[mirror_ubuntu-jammy-kernel.git] / security / integrity / evm / evm_crypto.c

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
 * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
 *
 * Authors:
 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
 * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
 *
 * File: evm_crypto.c
 *	 Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
 */

#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "evm.h"

#define EVMKEY "evm-key"
#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
static const int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;

struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST];

static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);

#define EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY 0

static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags;

static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)";

/**
 * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
 * @key: pointer to a buffer with the key data
 * @size: length of the key data
 *
 * This function allows setting the EVM HMAC key from the kernel
 * without using the "encrypted" key subsystem keys. It can be used
 * by the crypto HW kernel module which has its own way of managing
 * keys.
 *
 * key length should be between 32 and 128 bytes long
 */
int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen)
{
	int rc;

	rc = -EBUSY;
	if (test_and_set_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags))
		goto busy;
	rc = -EINVAL;
	if (keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
		goto inval;
	memcpy(evmkey, key, keylen);
	evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_HMAC;
	pr_info("key initialized\n");
	return 0;
inval:
	clear_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags);
busy:
	pr_err("key initialization failed\n");
	return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_set_key);

static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
{
	long rc;
	const char *algo;
	struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;
	struct shash_desc *desc;

	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
		if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) {
			pr_err_once("HMAC key is not set\n");
			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
		}
		tfm = &hmac_tfm;
		algo = evm_hmac;
	} else {
		if (hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

		tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
		algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
	}

	if (*tfm)
		goto alloc;
	mutex_lock(&mutex);
	if (*tfm)
		goto unlock;

	tmp_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
	if (IS_ERR(tmp_tfm)) {
		pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo,
		       PTR_ERR(tmp_tfm));
		mutex_unlock(&mutex);
		return ERR_CAST(tmp_tfm);
	}
	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
		rc = crypto_shash_setkey(tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
		if (rc) {
			crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
			mutex_unlock(&mutex);
			return ERR_PTR(rc);
		}
	}
	*tfm = tmp_tfm;
unlock:
	mutex_unlock(&mutex);
alloc:
	desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
			GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!desc)
		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

	desc->tfm = *tfm;

	rc = crypto_shash_init(desc);
	if (rc) {
		kfree(desc);
		return ERR_PTR(rc);
	}
	return desc;
}

/* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode
 * specific info.
 *
 * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete
 * protection.)
 */
static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
			  char type, char *digest)
{
	struct h_misc {
		unsigned long ino;
		__u32 generation;
		uid_t uid;
		gid_t gid;
		umode_t mode;
	} hmac_misc;

	memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
	/* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable
	 * signatures
	 */
	if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
		hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
		hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
	}
	/* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user
	 * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding
	 * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack
	 * where first they are written in an unprivileged fuse mount
	 * of a filesystem and then the system is tricked to mount the
	 * filesystem for real on next boot and trust it because
	 * everything is signed.
	 */
	hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
	hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
	hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
	if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) &&
	    type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
		crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE);
	crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
}

/*
 * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
 *
 * Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate
 * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
 * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
 */
static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
				 const char *req_xattr_name,
				 const char *req_xattr_value,
				 size_t req_xattr_value_len,
				 uint8_t type, struct evm_digest *data)
{
	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
	struct xattr_list *xattr;
	struct shash_desc *desc;
	size_t xattr_size = 0;
	char *xattr_value = NULL;
	int error;
	int size;
	bool ima_present = false;

	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) ||
	    inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
		return -EOPNOTSUPP;

	desc = init_desc(type, data->hdr.algo);
	if (IS_ERR(desc))
		return PTR_ERR(desc);

	data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);

	error = -ENODATA;
	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
		bool is_ima = false;

		if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
			is_ima = true;

		if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
		    && !strcmp(xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) {
			error = 0;
			crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
					     req_xattr_value_len);
			if (is_ima)
				ima_present = true;
			continue;
		}
		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, xattr->name,
					  &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
		if (size == -ENOMEM) {
			error = -ENOMEM;
			goto out;
		}
		if (size < 0)
			continue;

		error = 0;
		xattr_size = size;
		crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size);
		if (is_ima)
			ima_present = true;
	}
	hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, data->digest);

	/* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */
	if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present)
		error = -EPERM;
out:
	kfree(xattr_value);
	kfree(desc);
	return error;
}

int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
		  const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
		  struct evm_digest *data)
{
	return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
				    req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, data);
}

int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
		  const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
		  char type, struct evm_digest *data)
{
	return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
				     req_xattr_value_len, type, data);
}

static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
{
	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
	int rc = 0;

	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
	if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG))
		return 1;

	/* Do this the hard way */
	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
				GFP_NOFS);
	if (rc <= 0) {
		if (rc == -ENODATA)
			return 0;
		return rc;
	}
	if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
		rc = 1;
	else
		rc = 0;

	kfree(xattr_data);
	return rc;
}


/*
 * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
 *
 * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
 */
int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
			const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
	struct evm_digest data;
	int rc = 0;

	/*
	 * Don't permit any transformation of the EVM xattr if the signature
	 * is of an immutable type
	 */
	rc = evm_is_immutable(dentry, inode);
	if (rc < 0)
		return rc;
	if (rc)
		return -EPERM;

	data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
	rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
			   xattr_value_len, &data);
	if (rc == 0) {
		data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
		rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
					   &data.hdr.xattr.data[1],
					   SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
	} else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
		rc = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
	}
	return rc;
}

int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
		  char *hmac_val)
{
	struct shash_desc *desc;

	desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1);
	if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
		pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
		return PTR_ERR(desc);
	}

	crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
	hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val);
	kfree(desc);
	return 0;
}

/*
 * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
 */
int evm_init_key(void)
{
	struct key *evm_key;
	struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
	int rc;

	evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
	if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
		return -ENOENT;

	down_read(&evm_key->sem);
	ekp = evm_key->payload.data[0];

	rc = evm_set_key(ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);

	/* burn the original key contents */
	memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
	up_read(&evm_key->sem);
	key_put(evm_key);
	return rc;
}
Commit	Line	Data
b886d83c	1	// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
66dbc325 MZ	2	/*
	3	* Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
	4	*
	5	* Authors:
	6	* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
	7	* Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
	8	*
66dbc325 MZ	9	* File: evm_crypto.c
	10	* Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
	11	*/
	12
876979c9	13	#include <linux/export.h>
66dbc325 MZ	14	#include <linux/crypto.h>
66dbc325 MZ	15	#include <linux/xattr.h>
76266763	16	#include <linux/evm.h>
66dbc325	17	#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
d46eb369	18	#include <crypto/hash.h>
5feeb611	19	#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
66dbc325 MZ	20	#include "evm.h"
	21
	22	#define EVMKEY "evm-key"
	23	#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
	24	static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
b2724d58	25	static const int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
66dbc325	26
d46eb369	27	struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
5feeb611	28	static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
d46eb369	29
97426f98 DK	30	static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
97426f98 DK	31
76266763 DK	32	#define EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY 0
	33
	34	static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags;
	35
b2724d58	36	static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)";
1a82cee3	37
76266763 DK	38	/**
	39	* evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
	40	* @key: pointer to a buffer with the key data
	41	* @size: length of the key data
	42	*
	43	* This function allows setting the EVM HMAC key from the kernel
	44	* without using the "encrypted" key subsystem keys. It can be used
	45	* by the crypto HW kernel module which has its own way of managing
	46	* keys.
	47	*
	48	* key length should be between 32 and 128 bytes long
	49	*/
	50	int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen)
	51	{
	52	int rc;
	53
	54	rc = -EBUSY;
	55	if (test_and_set_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags))
	56	goto busy;
	57	rc = -EINVAL;
	58	if (keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
	59	goto inval;
	60	memcpy(evmkey, key, keylen);
	61	evm_initialized \|= EVM_INIT_HMAC;
	62	pr_info("key initialized\n");
	63	return 0;
	64	inval:
	65	clear_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags);
	66	busy:
	67	pr_err("key initialization failed\n");
	68	return rc;
	69	}
	70	EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_set_key);
	71
5feeb611	72	static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
66dbc325	73	{
143b01d3	74	long rc;
5feeb611	75	const char *algo;
84338569	76	struct crypto_shash *tfm, tmp_tfm;
d46eb369 DK	77	struct shash_desc *desc;
d46eb369 DK	78
15647eb3	79	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
26ddabfe	80	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) {
0485d066	81	pr_err_once("HMAC key is not set\n");
26ddabfe DK	82	return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
26ddabfe DK	83	}
15647eb3 DK	84	tfm = &hmac_tfm;
	85	algo = evm_hmac;
	86	} else {
221be106 RS	87	if (hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
	88	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
	89
5feeb611 MG	90	tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
5feeb611 MG	91	algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
15647eb3 DK	92	}
15647eb3 DK	93
84338569 DC	94	if (*tfm)
	95	goto alloc;
	96	mutex_lock(&mutex);
	97	if (*tfm)
	98	goto unlock;
	99
	100	tmp_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
	101	if (IS_ERR(tmp_tfm)) {
	102	pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo,
	103	PTR_ERR(tmp_tfm));
	104	mutex_unlock(&mutex);
	105	return ERR_CAST(tmp_tfm);
	106	}
	107	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
	108	rc = crypto_shash_setkey(tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
	109	if (rc) {
	110	crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
97426f98	111	mutex_unlock(&mutex);
d46eb369 DK	112	return ERR_PTR(rc);
d46eb369 DK	113	}
66dbc325	114	}
84338569 DC	115	*tfm = tmp_tfm;
	116	unlock:
	117	mutex_unlock(&mutex);
	118	alloc:
15647eb3	119	desc = kmalloc(sizeof(desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm),
d46eb369 DK	120	GFP_KERNEL);
	121	if (!desc)
	122	return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
	123
15647eb3	124	desc->tfm = *tfm;
d46eb369	125
d46eb369	126	rc = crypto_shash_init(desc);
d46eb369 DK	127	if (rc) {
	128	kfree(desc);
	129	return ERR_PTR(rc);
	130	}
	131	return desc;
66dbc325 MZ	132	}
	133
	134	/* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode
	135	* specific info.
	136	*
	137	* (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete
	138	* protection.)
	139	*/
d46eb369	140	static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc desc, struct inode inode,
50b97748	141	char type, char *digest)
66dbc325 MZ	142	{
	143	struct h_misc {
	144	unsigned long ino;
	145	__u32 generation;
	146	uid_t uid;
	147	gid_t gid;
	148	umode_t mode;
	149	} hmac_misc;
66dbc325	150
2bb930ab	151	memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
50b97748 MG	152	/* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable
	153	* signatures
	154	*/
	155	if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
	156	hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
	157	hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
	158	}
19339c25 EB	159	/* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user
	160	* namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding
	161	* them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack
	162	* where first they are written in an unprivileged fuse mount
	163	* of a filesystem and then the system is tricked to mount the
	164	* filesystem for real on next boot and trust it because
	165	* everything is signed.
	166	*/
	167	hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
	168	hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
66dbc325	169	hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
2bb930ab	170	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
50b97748 MG	171	if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) &&
50b97748 MG	172	type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
e7fde070	173	crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE);
d46eb369	174	crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
66dbc325 MZ	175	}
	176
	177	/*
	178	* Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
	179	*
	180	* Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate
	181	* the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
	182	* each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
	183	*/
15647eb3	184	static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
5feeb611 MG	185	const char *req_xattr_name,
	186	const char *req_xattr_value,
	187	size_t req_xattr_value_len,
	188	uint8_t type, struct evm_digest *data)
66dbc325	189	{
c6f493d6	190	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
21af7663	191	struct xattr_list *xattr;
d46eb369	192	struct shash_desc *desc;
66dbc325 MZ	193	size_t xattr_size = 0;
	194	char *xattr_value = NULL;
	195	int error;
	196	int size;
50b97748	197	bool ima_present = false;
66dbc325	198
a3a5c966 SF	199	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) \|\|
a3a5c966 SF	200	inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
66dbc325	201	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
5d6c3191	202
5feeb611	203	desc = init_desc(type, data->hdr.algo);
d46eb369 DK	204	if (IS_ERR(desc))
d46eb369 DK	205	return PTR_ERR(desc);
66dbc325	206
5feeb611 MG	207	data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
5feeb611 MG	208
66dbc325	209	error = -ENODATA;
770f6058	210	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
50b97748 MG	211	bool is_ima = false;
50b97748 MG	212
21af7663	213	if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
50b97748 MG	214	is_ima = true;
50b97748 MG	215
66dbc325	216	if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
21af7663	217	&& !strcmp(xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) {
66dbc325	218	error = 0;
d46eb369 DK	219	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
d46eb369 DK	220	req_xattr_value_len);
50b97748 MG	221	if (is_ima)
50b97748 MG	222	ima_present = true;
66dbc325 MZ	223	continue;
66dbc325 MZ	224	}
21af7663	225	size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, xattr->name,
66dbc325 MZ	226	&xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
	227	if (size == -ENOMEM) {
	228	error = -ENOMEM;
	229	goto out;
	230	}
	231	if (size < 0)
	232	continue;
	233
	234	error = 0;
	235	xattr_size = size;
d46eb369	236	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size);
50b97748 MG	237	if (is_ima)
50b97748 MG	238	ima_present = true;
66dbc325	239	}
5feeb611	240	hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, data->digest);
d46eb369	241
50b97748 MG	242	/* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */
50b97748 MG	243	if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present)
0c4395fb	244	error = -EPERM;
66dbc325	245	out:
d46eb369 DK	246	kfree(xattr_value);
d46eb369 DK	247	kfree(desc);
66dbc325 MZ	248	return error;
	249	}
	250
15647eb3 DK	251	int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry dentry, const char req_xattr_name,
15647eb3 DK	252	const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
5feeb611	253	struct evm_digest *data)
15647eb3 DK	254	{
15647eb3 DK	255	return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
5feeb611	256	req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, data);
15647eb3 DK	257	}
	258
	259	int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry dentry, const char req_xattr_name,
	260	const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
5feeb611	261	char type, struct evm_digest *data)
15647eb3 DK	262	{
15647eb3 DK	263	return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
5feeb611	264	req_xattr_value_len, type, data);
50b97748 MG	265	}
	266
	267	static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry dentry, struct inode inode)
	268	{
	269	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
	270	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
	271	int rc = 0;
	272
	273	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
	274	if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG))
	275	return 1;
	276
	277	/* Do this the hard way */
	278	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
	279	GFP_NOFS);
	280	if (rc <= 0) {
	281	if (rc == -ENODATA)
	282	return 0;
	283	return rc;
	284	}
	285	if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
	286	rc = 1;
	287	else
	288	rc = 0;
	289
	290	kfree(xattr_data);
	291	return rc;
15647eb3 DK	292	}
15647eb3 DK	293
50b97748	294
66dbc325 MZ	295	/*
	296	* Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
	297	*
	298	* Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
	299	*/
	300	int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry dentry, const char xattr_name,
	301	const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
	302	{
c6f493d6	303	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
5feeb611	304	struct evm_digest data;
66dbc325 MZ	305	int rc = 0;
66dbc325 MZ	306
50b97748 MG	307	/*
	308	* Don't permit any transformation of the EVM xattr if the signature
	309	* is of an immutable type
	310	*/
	311	rc = evm_is_immutable(dentry, inode);
	312	if (rc < 0)
	313	return rc;
	314	if (rc)
	315	return -EPERM;
	316
5feeb611	317	data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
66dbc325	318	rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
5feeb611	319	xattr_value_len, &data);
6be5cc52	320	if (rc == 0) {
5feeb611	321	data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
66dbc325	322	rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
5feeb611 MG	323	&data.hdr.xattr.data[1],
5feeb611 MG	324	SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
5d6c3191 AG	325	} else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
5d6c3191 AG	326	rc = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
a67adb99	327	}
66dbc325 MZ	328	return rc;
	329	}
	330
cb723180 MZ	331	int evm_init_hmac(struct inode inode, const struct xattr lsm_xattr,
	332	char *hmac_val)
	333	{
d46eb369	334	struct shash_desc *desc;
cb723180	335
5feeb611	336	desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1);
d46eb369	337	if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
20ee451f	338	pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
d46eb369	339	return PTR_ERR(desc);
cb723180 MZ	340	}
cb723180 MZ	341
d46eb369	342	crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
50b97748	343	hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val);
d46eb369	344	kfree(desc);
cb723180 MZ	345	return 0;
	346	}
	347
66dbc325 MZ	348	/*
	349	* Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
	350	*/
	351	int evm_init_key(void)
	352	{
	353	struct key *evm_key;
	354	struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
76266763	355	int rc;
66dbc325	356
028db3e2	357	evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
66dbc325 MZ	358	if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
	359	return -ENOENT;
	360
	361	down_read(&evm_key->sem);
146aa8b1	362	ekp = evm_key->payload.data[0];
76266763 DK	363
	364	rc = evm_set_key(ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
	365
66dbc325 MZ	366	/* burn the original key contents */
	367	memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
	368	up_read(&evm_key->sem);
	369	key_put(evm_key);
	370	return rc;
	371	}