | size); | |
1da177e4 LT |
1839 | if (retval < 0) |
1840 | return retval; | |
a283b5c4 | 1841 | credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count); |
1da177e4 LT |
1842 | return 0; |
1843 | case RNDZAPENTCNT: | |
1844 | case RNDCLEARPOOL: | |
ae9ecd92 TT |
1845 | /* |
1846 | * Clear the entropy pool counters. We no longer clear | |
1847 | * the entropy pool, as that's silly. | |
1848 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1849 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1850 | return -EPERM; | |
ae9ecd92 | 1851 | input_pool.entropy_count = 0; |
ae9ecd92 | 1852 | blocking_pool.entropy_count = 0; |
1da177e4 LT |
1853 | return 0; |
1854 | default: | |
1855 | return -EINVAL; | |
1856 | } | |
1857 | } | |
1858 | ||
9a6f70bb JD |
1859 | static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) |
1860 | { | |
1861 | return fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &fasync); | |
1862 | } | |
1863 | ||
2b8693c0 | 1864 | const struct file_operations random_fops = { |
1da177e4 LT |
1865 | .read = random_read, |
1866 | .write = random_write, | |
1867 | .poll = random_poll, | |
43ae4860 | 1868 | .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, |
9a6f70bb | 1869 | .fasync = random_fasync, |
6038f373 | 1870 | .llseek = noop_llseek, |
1da177e4 LT |
1871 | }; |
1872 | ||
2b8693c0 | 1873 | const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { |
1da177e4 LT |
1874 | .read = urandom_read, |
1875 | .write = random_write, | |
43ae4860 | 1876 | .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, |
9a6f70bb | 1877 | .fasync = random_fasync, |
6038f373 | 1878 | .llseek = noop_llseek, |
1da177e4 LT |
1879 | }; |
1880 | ||
c6e9d6f3 TT |
1881 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, |
1882 | unsigned int, flags) | |
1883 | { | |
1884 | if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM)) | |
1885 | return -EINVAL; | |
1886 | ||
1887 | if (count > INT_MAX) | |
1888 | count = INT_MAX; | |
1889 | ||
1890 | if (flags & GRND_RANDOM) | |
1891 | return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count); | |
1892 | ||
e192be9d | 1893 | if (!crng_ready()) { |
c6e9d6f3 TT |
1894 | if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) |
1895 | return -EAGAIN; | |
e192be9d | 1896 | crng_wait_ready(); |
c6e9d6f3 TT |
1897 | if (signal_pending(current)) |
1898 | return -ERESTARTSYS; | |
1899 | } | |
1900 | return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL); | |
1901 | } | |
1902 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1903 | /******************************************************************** |
1904 | * | |
1905 | * Sysctl interface | |
1906 | * | |
1907 | ********************************************************************/ | |
1908 | ||
1909 | #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL | |
1910 | ||
1911 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> | |
1912 | ||
1913 | static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh; | |
8c2aa339 | 1914 | static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; |
1da177e4 LT |
1915 | static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; |
1916 | static char sysctl_bootid[16]; | |
1917 | ||
1918 | /* | |
f22052b2 | 1919 | * This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random |
1da177e4 LT |
1920 | * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is, |
1921 | * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user. | |
1922 | * | |
f22052b2 GP |
1923 | * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be |
1924 | * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the | |
1925 | * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data. | |
1da177e4 | 1926 | */ |
a151427e | 1927 | static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, |
1da177e4 LT |
1928 | void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) |
1929 | { | |
a151427e | 1930 | struct ctl_table fake_table; |
1da177e4 LT |
1931 | unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid; |
1932 | ||
1933 | uuid = table->data; | |
1934 | if (!uuid) { | |
1935 | uuid = tmp_uuid; | |
1da177e4 | 1936 | generate_random_uuid(uuid); |
44e4360f MD |
1937 | } else { |
1938 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootid_spinlock); | |
1939 | ||
1940 | spin_lock(&bootid_spinlock); | |
1941 | if (!uuid[8]) | |
1942 | generate_random_uuid(uuid); | |
1943 | spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock); | |
1944 | } | |
1da177e4 | 1945 | |
35900771 JP |
1946 | sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid); |
1947 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1948 | fake_table.data = buf; |
1949 | fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf); | |
1950 | ||
8d65af78 | 1951 | return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); |
1da177e4 LT |
1952 | } |
1953 | ||
a283b5c4 PA |
1954 | /* |
1955 | * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits | |
1956 | */ | |
5eb10d91 | 1957 | static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write, |
a283b5c4 PA |
1958 | void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) |
1959 | { | |
5eb10d91 | 1960 | struct ctl_table fake_table; |
a283b5c4 PA |
1961 | int entropy_count; |
1962 | ||
1963 | entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> ENTROPY_SHIFT; | |
1964 | ||
1965 | fake_table.data = &entropy_count; | |
1966 | fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count); | |
1967 | ||
1968 | return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); | |
1969 | } | |
1970 | ||
1da177e4 | 1971 | static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; |
a151427e JP |
1972 | extern struct ctl_table random_table[]; |
1973 | struct ctl_table random_table[] = { | |
1da177e4 | 1974 | { |
1da177e4 LT |
1975 | .procname = "poolsize", |
1976 | .data = &sysctl_poolsize, | |
1977 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), | |
1978 | .mode = 0444, | |
6d456111 | 1979 | .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, |
1da177e4 LT |
1980 | }, |
1981 | { | |
1da177e4 LT |
1982 | .procname = "entropy_avail", |
1983 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), | |
1984 | .mode = 0444, | |
a283b5c4 | 1985 | .proc_handler = proc_do_entropy, |
1da177e4 LT |
1986 | .data = &input_pool.entropy_count, |
1987 | }, | |
1988 | { | |
1da177e4 | 1989 | .procname = "read_wakeup_threshold", |
2132a96f | 1990 | .data = &random_read_wakeup_bits, |
1da177e4 LT |
1991 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
1992 | .mode = 0644, | |
6d456111 | 1993 | .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, |
1da177e4 LT |
1994 | .extra1 = &min_read_thresh, |
1995 | .extra2 = &max_read_thresh, | |
1996 | }, | |
1997 | { | |
1da177e4 | 1998 | .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold", |
2132a96f | 1999 | .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits, |
1da177e4 LT |
2000 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
2001 | .mode = 0644, | |
6d456111 | 2002 | .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, |
1da177e4 LT |
2003 | .extra1 = &min_write_thresh, |
2004 | .extra2 = &max_write_thresh, | |
2005 | }, | |
f5c2742c TT |
2006 | { |
2007 | .procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs", | |
2008 | .data = &random_min_urandom_seed, | |
2009 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), | |
2010 | .mode = 0644, | |
2011 | .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, | |
2012 | }, | |
1da177e4 | 2013 | { |
1da177e4 LT |
2014 | .procname = "boot_id", |
2015 | .data = &sysctl_bootid, | |
2016 | .maxlen = 16, | |
2017 | .mode = 0444, | |
6d456111 | 2018 | .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid, |
1da177e4 LT |
2019 | }, |
2020 | { | |
1da177e4 LT |
2021 | .procname = "uuid", |
2022 | .maxlen = 16, | |
2023 | .mode = 0444, | |
6d456111 | 2024 | .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid, |
1da177e4 | 2025 | }, |
43759d4f TT |
2026 | #ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH |
2027 | { | |
2028 | .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_cycles", | |
2029 | .data = &avg_cycles, | |
2030 | .maxlen = sizeof(avg_cycles), | |
2031 | .mode = 0444, | |
2032 | .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, | |
2033 | }, | |
2034 | { | |
2035 | .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_deviation", | |
2036 | .data = &avg_deviation, | |
2037 | .maxlen = sizeof(avg_deviation), | |
2038 | .mode = 0444, | |
2039 | .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, | |
2040 | }, | |
2041 | #endif | |
894d2491 | 2042 | { } |
1da177e4 LT |
2043 | }; |
2044 | #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ | |
2045 | ||
6e5714ea | 2046 | static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned; |
1da177e4 | 2047 | |
47d06e53 | 2048 | int random_int_secret_init(void) |
1da177e4 | 2049 | { |
6e5714ea | 2050 | get_random_bytes(random_int_secret, sizeof(random_int_secret)); |
1da177e4 LT |
2051 | return 0; |
2052 | } | |
1da177e4 | 2053 | |
b1132dea EB |
2054 | static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash) |
2055 | __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)); | |
2056 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
2057 | /* |
2058 | * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but | |
2059 | * with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random | |
2060 | * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of | |
2061 | * depleting entropy is too high | |
2062 | */ | |
2063 | unsigned int get_random_int(void) | |
2064 | { | |
63d77173 | 2065 | __u32 *hash; |
6e5714ea | 2066 | unsigned int ret; |
8a0a9bd4 | 2067 | |
63d77173 PA |
2068 | if (arch_get_random_int(&ret)) |
2069 | return ret; | |
2070 | ||
2071 | hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); | |
8a0a9bd4 | 2072 | |
61875f30 | 2073 | hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy(); |
6e5714ea DM |
2074 | md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret); |
2075 | ret = hash[0]; | |
8a0a9bd4 LT |
2076 | put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); |
2077 | ||
2078 | return ret; | |
1da177e4 | 2079 | } |
16c7fa05 | 2080 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_int); |
1da177e4 | 2081 | |
ec9ee4ac DC |
2082 | /* |
2083 | * Same as get_random_int(), but returns unsigned long. | |
2084 | */ | |
2085 | unsigned long get_random_long(void) | |
2086 | { | |
2087 | __u32 *hash; | |
2088 | unsigned long ret; | |
2089 | ||
2090 | if (arch_get_random_long(&ret)) | |
2091 | return ret; | |
2092 | ||
2093 | hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); | |
2094 | ||
2095 | hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy(); | |
2096 | md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret); | |
2097 | ret = *(unsigned long *)hash; | |
2098 | put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); | |
2099 | ||
2100 | return ret; | |
2101 | } | |
2102 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long); | |
2103 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
2104 | /* |
2105 | * randomize_range() returns a start address such that | |
2106 | * | |
2107 | * [...... <range> .....] | |
2108 | * start end | |
2109 | * | |
2110 | * a <range> with size "len" starting at the return value is inside in the | |
2111 | * area defined by [start, end], but is otherwise randomized. | |
2112 | */ | |
2113 | unsigned long | |
2114 | randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len) | |
2115 | { | |
2116 | unsigned long range = end - len - start; | |
2117 | ||
2118 | if (end <= start + len) | |
2119 | return 0; | |
2120 | return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_int() % range + start); | |
2121 | } | |
c84dbf61 TD |
2122 | |
2123 | /* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs. | |
2124 | * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled | |
2125 | * when our pool is full. | |
2126 | */ | |
2127 | void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, | |
2128 | size_t entropy) | |
2129 | { | |
2130 | struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool; | |
2131 | ||
e192be9d TT |
2132 | if (!crng_ready()) { |
2133 | crng_fast_load(buffer, count); | |
2134 | return; | |
3371f3da | 2135 | } |
e192be9d TT |
2136 | |
2137 | /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold. | |
2138 | * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, | |
2139 | * or when the calling thread is about to terminate. | |
2140 | */ | |
2141 | wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() || | |
2142 | ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits); | |
c84dbf61 TD |
2143 | mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count); |
2144 | credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy); | |
2145 | } | |
2146 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness); |