[mirror_ubuntu-eoan-kernel.git] / security / Kconfig

# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
#
# Security configuration
#

menu "Security options"

source "security/keys/Kconfig"

config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
	default n
	help
	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
	  syslog via dmesg(8).

	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
	  unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).

	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
	depends on PERF_EVENTS
	help
	  If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
	  will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
	  perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
	  changed.

config SECURITY
	bool "Enable different security models"
	depends on SYSFS
	depends on MULTIUSER
	help
	  This allows you to choose different security modules to be
	  configured into your kernel.

	  If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
	  model will be used.

	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
	depends on SECURITY
	bool
	default n

config SECURITYFS
	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
	help
	  This will build the securityfs filesystem.  It is currently used by
	  various security modules (AppArmor, IMA, SafeSetID, TOMOYO, TPM).

	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

config SECURITY_NETWORK
	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
	depends on SECURITY
	help
	  This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
	  implement socket and networking access controls.
	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
	bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
	default y
	depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) && !UML
	help
	  This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
	  ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
	  into userspace.

	  See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details.

config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
	bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
	depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
	help
	  This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
	  implement Infiniband access controls.
	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
	bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
	depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
	help
	  This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
	  implement per-packet access controls based on labels
	  derived from IPSec policy.  Non-IPSec communications are
	  designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
	  to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
	  IPSec.
	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

config SECURITY_PATH
	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
	depends on SECURITY
	help
	  This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
	  implement pathname based access controls.
	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

config INTEL_TXT
	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
	help
	  This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
	  Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
	  Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
	  of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
	  will have no effect.

	  Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
	  initial state as well as data reset protection.  This is used to
	  create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
	  helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
	  correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
	  of the kernel itself.

	  Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
	  confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
	  it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
	  providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.

	  See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
	  about Intel(R) TXT.
	  See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
	  See Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst for a description of how to enable
	  Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.

	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
	default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
	default 65536
	help
	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.

	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
	  Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
	  this low address space will need the permission specific to the
	  systems running LSM.

config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
	bool
	help
	  The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
	  validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
	  support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.

config HARDENED_USERCOPY
	bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
	depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
	imply STRICT_DEVMEM
	help
	  This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
	  copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
	  copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
	  are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
	  separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
	  or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
	  of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.

config HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK
	bool "Allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size"
	depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
	default y
	help
	  This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists
	  to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of
	  rejecting the copy, falling back to non-whitelisted hardened
	  usercopy that checks the slab allocation size instead of the
	  whitelist size. This option will be removed once it seems like
	  all missing usercopy whitelists have been identified and fixed.
	  Booting with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=Y/N" can change
	  this setting.

config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
	bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
	depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
	depends on EXPERT
	help
	  When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
	  hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
	  however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all
	  been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
	  trying to find such users.

config FORTIFY_SOURCE
	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
	help
	  Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
	  where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.

config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
	help
	  By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
	  binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
	  interface.  Some of these binaries are statically defined
	  either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
	  option.  However, some of these are dynamically created at
	  runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
	  To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
	  calls through a single executable that can not have its name
	  changed.

	  Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
	  "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
	  passed to it.  If desired, this program can filter and pick
	  and choose what real programs are called.

	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
	  disabled, choose this option and then set
	  STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.

config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
	string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
	depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
	default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
	help
	  The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
	  program is wish to be run.  The "real" application's name will
	  be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
	  line.

	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
	  specify an empty string here (i.e. "").

config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
	bool "Allow the kernel to be 'locked down'"
	help
	  Allow the kernel to be locked down. If lockdown support is enabled
	  and activated, the kernel will impose additional restrictions
	  intended to prevent uid 0 from being able to modify the running
	  kernel. This may break userland applications that rely on low-level
	  access to hardware.

config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE
        bool "Enable kernel lockdown mode automatically"
        depends on LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
        help
          Enable the kernel lock down functionality automatically at boot.

config ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ
        bool "Allow the kernel lockdown to be lifted by SysRq"
        depends on LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
        depends on !LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE
        depends on MAGIC_SYSRQ
        depends on X86
        help
          Allow the lockdown on a kernel to be lifted, by pressing a SysRq key
          combination on a wired keyboard.  On x86, this is SysRq+x.

source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
source "security/smack/Kconfig"
source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"
source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
source "security/yama/Kconfig"
source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"

source "security/integrity/Kconfig"

choice
	prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized"
	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC

	help
	  This choice is there only for converting CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY
	  in old kernel configs to CONFIG_LSM in new kernel configs. Don't
	  change this choice unless you are creating a fresh kernel config,
	  for this choice will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM has been set.

	  Selects the legacy "major security module" that will be
	  initialized first. Overridden by non-default CONFIG_LSM.

	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
		bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y

	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
		bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y

	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
		bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y

	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
		bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y

	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"

endchoice

config LSM
	string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
	default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
	default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
	default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
	default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
	default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
	help
	  A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
	  Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
	  controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.

	  If unsure, leave this as the default.

source "security/Kconfig.hardening"

endmenu
Commit	Line	Data
ec8f24b7	1	# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
1da177e4 LT	2	#
	3	# Security configuration
	4	#
	5
	6	menu "Security options"
	7
8636a1f9	8	source "security/keys/Kconfig"
1da177e4	9
eaf06b24 DR	10	config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
	11	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
	12	default n
	13	help
	14	This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
	15	syslog via dmesg(8).
	16
	17	If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
	18	unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
	19
	20	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
	21
fe4f062b BH	22	config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
	23	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
	24	depends on PERF_EVENTS
	25	help
	26	If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
	27	will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
	28	perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
	29	changed.
	30
1da177e4 LT	31	config SECURITY
1da177e4 LT	32	bool "Enable different security models"
2c40579b	33	depends on SYSFS
2813893f	34	depends on MULTIUSER
1da177e4 LT	35	help
	36	This allows you to choose different security modules to be
	37	configured into your kernel.
	38
	39	If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
	40	model will be used.
	41
	42	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
	43
dd0859dc JM	44	config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
	45	depends on SECURITY
	46	bool
	47	default n
	48
da31894e EP	49	config SECURITYFS
	50	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
	51	help
	52	This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
b102c11e	53	various security modules (AppArmor, IMA, SafeSetID, TOMOYO, TPM).
da31894e EP	54
	55	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
	56
1da177e4 LT	57	config SECURITY_NETWORK
	58	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
	59	depends on SECURITY
	60	help
	61	This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
	62	If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
	63	implement socket and networking access controls.
	64	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
df71837d	65
385ce0ea DH	66	config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
385ce0ea DH	67	bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
87faa0d9	68	default y
61a6bd83	69	depends on (X86_64 \|\| X86_PAE) && !UML
385ce0ea DH	70	help
	71	This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
	72	ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
	73	into userspace.
	74
cb1aaebe	75	See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details.
385ce0ea	76
d291f1a6 DJ	77	config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
	78	bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
	79	depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
	80	help
	81	This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
	82	If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
	83	implement Infiniband access controls.
	84	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
	85
df71837d TJ	86	config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
	87	bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
	88	depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
	89	help
	90	This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
	91	If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
	92	implement per-packet access controls based on labels
	93	derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
	94	designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
	95	to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
	96	IPSec.
	97	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
1da177e4	98
be6d3e56 KT	99	config SECURITY_PATH
	100	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
	101	depends on SECURITY
	102	help
	103	This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
	104	If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
	105	implement pathname based access controls.
	106	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
	107
31625340 JC	108	config INTEL_TXT
31625340 JC	109	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
69575d38	110	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
31625340 JC	111	help
	112	This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
	113	Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
	114	Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
	115	of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
	116	will have no effect.
	117
3c556e41	118	Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
31625340 JC	119	initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
	120	create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
	121	helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
	122	correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
	123	of the kernel itself.
	124
	125	Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
	126	confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
3c556e41	127	it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
31625340 JC	128	providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
	129
	130	See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
	131	about Intel(R) TXT.
	132	See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
e8d776f2	133	See Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst for a description of how to enable
31625340 JC	134	Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
	135
	136	If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
	137
788084ab	138	config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
024e6cb4	139	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
788084ab	140	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
530b099d	141	default 32768 if ARM \|\| (ARM64 && COMPAT)
a58578e4	142	default 65536
788084ab EP	143	help
	144	This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
	145	from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
	146	can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
	147
	148	For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
	149	a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
	150	On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
	151	Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
	152	this low address space will need the permission specific to the
	153	systems running LSM.
	154
f5509cc1 KC	155	config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
	156	bool
	157	help
	158	The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
	159	validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
	160	support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
	161
f5509cc1 KC	162	config HARDENED_USERCOPY
f5509cc1 KC	163	bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
6040e576	164	depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
22ec1a2a	165	imply STRICT_DEVMEM
f5509cc1 KC	166	help
	167	This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
	168	copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
	169	copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
	170	are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
99c55fb1	171	separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
f5509cc1 KC	172	or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
	173	of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
	174
2d891fbc KC	175	config HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK
	176	bool "Allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size"
	177	depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
	178	default y
	179	help
	180	This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists
	181	to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of
	182	rejecting the copy, falling back to non-whitelisted hardened
	183	usercopy that checks the slab allocation size instead of the
	184	whitelist size. This option will be removed once it seems like
	185	all missing usercopy whitelists have been identified and fixed.
	186	Booting with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=Y/N" can change
	187	this setting.
	188
8e1f74ea KC	189	config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
	190	bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
	191	depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
80a77045	192	depends on EXPERT
8e1f74ea KC	193	help
	194	When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
	195	hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
	196	however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all
	197	been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
	198	trying to find such users.
	199
6974f0c4 DM	200	config FORTIFY_SOURCE
	201	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
	202	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
	203	help
	204	Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
	205	where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
	206
64e90a8a GKH	207	config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
	208	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
	209	help
	210	By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
	211	binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
	212	interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
	213	either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
	214	option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
	215	runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
	216	To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
	217	calls through a single executable that can not have its name
	218	changed.
	219
	220	Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
	221	"real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
	222	passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
	223	and choose what real programs are called.
	224
	225	If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
	226	disabled, choose this option and then set
	227	STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
	228
	229	config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
	230	string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
	231	depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
	232	default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
	233	help
	234	The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
	235	program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will
	236	be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
	237	line.
	238
	239	If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
	240	specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
	241
0a8dc8c9 DH	242	config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
	243	bool "Allow the kernel to be 'locked down'"
	244	help
	245	Allow the kernel to be locked down. If lockdown support is enabled
	246	and activated, the kernel will impose additional restrictions
	247	intended to prevent uid 0 from being able to modify the running
	248	kernel. This may break userland applications that rely on low-level
	249	access to hardware.
	250
	251	config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE
	252	bool "Enable kernel lockdown mode automatically"
	253	depends on LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
	254	help
	255	Enable the kernel lock down functionality automatically at boot.
	256
3da3c68e KM	257	config ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ
	258	bool "Allow the kernel lockdown to be lifted by SysRq"
	259	depends on LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
	260	depends on !LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE
	261	depends on MAGIC_SYSRQ
	262	depends on X86
	263	help
	264	Allow the lockdown on a kernel to be lifted, by pressing a SysRq key
	265	combination on a wired keyboard. On x86, this is SysRq+x.
	266
8636a1f9 MY	267	source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
	268	source "security/smack/Kconfig"
	269	source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
	270	source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"
	271	source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
	272	source "security/yama/Kconfig"
aeca4e2c	273	source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
1da177e4	274
8636a1f9	275	source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
3323eec9	276
2623c4fb KC	277	choice
	278	prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized"
	279	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
	280	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
	281	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
	282	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
	283	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
	284
	285	help
	286	This choice is there only for converting CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY
	287	in old kernel configs to CONFIG_LSM in new kernel configs. Don't
	288	change this choice unless you are creating a fresh kernel config,
	289	for this choice will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM has been set.
	290
	291	Selects the legacy "major security module" that will be
	292	initialized first. Overridden by non-default CONFIG_LSM.
	293
	294	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
	295	bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
	296
	297	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
	298	bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
	299
	300	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
	301	bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
	302
	303	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
	304	bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
	305
	306	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
	307	bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
	308
	309	endchoice
	310
13e735c0 KC	311	config LSM
13e735c0 KC	312	string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
2623c4fb KC	313	default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
	314	default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
	315	default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
	316	default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
aeca4e2c	317	default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
13e735c0 KC	318	help
13e735c0 KC	319	A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
79f7865d KC	320	Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
79f7865d KC	321	controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.
13e735c0 KC	322
	323	If unsure, leave this as the default.
	324
9f671e58 KC	325	source "security/Kconfig.hardening"
9f671e58 KC	326
1da177e4 LT	327	endmenu
1da177e4 LT	328