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1da177e4 LT |
1 | /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o |
2 | * | |
3 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
4 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
5 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
6 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
7 | * | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
c59ede7b | 10 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
11 | #include <linux/module.h> |
12 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
13 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
14 | #include <linux/security.h> | |
15 | #include <linux/file.h> | |
16 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
17 | #include <linux/mman.h> | |
18 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> | |
19 | #include <linux/swap.h> | |
1da177e4 LT |
20 | #include <linux/skbuff.h> |
21 | #include <linux/netlink.h> | |
22 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | |
23 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> | |
b5376771 | 25 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
1da177e4 | 26 | |
72c2d582 AM |
27 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES |
28 | /* | |
29 | * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem | |
30 | * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow this capability to | |
31 | * be available in the default configuration. | |
32 | */ | |
33 | # define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_FULL_SET | |
34 | #else /* ie. ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ | |
35 | # define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_INIT_EFF_SET | |
36 | #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ | |
37 | ||
38 | kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET; /* systemwide capability bound */ | |
39 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bset); | |
40 | ||
41 | /* Global security state */ | |
42 | ||
43 | unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */ | |
44 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(securebits); | |
45 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
46 | int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
47 | { | |
48 | NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective; | |
49 | return 0; | |
50 | } | |
51 | ||
c7bdb545 | 52 | int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap) |
1da177e4 | 53 | { |
c7bdb545 | 54 | if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap)) |
1da177e4 LT |
55 | return -EPERM; |
56 | return 0; | |
57 | } | |
58 | ||
59 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); | |
60 | ||
61 | int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) | |
62 | { | |
63 | /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */ | |
64 | if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap)) | |
65 | return 0; | |
66 | return -EPERM; | |
67 | } | |
68 | ||
69 | int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) | |
70 | { | |
71 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) | |
72 | return -EPERM; | |
73 | return 0; | |
74 | } | |
75 | ||
76 | int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) | |
77 | { | |
78 | /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */ | |
d4eb82c7 CW |
79 | if (!cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) && |
80 | !__capable(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) | |
1da177e4 LT |
81 | return -EPERM; |
82 | return 0; | |
83 | } | |
84 | ||
85 | int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
86 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
87 | { | |
88 | /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */ | |
89 | *effective = cap_t (target->cap_effective); | |
90 | *inheritable = cap_t (target->cap_inheritable); | |
91 | *permitted = cap_t (target->cap_permitted); | |
92 | return 0; | |
93 | } | |
94 | ||
72c2d582 AM |
95 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES |
96 | ||
97 | static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *target) | |
98 | { | |
99 | /* | |
100 | * No support for remote process capability manipulation with | |
101 | * filesystem capability support. | |
102 | */ | |
103 | return (target != current); | |
104 | } | |
105 | ||
106 | static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) | |
107 | { | |
108 | /* | |
109 | * return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited | |
110 | * to the old permitted set. | |
111 | */ | |
112 | return !cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP); | |
113 | } | |
114 | ||
115 | #else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ | |
116 | ||
117 | static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *t) { return 0; } | |
118 | static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; } | |
119 | ||
120 | #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ | |
121 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
122 | int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, |
123 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
124 | { | |
72c2d582 AM |
125 | if (cap_block_setpcap(target)) { |
126 | return -EPERM; | |
127 | } | |
128 | if (cap_inh_is_capped() | |
129 | && !cap_issubset(*inheritable, | |
130 | cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable, | |
131 | current->cap_permitted))) { | |
132 | /* incapable of using this inheritable set */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
133 | return -EPERM; |
134 | } | |
135 | ||
136 | /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */ | |
137 | if (!cap_issubset (*permitted, | |
138 | cap_combine (target->cap_permitted, | |
139 | current->cap_permitted))) { | |
140 | return -EPERM; | |
141 | } | |
142 | ||
143 | /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */ | |
144 | if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) { | |
145 | return -EPERM; | |
146 | } | |
147 | ||
148 | return 0; | |
149 | } | |
150 | ||
151 | void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
152 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
153 | { | |
154 | target->cap_effective = *effective; | |
155 | target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; | |
156 | target->cap_permitted = *permitted; | |
157 | } | |
158 | ||
b5376771 SH |
159 | static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
160 | { | |
161 | cap_clear(bprm->cap_inheritable); | |
162 | cap_clear(bprm->cap_permitted); | |
163 | bprm->cap_effective = false; | |
164 | } | |
165 | ||
166 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES | |
167 | ||
168 | int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) | |
169 | { | |
170 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
171 | int error; | |
172 | ||
173 | if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) | |
174 | return 0; | |
175 | ||
176 | error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0); | |
177 | if (error <= 0) | |
178 | return 0; | |
179 | return 1; | |
180 | } | |
181 | ||
182 | int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) | |
183 | { | |
184 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
185 | ||
186 | if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->removexattr) | |
187 | return 0; | |
188 | ||
189 | return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS); | |
190 | } | |
191 | ||
192 | static inline int cap_from_disk(__le32 *caps, struct linux_binprm *bprm, | |
193 | int size) | |
194 | { | |
195 | __u32 magic_etc; | |
196 | ||
197 | if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ) | |
198 | return -EINVAL; | |
199 | ||
200 | magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps[0]); | |
201 | ||
202 | switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) { | |
203 | case VFS_CAP_REVISION: | |
204 | if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) | |
205 | bprm->cap_effective = true; | |
206 | else | |
207 | bprm->cap_effective = false; | |
208 | bprm->cap_permitted = to_cap_t( le32_to_cpu(caps[1]) ); | |
209 | bprm->cap_inheritable = to_cap_t( le32_to_cpu(caps[2]) ); | |
210 | return 0; | |
211 | default: | |
212 | return -EINVAL; | |
213 | } | |
214 | } | |
215 | ||
216 | /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */ | |
217 | static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
218 | { | |
219 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
220 | int rc = 0; | |
221 | __le32 v1caps[XATTR_CAPS_SZ]; | |
222 | struct inode *inode; | |
223 | ||
224 | if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) { | |
225 | bprm_clear_caps(bprm); | |
226 | return 0; | |
227 | } | |
228 | ||
229 | dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); | |
230 | inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
231 | if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) | |
232 | goto out; | |
233 | ||
234 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &v1caps, | |
235 | XATTR_CAPS_SZ); | |
236 | if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { | |
237 | /* no data, that's ok */ | |
238 | rc = 0; | |
239 | goto out; | |
240 | } | |
241 | if (rc < 0) | |
242 | goto out; | |
243 | ||
244 | rc = cap_from_disk(v1caps, bprm, rc); | |
245 | if (rc) | |
246 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", | |
247 | __FUNCTION__, rc, bprm->filename); | |
248 | ||
249 | out: | |
250 | dput(dentry); | |
251 | if (rc) | |
252 | bprm_clear_caps(bprm); | |
253 | ||
254 | return rc; | |
255 | } | |
256 | ||
257 | #else | |
258 | int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) | |
259 | { | |
260 | return 0; | |
261 | } | |
262 | ||
263 | int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) | |
264 | { | |
265 | return 0; | |
266 | } | |
267 | ||
268 | static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
269 | { | |
270 | bprm_clear_caps(bprm); | |
271 | return 0; | |
272 | } | |
273 | #endif | |
274 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
275 | int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
276 | { | |
b5376771 | 277 | int ret; |
1da177e4 | 278 | |
b5376771 SH |
279 | ret = get_file_caps(bprm); |
280 | if (ret) | |
281 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_file_caps returned %d for %s\n", | |
282 | __FUNCTION__, ret, bprm->filename); | |
1da177e4 LT |
283 | |
284 | /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root | |
285 | * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three | |
286 | * capability sets for the file. | |
287 | * | |
288 | * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable | |
289 | * and permitted sets of the executable file. | |
290 | */ | |
291 | ||
292 | if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) { | |
293 | if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) { | |
294 | cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable); | |
295 | cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted); | |
296 | } | |
297 | if (bprm->e_uid == 0) | |
b5376771 | 298 | bprm->cap_effective = true; |
1da177e4 | 299 | } |
b5376771 SH |
300 | |
301 | return ret; | |
1da177e4 LT |
302 | } |
303 | ||
304 | void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) | |
305 | { | |
306 | /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */ | |
307 | kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working; | |
308 | ||
309 | new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset); | |
310 | working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable, | |
311 | current->cap_inheritable); | |
312 | new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working); | |
313 | ||
314 | if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid || | |
315 | !cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) { | |
6c5d5238 | 316 | set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); |
b5376771 | 317 | current->pdeath_signal = 0; |
1da177e4 LT |
318 | |
319 | if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) { | |
320 | if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) { | |
321 | bprm->e_uid = current->uid; | |
322 | bprm->e_gid = current->gid; | |
323 | } | |
324 | if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) { | |
325 | new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted, | |
326 | current->cap_permitted); | |
327 | } | |
328 | } | |
329 | } | |
330 | ||
331 | current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; | |
332 | current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; | |
333 | ||
334 | /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set | |
335 | * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual | |
336 | * capability rules */ | |
f400e198 | 337 | if (!is_init(current)) { |
1da177e4 | 338 | current->cap_permitted = new_permitted; |
b5376771 SH |
339 | current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_effective ? |
340 | new_permitted : 0; | |
1da177e4 LT |
341 | } |
342 | ||
343 | /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */ | |
344 | ||
345 | current->keep_capabilities = 0; | |
346 | } | |
347 | ||
348 | int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
349 | { | |
b5376771 SH |
350 | if (current->uid != 0) { |
351 | if (bprm->cap_effective) | |
352 | return 1; | |
353 | if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_permitted)) | |
354 | return 1; | |
355 | if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_inheritable)) | |
356 | return 1; | |
357 | } | |
358 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
359 | return (current->euid != current->uid || |
360 | current->egid != current->gid); | |
361 | } | |
362 | ||
363 | int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, | |
364 | size_t size, int flags) | |
365 | { | |
b5376771 SH |
366 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
367 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) | |
368 | return -EPERM; | |
369 | return 0; | |
370 | } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
1da177e4 LT |
371 | sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && |
372 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
373 | return -EPERM; | |
374 | return 0; | |
375 | } | |
376 | ||
377 | int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name) | |
378 | { | |
b5376771 SH |
379 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
380 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) | |
381 | return -EPERM; | |
382 | return 0; | |
383 | } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
1da177e4 LT |
384 | sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && |
385 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
386 | return -EPERM; | |
387 | return 0; | |
388 | } | |
389 | ||
390 | /* moved from kernel/sys.c. */ | |
391 | /* | |
392 | * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of | |
393 | * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid. | |
394 | * | |
395 | * 1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of | |
396 | * {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are | |
397 | * cleared. | |
398 | * | |
399 | * 2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective | |
400 | * capabilities of the process are cleared. | |
401 | * | |
402 | * 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective | |
403 | * capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities. | |
404 | * | |
405 | * fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should | |
406 | * never happen. | |
407 | * | |
408 | * -astor | |
409 | * | |
410 | * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99 | |
411 | * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it | |
412 | * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and | |
413 | * effective sets will be retained. | |
414 | * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some | |
415 | * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges! | |
416 | * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital | |
417 | * files.. | |
418 | * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this. | |
419 | */ | |
420 | static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid, | |
421 | int old_suid) | |
422 | { | |
423 | if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) && | |
424 | (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) && | |
425 | !current->keep_capabilities) { | |
426 | cap_clear (current->cap_permitted); | |
427 | cap_clear (current->cap_effective); | |
428 | } | |
429 | if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) { | |
430 | cap_clear (current->cap_effective); | |
431 | } | |
432 | if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) { | |
433 | current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted; | |
434 | } | |
435 | } | |
436 | ||
437 | int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, | |
438 | int flags) | |
439 | { | |
440 | switch (flags) { | |
441 | case LSM_SETID_RE: | |
442 | case LSM_SETID_ID: | |
443 | case LSM_SETID_RES: | |
444 | /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */ | |
445 | if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { | |
446 | cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid); | |
447 | } | |
448 | break; | |
449 | case LSM_SETID_FS: | |
450 | { | |
451 | uid_t old_fsuid = old_ruid; | |
452 | ||
453 | /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */ | |
454 | ||
455 | /* | |
456 | * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities? | |
457 | * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here. | |
458 | */ | |
459 | ||
460 | if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { | |
461 | if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) { | |
462 | cap_t (current->cap_effective) &= | |
463 | ~CAP_FS_MASK; | |
464 | } | |
465 | if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) { | |
466 | cap_t (current->cap_effective) |= | |
467 | (cap_t (current->cap_permitted) & | |
468 | CAP_FS_MASK); | |
469 | } | |
470 | } | |
471 | break; | |
472 | } | |
473 | default: | |
474 | return -EINVAL; | |
475 | } | |
476 | ||
477 | return 0; | |
478 | } | |
479 | ||
b5376771 SH |
480 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES |
481 | /* | |
482 | * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and | |
483 | * task_setnice, assumes that | |
484 | * . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed | |
485 | * . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes, | |
486 | * then those actions should be allowed | |
487 | * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but | |
488 | * yet with increased caps. | |
489 | * So we check for increased caps on the target process. | |
490 | */ | |
491 | static inline int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p) | |
492 | { | |
493 | if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) && | |
494 | !__capable(current, CAP_SYS_NICE)) | |
495 | return -EPERM; | |
496 | return 0; | |
497 | } | |
498 | ||
499 | int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, | |
500 | struct sched_param *lp) | |
501 | { | |
502 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
503 | } | |
504 | ||
505 | int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) | |
506 | { | |
507 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
508 | } | |
509 | ||
510 | int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) | |
511 | { | |
512 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
513 | } | |
514 | ||
515 | int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, | |
516 | int sig, u32 secid) | |
517 | { | |
518 | if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info))) | |
519 | return 0; | |
520 | ||
521 | if (secid) | |
522 | /* | |
523 | * Signal sent as a particular user. | |
524 | * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the | |
525 | * only thing we can do at the moment. | |
526 | * Used only by usb drivers? | |
527 | */ | |
528 | return 0; | |
529 | if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) | |
530 | return 0; | |
531 | if (capable(CAP_KILL)) | |
532 | return 0; | |
533 | ||
534 | return -EPERM; | |
535 | } | |
536 | #else | |
537 | int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, | |
538 | struct sched_param *lp) | |
539 | { | |
540 | return 0; | |
541 | } | |
542 | int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) | |
543 | { | |
544 | return 0; | |
545 | } | |
546 | int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) | |
547 | { | |
548 | return 0; | |
549 | } | |
550 | int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, | |
551 | int sig, u32 secid) | |
552 | { | |
553 | return 0; | |
554 | } | |
555 | #endif | |
556 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
557 | void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p) |
558 | { | |
559 | p->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET; | |
560 | p->cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET; | |
561 | p->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET; | |
562 | p->keep_capabilities = 0; | |
563 | return; | |
564 | } | |
565 | ||
566 | int cap_syslog (int type) | |
567 | { | |
568 | if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
569 | return -EPERM; | |
570 | return 0; | |
571 | } | |
572 | ||
34b4e4aa | 573 | int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) |
1da177e4 LT |
574 | { |
575 | int cap_sys_admin = 0; | |
576 | ||
577 | if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) | |
578 | cap_sys_admin = 1; | |
34b4e4aa | 579 | return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); |
1da177e4 LT |
580 | } |
581 |