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Commit | Line | Data |
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3e1c2515 | 1 | /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o. |
1da177e4 LT |
2 | * |
3 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
4 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
5 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
6 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
7 | * | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
c59ede7b | 10 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
3fc689e9 | 11 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
12 | #include <linux/module.h> |
13 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
14 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
b1d9e6b0 | 15 | #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
16 | #include <linux/file.h> |
17 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
18 | #include <linux/mman.h> | |
19 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> | |
20 | #include <linux/swap.h> | |
1da177e4 LT |
21 | #include <linux/skbuff.h> |
22 | #include <linux/netlink.h> | |
23 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | |
25 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> | |
b5376771 | 26 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
b460cbc5 | 27 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
3898b1b4 AM |
28 | #include <linux/prctl.h> |
29 | #include <linux/securebits.h> | |
3486740a | 30 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
40401530 | 31 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> |
51b79bee | 32 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
72c2d582 | 33 | |
b5f22a59 SH |
34 | /* |
35 | * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in | |
36 | * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. | |
37 | * However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only | |
38 | * the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root | |
39 | * bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or | |
40 | * to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities | |
41 | * support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities. | |
42 | * | |
43 | * Warn if that happens, once per boot. | |
44 | */ | |
d7627467 | 45 | static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) |
b5f22a59 SH |
46 | { |
47 | static int warned; | |
48 | if (!warned) { | |
49 | printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and" | |
50 | " effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all" | |
51 | " capabilities.\n", fname); | |
52 | warned = 1; | |
53 | } | |
54 | } | |
55 | ||
1d045980 DH |
56 | /** |
57 | * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability | |
3699c53c | 58 | * @cred: The credentials to use |
3486740a | 59 | * @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability |
1d045980 DH |
60 | * @cap: The capability to check for |
61 | * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not | |
62 | * | |
63 | * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst | |
64 | * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not. | |
65 | * | |
3699c53c DH |
66 | * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable() |
67 | * and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics: | |
68 | * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the | |
69 | * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. | |
a6dbb1ef | 70 | */ |
6a9de491 EP |
71 | int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, |
72 | int cap, int audit) | |
1da177e4 | 73 | { |
520d9eab | 74 | struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; |
3486740a | 75 | |
520d9eab EB |
76 | /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace |
77 | * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target | |
78 | * user namespace's parents. | |
79 | */ | |
80 | for (;;) { | |
3486740a | 81 | /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ |
520d9eab | 82 | if (ns == cred->user_ns) |
3486740a SH |
83 | return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; |
84 | ||
85 | /* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */ | |
520d9eab | 86 | if (ns == &init_user_ns) |
3486740a SH |
87 | return -EPERM; |
88 | ||
520d9eab EB |
89 | /* |
90 | * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the | |
91 | * user namespace has all caps. | |
92 | */ | |
93 | if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) | |
94 | return 0; | |
95 | ||
3486740a | 96 | /* |
520d9eab | 97 | * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have |
3486740a SH |
98 | * it over all children user namespaces as well. |
99 | */ | |
520d9eab | 100 | ns = ns->parent; |
3486740a SH |
101 | } |
102 | ||
103 | /* We never get here */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
104 | } |
105 | ||
1d045980 DH |
106 | /** |
107 | * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock | |
108 | * @ts: The time to set | |
109 | * @tz: The timezone to set | |
110 | * | |
111 | * Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone | |
112 | * information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied. | |
113 | */ | |
1e6d7679 | 114 | int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz) |
1da177e4 LT |
115 | { |
116 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) | |
117 | return -EPERM; | |
118 | return 0; | |
119 | } | |
120 | ||
1d045980 | 121 | /** |
9e48858f | 122 | * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access |
1d045980 DH |
123 | * another |
124 | * @child: The process to be accessed | |
125 | * @mode: The mode of attachment. | |
126 | * | |
8409cca7 SH |
127 | * If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target |
128 | * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. | |
129 | * If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace | |
130 | * access is allowed. | |
131 | * Else denied. | |
132 | * | |
1d045980 DH |
133 | * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission |
134 | * granted, -ve if denied. | |
135 | */ | |
9e48858f | 136 | int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) |
1da177e4 | 137 | { |
c69e8d9c | 138 | int ret = 0; |
8409cca7 | 139 | const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; |
c69e8d9c DH |
140 | |
141 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
8409cca7 SH |
142 | cred = current_cred(); |
143 | child_cred = __task_cred(child); | |
c4a4d603 | 144 | if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && |
8409cca7 SH |
145 | cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) |
146 | goto out; | |
c4a4d603 | 147 | if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) |
8409cca7 SH |
148 | goto out; |
149 | ret = -EPERM; | |
150 | out: | |
c69e8d9c DH |
151 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
152 | return ret; | |
5cd9c58f DH |
153 | } |
154 | ||
1d045980 DH |
155 | /** |
156 | * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current | |
157 | * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer | |
158 | * | |
8409cca7 SH |
159 | * If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's |
160 | * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. | |
161 | * If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace | |
162 | * access is allowed. | |
163 | * Else denied. | |
164 | * | |
1d045980 DH |
165 | * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current |
166 | * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
167 | */ | |
5cd9c58f DH |
168 | int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
169 | { | |
c69e8d9c | 170 | int ret = 0; |
8409cca7 | 171 | const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; |
c69e8d9c DH |
172 | |
173 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
8409cca7 SH |
174 | cred = __task_cred(parent); |
175 | child_cred = current_cred(); | |
c4a4d603 | 176 | if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && |
8409cca7 SH |
177 | cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) |
178 | goto out; | |
c4a4d603 | 179 | if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) |
8409cca7 SH |
180 | goto out; |
181 | ret = -EPERM; | |
182 | out: | |
c69e8d9c DH |
183 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
184 | return ret; | |
1da177e4 LT |
185 | } |
186 | ||
1d045980 DH |
187 | /** |
188 | * cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets | |
189 | * @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets | |
190 | * @effective: The place to record the effective set | |
191 | * @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set | |
192 | * @permitted: The place to record the permitted set | |
193 | * | |
194 | * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns | |
195 | * them to the caller. | |
196 | */ | |
197 | int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
198 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1da177e4 | 199 | { |
c69e8d9c | 200 | const struct cred *cred; |
b6dff3ec | 201 | |
1da177e4 | 202 | /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */ |
c69e8d9c DH |
203 | rcu_read_lock(); |
204 | cred = __task_cred(target); | |
b6dff3ec DH |
205 | *effective = cred->cap_effective; |
206 | *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; | |
207 | *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; | |
c69e8d9c | 208 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1da177e4 LT |
209 | return 0; |
210 | } | |
211 | ||
1d045980 DH |
212 | /* |
213 | * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old | |
214 | * permitted set. Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not. | |
215 | */ | |
72c2d582 AM |
216 | static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) |
217 | { | |
72c2d582 | 218 | |
1d045980 DH |
219 | /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP |
220 | * capability | |
221 | */ | |
c4a4d603 | 222 | if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns, |
6a9de491 | 223 | CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) |
1d045980 | 224 | return 0; |
1d045980 | 225 | return 1; |
1209726c | 226 | } |
72c2d582 | 227 | |
1d045980 DH |
228 | /** |
229 | * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities | |
230 | * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here | |
231 | * @old: The current task's current credentials | |
232 | * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set | |
233 | * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set | |
234 | * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set | |
235 | * | |
236 | * This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current | |
237 | * process's capability sets. The changes are made to the proposed new | |
238 | * credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM. | |
239 | */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
240 | int cap_capset(struct cred *new, |
241 | const struct cred *old, | |
242 | const kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
243 | const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, | |
244 | const kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1da177e4 | 245 | { |
d84f4f99 DH |
246 | if (cap_inh_is_capped() && |
247 | !cap_issubset(*inheritable, | |
248 | cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, | |
249 | old->cap_permitted))) | |
72c2d582 | 250 | /* incapable of using this inheritable set */ |
1da177e4 | 251 | return -EPERM; |
d84f4f99 | 252 | |
3b7391de | 253 | if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable, |
d84f4f99 DH |
254 | cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, |
255 | old->cap_bset))) | |
3b7391de SH |
256 | /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */ |
257 | return -EPERM; | |
1da177e4 LT |
258 | |
259 | /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */ | |
d84f4f99 | 260 | if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted)) |
1da177e4 | 261 | return -EPERM; |
1da177e4 LT |
262 | |
263 | /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */ | |
d84f4f99 | 264 | if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted)) |
1da177e4 | 265 | return -EPERM; |
1da177e4 | 266 | |
d84f4f99 DH |
267 | new->cap_effective = *effective; |
268 | new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; | |
269 | new->cap_permitted = *permitted; | |
1da177e4 LT |
270 | return 0; |
271 | } | |
272 | ||
1d045980 DH |
273 | /* |
274 | * Clear proposed capability sets for execve(). | |
275 | */ | |
b5376771 SH |
276 | static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
277 | { | |
a6f76f23 | 278 | cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted); |
b5376771 SH |
279 | bprm->cap_effective = false; |
280 | } | |
281 | ||
1d045980 DH |
282 | /** |
283 | * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges | |
284 | * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV | |
285 | * | |
286 | * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV | |
287 | * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should | |
288 | * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected? | |
289 | * | |
290 | * Returns 0 if granted; +ve if granted, but inode_killpriv() is required; and | |
291 | * -ve to deny the change. | |
292 | */ | |
b5376771 SH |
293 | int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) |
294 | { | |
c6f493d6 | 295 | struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
b5376771 SH |
296 | int error; |
297 | ||
acfa4380 | 298 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) |
b5376771 SH |
299 | return 0; |
300 | ||
301 | error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0); | |
302 | if (error <= 0) | |
303 | return 0; | |
304 | return 1; | |
305 | } | |
306 | ||
1d045980 DH |
307 | /** |
308 | * cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode | |
309 | * @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter | |
310 | * | |
311 | * Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode. | |
312 | * | |
313 | * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. | |
314 | */ | |
b5376771 SH |
315 | int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) |
316 | { | |
c6f493d6 | 317 | struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
b5376771 | 318 | |
acfa4380 | 319 | if (!inode->i_op->removexattr) |
b5376771 SH |
320 | return 0; |
321 | ||
322 | return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS); | |
323 | } | |
324 | ||
1d045980 DH |
325 | /* |
326 | * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached | |
327 | * to a file. | |
328 | */ | |
c0b00441 | 329 | static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, |
a6f76f23 | 330 | struct linux_binprm *bprm, |
4d49f671 ZL |
331 | bool *effective, |
332 | bool *has_cap) | |
b5376771 | 333 | { |
a6f76f23 | 334 | struct cred *new = bprm->cred; |
c0b00441 EP |
335 | unsigned i; |
336 | int ret = 0; | |
337 | ||
338 | if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) | |
a6f76f23 | 339 | *effective = true; |
c0b00441 | 340 | |
4d49f671 ZL |
341 | if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) |
342 | *has_cap = true; | |
343 | ||
c0b00441 EP |
344 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { |
345 | __u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i]; | |
346 | __u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i]; | |
347 | ||
348 | /* | |
349 | * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | |
350 | */ | |
a6f76f23 DH |
351 | new->cap_permitted.cap[i] = |
352 | (new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) | | |
353 | (new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable); | |
c0b00441 | 354 | |
a6f76f23 DH |
355 | if (permitted & ~new->cap_permitted.cap[i]) |
356 | /* insufficient to execute correctly */ | |
c0b00441 | 357 | ret = -EPERM; |
c0b00441 EP |
358 | } |
359 | ||
360 | /* | |
361 | * For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they | |
362 | * do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are | |
363 | * missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities. | |
364 | */ | |
a6f76f23 | 365 | return *effective ? ret : 0; |
c0b00441 EP |
366 | } |
367 | ||
1d045980 DH |
368 | /* |
369 | * Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file. | |
370 | */ | |
c0b00441 EP |
371 | int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps) |
372 | { | |
c6f493d6 | 373 | struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
b5376771 | 374 | __u32 magic_etc; |
e338d263 | 375 | unsigned tocopy, i; |
c0b00441 EP |
376 | int size; |
377 | struct vfs_cap_data caps; | |
378 | ||
379 | memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data)); | |
380 | ||
acfa4380 | 381 | if (!inode || !inode->i_op->getxattr) |
c0b00441 EP |
382 | return -ENODATA; |
383 | ||
384 | size = inode->i_op->getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps, | |
385 | XATTR_CAPS_SZ); | |
a6f76f23 | 386 | if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP) |
c0b00441 EP |
387 | /* no data, that's ok */ |
388 | return -ENODATA; | |
c0b00441 EP |
389 | if (size < 0) |
390 | return size; | |
b5376771 | 391 | |
e338d263 | 392 | if (size < sizeof(magic_etc)) |
b5376771 SH |
393 | return -EINVAL; |
394 | ||
c0b00441 | 395 | cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc); |
b5376771 | 396 | |
a6f76f23 | 397 | switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) { |
e338d263 AM |
398 | case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1: |
399 | if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1) | |
400 | return -EINVAL; | |
401 | tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1; | |
402 | break; | |
403 | case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2: | |
404 | if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2) | |
405 | return -EINVAL; | |
406 | tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2; | |
407 | break; | |
b5376771 SH |
408 | default: |
409 | return -EINVAL; | |
410 | } | |
e338d263 | 411 | |
5459c164 | 412 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { |
c0b00441 EP |
413 | if (i >= tocopy) |
414 | break; | |
415 | cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted); | |
416 | cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable); | |
e338d263 | 417 | } |
a6f76f23 | 418 | |
7d8b6c63 EP |
419 | cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; |
420 | cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; | |
421 | ||
c0b00441 | 422 | return 0; |
b5376771 SH |
423 | } |
424 | ||
1d045980 DH |
425 | /* |
426 | * Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from | |
427 | * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being | |
428 | * constructed by execve(). | |
429 | */ | |
4d49f671 | 430 | static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap) |
b5376771 | 431 | { |
b5376771 | 432 | int rc = 0; |
c0b00441 | 433 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; |
b5376771 | 434 | |
3318a386 SH |
435 | bprm_clear_caps(bprm); |
436 | ||
1f29fae2 SH |
437 | if (!file_caps_enabled) |
438 | return 0; | |
439 | ||
182be684 | 440 | if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) |
b5376771 | 441 | return 0; |
b5376771 | 442 | |
f4a4a8b1 | 443 | rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); |
c0b00441 EP |
444 | if (rc < 0) { |
445 | if (rc == -EINVAL) | |
446 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", | |
447 | __func__, rc, bprm->filename); | |
448 | else if (rc == -ENODATA) | |
449 | rc = 0; | |
b5376771 SH |
450 | goto out; |
451 | } | |
b5376771 | 452 | |
4d49f671 | 453 | rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap); |
a6f76f23 DH |
454 | if (rc == -EINVAL) |
455 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", | |
456 | __func__, rc, bprm->filename); | |
b5376771 SH |
457 | |
458 | out: | |
b5376771 SH |
459 | if (rc) |
460 | bprm_clear_caps(bprm); | |
461 | ||
462 | return rc; | |
463 | } | |
464 | ||
1d045980 DH |
465 | /** |
466 | * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). | |
467 | * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds | |
468 | * | |
469 | * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being | |
470 | * constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered, | |
471 | * which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. | |
a6f76f23 DH |
472 | */ |
473 | int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1da177e4 | 474 | { |
a6f76f23 DH |
475 | const struct cred *old = current_cred(); |
476 | struct cred *new = bprm->cred; | |
7d8db180 | 477 | bool effective, has_cap = false; |
b5376771 | 478 | int ret; |
18815a18 | 479 | kuid_t root_uid; |
1da177e4 | 480 | |
a6f76f23 | 481 | effective = false; |
4d49f671 | 482 | ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap); |
a6f76f23 DH |
483 | if (ret < 0) |
484 | return ret; | |
1da177e4 | 485 | |
18815a18 EB |
486 | root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0); |
487 | ||
5459c164 | 488 | if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { |
b5f22a59 SH |
489 | /* |
490 | * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs | |
491 | * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it | |
492 | * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin. | |
493 | */ | |
18815a18 | 494 | if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) { |
b5f22a59 SH |
495 | warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename); |
496 | goto skip; | |
497 | } | |
5459c164 AM |
498 | /* |
499 | * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root | |
500 | * executables under compatibility mode, we override the | |
501 | * capability sets for the file. | |
502 | * | |
a6f76f23 | 503 | * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit. |
5459c164 | 504 | */ |
18815a18 | 505 | if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) { |
5459c164 | 506 | /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */ |
a6f76f23 DH |
507 | new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset, |
508 | old->cap_inheritable); | |
1da177e4 | 509 | } |
18815a18 | 510 | if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) |
a6f76f23 | 511 | effective = true; |
1da177e4 | 512 | } |
b5f22a59 | 513 | skip: |
b5376771 | 514 | |
d52fc5dd EP |
515 | /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ |
516 | if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) | |
517 | bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; | |
518 | ||
519 | ||
a6f76f23 | 520 | /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised |
259e5e6c AL |
521 | * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit. |
522 | * | |
523 | * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs. | |
a6f76f23 | 524 | */ |
18815a18 EB |
525 | if ((!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || |
526 | !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) || | |
a6f76f23 DH |
527 | !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) && |
528 | bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) { | |
529 | /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */ | |
259e5e6c AL |
530 | if (!capable(CAP_SETUID) || |
531 | (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) { | |
a6f76f23 DH |
532 | new->euid = new->uid; |
533 | new->egid = new->gid; | |
1da177e4 | 534 | } |
b3a222e5 SH |
535 | new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted, |
536 | old->cap_permitted); | |
1da177e4 LT |
537 | } |
538 | ||
a6f76f23 DH |
539 | new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid; |
540 | new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid; | |
1da177e4 | 541 | |
4bf2ea77 EP |
542 | if (effective) |
543 | new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; | |
544 | else | |
545 | cap_clear(new->cap_effective); | |
a6f76f23 | 546 | bprm->cap_effective = effective; |
1da177e4 | 547 | |
3fc689e9 EP |
548 | /* |
549 | * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set | |
550 | * | |
551 | * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: | |
552 | * 1) cap_effective has all caps | |
553 | * 2) we are root | |
554 | * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) | |
555 | * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. | |
556 | * | |
557 | * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think | |
558 | * that is interesting information to audit. | |
559 | */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
560 | if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) { |
561 | if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) || | |
18815a18 | 562 | !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || |
a6f76f23 DH |
563 | issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { |
564 | ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); | |
565 | if (ret < 0) | |
566 | return ret; | |
567 | } | |
3fc689e9 | 568 | } |
1da177e4 | 569 | |
d84f4f99 | 570 | new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); |
a6f76f23 | 571 | return 0; |
1da177e4 LT |
572 | } |
573 | ||
1d045980 DH |
574 | /** |
575 | * cap_bprm_secureexec - Determine whether a secure execution is required | |
576 | * @bprm: The execution parameters | |
577 | * | |
578 | * Determine whether a secure execution is required, return 1 if it is, and 0 | |
579 | * if it is not. | |
580 | * | |
581 | * The credentials have been committed by this point, and so are no longer | |
582 | * available through @bprm->cred. | |
a6f76f23 DH |
583 | */ |
584 | int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1da177e4 | 585 | { |
c69e8d9c | 586 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
18815a18 | 587 | kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, 0); |
b6dff3ec | 588 | |
18815a18 | 589 | if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, root_uid)) { |
b5376771 SH |
590 | if (bprm->cap_effective) |
591 | return 1; | |
a6f76f23 | 592 | if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_permitted)) |
b5376771 SH |
593 | return 1; |
594 | } | |
595 | ||
18815a18 EB |
596 | return (!uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) || |
597 | !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid)); | |
1da177e4 LT |
598 | } |
599 | ||
1d045980 DH |
600 | /** |
601 | * cap_inode_setxattr - Determine whether an xattr may be altered | |
602 | * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered | |
603 | * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed | |
604 | * @value: The value that the xattr will be changed to | |
605 | * @size: The size of value | |
606 | * @flags: The replacement flag | |
607 | * | |
608 | * Determine whether an xattr may be altered or set on an inode, returning 0 if | |
609 | * permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
610 | * | |
611 | * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get updated or set by those | |
612 | * who aren't privileged to do so. | |
613 | */ | |
8f0cfa52 DH |
614 | int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, |
615 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
1da177e4 | 616 | { |
b5376771 SH |
617 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
618 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) | |
619 | return -EPERM; | |
620 | return 0; | |
1d045980 DH |
621 | } |
622 | ||
623 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
c5b60b5e | 624 | sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && |
1da177e4 LT |
625 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
626 | return -EPERM; | |
627 | return 0; | |
628 | } | |
629 | ||
1d045980 DH |
630 | /** |
631 | * cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed | |
632 | * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered | |
633 | * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed | |
634 | * | |
635 | * Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if | |
636 | * permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
637 | * | |
638 | * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who | |
639 | * aren't privileged to remove them. | |
640 | */ | |
8f0cfa52 | 641 | int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
1da177e4 | 642 | { |
b5376771 SH |
643 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
644 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) | |
645 | return -EPERM; | |
646 | return 0; | |
1d045980 DH |
647 | } |
648 | ||
649 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
c5b60b5e | 650 | sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && |
1da177e4 LT |
651 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
652 | return -EPERM; | |
653 | return 0; | |
654 | } | |
655 | ||
a6f76f23 | 656 | /* |
1da177e4 LT |
657 | * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of |
658 | * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid. | |
659 | * | |
660 | * 1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of | |
661 | * {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are | |
662 | * cleared. | |
663 | * | |
664 | * 2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective | |
665 | * capabilities of the process are cleared. | |
666 | * | |
667 | * 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective | |
668 | * capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities. | |
669 | * | |
a6f76f23 | 670 | * fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should |
1da177e4 LT |
671 | * never happen. |
672 | * | |
a6f76f23 | 673 | * -astor |
1da177e4 LT |
674 | * |
675 | * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99 | |
676 | * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it | |
677 | * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and | |
678 | * effective sets will be retained. | |
679 | * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some | |
680 | * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges! | |
681 | * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital | |
682 | * files.. | |
683 | * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this. | |
684 | */ | |
d84f4f99 | 685 | static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
1da177e4 | 686 | { |
18815a18 EB |
687 | kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0); |
688 | ||
689 | if ((uid_eq(old->uid, root_uid) || | |
690 | uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) || | |
691 | uid_eq(old->suid, root_uid)) && | |
692 | (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && | |
693 | !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) && | |
694 | !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid)) && | |
3898b1b4 | 695 | !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) { |
d84f4f99 DH |
696 | cap_clear(new->cap_permitted); |
697 | cap_clear(new->cap_effective); | |
1da177e4 | 698 | } |
18815a18 | 699 | if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) |
d84f4f99 | 700 | cap_clear(new->cap_effective); |
18815a18 | 701 | if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) |
d84f4f99 | 702 | new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; |
1da177e4 LT |
703 | } |
704 | ||
1d045980 DH |
705 | /** |
706 | * cap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call | |
707 | * @new: The proposed credentials | |
708 | * @old: The current task's current credentials | |
709 | * @flags: Indications of what has changed | |
710 | * | |
711 | * Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are | |
712 | * actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them. | |
713 | */ | |
d84f4f99 | 714 | int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) |
1da177e4 LT |
715 | { |
716 | switch (flags) { | |
717 | case LSM_SETID_RE: | |
718 | case LSM_SETID_ID: | |
719 | case LSM_SETID_RES: | |
1d045980 DH |
720 | /* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless |
721 | * otherwise suppressed */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
722 | if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) |
723 | cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old); | |
1da177e4 | 724 | break; |
1da177e4 | 725 | |
1d045980 DH |
726 | case LSM_SETID_FS: |
727 | /* juggle the capabilties to follow FSUID changes, unless | |
728 | * otherwise suppressed | |
729 | * | |
d84f4f99 DH |
730 | * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities? |
731 | * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here. | |
732 | */ | |
733 | if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { | |
18815a18 EB |
734 | kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0); |
735 | if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid)) | |
d84f4f99 DH |
736 | new->cap_effective = |
737 | cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective); | |
1d045980 | 738 | |
18815a18 | 739 | if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid)) |
d84f4f99 DH |
740 | new->cap_effective = |
741 | cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective, | |
742 | new->cap_permitted); | |
1da177e4 | 743 | } |
d84f4f99 | 744 | break; |
1d045980 | 745 | |
1da177e4 LT |
746 | default: |
747 | return -EINVAL; | |
748 | } | |
749 | ||
750 | return 0; | |
751 | } | |
752 | ||
b5376771 SH |
753 | /* |
754 | * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and | |
755 | * task_setnice, assumes that | |
756 | * . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed | |
757 | * . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes, | |
758 | * then those actions should be allowed | |
759 | * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but | |
760 | * yet with increased caps. | |
761 | * So we check for increased caps on the target process. | |
762 | */ | |
de45e806 | 763 | static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p) |
b5376771 | 764 | { |
f54fb863 | 765 | int is_subset, ret = 0; |
c69e8d9c DH |
766 | |
767 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
768 | is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted, | |
769 | current_cred()->cap_permitted); | |
f54fb863 SH |
770 | if (!is_subset && !ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) |
771 | ret = -EPERM; | |
c69e8d9c DH |
772 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
773 | ||
f54fb863 | 774 | return ret; |
b5376771 SH |
775 | } |
776 | ||
1d045980 DH |
777 | /** |
778 | * cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted | |
779 | * @p: The task to affect | |
1d045980 DH |
780 | * |
781 | * Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the | |
782 | * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
783 | */ | |
b0ae1981 | 784 | int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) |
b5376771 SH |
785 | { |
786 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
787 | } | |
788 | ||
1d045980 DH |
789 | /** |
790 | * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted | |
791 | * @p: The task to affect | |
792 | * @ioprio: The I/O priority to set | |
793 | * | |
794 | * Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified | |
795 | * task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
796 | */ | |
797 | int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) | |
b5376771 SH |
798 | { |
799 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
800 | } | |
801 | ||
1d045980 DH |
802 | /** |
803 | * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted | |
804 | * @p: The task to affect | |
805 | * @nice: The nice value to set | |
806 | * | |
807 | * Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the | |
808 | * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
809 | */ | |
810 | int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) | |
b5376771 SH |
811 | { |
812 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
813 | } | |
814 | ||
3b7391de | 815 | /* |
1d045980 DH |
816 | * Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP. Attempt to remove the specified capability from |
817 | * the current task's bounding set. Returns 0 on success, -ve on error. | |
3b7391de | 818 | */ |
6d6f3328 | 819 | static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap) |
3b7391de | 820 | { |
6d6f3328 TH |
821 | struct cred *new; |
822 | ||
160da84d | 823 | if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP)) |
3b7391de SH |
824 | return -EPERM; |
825 | if (!cap_valid(cap)) | |
826 | return -EINVAL; | |
d84f4f99 | 827 | |
6d6f3328 TH |
828 | new = prepare_creds(); |
829 | if (!new) | |
830 | return -ENOMEM; | |
d84f4f99 | 831 | cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap); |
6d6f3328 | 832 | return commit_creds(new); |
3b7391de | 833 | } |
3898b1b4 | 834 | |
1d045980 DH |
835 | /** |
836 | * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module | |
837 | * @option: The process control function requested | |
838 | * @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function | |
839 | * | |
840 | * Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may | |
841 | * also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here. | |
842 | * | |
843 | * Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented | |
844 | * here, other -ve on error. If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM | |
845 | * modules will consider performing the function. | |
846 | */ | |
3898b1b4 | 847 | int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, |
d84f4f99 | 848 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) |
3898b1b4 | 849 | { |
6d6f3328 | 850 | const struct cred *old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f99 | 851 | struct cred *new; |
d84f4f99 | 852 | |
3898b1b4 AM |
853 | switch (option) { |
854 | case PR_CAPBSET_READ: | |
855 | if (!cap_valid(arg2)) | |
6d6f3328 TH |
856 | return -EINVAL; |
857 | return !!cap_raised(old->cap_bset, arg2); | |
d84f4f99 | 858 | |
3898b1b4 | 859 | case PR_CAPBSET_DROP: |
6d6f3328 | 860 | return cap_prctl_drop(arg2); |
3898b1b4 AM |
861 | |
862 | /* | |
863 | * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a | |
864 | * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem | |
865 | * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem | |
866 | * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended. | |
867 | * | |
868 | * Note: | |
869 | * | |
870 | * PR_SET_SECUREBITS = | |
871 | * issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED) | |
872 | * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | |
873 | * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED) | |
874 | * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | |
875 | * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED) | |
876 | * | |
877 | * will ensure that the current process and all of its | |
878 | * children will be locked into a pure | |
879 | * capability-based-privilege environment. | |
880 | */ | |
881 | case PR_SET_SECUREBITS: | |
6d6f3328 TH |
882 | if ((((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1) |
883 | & (old->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/ | |
884 | || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ | |
d84f4f99 | 885 | || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ |
6a9de491 | 886 | || (cap_capable(current_cred(), |
c4a4d603 | 887 | current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, |
3699c53c | 888 | SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ |
3898b1b4 AM |
889 | /* |
890 | * [1] no changing of bits that are locked | |
891 | * [2] no unlocking of locks | |
892 | * [3] no setting of unsupported bits | |
893 | * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about | |
894 | * the "sendmail capabilities bug") | |
895 | */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
896 | ) |
897 | /* cannot change a locked bit */ | |
6d6f3328 TH |
898 | return -EPERM; |
899 | ||
900 | new = prepare_creds(); | |
901 | if (!new) | |
902 | return -ENOMEM; | |
d84f4f99 | 903 | new->securebits = arg2; |
6d6f3328 | 904 | return commit_creds(new); |
d84f4f99 | 905 | |
3898b1b4 | 906 | case PR_GET_SECUREBITS: |
6d6f3328 | 907 | return old->securebits; |
3898b1b4 | 908 | |
3898b1b4 | 909 | case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS: |
6d6f3328 | 910 | return !!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); |
d84f4f99 | 911 | |
3898b1b4 AM |
912 | case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS: |
913 | if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */ | |
6d6f3328 | 914 | return -EINVAL; |
d84f4f99 | 915 | if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)) |
6d6f3328 TH |
916 | return -EPERM; |
917 | ||
918 | new = prepare_creds(); | |
919 | if (!new) | |
920 | return -ENOMEM; | |
d84f4f99 DH |
921 | if (arg2) |
922 | new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); | |
3898b1b4 | 923 | else |
d84f4f99 | 924 | new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); |
6d6f3328 | 925 | return commit_creds(new); |
3898b1b4 AM |
926 | |
927 | default: | |
928 | /* No functionality available - continue with default */ | |
6d6f3328 | 929 | return -ENOSYS; |
3898b1b4 | 930 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
931 | } |
932 | ||
1d045980 DH |
933 | /** |
934 | * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted | |
935 | * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made | |
936 | * @pages: The size of the mapping | |
937 | * | |
938 | * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current | |
b1d9e6b0 | 939 | * task is permitted, returning 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not. |
1d045980 | 940 | */ |
34b4e4aa | 941 | int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) |
1da177e4 LT |
942 | { |
943 | int cap_sys_admin = 0; | |
944 | ||
6a9de491 | 945 | if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, |
3699c53c | 946 | SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) |
1da177e4 | 947 | cap_sys_admin = 1; |
b1d9e6b0 | 948 | return cap_sys_admin; |
1da177e4 | 949 | } |
7c73875e EP |
950 | |
951 | /* | |
d007794a | 952 | * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr |
7c73875e | 953 | * @addr: address attempting to be mapped |
7c73875e | 954 | * |
6f262d8e | 955 | * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need |
7c73875e EP |
956 | * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the |
957 | * capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed | |
958 | * -EPERM if not. | |
959 | */ | |
d007794a | 960 | int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) |
7c73875e EP |
961 | { |
962 | int ret = 0; | |
963 | ||
a2551df7 | 964 | if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { |
6a9de491 | 965 | ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, |
7c73875e EP |
966 | SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); |
967 | /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ | |
968 | if (ret == 0) | |
969 | current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; | |
970 | } | |
971 | return ret; | |
972 | } | |
d007794a | 973 | |
e5467859 AV |
974 | int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
975 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) | |
d007794a | 976 | { |
e5467859 | 977 | return 0; |
d007794a | 978 | } |
b1d9e6b0 CS |
979 | |
980 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY | |
981 | ||
982 | struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = { | |
983 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable), | |
984 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime), | |
985 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, cap_ptrace_access_check), | |
986 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme), | |
987 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget), | |
988 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset), | |
989 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds), | |
990 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec), | |
991 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv), | |
992 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv), | |
993 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr), | |
994 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file), | |
995 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid), | |
996 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, cap_task_prctl), | |
997 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, cap_task_setscheduler), | |
998 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, cap_task_setioprio), | |
999 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, cap_task_setnice), | |
1000 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, cap_vm_enough_memory), | |
1001 | }; | |
1002 | ||
1003 | void __init capability_add_hooks(void) | |
1004 | { | |
1005 | security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks)); | |
1006 | } | |
1007 | ||
1008 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ |