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51580e79 | 1 | /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com |
969bf05e | 2 | * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook |
51580e79 AS |
3 | * |
4 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | |
5 | * modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public | |
6 | * License as published by the Free Software Foundation. | |
7 | * | |
8 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but | |
9 | * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
10 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU | |
11 | * General Public License for more details. | |
12 | */ | |
13 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
14 | #include <linux/types.h> | |
15 | #include <linux/slab.h> | |
16 | #include <linux/bpf.h> | |
58e2af8b | 17 | #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> |
51580e79 AS |
18 | #include <linux/filter.h> |
19 | #include <net/netlink.h> | |
20 | #include <linux/file.h> | |
21 | #include <linux/vmalloc.h> | |
ebb676da | 22 | #include <linux/stringify.h> |
cc8b0b92 AS |
23 | #include <linux/bsearch.h> |
24 | #include <linux/sort.h> | |
c195651e | 25 | #include <linux/perf_event.h> |
51580e79 | 26 | |
f4ac7e0b JK |
27 | #include "disasm.h" |
28 | ||
00176a34 JK |
29 | static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { |
30 | #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name) \ | |
31 | [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, | |
32 | #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) | |
33 | #include <linux/bpf_types.h> | |
34 | #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE | |
35 | #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE | |
36 | }; | |
37 | ||
51580e79 AS |
38 | /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program |
39 | * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. | |
40 | * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. | |
41 | * | |
42 | * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. | |
43 | * It rejects the following programs: | |
44 | * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns | |
45 | * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) | |
46 | * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) | |
47 | * - out of bounds or malformed jumps | |
48 | * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. | |
49 | * Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the | |
eba38a96 | 50 | * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of |
51580e79 AS |
51 | * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. |
52 | * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k | |
53 | * | |
54 | * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction | |
55 | * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. | |
56 | * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is | |
57 | * copied to R1. | |
58 | * | |
59 | * All registers are 64-bit. | |
60 | * R0 - return register | |
61 | * R1-R5 argument passing registers | |
62 | * R6-R9 callee saved registers | |
63 | * R10 - frame pointer read-only | |
64 | * | |
65 | * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context | |
66 | * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. | |
67 | * | |
68 | * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: | |
69 | * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), | |
70 | * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), | |
71 | * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 | |
72 | * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize | |
73 | * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. | |
74 | * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK | |
75 | * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). | |
76 | * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. | |
77 | * | |
f1174f77 | 78 | * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which |
51580e79 | 79 | * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. |
f1174f77 | 80 | * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) |
51580e79 AS |
81 | * |
82 | * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register | |
f1174f77 | 83 | * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK. These are three pointer |
51580e79 AS |
84 | * types recognized by check_mem_access() function. |
85 | * | |
86 | * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' | |
87 | * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. | |
88 | * | |
89 | * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against | |
90 | * function argument constraints. | |
91 | * | |
92 | * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. | |
93 | * It means that the register type passed to this function must be | |
94 | * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as | |
95 | * 'pointer to map element key' | |
96 | * | |
97 | * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): | |
98 | * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, | |
99 | * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, | |
100 | * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, | |
101 | * | |
102 | * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' | |
103 | * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and | |
104 | * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside | |
105 | * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. | |
106 | * | |
107 | * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: | |
108 | * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) | |
109 | * { | |
110 | * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; | |
111 | * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; | |
112 | * void *value; | |
113 | * | |
114 | * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that | |
115 | * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on | |
116 | * the stack of eBPF program. | |
117 | * } | |
118 | * | |
119 | * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: | |
120 | * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR | |
121 | * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK | |
122 | * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP | |
123 | * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), | |
124 | * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: | |
125 | * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, | |
126 | * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes | |
127 | * | |
128 | * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, | |
129 | * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits | |
130 | * and were initialized prior to this call. | |
131 | * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at | |
132 | * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets | |
133 | * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function | |
134 | * returns ether pointer to map value or NULL. | |
135 | * | |
136 | * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' | |
137 | * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to | |
138 | * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false | |
139 | * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). | |
140 | * | |
141 | * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 | |
142 | * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. | |
143 | */ | |
144 | ||
17a52670 | 145 | /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ |
58e2af8b | 146 | struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { |
17a52670 AS |
147 | /* verifer state is 'st' |
148 | * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' | |
149 | * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' | |
150 | */ | |
58e2af8b | 151 | struct bpf_verifier_state st; |
17a52670 AS |
152 | int insn_idx; |
153 | int prev_insn_idx; | |
58e2af8b | 154 | struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; |
cbd35700 AS |
155 | }; |
156 | ||
8e17c1b1 | 157 | #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 131072 |
07016151 DB |
158 | #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024 |
159 | ||
c93552c4 DB |
160 | #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL |
161 | #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \ | |
162 | POISON_POINTER_DELTA)) | |
163 | #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X) ((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV)) | |
164 | ||
165 | static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) | |
166 | { | |
167 | return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON; | |
168 | } | |
169 | ||
170 | static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) | |
171 | { | |
172 | return aux->map_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV; | |
173 | } | |
174 | ||
175 | static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, | |
176 | const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv) | |
177 | { | |
178 | BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV); | |
179 | unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux); | |
180 | aux->map_state = (unsigned long)map | | |
181 | (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL); | |
182 | } | |
fad73a1a | 183 | |
33ff9823 DB |
184 | struct bpf_call_arg_meta { |
185 | struct bpf_map *map_ptr; | |
435faee1 | 186 | bool raw_mode; |
36bbef52 | 187 | bool pkt_access; |
435faee1 DB |
188 | int regno; |
189 | int access_size; | |
849fa506 YS |
190 | s64 msize_smax_value; |
191 | u64 msize_umax_value; | |
33ff9823 DB |
192 | }; |
193 | ||
cbd35700 AS |
194 | static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); |
195 | ||
77d2e05a MKL |
196 | void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const char *fmt, |
197 | va_list args) | |
cbd35700 | 198 | { |
a2a7d570 | 199 | unsigned int n; |
cbd35700 | 200 | |
a2a7d570 | 201 | n = vscnprintf(log->kbuf, BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE, fmt, args); |
a2a7d570 JK |
202 | |
203 | WARN_ONCE(n >= BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE - 1, | |
204 | "verifier log line truncated - local buffer too short\n"); | |
205 | ||
206 | n = min(log->len_total - log->len_used - 1, n); | |
207 | log->kbuf[n] = '\0'; | |
208 | ||
209 | if (!copy_to_user(log->ubuf + log->len_used, log->kbuf, n + 1)) | |
210 | log->len_used += n; | |
211 | else | |
212 | log->ubuf = NULL; | |
cbd35700 | 213 | } |
abe08840 JO |
214 | |
215 | /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier. | |
216 | * bpf_verifier_log_write() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, | |
217 | * so the user can figure out what's wrong with the program | |
430e68d1 | 218 | */ |
abe08840 JO |
219 | __printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
220 | const char *fmt, ...) | |
221 | { | |
222 | va_list args; | |
223 | ||
77d2e05a MKL |
224 | if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) |
225 | return; | |
226 | ||
abe08840 | 227 | va_start(args, fmt); |
77d2e05a | 228 | bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); |
abe08840 JO |
229 | va_end(args); |
230 | } | |
231 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_verifier_log_write); | |
232 | ||
233 | __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...) | |
234 | { | |
77d2e05a | 235 | struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data; |
abe08840 JO |
236 | va_list args; |
237 | ||
77d2e05a MKL |
238 | if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) |
239 | return; | |
240 | ||
abe08840 | 241 | va_start(args, fmt); |
77d2e05a | 242 | bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); |
abe08840 JO |
243 | va_end(args); |
244 | } | |
cbd35700 | 245 | |
de8f3a83 DB |
246 | static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) |
247 | { | |
248 | return type == PTR_TO_PACKET || | |
249 | type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META; | |
250 | } | |
251 | ||
17a52670 AS |
252 | /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */ |
253 | static const char * const reg_type_str[] = { | |
254 | [NOT_INIT] = "?", | |
f1174f77 | 255 | [SCALAR_VALUE] = "inv", |
17a52670 AS |
256 | [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx", |
257 | [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr", | |
258 | [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value", | |
259 | [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = "map_value_or_null", | |
17a52670 | 260 | [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp", |
969bf05e | 261 | [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt", |
de8f3a83 | 262 | [PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta", |
969bf05e | 263 | [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", |
17a52670 AS |
264 | }; |
265 | ||
4e92024a AS |
266 | static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
267 | enum bpf_reg_liveness live) | |
268 | { | |
269 | if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)) | |
270 | verbose(env, "_"); | |
271 | if (live & REG_LIVE_READ) | |
272 | verbose(env, "r"); | |
273 | if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) | |
274 | verbose(env, "w"); | |
275 | } | |
276 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
277 | static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
278 | const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) | |
279 | { | |
280 | struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; | |
281 | ||
282 | return cur->frame[reg->frameno]; | |
283 | } | |
284 | ||
61bd5218 | 285 | static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
f4d7e40a | 286 | const struct bpf_func_state *state) |
17a52670 | 287 | { |
f4d7e40a | 288 | const struct bpf_reg_state *reg; |
17a52670 AS |
289 | enum bpf_reg_type t; |
290 | int i; | |
291 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
292 | if (state->frameno) |
293 | verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno); | |
17a52670 | 294 | for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { |
1a0dc1ac AS |
295 | reg = &state->regs[i]; |
296 | t = reg->type; | |
17a52670 AS |
297 | if (t == NOT_INIT) |
298 | continue; | |
4e92024a AS |
299 | verbose(env, " R%d", i); |
300 | print_liveness(env, reg->live); | |
301 | verbose(env, "=%s", reg_type_str[t]); | |
f1174f77 EC |
302 | if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && |
303 | tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { | |
304 | /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ | |
61bd5218 | 305 | verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); |
f4d7e40a AS |
306 | if (t == PTR_TO_STACK) |
307 | verbose(env, ",call_%d", func(env, reg)->callsite); | |
f1174f77 | 308 | } else { |
61bd5218 | 309 | verbose(env, "(id=%d", reg->id); |
f1174f77 | 310 | if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) |
61bd5218 | 311 | verbose(env, ",off=%d", reg->off); |
de8f3a83 | 312 | if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) |
61bd5218 | 313 | verbose(env, ",r=%d", reg->range); |
f1174f77 EC |
314 | else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || |
315 | t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || | |
316 | t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) | |
61bd5218 | 317 | verbose(env, ",ks=%d,vs=%d", |
f1174f77 EC |
318 | reg->map_ptr->key_size, |
319 | reg->map_ptr->value_size); | |
7d1238f2 EC |
320 | if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |
321 | /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but | |
322 | * could be a pointer whose offset is too big | |
323 | * for reg->off | |
324 | */ | |
61bd5218 | 325 | verbose(env, ",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); |
7d1238f2 EC |
326 | } else { |
327 | if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value && | |
328 | reg->smin_value != S64_MIN) | |
61bd5218 | 329 | verbose(env, ",smin_value=%lld", |
7d1238f2 EC |
330 | (long long)reg->smin_value); |
331 | if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value && | |
332 | reg->smax_value != S64_MAX) | |
61bd5218 | 333 | verbose(env, ",smax_value=%lld", |
7d1238f2 EC |
334 | (long long)reg->smax_value); |
335 | if (reg->umin_value != 0) | |
61bd5218 | 336 | verbose(env, ",umin_value=%llu", |
7d1238f2 EC |
337 | (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value); |
338 | if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX) | |
61bd5218 | 339 | verbose(env, ",umax_value=%llu", |
7d1238f2 EC |
340 | (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value); |
341 | if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { | |
342 | char tn_buf[48]; | |
f1174f77 | 343 | |
7d1238f2 | 344 | tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
61bd5218 | 345 | verbose(env, ",var_off=%s", tn_buf); |
7d1238f2 | 346 | } |
f1174f77 | 347 | } |
61bd5218 | 348 | verbose(env, ")"); |
f1174f77 | 349 | } |
17a52670 | 350 | } |
638f5b90 | 351 | for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { |
4e92024a AS |
352 | if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) { |
353 | verbose(env, " fp%d", | |
354 | (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); | |
355 | print_liveness(env, state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live); | |
356 | verbose(env, "=%s", | |
638f5b90 | 357 | reg_type_str[state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.type]); |
4e92024a | 358 | } |
cc2b14d5 AS |
359 | if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] == STACK_ZERO) |
360 | verbose(env, " fp%d=0", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); | |
17a52670 | 361 | } |
61bd5218 | 362 | verbose(env, "\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
363 | } |
364 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
365 | static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, |
366 | const struct bpf_func_state *src) | |
17a52670 | 367 | { |
638f5b90 AS |
368 | if (!src->stack) |
369 | return 0; | |
370 | if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dst->allocated_stack < src->allocated_stack)) { | |
371 | /* internal bug, make state invalid to reject the program */ | |
372 | memset(dst, 0, sizeof(*dst)); | |
373 | return -EFAULT; | |
374 | } | |
375 | memcpy(dst->stack, src->stack, | |
376 | sizeof(*src->stack) * (src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE)); | |
377 | return 0; | |
378 | } | |
379 | ||
380 | /* do_check() starts with zero-sized stack in struct bpf_verifier_state to | |
381 | * make it consume minimal amount of memory. check_stack_write() access from | |
f4d7e40a | 382 | * the program calls into realloc_func_state() to grow the stack size. |
638f5b90 AS |
383 | * Note there is a non-zero 'parent' pointer inside bpf_verifier_state |
384 | * which this function copies over. It points to previous bpf_verifier_state | |
385 | * which is never reallocated | |
386 | */ | |
f4d7e40a AS |
387 | static int realloc_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int size, |
388 | bool copy_old) | |
638f5b90 AS |
389 | { |
390 | u32 old_size = state->allocated_stack; | |
391 | struct bpf_stack_state *new_stack; | |
392 | int slot = size / BPF_REG_SIZE; | |
393 | ||
394 | if (size <= old_size || !size) { | |
395 | if (copy_old) | |
396 | return 0; | |
397 | state->allocated_stack = slot * BPF_REG_SIZE; | |
398 | if (!size && old_size) { | |
399 | kfree(state->stack); | |
400 | state->stack = NULL; | |
401 | } | |
402 | return 0; | |
403 | } | |
404 | new_stack = kmalloc_array(slot, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state), | |
405 | GFP_KERNEL); | |
406 | if (!new_stack) | |
407 | return -ENOMEM; | |
408 | if (copy_old) { | |
409 | if (state->stack) | |
410 | memcpy(new_stack, state->stack, | |
411 | sizeof(*new_stack) * (old_size / BPF_REG_SIZE)); | |
412 | memset(new_stack + old_size / BPF_REG_SIZE, 0, | |
413 | sizeof(*new_stack) * (size - old_size) / BPF_REG_SIZE); | |
414 | } | |
415 | state->allocated_stack = slot * BPF_REG_SIZE; | |
416 | kfree(state->stack); | |
417 | state->stack = new_stack; | |
418 | return 0; | |
419 | } | |
420 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
421 | static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) |
422 | { | |
5896351e AS |
423 | if (!state) |
424 | return; | |
f4d7e40a AS |
425 | kfree(state->stack); |
426 | kfree(state); | |
427 | } | |
428 | ||
1969db47 AS |
429 | static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, |
430 | bool free_self) | |
638f5b90 | 431 | { |
f4d7e40a AS |
432 | int i; |
433 | ||
434 | for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) { | |
435 | free_func_state(state->frame[i]); | |
436 | state->frame[i] = NULL; | |
437 | } | |
1969db47 AS |
438 | if (free_self) |
439 | kfree(state); | |
638f5b90 AS |
440 | } |
441 | ||
442 | /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space | |
443 | * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack | |
444 | */ | |
f4d7e40a AS |
445 | static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, |
446 | const struct bpf_func_state *src) | |
638f5b90 AS |
447 | { |
448 | int err; | |
449 | ||
f4d7e40a | 450 | err = realloc_func_state(dst, src->allocated_stack, false); |
638f5b90 AS |
451 | if (err) |
452 | return err; | |
f4d7e40a | 453 | memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, allocated_stack)); |
638f5b90 AS |
454 | return copy_stack_state(dst, src); |
455 | } | |
456 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
457 | static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, |
458 | const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) | |
459 | { | |
460 | struct bpf_func_state *dst; | |
461 | int i, err; | |
462 | ||
463 | /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */ | |
464 | for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { | |
465 | free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); | |
466 | dst_state->frame[i] = NULL; | |
467 | } | |
468 | dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; | |
469 | dst_state->parent = src->parent; | |
470 | for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { | |
471 | dst = dst_state->frame[i]; | |
472 | if (!dst) { | |
473 | dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL); | |
474 | if (!dst) | |
475 | return -ENOMEM; | |
476 | dst_state->frame[i] = dst; | |
477 | } | |
478 | err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]); | |
479 | if (err) | |
480 | return err; | |
481 | } | |
482 | return 0; | |
483 | } | |
484 | ||
638f5b90 AS |
485 | static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, |
486 | int *insn_idx) | |
487 | { | |
488 | struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; | |
489 | struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; | |
490 | int err; | |
17a52670 AS |
491 | |
492 | if (env->head == NULL) | |
638f5b90 | 493 | return -ENOENT; |
17a52670 | 494 | |
638f5b90 AS |
495 | if (cur) { |
496 | err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st); | |
497 | if (err) | |
498 | return err; | |
499 | } | |
500 | if (insn_idx) | |
501 | *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; | |
17a52670 | 502 | if (prev_insn_idx) |
638f5b90 AS |
503 | *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx; |
504 | elem = head->next; | |
1969db47 | 505 | free_verifier_state(&head->st, false); |
638f5b90 | 506 | kfree(head); |
17a52670 AS |
507 | env->head = elem; |
508 | env->stack_size--; | |
638f5b90 | 509 | return 0; |
17a52670 AS |
510 | } |
511 | ||
58e2af8b JK |
512 | static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
513 | int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx) | |
17a52670 | 514 | { |
638f5b90 | 515 | struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; |
58e2af8b | 516 | struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; |
638f5b90 | 517 | int err; |
17a52670 | 518 | |
638f5b90 | 519 | elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); |
17a52670 AS |
520 | if (!elem) |
521 | goto err; | |
522 | ||
17a52670 AS |
523 | elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; |
524 | elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; | |
525 | elem->next = env->head; | |
526 | env->head = elem; | |
527 | env->stack_size++; | |
1969db47 AS |
528 | err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); |
529 | if (err) | |
530 | goto err; | |
07016151 | 531 | if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK) { |
61bd5218 | 532 | verbose(env, "BPF program is too complex\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
533 | goto err; |
534 | } | |
535 | return &elem->st; | |
536 | err: | |
5896351e AS |
537 | free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); |
538 | env->cur_state = NULL; | |
17a52670 | 539 | /* pop all elements and return */ |
638f5b90 | 540 | while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL)); |
17a52670 AS |
541 | return NULL; |
542 | } | |
543 | ||
544 | #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 | |
545 | static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { | |
546 | BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 | |
547 | }; | |
548 | ||
f1174f77 EC |
549 | static void __mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *reg); |
550 | ||
b03c9f9f EC |
551 | /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as |
552 | * known to have the value @imm. | |
553 | */ | |
554 | static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) | |
555 | { | |
556 | reg->id = 0; | |
557 | reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); | |
558 | reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; | |
559 | reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; | |
560 | reg->umin_value = imm; | |
561 | reg->umax_value = imm; | |
562 | } | |
563 | ||
f1174f77 EC |
564 | /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be |
565 | * used only on registers holding a pointer type. | |
566 | */ | |
567 | static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) | |
a9789ef9 | 568 | { |
b03c9f9f | 569 | __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); |
f1174f77 | 570 | } |
a9789ef9 | 571 | |
cc2b14d5 AS |
572 | static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
573 | { | |
574 | __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); | |
575 | reg->off = 0; | |
576 | reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; | |
577 | } | |
578 | ||
61bd5218 JK |
579 | static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
580 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) | |
f1174f77 EC |
581 | { |
582 | if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { | |
61bd5218 | 583 | verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); |
f1174f77 EC |
584 | /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ |
585 | for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) | |
586 | __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno); | |
587 | return; | |
588 | } | |
589 | __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); | |
590 | } | |
591 | ||
de8f3a83 DB |
592 | static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) |
593 | { | |
594 | return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); | |
595 | } | |
596 | ||
597 | static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) | |
598 | { | |
599 | return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || | |
600 | reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; | |
601 | } | |
602 | ||
603 | /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ | |
604 | static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, | |
605 | enum bpf_reg_type which) | |
606 | { | |
607 | /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. | |
608 | * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its | |
609 | * origin. | |
610 | */ | |
611 | return reg->type == which && | |
612 | reg->id == 0 && | |
613 | reg->off == 0 && | |
614 | tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); | |
615 | } | |
616 | ||
b03c9f9f EC |
617 | /* Attempts to improve min/max values based on var_off information */ |
618 | static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) | |
619 | { | |
620 | /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ | |
621 | reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, | |
622 | reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); | |
623 | /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ | |
624 | reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, | |
625 | reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); | |
626 | reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); | |
627 | reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, | |
628 | reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); | |
629 | } | |
630 | ||
631 | /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ | |
632 | static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) | |
633 | { | |
634 | /* Learn sign from signed bounds. | |
635 | * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds | |
636 | * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. | |
637 | * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. | |
638 | */ | |
639 | if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) { | |
640 | reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, | |
641 | reg->umin_value); | |
642 | reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, | |
643 | reg->umax_value); | |
644 | return; | |
645 | } | |
646 | /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign | |
647 | * boundary, so we must be careful. | |
648 | */ | |
649 | if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) { | |
650 | /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax | |
651 | * is positive, hence safe. | |
652 | */ | |
653 | reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; | |
654 | reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, | |
655 | reg->umax_value); | |
656 | } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) { | |
657 | /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin | |
658 | * is negative, hence safe. | |
659 | */ | |
660 | reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, | |
661 | reg->umin_value); | |
662 | reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; | |
663 | } | |
664 | } | |
665 | ||
666 | /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ | |
667 | static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) | |
668 | { | |
669 | reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, | |
670 | tnum_range(reg->umin_value, | |
671 | reg->umax_value)); | |
672 | } | |
673 | ||
674 | /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ | |
675 | static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) | |
676 | { | |
677 | reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; | |
678 | reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; | |
679 | reg->umin_value = 0; | |
680 | reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; | |
681 | } | |
682 | ||
f1174f77 EC |
683 | /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ |
684 | static void __mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) | |
685 | { | |
686 | reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; | |
687 | reg->id = 0; | |
688 | reg->off = 0; | |
689 | reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; | |
f4d7e40a | 690 | reg->frameno = 0; |
b03c9f9f | 691 | __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); |
f1174f77 EC |
692 | } |
693 | ||
61bd5218 JK |
694 | static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
695 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) | |
f1174f77 EC |
696 | { |
697 | if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { | |
61bd5218 | 698 | verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); |
19ceb417 AS |
699 | /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ |
700 | for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) | |
f1174f77 EC |
701 | __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno); |
702 | return; | |
703 | } | |
704 | __mark_reg_unknown(regs + regno); | |
705 | } | |
706 | ||
707 | static void __mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) | |
708 | { | |
709 | __mark_reg_unknown(reg); | |
710 | reg->type = NOT_INIT; | |
711 | } | |
712 | ||
61bd5218 JK |
713 | static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
714 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) | |
f1174f77 EC |
715 | { |
716 | if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { | |
61bd5218 | 717 | verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); |
19ceb417 AS |
718 | /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ |
719 | for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) | |
f1174f77 EC |
720 | __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno); |
721 | return; | |
722 | } | |
723 | __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno); | |
a9789ef9 DB |
724 | } |
725 | ||
61bd5218 | 726 | static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
f4d7e40a | 727 | struct bpf_func_state *state) |
17a52670 | 728 | { |
f4d7e40a | 729 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; |
17a52670 AS |
730 | int i; |
731 | ||
dc503a8a | 732 | for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { |
61bd5218 | 733 | mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); |
dc503a8a EC |
734 | regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; |
735 | } | |
17a52670 AS |
736 | |
737 | /* frame pointer */ | |
f1174f77 | 738 | regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; |
61bd5218 | 739 | mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); |
f4d7e40a | 740 | regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; |
17a52670 AS |
741 | |
742 | /* 1st arg to a function */ | |
743 | regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; | |
61bd5218 | 744 | mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); |
6760bf2d DB |
745 | } |
746 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
747 | #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) |
748 | static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, | |
749 | struct bpf_func_state *state, | |
750 | int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno) | |
751 | { | |
752 | state->callsite = callsite; | |
753 | state->frameno = frameno; | |
754 | state->subprogno = subprogno; | |
755 | init_reg_state(env, state); | |
756 | } | |
757 | ||
17a52670 AS |
758 | enum reg_arg_type { |
759 | SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ | |
760 | DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ | |
761 | DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ | |
762 | }; | |
763 | ||
cc8b0b92 AS |
764 | static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b) |
765 | { | |
9c8105bd JW |
766 | return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start - |
767 | ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start; | |
cc8b0b92 AS |
768 | } |
769 | ||
770 | static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) | |
771 | { | |
9c8105bd | 772 | struct bpf_subprog_info *p; |
cc8b0b92 | 773 | |
9c8105bd JW |
774 | p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, |
775 | sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs); | |
cc8b0b92 AS |
776 | if (!p) |
777 | return -ENOENT; | |
9c8105bd | 778 | return p - env->subprog_info; |
cc8b0b92 AS |
779 | |
780 | } | |
781 | ||
782 | static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) | |
783 | { | |
784 | int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; | |
785 | int ret; | |
786 | ||
787 | if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) { | |
788 | verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n"); | |
789 | return -EINVAL; | |
790 | } | |
791 | ret = find_subprog(env, off); | |
792 | if (ret >= 0) | |
793 | return 0; | |
4cb3d99c | 794 | if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { |
cc8b0b92 AS |
795 | verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); |
796 | return -E2BIG; | |
797 | } | |
9c8105bd JW |
798 | env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; |
799 | sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, | |
800 | sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); | |
cc8b0b92 AS |
801 | return 0; |
802 | } | |
803 | ||
804 | static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) | |
805 | { | |
806 | int i, ret, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0; | |
9c8105bd | 807 | struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; |
cc8b0b92 AS |
808 | struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; |
809 | int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; | |
810 | ||
f910cefa JW |
811 | /* Add entry function. */ |
812 | ret = add_subprog(env, 0); | |
813 | if (ret < 0) | |
814 | return ret; | |
815 | ||
cc8b0b92 AS |
816 | /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ |
817 | for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { | |
818 | if (insn[i].code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) | |
819 | continue; | |
820 | if (insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) | |
821 | continue; | |
822 | if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { | |
823 | verbose(env, "function calls to other bpf functions are allowed for root only\n"); | |
824 | return -EPERM; | |
825 | } | |
826 | if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { | |
e90004d5 | 827 | verbose(env, "function calls in offloaded programs are not supported yet\n"); |
cc8b0b92 AS |
828 | return -EINVAL; |
829 | } | |
830 | ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn[i].imm + 1); | |
831 | if (ret < 0) | |
832 | return ret; | |
833 | } | |
834 | ||
4cb3d99c JW |
835 | /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration |
836 | * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased. | |
837 | */ | |
838 | subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; | |
839 | ||
cc8b0b92 AS |
840 | if (env->log.level > 1) |
841 | for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) | |
9c8105bd | 842 | verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); |
cc8b0b92 AS |
843 | |
844 | /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */ | |
4cb3d99c JW |
845 | subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start; |
846 | subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; | |
cc8b0b92 AS |
847 | for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { |
848 | u8 code = insn[i].code; | |
849 | ||
850 | if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP) | |
851 | goto next; | |
852 | if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) | |
853 | goto next; | |
854 | off = i + insn[i].off + 1; | |
855 | if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) { | |
856 | verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off); | |
857 | return -EINVAL; | |
858 | } | |
859 | next: | |
860 | if (i == subprog_end - 1) { | |
861 | /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another | |
862 | * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit | |
863 | * or unconditional jump back | |
864 | */ | |
865 | if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && | |
866 | code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { | |
867 | verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n"); | |
868 | return -EINVAL; | |
869 | } | |
870 | subprog_start = subprog_end; | |
4cb3d99c JW |
871 | cur_subprog++; |
872 | if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt) | |
9c8105bd | 873 | subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; |
cc8b0b92 AS |
874 | } |
875 | } | |
876 | return 0; | |
877 | } | |
878 | ||
fa2d41ad | 879 | static |
f4d7e40a AS |
880 | struct bpf_verifier_state *skip_callee(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
881 | const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, | |
882 | struct bpf_verifier_state *parent, | |
883 | u32 regno) | |
dc503a8a | 884 | { |
f4d7e40a AS |
885 | struct bpf_verifier_state *tmp = NULL; |
886 | ||
887 | /* 'parent' could be a state of caller and | |
888 | * 'state' could be a state of callee. In such case | |
889 | * parent->curframe < state->curframe | |
890 | * and it's ok for r1 - r5 registers | |
891 | * | |
892 | * 'parent' could be a callee's state after it bpf_exit-ed. | |
893 | * In such case parent->curframe > state->curframe | |
894 | * and it's ok for r0 only | |
895 | */ | |
896 | if (parent->curframe == state->curframe || | |
897 | (parent->curframe < state->curframe && | |
898 | regno >= BPF_REG_1 && regno <= BPF_REG_5) || | |
899 | (parent->curframe > state->curframe && | |
900 | regno == BPF_REG_0)) | |
901 | return parent; | |
902 | ||
903 | if (parent->curframe > state->curframe && | |
904 | regno >= BPF_REG_6) { | |
905 | /* for callee saved regs we have to skip the whole chain | |
906 | * of states that belong to callee and mark as LIVE_READ | |
907 | * the registers before the call | |
908 | */ | |
909 | tmp = parent; | |
910 | while (tmp && tmp->curframe != state->curframe) { | |
911 | tmp = tmp->parent; | |
912 | } | |
913 | if (!tmp) | |
914 | goto bug; | |
915 | parent = tmp; | |
916 | } else { | |
917 | goto bug; | |
918 | } | |
919 | return parent; | |
920 | bug: | |
921 | verbose(env, "verifier bug regno %d tmp %p\n", regno, tmp); | |
922 | verbose(env, "regno %d parent frame %d current frame %d\n", | |
923 | regno, parent->curframe, state->curframe); | |
fa2d41ad | 924 | return NULL; |
f4d7e40a AS |
925 | } |
926 | ||
927 | static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, | |
928 | const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, | |
929 | struct bpf_verifier_state *parent, | |
930 | u32 regno) | |
931 | { | |
932 | bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ | |
dc503a8a | 933 | |
8fe2d6cc AS |
934 | if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) |
935 | /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ | |
f4d7e40a | 936 | return 0; |
8fe2d6cc | 937 | |
dc503a8a EC |
938 | while (parent) { |
939 | /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ | |
f4d7e40a | 940 | if (writes && state->frame[state->curframe]->regs[regno].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) |
dc503a8a | 941 | break; |
f4d7e40a AS |
942 | parent = skip_callee(env, state, parent, regno); |
943 | if (!parent) | |
944 | return -EFAULT; | |
dc503a8a | 945 | /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ |
f4d7e40a | 946 | parent->frame[parent->curframe]->regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_READ; |
dc503a8a EC |
947 | state = parent; |
948 | parent = state->parent; | |
f4d7e40a | 949 | writes = true; |
dc503a8a | 950 | } |
f4d7e40a | 951 | return 0; |
dc503a8a EC |
952 | } |
953 | ||
954 | static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, | |
17a52670 AS |
955 | enum reg_arg_type t) |
956 | { | |
f4d7e40a AS |
957 | struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
958 | struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; | |
959 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; | |
dc503a8a | 960 | |
17a52670 | 961 | if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { |
61bd5218 | 962 | verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); |
17a52670 AS |
963 | return -EINVAL; |
964 | } | |
965 | ||
966 | if (t == SRC_OP) { | |
967 | /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ | |
968 | if (regs[regno].type == NOT_INIT) { | |
61bd5218 | 969 | verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); |
17a52670 AS |
970 | return -EACCES; |
971 | } | |
f4d7e40a | 972 | return mark_reg_read(env, vstate, vstate->parent, regno); |
17a52670 AS |
973 | } else { |
974 | /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ | |
975 | if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { | |
61bd5218 | 976 | verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
977 | return -EACCES; |
978 | } | |
dc503a8a | 979 | regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; |
17a52670 | 980 | if (t == DST_OP) |
61bd5218 | 981 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); |
17a52670 AS |
982 | } |
983 | return 0; | |
984 | } | |
985 | ||
1be7f75d AS |
986 | static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) |
987 | { | |
988 | switch (type) { | |
989 | case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: | |
990 | case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: | |
991 | case PTR_TO_STACK: | |
992 | case PTR_TO_CTX: | |
969bf05e | 993 | case PTR_TO_PACKET: |
de8f3a83 | 994 | case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: |
969bf05e | 995 | case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: |
1be7f75d AS |
996 | case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: |
997 | return true; | |
998 | default: | |
999 | return false; | |
1000 | } | |
1001 | } | |
1002 | ||
cc2b14d5 AS |
1003 | /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ |
1004 | static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) | |
1005 | { | |
1006 | return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); | |
1007 | } | |
1008 | ||
17a52670 AS |
1009 | /* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers, |
1010 | * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() | |
1011 | */ | |
61bd5218 | 1012 | static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
f4d7e40a | 1013 | struct bpf_func_state *state, /* func where register points to */ |
af86ca4e | 1014 | int off, int size, int value_regno, int insn_idx) |
17a52670 | 1015 | { |
f4d7e40a | 1016 | struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ |
638f5b90 | 1017 | int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; |
f4d7e40a | 1018 | enum bpf_reg_type type; |
638f5b90 | 1019 | |
f4d7e40a AS |
1020 | err = realloc_func_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE), |
1021 | true); | |
638f5b90 AS |
1022 | if (err) |
1023 | return err; | |
9c399760 AS |
1024 | /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, |
1025 | * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits | |
1026 | */ | |
638f5b90 AS |
1027 | if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && |
1028 | state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && | |
1029 | size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { | |
1030 | verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); | |
1031 | return -EACCES; | |
1032 | } | |
17a52670 | 1033 | |
f4d7e40a | 1034 | cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; |
17a52670 | 1035 | if (value_regno >= 0 && |
f4d7e40a | 1036 | is_spillable_regtype((type = cur->regs[value_regno].type))) { |
17a52670 AS |
1037 | |
1038 | /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ | |
9c399760 | 1039 | if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { |
61bd5218 | 1040 | verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
1041 | return -EACCES; |
1042 | } | |
1043 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
1044 | if (state != cur && type == PTR_TO_STACK) { |
1045 | verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); | |
1046 | return -EINVAL; | |
1047 | } | |
1048 | ||
17a52670 | 1049 | /* save register state */ |
f4d7e40a | 1050 | state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = cur->regs[value_regno]; |
638f5b90 | 1051 | state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; |
17a52670 | 1052 | |
af86ca4e AS |
1053 | for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { |
1054 | if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC && | |
1055 | !env->allow_ptr_leaks) { | |
1056 | int *poff = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off; | |
1057 | int soff = (-spi - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE; | |
1058 | ||
1059 | /* detected reuse of integer stack slot with a pointer | |
1060 | * which means either llvm is reusing stack slot or | |
1061 | * an attacker is trying to exploit CVE-2018-3639 | |
1062 | * (speculative store bypass) | |
1063 | * Have to sanitize that slot with preemptive | |
1064 | * store of zero. | |
1065 | */ | |
1066 | if (*poff && *poff != soff) { | |
1067 | /* disallow programs where single insn stores | |
1068 | * into two different stack slots, since verifier | |
1069 | * cannot sanitize them | |
1070 | */ | |
1071 | verbose(env, | |
1072 | "insn %d cannot access two stack slots fp%d and fp%d", | |
1073 | insn_idx, *poff, soff); | |
1074 | return -EINVAL; | |
1075 | } | |
1076 | *poff = soff; | |
1077 | } | |
638f5b90 | 1078 | state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL; |
af86ca4e | 1079 | } |
9c399760 | 1080 | } else { |
cc2b14d5 AS |
1081 | u8 type = STACK_MISC; |
1082 | ||
17a52670 | 1083 | /* regular write of data into stack */ |
638f5b90 | 1084 | state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = (struct bpf_reg_state) {}; |
9c399760 | 1085 | |
cc2b14d5 AS |
1086 | /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written |
1087 | * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon | |
1088 | * when stack slots are partially written. | |
1089 | * This heuristic means that read propagation will be | |
1090 | * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks | |
1091 | * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs | |
1092 | * writes+reads less than 8 bytes | |
1093 | */ | |
1094 | if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) | |
1095 | state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; | |
1096 | ||
1097 | /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ | |
1098 | if (value_regno >= 0 && | |
1099 | register_is_null(&cur->regs[value_regno])) | |
1100 | type = STACK_ZERO; | |
1101 | ||
9c399760 | 1102 | for (i = 0; i < size; i++) |
638f5b90 | 1103 | state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = |
cc2b14d5 | 1104 | type; |
17a52670 AS |
1105 | } |
1106 | return 0; | |
1107 | } | |
1108 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
1109 | /* registers of every function are unique and mark_reg_read() propagates |
1110 | * the liveness in the following cases: | |
1111 | * - from callee into caller for R1 - R5 that were used as arguments | |
1112 | * - from caller into callee for R0 that used as result of the call | |
1113 | * - from caller to the same caller skipping states of the callee for R6 - R9, | |
1114 | * since R6 - R9 are callee saved by implicit function prologue and | |
1115 | * caller's R6 != callee's R6, so when we propagate liveness up to | |
1116 | * parent states we need to skip callee states for R6 - R9. | |
1117 | * | |
1118 | * stack slot marking is different, since stacks of caller and callee are | |
1119 | * accessible in both (since caller can pass a pointer to caller's stack to | |
1120 | * callee which can pass it to another function), hence mark_stack_slot_read() | |
1121 | * has to propagate the stack liveness to all parent states at given frame number. | |
1122 | * Consider code: | |
1123 | * f1() { | |
1124 | * ptr = fp - 8; | |
1125 | * *ptr = ctx; | |
1126 | * call f2 { | |
1127 | * .. = *ptr; | |
1128 | * } | |
1129 | * .. = *ptr; | |
1130 | * } | |
1131 | * First *ptr is reading from f1's stack and mark_stack_slot_read() has | |
1132 | * to mark liveness at the f1's frame and not f2's frame. | |
1133 | * Second *ptr is also reading from f1's stack and mark_stack_slot_read() has | |
1134 | * to propagate liveness to f2 states at f1's frame level and further into | |
1135 | * f1 states at f1's frame level until write into that stack slot | |
1136 | */ | |
1137 | static void mark_stack_slot_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, | |
1138 | const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, | |
1139 | struct bpf_verifier_state *parent, | |
1140 | int slot, int frameno) | |
dc503a8a | 1141 | { |
f4d7e40a | 1142 | bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ |
dc503a8a EC |
1143 | |
1144 | while (parent) { | |
cc2b14d5 AS |
1145 | if (parent->frame[frameno]->allocated_stack <= slot * BPF_REG_SIZE) |
1146 | /* since LIVE_WRITTEN mark is only done for full 8-byte | |
1147 | * write the read marks are conservative and parent | |
1148 | * state may not even have the stack allocated. In such case | |
1149 | * end the propagation, since the loop reached beginning | |
1150 | * of the function | |
1151 | */ | |
1152 | break; | |
dc503a8a | 1153 | /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ |
f4d7e40a | 1154 | if (writes && state->frame[frameno]->stack[slot].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) |
dc503a8a EC |
1155 | break; |
1156 | /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ | |
f4d7e40a | 1157 | parent->frame[frameno]->stack[slot].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_READ; |
dc503a8a EC |
1158 | state = parent; |
1159 | parent = state->parent; | |
f4d7e40a | 1160 | writes = true; |
dc503a8a EC |
1161 | } |
1162 | } | |
1163 | ||
61bd5218 | 1164 | static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
f4d7e40a AS |
1165 | struct bpf_func_state *reg_state /* func where register points to */, |
1166 | int off, int size, int value_regno) | |
17a52670 | 1167 | { |
f4d7e40a AS |
1168 | struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
1169 | struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; | |
638f5b90 AS |
1170 | int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; |
1171 | u8 *stype; | |
17a52670 | 1172 | |
f4d7e40a | 1173 | if (reg_state->allocated_stack <= slot) { |
638f5b90 AS |
1174 | verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+0 size %d\n", |
1175 | off, size); | |
1176 | return -EACCES; | |
1177 | } | |
f4d7e40a | 1178 | stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; |
17a52670 | 1179 | |
638f5b90 | 1180 | if (stype[0] == STACK_SPILL) { |
9c399760 | 1181 | if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { |
61bd5218 | 1182 | verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
1183 | return -EACCES; |
1184 | } | |
9c399760 | 1185 | for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { |
638f5b90 | 1186 | if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL) { |
61bd5218 | 1187 | verbose(env, "corrupted spill memory\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
1188 | return -EACCES; |
1189 | } | |
1190 | } | |
1191 | ||
dc503a8a | 1192 | if (value_regno >= 0) { |
17a52670 | 1193 | /* restore register state from stack */ |
f4d7e40a | 1194 | state->regs[value_regno] = reg_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; |
2f18f62e AS |
1195 | /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely |
1196 | * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() | |
1197 | * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions | |
1198 | */ | |
1199 | state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; | |
dc503a8a | 1200 | } |
cc2b14d5 AS |
1201 | mark_stack_slot_read(env, vstate, vstate->parent, spi, |
1202 | reg_state->frameno); | |
17a52670 AS |
1203 | return 0; |
1204 | } else { | |
cc2b14d5 AS |
1205 | int zeros = 0; |
1206 | ||
17a52670 | 1207 | for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { |
cc2b14d5 AS |
1208 | if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC) |
1209 | continue; | |
1210 | if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) { | |
1211 | zeros++; | |
1212 | continue; | |
17a52670 | 1213 | } |
cc2b14d5 AS |
1214 | verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", |
1215 | off, i, size); | |
1216 | return -EACCES; | |
1217 | } | |
1218 | mark_stack_slot_read(env, vstate, vstate->parent, spi, | |
1219 | reg_state->frameno); | |
1220 | if (value_regno >= 0) { | |
1221 | if (zeros == size) { | |
1222 | /* any size read into register is zero extended, | |
1223 | * so the whole register == const_zero | |
1224 | */ | |
1225 | __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[value_regno]); | |
1226 | } else { | |
1227 | /* have read misc data from the stack */ | |
1228 | mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno); | |
1229 | } | |
1230 | state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; | |
17a52670 | 1231 | } |
17a52670 AS |
1232 | return 0; |
1233 | } | |
1234 | } | |
1235 | ||
1236 | /* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */ | |
f1174f77 | 1237 | static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, |
9fd29c08 | 1238 | int size, bool zero_size_allowed) |
17a52670 | 1239 | { |
638f5b90 AS |
1240 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
1241 | struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr; | |
17a52670 | 1242 | |
9fd29c08 YS |
1243 | if (off < 0 || size < 0 || (size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) || |
1244 | off + size > map->value_size) { | |
61bd5218 | 1245 | verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", |
17a52670 AS |
1246 | map->value_size, off, size); |
1247 | return -EACCES; | |
1248 | } | |
1249 | return 0; | |
1250 | } | |
1251 | ||
f1174f77 EC |
1252 | /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ |
1253 | static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, | |
9fd29c08 | 1254 | int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed) |
dbcfe5f7 | 1255 | { |
f4d7e40a AS |
1256 | struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
1257 | struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; | |
dbcfe5f7 GB |
1258 | struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; |
1259 | int err; | |
1260 | ||
f1174f77 EC |
1261 | /* We may have adjusted the register to this map value, so we |
1262 | * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off | |
1263 | * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. | |
dbcfe5f7 | 1264 | */ |
61bd5218 JK |
1265 | if (env->log.level) |
1266 | print_verifier_state(env, state); | |
dbcfe5f7 GB |
1267 | /* The minimum value is only important with signed |
1268 | * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a | |
1269 | * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our | |
1270 | * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use | |
1271 | * will have a set floor within our range. | |
1272 | */ | |
b03c9f9f | 1273 | if (reg->smin_value < 0) { |
61bd5218 | 1274 | verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", |
dbcfe5f7 GB |
1275 | regno); |
1276 | return -EACCES; | |
1277 | } | |
9fd29c08 YS |
1278 | err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, |
1279 | zero_size_allowed); | |
dbcfe5f7 | 1280 | if (err) { |
61bd5218 JK |
1281 | verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the array range\n", |
1282 | regno); | |
dbcfe5f7 GB |
1283 | return err; |
1284 | } | |
1285 | ||
b03c9f9f EC |
1286 | /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be |
1287 | * sure we won't do bad things. | |
1288 | * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. | |
dbcfe5f7 | 1289 | */ |
b03c9f9f | 1290 | if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { |
61bd5218 | 1291 | verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n", |
dbcfe5f7 GB |
1292 | regno); |
1293 | return -EACCES; | |
1294 | } | |
9fd29c08 YS |
1295 | err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, |
1296 | zero_size_allowed); | |
f1174f77 | 1297 | if (err) |
61bd5218 JK |
1298 | verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the array range\n", |
1299 | regno); | |
f1174f77 | 1300 | return err; |
dbcfe5f7 GB |
1301 | } |
1302 | ||
969bf05e AS |
1303 | #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff |
1304 | ||
58e2af8b | 1305 | static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
3a0af8fd TG |
1306 | const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, |
1307 | enum bpf_access_type t) | |
4acf6c0b | 1308 | { |
36bbef52 | 1309 | switch (env->prog->type) { |
3a0af8fd TG |
1310 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: |
1311 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: | |
004d4b27 | 1312 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL: |
3a0af8fd TG |
1313 | /* dst_input() and dst_output() can't write for now */ |
1314 | if (t == BPF_WRITE) | |
1315 | return false; | |
7e57fbb2 | 1316 | /* fallthrough */ |
36bbef52 DB |
1317 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: |
1318 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: | |
4acf6c0b | 1319 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: |
3a0af8fd | 1320 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: |
8a31db56 | 1321 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: |
4f738adb | 1322 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: |
36bbef52 DB |
1323 | if (meta) |
1324 | return meta->pkt_access; | |
1325 | ||
1326 | env->seen_direct_write = true; | |
4acf6c0b BB |
1327 | return true; |
1328 | default: | |
1329 | return false; | |
1330 | } | |
1331 | } | |
1332 | ||
f1174f77 | 1333 | static int __check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, |
9fd29c08 | 1334 | int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed) |
969bf05e | 1335 | { |
638f5b90 | 1336 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
58e2af8b | 1337 | struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; |
969bf05e | 1338 | |
9fd29c08 YS |
1339 | if (off < 0 || size < 0 || (size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) || |
1340 | (u64)off + size > reg->range) { | |
61bd5218 | 1341 | verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", |
d91b28ed | 1342 | off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range); |
969bf05e AS |
1343 | return -EACCES; |
1344 | } | |
1345 | return 0; | |
1346 | } | |
1347 | ||
f1174f77 | 1348 | static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, |
9fd29c08 | 1349 | int size, bool zero_size_allowed) |
f1174f77 | 1350 | { |
638f5b90 | 1351 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
f1174f77 EC |
1352 | struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; |
1353 | int err; | |
1354 | ||
1355 | /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any | |
1356 | * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed | |
1357 | * offset. | |
1358 | */ | |
1359 | ||
1360 | /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough | |
1361 | * detail to prove they're safe. | |
1362 | */ | |
b03c9f9f | 1363 | if (reg->smin_value < 0) { |
61bd5218 | 1364 | verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", |
f1174f77 EC |
1365 | regno); |
1366 | return -EACCES; | |
1367 | } | |
9fd29c08 | 1368 | err = __check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, zero_size_allowed); |
f1174f77 | 1369 | if (err) { |
61bd5218 | 1370 | verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); |
f1174f77 EC |
1371 | return err; |
1372 | } | |
1373 | return err; | |
1374 | } | |
1375 | ||
1376 | /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ | |
31fd8581 | 1377 | static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, |
19de99f7 | 1378 | enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type) |
17a52670 | 1379 | { |
f96da094 DB |
1380 | struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { |
1381 | .reg_type = *reg_type, | |
1382 | }; | |
31fd8581 | 1383 | |
4f9218aa | 1384 | if (env->ops->is_valid_access && |
5e43f899 | 1385 | env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) { |
f96da094 DB |
1386 | /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a |
1387 | * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole | |
1388 | * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower | |
1389 | * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size | |
1390 | * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other | |
1391 | * type of narrower access. | |
31fd8581 | 1392 | */ |
23994631 | 1393 | *reg_type = info.reg_type; |
31fd8581 | 1394 | |
4f9218aa | 1395 | env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; |
32bbe007 AS |
1396 | /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ |
1397 | if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) | |
1398 | env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; | |
17a52670 | 1399 | return 0; |
32bbe007 | 1400 | } |
17a52670 | 1401 | |
61bd5218 | 1402 | verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); |
17a52670 AS |
1403 | return -EACCES; |
1404 | } | |
1405 | ||
4cabc5b1 DB |
1406 | static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, |
1407 | const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) | |
1be7f75d | 1408 | { |
4cabc5b1 | 1409 | if (allow_ptr_leaks) |
1be7f75d AS |
1410 | return false; |
1411 | ||
f1174f77 | 1412 | return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; |
1be7f75d AS |
1413 | } |
1414 | ||
4cabc5b1 DB |
1415 | static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) |
1416 | { | |
638f5b90 | 1417 | return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, cur_regs(env) + regno); |
4cabc5b1 DB |
1418 | } |
1419 | ||
f37a8cb8 DB |
1420 | static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) |
1421 | { | |
1422 | const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = cur_regs(env) + regno; | |
1423 | ||
1424 | return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; | |
1425 | } | |
1426 | ||
ca369602 DB |
1427 | static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) |
1428 | { | |
1429 | const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = cur_regs(env) + regno; | |
1430 | ||
1431 | return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); | |
1432 | } | |
1433 | ||
61bd5218 JK |
1434 | static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
1435 | const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, | |
d1174416 | 1436 | int off, int size, bool strict) |
969bf05e | 1437 | { |
f1174f77 | 1438 | struct tnum reg_off; |
e07b98d9 | 1439 | int ip_align; |
d1174416 DM |
1440 | |
1441 | /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ | |
1442 | if (!strict || size == 1) | |
1443 | return 0; | |
1444 | ||
e4eda884 DM |
1445 | /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling |
1446 | * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of | |
1447 | * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms | |
1448 | * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get | |
1449 | * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate | |
1450 | * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an | |
1451 | * unconditional IP align value of '2'. | |
e07b98d9 | 1452 | */ |
e4eda884 | 1453 | ip_align = 2; |
f1174f77 EC |
1454 | |
1455 | reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); | |
1456 | if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { | |
1457 | char tn_buf[48]; | |
1458 | ||
1459 | tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); | |
61bd5218 JK |
1460 | verbose(env, |
1461 | "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", | |
f1174f77 | 1462 | ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); |
969bf05e AS |
1463 | return -EACCES; |
1464 | } | |
79adffcd | 1465 | |
969bf05e AS |
1466 | return 0; |
1467 | } | |
1468 | ||
61bd5218 JK |
1469 | static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
1470 | const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, | |
f1174f77 EC |
1471 | const char *pointer_desc, |
1472 | int off, int size, bool strict) | |
79adffcd | 1473 | { |
f1174f77 EC |
1474 | struct tnum reg_off; |
1475 | ||
1476 | /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ | |
1477 | if (!strict || size == 1) | |
1478 | return 0; | |
1479 | ||
1480 | reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); | |
1481 | if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { | |
1482 | char tn_buf[48]; | |
1483 | ||
1484 | tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); | |
61bd5218 | 1485 | verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", |
f1174f77 | 1486 | pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); |
79adffcd DB |
1487 | return -EACCES; |
1488 | } | |
1489 | ||
969bf05e AS |
1490 | return 0; |
1491 | } | |
1492 | ||
e07b98d9 | 1493 | static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
ca369602 DB |
1494 | const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, |
1495 | int size, bool strict_alignment_once) | |
79adffcd | 1496 | { |
ca369602 | 1497 | bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once; |
f1174f77 | 1498 | const char *pointer_desc = ""; |
d1174416 | 1499 | |
79adffcd DB |
1500 | switch (reg->type) { |
1501 | case PTR_TO_PACKET: | |
de8f3a83 DB |
1502 | case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: |
1503 | /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits | |
1504 | * right in front, treat it the very same way. | |
1505 | */ | |
61bd5218 | 1506 | return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); |
f1174f77 EC |
1507 | case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: |
1508 | pointer_desc = "value "; | |
1509 | break; | |
1510 | case PTR_TO_CTX: | |
1511 | pointer_desc = "context "; | |
1512 | break; | |
1513 | case PTR_TO_STACK: | |
1514 | pointer_desc = "stack "; | |
a5ec6ae1 JH |
1515 | /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write() |
1516 | * and check_stack_read() relies on stack accesses being | |
1517 | * aligned. | |
1518 | */ | |
1519 | strict = true; | |
f1174f77 | 1520 | break; |
79adffcd | 1521 | default: |
f1174f77 | 1522 | break; |
79adffcd | 1523 | } |
61bd5218 JK |
1524 | return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, |
1525 | strict); | |
79adffcd DB |
1526 | } |
1527 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
1528 | static int update_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
1529 | const struct bpf_func_state *func, | |
1530 | int off) | |
1531 | { | |
9c8105bd | 1532 | u16 stack = env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth; |
f4d7e40a AS |
1533 | |
1534 | if (stack >= -off) | |
1535 | return 0; | |
1536 | ||
1537 | /* update known max for given subprogram */ | |
9c8105bd | 1538 | env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth = -off; |
70a87ffe AS |
1539 | return 0; |
1540 | } | |
f4d7e40a | 1541 | |
70a87ffe AS |
1542 | /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function |
1543 | * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. | |
1544 | * Ignore jump and exit insns. | |
1545 | * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm | |
1546 | * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites | |
1547 | */ | |
1548 | static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) | |
1549 | { | |
9c8105bd JW |
1550 | int depth = 0, frame = 0, idx = 0, i = 0, subprog_end; |
1551 | struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; | |
70a87ffe | 1552 | struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; |
70a87ffe AS |
1553 | int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; |
1554 | int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; | |
f4d7e40a | 1555 | |
70a87ffe AS |
1556 | process_func: |
1557 | /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity | |
1558 | * of interpreter stack size | |
1559 | */ | |
9c8105bd | 1560 | depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); |
70a87ffe | 1561 | if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { |
f4d7e40a | 1562 | verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n", |
70a87ffe | 1563 | frame + 1, depth); |
f4d7e40a AS |
1564 | return -EACCES; |
1565 | } | |
70a87ffe | 1566 | continue_func: |
4cb3d99c | 1567 | subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; |
70a87ffe AS |
1568 | for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { |
1569 | if (insn[i].code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) | |
1570 | continue; | |
1571 | if (insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) | |
1572 | continue; | |
1573 | /* remember insn and function to return to */ | |
1574 | ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; | |
9c8105bd | 1575 | ret_prog[frame] = idx; |
70a87ffe AS |
1576 | |
1577 | /* find the callee */ | |
1578 | i = i + insn[i].imm + 1; | |
9c8105bd JW |
1579 | idx = find_subprog(env, i); |
1580 | if (idx < 0) { | |
70a87ffe AS |
1581 | WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", |
1582 | i); | |
1583 | return -EFAULT; | |
1584 | } | |
70a87ffe AS |
1585 | frame++; |
1586 | if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { | |
1587 | WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. Call stack is too deep\n"); | |
1588 | return -EFAULT; | |
1589 | } | |
1590 | goto process_func; | |
1591 | } | |
1592 | /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog' | |
1593 | * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT | |
1594 | */ | |
1595 | if (frame == 0) | |
1596 | return 0; | |
9c8105bd | 1597 | depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); |
70a87ffe AS |
1598 | frame--; |
1599 | i = ret_insn[frame]; | |
9c8105bd | 1600 | idx = ret_prog[frame]; |
70a87ffe | 1601 | goto continue_func; |
f4d7e40a AS |
1602 | } |
1603 | ||
19d28fbd | 1604 | #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON |
1ea47e01 AS |
1605 | static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
1606 | const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx) | |
1607 | { | |
1608 | int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog; | |
1609 | ||
1610 | subprog = find_subprog(env, start); | |
1611 | if (subprog < 0) { | |
1612 | WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", | |
1613 | start); | |
1614 | return -EFAULT; | |
1615 | } | |
9c8105bd | 1616 | return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth; |
1ea47e01 | 1617 | } |
19d28fbd | 1618 | #endif |
1ea47e01 | 1619 | |
0c17d1d2 JH |
1620 | /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes) |
1621 | * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE | |
1622 | */ | |
1623 | static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) | |
1624 | { | |
1625 | u64 mask; | |
1626 | ||
1627 | /* clear high bits in bit representation */ | |
1628 | reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size); | |
1629 | ||
1630 | /* fix arithmetic bounds */ | |
1631 | mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1; | |
1632 | if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) { | |
1633 | reg->umin_value &= mask; | |
1634 | reg->umax_value &= mask; | |
1635 | } else { | |
1636 | reg->umin_value = 0; | |
1637 | reg->umax_value = mask; | |
1638 | } | |
1639 | reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; | |
1640 | reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; | |
1641 | } | |
1642 | ||
17a52670 AS |
1643 | /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) |
1644 | * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory | |
1645 | * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory | |
1646 | * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory | |
1647 | * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory | |
1648 | */ | |
ca369602 DB |
1649 | static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, |
1650 | int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, | |
1651 | int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once) | |
17a52670 | 1652 | { |
638f5b90 AS |
1653 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
1654 | struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; | |
f4d7e40a | 1655 | struct bpf_func_state *state; |
17a52670 AS |
1656 | int size, err = 0; |
1657 | ||
1658 | size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); | |
1659 | if (size < 0) | |
1660 | return size; | |
1661 | ||
f1174f77 | 1662 | /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ |
ca369602 | 1663 | err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once); |
969bf05e AS |
1664 | if (err) |
1665 | return err; | |
17a52670 | 1666 | |
f1174f77 EC |
1667 | /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ |
1668 | off += reg->off; | |
1669 | ||
1670 | if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { | |
1be7f75d AS |
1671 | if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && |
1672 | is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { | |
61bd5218 | 1673 | verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); |
1be7f75d AS |
1674 | return -EACCES; |
1675 | } | |
48461135 | 1676 | |
9fd29c08 | 1677 | err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false); |
17a52670 | 1678 | if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) |
638f5b90 | 1679 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
17a52670 | 1680 | |
1a0dc1ac | 1681 | } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { |
f1174f77 | 1682 | enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; |
19de99f7 | 1683 | |
1be7f75d AS |
1684 | if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && |
1685 | is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { | |
61bd5218 | 1686 | verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); |
1be7f75d AS |
1687 | return -EACCES; |
1688 | } | |
f1174f77 EC |
1689 | /* ctx accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can |
1690 | * determine what type of data were returned. | |
1691 | */ | |
28e33f9d | 1692 | if (reg->off) { |
f8ddadc4 DM |
1693 | verbose(env, |
1694 | "dereference of modified ctx ptr R%d off=%d+%d, ctx+const is allowed, ctx+const+const is not\n", | |
28e33f9d JK |
1695 | regno, reg->off, off - reg->off); |
1696 | return -EACCES; | |
1697 | } | |
1698 | if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { | |
f1174f77 EC |
1699 | char tn_buf[48]; |
1700 | ||
1701 | tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); | |
61bd5218 JK |
1702 | verbose(env, |
1703 | "variable ctx access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d", | |
f1174f77 EC |
1704 | tn_buf, off, size); |
1705 | return -EACCES; | |
1706 | } | |
31fd8581 | 1707 | err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type); |
969bf05e | 1708 | if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { |
f1174f77 | 1709 | /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a |
de8f3a83 DB |
1710 | * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter |
1711 | * case, we know the offset is zero. | |
f1174f77 EC |
1712 | */ |
1713 | if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) | |
638f5b90 | 1714 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
f1174f77 | 1715 | else |
638f5b90 | 1716 | mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, |
61bd5218 | 1717 | value_regno); |
638f5b90 AS |
1718 | regs[value_regno].id = 0; |
1719 | regs[value_regno].off = 0; | |
1720 | regs[value_regno].range = 0; | |
1721 | regs[value_regno].type = reg_type; | |
969bf05e | 1722 | } |
17a52670 | 1723 | |
f1174f77 EC |
1724 | } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { |
1725 | /* stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can | |
1726 | * determine what type of data were returned. | |
1727 | * See check_stack_read(). | |
1728 | */ | |
1729 | if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { | |
1730 | char tn_buf[48]; | |
1731 | ||
1732 | tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); | |
61bd5218 | 1733 | verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d", |
f1174f77 EC |
1734 | tn_buf, off, size); |
1735 | return -EACCES; | |
1736 | } | |
1737 | off += reg->var_off.value; | |
17a52670 | 1738 | if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { |
61bd5218 JK |
1739 | verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, |
1740 | size); | |
17a52670 AS |
1741 | return -EACCES; |
1742 | } | |
8726679a | 1743 | |
f4d7e40a AS |
1744 | state = func(env, reg); |
1745 | err = update_stack_depth(env, state, off); | |
1746 | if (err) | |
1747 | return err; | |
8726679a | 1748 | |
638f5b90 | 1749 | if (t == BPF_WRITE) |
61bd5218 | 1750 | err = check_stack_write(env, state, off, size, |
af86ca4e | 1751 | value_regno, insn_idx); |
638f5b90 | 1752 | else |
61bd5218 JK |
1753 | err = check_stack_read(env, state, off, size, |
1754 | value_regno); | |
de8f3a83 | 1755 | } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { |
3a0af8fd | 1756 | if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { |
61bd5218 | 1757 | verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); |
969bf05e AS |
1758 | return -EACCES; |
1759 | } | |
4acf6c0b BB |
1760 | if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && |
1761 | is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { | |
61bd5218 JK |
1762 | verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", |
1763 | value_regno); | |
4acf6c0b BB |
1764 | return -EACCES; |
1765 | } | |
9fd29c08 | 1766 | err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false); |
969bf05e | 1767 | if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) |
638f5b90 | 1768 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); |
17a52670 | 1769 | } else { |
61bd5218 JK |
1770 | verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, |
1771 | reg_type_str[reg->type]); | |
17a52670 AS |
1772 | return -EACCES; |
1773 | } | |
969bf05e | 1774 | |
f1174f77 | 1775 | if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && |
638f5b90 | 1776 | regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { |
f1174f77 | 1777 | /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ |
0c17d1d2 | 1778 | coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size); |
969bf05e | 1779 | } |
17a52670 AS |
1780 | return err; |
1781 | } | |
1782 | ||
31fd8581 | 1783 | static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn) |
17a52670 | 1784 | { |
17a52670 AS |
1785 | int err; |
1786 | ||
1787 | if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) || | |
1788 | insn->imm != 0) { | |
61bd5218 | 1789 | verbose(env, "BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
1790 | return -EINVAL; |
1791 | } | |
1792 | ||
1793 | /* check src1 operand */ | |
dc503a8a | 1794 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
1795 | if (err) |
1796 | return err; | |
1797 | ||
1798 | /* check src2 operand */ | |
dc503a8a | 1799 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
1800 | if (err) |
1801 | return err; | |
1802 | ||
6bdf6abc | 1803 | if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { |
61bd5218 | 1804 | verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); |
6bdf6abc DB |
1805 | return -EACCES; |
1806 | } | |
1807 | ||
ca369602 DB |
1808 | if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || |
1809 | is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { | |
1810 | verbose(env, "BPF_XADD stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", | |
1811 | insn->dst_reg, is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ? | |
1812 | "context" : "packet"); | |
f37a8cb8 DB |
1813 | return -EACCES; |
1814 | } | |
1815 | ||
17a52670 | 1816 | /* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */ |
31fd8581 | 1817 | err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, |
ca369602 | 1818 | BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true); |
17a52670 AS |
1819 | if (err) |
1820 | return err; | |
1821 | ||
1822 | /* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */ | |
31fd8581 | 1823 | return check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, |
ca369602 | 1824 | BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true); |
17a52670 AS |
1825 | } |
1826 | ||
1827 | /* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size' | |
1828 | * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary | |
f1174f77 EC |
1829 | * and all elements of stack are initialized. |
1830 | * Unlike most pointer bounds-checking functions, this one doesn't take an | |
1831 | * 'off' argument, so it has to add in reg->off itself. | |
17a52670 | 1832 | */ |
58e2af8b | 1833 | static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, |
435faee1 DB |
1834 | int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, |
1835 | struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) | |
17a52670 | 1836 | { |
914cb781 | 1837 | struct bpf_reg_state *reg = cur_regs(env) + regno; |
f4d7e40a | 1838 | struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); |
638f5b90 | 1839 | int off, i, slot, spi; |
17a52670 | 1840 | |
914cb781 | 1841 | if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) { |
f1174f77 | 1842 | /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ |
8e2fe1d9 | 1843 | if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && |
914cb781 | 1844 | register_is_null(reg)) |
8e2fe1d9 DB |
1845 | return 0; |
1846 | ||
61bd5218 | 1847 | verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno, |
914cb781 | 1848 | reg_type_str[reg->type], |
8e2fe1d9 | 1849 | reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]); |
17a52670 | 1850 | return -EACCES; |
8e2fe1d9 | 1851 | } |
17a52670 | 1852 | |
f1174f77 | 1853 | /* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */ |
914cb781 | 1854 | if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |
f1174f77 EC |
1855 | char tn_buf[48]; |
1856 | ||
914cb781 | 1857 | tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); |
61bd5218 | 1858 | verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n", |
f1174f77 | 1859 | regno, tn_buf); |
ea25f914 | 1860 | return -EACCES; |
f1174f77 | 1861 | } |
914cb781 | 1862 | off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; |
17a52670 | 1863 | if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 || |
9fd29c08 | 1864 | access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) { |
61bd5218 | 1865 | verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n", |
17a52670 AS |
1866 | regno, off, access_size); |
1867 | return -EACCES; | |
1868 | } | |
1869 | ||
435faee1 DB |
1870 | if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { |
1871 | meta->access_size = access_size; | |
1872 | meta->regno = regno; | |
1873 | return 0; | |
1874 | } | |
1875 | ||
17a52670 | 1876 | for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) { |
cc2b14d5 AS |
1877 | u8 *stype; |
1878 | ||
638f5b90 AS |
1879 | slot = -(off + i) - 1; |
1880 | spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; | |
cc2b14d5 AS |
1881 | if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) |
1882 | goto err; | |
1883 | stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; | |
1884 | if (*stype == STACK_MISC) | |
1885 | goto mark; | |
1886 | if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) { | |
1887 | /* helper can write anything into the stack */ | |
1888 | *stype = STACK_MISC; | |
1889 | goto mark; | |
17a52670 | 1890 | } |
cc2b14d5 AS |
1891 | err: |
1892 | verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", | |
1893 | off, i, access_size); | |
1894 | return -EACCES; | |
1895 | mark: | |
1896 | /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause | |
1897 | * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' | |
1898 | */ | |
1899 | mark_stack_slot_read(env, env->cur_state, env->cur_state->parent, | |
1900 | spi, state->frameno); | |
17a52670 | 1901 | } |
f4d7e40a | 1902 | return update_stack_depth(env, state, off); |
17a52670 AS |
1903 | } |
1904 | ||
06c1c049 GB |
1905 | static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, |
1906 | int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, | |
1907 | struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) | |
1908 | { | |
638f5b90 | 1909 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; |
06c1c049 | 1910 | |
f1174f77 | 1911 | switch (reg->type) { |
06c1c049 | 1912 | case PTR_TO_PACKET: |
de8f3a83 | 1913 | case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: |
9fd29c08 YS |
1914 | return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, |
1915 | zero_size_allowed); | |
06c1c049 | 1916 | case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: |
9fd29c08 YS |
1917 | return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, |
1918 | zero_size_allowed); | |
f1174f77 | 1919 | default: /* scalar_value|ptr_to_stack or invalid ptr */ |
06c1c049 GB |
1920 | return check_stack_boundary(env, regno, access_size, |
1921 | zero_size_allowed, meta); | |
1922 | } | |
1923 | } | |
1924 | ||
90133415 DB |
1925 | static bool arg_type_is_mem_ptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) |
1926 | { | |
1927 | return type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || | |
1928 | type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL || | |
1929 | type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM; | |
1930 | } | |
1931 | ||
1932 | static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) | |
1933 | { | |
1934 | return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || | |
1935 | type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO; | |
1936 | } | |
1937 | ||
58e2af8b | 1938 | static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, |
33ff9823 DB |
1939 | enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, |
1940 | struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) | |
17a52670 | 1941 | { |
638f5b90 | 1942 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; |
6841de8b | 1943 | enum bpf_reg_type expected_type, type = reg->type; |
17a52670 AS |
1944 | int err = 0; |
1945 | ||
80f1d68c | 1946 | if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) |
17a52670 AS |
1947 | return 0; |
1948 | ||
dc503a8a EC |
1949 | err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); |
1950 | if (err) | |
1951 | return err; | |
17a52670 | 1952 | |
1be7f75d AS |
1953 | if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { |
1954 | if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { | |
61bd5218 JK |
1955 | verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", |
1956 | regno); | |
1be7f75d AS |
1957 | return -EACCES; |
1958 | } | |
80f1d68c | 1959 | return 0; |
1be7f75d | 1960 | } |
80f1d68c | 1961 | |
de8f3a83 | 1962 | if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && |
3a0af8fd | 1963 | !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { |
61bd5218 | 1964 | verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); |
6841de8b AS |
1965 | return -EACCES; |
1966 | } | |
1967 | ||
8e2fe1d9 | 1968 | if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || |
17a52670 AS |
1969 | arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { |
1970 | expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK; | |
d71962f3 | 1971 | if (!type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && |
de8f3a83 | 1972 | type != expected_type) |
6841de8b | 1973 | goto err_type; |
39f19ebb AS |
1974 | } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || |
1975 | arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) { | |
f1174f77 EC |
1976 | expected_type = SCALAR_VALUE; |
1977 | if (type != expected_type) | |
6841de8b | 1978 | goto err_type; |
17a52670 AS |
1979 | } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) { |
1980 | expected_type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; | |
6841de8b AS |
1981 | if (type != expected_type) |
1982 | goto err_type; | |
608cd71a AS |
1983 | } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { |
1984 | expected_type = PTR_TO_CTX; | |
6841de8b AS |
1985 | if (type != expected_type) |
1986 | goto err_type; | |
90133415 | 1987 | } else if (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_type)) { |
8e2fe1d9 DB |
1988 | expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK; |
1989 | /* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be | |
f1174f77 | 1990 | * passed in as argument, it's a SCALAR_VALUE type. Final test |
8e2fe1d9 DB |
1991 | * happens during stack boundary checking. |
1992 | */ | |
914cb781 | 1993 | if (register_is_null(reg) && |
db1ac496 | 1994 | arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL) |
6841de8b | 1995 | /* final test in check_stack_boundary() */; |
de8f3a83 DB |
1996 | else if (!type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && |
1997 | type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && | |
f1174f77 | 1998 | type != expected_type) |
6841de8b | 1999 | goto err_type; |
39f19ebb | 2000 | meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM; |
17a52670 | 2001 | } else { |
61bd5218 | 2002 | verbose(env, "unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type); |
17a52670 AS |
2003 | return -EFAULT; |
2004 | } | |
2005 | ||
17a52670 AS |
2006 | if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) { |
2007 | /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ | |
33ff9823 | 2008 | meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; |
17a52670 AS |
2009 | } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { |
2010 | /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: | |
2011 | * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within | |
2012 | * stack limits and initialized | |
2013 | */ | |
33ff9823 | 2014 | if (!meta->map_ptr) { |
17a52670 AS |
2015 | /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before |
2016 | * map_key, so that it's verified and known before | |
2017 | * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means | |
2018 | * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier | |
2019 | */ | |
61bd5218 | 2020 | verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
2021 | return -EACCES; |
2022 | } | |
d71962f3 PC |
2023 | err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, |
2024 | meta->map_ptr->key_size, false, | |
2025 | NULL); | |
17a52670 AS |
2026 | } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { |
2027 | /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: | |
2028 | * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity | |
2029 | */ | |
33ff9823 | 2030 | if (!meta->map_ptr) { |
17a52670 | 2031 | /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ |
61bd5218 | 2032 | verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
2033 | return -EACCES; |
2034 | } | |
d71962f3 PC |
2035 | err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, |
2036 | meta->map_ptr->value_size, false, | |
2037 | NULL); | |
90133415 | 2038 | } else if (arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_type)) { |
39f19ebb | 2039 | bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO); |
17a52670 | 2040 | |
849fa506 YS |
2041 | /* remember the mem_size which may be used later |
2042 | * to refine return values. | |
2043 | */ | |
2044 | meta->msize_smax_value = reg->smax_value; | |
2045 | meta->msize_umax_value = reg->umax_value; | |
2046 | ||
f1174f77 EC |
2047 | /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check |
2048 | * happens using its boundaries. | |
06c1c049 | 2049 | */ |
f1174f77 | 2050 | if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) |
06c1c049 GB |
2051 | /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw |
2052 | * mode so that the program is required to | |
2053 | * initialize all the memory that the helper could | |
2054 | * just partially fill up. | |
2055 | */ | |
2056 | meta = NULL; | |
2057 | ||
b03c9f9f | 2058 | if (reg->smin_value < 0) { |
61bd5218 | 2059 | verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", |
f1174f77 EC |
2060 | regno); |
2061 | return -EACCES; | |
2062 | } | |
06c1c049 | 2063 | |
b03c9f9f | 2064 | if (reg->umin_value == 0) { |
f1174f77 EC |
2065 | err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0, |
2066 | zero_size_allowed, | |
2067 | meta); | |
06c1c049 GB |
2068 | if (err) |
2069 | return err; | |
06c1c049 | 2070 | } |
f1174f77 | 2071 | |
b03c9f9f | 2072 | if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { |
61bd5218 | 2073 | verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", |
f1174f77 EC |
2074 | regno); |
2075 | return -EACCES; | |
2076 | } | |
2077 | err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, | |
b03c9f9f | 2078 | reg->umax_value, |
f1174f77 | 2079 | zero_size_allowed, meta); |
17a52670 AS |
2080 | } |
2081 | ||
2082 | return err; | |
6841de8b | 2083 | err_type: |
61bd5218 | 2084 | verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno, |
6841de8b AS |
2085 | reg_type_str[type], reg_type_str[expected_type]); |
2086 | return -EACCES; | |
17a52670 AS |
2087 | } |
2088 | ||
61bd5218 JK |
2089 | static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
2090 | struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) | |
35578d79 | 2091 | { |
35578d79 KX |
2092 | if (!map) |
2093 | return 0; | |
2094 | ||
6aff67c8 AS |
2095 | /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ |
2096 | switch (map->map_type) { | |
2097 | case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: | |
2098 | if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) | |
2099 | goto error; | |
2100 | break; | |
2101 | case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: | |
2102 | if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && | |
908432ca YS |
2103 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output && |
2104 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value) | |
6aff67c8 AS |
2105 | goto error; |
2106 | break; | |
2107 | case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: | |
2108 | if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) | |
2109 | goto error; | |
2110 | break; | |
4ed8ec52 | 2111 | case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: |
60747ef4 | 2112 | if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && |
60d20f91 | 2113 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) |
4a482f34 MKL |
2114 | goto error; |
2115 | break; | |
546ac1ff JF |
2116 | /* devmap returns a pointer to a live net_device ifindex that we cannot |
2117 | * allow to be modified from bpf side. So do not allow lookup elements | |
2118 | * for now. | |
2119 | */ | |
2120 | case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: | |
2ddf71e2 | 2121 | if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) |
546ac1ff JF |
2122 | goto error; |
2123 | break; | |
fbfc504a BT |
2124 | /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases |
2125 | * appear. | |
2126 | */ | |
6710e112 | 2127 | case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: |
fbfc504a | 2128 | case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: |
6710e112 JDB |
2129 | if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) |
2130 | goto error; | |
2131 | break; | |
56f668df | 2132 | case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: |
bcc6b1b7 | 2133 | case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: |
56f668df MKL |
2134 | if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) |
2135 | goto error; | |
16a43625 | 2136 | break; |
174a79ff JF |
2137 | case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: |
2138 | if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && | |
2139 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && | |
4f738adb JF |
2140 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && |
2141 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map) | |
174a79ff JF |
2142 | goto error; |
2143 | break; | |
81110384 JF |
2144 | case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: |
2145 | if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && | |
2146 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && | |
2147 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && | |
2148 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash) | |
2149 | goto error; | |
2150 | break; | |
6aff67c8 AS |
2151 | default: |
2152 | break; | |
2153 | } | |
2154 | ||
2155 | /* ... and second from the function itself. */ | |
2156 | switch (func_id) { | |
2157 | case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: | |
2158 | if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) | |
2159 | goto error; | |
f910cefa | 2160 | if (env->subprog_cnt > 1) { |
f4d7e40a AS |
2161 | verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); |
2162 | return -EINVAL; | |
2163 | } | |
6aff67c8 AS |
2164 | break; |
2165 | case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: | |
2166 | case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: | |
908432ca | 2167 | case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: |
6aff67c8 AS |
2168 | if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) |
2169 | goto error; | |
2170 | break; | |
2171 | case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: | |
2172 | if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) | |
2173 | goto error; | |
2174 | break; | |
60d20f91 | 2175 | case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: |
747ea55e | 2176 | case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: |
4a482f34 MKL |
2177 | if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) |
2178 | goto error; | |
2179 | break; | |
97f91a7c | 2180 | case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: |
9c270af3 | 2181 | if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP && |
fbfc504a BT |
2182 | map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP && |
2183 | map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) | |
97f91a7c JF |
2184 | goto error; |
2185 | break; | |
174a79ff | 2186 | case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: |
4f738adb | 2187 | case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map: |
81110384 | 2188 | case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: |
174a79ff JF |
2189 | if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) |
2190 | goto error; | |
2191 | break; | |
81110384 JF |
2192 | case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash: |
2193 | case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash: | |
2194 | case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update: | |
2195 | if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) | |
174a79ff JF |
2196 | goto error; |
2197 | break; | |
6aff67c8 AS |
2198 | default: |
2199 | break; | |
35578d79 KX |
2200 | } |
2201 | ||
2202 | return 0; | |
6aff67c8 | 2203 | error: |
61bd5218 | 2204 | verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", |
ebb676da | 2205 | map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); |
6aff67c8 | 2206 | return -EINVAL; |
35578d79 KX |
2207 | } |
2208 | ||
90133415 | 2209 | static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) |
435faee1 DB |
2210 | { |
2211 | int count = 0; | |
2212 | ||
39f19ebb | 2213 | if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) |
435faee1 | 2214 | count++; |
39f19ebb | 2215 | if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) |
435faee1 | 2216 | count++; |
39f19ebb | 2217 | if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) |
435faee1 | 2218 | count++; |
39f19ebb | 2219 | if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) |
435faee1 | 2220 | count++; |
39f19ebb | 2221 | if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) |
435faee1 DB |
2222 | count++; |
2223 | ||
90133415 DB |
2224 | /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, |
2225 | * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have | |
2226 | * right now. | |
2227 | */ | |
2228 | return count <= 1; | |
2229 | } | |
2230 | ||
2231 | static bool check_args_pair_invalid(enum bpf_arg_type arg_curr, | |
2232 | enum bpf_arg_type arg_next) | |
2233 | { | |
2234 | return (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_curr) && | |
2235 | !arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_next)) || | |
2236 | (!arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_curr) && | |
2237 | arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_next)); | |
2238 | } | |
2239 | ||
2240 | static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) | |
2241 | { | |
2242 | /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' | |
2243 | * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need | |
2244 | * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy | |
2245 | * helper function specification. | |
2246 | */ | |
2247 | if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) || | |
2248 | arg_type_is_mem_ptr(fn->arg5_type) || | |
2249 | check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg1_type, fn->arg2_type) || | |
2250 | check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg2_type, fn->arg3_type) || | |
2251 | check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg3_type, fn->arg4_type) || | |
2252 | check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg4_type, fn->arg5_type)) | |
2253 | return false; | |
2254 | ||
2255 | return true; | |
2256 | } | |
2257 | ||
2258 | static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) | |
2259 | { | |
2260 | return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) && | |
2261 | check_arg_pair_ok(fn) ? 0 : -EINVAL; | |
435faee1 DB |
2262 | } |
2263 | ||
de8f3a83 DB |
2264 | /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] |
2265 | * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. | |
f1174f77 | 2266 | */ |
f4d7e40a AS |
2267 | static void __clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
2268 | struct bpf_func_state *state) | |
969bf05e | 2269 | { |
58e2af8b | 2270 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; |
969bf05e AS |
2271 | int i; |
2272 | ||
2273 | for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) | |
de8f3a83 | 2274 | if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(®s[i])) |
61bd5218 | 2275 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); |
969bf05e | 2276 | |
638f5b90 AS |
2277 | for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { |
2278 | if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) | |
969bf05e | 2279 | continue; |
638f5b90 | 2280 | reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; |
de8f3a83 DB |
2281 | if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg)) |
2282 | __mark_reg_unknown(reg); | |
969bf05e AS |
2283 | } |
2284 | } | |
2285 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
2286 | static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
2287 | { | |
2288 | struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; | |
2289 | int i; | |
2290 | ||
2291 | for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) | |
2292 | __clear_all_pkt_pointers(env, vstate->frame[i]); | |
2293 | } | |
2294 | ||
2295 | static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, | |
2296 | int *insn_idx) | |
2297 | { | |
2298 | struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; | |
2299 | struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; | |
2300 | int i, subprog, target_insn; | |
2301 | ||
aada9ce6 | 2302 | if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { |
f4d7e40a | 2303 | verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n", |
aada9ce6 | 2304 | state->curframe + 2); |
f4d7e40a AS |
2305 | return -E2BIG; |
2306 | } | |
2307 | ||
2308 | target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm; | |
2309 | subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn + 1); | |
2310 | if (subprog < 0) { | |
2311 | verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", | |
2312 | target_insn + 1); | |
2313 | return -EFAULT; | |
2314 | } | |
2315 | ||
2316 | caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; | |
2317 | if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { | |
2318 | verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n", | |
2319 | state->curframe + 1); | |
2320 | return -EFAULT; | |
2321 | } | |
2322 | ||
2323 | callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); | |
2324 | if (!callee) | |
2325 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2326 | state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; | |
2327 | ||
2328 | /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write | |
2329 | * into its own stack before reading from it. | |
2330 | * callee can read/write into caller's stack | |
2331 | */ | |
2332 | init_func_state(env, callee, | |
2333 | /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ | |
2334 | *insn_idx /* callsite */, | |
2335 | state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, | |
f910cefa | 2336 | subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); |
f4d7e40a AS |
2337 | |
2338 | /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access */ | |
2339 | for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) | |
2340 | callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; | |
2341 | ||
2342 | /* after the call regsiters r0 - r5 were scratched */ | |
2343 | for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { | |
2344 | mark_reg_not_init(env, caller->regs, caller_saved[i]); | |
2345 | check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); | |
2346 | } | |
2347 | ||
2348 | /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ | |
2349 | state->curframe++; | |
2350 | ||
2351 | /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ | |
2352 | *insn_idx = target_insn; | |
2353 | ||
2354 | if (env->log.level) { | |
2355 | verbose(env, "caller:\n"); | |
2356 | print_verifier_state(env, caller); | |
2357 | verbose(env, "callee:\n"); | |
2358 | print_verifier_state(env, callee); | |
2359 | } | |
2360 | return 0; | |
2361 | } | |
2362 | ||
2363 | static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) | |
2364 | { | |
2365 | struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; | |
2366 | struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; | |
2367 | struct bpf_reg_state *r0; | |
2368 | ||
2369 | callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; | |
2370 | r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]; | |
2371 | if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { | |
2372 | /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer | |
2373 | * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller, | |
2374 | * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack | |
2375 | * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits, | |
2376 | * but let's be conservative | |
2377 | */ | |
2378 | verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n"); | |
2379 | return -EINVAL; | |
2380 | } | |
2381 | ||
2382 | state->curframe--; | |
2383 | caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; | |
2384 | /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ | |
2385 | caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; | |
2386 | ||
2387 | *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; | |
2388 | if (env->log.level) { | |
2389 | verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); | |
2390 | print_verifier_state(env, callee); | |
2391 | verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); | |
2392 | print_verifier_state(env, caller); | |
2393 | } | |
2394 | /* clear everything in the callee */ | |
2395 | free_func_state(callee); | |
2396 | state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; | |
2397 | return 0; | |
2398 | } | |
2399 | ||
849fa506 YS |
2400 | static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, |
2401 | int func_id, | |
2402 | struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) | |
2403 | { | |
2404 | struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; | |
2405 | ||
2406 | if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER || | |
2407 | (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack && | |
2408 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str)) | |
2409 | return; | |
2410 | ||
2411 | ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_smax_value; | |
2412 | ret_reg->umax_value = meta->msize_umax_value; | |
2413 | __reg_deduce_bounds(ret_reg); | |
2414 | __reg_bound_offset(ret_reg); | |
2415 | } | |
2416 | ||
c93552c4 DB |
2417 | static int |
2418 | record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, | |
2419 | int func_id, int insn_idx) | |
2420 | { | |
2421 | struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; | |
2422 | ||
2423 | if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && | |
09772d92 DB |
2424 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && |
2425 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && | |
2426 | func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem) | |
c93552c4 | 2427 | return 0; |
09772d92 | 2428 | |
c93552c4 DB |
2429 | if (meta->map_ptr == NULL) { |
2430 | verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); | |
2431 | return -EINVAL; | |
2432 | } | |
2433 | ||
2434 | if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_state)) | |
2435 | bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, | |
2436 | meta->map_ptr->unpriv_array); | |
2437 | else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_state) != meta->map_ptr) | |
2438 | bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON, | |
2439 | meta->map_ptr->unpriv_array); | |
2440 | return 0; | |
2441 | } | |
2442 | ||
f4d7e40a | 2443 | static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx) |
17a52670 | 2444 | { |
17a52670 | 2445 | const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; |
638f5b90 | 2446 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs; |
33ff9823 | 2447 | struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; |
969bf05e | 2448 | bool changes_data; |
17a52670 AS |
2449 | int i, err; |
2450 | ||
2451 | /* find function prototype */ | |
2452 | if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { | |
61bd5218 JK |
2453 | verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), |
2454 | func_id); | |
17a52670 AS |
2455 | return -EINVAL; |
2456 | } | |
2457 | ||
00176a34 | 2458 | if (env->ops->get_func_proto) |
5e43f899 | 2459 | fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog); |
17a52670 | 2460 | if (!fn) { |
61bd5218 JK |
2461 | verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), |
2462 | func_id); | |
17a52670 AS |
2463 | return -EINVAL; |
2464 | } | |
2465 | ||
2466 | /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ | |
24701ece | 2467 | if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { |
3fe2867c | 2468 | verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
2469 | return -EINVAL; |
2470 | } | |
2471 | ||
04514d13 | 2472 | /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ |
17bedab2 | 2473 | changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func); |
04514d13 DB |
2474 | if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { |
2475 | verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n", | |
2476 | func_id_name(func_id), func_id); | |
2477 | return -EINVAL; | |
2478 | } | |
969bf05e | 2479 | |
33ff9823 | 2480 | memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); |
36bbef52 | 2481 | meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; |
33ff9823 | 2482 | |
90133415 | 2483 | err = check_func_proto(fn); |
435faee1 | 2484 | if (err) { |
61bd5218 | 2485 | verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", |
ebb676da | 2486 | func_id_name(func_id), func_id); |
435faee1 DB |
2487 | return err; |
2488 | } | |
2489 | ||
17a52670 | 2490 | /* check args */ |
33ff9823 | 2491 | err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &meta); |
17a52670 AS |
2492 | if (err) |
2493 | return err; | |
33ff9823 | 2494 | err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta); |
17a52670 AS |
2495 | if (err) |
2496 | return err; | |
33ff9823 | 2497 | err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta); |
17a52670 AS |
2498 | if (err) |
2499 | return err; | |
33ff9823 | 2500 | err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &meta); |
17a52670 AS |
2501 | if (err) |
2502 | return err; | |
33ff9823 | 2503 | err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_5, fn->arg5_type, &meta); |
17a52670 AS |
2504 | if (err) |
2505 | return err; | |
2506 | ||
c93552c4 DB |
2507 | err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); |
2508 | if (err) | |
2509 | return err; | |
2510 | ||
435faee1 DB |
2511 | /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset |
2512 | * is inferred from register state. | |
2513 | */ | |
2514 | for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { | |
ca369602 DB |
2515 | err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, |
2516 | BPF_WRITE, -1, false); | |
435faee1 DB |
2517 | if (err) |
2518 | return err; | |
2519 | } | |
2520 | ||
638f5b90 | 2521 | regs = cur_regs(env); |
17a52670 | 2522 | /* reset caller saved regs */ |
dc503a8a | 2523 | for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { |
61bd5218 | 2524 | mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); |
dc503a8a EC |
2525 | check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); |
2526 | } | |
17a52670 | 2527 | |
dc503a8a | 2528 | /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ |
17a52670 | 2529 | if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) { |
f1174f77 | 2530 | /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ |
61bd5218 | 2531 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
17a52670 AS |
2532 | } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) { |
2533 | regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; | |
2534 | } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { | |
2535 | regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL; | |
f1174f77 | 2536 | /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ |
61bd5218 | 2537 | mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
f1174f77 | 2538 | regs[BPF_REG_0].off = 0; |
17a52670 AS |
2539 | /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() |
2540 | * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access | |
2541 | * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() | |
2542 | */ | |
33ff9823 | 2543 | if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { |
61bd5218 JK |
2544 | verbose(env, |
2545 | "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); | |
17a52670 AS |
2546 | return -EINVAL; |
2547 | } | |
33ff9823 | 2548 | regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; |
57a09bf0 | 2549 | regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; |
17a52670 | 2550 | } else { |
61bd5218 | 2551 | verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n", |
ebb676da | 2552 | fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); |
17a52670 AS |
2553 | return -EINVAL; |
2554 | } | |
04fd61ab | 2555 | |
849fa506 YS |
2556 | do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); |
2557 | ||
61bd5218 | 2558 | err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); |
35578d79 KX |
2559 | if (err) |
2560 | return err; | |
04fd61ab | 2561 | |
c195651e YS |
2562 | if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack && !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) { |
2563 | const char *err_str; | |
2564 | ||
2565 | #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS | |
2566 | err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); | |
2567 | err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n"; | |
2568 | #else | |
2569 | err = -ENOTSUPP; | |
2570 | err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n"; | |
2571 | #endif | |
2572 | if (err) { | |
2573 | verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); | |
2574 | return err; | |
2575 | } | |
2576 | ||
2577 | env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true; | |
2578 | } | |
2579 | ||
969bf05e AS |
2580 | if (changes_data) |
2581 | clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); | |
2582 | return 0; | |
2583 | } | |
2584 | ||
b03c9f9f EC |
2585 | static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) |
2586 | { | |
2587 | /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ | |
2588 | s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b); | |
2589 | ||
2590 | if (b < 0) | |
2591 | return res > a; | |
2592 | return res < a; | |
2593 | } | |
2594 | ||
2595 | static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) | |
2596 | { | |
2597 | /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ | |
2598 | s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b); | |
2599 | ||
2600 | if (b < 0) | |
2601 | return res < a; | |
2602 | return res > a; | |
969bf05e AS |
2603 | } |
2604 | ||
bb7f0f98 AS |
2605 | static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
2606 | const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, | |
2607 | enum bpf_reg_type type) | |
2608 | { | |
2609 | bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); | |
2610 | s64 val = reg->var_off.value; | |
2611 | s64 smin = reg->smin_value; | |
2612 | ||
2613 | if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { | |
2614 | verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", | |
2615 | reg_type_str[type], val); | |
2616 | return false; | |
2617 | } | |
2618 | ||
2619 | if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { | |
2620 | verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", | |
2621 | reg_type_str[type], reg->off); | |
2622 | return false; | |
2623 | } | |
2624 | ||
2625 | if (smin == S64_MIN) { | |
2626 | verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", | |
2627 | reg_type_str[type]); | |
2628 | return false; | |
2629 | } | |
2630 | ||
2631 | if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { | |
2632 | verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", | |
2633 | smin, reg_type_str[type]); | |
2634 | return false; | |
2635 | } | |
2636 | ||
2637 | return true; | |
2638 | } | |
2639 | ||
f1174f77 | 2640 | /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. |
f1174f77 EC |
2641 | * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. |
2642 | * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a | |
2643 | * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. | |
2644 | */ | |
2645 | static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, | |
2646 | struct bpf_insn *insn, | |
2647 | const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, | |
2648 | const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) | |
969bf05e | 2649 | { |
f4d7e40a AS |
2650 | struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
2651 | struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; | |
2652 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg; | |
f1174f77 | 2653 | bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); |
b03c9f9f EC |
2654 | s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, |
2655 | smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; | |
2656 | u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, | |
2657 | umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; | |
969bf05e | 2658 | u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
f1174f77 | 2659 | u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; |
969bf05e | 2660 | |
f1174f77 | 2661 | dst_reg = ®s[dst]; |
969bf05e | 2662 | |
6f16101e DB |
2663 | if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || |
2664 | smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { | |
2665 | /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from | |
2666 | * e.g. dead branches. | |
2667 | */ | |
2668 | __mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg); | |
2669 | return 0; | |
f1174f77 EC |
2670 | } |
2671 | ||
2672 | if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { | |
2673 | /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ | |
82abbf8d AS |
2674 | verbose(env, |
2675 | "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", | |
2676 | dst); | |
f1174f77 | 2677 | return -EACCES; |
969bf05e AS |
2678 | } |
2679 | ||
f1174f77 | 2680 | if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { |
82abbf8d AS |
2681 | verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n", |
2682 | dst); | |
f1174f77 EC |
2683 | return -EACCES; |
2684 | } | |
2685 | if (ptr_reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { | |
82abbf8d AS |
2686 | verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n", |
2687 | dst); | |
f1174f77 EC |
2688 | return -EACCES; |
2689 | } | |
2690 | if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { | |
82abbf8d AS |
2691 | verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n", |
2692 | dst); | |
f1174f77 EC |
2693 | return -EACCES; |
2694 | } | |
2695 | ||
2696 | /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. | |
2697 | * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. | |
969bf05e | 2698 | */ |
f1174f77 EC |
2699 | dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; |
2700 | dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; | |
969bf05e | 2701 | |
bb7f0f98 AS |
2702 | if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || |
2703 | !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) | |
2704 | return -EINVAL; | |
2705 | ||
f1174f77 EC |
2706 | switch (opcode) { |
2707 | case BPF_ADD: | |
2708 | /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow | |
2709 | * the s32 'off' field | |
969bf05e | 2710 | */ |
b03c9f9f EC |
2711 | if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == |
2712 | (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { | |
f1174f77 | 2713 | /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ |
b03c9f9f EC |
2714 | dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; |
2715 | dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; | |
2716 | dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; | |
2717 | dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; | |
f1174f77 | 2718 | dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; |
b03c9f9f | 2719 | dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; |
f1174f77 EC |
2720 | dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range; |
2721 | break; | |
2722 | } | |
f1174f77 EC |
2723 | /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off |
2724 | * == 0, since it's a scalar. | |
2725 | * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive | |
2726 | * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' | |
2727 | * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. | |
2728 | * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets | |
2729 | * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset | |
2730 | * from ptr_reg. | |
969bf05e | 2731 | */ |
b03c9f9f EC |
2732 | if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) || |
2733 | signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) { | |
2734 | dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; | |
2735 | dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; | |
2736 | } else { | |
2737 | dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val; | |
2738 | dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val; | |
2739 | } | |
2740 | if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr || | |
2741 | umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) { | |
2742 | dst_reg->umin_value = 0; | |
2743 | dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; | |
2744 | } else { | |
2745 | dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val; | |
2746 | dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val; | |
2747 | } | |
f1174f77 EC |
2748 | dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); |
2749 | dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; | |
de8f3a83 | 2750 | if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { |
f1174f77 EC |
2751 | dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; |
2752 | /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ | |
2753 | dst_reg->range = 0; | |
2754 | } | |
2755 | break; | |
2756 | case BPF_SUB: | |
2757 | if (dst_reg == off_reg) { | |
2758 | /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ | |
82abbf8d AS |
2759 | verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", |
2760 | dst); | |
f1174f77 EC |
2761 | return -EACCES; |
2762 | } | |
2763 | /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to | |
2764 | * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not | |
2765 | * be able to deal with it. | |
969bf05e | 2766 | */ |
f1174f77 | 2767 | if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { |
82abbf8d AS |
2768 | verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", |
2769 | dst); | |
f1174f77 EC |
2770 | return -EACCES; |
2771 | } | |
b03c9f9f EC |
2772 | if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == |
2773 | (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { | |
f1174f77 | 2774 | /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ |
b03c9f9f EC |
2775 | dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; |
2776 | dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; | |
2777 | dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; | |
2778 | dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; | |
f1174f77 EC |
2779 | dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; |
2780 | dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; | |
b03c9f9f | 2781 | dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; |
f1174f77 EC |
2782 | dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range; |
2783 | break; | |
2784 | } | |
f1174f77 EC |
2785 | /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known |
2786 | * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. | |
969bf05e | 2787 | */ |
b03c9f9f EC |
2788 | if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) || |
2789 | signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) { | |
2790 | /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ | |
2791 | dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; | |
2792 | dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; | |
2793 | } else { | |
2794 | dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val; | |
2795 | dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val; | |
2796 | } | |
2797 | if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { | |
2798 | /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ | |
2799 | dst_reg->umin_value = 0; | |
2800 | dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; | |
2801 | } else { | |
2802 | /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ | |
2803 | dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; | |
2804 | dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; | |
2805 | } | |
f1174f77 EC |
2806 | dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); |
2807 | dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; | |
de8f3a83 | 2808 | if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { |
f1174f77 EC |
2809 | dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; |
2810 | /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ | |
b03c9f9f | 2811 | if (smin_val < 0) |
f1174f77 | 2812 | dst_reg->range = 0; |
43188702 | 2813 | } |
f1174f77 EC |
2814 | break; |
2815 | case BPF_AND: | |
2816 | case BPF_OR: | |
2817 | case BPF_XOR: | |
82abbf8d AS |
2818 | /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */ |
2819 | verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", | |
2820 | dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); | |
f1174f77 EC |
2821 | return -EACCES; |
2822 | default: | |
2823 | /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ | |
82abbf8d AS |
2824 | verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", |
2825 | dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); | |
f1174f77 | 2826 | return -EACCES; |
43188702 JF |
2827 | } |
2828 | ||
bb7f0f98 AS |
2829 | if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) |
2830 | return -EINVAL; | |
2831 | ||
b03c9f9f EC |
2832 | __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); |
2833 | __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); | |
2834 | __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); | |
43188702 JF |
2835 | return 0; |
2836 | } | |
2837 | ||
468f6eaf JH |
2838 | /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual |
2839 | * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts | |
2840 | * need extra checks in the 32-bit case. | |
2841 | */ | |
f1174f77 EC |
2842 | static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
2843 | struct bpf_insn *insn, | |
2844 | struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, | |
2845 | struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) | |
969bf05e | 2846 | { |
638f5b90 | 2847 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
48461135 | 2848 | u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
f1174f77 | 2849 | bool src_known, dst_known; |
b03c9f9f EC |
2850 | s64 smin_val, smax_val; |
2851 | u64 umin_val, umax_val; | |
468f6eaf | 2852 | u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32; |
48461135 | 2853 | |
b03c9f9f EC |
2854 | smin_val = src_reg.smin_value; |
2855 | smax_val = src_reg.smax_value; | |
2856 | umin_val = src_reg.umin_value; | |
2857 | umax_val = src_reg.umax_value; | |
f1174f77 EC |
2858 | src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); |
2859 | dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); | |
f23cc643 | 2860 | |
6f16101e DB |
2861 | if ((src_known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || |
2862 | smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { | |
2863 | /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from | |
2864 | * e.g. dead branches. | |
2865 | */ | |
2866 | __mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg); | |
2867 | return 0; | |
2868 | } | |
2869 | ||
bb7f0f98 AS |
2870 | if (!src_known && |
2871 | opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) { | |
2872 | __mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg); | |
2873 | return 0; | |
2874 | } | |
2875 | ||
48461135 JB |
2876 | switch (opcode) { |
2877 | case BPF_ADD: | |
b03c9f9f EC |
2878 | if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) || |
2879 | signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) { | |
2880 | dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; | |
2881 | dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; | |
2882 | } else { | |
2883 | dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val; | |
2884 | dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val; | |
2885 | } | |
2886 | if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val || | |
2887 | dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) { | |
2888 | dst_reg->umin_value = 0; | |
2889 | dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; | |
2890 | } else { | |
2891 | dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val; | |
2892 | dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val; | |
2893 | } | |
f1174f77 | 2894 | dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); |
48461135 JB |
2895 | break; |
2896 | case BPF_SUB: | |
b03c9f9f EC |
2897 | if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) || |
2898 | signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) { | |
2899 | /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ | |
2900 | dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; | |
2901 | dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; | |
2902 | } else { | |
2903 | dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val; | |
2904 | dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val; | |
2905 | } | |
2906 | if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { | |
2907 | /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ | |
2908 | dst_reg->umin_value = 0; | |
2909 | dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; | |
2910 | } else { | |
2911 | /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ | |
2912 | dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val; | |
2913 | dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val; | |
2914 | } | |
f1174f77 | 2915 | dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); |
48461135 JB |
2916 | break; |
2917 | case BPF_MUL: | |
b03c9f9f EC |
2918 | dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); |
2919 | if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) { | |
f1174f77 | 2920 | /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ |
b03c9f9f EC |
2921 | __mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg); |
2922 | __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); | |
f1174f77 EC |
2923 | break; |
2924 | } | |
b03c9f9f EC |
2925 | /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and |
2926 | * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX). | |
f1174f77 | 2927 | */ |
b03c9f9f EC |
2928 | if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) { |
2929 | /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ | |
2930 | __mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg); | |
2931 | /* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */ | |
2932 | __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); | |
2933 | break; | |
2934 | } | |
2935 | dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val; | |
2936 | dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val; | |
2937 | if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) { | |
2938 | /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ | |
2939 | dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; | |
2940 | dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; | |
2941 | } else { | |
2942 | dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; | |
2943 | dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; | |
2944 | } | |
48461135 JB |
2945 | break; |
2946 | case BPF_AND: | |
f1174f77 | 2947 | if (src_known && dst_known) { |
b03c9f9f EC |
2948 | __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value & |
2949 | src_reg.var_off.value); | |
f1174f77 EC |
2950 | break; |
2951 | } | |
b03c9f9f EC |
2952 | /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently |
2953 | * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. | |
f23cc643 | 2954 | */ |
f1174f77 | 2955 | dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); |
b03c9f9f EC |
2956 | dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; |
2957 | dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); | |
2958 | if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { | |
2959 | /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, | |
2960 | * ain't nobody got time for that. | |
2961 | */ | |
2962 | dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; | |
2963 | dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; | |
2964 | } else { | |
2965 | /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to | |
2966 | * cast result into s64. | |
2967 | */ | |
2968 | dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; | |
2969 | dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; | |
2970 | } | |
2971 | /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ | |
2972 | __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); | |
f1174f77 EC |
2973 | break; |
2974 | case BPF_OR: | |
2975 | if (src_known && dst_known) { | |
b03c9f9f EC |
2976 | __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value | |
2977 | src_reg.var_off.value); | |
f1174f77 EC |
2978 | break; |
2979 | } | |
b03c9f9f EC |
2980 | /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the |
2981 | * maximum of the operands' minima | |
f1174f77 EC |
2982 | */ |
2983 | dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); | |
b03c9f9f EC |
2984 | dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); |
2985 | dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | | |
2986 | dst_reg->var_off.mask; | |
2987 | if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { | |
2988 | /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, | |
2989 | * ain't nobody got time for that. | |
2990 | */ | |
2991 | dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; | |
2992 | dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; | |
f1174f77 | 2993 | } else { |
b03c9f9f EC |
2994 | /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to |
2995 | * cast result into s64. | |
2996 | */ | |
2997 | dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; | |
2998 | dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; | |
f1174f77 | 2999 | } |
b03c9f9f EC |
3000 | /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ |
3001 | __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); | |
48461135 JB |
3002 | break; |
3003 | case BPF_LSH: | |
468f6eaf JH |
3004 | if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { |
3005 | /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. | |
3006 | * This includes shifts by a negative number. | |
b03c9f9f | 3007 | */ |
61bd5218 | 3008 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
f1174f77 EC |
3009 | break; |
3010 | } | |
b03c9f9f EC |
3011 | /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick |
3012 | * up from var_off) | |
48461135 | 3013 | */ |
b03c9f9f EC |
3014 | dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; |
3015 | dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; | |
3016 | /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ | |
3017 | if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { | |
3018 | dst_reg->umin_value = 0; | |
3019 | dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; | |
d1174416 | 3020 | } else { |
b03c9f9f EC |
3021 | dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; |
3022 | dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; | |
d1174416 | 3023 | } |
afbe1a5b | 3024 | dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); |
b03c9f9f EC |
3025 | /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ |
3026 | __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); | |
48461135 JB |
3027 | break; |
3028 | case BPF_RSH: | |
468f6eaf JH |
3029 | if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { |
3030 | /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. | |
3031 | * This includes shifts by a negative number. | |
b03c9f9f | 3032 | */ |
61bd5218 | 3033 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
f1174f77 EC |
3034 | break; |
3035 | } | |
4374f256 EC |
3036 | /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might |
3037 | * be negative, then either: | |
3038 | * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is | |
3039 | * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds | |
3040 | * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the | |
3041 | * signed bounds | |
3042 | * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing | |
3043 | * about the result | |
3044 | * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the | |
3045 | * unsigned bounts capture the signed bounds. | |
3046 | * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds | |
3047 | * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and | |
3048 | * var_off of the result. | |
3049 | */ | |
3050 | dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; | |
3051 | dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; | |
afbe1a5b | 3052 | dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); |
b03c9f9f EC |
3053 | dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; |
3054 | dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; | |
3055 | /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ | |
3056 | __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); | |
48461135 | 3057 | break; |
9cbe1f5a YS |
3058 | case BPF_ARSH: |
3059 | if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { | |
3060 | /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. | |
3061 | * This includes shifts by a negative number. | |
3062 | */ | |
3063 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); | |
3064 | break; | |
3065 | } | |
3066 | ||
3067 | /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and | |
3068 | * umax_val is equal to umin_val. | |
3069 | */ | |
3070 | dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val; | |
3071 | dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val; | |
3072 | dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); | |
3073 | ||
3074 | /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on | |
3075 | * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. | |
3076 | */ | |
3077 | dst_reg->umin_value = 0; | |
3078 | dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; | |
3079 | __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); | |
3080 | break; | |
48461135 | 3081 | default: |
61bd5218 | 3082 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
48461135 JB |
3083 | break; |
3084 | } | |
3085 | ||
468f6eaf JH |
3086 | if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { |
3087 | /* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->32 */ | |
3088 | coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4); | |
3089 | coerce_reg_to_size(&src_reg, 4); | |
3090 | } | |
3091 | ||
b03c9f9f EC |
3092 | __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); |
3093 | __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); | |
f1174f77 EC |
3094 | return 0; |
3095 | } | |
3096 | ||
3097 | /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max | |
3098 | * and var_off. | |
3099 | */ | |
3100 | static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, | |
3101 | struct bpf_insn *insn) | |
3102 | { | |
f4d7e40a AS |
3103 | struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; |
3104 | struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; | |
3105 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; | |
f1174f77 EC |
3106 | struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; |
3107 | u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); | |
f1174f77 EC |
3108 | |
3109 | dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; | |
f1174f77 EC |
3110 | src_reg = NULL; |
3111 | if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) | |
3112 | ptr_reg = dst_reg; | |
3113 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { | |
3114 | src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; | |
f1174f77 EC |
3115 | if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
3116 | if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { | |
3117 | /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields | |
82abbf8d AS |
3118 | * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except |
3119 | * pointer subtraction | |
f1174f77 | 3120 | */ |
82abbf8d AS |
3121 | if (opcode == BPF_SUB){ |
3122 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); | |
3123 | return 0; | |
f1174f77 | 3124 | } |
82abbf8d AS |
3125 | verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", |
3126 | insn->dst_reg, | |
3127 | bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); | |
3128 | return -EACCES; | |
f1174f77 EC |
3129 | } else { |
3130 | /* scalar += pointer | |
3131 | * This is legal, but we have to reverse our | |
3132 | * src/dest handling in computing the range | |
3133 | */ | |
82abbf8d AS |
3134 | return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, |
3135 | src_reg, dst_reg); | |
f1174f77 EC |
3136 | } |
3137 | } else if (ptr_reg) { | |
3138 | /* pointer += scalar */ | |
82abbf8d AS |
3139 | return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, |
3140 | dst_reg, src_reg); | |
f1174f77 EC |
3141 | } |
3142 | } else { | |
3143 | /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only | |
3144 | * need to be able to read from this state. | |
3145 | */ | |
3146 | off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; | |
b03c9f9f | 3147 | __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); |
f1174f77 | 3148 | src_reg = &off_reg; |
82abbf8d AS |
3149 | if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */ |
3150 | return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, | |
3151 | ptr_reg, src_reg); | |
f1174f77 EC |
3152 | } |
3153 | ||
3154 | /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ | |
3155 | if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { | |
f4d7e40a | 3156 | print_verifier_state(env, state); |
61bd5218 | 3157 | verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); |
f1174f77 EC |
3158 | return -EINVAL; |
3159 | } | |
3160 | if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { | |
f4d7e40a | 3161 | print_verifier_state(env, state); |
61bd5218 | 3162 | verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); |
f1174f77 EC |
3163 | return -EINVAL; |
3164 | } | |
3165 | return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); | |
48461135 JB |
3166 | } |
3167 | ||
17a52670 | 3168 | /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ |
58e2af8b | 3169 | static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) |
17a52670 | 3170 | { |
638f5b90 | 3171 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
17a52670 AS |
3172 | u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
3173 | int err; | |
3174 | ||
3175 | if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { | |
3176 | if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { | |
3177 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 || | |
3178 | insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || | |
3179 | insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { | |
61bd5218 | 3180 | verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
3181 | return -EINVAL; |
3182 | } | |
3183 | } else { | |
3184 | if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || | |
e67b8a68 EC |
3185 | (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || |
3186 | BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { | |
61bd5218 | 3187 | verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
3188 | return -EINVAL; |
3189 | } | |
3190 | } | |
3191 | ||
3192 | /* check src operand */ | |
dc503a8a | 3193 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
3194 | if (err) |
3195 | return err; | |
3196 | ||
1be7f75d | 3197 | if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { |
61bd5218 | 3198 | verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", |
1be7f75d AS |
3199 | insn->dst_reg); |
3200 | return -EACCES; | |
3201 | } | |
3202 | ||
17a52670 | 3203 | /* check dest operand */ |
dc503a8a | 3204 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
3205 | if (err) |
3206 | return err; | |
3207 | ||
3208 | } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { | |
3209 | ||
3210 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { | |
3211 | if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { | |
61bd5218 | 3212 | verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
3213 | return -EINVAL; |
3214 | } | |
3215 | ||
3216 | /* check src operand */ | |
dc503a8a | 3217 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
3218 | if (err) |
3219 | return err; | |
3220 | } else { | |
3221 | if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { | |
61bd5218 | 3222 | verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
3223 | return -EINVAL; |
3224 | } | |
3225 | } | |
3226 | ||
3227 | /* check dest operand */ | |
dc503a8a | 3228 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
3229 | if (err) |
3230 | return err; | |
3231 | ||
3232 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { | |
3233 | if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { | |
3234 | /* case: R1 = R2 | |
3235 | * copy register state to dest reg | |
3236 | */ | |
3237 | regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg]; | |
8fe2d6cc | 3238 | regs[insn->dst_reg].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; |
17a52670 | 3239 | } else { |
f1174f77 | 3240 | /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ |
1be7f75d | 3241 | if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { |
61bd5218 JK |
3242 | verbose(env, |
3243 | "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", | |
1be7f75d AS |
3244 | insn->src_reg); |
3245 | return -EACCES; | |
3246 | } | |
61bd5218 | 3247 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); |
0c17d1d2 | 3248 | coerce_reg_to_size(®s[insn->dst_reg], 4); |
17a52670 AS |
3249 | } |
3250 | } else { | |
3251 | /* case: R = imm | |
3252 | * remember the value we stored into this reg | |
3253 | */ | |
f1174f77 | 3254 | regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; |
95a762e2 JH |
3255 | if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { |
3256 | __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, | |
3257 | insn->imm); | |
3258 | } else { | |
3259 | __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, | |
3260 | (u32)insn->imm); | |
3261 | } | |
17a52670 AS |
3262 | } |
3263 | ||
3264 | } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { | |
61bd5218 | 3265 | verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); |
17a52670 AS |
3266 | return -EINVAL; |
3267 | ||
3268 | } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ | |
3269 | ||
17a52670 AS |
3270 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { |
3271 | if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { | |
61bd5218 | 3272 | verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
3273 | return -EINVAL; |
3274 | } | |
3275 | /* check src1 operand */ | |
dc503a8a | 3276 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
3277 | if (err) |
3278 | return err; | |
3279 | } else { | |
3280 | if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { | |
61bd5218 | 3281 | verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
3282 | return -EINVAL; |
3283 | } | |
3284 | } | |
3285 | ||
3286 | /* check src2 operand */ | |
dc503a8a | 3287 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
3288 | if (err) |
3289 | return err; | |
3290 | ||
3291 | if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && | |
3292 | BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { | |
61bd5218 | 3293 | verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
3294 | return -EINVAL; |
3295 | } | |
3296 | ||
7891a87e DB |
3297 | if (opcode == BPF_ARSH && BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { |
3298 | verbose(env, "BPF_ARSH not supported for 32 bit ALU\n"); | |
3299 | return -EINVAL; | |
3300 | } | |
3301 | ||
229394e8 RV |
3302 | if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || |
3303 | opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { | |
3304 | int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; | |
3305 | ||
3306 | if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { | |
61bd5218 | 3307 | verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); |
229394e8 RV |
3308 | return -EINVAL; |
3309 | } | |
3310 | } | |
3311 | ||
1a0dc1ac | 3312 | /* check dest operand */ |
dc503a8a | 3313 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); |
1a0dc1ac AS |
3314 | if (err) |
3315 | return err; | |
3316 | ||
f1174f77 | 3317 | return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); |
17a52670 AS |
3318 | } |
3319 | ||
3320 | return 0; | |
3321 | } | |
3322 | ||
f4d7e40a | 3323 | static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, |
de8f3a83 | 3324 | struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, |
f8ddadc4 | 3325 | enum bpf_reg_type type, |
fb2a311a | 3326 | bool range_right_open) |
969bf05e | 3327 | { |
f4d7e40a | 3328 | struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; |
58e2af8b | 3329 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; |
fb2a311a | 3330 | u16 new_range; |
f4d7e40a | 3331 | int i, j; |
2d2be8ca | 3332 | |
fb2a311a DB |
3333 | if (dst_reg->off < 0 || |
3334 | (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open)) | |
f1174f77 EC |
3335 | /* This doesn't give us any range */ |
3336 | return; | |
3337 | ||
b03c9f9f EC |
3338 | if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || |
3339 | dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) | |
f1174f77 EC |
3340 | /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less |
3341 | * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. | |
3342 | */ | |
3343 | return; | |
3344 | ||
fb2a311a DB |
3345 | new_range = dst_reg->off; |
3346 | if (range_right_open) | |
3347 | new_range--; | |
3348 | ||
3349 | /* Examples for register markings: | |
2d2be8ca | 3350 | * |
fb2a311a | 3351 | * pkt_data in dst register: |
2d2be8ca DB |
3352 | * |
3353 | * r2 = r3; | |
3354 | * r2 += 8; | |
3355 | * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> | |
3356 | * <access okay> | |
3357 | * | |
b4e432f1 DB |
3358 | * r2 = r3; |
3359 | * r2 += 8; | |
3360 | * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> | |
3361 | * <handle exception> | |
3362 | * | |
2d2be8ca DB |
3363 | * Where: |
3364 | * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg | |
3365 | * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) | |
3366 | * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) | |
3367 | * | |
fb2a311a | 3368 | * pkt_data in src register: |
2d2be8ca DB |
3369 | * |
3370 | * r2 = r3; | |
3371 | * r2 += 8; | |
3372 | * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> | |
3373 | * <handle exception> | |
3374 | * | |
b4e432f1 DB |
3375 | * r2 = r3; |
3376 | * r2 += 8; | |
3377 | * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> | |
3378 | * <access okay> | |
3379 | * | |
2d2be8ca DB |
3380 | * Where: |
3381 | * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg | |
3382 | * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) | |
3383 | * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) | |
3384 | * | |
3385 | * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) | |
fb2a311a DB |
3386 | * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) |
3387 | * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on | |
3388 | * the check. | |
969bf05e | 3389 | */ |
2d2be8ca | 3390 | |
f1174f77 EC |
3391 | /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we |
3392 | * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big | |
3393 | * the range won't allow anything. | |
3394 | * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. | |
3395 | */ | |
969bf05e | 3396 | for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) |
de8f3a83 | 3397 | if (regs[i].type == type && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id) |
b1977682 | 3398 | /* keep the maximum range already checked */ |
fb2a311a | 3399 | regs[i].range = max(regs[i].range, new_range); |
969bf05e | 3400 | |
f4d7e40a AS |
3401 | for (j = 0; j <= vstate->curframe; j++) { |
3402 | state = vstate->frame[j]; | |
3403 | for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { | |
3404 | if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) | |
3405 | continue; | |
3406 | reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; | |
3407 | if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) | |
3408 | reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); | |
3409 | } | |
969bf05e AS |
3410 | } |
3411 | } | |
3412 | ||
48461135 JB |
3413 | /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the |
3414 | * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're | |
3415 | * simply doing a BPF_K check. | |
f1174f77 | 3416 | * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values. |
48461135 JB |
3417 | */ |
3418 | static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, | |
3419 | struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val, | |
3420 | u8 opcode) | |
3421 | { | |
f1174f77 EC |
3422 | /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its |
3423 | * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into | |
3424 | * the same object, but we don't bother with that. | |
3425 | * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we | |
3426 | * only need to check one of them for pointerness. | |
3427 | */ | |
3428 | if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) | |
3429 | return; | |
4cabc5b1 | 3430 | |
48461135 JB |
3431 | switch (opcode) { |
3432 | case BPF_JEQ: | |
3433 | /* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is | |
3434 | * true then we know for sure. | |
3435 | */ | |
b03c9f9f | 3436 | __mark_reg_known(true_reg, val); |
48461135 JB |
3437 | break; |
3438 | case BPF_JNE: | |
3439 | /* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false | |
3440 | * we know the value for sure; | |
3441 | */ | |
b03c9f9f | 3442 | __mark_reg_known(false_reg, val); |
48461135 JB |
3443 | break; |
3444 | case BPF_JGT: | |
b03c9f9f EC |
3445 | false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val); |
3446 | true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val + 1); | |
3447 | break; | |
48461135 | 3448 | case BPF_JSGT: |
b03c9f9f EC |
3449 | false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val); |
3450 | true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val + 1); | |
48461135 | 3451 | break; |
b4e432f1 DB |
3452 | case BPF_JLT: |
3453 | false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val); | |
3454 | true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val - 1); | |
3455 | break; | |
3456 | case BPF_JSLT: | |
3457 | false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val); | |
3458 | true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val - 1); | |
3459 | break; | |
48461135 | 3460 | case BPF_JGE: |
b03c9f9f EC |
3461 | false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val - 1); |
3462 | true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val); | |
3463 | break; | |
48461135 | 3464 | case BPF_JSGE: |
b03c9f9f EC |
3465 | false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val - 1); |
3466 | true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val); | |
48461135 | 3467 | break; |
b4e432f1 DB |
3468 | case BPF_JLE: |
3469 | false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val + 1); | |
3470 | true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val); | |
3471 | break; | |
3472 | case BPF_JSLE: | |
3473 | false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val + 1); | |
3474 | true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val); | |
3475 | break; | |
48461135 JB |
3476 | default: |
3477 | break; | |
3478 | } | |
3479 | ||
b03c9f9f EC |
3480 | __reg_deduce_bounds(false_reg); |
3481 | __reg_deduce_bounds(true_reg); | |
3482 | /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ | |
3483 | __reg_bound_offset(false_reg); | |
3484 | __reg_bound_offset(true_reg); | |
3485 | /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds | |
3486 | * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), | |
3487 | * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. | |
3488 | */ | |
3489 | __update_reg_bounds(false_reg); | |
3490 | __update_reg_bounds(true_reg); | |
48461135 JB |
3491 | } |
3492 | ||
f1174f77 EC |
3493 | /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is |
3494 | * the variable reg. | |
48461135 JB |
3495 | */ |
3496 | static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, | |
3497 | struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val, | |
3498 | u8 opcode) | |
3499 | { | |
f1174f77 EC |
3500 | if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) |
3501 | return; | |
4cabc5b1 | 3502 | |
48461135 JB |
3503 | switch (opcode) { |
3504 | case BPF_JEQ: | |
3505 | /* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is | |
3506 | * true then we know for sure. | |
3507 | */ | |
b03c9f9f | 3508 | __mark_reg_known(true_reg, val); |
48461135 JB |
3509 | break; |
3510 | case BPF_JNE: | |
3511 | /* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false | |
3512 | * we know the value for sure; | |
3513 | */ | |
b03c9f9f | 3514 | __mark_reg_known(false_reg, val); |
48461135 JB |
3515 | break; |
3516 | case BPF_JGT: | |
b03c9f9f EC |
3517 | true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val - 1); |
3518 | false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val); | |
3519 | break; | |
48461135 | 3520 | case BPF_JSGT: |
b03c9f9f EC |
3521 | true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val - 1); |
3522 | false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val); | |
48461135 | 3523 | break; |
b4e432f1 DB |
3524 | case BPF_JLT: |
3525 | true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val + 1); | |
3526 | false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val); | |
3527 | break; | |
3528 | case BPF_JSLT: | |
3529 | true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val + 1); | |
3530 | false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val); | |
3531 | break; | |
48461135 | 3532 | case BPF_JGE: |
b03c9f9f EC |
3533 | true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val); |
3534 | false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val + 1); | |
3535 | break; | |
48461135 | 3536 | case BPF_JSGE: |
b03c9f9f EC |
3537 | true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val); |
3538 | false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val + 1); | |
48461135 | 3539 | break; |
b4e432f1 DB |
3540 | case BPF_JLE: |
3541 | true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val); | |
3542 | false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val - 1); | |
3543 | break; | |
3544 | case BPF_JSLE: | |
3545 | true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val); | |
3546 | false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val - 1); | |
3547 | break; | |
48461135 JB |
3548 | default: |
3549 | break; | |
3550 | } | |
3551 | ||
b03c9f9f EC |
3552 | __reg_deduce_bounds(false_reg); |
3553 | __reg_deduce_bounds(true_reg); | |
3554 | /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ | |
3555 | __reg_bound_offset(false_reg); | |
3556 | __reg_bound_offset(true_reg); | |
3557 | /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds | |
3558 | * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), | |
3559 | * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. | |
3560 | */ | |
3561 | __update_reg_bounds(false_reg); | |
3562 | __update_reg_bounds(true_reg); | |
f1174f77 EC |
3563 | } |
3564 | ||
3565 | /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */ | |
3566 | static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, | |
3567 | struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) | |
3568 | { | |
b03c9f9f EC |
3569 | src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value, |
3570 | dst_reg->umin_value); | |
3571 | src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value, | |
3572 | dst_reg->umax_value); | |
3573 | src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value, | |
3574 | dst_reg->smin_value); | |
3575 | src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value, | |
3576 | dst_reg->smax_value); | |
f1174f77 EC |
3577 | src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off, |
3578 | dst_reg->var_off); | |
b03c9f9f EC |
3579 | /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ |
3580 | __update_reg_bounds(src_reg); | |
3581 | __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); | |
3582 | /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ | |
3583 | __reg_deduce_bounds(src_reg); | |
3584 | __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); | |
3585 | /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ | |
3586 | __reg_bound_offset(src_reg); | |
3587 | __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); | |
3588 | /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds | |
3589 | * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), | |
3590 | * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. | |
3591 | */ | |
3592 | __update_reg_bounds(src_reg); | |
3593 | __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); | |
f1174f77 EC |
3594 | } |
3595 | ||
3596 | static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src, | |
3597 | struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst, | |
3598 | struct bpf_reg_state *false_src, | |
3599 | struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst, | |
3600 | u8 opcode) | |
3601 | { | |
3602 | switch (opcode) { | |
3603 | case BPF_JEQ: | |
3604 | __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst); | |
3605 | break; | |
3606 | case BPF_JNE: | |
3607 | __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst); | |
b03c9f9f | 3608 | break; |
4cabc5b1 | 3609 | } |
48461135 JB |
3610 | } |
3611 | ||
57a09bf0 | 3612 | static void mark_map_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, u32 id, |
f1174f77 | 3613 | bool is_null) |
57a09bf0 TG |
3614 | { |
3615 | struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; | |
3616 | ||
3617 | if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && reg->id == id) { | |
f1174f77 EC |
3618 | /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should |
3619 | * have been known-zero, because we don't allow pointer | |
3620 | * arithmetic on pointers that might be NULL. | |
3621 | */ | |
b03c9f9f EC |
3622 | if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || |
3623 | !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0) || | |
f1174f77 | 3624 | reg->off)) { |
b03c9f9f EC |
3625 | __mark_reg_known_zero(reg); |
3626 | reg->off = 0; | |
f1174f77 EC |
3627 | } |
3628 | if (is_null) { | |
3629 | reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; | |
56f668df MKL |
3630 | } else if (reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta) { |
3631 | reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; | |
3632 | reg->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta; | |
3633 | } else { | |
f1174f77 | 3634 | reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; |
56f668df | 3635 | } |
a08dd0da DB |
3636 | /* We don't need id from this point onwards anymore, thus we |
3637 | * should better reset it, so that state pruning has chances | |
3638 | * to take effect. | |
3639 | */ | |
3640 | reg->id = 0; | |
57a09bf0 TG |
3641 | } |
3642 | } | |
3643 | ||
3644 | /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually | |
3645 | * be folded together at some point. | |
3646 | */ | |
f4d7e40a | 3647 | static void mark_map_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno, |
f1174f77 | 3648 | bool is_null) |
57a09bf0 | 3649 | { |
f4d7e40a | 3650 | struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; |
57a09bf0 | 3651 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; |
a08dd0da | 3652 | u32 id = regs[regno].id; |
f4d7e40a | 3653 | int i, j; |
57a09bf0 TG |
3654 | |
3655 | for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) | |
f1174f77 | 3656 | mark_map_reg(regs, i, id, is_null); |
57a09bf0 | 3657 | |
f4d7e40a AS |
3658 | for (j = 0; j <= vstate->curframe; j++) { |
3659 | state = vstate->frame[j]; | |
3660 | for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { | |
3661 | if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) | |
3662 | continue; | |
3663 | mark_map_reg(&state->stack[i].spilled_ptr, 0, id, is_null); | |
3664 | } | |
57a09bf0 TG |
3665 | } |
3666 | } | |
3667 | ||
5beca081 DB |
3668 | static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn, |
3669 | struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, | |
3670 | struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, | |
3671 | struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch, | |
3672 | struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch) | |
3673 | { | |
3674 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X) | |
3675 | return false; | |
3676 | ||
3677 | switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { | |
3678 | case BPF_JGT: | |
3679 | if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && | |
3680 | src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || | |
3681 | (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && | |
3682 | reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { | |
3683 | /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */ | |
3684 | find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, | |
3685 | dst_reg->type, false); | |
3686 | } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && | |
3687 | src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || | |
3688 | (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && | |
3689 | src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { | |
3690 | /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ | |
3691 | find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, | |
3692 | src_reg->type, true); | |
3693 | } else { | |
3694 | return false; | |
3695 | } | |
3696 | break; | |
3697 | case BPF_JLT: | |
3698 | if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && | |
3699 | src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || | |
3700 | (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && | |
3701 | reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { | |
3702 | /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */ | |
3703 | find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, | |
3704 | dst_reg->type, true); | |
3705 | } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && | |
3706 | src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || | |
3707 | (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && | |
3708 | src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { | |
3709 | /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ | |
3710 | find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, | |
3711 | src_reg->type, false); | |
3712 | } else { | |
3713 | return false; | |
3714 | } | |
3715 | break; | |
3716 | case BPF_JGE: | |
3717 | if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && | |
3718 | src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || | |
3719 | (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && | |
3720 | reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { | |
3721 | /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */ | |
3722 | find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, | |
3723 | dst_reg->type, true); | |
3724 | } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && | |
3725 | src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || | |
3726 | (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && | |
3727 | src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { | |
3728 | /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */ | |
3729 | find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, | |
3730 | src_reg->type, false); | |
3731 | } else { | |
3732 | return false; | |
3733 | } | |
3734 | break; | |
3735 | case BPF_JLE: | |
3736 | if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && | |
3737 | src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || | |
3738 | (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && | |
3739 | reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { | |
3740 | /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */ | |
3741 | find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, | |
3742 | dst_reg->type, false); | |
3743 | } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && | |
3744 | src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || | |
3745 | (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && | |
3746 | src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { | |
3747 | /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */ | |
3748 | find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, | |
3749 | src_reg->type, true); | |
3750 | } else { | |
3751 | return false; | |
3752 | } | |
3753 | break; | |
3754 | default: | |
3755 | return false; | |
3756 | } | |
3757 | ||
3758 | return true; | |
3759 | } | |
3760 | ||
58e2af8b | 3761 | static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
17a52670 AS |
3762 | struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) |
3763 | { | |
f4d7e40a AS |
3764 | struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; |
3765 | struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; | |
3766 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; | |
3767 | struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs; | |
17a52670 AS |
3768 | u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
3769 | int err; | |
3770 | ||
b4e432f1 | 3771 | if (opcode > BPF_JSLE) { |
61bd5218 | 3772 | verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode); |
17a52670 AS |
3773 | return -EINVAL; |
3774 | } | |
3775 | ||
3776 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { | |
3777 | if (insn->imm != 0) { | |
61bd5218 | 3778 | verbose(env, "BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
3779 | return -EINVAL; |
3780 | } | |
3781 | ||
3782 | /* check src1 operand */ | |
dc503a8a | 3783 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
3784 | if (err) |
3785 | return err; | |
1be7f75d AS |
3786 | |
3787 | if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { | |
61bd5218 | 3788 | verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", |
1be7f75d AS |
3789 | insn->src_reg); |
3790 | return -EACCES; | |
3791 | } | |
17a52670 AS |
3792 | } else { |
3793 | if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { | |
61bd5218 | 3794 | verbose(env, "BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
3795 | return -EINVAL; |
3796 | } | |
3797 | } | |
3798 | ||
3799 | /* check src2 operand */ | |
dc503a8a | 3800 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
3801 | if (err) |
3802 | return err; | |
3803 | ||
1a0dc1ac AS |
3804 | dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; |
3805 | ||
17a52670 AS |
3806 | /* detect if R == 0 where R was initialized to zero earlier */ |
3807 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && | |
3808 | (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && | |
f1174f77 | 3809 | dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && |
3bf15921 AS |
3810 | tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off)) { |
3811 | if ((opcode == BPF_JEQ && dst_reg->var_off.value == insn->imm) || | |
3812 | (opcode == BPF_JNE && dst_reg->var_off.value != insn->imm)) { | |
17a52670 AS |
3813 | /* if (imm == imm) goto pc+off; |
3814 | * only follow the goto, ignore fall-through | |
3815 | */ | |
3816 | *insn_idx += insn->off; | |
3817 | return 0; | |
3818 | } else { | |
3819 | /* if (imm != imm) goto pc+off; | |
3820 | * only follow fall-through branch, since | |
3821 | * that's where the program will go | |
3822 | */ | |
3823 | return 0; | |
3824 | } | |
3825 | } | |
3826 | ||
3827 | other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx); | |
3828 | if (!other_branch) | |
3829 | return -EFAULT; | |
f4d7e40a | 3830 | other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs; |
17a52670 | 3831 | |
48461135 JB |
3832 | /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust |
3833 | * our min/max values for our dst register. | |
f1174f77 EC |
3834 | * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same |
3835 | * object, I suppose, but we don't support that right now), because | |
3836 | * otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't | |
3837 | * comparable. | |
48461135 JB |
3838 | */ |
3839 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { | |
f1174f77 EC |
3840 | if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && |
3841 | regs[insn->src_reg].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { | |
3842 | if (tnum_is_const(regs[insn->src_reg].var_off)) | |
f4d7e40a | 3843 | reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], |
f1174f77 EC |
3844 | dst_reg, regs[insn->src_reg].var_off.value, |
3845 | opcode); | |
3846 | else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off)) | |
f4d7e40a | 3847 | reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], |
f1174f77 EC |
3848 | ®s[insn->src_reg], |
3849 | dst_reg->var_off.value, opcode); | |
3850 | else if (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) | |
3851 | /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */ | |
f4d7e40a AS |
3852 | reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], |
3853 | &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], | |
f1174f77 EC |
3854 | ®s[insn->src_reg], |
3855 | ®s[insn->dst_reg], opcode); | |
3856 | } | |
3857 | } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { | |
f4d7e40a | 3858 | reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], |
48461135 JB |
3859 | dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode); |
3860 | } | |
3861 | ||
58e2af8b | 3862 | /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() */ |
17a52670 | 3863 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && |
1a0dc1ac AS |
3864 | insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && |
3865 | dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { | |
57a09bf0 TG |
3866 | /* Mark all identical map registers in each branch as either |
3867 | * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. | |
3868 | */ | |
f1174f77 EC |
3869 | mark_map_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, opcode == BPF_JNE); |
3870 | mark_map_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, opcode == BPF_JEQ); | |
5beca081 DB |
3871 | } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg], |
3872 | this_branch, other_branch) && | |
3873 | is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { | |
61bd5218 JK |
3874 | verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", |
3875 | insn->dst_reg); | |
1be7f75d | 3876 | return -EACCES; |
17a52670 | 3877 | } |
61bd5218 | 3878 | if (env->log.level) |
f4d7e40a | 3879 | print_verifier_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); |
17a52670 AS |
3880 | return 0; |
3881 | } | |
3882 | ||
0246e64d AS |
3883 | /* return the map pointer stored inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ |
3884 | static struct bpf_map *ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(struct bpf_insn *insn) | |
3885 | { | |
3886 | u64 imm64 = ((u64) (u32) insn[0].imm) | ((u64) (u32) insn[1].imm) << 32; | |
3887 | ||
3888 | return (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) imm64; | |
3889 | } | |
3890 | ||
17a52670 | 3891 | /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ |
58e2af8b | 3892 | static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) |
17a52670 | 3893 | { |
638f5b90 | 3894 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
17a52670 AS |
3895 | int err; |
3896 | ||
3897 | if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { | |
61bd5218 | 3898 | verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
3899 | return -EINVAL; |
3900 | } | |
3901 | if (insn->off != 0) { | |
61bd5218 | 3902 | verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
3903 | return -EINVAL; |
3904 | } | |
3905 | ||
dc503a8a | 3906 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
3907 | if (err) |
3908 | return err; | |
3909 | ||
6b173873 | 3910 | if (insn->src_reg == 0) { |
6b173873 JK |
3911 | u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; |
3912 | ||
f1174f77 | 3913 | regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; |
b03c9f9f | 3914 | __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); |
17a52670 | 3915 | return 0; |
6b173873 | 3916 | } |
17a52670 AS |
3917 | |
3918 | /* replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() should have caught bad ld_imm64 */ | |
3919 | BUG_ON(insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD); | |
3920 | ||
3921 | regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; | |
3922 | regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(insn); | |
3923 | return 0; | |
3924 | } | |
3925 | ||
96be4325 DB |
3926 | static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) |
3927 | { | |
3928 | switch (type) { | |
3929 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: | |
3930 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: | |
94caee8c | 3931 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: |
96be4325 DB |
3932 | return true; |
3933 | default: | |
3934 | return false; | |
3935 | } | |
3936 | } | |
3937 | ||
ddd872bc AS |
3938 | /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: |
3939 | * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb | |
3940 | * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, | |
3941 | * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 | |
3942 | * | |
3943 | * Implicit input: | |
3944 | * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX | |
3945 | * | |
3946 | * Explicit input: | |
3947 | * SRC == any register | |
3948 | * IMM == 32-bit immediate | |
3949 | * | |
3950 | * Output: | |
3951 | * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness | |
3952 | */ | |
58e2af8b | 3953 | static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) |
ddd872bc | 3954 | { |
638f5b90 | 3955 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); |
ddd872bc | 3956 | u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); |
ddd872bc AS |
3957 | int i, err; |
3958 | ||
24701ece | 3959 | if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) { |
61bd5218 | 3960 | verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); |
ddd872bc AS |
3961 | return -EINVAL; |
3962 | } | |
3963 | ||
e0cea7ce DB |
3964 | if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { |
3965 | verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); | |
3966 | return -EINVAL; | |
3967 | } | |
3968 | ||
f910cefa | 3969 | if (env->subprog_cnt > 1) { |
f4d7e40a AS |
3970 | /* when program has LD_ABS insn JITs and interpreter assume |
3971 | * that r1 == ctx == skb which is not the case for callees | |
3972 | * that can have arbitrary arguments. It's problematic | |
3973 | * for main prog as well since JITs would need to analyze | |
3974 | * all functions in order to make proper register save/restore | |
3975 | * decisions in the main prog. Hence disallow LD_ABS with calls | |
3976 | */ | |
3977 | verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions cannot be mixed with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); | |
3978 | return -EINVAL; | |
3979 | } | |
3980 | ||
ddd872bc | 3981 | if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || |
d82bccc6 | 3982 | BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || |
ddd872bc | 3983 | (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { |
61bd5218 | 3984 | verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); |
ddd872bc AS |
3985 | return -EINVAL; |
3986 | } | |
3987 | ||
3988 | /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ | |
dc503a8a | 3989 | err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_6, SRC_OP); |
ddd872bc AS |
3990 | if (err) |
3991 | return err; | |
3992 | ||
3993 | if (regs[BPF_REG_6].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { | |
61bd5218 JK |
3994 | verbose(env, |
3995 | "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); | |
ddd872bc AS |
3996 | return -EINVAL; |
3997 | } | |
3998 | ||
3999 | if (mode == BPF_IND) { | |
4000 | /* check explicit source operand */ | |
dc503a8a | 4001 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
ddd872bc AS |
4002 | if (err) |
4003 | return err; | |
4004 | } | |
4005 | ||
4006 | /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ | |
dc503a8a | 4007 | for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { |
61bd5218 | 4008 | mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); |
dc503a8a EC |
4009 | check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); |
4010 | } | |
ddd872bc AS |
4011 | |
4012 | /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains | |
dc503a8a EC |
4013 | * the value fetched from the packet. |
4014 | * Already marked as written above. | |
ddd872bc | 4015 | */ |
61bd5218 | 4016 | mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); |
ddd872bc AS |
4017 | return 0; |
4018 | } | |
4019 | ||
390ee7e2 AS |
4020 | static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
4021 | { | |
4022 | struct bpf_reg_state *reg; | |
4023 | struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); | |
4024 | ||
4025 | switch (env->prog->type) { | |
4026 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: | |
4027 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: | |
4fbac77d | 4028 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: |
390ee7e2 | 4029 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: |
ebc614f6 | 4030 | case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: |
390ee7e2 AS |
4031 | break; |
4032 | default: | |
4033 | return 0; | |
4034 | } | |
4035 | ||
638f5b90 | 4036 | reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0; |
390ee7e2 | 4037 | if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { |
61bd5218 | 4038 | verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", |
390ee7e2 AS |
4039 | reg_type_str[reg->type]); |
4040 | return -EINVAL; | |
4041 | } | |
4042 | ||
4043 | if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { | |
61bd5218 | 4044 | verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 "); |
390ee7e2 AS |
4045 | if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { |
4046 | char tn_buf[48]; | |
4047 | ||
4048 | tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); | |
61bd5218 | 4049 | verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); |
390ee7e2 | 4050 | } else { |
61bd5218 | 4051 | verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); |
390ee7e2 | 4052 | } |
61bd5218 | 4053 | verbose(env, " should have been 0 or 1\n"); |
390ee7e2 AS |
4054 | return -EINVAL; |
4055 | } | |
4056 | return 0; | |
4057 | } | |
4058 | ||
475fb78f AS |
4059 | /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code |
4060 | * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): | |
4061 | * 2 label v as discovered | |
4062 | * 3 let S be a stack | |
4063 | * 4 S.push(v) | |
4064 | * 5 while S is not empty | |
4065 | * 6 t <- S.pop() | |
4066 | * 7 if t is what we're looking for: | |
4067 | * 8 return t | |
4068 | * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do | |
4069 | * 10 if edge e is already labelled | |
4070 | * 11 continue with the next edge | |
4071 | * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) | |
4072 | * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored | |
4073 | * 14 label e as tree-edge | |
4074 | * 15 label w as discovered | |
4075 | * 16 S.push(w) | |
4076 | * 17 continue at 5 | |
4077 | * 18 else if vertex w is discovered | |
4078 | * 19 label e as back-edge | |
4079 | * 20 else | |
4080 | * 21 // vertex w is explored | |
4081 | * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge | |
4082 | * 23 label t as explored | |
4083 | * 24 S.pop() | |
4084 | * | |
4085 | * convention: | |
4086 | * 0x10 - discovered | |
4087 | * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled | |
4088 | * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled | |
4089 | * 0x20 - explored | |
4090 | */ | |
4091 | ||
4092 | enum { | |
4093 | DISCOVERED = 0x10, | |
4094 | EXPLORED = 0x20, | |
4095 | FALLTHROUGH = 1, | |
4096 | BRANCH = 2, | |
4097 | }; | |
4098 | ||
58e2af8b | 4099 | #define STATE_LIST_MARK ((struct bpf_verifier_state_list *) -1L) |
f1bca824 | 4100 | |
475fb78f AS |
4101 | static int *insn_stack; /* stack of insns to process */ |
4102 | static int cur_stack; /* current stack index */ | |
4103 | static int *insn_state; | |
4104 | ||
4105 | /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: | |
4106 | * t - index of current instruction | |
4107 | * w - next instruction | |
4108 | * e - edge | |
4109 | */ | |
58e2af8b | 4110 | static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
475fb78f AS |
4111 | { |
4112 | if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) | |
4113 | return 0; | |
4114 | ||
4115 | if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) | |
4116 | return 0; | |
4117 | ||
4118 | if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { | |
61bd5218 | 4119 | verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); |
475fb78f AS |
4120 | return -EINVAL; |
4121 | } | |
4122 | ||
f1bca824 AS |
4123 | if (e == BRANCH) |
4124 | /* mark branch target for state pruning */ | |
4125 | env->explored_states[w] = STATE_LIST_MARK; | |
4126 | ||
475fb78f AS |
4127 | if (insn_state[w] == 0) { |
4128 | /* tree-edge */ | |
4129 | insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; | |
4130 | insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; | |
4131 | if (cur_stack >= env->prog->len) | |
4132 | return -E2BIG; | |
4133 | insn_stack[cur_stack++] = w; | |
4134 | return 1; | |
4135 | } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { | |
61bd5218 | 4136 | verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); |
475fb78f AS |
4137 | return -EINVAL; |
4138 | } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { | |
4139 | /* forward- or cross-edge */ | |
4140 | insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; | |
4141 | } else { | |
61bd5218 | 4142 | verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); |
475fb78f AS |
4143 | return -EFAULT; |
4144 | } | |
4145 | return 0; | |
4146 | } | |
4147 | ||
4148 | /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program | |
4149 | * loop == back-edge in directed graph | |
4150 | */ | |
58e2af8b | 4151 | static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
475fb78f AS |
4152 | { |
4153 | struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; | |
4154 | int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; | |
4155 | int ret = 0; | |
4156 | int i, t; | |
4157 | ||
cc8b0b92 AS |
4158 | ret = check_subprogs(env); |
4159 | if (ret < 0) | |
4160 | return ret; | |
4161 | ||
475fb78f AS |
4162 | insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); |
4163 | if (!insn_state) | |
4164 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4165 | ||
4166 | insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); | |
4167 | if (!insn_stack) { | |
4168 | kfree(insn_state); | |
4169 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4170 | } | |
4171 | ||
4172 | insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ | |
4173 | insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ | |
4174 | cur_stack = 1; | |
4175 | ||
4176 | peek_stack: | |
4177 | if (cur_stack == 0) | |
4178 | goto check_state; | |
4179 | t = insn_stack[cur_stack - 1]; | |
4180 | ||
4181 | if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP) { | |
4182 | u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code); | |
4183 | ||
4184 | if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { | |
4185 | goto mark_explored; | |
4186 | } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { | |
4187 | ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); | |
4188 | if (ret == 1) | |
4189 | goto peek_stack; | |
4190 | else if (ret < 0) | |
4191 | goto err_free; | |
07016151 DB |
4192 | if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) |
4193 | env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK; | |
cc8b0b92 AS |
4194 | if (insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) { |
4195 | env->explored_states[t] = STATE_LIST_MARK; | |
4196 | ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env); | |
4197 | if (ret == 1) | |
4198 | goto peek_stack; | |
4199 | else if (ret < 0) | |
4200 | goto err_free; | |
4201 | } | |
475fb78f AS |
4202 | } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { |
4203 | if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) { | |
4204 | ret = -EINVAL; | |
4205 | goto err_free; | |
4206 | } | |
4207 | /* unconditional jump with single edge */ | |
4208 | ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, | |
4209 | FALLTHROUGH, env); | |
4210 | if (ret == 1) | |
4211 | goto peek_stack; | |
4212 | else if (ret < 0) | |
4213 | goto err_free; | |
f1bca824 AS |
4214 | /* tell verifier to check for equivalent states |
4215 | * after every call and jump | |
4216 | */ | |
c3de6317 AS |
4217 | if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) |
4218 | env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK; | |
475fb78f AS |
4219 | } else { |
4220 | /* conditional jump with two edges */ | |
3c2ce60b | 4221 | env->explored_states[t] = STATE_LIST_MARK; |
475fb78f AS |
4222 | ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); |
4223 | if (ret == 1) | |
4224 | goto peek_stack; | |
4225 | else if (ret < 0) | |
4226 | goto err_free; | |
4227 | ||
4228 | ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env); | |
4229 | if (ret == 1) | |
4230 | goto peek_stack; | |
4231 | else if (ret < 0) | |
4232 | goto err_free; | |
4233 | } | |
4234 | } else { | |
4235 | /* all other non-branch instructions with single | |
4236 | * fall-through edge | |
4237 | */ | |
4238 | ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); | |
4239 | if (ret == 1) | |
4240 | goto peek_stack; | |
4241 | else if (ret < 0) | |
4242 | goto err_free; | |
4243 | } | |
4244 | ||
4245 | mark_explored: | |
4246 | insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; | |
4247 | if (cur_stack-- <= 0) { | |
61bd5218 | 4248 | verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); |
475fb78f AS |
4249 | ret = -EFAULT; |
4250 | goto err_free; | |
4251 | } | |
4252 | goto peek_stack; | |
4253 | ||
4254 | check_state: | |
4255 | for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { | |
4256 | if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { | |
61bd5218 | 4257 | verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); |
475fb78f AS |
4258 | ret = -EINVAL; |
4259 | goto err_free; | |
4260 | } | |
4261 | } | |
4262 | ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ | |
4263 | ||
4264 | err_free: | |
4265 | kfree(insn_state); | |
4266 | kfree(insn_stack); | |
4267 | return ret; | |
4268 | } | |
4269 | ||
f1174f77 EC |
4270 | /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ |
4271 | static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old, | |
4272 | struct bpf_reg_state *cur) | |
4273 | { | |
b03c9f9f EC |
4274 | return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && |
4275 | old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && | |
4276 | old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && | |
4277 | old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value; | |
f1174f77 EC |
4278 | } |
4279 | ||
4280 | /* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */ | |
4281 | #define ID_MAP_SIZE (MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) | |
4282 | struct idpair { | |
4283 | u32 old; | |
4284 | u32 cur; | |
4285 | }; | |
4286 | ||
4287 | /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have | |
4288 | * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from | |
4289 | * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. | |
4290 | * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent | |
4291 | * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But | |
4292 | * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about | |
4293 | * that. | |
4294 | * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If | |
4295 | * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. | |
969bf05e | 4296 | */ |
f1174f77 | 4297 | static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct idpair *idmap) |
969bf05e | 4298 | { |
f1174f77 | 4299 | unsigned int i; |
969bf05e | 4300 | |
f1174f77 EC |
4301 | for (i = 0; i < ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { |
4302 | if (!idmap[i].old) { | |
4303 | /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ | |
4304 | idmap[i].old = old_id; | |
4305 | idmap[i].cur = cur_id; | |
4306 | return true; | |
4307 | } | |
4308 | if (idmap[i].old == old_id) | |
4309 | return idmap[i].cur == cur_id; | |
4310 | } | |
4311 | /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ | |
4312 | WARN_ON_ONCE(1); | |
4313 | return false; | |
4314 | } | |
4315 | ||
4316 | /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ | |
1b688a19 EC |
4317 | static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, |
4318 | struct idpair *idmap) | |
f1174f77 | 4319 | { |
f4d7e40a AS |
4320 | bool equal; |
4321 | ||
dc503a8a EC |
4322 | if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) |
4323 | /* explored state didn't use this */ | |
4324 | return true; | |
4325 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
4326 | equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, frameno)) == 0; |
4327 | ||
4328 | if (rold->type == PTR_TO_STACK) | |
4329 | /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to | |
4330 | * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar | |
4331 | */ | |
4332 | return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; | |
4333 | ||
4334 | if (equal) | |
969bf05e AS |
4335 | return true; |
4336 | ||
f1174f77 EC |
4337 | if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) |
4338 | /* explored state can't have used this */ | |
969bf05e | 4339 | return true; |
f1174f77 EC |
4340 | if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT) |
4341 | return false; | |
4342 | switch (rold->type) { | |
4343 | case SCALAR_VALUE: | |
4344 | if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { | |
4345 | /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ | |
4346 | return range_within(rold, rcur) && | |
4347 | tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); | |
4348 | } else { | |
179d1c56 JH |
4349 | /* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar. |
4350 | * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to | |
4351 | * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak | |
4352 | * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in | |
4353 | * special cases if root is calling us, but it's | |
4354 | * probably not worth the hassle. | |
f1174f77 | 4355 | */ |
179d1c56 | 4356 | return false; |
f1174f77 EC |
4357 | } |
4358 | case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: | |
1b688a19 EC |
4359 | /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and |
4360 | * everything else matches, we are OK. | |
4361 | * We don't care about the 'id' value, because nothing | |
4362 | * uses it for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (only for ..._OR_NULL) | |
4363 | */ | |
4364 | return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && | |
4365 | range_within(rold, rcur) && | |
4366 | tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); | |
f1174f77 EC |
4367 | case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: |
4368 | /* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a | |
4369 | * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map. | |
4370 | * However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL- | |
4371 | * checked, doing so could have affected others with the same | |
4372 | * id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when | |
4373 | * we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. | |
4374 | */ | |
4375 | if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) | |
4376 | return false; | |
4377 | if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id))) | |
4378 | return false; | |
4379 | /* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */ | |
4380 | return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); | |
de8f3a83 | 4381 | case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: |
f1174f77 | 4382 | case PTR_TO_PACKET: |
de8f3a83 | 4383 | if (rcur->type != rold->type) |
f1174f77 EC |
4384 | return false; |
4385 | /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr | |
4386 | * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are | |
4387 | * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, | |
4388 | * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or | |
4389 | * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. | |
4390 | */ | |
4391 | if (rold->range > rcur->range) | |
4392 | return false; | |
4393 | /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; | |
4394 | * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. | |
4395 | */ | |
4396 | if (rold->off != rcur->off) | |
4397 | return false; | |
4398 | /* id relations must be preserved */ | |
4399 | if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) | |
4400 | return false; | |
4401 | /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ | |
4402 | return range_within(rold, rcur) && | |
4403 | tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); | |
4404 | case PTR_TO_CTX: | |
4405 | case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: | |
f1174f77 EC |
4406 | case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: |
4407 | /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above | |
4408 | * would have accepted | |
4409 | */ | |
4410 | default: | |
4411 | /* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */ | |
4412 | return false; | |
4413 | } | |
969bf05e | 4414 | |
f1174f77 EC |
4415 | /* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */ |
4416 | WARN_ON_ONCE(1); | |
969bf05e AS |
4417 | return false; |
4418 | } | |
4419 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
4420 | static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, |
4421 | struct bpf_func_state *cur, | |
638f5b90 AS |
4422 | struct idpair *idmap) |
4423 | { | |
4424 | int i, spi; | |
4425 | ||
4426 | /* if explored stack has more populated slots than current stack | |
4427 | * such stacks are not equivalent | |
4428 | */ | |
4429 | if (old->allocated_stack > cur->allocated_stack) | |
4430 | return false; | |
4431 | ||
4432 | /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional | |
4433 | * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state | |
4434 | * didn't use them | |
4435 | */ | |
4436 | for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) { | |
4437 | spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; | |
4438 | ||
cc2b14d5 AS |
4439 | if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) |
4440 | /* explored state didn't use this */ | |
fd05e57b | 4441 | continue; |
cc2b14d5 | 4442 | |
638f5b90 AS |
4443 | if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) |
4444 | continue; | |
cc2b14d5 AS |
4445 | /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack |
4446 | * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack. | |
4447 | * The opposite is not true | |
4448 | */ | |
4449 | if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC && | |
4450 | cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) | |
4451 | continue; | |
638f5b90 AS |
4452 | if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != |
4453 | cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) | |
4454 | /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in | |
4455 | * this stack slot, but current has has STACK_MISC -> | |
4456 | * this verifier states are not equivalent, | |
4457 | * return false to continue verification of this path | |
4458 | */ | |
4459 | return false; | |
4460 | if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE) | |
4461 | continue; | |
4462 | if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) | |
4463 | continue; | |
4464 | if (!regsafe(&old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, | |
4465 | &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, | |
4466 | idmap)) | |
4467 | /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing | |
4468 | * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types | |
4469 | * are the same as well. | |
4470 | * Ex: explored safe path could have stored | |
4471 | * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} | |
4472 | * but current path has stored: | |
4473 | * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} | |
4474 | * such verifier states are not equivalent. | |
4475 | * return false to continue verification of this path | |
4476 | */ | |
4477 | return false; | |
4478 | } | |
4479 | return true; | |
4480 | } | |
4481 | ||
f1bca824 AS |
4482 | /* compare two verifier states |
4483 | * | |
4484 | * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since | |
4485 | * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them | |
4486 | * | |
4487 | * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of | |
4488 | * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has | |
4489 | * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution | |
4490 | * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already | |
4491 | * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. | |
4492 | * | |
4493 | * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative | |
4494 | * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. | |
4495 | * Example: | |
4496 | * explored current | |
4497 | * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) | |
4498 | * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) | |
4499 | * | |
4500 | * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more | |
4501 | * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means | |
4502 | * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too | |
4503 | * | |
4504 | * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid | |
4505 | * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that | |
4506 | * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely | |
4507 | */ | |
f4d7e40a AS |
4508 | static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_func_state *old, |
4509 | struct bpf_func_state *cur) | |
f1bca824 | 4510 | { |
f1174f77 EC |
4511 | struct idpair *idmap; |
4512 | bool ret = false; | |
f1bca824 AS |
4513 | int i; |
4514 | ||
f1174f77 EC |
4515 | idmap = kcalloc(ID_MAP_SIZE, sizeof(struct idpair), GFP_KERNEL); |
4516 | /* If we failed to allocate the idmap, just say it's not safe */ | |
4517 | if (!idmap) | |
1a0dc1ac | 4518 | return false; |
f1174f77 EC |
4519 | |
4520 | for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { | |
1b688a19 | 4521 | if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], idmap)) |
f1174f77 | 4522 | goto out_free; |
f1bca824 AS |
4523 | } |
4524 | ||
638f5b90 AS |
4525 | if (!stacksafe(old, cur, idmap)) |
4526 | goto out_free; | |
f1174f77 EC |
4527 | ret = true; |
4528 | out_free: | |
4529 | kfree(idmap); | |
4530 | return ret; | |
f1bca824 AS |
4531 | } |
4532 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
4533 | static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
4534 | struct bpf_verifier_state *old, | |
4535 | struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) | |
4536 | { | |
4537 | int i; | |
4538 | ||
4539 | if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) | |
4540 | return false; | |
4541 | ||
4542 | /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same | |
4543 | * and all frame states need to be equivalent | |
4544 | */ | |
4545 | for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { | |
4546 | if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) | |
4547 | return false; | |
4548 | if (!func_states_equal(old->frame[i], cur->frame[i])) | |
4549 | return false; | |
4550 | } | |
4551 | return true; | |
4552 | } | |
4553 | ||
8e9cd9ce | 4554 | /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the |
f4d7e40a AS |
4555 | * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at an |
4556 | * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line | |
4557 | * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless | |
4558 | * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison | |
4559 | * in mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() is for. | |
8e9cd9ce | 4560 | */ |
f4d7e40a AS |
4561 | static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
4562 | const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, | |
4563 | struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent) | |
dc503a8a | 4564 | { |
f4d7e40a AS |
4565 | int i, frame, err = 0; |
4566 | struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent; | |
dc503a8a | 4567 | |
f4d7e40a AS |
4568 | if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) { |
4569 | WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n", | |
4570 | vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe); | |
4571 | return -EFAULT; | |
4572 | } | |
dc503a8a EC |
4573 | /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */ |
4574 | BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG); | |
4575 | /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ | |
4576 | for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { | |
f4d7e40a | 4577 | if (vparent->frame[vparent->curframe]->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) |
63f45f84 | 4578 | continue; |
f4d7e40a AS |
4579 | if (vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) { |
4580 | err = mark_reg_read(env, vstate, vparent, i); | |
4581 | if (err) | |
4582 | return err; | |
dc503a8a EC |
4583 | } |
4584 | } | |
f4d7e40a | 4585 | |
dc503a8a | 4586 | /* ... and stack slots */ |
f4d7e40a AS |
4587 | for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) { |
4588 | state = vstate->frame[frame]; | |
4589 | parent = vparent->frame[frame]; | |
4590 | for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE && | |
4591 | i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { | |
f4d7e40a AS |
4592 | if (parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ) |
4593 | continue; | |
4594 | if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ) | |
4595 | mark_stack_slot_read(env, vstate, vparent, i, frame); | |
dc503a8a EC |
4596 | } |
4597 | } | |
f4d7e40a | 4598 | return err; |
dc503a8a EC |
4599 | } |
4600 | ||
58e2af8b | 4601 | static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) |
f1bca824 | 4602 | { |
58e2af8b JK |
4603 | struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; |
4604 | struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; | |
638f5b90 | 4605 | struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; |
f4d7e40a | 4606 | int i, j, err; |
f1bca824 AS |
4607 | |
4608 | sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx]; | |
4609 | if (!sl) | |
4610 | /* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not | |
4611 | * be doing state search here | |
4612 | */ | |
4613 | return 0; | |
4614 | ||
4615 | while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) { | |
638f5b90 | 4616 | if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { |
f1bca824 | 4617 | /* reached equivalent register/stack state, |
dc503a8a EC |
4618 | * prune the search. |
4619 | * Registers read by the continuation are read by us. | |
8e9cd9ce EC |
4620 | * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they |
4621 | * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation | |
4622 | * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our | |
4623 | * own state will get the read marks recorded, but | |
4624 | * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning | |
4625 | * this state and will pop a new one. | |
f1bca824 | 4626 | */ |
f4d7e40a AS |
4627 | err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur); |
4628 | if (err) | |
4629 | return err; | |
f1bca824 | 4630 | return 1; |
dc503a8a | 4631 | } |
f1bca824 AS |
4632 | sl = sl->next; |
4633 | } | |
4634 | ||
4635 | /* there were no equivalent states, remember current one. | |
4636 | * technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, | |
f4d7e40a AS |
4637 | * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) |
4638 | * or it will be rejected. Since there are no loops, we won't be | |
4639 | * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) | |
4640 | * again on the way to bpf_exit | |
f1bca824 | 4641 | */ |
638f5b90 | 4642 | new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); |
f1bca824 AS |
4643 | if (!new_sl) |
4644 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4645 | ||
4646 | /* add new state to the head of linked list */ | |
1969db47 AS |
4647 | err = copy_verifier_state(&new_sl->state, cur); |
4648 | if (err) { | |
4649 | free_verifier_state(&new_sl->state, false); | |
4650 | kfree(new_sl); | |
4651 | return err; | |
4652 | } | |
f1bca824 AS |
4653 | new_sl->next = env->explored_states[insn_idx]; |
4654 | env->explored_states[insn_idx] = new_sl; | |
dc503a8a | 4655 | /* connect new state to parentage chain */ |
638f5b90 | 4656 | cur->parent = &new_sl->state; |
8e9cd9ce EC |
4657 | /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes |
4658 | * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. | |
4659 | * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark | |
4660 | * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only | |
4661 | * explored_states can get read marks.) | |
4662 | */ | |
dc503a8a | 4663 | for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) |
f4d7e40a AS |
4664 | cur->frame[cur->curframe]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; |
4665 | ||
4666 | /* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */ | |
4667 | for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { | |
4668 | struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j]; | |
4669 | ||
4670 | for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) | |
cc2b14d5 | 4671 | frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE; |
f4d7e40a | 4672 | } |
f1bca824 AS |
4673 | return 0; |
4674 | } | |
4675 | ||
58e2af8b | 4676 | static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
17a52670 | 4677 | { |
638f5b90 | 4678 | struct bpf_verifier_state *state; |
17a52670 | 4679 | struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; |
638f5b90 | 4680 | struct bpf_reg_state *regs; |
f4d7e40a | 4681 | int insn_cnt = env->prog->len, i; |
17a52670 AS |
4682 | int insn_idx, prev_insn_idx = 0; |
4683 | int insn_processed = 0; | |
4684 | bool do_print_state = false; | |
4685 | ||
638f5b90 AS |
4686 | state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL); |
4687 | if (!state) | |
4688 | return -ENOMEM; | |
f4d7e40a | 4689 | state->curframe = 0; |
dc503a8a | 4690 | state->parent = NULL; |
f4d7e40a AS |
4691 | state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL); |
4692 | if (!state->frame[0]) { | |
4693 | kfree(state); | |
4694 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4695 | } | |
4696 | env->cur_state = state; | |
4697 | init_func_state(env, state->frame[0], | |
4698 | BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, | |
4699 | 0 /* frameno */, | |
4700 | 0 /* subprogno, zero == main subprog */); | |
17a52670 AS |
4701 | insn_idx = 0; |
4702 | for (;;) { | |
4703 | struct bpf_insn *insn; | |
4704 | u8 class; | |
4705 | int err; | |
4706 | ||
4707 | if (insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { | |
61bd5218 | 4708 | verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", |
17a52670 AS |
4709 | insn_idx, insn_cnt); |
4710 | return -EFAULT; | |
4711 | } | |
4712 | ||
4713 | insn = &insns[insn_idx]; | |
4714 | class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); | |
4715 | ||
07016151 | 4716 | if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { |
61bd5218 JK |
4717 | verbose(env, |
4718 | "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", | |
17a52670 AS |
4719 | insn_processed); |
4720 | return -E2BIG; | |
4721 | } | |
4722 | ||
f1bca824 AS |
4723 | err = is_state_visited(env, insn_idx); |
4724 | if (err < 0) | |
4725 | return err; | |
4726 | if (err == 1) { | |
4727 | /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ | |
61bd5218 | 4728 | if (env->log.level) { |
f1bca824 | 4729 | if (do_print_state) |
61bd5218 | 4730 | verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n", |
f1bca824 AS |
4731 | prev_insn_idx, insn_idx); |
4732 | else | |
61bd5218 | 4733 | verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", insn_idx); |
f1bca824 AS |
4734 | } |
4735 | goto process_bpf_exit; | |
4736 | } | |
4737 | ||
3c2ce60b DB |
4738 | if (need_resched()) |
4739 | cond_resched(); | |
4740 | ||
61bd5218 JK |
4741 | if (env->log.level > 1 || (env->log.level && do_print_state)) { |
4742 | if (env->log.level > 1) | |
4743 | verbose(env, "%d:", insn_idx); | |
c5fc9692 | 4744 | else |
61bd5218 | 4745 | verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d:", |
c5fc9692 | 4746 | prev_insn_idx, insn_idx); |
f4d7e40a | 4747 | print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]); |
17a52670 AS |
4748 | do_print_state = false; |
4749 | } | |
4750 | ||
61bd5218 | 4751 | if (env->log.level) { |
7105e828 DB |
4752 | const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { |
4753 | .cb_print = verbose, | |
abe08840 | 4754 | .private_data = env, |
7105e828 DB |
4755 | }; |
4756 | ||
61bd5218 | 4757 | verbose(env, "%d: ", insn_idx); |
abe08840 | 4758 | print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); |
17a52670 AS |
4759 | } |
4760 | ||
cae1927c JK |
4761 | if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { |
4762 | err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, insn_idx, | |
4763 | prev_insn_idx); | |
4764 | if (err) | |
4765 | return err; | |
4766 | } | |
13a27dfc | 4767 | |
638f5b90 | 4768 | regs = cur_regs(env); |
c131187d | 4769 | env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].seen = true; |
17a52670 | 4770 | if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { |
1be7f75d | 4771 | err = check_alu_op(env, insn); |
17a52670 AS |
4772 | if (err) |
4773 | return err; | |
4774 | ||
4775 | } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { | |
3df126f3 | 4776 | enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type; |
9bac3d6d AS |
4777 | |
4778 | /* check for reserved fields is already done */ | |
4779 | ||
17a52670 | 4780 | /* check src operand */ |
dc503a8a | 4781 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
4782 | if (err) |
4783 | return err; | |
4784 | ||
dc503a8a | 4785 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); |
17a52670 AS |
4786 | if (err) |
4787 | return err; | |
4788 | ||
725f9dcd AS |
4789 | src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; |
4790 | ||
17a52670 AS |
4791 | /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable, |
4792 | * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func | |
4793 | */ | |
31fd8581 | 4794 | err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off, |
17a52670 | 4795 | BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, |
ca369602 | 4796 | insn->dst_reg, false); |
17a52670 AS |
4797 | if (err) |
4798 | return err; | |
4799 | ||
3df126f3 JK |
4800 | prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type; |
4801 | ||
4802 | if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) { | |
9bac3d6d AS |
4803 | /* saw a valid insn |
4804 | * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) | |
3df126f3 | 4805 | * save type to validate intersecting paths |
9bac3d6d | 4806 | */ |
3df126f3 | 4807 | *prev_src_type = src_reg_type; |
9bac3d6d | 4808 | |
3df126f3 | 4809 | } else if (src_reg_type != *prev_src_type && |
9bac3d6d | 4810 | (src_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX || |
3df126f3 | 4811 | *prev_src_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) { |
9bac3d6d AS |
4812 | /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn |
4813 | * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) | |
4814 | * with different pointer types: | |
4815 | * src_reg == ctx in one branch and | |
4816 | * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. | |
4817 | * Reject it. | |
4818 | */ | |
61bd5218 | 4819 | verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); |
9bac3d6d AS |
4820 | return -EINVAL; |
4821 | } | |
4822 | ||
17a52670 | 4823 | } else if (class == BPF_STX) { |
3df126f3 | 4824 | enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type; |
d691f9e8 | 4825 | |
17a52670 | 4826 | if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) { |
31fd8581 | 4827 | err = check_xadd(env, insn_idx, insn); |
17a52670 AS |
4828 | if (err) |
4829 | return err; | |
4830 | insn_idx++; | |
4831 | continue; | |
4832 | } | |
4833 | ||
17a52670 | 4834 | /* check src1 operand */ |
dc503a8a | 4835 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
4836 | if (err) |
4837 | return err; | |
4838 | /* check src2 operand */ | |
dc503a8a | 4839 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
4840 | if (err) |
4841 | return err; | |
4842 | ||
d691f9e8 AS |
4843 | dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; |
4844 | ||
17a52670 | 4845 | /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ |
31fd8581 | 4846 | err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, |
17a52670 | 4847 | BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, |
ca369602 | 4848 | insn->src_reg, false); |
17a52670 AS |
4849 | if (err) |
4850 | return err; | |
4851 | ||
3df126f3 JK |
4852 | prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type; |
4853 | ||
4854 | if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) { | |
4855 | *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type; | |
4856 | } else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type && | |
d691f9e8 | 4857 | (dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX || |
3df126f3 | 4858 | *prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) { |
61bd5218 | 4859 | verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); |
d691f9e8 AS |
4860 | return -EINVAL; |
4861 | } | |
4862 | ||
17a52670 AS |
4863 | } else if (class == BPF_ST) { |
4864 | if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || | |
4865 | insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { | |
61bd5218 | 4866 | verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
4867 | return -EINVAL; |
4868 | } | |
4869 | /* check src operand */ | |
dc503a8a | 4870 | err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
4871 | if (err) |
4872 | return err; | |
4873 | ||
f37a8cb8 DB |
4874 | if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { |
4875 | verbose(env, "BPF_ST stores into R%d context is not allowed\n", | |
4876 | insn->dst_reg); | |
4877 | return -EACCES; | |
4878 | } | |
4879 | ||
17a52670 | 4880 | /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ |
31fd8581 | 4881 | err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, |
17a52670 | 4882 | BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, |
ca369602 | 4883 | -1, false); |
17a52670 AS |
4884 | if (err) |
4885 | return err; | |
4886 | ||
4887 | } else if (class == BPF_JMP) { | |
4888 | u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); | |
4889 | ||
4890 | if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { | |
4891 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || | |
4892 | insn->off != 0 || | |
f4d7e40a AS |
4893 | (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && |
4894 | insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) || | |
17a52670 | 4895 | insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) { |
61bd5218 | 4896 | verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
4897 | return -EINVAL; |
4898 | } | |
4899 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
4900 | if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) |
4901 | err = check_func_call(env, insn, &insn_idx); | |
4902 | else | |
4903 | err = check_helper_call(env, insn->imm, insn_idx); | |
17a52670 AS |
4904 | if (err) |
4905 | return err; | |
4906 | ||
4907 | } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { | |
4908 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || | |
4909 | insn->imm != 0 || | |
4910 | insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || | |
4911 | insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) { | |
61bd5218 | 4912 | verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
4913 | return -EINVAL; |
4914 | } | |
4915 | ||
4916 | insn_idx += insn->off + 1; | |
4917 | continue; | |
4918 | ||
4919 | } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { | |
4920 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || | |
4921 | insn->imm != 0 || | |
4922 | insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || | |
4923 | insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) { | |
61bd5218 | 4924 | verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
4925 | return -EINVAL; |
4926 | } | |
4927 | ||
f4d7e40a AS |
4928 | if (state->curframe) { |
4929 | /* exit from nested function */ | |
4930 | prev_insn_idx = insn_idx; | |
4931 | err = prepare_func_exit(env, &insn_idx); | |
4932 | if (err) | |
4933 | return err; | |
4934 | do_print_state = true; | |
4935 | continue; | |
4936 | } | |
4937 | ||
17a52670 AS |
4938 | /* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used |
4939 | * to return the value from eBPF program. | |
4940 | * Make sure that it's readable at this time | |
4941 | * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote | |
4942 | * something into it earlier | |
4943 | */ | |
dc503a8a | 4944 | err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); |
17a52670 AS |
4945 | if (err) |
4946 | return err; | |
4947 | ||
1be7f75d | 4948 | if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) { |
61bd5218 | 4949 | verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); |
1be7f75d AS |
4950 | return -EACCES; |
4951 | } | |
4952 | ||
390ee7e2 AS |
4953 | err = check_return_code(env); |
4954 | if (err) | |
4955 | return err; | |
f1bca824 | 4956 | process_bpf_exit: |
638f5b90 AS |
4957 | err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, &insn_idx); |
4958 | if (err < 0) { | |
4959 | if (err != -ENOENT) | |
4960 | return err; | |
17a52670 AS |
4961 | break; |
4962 | } else { | |
4963 | do_print_state = true; | |
4964 | continue; | |
4965 | } | |
4966 | } else { | |
4967 | err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &insn_idx); | |
4968 | if (err) | |
4969 | return err; | |
4970 | } | |
4971 | } else if (class == BPF_LD) { | |
4972 | u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); | |
4973 | ||
4974 | if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { | |
ddd872bc AS |
4975 | err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); |
4976 | if (err) | |
4977 | return err; | |
4978 | ||
17a52670 AS |
4979 | } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { |
4980 | err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); | |
4981 | if (err) | |
4982 | return err; | |
4983 | ||
4984 | insn_idx++; | |
c131187d | 4985 | env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].seen = true; |
17a52670 | 4986 | } else { |
61bd5218 | 4987 | verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); |
17a52670 AS |
4988 | return -EINVAL; |
4989 | } | |
4990 | } else { | |
61bd5218 | 4991 | verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); |
17a52670 AS |
4992 | return -EINVAL; |
4993 | } | |
4994 | ||
4995 | insn_idx++; | |
4996 | } | |
4997 | ||
4bd95f4b DB |
4998 | verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d), stack depth ", |
4999 | insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS); | |
f910cefa | 5000 | for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
9c8105bd | 5001 | u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; |
f4d7e40a AS |
5002 | |
5003 | verbose(env, "%d", depth); | |
f910cefa | 5004 | if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) |
f4d7e40a AS |
5005 | verbose(env, "+"); |
5006 | } | |
5007 | verbose(env, "\n"); | |
9c8105bd | 5008 | env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; |
17a52670 AS |
5009 | return 0; |
5010 | } | |
5011 | ||
56f668df MKL |
5012 | static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map) |
5013 | { | |
5014 | return (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH && | |
bcc6b1b7 MKL |
5015 | map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && |
5016 | map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS) || | |
56f668df MKL |
5017 | !(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC); |
5018 | } | |
5019 | ||
61bd5218 JK |
5020 | static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, |
5021 | struct bpf_map *map, | |
fdc15d38 AS |
5022 | struct bpf_prog *prog) |
5023 | ||
5024 | { | |
56f668df MKL |
5025 | /* Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use |
5026 | * preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation | |
5027 | * in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got | |
5028 | * triggered. | |
5029 | */ | |
5030 | if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) { | |
5031 | if (!check_map_prealloc(map)) { | |
61bd5218 | 5032 | verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n"); |
56f668df MKL |
5033 | return -EINVAL; |
5034 | } | |
5035 | if (map->inner_map_meta && | |
5036 | !check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta)) { | |
61bd5218 | 5037 | verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated inner hash map\n"); |
56f668df MKL |
5038 | return -EINVAL; |
5039 | } | |
fdc15d38 | 5040 | } |
a3884572 JK |
5041 | |
5042 | if ((bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) && | |
5043 | !bpf_offload_dev_match(prog, map)) { | |
5044 | verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n"); | |
5045 | return -EINVAL; | |
5046 | } | |
5047 | ||
fdc15d38 AS |
5048 | return 0; |
5049 | } | |
5050 | ||
0246e64d AS |
5051 | /* look for pseudo eBPF instructions that access map FDs and |
5052 | * replace them with actual map pointers | |
5053 | */ | |
58e2af8b | 5054 | static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
0246e64d AS |
5055 | { |
5056 | struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; | |
5057 | int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; | |
fdc15d38 | 5058 | int i, j, err; |
0246e64d | 5059 | |
f1f7714e | 5060 | err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); |
aafe6ae9 DB |
5061 | if (err) |
5062 | return err; | |
5063 | ||
0246e64d | 5064 | for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { |
9bac3d6d | 5065 | if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && |
d691f9e8 | 5066 | (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) { |
61bd5218 | 5067 | verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); |
9bac3d6d AS |
5068 | return -EINVAL; |
5069 | } | |
5070 | ||
d691f9e8 AS |
5071 | if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && |
5072 | ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM && | |
5073 | BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) { | |
61bd5218 | 5074 | verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); |
d691f9e8 AS |
5075 | return -EINVAL; |
5076 | } | |
5077 | ||
0246e64d AS |
5078 | if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { |
5079 | struct bpf_map *map; | |
5080 | struct fd f; | |
5081 | ||
5082 | if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || | |
5083 | insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || | |
5084 | insn[1].off != 0) { | |
61bd5218 | 5085 | verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); |
0246e64d AS |
5086 | return -EINVAL; |
5087 | } | |
5088 | ||
5089 | if (insn->src_reg == 0) | |
5090 | /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ | |
5091 | goto next_insn; | |
5092 | ||
5093 | if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) { | |
61bd5218 JK |
5094 | verbose(env, |
5095 | "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); | |
0246e64d AS |
5096 | return -EINVAL; |
5097 | } | |
5098 | ||
5099 | f = fdget(insn->imm); | |
c2101297 | 5100 | map = __bpf_map_get(f); |
0246e64d | 5101 | if (IS_ERR(map)) { |
61bd5218 | 5102 | verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", |
0246e64d | 5103 | insn->imm); |
0246e64d AS |
5104 | return PTR_ERR(map); |
5105 | } | |
5106 | ||
61bd5218 | 5107 | err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); |
fdc15d38 AS |
5108 | if (err) { |
5109 | fdput(f); | |
5110 | return err; | |
5111 | } | |
5112 | ||
0246e64d AS |
5113 | /* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ |
5114 | insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map; | |
5115 | insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32; | |
5116 | ||
5117 | /* check whether we recorded this map already */ | |
5118 | for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) | |
5119 | if (env->used_maps[j] == map) { | |
5120 | fdput(f); | |
5121 | goto next_insn; | |
5122 | } | |
5123 | ||
5124 | if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { | |
5125 | fdput(f); | |
5126 | return -E2BIG; | |
5127 | } | |
5128 | ||
0246e64d AS |
5129 | /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, |
5130 | * the map will be released by release_maps() or it | |
5131 | * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded | |
ab7f5bf0 | 5132 | * and all maps are released in free_used_maps() |
0246e64d | 5133 | */ |
92117d84 AS |
5134 | map = bpf_map_inc(map, false); |
5135 | if (IS_ERR(map)) { | |
5136 | fdput(f); | |
5137 | return PTR_ERR(map); | |
5138 | } | |
5139 | env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; | |
5140 | ||
0246e64d AS |
5141 | fdput(f); |
5142 | next_insn: | |
5143 | insn++; | |
5144 | i++; | |
5e581dad DB |
5145 | continue; |
5146 | } | |
5147 | ||
5148 | /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */ | |
5149 | if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) { | |
5150 | verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code); | |
5151 | return -EINVAL; | |
0246e64d AS |
5152 | } |
5153 | } | |
5154 | ||
5155 | /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid | |
5156 | * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. | |
5157 | * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. | |
5158 | */ | |
5159 | return 0; | |
5160 | } | |
5161 | ||
5162 | /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ | |
58e2af8b | 5163 | static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
0246e64d AS |
5164 | { |
5165 | int i; | |
5166 | ||
5167 | for (i = 0; i < env->used_map_cnt; i++) | |
5168 | bpf_map_put(env->used_maps[i]); | |
5169 | } | |
5170 | ||
5171 | /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ | |
58e2af8b | 5172 | static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
0246e64d AS |
5173 | { |
5174 | struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; | |
5175 | int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; | |
5176 | int i; | |
5177 | ||
5178 | for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) | |
5179 | if (insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) | |
5180 | insn->src_reg = 0; | |
5181 | } | |
5182 | ||
8041902d AS |
5183 | /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range |
5184 | * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying | |
5185 | * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero | |
5186 | */ | |
5187 | static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len, | |
5188 | u32 off, u32 cnt) | |
5189 | { | |
5190 | struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data; | |
c131187d | 5191 | int i; |
8041902d AS |
5192 | |
5193 | if (cnt == 1) | |
5194 | return 0; | |
5195 | new_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * prog_len); | |
5196 | if (!new_data) | |
5197 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5198 | memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off); | |
5199 | memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off, | |
5200 | sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); | |
c131187d AS |
5201 | for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) |
5202 | new_data[i].seen = true; | |
8041902d AS |
5203 | env->insn_aux_data = new_data; |
5204 | vfree(old_data); | |
5205 | return 0; | |
5206 | } | |
5207 | ||
cc8b0b92 AS |
5208 | static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) |
5209 | { | |
5210 | int i; | |
5211 | ||
5212 | if (len == 1) | |
5213 | return; | |
4cb3d99c JW |
5214 | /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */ |
5215 | for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) { | |
9c8105bd | 5216 | if (env->subprog_info[i].start < off) |
cc8b0b92 | 5217 | continue; |
9c8105bd | 5218 | env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1; |
cc8b0b92 AS |
5219 | } |
5220 | } | |
5221 | ||
8041902d AS |
5222 | static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, |
5223 | const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) | |
5224 | { | |
5225 | struct bpf_prog *new_prog; | |
5226 | ||
5227 | new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); | |
5228 | if (!new_prog) | |
5229 | return NULL; | |
5230 | if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog->len, off, len)) | |
5231 | return NULL; | |
cc8b0b92 | 5232 | adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len); |
8041902d AS |
5233 | return new_prog; |
5234 | } | |
5235 | ||
2a5418a1 DB |
5236 | /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not |
5237 | * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can | |
5238 | * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code | |
5239 | * with 'ja -1'. | |
5240 | * | |
5241 | * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the | |
5242 | * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then | |
5243 | * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception | |
5244 | * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead | |
5245 | * code could be located. | |
c131187d AS |
5246 | */ |
5247 | static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) | |
5248 | { | |
5249 | struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; | |
2a5418a1 | 5250 | struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1); |
c131187d AS |
5251 | struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; |
5252 | const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; | |
5253 | int i; | |
5254 | ||
5255 | for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { | |
5256 | if (aux_data[i].seen) | |
5257 | continue; | |
2a5418a1 | 5258 | memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap)); |
c131187d AS |
5259 | } |
5260 | } | |
5261 | ||
9bac3d6d AS |
5262 | /* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff' |
5263 | * into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff' | |
5264 | */ | |
58e2af8b | 5265 | static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
9bac3d6d | 5266 | { |
00176a34 | 5267 | const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops; |
f96da094 | 5268 | int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0; |
3df126f3 | 5269 | const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; |
36bbef52 | 5270 | struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn; |
9bac3d6d | 5271 | struct bpf_prog *new_prog; |
d691f9e8 | 5272 | enum bpf_access_type type; |
f96da094 DB |
5273 | bool is_narrower_load; |
5274 | u32 target_size; | |
9bac3d6d | 5275 | |
36bbef52 DB |
5276 | if (ops->gen_prologue) { |
5277 | cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, | |
5278 | env->prog); | |
5279 | if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { | |
61bd5218 | 5280 | verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); |
36bbef52 DB |
5281 | return -EINVAL; |
5282 | } else if (cnt) { | |
8041902d | 5283 | new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); |
36bbef52 DB |
5284 | if (!new_prog) |
5285 | return -ENOMEM; | |
8041902d | 5286 | |
36bbef52 | 5287 | env->prog = new_prog; |
3df126f3 | 5288 | delta += cnt - 1; |
36bbef52 DB |
5289 | } |
5290 | } | |
5291 | ||
0d830032 | 5292 | if (!ops->convert_ctx_access || bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) |
9bac3d6d AS |
5293 | return 0; |
5294 | ||
3df126f3 | 5295 | insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; |
36bbef52 | 5296 | |
9bac3d6d | 5297 | for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { |
62c7989b DB |
5298 | if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || |
5299 | insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || | |
5300 | insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || | |
ea2e7ce5 | 5301 | insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) |
d691f9e8 | 5302 | type = BPF_READ; |
62c7989b DB |
5303 | else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || |
5304 | insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || | |
5305 | insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || | |
ea2e7ce5 | 5306 | insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) |
d691f9e8 AS |
5307 | type = BPF_WRITE; |
5308 | else | |
9bac3d6d AS |
5309 | continue; |
5310 | ||
af86ca4e AS |
5311 | if (type == BPF_WRITE && |
5312 | env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off) { | |
5313 | struct bpf_insn patch[] = { | |
5314 | /* Sanitize suspicious stack slot with zero. | |
5315 | * There are no memory dependencies for this store, | |
5316 | * since it's only using frame pointer and immediate | |
5317 | * constant of zero | |
5318 | */ | |
5319 | BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, | |
5320 | env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off, | |
5321 | 0), | |
5322 | /* the original STX instruction will immediately | |
5323 | * overwrite the same stack slot with appropriate value | |
5324 | */ | |
5325 | *insn, | |
5326 | }; | |
5327 | ||
5328 | cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch); | |
5329 | new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt); | |
5330 | if (!new_prog) | |
5331 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5332 | ||
5333 | delta += cnt - 1; | |
5334 | env->prog = new_prog; | |
5335 | insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; | |
5336 | continue; | |
5337 | } | |
5338 | ||
8041902d | 5339 | if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX) |
9bac3d6d | 5340 | continue; |
9bac3d6d | 5341 | |
31fd8581 | 5342 | ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; |
f96da094 | 5343 | size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); |
31fd8581 YS |
5344 | |
5345 | /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, | |
5346 | * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific | |
5347 | * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, | |
5348 | * we will apply proper mask to the result. | |
5349 | */ | |
f96da094 | 5350 | is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; |
31fd8581 | 5351 | if (is_narrower_load) { |
bc23105c | 5352 | u32 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size); |
f96da094 DB |
5353 | u32 off = insn->off; |
5354 | u8 size_code; | |
5355 | ||
5356 | if (type == BPF_WRITE) { | |
61bd5218 | 5357 | verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); |
f96da094 DB |
5358 | return -EINVAL; |
5359 | } | |
31fd8581 | 5360 | |
f96da094 | 5361 | size_code = BPF_H; |
31fd8581 YS |
5362 | if (ctx_field_size == 4) |
5363 | size_code = BPF_W; | |
5364 | else if (ctx_field_size == 8) | |
5365 | size_code = BPF_DW; | |
f96da094 | 5366 | |
bc23105c | 5367 | insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); |
31fd8581 YS |
5368 | insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; |
5369 | } | |
f96da094 DB |
5370 | |
5371 | target_size = 0; | |
5372 | cnt = ops->convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, | |
5373 | &target_size); | |
5374 | if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || | |
5375 | (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { | |
61bd5218 | 5376 | verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); |
9bac3d6d AS |
5377 | return -EINVAL; |
5378 | } | |
f96da094 DB |
5379 | |
5380 | if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { | |
31fd8581 YS |
5381 | if (ctx_field_size <= 4) |
5382 | insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, | |
f96da094 | 5383 | (1 << size * 8) - 1); |
31fd8581 YS |
5384 | else |
5385 | insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, | |
f96da094 | 5386 | (1 << size * 8) - 1); |
31fd8581 | 5387 | } |
9bac3d6d | 5388 | |
8041902d | 5389 | new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); |
9bac3d6d AS |
5390 | if (!new_prog) |
5391 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5392 | ||
3df126f3 | 5393 | delta += cnt - 1; |
9bac3d6d AS |
5394 | |
5395 | /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ | |
5396 | env->prog = new_prog; | |
3df126f3 | 5397 | insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; |
9bac3d6d AS |
5398 | } |
5399 | ||
5400 | return 0; | |
5401 | } | |
5402 | ||
1c2a088a AS |
5403 | static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
5404 | { | |
5405 | struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp; | |
5406 | int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog; | |
7105e828 | 5407 | struct bpf_insn *insn; |
1c2a088a AS |
5408 | void *old_bpf_func; |
5409 | int err = -ENOMEM; | |
5410 | ||
f910cefa | 5411 | if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) |
1c2a088a AS |
5412 | return 0; |
5413 | ||
7105e828 | 5414 | for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { |
1c2a088a AS |
5415 | if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || |
5416 | insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) | |
5417 | continue; | |
5418 | subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); | |
5419 | if (subprog < 0) { | |
5420 | WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", | |
5421 | i + insn->imm + 1); | |
5422 | return -EFAULT; | |
5423 | } | |
5424 | /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of | |
5425 | * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs | |
5426 | */ | |
f910cefa | 5427 | insn->off = subprog; |
1c2a088a AS |
5428 | /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback |
5429 | * to interpreter will be needed | |
5430 | */ | |
5431 | env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; | |
5432 | /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ | |
5433 | insn->imm = 1; | |
5434 | } | |
5435 | ||
f910cefa | 5436 | func = kzalloc(sizeof(prog) * env->subprog_cnt, GFP_KERNEL); |
1c2a088a AS |
5437 | if (!func) |
5438 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5439 | ||
f910cefa | 5440 | for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
1c2a088a | 5441 | subprog_start = subprog_end; |
4cb3d99c | 5442 | subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start; |
1c2a088a AS |
5443 | |
5444 | len = subprog_end - subprog_start; | |
5445 | func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER); | |
5446 | if (!func[i]) | |
5447 | goto out_free; | |
5448 | memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start], | |
5449 | len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); | |
4f74d809 | 5450 | func[i]->type = prog->type; |
1c2a088a | 5451 | func[i]->len = len; |
4f74d809 DB |
5452 | if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i])) |
5453 | goto out_free; | |
1c2a088a AS |
5454 | func[i]->is_func = 1; |
5455 | /* Use bpf_prog_F_tag to indicate functions in stack traces. | |
5456 | * Long term would need debug info to populate names | |
5457 | */ | |
5458 | func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F'; | |
9c8105bd | 5459 | func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; |
1c2a088a AS |
5460 | func[i]->jit_requested = 1; |
5461 | func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); | |
5462 | if (!func[i]->jited) { | |
5463 | err = -ENOTSUPP; | |
5464 | goto out_free; | |
5465 | } | |
5466 | cond_resched(); | |
5467 | } | |
5468 | /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed | |
5469 | * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and | |
5470 | * run last pass of JIT | |
5471 | */ | |
f910cefa | 5472 | for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
1c2a088a AS |
5473 | insn = func[i]->insnsi; |
5474 | for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { | |
5475 | if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || | |
5476 | insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) | |
5477 | continue; | |
5478 | subprog = insn->off; | |
1c2a088a AS |
5479 | insn->imm = (u64 (*)(u64, u64, u64, u64, u64)) |
5480 | func[subprog]->bpf_func - | |
5481 | __bpf_call_base; | |
5482 | } | |
2162fed4 SD |
5483 | |
5484 | /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses | |
5485 | * of the JITed images for each function in the program | |
5486 | * | |
5487 | * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field | |
5488 | * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start | |
5489 | * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base | |
5490 | * | |
5491 | * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee | |
5492 | * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of | |
5493 | * the call instruction, as an index for this list | |
5494 | */ | |
5495 | func[i]->aux->func = func; | |
5496 | func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; | |
1c2a088a | 5497 | } |
f910cefa | 5498 | for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
1c2a088a AS |
5499 | old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func; |
5500 | tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); | |
5501 | if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) { | |
5502 | verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); | |
5503 | err = -EFAULT; | |
5504 | goto out_free; | |
5505 | } | |
5506 | cond_resched(); | |
5507 | } | |
5508 | ||
5509 | /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and | |
5510 | * populate kallsysm | |
5511 | */ | |
f910cefa | 5512 | for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { |
1c2a088a AS |
5513 | bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]); |
5514 | bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]); | |
5515 | } | |
7105e828 DB |
5516 | |
5517 | /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main | |
5518 | * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can | |
5519 | * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. | |
5520 | */ | |
5521 | for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { | |
7105e828 DB |
5522 | if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || |
5523 | insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) | |
5524 | continue; | |
5525 | insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; | |
5526 | subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); | |
dbecd738 | 5527 | insn->imm = subprog; |
7105e828 DB |
5528 | } |
5529 | ||
1c2a088a AS |
5530 | prog->jited = 1; |
5531 | prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func; | |
5532 | prog->aux->func = func; | |
f910cefa | 5533 | prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; |
1c2a088a AS |
5534 | return 0; |
5535 | out_free: | |
f910cefa | 5536 | for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) |
1c2a088a AS |
5537 | if (func[i]) |
5538 | bpf_jit_free(func[i]); | |
5539 | kfree(func); | |
5540 | /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ | |
5541 | prog->jit_requested = 0; | |
5542 | for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { | |
5543 | if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || | |
5544 | insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) | |
5545 | continue; | |
5546 | insn->off = 0; | |
5547 | insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; | |
5548 | } | |
5549 | return err; | |
5550 | } | |
5551 | ||
1ea47e01 AS |
5552 | static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
5553 | { | |
19d28fbd | 5554 | #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON |
1ea47e01 AS |
5555 | struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; |
5556 | struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; | |
5557 | int i, depth; | |
19d28fbd DM |
5558 | #endif |
5559 | int err; | |
1ea47e01 | 5560 | |
19d28fbd DM |
5561 | err = 0; |
5562 | if (env->prog->jit_requested) { | |
5563 | err = jit_subprogs(env); | |
5564 | if (err == 0) | |
1c2a088a | 5565 | return 0; |
19d28fbd DM |
5566 | } |
5567 | #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON | |
1ea47e01 AS |
5568 | for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { |
5569 | if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || | |
5570 | insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) | |
5571 | continue; | |
5572 | depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); | |
5573 | if (depth < 0) | |
5574 | return depth; | |
5575 | bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth); | |
5576 | } | |
19d28fbd DM |
5577 | err = 0; |
5578 | #endif | |
5579 | return err; | |
1ea47e01 AS |
5580 | } |
5581 | ||
79741b3b | 5582 | /* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions |
81ed18ab | 5583 | * and inline eligible helpers as explicit sequence of BPF instructions |
e245c5c6 AS |
5584 | * |
5585 | * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification | |
5586 | */ | |
79741b3b | 5587 | static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
e245c5c6 | 5588 | { |
79741b3b AS |
5589 | struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; |
5590 | struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; | |
e245c5c6 | 5591 | const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; |
79741b3b | 5592 | const int insn_cnt = prog->len; |
09772d92 | 5593 | const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; |
c93552c4 | 5594 | struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; |
81ed18ab AS |
5595 | struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; |
5596 | struct bpf_prog *new_prog; | |
5597 | struct bpf_map *map_ptr; | |
5598 | int i, cnt, delta = 0; | |
e245c5c6 | 5599 | |
79741b3b | 5600 | for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { |
f6b1b3bf DB |
5601 | if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || |
5602 | insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || | |
5603 | insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || | |
68fda450 | 5604 | insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { |
f6b1b3bf DB |
5605 | bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; |
5606 | struct bpf_insn mask_and_div[] = { | |
5607 | BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->src_reg, insn->src_reg), | |
5608 | /* Rx div 0 -> 0 */ | |
5609 | BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, insn->src_reg, 0, 2), | |
5610 | BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), | |
5611 | BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), | |
5612 | *insn, | |
5613 | }; | |
5614 | struct bpf_insn mask_and_mod[] = { | |
5615 | BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->src_reg, insn->src_reg), | |
5616 | /* Rx mod 0 -> Rx */ | |
5617 | BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, insn->src_reg, 0, 1), | |
5618 | *insn, | |
5619 | }; | |
5620 | struct bpf_insn *patchlet; | |
5621 | ||
5622 | if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || | |
5623 | insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { | |
5624 | patchlet = mask_and_div + (is64 ? 1 : 0); | |
5625 | cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(mask_and_div) - (is64 ? 1 : 0); | |
5626 | } else { | |
5627 | patchlet = mask_and_mod + (is64 ? 1 : 0); | |
5628 | cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(mask_and_mod) - (is64 ? 1 : 0); | |
5629 | } | |
5630 | ||
5631 | new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt); | |
68fda450 AS |
5632 | if (!new_prog) |
5633 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5634 | ||
5635 | delta += cnt - 1; | |
5636 | env->prog = prog = new_prog; | |
5637 | insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; | |
5638 | continue; | |
5639 | } | |
5640 | ||
e0cea7ce DB |
5641 | if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && |
5642 | (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || | |
5643 | BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { | |
5644 | cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); | |
5645 | if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { | |
5646 | verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); | |
5647 | return -EINVAL; | |
5648 | } | |
5649 | ||
5650 | new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); | |
5651 | if (!new_prog) | |
5652 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5653 | ||
5654 | delta += cnt - 1; | |
5655 | env->prog = prog = new_prog; | |
5656 | insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; | |
5657 | continue; | |
5658 | } | |
5659 | ||
79741b3b AS |
5660 | if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) |
5661 | continue; | |
cc8b0b92 AS |
5662 | if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) |
5663 | continue; | |
e245c5c6 | 5664 | |
79741b3b AS |
5665 | if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) |
5666 | prog->dst_needed = 1; | |
5667 | if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) | |
5668 | bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); | |
9802d865 JB |
5669 | if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return) |
5670 | prog->kprobe_override = 1; | |
79741b3b | 5671 | if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { |
7b9f6da1 DM |
5672 | /* If we tail call into other programs, we |
5673 | * cannot make any assumptions since they can | |
5674 | * be replaced dynamically during runtime in | |
5675 | * the program array. | |
5676 | */ | |
5677 | prog->cb_access = 1; | |
80a58d02 | 5678 | env->prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; |
7b9f6da1 | 5679 | |
79741b3b AS |
5680 | /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid |
5681 | * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal | |
5682 | * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler | |
5683 | * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet | |
e245c5c6 | 5684 | */ |
79741b3b | 5685 | insn->imm = 0; |
71189fa9 | 5686 | insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; |
b2157399 | 5687 | |
c93552c4 DB |
5688 | aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; |
5689 | if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) | |
5690 | continue; | |
5691 | ||
b2157399 AS |
5692 | /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call |
5693 | * emit two extra insns: | |
5694 | * if (index >= max_entries) goto out; | |
5695 | * index &= array->index_mask; | |
5696 | * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation | |
5697 | */ | |
c93552c4 | 5698 | if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) { |
40950343 | 5699 | verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); |
b2157399 AS |
5700 | return -EINVAL; |
5701 | } | |
c93552c4 DB |
5702 | |
5703 | map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_state); | |
b2157399 AS |
5704 | insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, |
5705 | map_ptr->max_entries, 2); | |
5706 | insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, | |
5707 | container_of(map_ptr, | |
5708 | struct bpf_array, | |
5709 | map)->index_mask); | |
5710 | insn_buf[2] = *insn; | |
5711 | cnt = 3; | |
5712 | new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); | |
5713 | if (!new_prog) | |
5714 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5715 | ||
5716 | delta += cnt - 1; | |
5717 | env->prog = prog = new_prog; | |
5718 | insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; | |
79741b3b AS |
5719 | continue; |
5720 | } | |
e245c5c6 | 5721 | |
89c63074 | 5722 | /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup |
09772d92 DB |
5723 | * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit |
5724 | * only. | |
89c63074 | 5725 | */ |
60b58afc | 5726 | if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && |
09772d92 DB |
5727 | (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || |
5728 | insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || | |
5729 | insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem)) { | |
c93552c4 DB |
5730 | aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; |
5731 | if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) | |
5732 | goto patch_call_imm; | |
5733 | ||
5734 | map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_state); | |
09772d92 DB |
5735 | ops = map_ptr->ops; |
5736 | if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && | |
5737 | ops->map_gen_lookup) { | |
5738 | cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); | |
5739 | if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { | |
5740 | verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); | |
5741 | return -EINVAL; | |
5742 | } | |
81ed18ab | 5743 | |
09772d92 DB |
5744 | new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, |
5745 | insn_buf, cnt); | |
5746 | if (!new_prog) | |
5747 | return -ENOMEM; | |
81ed18ab | 5748 | |
09772d92 DB |
5749 | delta += cnt - 1; |
5750 | env->prog = prog = new_prog; | |
5751 | insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; | |
5752 | continue; | |
5753 | } | |
81ed18ab | 5754 | |
09772d92 DB |
5755 | BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, |
5756 | (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); | |
5757 | BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem, | |
5758 | (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); | |
5759 | BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem, | |
5760 | (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, | |
5761 | u64 flags))NULL)); | |
5762 | switch (insn->imm) { | |
5763 | case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: | |
5764 | insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_lookup_elem) - | |
5765 | __bpf_call_base; | |
5766 | continue; | |
5767 | case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: | |
5768 | insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_update_elem) - | |
5769 | __bpf_call_base; | |
5770 | continue; | |
5771 | case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: | |
5772 | insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_delete_elem) - | |
5773 | __bpf_call_base; | |
5774 | continue; | |
5775 | } | |
81ed18ab | 5776 | |
09772d92 | 5777 | goto patch_call_imm; |
81ed18ab AS |
5778 | } |
5779 | ||
109980b8 | 5780 | if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) { |
7c300131 DB |
5781 | /* Note, we cannot use prog directly as imm as subsequent |
5782 | * rewrites would still change the prog pointer. The only | |
5783 | * stable address we can use is aux, which also works with | |
5784 | * prog clones during blinding. | |
5785 | */ | |
5786 | u64 addr = (unsigned long)prog->aux; | |
109980b8 DB |
5787 | struct bpf_insn r4_ld[] = { |
5788 | BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_4, addr), | |
5789 | *insn, | |
5790 | }; | |
5791 | cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(r4_ld); | |
5792 | ||
5793 | new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, r4_ld, cnt); | |
5794 | if (!new_prog) | |
5795 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5796 | ||
5797 | delta += cnt - 1; | |
5798 | env->prog = prog = new_prog; | |
5799 | insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; | |
5800 | } | |
81ed18ab | 5801 | patch_call_imm: |
5e43f899 | 5802 | fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); |
79741b3b AS |
5803 | /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed |
5804 | * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions | |
5805 | */ | |
5806 | if (!fn->func) { | |
61bd5218 JK |
5807 | verbose(env, |
5808 | "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", | |
79741b3b AS |
5809 | func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); |
5810 | return -EFAULT; | |
e245c5c6 | 5811 | } |
79741b3b | 5812 | insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; |
e245c5c6 | 5813 | } |
e245c5c6 | 5814 | |
79741b3b AS |
5815 | return 0; |
5816 | } | |
e245c5c6 | 5817 | |
58e2af8b | 5818 | static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) |
f1bca824 | 5819 | { |
58e2af8b | 5820 | struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln; |
f1bca824 AS |
5821 | int i; |
5822 | ||
5823 | if (!env->explored_states) | |
5824 | return; | |
5825 | ||
5826 | for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) { | |
5827 | sl = env->explored_states[i]; | |
5828 | ||
5829 | if (sl) | |
5830 | while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) { | |
5831 | sln = sl->next; | |
1969db47 | 5832 | free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); |
f1bca824 AS |
5833 | kfree(sl); |
5834 | sl = sln; | |
5835 | } | |
5836 | } | |
5837 | ||
5838 | kfree(env->explored_states); | |
5839 | } | |
5840 | ||
9bac3d6d | 5841 | int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) |
51580e79 | 5842 | { |
58e2af8b | 5843 | struct bpf_verifier_env *env; |
b9193c1b | 5844 | struct bpf_verifier_log *log; |
51580e79 AS |
5845 | int ret = -EINVAL; |
5846 | ||
eba0c929 AB |
5847 | /* no program is valid */ |
5848 | if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) | |
5849 | return -EINVAL; | |
5850 | ||
58e2af8b | 5851 | /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, |
cbd35700 AS |
5852 | * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called |
5853 | */ | |
58e2af8b | 5854 | env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); |
cbd35700 AS |
5855 | if (!env) |
5856 | return -ENOMEM; | |
61bd5218 | 5857 | log = &env->log; |
cbd35700 | 5858 | |
3df126f3 JK |
5859 | env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * |
5860 | (*prog)->len); | |
5861 | ret = -ENOMEM; | |
5862 | if (!env->insn_aux_data) | |
5863 | goto err_free_env; | |
9bac3d6d | 5864 | env->prog = *prog; |
00176a34 | 5865 | env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; |
0246e64d | 5866 | |
cbd35700 AS |
5867 | /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ |
5868 | mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); | |
5869 | ||
5870 | if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) { | |
5871 | /* user requested verbose verifier output | |
5872 | * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace | |
5873 | */ | |
e7bf8249 JK |
5874 | log->level = attr->log_level; |
5875 | log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf; | |
5876 | log->len_total = attr->log_size; | |
cbd35700 AS |
5877 | |
5878 | ret = -EINVAL; | |
e7bf8249 JK |
5879 | /* log attributes have to be sane */ |
5880 | if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 8 || | |
5881 | !log->level || !log->ubuf) | |
3df126f3 | 5882 | goto err_unlock; |
cbd35700 | 5883 | } |
1ad2f583 DB |
5884 | |
5885 | env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); | |
5886 | if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) | |
e07b98d9 | 5887 | env->strict_alignment = true; |
cbd35700 | 5888 | |
f4e3ec0d JK |
5889 | ret = replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(env); |
5890 | if (ret < 0) | |
5891 | goto skip_full_check; | |
5892 | ||
cae1927c | 5893 | if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { |
ab3f0063 JK |
5894 | ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env); |
5895 | if (ret) | |
f4e3ec0d | 5896 | goto skip_full_check; |
ab3f0063 JK |
5897 | } |
5898 | ||
9bac3d6d | 5899 | env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len, |
58e2af8b | 5900 | sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), |
f1bca824 AS |
5901 | GFP_USER); |
5902 | ret = -ENOMEM; | |
5903 | if (!env->explored_states) | |
5904 | goto skip_full_check; | |
5905 | ||
cc8b0b92 AS |
5906 | env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); |
5907 | ||
475fb78f AS |
5908 | ret = check_cfg(env); |
5909 | if (ret < 0) | |
5910 | goto skip_full_check; | |
5911 | ||
17a52670 | 5912 | ret = do_check(env); |
8c01c4f8 CG |
5913 | if (env->cur_state) { |
5914 | free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); | |
5915 | env->cur_state = NULL; | |
5916 | } | |
cbd35700 | 5917 | |
0246e64d | 5918 | skip_full_check: |
638f5b90 | 5919 | while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL)); |
f1bca824 | 5920 | free_states(env); |
0246e64d | 5921 | |
c131187d AS |
5922 | if (ret == 0) |
5923 | sanitize_dead_code(env); | |
5924 | ||
70a87ffe AS |
5925 | if (ret == 0) |
5926 | ret = check_max_stack_depth(env); | |
5927 | ||
9bac3d6d AS |
5928 | if (ret == 0) |
5929 | /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ | |
5930 | ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); | |
5931 | ||
e245c5c6 | 5932 | if (ret == 0) |
79741b3b | 5933 | ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env); |
e245c5c6 | 5934 | |
1ea47e01 AS |
5935 | if (ret == 0) |
5936 | ret = fixup_call_args(env); | |
5937 | ||
a2a7d570 | 5938 | if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) |
cbd35700 | 5939 | ret = -ENOSPC; |
a2a7d570 | 5940 | if (log->level && !log->ubuf) { |
cbd35700 | 5941 | ret = -EFAULT; |
a2a7d570 | 5942 | goto err_release_maps; |
cbd35700 AS |
5943 | } |
5944 | ||
0246e64d AS |
5945 | if (ret == 0 && env->used_map_cnt) { |
5946 | /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ | |
9bac3d6d AS |
5947 | env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, |
5948 | sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), | |
5949 | GFP_KERNEL); | |
0246e64d | 5950 | |
9bac3d6d | 5951 | if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { |
0246e64d | 5952 | ret = -ENOMEM; |
a2a7d570 | 5953 | goto err_release_maps; |
0246e64d AS |
5954 | } |
5955 | ||
9bac3d6d | 5956 | memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, |
0246e64d | 5957 | sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); |
9bac3d6d | 5958 | env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; |
0246e64d AS |
5959 | |
5960 | /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic | |
5961 | * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions | |
5962 | */ | |
5963 | convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); | |
5964 | } | |
cbd35700 | 5965 | |
a2a7d570 | 5966 | err_release_maps: |
9bac3d6d | 5967 | if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) |
0246e64d | 5968 | /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release |
ab7f5bf0 | 5969 | * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them. |
0246e64d AS |
5970 | */ |
5971 | release_maps(env); | |
9bac3d6d | 5972 | *prog = env->prog; |
3df126f3 | 5973 | err_unlock: |
cbd35700 | 5974 | mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); |
3df126f3 JK |
5975 | vfree(env->insn_aux_data); |
5976 | err_free_env: | |
5977 | kfree(env); | |
51580e79 AS |
5978 | return ret; |
5979 | } |