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1#
2# Security configuration
3#
4
5menu "Security options"
6
f0894940 7source security/keys/Kconfig
1da177e4 8
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9config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
10 bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
11 default n
12 help
13 This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
14 syslog via dmesg(8).
15
16 If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
17 unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
18
19 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
20
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21config SECURITY
22 bool "Enable different security models"
2c40579b 23 depends on SYSFS
2813893f 24 depends on MULTIUSER
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25 help
26 This allows you to choose different security modules to be
27 configured into your kernel.
28
29 If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
30 model will be used.
31
32 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
33
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34config SECURITYFS
35 bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
36 help
37 This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
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38 the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is
39 not used by SELinux or SMACK.
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40
41 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
42
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43config SECURITY_NETWORK
44 bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
45 depends on SECURITY
46 help
47 This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
48 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
49 implement socket and networking access controls.
50 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
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51
52config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
53 bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
54 depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
55 help
56 This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
57 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
58 implement per-packet access controls based on labels
59 derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
60 designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
61 to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
62 IPSec.
63 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
1da177e4 64
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65config SECURITY_PATH
66 bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
67 depends on SECURITY
68 help
69 This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
70 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
71 implement pathname based access controls.
72 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
73
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74config INTEL_TXT
75 bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
69575d38 76 depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
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77 help
78 This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
79 Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
80 Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
81 of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
82 will have no effect.
83
3c556e41 84 Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
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85 initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
86 create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
87 helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
88 correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
89 of the kernel itself.
90
91 Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
92 confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
3c556e41 93 it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
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94 providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
95
96 See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
97 about Intel(R) TXT.
98 See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
99 See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
100 Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
101
102 If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
103
788084ab 104config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
024e6cb4 105 int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
788084ab 106 depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
530b099d 107 default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
a58578e4 108 default 65536
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109 help
110 This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
111 from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
112 can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
113
114 For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
115 a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
116 On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
117 Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
118 this low address space will need the permission specific to the
119 systems running LSM.
120
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121config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
122 bool
123 help
124 The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
125 validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
126 support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
127
128config HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
129 bool
130 help
131 The architecture supports CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY by
132 calling check_object_size() just before performing the
133 userspace copies in the low level implementation of
134 copy_to_user() and copy_from_user().
135
136config HARDENED_USERCOPY
137 bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
138 depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
139 select BUG
140 help
141 This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
142 copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
143 copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
144 are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
145 separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack,
146 or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
147 of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
148
1da177e4 149source security/selinux/Kconfig
e114e473 150source security/smack/Kconfig
00d7d6f8 151source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
f9ad1af5 152source security/apparmor/Kconfig
9b091556 153source security/loadpin/Kconfig
2d514487 154source security/yama/Kconfig
1da177e4 155
f381c272 156source security/integrity/Kconfig
3323eec9 157
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158choice
159 prompt "Default security module"
160 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
161 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
162 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
f9ad1af5 163 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
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164 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
165
166 help
167 Select the security module that will be used by default if the
168 kernel parameter security= is not specified.
169
170 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
171 bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
172
173 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
174 bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
175
176 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
177 bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
178
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179 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
180 bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
181
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182 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
183 bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
184
185endchoice
186
187config DEFAULT_SECURITY
188 string
189 default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
190 default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
191 default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
f9ad1af5 192 default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
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193 default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
194
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195endmenu
196