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1da177e4 LT |
1 | # |
2 | # Security configuration | |
3 | # | |
4 | ||
5 | menu "Security options" | |
6 | ||
f0894940 | 7 | source security/keys/Kconfig |
1da177e4 | 8 | |
eaf06b24 DR |
9 | config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT |
10 | bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" | |
11 | default n | |
12 | help | |
13 | This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel | |
14 | syslog via dmesg(8). | |
15 | ||
16 | If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced | |
17 | unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). | |
18 | ||
19 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
20 | ||
e4fee368 BH |
21 | config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT |
22 | bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events" | |
23 | depends on PERF_EVENTS | |
24 | help | |
25 | If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl | |
26 | will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the | |
27 | perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is | |
28 | changed. | |
29 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
30 | config SECURITY |
31 | bool "Enable different security models" | |
2c40579b | 32 | depends on SYSFS |
2813893f | 33 | depends on MULTIUSER |
1da177e4 LT |
34 | help |
35 | This allows you to choose different security modules to be | |
36 | configured into your kernel. | |
37 | ||
38 | If this option is not selected, the default Linux security | |
39 | model will be used. | |
40 | ||
41 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
42 | ||
da31894e EP |
43 | config SECURITYFS |
44 | bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem" | |
45 | help | |
46 | This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by | |
3323eec9 MZ |
47 | the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is |
48 | not used by SELinux or SMACK. | |
da31894e EP |
49 | |
50 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
51 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
52 | config SECURITY_NETWORK |
53 | bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" | |
54 | depends on SECURITY | |
55 | help | |
56 | This enables the socket and networking security hooks. | |
57 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
58 | implement socket and networking access controls. | |
59 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
df71837d TJ |
60 | |
61 | config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM | |
62 | bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks" | |
63 | depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK | |
64 | help | |
65 | This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks. | |
66 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
67 | implement per-packet access controls based on labels | |
68 | derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are | |
69 | designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized | |
70 | to communicate unlabelled data can send without using | |
71 | IPSec. | |
72 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
1da177e4 | 73 | |
be6d3e56 KT |
74 | config SECURITY_PATH |
75 | bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" | |
76 | depends on SECURITY | |
77 | help | |
78 | This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. | |
79 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
80 | implement pathname based access controls. | |
81 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
82 | ||
31625340 JC |
83 | config INTEL_TXT |
84 | bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)" | |
69575d38 | 85 | depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT |
31625340 JC |
86 | help |
87 | This option enables support for booting the kernel with the | |
88 | Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize | |
89 | Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch | |
90 | of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this | |
91 | will have no effect. | |
92 | ||
3c556e41 | 93 | Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and |
31625340 JC |
94 | initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to |
95 | create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which | |
96 | helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning | |
97 | correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside | |
98 | of the kernel itself. | |
99 | ||
100 | Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having | |
101 | confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that | |
3c556e41 | 102 | it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for |
31625340 JC |
103 | providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. |
104 | ||
105 | See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information | |
106 | about Intel(R) TXT. | |
107 | See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot. | |
108 | See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable | |
109 | Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. | |
110 | ||
111 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. | |
112 | ||
788084ab | 113 | config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR |
024e6cb4 | 114 | int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" |
788084ab | 115 | depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX |
530b099d | 116 | default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT) |
a58578e4 | 117 | default 65536 |
788084ab EP |
118 | help |
119 | This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected | |
120 | from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages | |
121 | can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. | |
122 | ||
123 | For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space | |
124 | a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. | |
125 | On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. | |
126 | Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map | |
127 | this low address space will need the permission specific to the | |
128 | systems running LSM. | |
129 | ||
f5509cc1 KC |
130 | config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR |
131 | bool | |
132 | help | |
133 | The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for | |
134 | validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in | |
135 | support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. | |
136 | ||
137 | config HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY | |
138 | bool | |
139 | help | |
140 | The architecture supports CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY by | |
141 | calling check_object_size() just before performing the | |
142 | userspace copies in the low level implementation of | |
143 | copy_to_user() and copy_from_user(). | |
144 | ||
145 | config HARDENED_USERCOPY | |
146 | bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" | |
147 | depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY | |
6040e576 | 148 | depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR |
f5509cc1 KC |
149 | select BUG |
150 | help | |
151 | This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when | |
152 | copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and | |
153 | copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that | |
154 | are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple | |
155 | separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack, | |
156 | or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes | |
157 | of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. | |
158 | ||
8e1f74ea KC |
159 | config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN |
160 | bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages" | |
161 | depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY | |
80a77045 | 162 | depends on EXPERT |
8e1f74ea KC |
163 | help |
164 | When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP, | |
165 | hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are, | |
166 | however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all | |
167 | been removed. This config is intended to be used only while | |
168 | trying to find such users. | |
169 | ||
1da177e4 | 170 | source security/selinux/Kconfig |
e114e473 | 171 | source security/smack/Kconfig |
00d7d6f8 | 172 | source security/tomoyo/Kconfig |
f9ad1af5 | 173 | source security/apparmor/Kconfig |
9b091556 | 174 | source security/loadpin/Kconfig |
2d514487 | 175 | source security/yama/Kconfig |
1da177e4 | 176 | |
f381c272 | 177 | source security/integrity/Kconfig |
3323eec9 | 178 | |
6e65f92f JJ |
179 | choice |
180 | prompt "Default security module" | |
181 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX | |
182 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK | |
183 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
f9ad1af5 | 184 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR |
6e65f92f JJ |
185 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
186 | ||
187 | help | |
188 | Select the security module that will be used by default if the | |
189 | kernel parameter security= is not specified. | |
190 | ||
191 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX | |
192 | bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y | |
193 | ||
194 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK | |
195 | bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y | |
196 | ||
197 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
198 | bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y | |
199 | ||
f9ad1af5 JJ |
200 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR |
201 | bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y | |
202 | ||
6e65f92f JJ |
203 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
204 | bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" | |
205 | ||
206 | endchoice | |
207 | ||
208 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY | |
209 | string | |
210 | default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX | |
211 | default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK | |
212 | default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
f9ad1af5 | 213 | default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR |
6e65f92f JJ |
214 | default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
215 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
216 | endmenu |
217 |