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85c8721f | 1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
1da177e4 LT |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
3 | * | |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. | |
73241ccc | 5 | * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
b63862f4 | 6 | * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation |
1da177e4 LT |
7 | * All Rights Reserved. |
8 | * | |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
10 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
11 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
12 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
13 | * | |
14 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, | |
15 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
16 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | |
17 | * GNU General Public License for more details. | |
18 | * | |
19 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License | |
20 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software | |
21 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> | |
24 | * | |
25 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, | |
26 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. | |
27 | * | |
28 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in | |
29 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by | |
30 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. | |
31 | * | |
b63862f4 DK |
32 | * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was |
33 | * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. | |
34 | * | |
73241ccc AG |
35 | * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional |
36 | * filesystem information. | |
8c8570fb DK |
37 | * |
38 | * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> | |
39 | * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. | |
1da177e4 LT |
40 | */ |
41 | ||
42 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
1da177e4 | 43 | #include <asm/types.h> |
715b49ef | 44 | #include <asm/atomic.h> |
73241ccc AG |
45 | #include <asm/types.h> |
46 | #include <linux/fs.h> | |
47 | #include <linux/namei.h> | |
1da177e4 LT |
48 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
49 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
01116105 | 50 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
3ec3b2fb | 51 | #include <linux/socket.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
52 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
53 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
54 | #include <linux/time.h> | |
5bb289b5 | 55 | #include <linux/netlink.h> |
f5561964 | 56 | #include <linux/compiler.h> |
1da177e4 | 57 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
8c8570fb | 58 | #include <linux/security.h> |
fe7752ba | 59 | #include <linux/list.h> |
a6c043a8 | 60 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
1da177e4 | 61 | |
fe7752ba | 62 | #include "audit.h" |
1da177e4 | 63 | |
fe7752ba | 64 | extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[]; |
1da177e4 LT |
65 | |
66 | /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */ | |
67 | extern int audit_enabled; | |
68 | ||
69 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context | |
70 | * for saving names from getname(). */ | |
71 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 | |
72 | ||
73 | /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the | |
74 | * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from | |
75 | * path_lookup. */ | |
76 | #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7 | |
77 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
78 | /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and |
79 | * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved | |
80 | * pointers at syscall exit time). | |
81 | * | |
82 | * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ | |
83 | struct audit_names { | |
84 | const char *name; | |
85 | unsigned long ino; | |
73241ccc | 86 | unsigned long pino; |
1da177e4 LT |
87 | dev_t dev; |
88 | umode_t mode; | |
89 | uid_t uid; | |
90 | gid_t gid; | |
91 | dev_t rdev; | |
8c8570fb | 92 | char *ctx; |
1da177e4 LT |
93 | }; |
94 | ||
95 | struct audit_aux_data { | |
96 | struct audit_aux_data *next; | |
97 | int type; | |
98 | }; | |
99 | ||
100 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 | |
101 | ||
102 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl { | |
103 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
104 | struct ipc_perm p; | |
105 | unsigned long qbytes; | |
106 | uid_t uid; | |
107 | gid_t gid; | |
108 | mode_t mode; | |
8c8570fb | 109 | char *ctx; |
1da177e4 LT |
110 | }; |
111 | ||
3ec3b2fb DW |
112 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall { |
113 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
114 | int nargs; | |
115 | unsigned long args[0]; | |
116 | }; | |
117 | ||
118 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr { | |
119 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
120 | int len; | |
121 | char a[0]; | |
122 | }; | |
123 | ||
01116105 SS |
124 | struct audit_aux_data_path { |
125 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
126 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
127 | struct vfsmount *mnt; | |
128 | }; | |
1da177e4 LT |
129 | |
130 | /* The per-task audit context. */ | |
131 | struct audit_context { | |
132 | int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ | |
133 | enum audit_state state; | |
134 | unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ | |
135 | struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ | |
136 | uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */ | |
137 | int major; /* syscall number */ | |
138 | unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ | |
139 | int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ | |
2fd6f58b | 140 | long return_code;/* syscall return code */ |
1da177e4 LT |
141 | int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */ |
142 | int name_count; | |
143 | struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; | |
8f37d47c DW |
144 | struct dentry * pwd; |
145 | struct vfsmount * pwdmnt; | |
1da177e4 LT |
146 | struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ |
147 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
148 | ||
149 | /* Save things to print about task_struct */ | |
150 | pid_t pid; | |
151 | uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; | |
152 | gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; | |
153 | unsigned long personality; | |
2fd6f58b | 154 | int arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
155 | |
156 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
157 | int put_count; | |
158 | int ino_count; | |
159 | #endif | |
160 | }; | |
161 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
162 | |
163 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 | |
164 | * otherwise. */ | |
165 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
93315ed6 | 166 | struct audit_krule *rule, |
1da177e4 LT |
167 | struct audit_context *ctx, |
168 | enum audit_state *state) | |
169 | { | |
170 | int i, j; | |
171 | ||
172 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { | |
93315ed6 | 173 | struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; |
1da177e4 LT |
174 | int result = 0; |
175 | ||
93315ed6 | 176 | switch (f->type) { |
1da177e4 | 177 | case AUDIT_PID: |
93315ed6 | 178 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
179 | break; |
180 | case AUDIT_UID: | |
93315ed6 | 181 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
182 | break; |
183 | case AUDIT_EUID: | |
93315ed6 | 184 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
185 | break; |
186 | case AUDIT_SUID: | |
93315ed6 | 187 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
188 | break; |
189 | case AUDIT_FSUID: | |
93315ed6 | 190 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
191 | break; |
192 | case AUDIT_GID: | |
93315ed6 | 193 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
194 | break; |
195 | case AUDIT_EGID: | |
93315ed6 | 196 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
197 | break; |
198 | case AUDIT_SGID: | |
93315ed6 | 199 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
200 | break; |
201 | case AUDIT_FSGID: | |
93315ed6 | 202 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
203 | break; |
204 | case AUDIT_PERS: | |
93315ed6 | 205 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 | 206 | break; |
2fd6f58b | 207 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
b63862f4 | 208 | if (ctx) |
93315ed6 | 209 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); |
2fd6f58b | 210 | break; |
1da177e4 LT |
211 | |
212 | case AUDIT_EXIT: | |
213 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) | |
93315ed6 | 214 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
215 | break; |
216 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: | |
b01f2cc1 | 217 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { |
93315ed6 AG |
218 | if (f->val) |
219 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); | |
b01f2cc1 | 220 | else |
93315ed6 | 221 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); |
b01f2cc1 | 222 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
223 | break; |
224 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: | |
225 | if (ctx) { | |
226 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
93315ed6 | 227 | if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { |
1da177e4 LT |
228 | ++result; |
229 | break; | |
230 | } | |
231 | } | |
232 | } | |
233 | break; | |
234 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: | |
235 | if (ctx) { | |
236 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
93315ed6 | 237 | if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { |
1da177e4 LT |
238 | ++result; |
239 | break; | |
240 | } | |
241 | } | |
242 | } | |
243 | break; | |
244 | case AUDIT_INODE: | |
245 | if (ctx) { | |
246 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
93315ed6 AG |
247 | if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) || |
248 | audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) { | |
1da177e4 LT |
249 | ++result; |
250 | break; | |
251 | } | |
252 | } | |
253 | } | |
254 | break; | |
255 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: | |
256 | result = 0; | |
257 | if (ctx) | |
93315ed6 | 258 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
259 | break; |
260 | case AUDIT_ARG0: | |
261 | case AUDIT_ARG1: | |
262 | case AUDIT_ARG2: | |
263 | case AUDIT_ARG3: | |
264 | if (ctx) | |
93315ed6 | 265 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
266 | break; |
267 | } | |
268 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
269 | if (!result) |
270 | return 0; | |
271 | } | |
272 | switch (rule->action) { | |
273 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; | |
274 | case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break; | |
275 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; | |
276 | } | |
277 | return 1; | |
278 | } | |
279 | ||
280 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is | |
281 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task | |
282 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. | |
283 | */ | |
284 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
285 | { | |
286 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
287 | enum audit_state state; | |
288 | ||
289 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
0f45aa18 | 290 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { |
1da177e4 LT |
291 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) { |
292 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
293 | return state; | |
294 | } | |
295 | } | |
296 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
297 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
298 | } | |
299 | ||
300 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the | |
301 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is | |
23f32d18 | 302 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit |
b0dd25a8 | 303 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). |
1da177e4 LT |
304 | */ |
305 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
306 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
307 | struct list_head *list) | |
308 | { | |
309 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
c3896495 | 310 | enum audit_state state; |
1da177e4 | 311 | |
351bb722 | 312 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
f7056d64 DW |
313 | return AUDIT_DISABLED; |
314 | ||
1da177e4 | 315 | rcu_read_lock(); |
c3896495 | 316 | if (!list_empty(list)) { |
b63862f4 DK |
317 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); |
318 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); | |
319 | ||
320 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { | |
321 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit | |
322 | && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) { | |
323 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
324 | return state; | |
325 | } | |
0f45aa18 DW |
326 | } |
327 | } | |
328 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1da177e4 | 329 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; |
0f45aa18 DW |
330 | } |
331 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
332 | /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */ |
333 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
334 | int return_valid, | |
335 | int return_code) | |
336 | { | |
337 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
338 | ||
339 | if (likely(!context)) | |
340 | return NULL; | |
341 | context->return_valid = return_valid; | |
342 | context->return_code = return_code; | |
343 | ||
21af6c4f | 344 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) { |
1da177e4 | 345 | enum audit_state state; |
0f45aa18 | 346 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); |
1da177e4 LT |
347 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
348 | context->auditable = 1; | |
349 | } | |
350 | ||
351 | context->pid = tsk->pid; | |
352 | context->uid = tsk->uid; | |
353 | context->gid = tsk->gid; | |
354 | context->euid = tsk->euid; | |
355 | context->suid = tsk->suid; | |
356 | context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid; | |
357 | context->egid = tsk->egid; | |
358 | context->sgid = tsk->sgid; | |
359 | context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid; | |
360 | context->personality = tsk->personality; | |
361 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; | |
362 | return context; | |
363 | } | |
364 | ||
365 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) | |
366 | { | |
367 | int i; | |
368 | ||
369 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
370 | if (context->auditable | |
371 | ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { | |
73241ccc | 372 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" |
1da177e4 LT |
373 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" |
374 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", | |
73241ccc | 375 | __FILE__, __LINE__, |
1da177e4 LT |
376 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, |
377 | context->name_count, context->put_count, | |
378 | context->ino_count); | |
8c8570fb | 379 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
1da177e4 LT |
380 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, |
381 | context->names[i].name, | |
73241ccc | 382 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); |
8c8570fb | 383 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
384 | dump_stack(); |
385 | return; | |
386 | } | |
387 | #endif | |
388 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
389 | context->put_count = 0; | |
390 | context->ino_count = 0; | |
391 | #endif | |
392 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
393 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
394 | char *p = context->names[i].ctx; | |
395 | context->names[i].ctx = NULL; | |
396 | kfree(p); | |
1da177e4 LT |
397 | if (context->names[i].name) |
398 | __putname(context->names[i].name); | |
8c8570fb | 399 | } |
1da177e4 | 400 | context->name_count = 0; |
8f37d47c DW |
401 | if (context->pwd) |
402 | dput(context->pwd); | |
403 | if (context->pwdmnt) | |
404 | mntput(context->pwdmnt); | |
405 | context->pwd = NULL; | |
406 | context->pwdmnt = NULL; | |
1da177e4 LT |
407 | } |
408 | ||
409 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) | |
410 | { | |
411 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
412 | ||
413 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { | |
01116105 SS |
414 | if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) { |
415 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
416 | dput(axi->dentry); | |
417 | mntput(axi->mnt); | |
418 | } | |
8c8570fb DK |
419 | if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) { |
420 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; | |
421 | if (axi->ctx) | |
422 | kfree(axi->ctx); | |
423 | } | |
424 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
425 | context->aux = aux->next; |
426 | kfree(aux); | |
427 | } | |
428 | } | |
429 | ||
430 | static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, | |
431 | enum audit_state state) | |
432 | { | |
433 | uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid; | |
434 | ||
435 | memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); | |
436 | context->state = state; | |
437 | context->loginuid = loginuid; | |
438 | } | |
439 | ||
440 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) | |
441 | { | |
442 | struct audit_context *context; | |
443 | ||
444 | if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
445 | return NULL; | |
446 | audit_zero_context(context, state); | |
447 | return context; | |
448 | } | |
449 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
450 | /** |
451 | * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task | |
452 | * @tsk: task | |
453 | * | |
454 | * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context | |
1da177e4 LT |
455 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the |
456 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
457 | * needed. |
458 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
459 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) |
460 | { | |
461 | struct audit_context *context; | |
462 | enum audit_state state; | |
463 | ||
464 | if (likely(!audit_enabled)) | |
465 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ | |
466 | ||
467 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk); | |
468 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
469 | return 0; | |
470 | ||
471 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { | |
472 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); | |
473 | return -ENOMEM; | |
474 | } | |
475 | ||
476 | /* Preserve login uid */ | |
477 | context->loginuid = -1; | |
478 | if (current->audit_context) | |
479 | context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid; | |
480 | ||
481 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
482 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); | |
483 | return 0; | |
484 | } | |
485 | ||
486 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) | |
487 | { | |
488 | struct audit_context *previous; | |
489 | int count = 0; | |
490 | ||
491 | do { | |
492 | previous = context->previous; | |
493 | if (previous || (count && count < 10)) { | |
494 | ++count; | |
495 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:" | |
496 | " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n", | |
497 | context->serial, context->major, | |
498 | context->name_count, count); | |
499 | } | |
500 | audit_free_names(context); | |
501 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
502 | kfree(context); | |
503 | context = previous; | |
504 | } while (context); | |
505 | if (count >= 10) | |
506 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); | |
507 | } | |
508 | ||
e495149b | 509 | static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) |
8c8570fb DK |
510 | { |
511 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
512 | ssize_t len = 0; | |
513 | ||
514 | len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0); | |
515 | if (len < 0) { | |
516 | if (len != -EINVAL) | |
517 | goto error_path; | |
518 | return; | |
519 | } | |
520 | ||
e495149b | 521 | ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); |
7306a0b9 | 522 | if (!ctx) |
8c8570fb | 523 | goto error_path; |
8c8570fb DK |
524 | |
525 | len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len); | |
526 | if (len < 0 ) | |
527 | goto error_path; | |
528 | ||
529 | audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); | |
7306a0b9 | 530 | return; |
8c8570fb DK |
531 | |
532 | error_path: | |
533 | if (ctx) | |
534 | kfree(ctx); | |
7306a0b9 | 535 | audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context"); |
8c8570fb DK |
536 | return; |
537 | } | |
538 | ||
e495149b | 539 | static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk) |
219f0817 | 540 | { |
45d9bb0e AV |
541 | char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)]; |
542 | struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm; | |
219f0817 SS |
543 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
544 | ||
e495149b AV |
545 | /* tsk == current */ |
546 | ||
45d9bb0e | 547 | get_task_comm(name, tsk); |
99e45eea DW |
548 | audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); |
549 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); | |
219f0817 | 550 | |
e495149b AV |
551 | if (mm) { |
552 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
553 | vma = mm->mmap; | |
554 | while (vma) { | |
555 | if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && | |
556 | vma->vm_file) { | |
557 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", | |
558 | vma->vm_file->f_dentry, | |
559 | vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt); | |
560 | break; | |
561 | } | |
562 | vma = vma->vm_next; | |
219f0817 | 563 | } |
e495149b | 564 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
219f0817 | 565 | } |
e495149b | 566 | audit_log_task_context(ab); |
219f0817 SS |
567 | } |
568 | ||
e495149b | 569 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) |
1da177e4 LT |
570 | { |
571 | int i; | |
572 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
7551ced3 | 573 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
a6c043a8 | 574 | const char *tty; |
1da177e4 | 575 | |
e495149b AV |
576 | /* tsk == current */ |
577 | ||
578 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); | |
1da177e4 LT |
579 | if (!ab) |
580 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
bccf6ae0 DW |
581 | audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", |
582 | context->arch, context->major); | |
1da177e4 LT |
583 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) |
584 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); | |
585 | if (context->return_valid) | |
2fd6f58b DW |
586 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
587 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", | |
588 | context->return_code); | |
45d9bb0e AV |
589 | if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name) |
590 | tty = tsk->signal->tty->name; | |
a6c043a8 SG |
591 | else |
592 | tty = "(none)"; | |
1da177e4 LT |
593 | audit_log_format(ab, |
594 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" | |
326e9c8b SG |
595 | " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" |
596 | " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" | |
a6c043a8 | 597 | " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s", |
1da177e4 LT |
598 | context->argv[0], |
599 | context->argv[1], | |
600 | context->argv[2], | |
601 | context->argv[3], | |
602 | context->name_count, | |
603 | context->pid, | |
604 | context->loginuid, | |
605 | context->uid, | |
606 | context->gid, | |
607 | context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, | |
a6c043a8 | 608 | context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty); |
e495149b | 609 | audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk); |
1da177e4 | 610 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1da177e4 | 611 | |
7551ced3 | 612 | for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
c0404993 | 613 | |
e495149b | 614 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); |
1da177e4 LT |
615 | if (!ab) |
616 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
617 | ||
1da177e4 | 618 | switch (aux->type) { |
c0404993 | 619 | case AUDIT_IPC: { |
1da177e4 LT |
620 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; |
621 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
8c8570fb DK |
622 | " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s", |
623 | axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx); | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
624 | break; } |
625 | ||
626 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { | |
627 | int i; | |
628 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux; | |
629 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs); | |
630 | for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++) | |
631 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]); | |
632 | break; } | |
633 | ||
634 | case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: { | |
635 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux; | |
636 | ||
637 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); | |
638 | audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len); | |
639 | break; } | |
01116105 SS |
640 | |
641 | case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: { | |
642 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
643 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt); | |
01116105 SS |
644 | break; } |
645 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
646 | } |
647 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1da177e4 LT |
648 | } |
649 | ||
8f37d47c | 650 | if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) { |
e495149b | 651 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); |
8f37d47c DW |
652 | if (ab) { |
653 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt); | |
654 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
655 | } | |
656 | } | |
1da177e4 | 657 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
73241ccc AG |
658 | unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino; |
659 | unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino; | |
660 | ||
e495149b | 661 | ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); |
1da177e4 LT |
662 | if (!ab) |
663 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
8f37d47c | 664 | |
1da177e4 | 665 | audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); |
73241ccc AG |
666 | |
667 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); | |
668 | if (context->names[i].name) | |
83c7d091 | 669 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name); |
73241ccc AG |
670 | else |
671 | audit_log_format(ab, "(null)"); | |
672 | ||
673 | if (pino != (unsigned long)-1) | |
674 | audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino); | |
675 | if (ino != (unsigned long)-1) | |
676 | audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino); | |
677 | if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1)) | |
678 | audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" | |
679 | " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", | |
680 | MAJOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
681 | MINOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
682 | context->names[i].mode, | |
683 | context->names[i].uid, | |
684 | context->names[i].gid, | |
685 | MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), | |
1da177e4 | 686 | MINOR(context->names[i].rdev)); |
8c8570fb DK |
687 | if (context->names[i].ctx) { |
688 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", | |
689 | context->names[i].ctx); | |
690 | } | |
691 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
692 | audit_log_end(ab); |
693 | } | |
694 | } | |
695 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
696 | /** |
697 | * audit_free - free a per-task audit context | |
698 | * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free | |
699 | * | |
fa84cb93 | 700 | * Called from copy_process and do_exit |
b0dd25a8 | 701 | */ |
1da177e4 LT |
702 | void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) |
703 | { | |
704 | struct audit_context *context; | |
705 | ||
1da177e4 | 706 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); |
1da177e4 LT |
707 | if (likely(!context)) |
708 | return; | |
709 | ||
710 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit | |
f5561964 DW |
711 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. |
712 | * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this | |
713 | * in the context of the idle thread */ | |
e495149b | 714 | /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */ |
f7056d64 | 715 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable) |
e495149b | 716 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); |
1da177e4 LT |
717 | |
718 | audit_free_context(context); | |
719 | } | |
720 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
721 | /** |
722 | * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry | |
723 | * @tsk: task being audited | |
724 | * @arch: architecture type | |
725 | * @major: major syscall type (function) | |
726 | * @a1: additional syscall register 1 | |
727 | * @a2: additional syscall register 2 | |
728 | * @a3: additional syscall register 3 | |
729 | * @a4: additional syscall register 4 | |
730 | * | |
731 | * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the | |
1da177e4 LT |
732 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or |
733 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the | |
734 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, | |
735 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it | |
736 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
737 | * be written). |
738 | */ | |
2fd6f58b | 739 | void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major, |
1da177e4 LT |
740 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
741 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) | |
742 | { | |
743 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
744 | enum audit_state state; | |
745 | ||
746 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
747 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
748 | /* |
749 | * This happens only on certain architectures that make system | |
1da177e4 LT |
750 | * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of |
751 | * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new | |
752 | * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you | |
753 | * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.) | |
754 | * | |
755 | * i386 no | |
756 | * x86_64 no | |
2ef9481e | 757 | * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S) |
1da177e4 LT |
758 | * |
759 | * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner | |
760 | * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught. | |
761 | */ | |
762 | if (context->in_syscall) { | |
763 | struct audit_context *newctx; | |
764 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
765 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
766 | printk(KERN_ERR | |
767 | "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" | |
768 | " entering syscall=%d\n", | |
769 | context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major); | |
770 | #endif | |
771 | newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state); | |
772 | if (newctx) { | |
773 | newctx->previous = context; | |
774 | context = newctx; | |
775 | tsk->audit_context = newctx; | |
776 | } else { | |
777 | /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we | |
778 | * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname | |
779 | * will be lost). The only other alternative is | |
780 | * to abandon auditing. */ | |
781 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); | |
782 | } | |
783 | } | |
784 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); | |
785 | ||
786 | if (!audit_enabled) | |
787 | return; | |
788 | ||
2fd6f58b | 789 | context->arch = arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
790 | context->major = major; |
791 | context->argv[0] = a1; | |
792 | context->argv[1] = a2; | |
793 | context->argv[2] = a3; | |
794 | context->argv[3] = a4; | |
795 | ||
796 | state = context->state; | |
797 | if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) | |
0f45aa18 | 798 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); |
1da177e4 LT |
799 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) |
800 | return; | |
801 | ||
ce625a80 | 802 | context->serial = 0; |
1da177e4 LT |
803 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; |
804 | context->in_syscall = 1; | |
805 | context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT); | |
806 | } | |
807 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
808 | /** |
809 | * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call | |
810 | * @tsk: task being audited | |
811 | * @valid: success/failure flag | |
812 | * @return_code: syscall return value | |
813 | * | |
814 | * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as | |
1da177e4 LT |
815 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from |
816 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit | |
817 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
818 | * free the names stored from getname(). |
819 | */ | |
2fd6f58b | 820 | void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code) |
1da177e4 LT |
821 | { |
822 | struct audit_context *context; | |
823 | ||
e495149b AV |
824 | /* tsk == current */ |
825 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
826 | get_task_struct(tsk); |
827 | task_lock(tsk); | |
2fd6f58b | 828 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); |
1da177e4 LT |
829 | task_unlock(tsk); |
830 | ||
831 | /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have | |
832 | * called __put_task_struct. */ | |
833 | if (likely(!context)) | |
413a1c75 | 834 | goto out; |
1da177e4 | 835 | |
f7056d64 | 836 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable) |
e495149b | 837 | audit_log_exit(context, tsk); |
1da177e4 LT |
838 | |
839 | context->in_syscall = 0; | |
840 | context->auditable = 0; | |
2fd6f58b | 841 | |
1da177e4 LT |
842 | if (context->previous) { |
843 | struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; | |
844 | context->previous = NULL; | |
845 | audit_free_context(context); | |
846 | tsk->audit_context = new_context; | |
847 | } else { | |
848 | audit_free_names(context); | |
849 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
1da177e4 LT |
850 | tsk->audit_context = context; |
851 | } | |
413a1c75 | 852 | out: |
1da177e4 LT |
853 | put_task_struct(tsk); |
854 | } | |
855 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
856 | /** |
857 | * audit_getname - add a name to the list | |
858 | * @name: name to add | |
859 | * | |
860 | * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. | |
861 | * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). | |
862 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
863 | void audit_getname(const char *name) |
864 | { | |
865 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
866 | ||
867 | if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name) | |
868 | return; | |
869 | ||
870 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
871 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
872 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", | |
873 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
874 | dump_stack(); | |
875 | #endif | |
876 | return; | |
877 | } | |
878 | BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); | |
879 | context->names[context->name_count].name = name; | |
880 | context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
881 | ++context->name_count; | |
8f37d47c DW |
882 | if (!context->pwd) { |
883 | read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
884 | context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd); | |
885 | context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt); | |
886 | read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
887 | } | |
888 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
889 | } |
890 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
891 | /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request |
892 | * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname | |
893 | * | |
894 | * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, | |
895 | * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. | |
896 | * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). | |
897 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
898 | void audit_putname(const char *name) |
899 | { | |
900 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
901 | ||
902 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
903 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
904 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
905 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", | |
906 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
907 | if (context->name_count) { | |
908 | int i; | |
909 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
910 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
911 | context->names[i].name, | |
73241ccc | 912 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); |
1da177e4 LT |
913 | } |
914 | #endif | |
915 | __putname(name); | |
916 | } | |
917 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
918 | else { | |
919 | ++context->put_count; | |
920 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { | |
921 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" | |
922 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" | |
923 | " put_count=%d\n", | |
924 | __FILE__, __LINE__, | |
925 | context->serial, context->major, | |
926 | context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, | |
927 | context->put_count); | |
928 | dump_stack(); | |
929 | } | |
930 | } | |
931 | #endif | |
932 | } | |
933 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
934 | void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode) |
935 | { | |
936 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
7306a0b9 | 937 | const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(); |
8c8570fb DK |
938 | char *ctx = NULL; |
939 | int len = 0; | |
940 | ||
7306a0b9 DK |
941 | if (!suffix) |
942 | goto ret; | |
8c8570fb | 943 | |
7306a0b9 DK |
944 | len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0); |
945 | if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP) | |
946 | goto ret; | |
8c8570fb DK |
947 | if (len < 0) |
948 | goto error_path; | |
949 | ||
950 | ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
951 | if (!ctx) | |
952 | goto error_path; | |
953 | ||
7306a0b9 | 954 | len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0); |
8c8570fb DK |
955 | if (len < 0) |
956 | goto error_path; | |
957 | ||
958 | kfree(context->names[idx].ctx); | |
959 | context->names[idx].ctx = ctx; | |
7306a0b9 | 960 | goto ret; |
8c8570fb DK |
961 | |
962 | error_path: | |
963 | if (ctx) | |
964 | kfree(ctx); | |
965 | audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context"); | |
7306a0b9 | 966 | ret: |
8c8570fb DK |
967 | return; |
968 | } | |
969 | ||
970 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
971 | /** |
972 | * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup | |
973 | * @name: name being audited | |
974 | * @inode: inode being audited | |
975 | * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup()) | |
976 | * | |
977 | * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). | |
978 | */ | |
73241ccc | 979 | void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags) |
1da177e4 LT |
980 | { |
981 | int idx; | |
982 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
983 | ||
984 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
985 | return; | |
986 | if (context->name_count | |
987 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name | |
988 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) | |
989 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
990 | else if (context->name_count > 1 | |
991 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name | |
992 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) | |
993 | idx = context->name_count - 2; | |
994 | else { | |
995 | /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no | |
996 | * associated name? */ | |
997 | if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED) | |
998 | return; | |
999 | idx = context->name_count++; | |
1000 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
1001 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1002 | ++context->ino_count; | |
1003 | #endif | |
1004 | } | |
ae7b961b DW |
1005 | context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; |
1006 | context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode; | |
1007 | context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; | |
1008 | context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; | |
1009 | context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; | |
8c8570fb | 1010 | audit_inode_context(idx, inode); |
73241ccc AG |
1011 | if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) && |
1012 | (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) { | |
1013 | context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
1014 | context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino; | |
1015 | } else { | |
1016 | context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; | |
1017 | context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
1018 | } | |
1019 | } | |
1020 | ||
1021 | /** | |
1022 | * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects | |
1023 | * @dname: inode's dentry name | |
1024 | * @inode: inode being audited | |
1025 | * @pino: inode number of dentry parent | |
1026 | * | |
1027 | * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode | |
1028 | * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. | |
1029 | * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. | |
1030 | * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after | |
1031 | * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object | |
1032 | * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during | |
1033 | * unsuccessful attempts. | |
1034 | */ | |
1035 | void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode, | |
1036 | unsigned long pino) | |
1037 | { | |
1038 | int idx; | |
1039 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1040 | ||
1041 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
1042 | return; | |
1043 | ||
1044 | /* determine matching parent */ | |
1045 | if (dname) | |
1046 | for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) | |
1047 | if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) { | |
1048 | const char *n; | |
1049 | const char *name = context->names[idx].name; | |
1050 | int dlen = strlen(dname); | |
1051 | int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0; | |
1052 | ||
1053 | if (nlen < dlen) | |
1054 | continue; | |
1055 | ||
1056 | /* disregard trailing slashes */ | |
1057 | n = name + nlen - 1; | |
1058 | while ((*n == '/') && (n > name)) | |
1059 | n--; | |
1060 | ||
1061 | /* find last path component */ | |
1062 | n = n - dlen + 1; | |
1063 | if (n < name) | |
1064 | continue; | |
1065 | else if (n > name) { | |
1066 | if (*--n != '/') | |
1067 | continue; | |
1068 | else | |
1069 | n++; | |
1070 | } | |
1071 | ||
1072 | if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0) | |
1073 | goto update_context; | |
1074 | } | |
1075 | ||
1076 | /* catch-all in case match not found */ | |
1077 | idx = context->name_count++; | |
1078 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
1079 | context->names[idx].pino = pino; | |
1080 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1081 | context->ino_count++; | |
1082 | #endif | |
1083 | ||
1084 | update_context: | |
1085 | if (inode) { | |
1086 | context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; | |
1087 | context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; | |
1088 | context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode; | |
1089 | context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; | |
1090 | context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; | |
1091 | context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; | |
8c8570fb | 1092 | audit_inode_context(idx, inode); |
73241ccc | 1093 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
1094 | } |
1095 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1096 | /** |
1097 | * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values | |
1098 | * @ctx: audit_context for the task | |
1099 | * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context | |
1100 | * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context | |
1101 | * | |
1102 | * Also sets the context as auditable. | |
1103 | */ | |
bfb4496e DW |
1104 | void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
1105 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) | |
1da177e4 | 1106 | { |
ce625a80 DW |
1107 | if (!ctx->serial) |
1108 | ctx->serial = audit_serial(); | |
bfb4496e DW |
1109 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; |
1110 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; | |
1111 | *serial = ctx->serial; | |
1112 | ctx->auditable = 1; | |
1da177e4 LT |
1113 | } |
1114 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1115 | /** |
1116 | * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid | |
1117 | * @task: task whose audit context is being modified | |
1118 | * @loginuid: loginuid value | |
1119 | * | |
1120 | * Returns 0. | |
1121 | * | |
1122 | * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). | |
1123 | */ | |
456be6cd | 1124 | int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) |
1da177e4 | 1125 | { |
456be6cd | 1126 | if (task->audit_context) { |
c0404993 SG |
1127 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1128 | ||
9ad9ad38 | 1129 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); |
c0404993 SG |
1130 | if (ab) { |
1131 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " | |
326e9c8b | 1132 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u", |
c0404993 SG |
1133 | task->pid, task->uid, |
1134 | task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid); | |
1135 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1136 | } | |
456be6cd | 1137 | task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid; |
1da177e4 LT |
1138 | } |
1139 | return 0; | |
1140 | } | |
1141 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1142 | /** |
1143 | * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context | |
1144 | * @ctx: the audit_context | |
1145 | * | |
1146 | * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL. | |
1147 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1148 | uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx) |
1149 | { | |
1150 | return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1; | |
1151 | } | |
1152 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
1153 | static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) |
1154 | { | |
1155 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1156 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
1157 | int len = 0; | |
1158 | ||
1159 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1160 | return NULL; | |
1161 | ||
1162 | len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0); | |
1163 | if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP) | |
1164 | goto ret; | |
1165 | if (len < 0) | |
1166 | goto error_path; | |
1167 | ||
1168 | ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC); | |
1169 | if (!ctx) | |
1170 | goto error_path; | |
1171 | ||
1172 | len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len); | |
1173 | if (len < 0) | |
1174 | goto error_path; | |
1175 | ||
1176 | return ctx; | |
1177 | ||
1178 | error_path: | |
1179 | kfree(ctx); | |
1180 | audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context"); | |
1181 | ret: | |
1182 | return NULL; | |
1183 | } | |
1184 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1185 | /** |
1186 | * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc | |
1187 | * @qbytes: msgq bytes | |
1188 | * @uid: msgq user id | |
1189 | * @gid: msgq group id | |
1190 | * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) | |
1191 | * | |
1192 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1193 | */ | |
8c8570fb | 1194 | int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) |
1da177e4 LT |
1195 | { |
1196 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax; | |
1197 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1198 | ||
1199 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1200 | return 0; | |
1201 | ||
8c8570fb | 1202 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC); |
1da177e4 LT |
1203 | if (!ax) |
1204 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1205 | ||
1206 | ax->qbytes = qbytes; | |
1207 | ax->uid = uid; | |
1208 | ax->gid = gid; | |
1209 | ax->mode = mode; | |
8c8570fb | 1210 | ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp); |
1da177e4 | 1211 | |
c0404993 | 1212 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC; |
1da177e4 LT |
1213 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
1214 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1215 | return 0; | |
1216 | } | |
c2f0c7c3 | 1217 | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
1218 | /** |
1219 | * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall | |
1220 | * @nargs: number of args | |
1221 | * @args: args array | |
1222 | * | |
1223 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1224 | */ | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
1225 | int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
1226 | { | |
1227 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax; | |
1228 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1229 | ||
1230 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1231 | return 0; | |
1232 | ||
1233 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1234 | if (!ax) | |
1235 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1236 | ||
1237 | ax->nargs = nargs; | |
1238 | memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); | |
1239 | ||
1240 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; | |
1241 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1242 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1243 | return 0; | |
1244 | } | |
1245 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1246 | /** |
1247 | * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto | |
1248 | * @len: data length in user space | |
1249 | * @a: data address in kernel space | |
1250 | * | |
1251 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1252 | */ | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
1253 | int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) |
1254 | { | |
1255 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax; | |
1256 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1257 | ||
1258 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1259 | return 0; | |
1260 | ||
1261 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1262 | if (!ax) | |
1263 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1264 | ||
1265 | ax->len = len; | |
1266 | memcpy(ax->a, a, len); | |
1267 | ||
1268 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR; | |
1269 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1270 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1271 | return 0; | |
1272 | } | |
1273 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1274 | /** |
1275 | * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions | |
1276 | * @dentry: dentry to record | |
1277 | * @mnt: mnt to record | |
1278 | * | |
1279 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1280 | * | |
1281 | * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit() | |
1282 | */ | |
01116105 SS |
1283 | int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) |
1284 | { | |
1285 | struct audit_aux_data_path *ax; | |
1286 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1287 | ||
1288 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1289 | return 0; | |
1290 | ||
1291 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC); | |
1292 | if (!ax) | |
1293 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1294 | ||
1295 | ax->dentry = dget(dentry); | |
1296 | ax->mnt = mntget(mnt); | |
1297 | ||
1298 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH; | |
1299 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1300 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1301 | return 0; | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1304 | /** |
1305 | * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem | |
1306 | * @sig: signal value | |
1307 | * @t: task being signaled | |
1308 | * | |
1309 | * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) | |
1310 | * and uid that is doing that. | |
1311 | */ | |
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1312 | void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) |
1313 | { | |
1314 | extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; | |
1315 | extern uid_t audit_sig_uid; | |
c2f0c7c3 | 1316 | |
582edda5 | 1317 | if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) { |
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1318 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) { |
1319 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; | |
1320 | audit_sig_pid = current->pid; | |
1321 | if (ctx) | |
1322 | audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid; | |
1323 | else | |
1324 | audit_sig_uid = current->uid; | |
1325 | } | |
1326 | } | |
1327 | } |