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CommitLineData
1da177e4
LT
1/*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
828dfe1d
EP
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
1da177e4
LT
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
2069f457
EP
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
1da177e4 14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
828dfe1d 15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
effad8df 16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
828dfe1d 17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
788e7dd4 18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
828dfe1d 19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
1da177e4
LT
20 *
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
828dfe1d 23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
1da177e4
LT
24 */
25
1da177e4
LT
26#include <linux/init.h>
27#include <linux/kernel.h>
0d094efe 28#include <linux/tracehook.h>
1da177e4
LT
29#include <linux/errno.h>
30#include <linux/sched.h>
31#include <linux/security.h>
32#include <linux/xattr.h>
33#include <linux/capability.h>
34#include <linux/unistd.h>
35#include <linux/mm.h>
36#include <linux/mman.h>
37#include <linux/slab.h>
38#include <linux/pagemap.h>
39#include <linux/swap.h>
1da177e4
LT
40#include <linux/spinlock.h>
41#include <linux/syscalls.h>
42#include <linux/file.h>
9f3acc31 43#include <linux/fdtable.h>
1da177e4
LT
44#include <linux/namei.h>
45#include <linux/mount.h>
1da177e4 46#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
1da177e4
LT
47#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49#include <linux/tty.h>
50#include <net/icmp.h>
227b60f5 51#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
1da177e4 52#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
220deb96 53#include <net/net_namespace.h>
d621d35e 54#include <net/netlabel.h>
f5269710 55#include <linux/uaccess.h>
1da177e4 56#include <asm/ioctls.h>
d621d35e 57#include <asm/atomic.h>
1da177e4
LT
58#include <linux/bitops.h>
59#include <linux/interrupt.h>
60#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61#include <linux/netlink.h>
62#include <linux/tcp.h>
63#include <linux/udp.h>
2ee92d46 64#include <linux/dccp.h>
1da177e4
LT
65#include <linux/quota.h>
66#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68#include <linux/parser.h>
69#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
70#include <net/ipv6.h>
71#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72#include <linux/personality.h>
73#include <linux/sysctl.h>
74#include <linux/audit.h>
6931dfc9 75#include <linux/string.h>
877ce7c1 76#include <linux/selinux.h>
23970741 77#include <linux/mutex.h>
1da177e4
LT
78
79#include "avc.h"
80#include "objsec.h"
81#include "netif.h"
224dfbd8 82#include "netnode.h"
3e112172 83#include "netport.h"
d28d1e08 84#include "xfrm.h"
c60475bf 85#include "netlabel.h"
9d57a7f9 86#include "audit.h"
1da177e4
LT
87
88#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
89#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
90
c9180a57
EP
91#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
92
1da177e4
LT
93extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
94extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
4e5ab4cb 95extern int selinux_compat_net;
20510f2f 96extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
1da177e4 97
d621d35e
PM
98/* SECMARK reference count */
99atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100
1da177e4 101#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
828dfe1d 102int selinux_enforcing;
1da177e4
LT
103
104static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105{
f5269710
EP
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
1da177e4
LT
109 return 1;
110}
111__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
112#endif
113
114#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116
117static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118{
f5269710
EP
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
1da177e4
LT
122 return 1;
123}
124__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
30d55280
SS
125#else
126int selinux_enabled = 1;
1da177e4
LT
127#endif
128
1da177e4 129
6f0f0fd4
JM
130/*
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
133 */
828dfe1d 134static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
1da177e4
LT
135
136/* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
140
e18b890b 141static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
7cae7e26 142
d621d35e
PM
143/**
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
145 *
146 * Description:
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
151 *
152 */
153static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
154{
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
156}
157
1da177e4
LT
158/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
159
160static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
161{
162 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
163
89d155ef 164 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1da177e4
LT
165 if (!tsec)
166 return -ENOMEM;
167
0356357c 168 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1da177e4
LT
169 task->security = tsec;
170
171 return 0;
172}
173
174static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
175{
176 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
1da177e4
LT
177 task->security = NULL;
178 kfree(tsec);
179}
180
181static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
182{
183 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
184 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
185
a02fe132 186 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
1da177e4
LT
187 if (!isec)
188 return -ENOMEM;
189
23970741 190 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
1da177e4 191 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
1da177e4
LT
192 isec->inode = inode;
193 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
194 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
9ac49d22 195 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
1da177e4
LT
196 inode->i_security = isec;
197
198 return 0;
199}
200
201static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
202{
203 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
204 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
205
1da177e4
LT
206 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
207 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
208 list_del_init(&isec->list);
209 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
210
211 inode->i_security = NULL;
7cae7e26 212 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
1da177e4
LT
213}
214
215static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
216{
217 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
218 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
219
26d2a4be 220 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1da177e4
LT
221 if (!fsec)
222 return -ENOMEM;
223
9ac49d22
SS
224 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
225 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
1da177e4
LT
226 file->f_security = fsec;
227
228 return 0;
229}
230
231static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
232{
233 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1da177e4
LT
234 file->f_security = NULL;
235 kfree(fsec);
236}
237
238static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
239{
240 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
241
89d155ef 242 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1da177e4
LT
243 if (!sbsec)
244 return -ENOMEM;
245
bc7e982b 246 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
1da177e4
LT
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1da177e4
LT
250 sbsec->sb = sb;
251 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
c312feb2 253 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1da177e4
LT
254 sb->s_security = sbsec;
255
256 return 0;
257}
258
259static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
260{
261 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
262
1da177e4
LT
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
267
268 sb->s_security = NULL;
269 kfree(sbsec);
270}
271
7d877f3b 272static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
1da177e4
LT
273{
274 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
275
89d155ef 276 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
1da177e4
LT
277 if (!ssec)
278 return -ENOMEM;
279
1da177e4 280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
892c141e 281 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1da177e4
LT
282 sk->sk_security = ssec;
283
f74af6e8 284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
99f59ed0 285
1da177e4
LT
286 return 0;
287}
288
289static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
290{
291 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
292
1da177e4
LT
293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
294 kfree(ssec);
295}
1da177e4
LT
296
297/* The security server must be initialized before
298 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
299extern int ss_initialized;
300
301/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
302
303static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
304 "uses xattr",
305 "uses transition SIDs",
306 "uses task SIDs",
307 "uses genfs_contexts",
308 "not configured for labeling",
309 "uses mountpoint labeling",
310};
311
312static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
313
314static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
315{
316 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
317}
318
319enum {
31e87930 320 Opt_error = -1,
1da177e4
LT
321 Opt_context = 1,
322 Opt_fscontext = 2,
c9180a57
EP
323 Opt_defcontext = 3,
324 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
1da177e4
LT
325};
326
327static match_table_t tokens = {
832cbd9a
EP
328 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
329 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
31e87930 332 {Opt_error, NULL},
1da177e4
LT
333};
334
335#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
336
c312feb2
EP
337static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
338 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
339 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
340{
341 int rc;
342
343 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
344 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
345 if (rc)
346 return rc;
347
348 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
349 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
350 return rc;
351}
352
0808925e
EP
353static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
354 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
355 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
356{
357 int rc;
358 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
359 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
360 if (rc)
361 return rc;
362
363 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
364 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
365 return rc;
366}
367
c9180a57 368static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
1da177e4 369{
1da177e4 370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
c9180a57
EP
371 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
372 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
373 int rc = 0;
1da177e4 374
c9180a57
EP
375 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
376 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
377 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
378 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
379 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
380 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
381 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
382 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
383 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
384 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
385 goto out;
386 }
387 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
388 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
389 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
390 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
391 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
393 else
394 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
395 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
396 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
397 goto out;
398 }
399 }
1da177e4 400
c9180a57 401 sbsec->initialized = 1;
1da177e4 402
c9180a57
EP
403 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
404 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
405 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
406 else
407 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
408 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
409 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
1da177e4 410
c9180a57
EP
411 /* Initialize the root inode. */
412 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
1da177e4 413
c9180a57
EP
414 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
415 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
416 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
417 populates itself. */
418 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
419next_inode:
420 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
421 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
422 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
423 struct inode_security_struct, list);
424 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
425 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
426 inode = igrab(inode);
427 if (inode) {
428 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
429 inode_doinit(inode);
430 iput(inode);
431 }
432 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
433 list_del_init(&isec->list);
434 goto next_inode;
435 }
436 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
437out:
438 return rc;
439}
1da177e4 440
c9180a57
EP
441/*
442 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
443 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
444 * mount options, or whatever.
445 */
446static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
e0007529 447 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
c9180a57
EP
448{
449 int rc = 0, i;
450 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
451 char *context = NULL;
452 u32 len;
453 char tmp;
1da177e4 454
e0007529 455 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
1da177e4 456
c9180a57
EP
457 if (!sbsec->initialized)
458 return -EINVAL;
1da177e4 459
c9180a57
EP
460 if (!ss_initialized)
461 return -EINVAL;
1da177e4 462
c9180a57
EP
463 /*
464 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
465 * settings this is going to need a mask
466 */
467 tmp = sbsec->flags;
468 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
469 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
470 if (tmp & 0x01)
e0007529 471 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
c9180a57
EP
472 tmp >>= 1;
473 }
1da177e4 474
e0007529
EP
475 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
476 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
c9180a57
EP
477 rc = -ENOMEM;
478 goto out_free;
479 }
1da177e4 480
e0007529
EP
481 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
482 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
c9180a57
EP
483 rc = -ENOMEM;
484 goto out_free;
485 }
1da177e4 486
c9180a57
EP
487 i = 0;
488 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
489 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
490 if (rc)
491 goto out_free;
e0007529
EP
492 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
493 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
c9180a57
EP
494 }
495 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
496 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
497 if (rc)
498 goto out_free;
e0007529
EP
499 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
500 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
c9180a57
EP
501 }
502 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
503 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
504 if (rc)
505 goto out_free;
e0007529
EP
506 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
507 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
c9180a57
EP
508 }
509 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
510 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
511 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
0808925e 512
c9180a57
EP
513 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
514 if (rc)
515 goto out_free;
e0007529
EP
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
c9180a57 518 }
1da177e4 519
e0007529 520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
1da177e4 521
c9180a57
EP
522 return 0;
523
524out_free:
e0007529 525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
c9180a57
EP
526 return rc;
527}
1da177e4 528
c9180a57
EP
529static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
531{
532 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
533 if (sbsec->initialized)
534 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
535 (old_sid != new_sid))
536 return 1;
537
538 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
539 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
540 */
541 if (!sbsec->initialized)
542 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
543 return 1;
544 return 0;
545}
e0007529 546
c9180a57
EP
547/*
548 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
549 * labeling information.
550 */
e0007529
EP
551static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
552 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
c9180a57
EP
553{
554 int rc = 0, i;
555 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
556 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
557 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
089be43e
JM
558 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
559 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
c9180a57
EP
560 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
561 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
e0007529
EP
562 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
563 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
564 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
c9180a57
EP
565
566 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
567
568 if (!ss_initialized) {
569 if (!num_opts) {
570 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
571 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
572 server is ready to handle calls. */
573 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
574 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
575 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
576 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
577 goto out;
578 }
579 rc = -EINVAL;
744ba35e
EP
580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
581 "before the security server is initialized\n");
1da177e4 582 goto out;
c9180a57 583 }
1da177e4 584
e0007529
EP
585 /*
586 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
587 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
588 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
589 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
590 *
591 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
592 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
593 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
594 * will be used for both mounts)
595 */
596 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
597 && (num_opts == 0))
f5269710 598 goto out;
e0007529 599
c9180a57
EP
600 /*
601 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
602 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
603 * than once with different security options.
604 */
605 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
606 u32 sid;
607 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
608 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
1da177e4
LT
609 if (rc) {
610 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
611 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
c9180a57
EP
612 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
613 goto out;
614 }
615 switch (flags[i]) {
616 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
617 fscontext_sid = sid;
618
619 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
620 fscontext_sid))
621 goto out_double_mount;
622
623 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
624 break;
625 case CONTEXT_MNT:
626 context_sid = sid;
627
628 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
629 context_sid))
630 goto out_double_mount;
631
632 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
633 break;
634 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
635 rootcontext_sid = sid;
636
637 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
638 rootcontext_sid))
639 goto out_double_mount;
640
641 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
642
643 break;
644 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
645 defcontext_sid = sid;
646
647 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
648 defcontext_sid))
649 goto out_double_mount;
650
651 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
652
653 break;
654 default:
655 rc = -EINVAL;
656 goto out;
1da177e4 657 }
c9180a57
EP
658 }
659
660 if (sbsec->initialized) {
661 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
662 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
663 goto out_double_mount;
664 rc = 0;
665 goto out;
666 }
667
089be43e 668 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
c9180a57
EP
669 sbsec->proc = 1;
670
671 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
089be43e 672 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
c9180a57
EP
673 if (rc) {
674 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
089be43e 675 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
c9180a57
EP
676 goto out;
677 }
1da177e4 678
c9180a57
EP
679 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
680 if (fscontext_sid) {
681
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
1da177e4 683 if (rc)
c9180a57 684 goto out;
1da177e4 685
c9180a57 686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
c312feb2
EP
687 }
688
689 /*
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
693 */
c9180a57
EP
694 if (context_sid) {
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
b04ea3ce 697 if (rc)
c9180a57
EP
698 goto out;
699 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
b04ea3ce 700 } else {
c9180a57 701 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
b04ea3ce 702 if (rc)
c9180a57 703 goto out;
b04ea3ce 704 }
c9180a57
EP
705 if (!rootcontext_sid)
706 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
1da177e4 707
c9180a57 708 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
c312feb2 709 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
1da177e4
LT
710 }
711
c9180a57
EP
712 if (rootcontext_sid) {
713 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
0808925e 714 if (rc)
c9180a57 715 goto out;
0808925e 716
c9180a57
EP
717 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
718 root_isec->initialized = 1;
0808925e
EP
719 }
720
c9180a57
EP
721 if (defcontext_sid) {
722 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
723 rc = -EINVAL;
724 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
725 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
726 goto out;
1da177e4
LT
727 }
728
c9180a57
EP
729 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
730 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
731 sbsec, tsec);
732 if (rc)
733 goto out;
734 }
1da177e4 735
c9180a57 736 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
1da177e4
LT
737 }
738
c9180a57 739 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
1da177e4 740out:
c9180a57 741 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
1da177e4 742 return rc;
c9180a57
EP
743out_double_mount:
744 rc = -EINVAL;
745 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
746 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
747 goto out;
1da177e4
LT
748}
749
c9180a57
EP
750static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
751 struct super_block *newsb)
1da177e4 752{
c9180a57
EP
753 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
754 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
1da177e4 755
c9180a57
EP
756 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
757 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
758 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
1da177e4 759
0f5e6420
EP
760 /*
761 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
762 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
763 * with it later
764 */
765 if (!ss_initialized) {
766 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
767 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
768 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
769 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
770 return;
771 }
c9180a57 772
c9180a57
EP
773 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
774 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
775
5a552617
EP
776 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
777 if (newsbsec->initialized)
778 return;
779
c9180a57
EP
780 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
781
782 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
783
784 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
785 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
786 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
787
788 if (set_context) {
789 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
790
791 if (!set_fscontext)
792 newsbsec->sid = sid;
793 if (!set_rootcontext) {
794 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
795 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
796 newisec->sid = sid;
797 }
798 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
1da177e4 799 }
c9180a57
EP
800 if (set_rootcontext) {
801 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
802 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
803 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
804 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
1da177e4 805
c9180a57 806 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
1da177e4
LT
807 }
808
c9180a57
EP
809 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
810 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
811}
812
2e1479d9
AB
813static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
814 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
c9180a57 815{
e0007529 816 char *p;
c9180a57
EP
817 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
818 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
e0007529 819 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
1da177e4 820
e0007529 821 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
1da177e4 822
c9180a57
EP
823 /* Standard string-based options. */
824 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
825 int token;
826 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
1da177e4 827
c9180a57
EP
828 if (!*p)
829 continue;
1da177e4 830
c9180a57 831 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
1da177e4 832
c9180a57
EP
833 switch (token) {
834 case Opt_context:
835 if (context || defcontext) {
836 rc = -EINVAL;
837 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
838 goto out_err;
839 }
840 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
841 if (!context) {
842 rc = -ENOMEM;
843 goto out_err;
844 }
845 break;
846
847 case Opt_fscontext:
848 if (fscontext) {
849 rc = -EINVAL;
850 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
851 goto out_err;
852 }
853 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
854 if (!fscontext) {
855 rc = -ENOMEM;
856 goto out_err;
857 }
858 break;
859
860 case Opt_rootcontext:
861 if (rootcontext) {
862 rc = -EINVAL;
863 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
864 goto out_err;
865 }
866 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
867 if (!rootcontext) {
868 rc = -ENOMEM;
869 goto out_err;
870 }
871 break;
872
873 case Opt_defcontext:
874 if (context || defcontext) {
875 rc = -EINVAL;
876 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
877 goto out_err;
878 }
879 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
880 if (!defcontext) {
881 rc = -ENOMEM;
882 goto out_err;
883 }
884 break;
885
886 default:
887 rc = -EINVAL;
888 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
889 goto out_err;
1da177e4 890
1da177e4 891 }
1da177e4 892 }
c9180a57 893
e0007529
EP
894 rc = -ENOMEM;
895 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
896 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
897 goto out_err;
898
899 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
901 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
902 goto out_err;
903 }
904
c9180a57 905 if (fscontext) {
e0007529
EP
906 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
907 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
c9180a57
EP
908 }
909 if (context) {
e0007529
EP
910 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
911 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
c9180a57
EP
912 }
913 if (rootcontext) {
e0007529
EP
914 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
915 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
c9180a57
EP
916 }
917 if (defcontext) {
e0007529
EP
918 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
919 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
c9180a57
EP
920 }
921
e0007529
EP
922 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
923 return 0;
924
c9180a57
EP
925out_err:
926 kfree(context);
927 kfree(defcontext);
928 kfree(fscontext);
929 kfree(rootcontext);
1da177e4
LT
930 return rc;
931}
e0007529
EP
932/*
933 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
934 */
935static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
936{
937 int rc = 0;
938 char *options = data;
939 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
940
941 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
942
943 if (!data)
944 goto out;
945
946 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
947
948 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
949 if (rc)
950 goto out_err;
951
952out:
953 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
954
955out_err:
956 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
957 return rc;
958}
1da177e4 959
2069f457
EP
960void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
961{
962 int i;
963 char *prefix;
964
965 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
966 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
967
968 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
969 case CONTEXT_MNT:
970 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
971 break;
972 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
973 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
974 break;
975 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
976 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
977 break;
978 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
979 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
980 break;
981 default:
982 BUG();
983 };
984 /* we need a comma before each option */
985 seq_putc(m, ',');
986 seq_puts(m, prefix);
987 if (has_comma)
988 seq_putc(m, '\"');
989 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
990 if (has_comma)
991 seq_putc(m, '\"');
992 }
993}
994
995static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
996{
997 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
998 int rc;
999
1000 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
383795c2
EP
1001 if (rc) {
1002 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1003 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1004 rc = 0;
2069f457 1005 return rc;
383795c2 1006 }
2069f457
EP
1007
1008 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1009
1010 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1011
1012 return rc;
1013}
1014
1da177e4
LT
1015static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1016{
1017 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1018 case S_IFSOCK:
1019 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1020 case S_IFLNK:
1021 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1022 case S_IFREG:
1023 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1024 case S_IFBLK:
1025 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1026 case S_IFDIR:
1027 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1028 case S_IFCHR:
1029 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1030 case S_IFIFO:
1031 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1032
1033 }
1034
1035 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1036}
1037
13402580
JM
1038static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1039{
1040 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1041}
1042
1043static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1044{
1045 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1046}
1047
1da177e4
LT
1048static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1049{
1050 switch (family) {
1051 case PF_UNIX:
1052 switch (type) {
1053 case SOCK_STREAM:
1054 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1055 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1056 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1057 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1058 }
1059 break;
1060 case PF_INET:
1061 case PF_INET6:
1062 switch (type) {
1063 case SOCK_STREAM:
13402580
JM
1064 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1065 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1066 else
1067 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1da177e4 1068 case SOCK_DGRAM:
13402580
JM
1069 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1070 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1071 else
1072 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
2ee92d46
JM
1073 case SOCK_DCCP:
1074 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
13402580 1075 default:
1da177e4
LT
1076 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1077 }
1078 break;
1079 case PF_NETLINK:
1080 switch (protocol) {
1081 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1082 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1083 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1084 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
216efaaa 1085 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1da177e4
LT
1086 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1087 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1088 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1089 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1090 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1091 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1093 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1095 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1097 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
0c9b7942
JM
1099 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1100 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1da177e4
LT
1101 default:
1102 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1103 }
1104 case PF_PACKET:
1105 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1106 case PF_KEY:
1107 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
3e3ff15e
CP
1108 case PF_APPLETALK:
1109 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1da177e4
LT
1110 }
1111
1112 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1113}
1114
1115#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1116static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1117 u16 tclass,
1118 u32 *sid)
1119{
1120 int buflen, rc;
1121 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1122
828dfe1d 1123 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1da177e4
LT
1124 if (!buffer)
1125 return -ENOMEM;
1126
1127 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1128 end = buffer+buflen;
1129 *--end = '\0';
1130 buflen--;
1131 path = end-1;
1132 *path = '/';
1133 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1134 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1135 if (buflen < 0)
1136 break;
1137 end -= de->namelen;
1138 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1139 *--end = '/';
1140 path = end;
1141 de = de->parent;
1142 }
1143 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1144 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1145 return rc;
1146}
1147#else
1148static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1149 u16 tclass,
1150 u32 *sid)
1151{
1152 return -EINVAL;
1153}
1154#endif
1155
1156/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1157static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1158{
1159 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1160 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1161 u32 sid;
1162 struct dentry *dentry;
1163#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1164 char *context = NULL;
1165 unsigned len = 0;
1166 int rc = 0;
1da177e4
LT
1167
1168 if (isec->initialized)
1169 goto out;
1170
23970741 1171 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1da177e4 1172 if (isec->initialized)
23970741 1173 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT
1174
1175 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1176 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1177 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1178 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1179 server is ready to handle calls. */
1180 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1181 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1182 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1183 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
23970741 1184 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT
1185 }
1186
1187 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1188 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1189 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1190 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1191 break;
1192 }
1193
1194 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1195 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1196 if (opt_dentry) {
1197 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1198 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1199 } else {
1200 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1201 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1202 }
1203 if (!dentry) {
744ba35e 1204 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
dd6f953a 1205 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1da177e4 1206 inode->i_ino);
23970741 1207 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT
1208 }
1209
1210 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
869ab514 1211 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1da177e4
LT
1212 if (!context) {
1213 rc = -ENOMEM;
1214 dput(dentry);
23970741 1215 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT
1216 }
1217 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1218 context, len);
1219 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1220 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1221 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1222 NULL, 0);
1223 if (rc < 0) {
1224 dput(dentry);
23970741 1225 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT
1226 }
1227 kfree(context);
1228 len = rc;
869ab514 1229 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1da177e4
LT
1230 if (!context) {
1231 rc = -ENOMEM;
1232 dput(dentry);
23970741 1233 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT
1234 }
1235 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1236 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1237 context, len);
1238 }
1239 dput(dentry);
1240 if (rc < 0) {
1241 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
744ba35e 1242 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
dd6f953a 1243 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1da177e4
LT
1244 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1245 kfree(context);
23970741 1246 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT
1247 }
1248 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1249 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1250 rc = 0;
1251 } else {
f5c1d5b2 1252 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
869ab514
SS
1253 sbsec->def_sid,
1254 GFP_NOFS);
1da177e4 1255 if (rc) {
744ba35e 1256 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1da177e4 1257 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
dd6f953a 1258 __func__, context, -rc,
1da177e4
LT
1259 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1260 kfree(context);
1261 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1262 rc = 0;
1263 break;
1264 }
1265 }
1266 kfree(context);
1267 isec->sid = sid;
1268 break;
1269 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1270 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1271 break;
1272 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1273 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1274 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1275
1276 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1277 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1278 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1279 sbsec->sid,
1280 isec->sclass,
1281 &sid);
1282 if (rc)
23970741 1283 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT
1284 isec->sid = sid;
1285 break;
c312feb2
EP
1286 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1287 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1288 break;
1da177e4 1289 default:
c312feb2 1290 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1da177e4
LT
1291 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1292
1293 if (sbsec->proc) {
1294 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1295 if (proci->pde) {
1296 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1297 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1298 isec->sclass,
1299 &sid);
1300 if (rc)
23970741 1301 goto out_unlock;
1da177e4
LT
1302 isec->sid = sid;
1303 }
1304 }
1305 break;
1306 }
1307
1308 isec->initialized = 1;
1309
23970741
EP
1310out_unlock:
1311 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1da177e4
LT
1312out:
1313 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1314 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1da177e4
LT
1315 return rc;
1316}
1317
1318/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1319static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1320{
1321 u32 perm = 0;
1322
1323 switch (sig) {
1324 case SIGCHLD:
1325 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1326 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1327 break;
1328 case SIGKILL:
1329 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1330 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1331 break;
1332 case SIGSTOP:
1333 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1334 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1335 break;
1336 default:
1337 /* All other signals. */
1338 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1339 break;
1340 }
1341
1342 return perm;
1343}
1344
1345/* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1346 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1347static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1348 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1349 u32 perms)
1350{
1351 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1352
1353 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1354 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1355 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1356 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1357}
1358
b68e418c
SS
1359#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1360#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1361#endif
1362
1da177e4
LT
1363/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1364static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1365 int cap)
1366{
1367 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1368 struct avc_audit_data ad;
b68e418c
SS
1369 u16 sclass;
1370 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1da177e4
LT
1371
1372 tsec = tsk->security;
1373
828dfe1d 1374 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1da177e4
LT
1375 ad.tsk = tsk;
1376 ad.u.cap = cap;
1377
b68e418c
SS
1378 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1379 case 0:
1380 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1381 break;
1382 case 1:
1383 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1384 break;
1385 default:
1386 printk(KERN_ERR
1387 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1388 BUG();
1389 }
1390 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1da177e4
LT
1391}
1392
1393/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1394static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1395 u32 perms)
1396{
1397 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1398
1399 tsec = tsk->security;
1400
1401 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1402 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1403}
1404
1405/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1406 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1407 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1408static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1409 struct inode *inode,
1410 u32 perms,
1411 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1412{
1413 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1414 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1415 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1416
828dfe1d 1417 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
bbaca6c2
SS
1418 return 0;
1419
1da177e4
LT
1420 tsec = tsk->security;
1421 isec = inode->i_security;
1422
1423 if (!adp) {
1424 adp = &ad;
1425 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1426 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1427 }
1428
1429 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1430}
1431
1432/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1433 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1434 pathname if needed. */
1435static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1436 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1437 struct dentry *dentry,
1438 u32 av)
1439{
1440 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1441 struct avc_audit_data ad;
828dfe1d 1442 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
44707fdf
JB
1443 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1444 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1da177e4
LT
1445 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1446}
1447
1448/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1449 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1450 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1451 check a particular permission to the file.
1452 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1453 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1454 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1455 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
858119e1 1456static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1da177e4
LT
1457 struct file *file,
1458 u32 av)
1459{
1460 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1461 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
44707fdf 1462 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1da177e4
LT
1463 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1464 int rc;
1465
1466 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
44707fdf 1467 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1da177e4
LT
1468
1469 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1470 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1471 SECCLASS_FD,
1472 FD__USE,
1473 &ad);
1474 if (rc)
1475 return rc;
1476 }
1477
1478 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1479 if (av)
1480 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1481
1482 return 0;
1483}
1484
1485/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1486static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1487 struct dentry *dentry,
1488 u16 tclass)
1489{
1490 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1491 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1492 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1493 u32 newsid;
1494 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1495 int rc;
1496
1497 tsec = current->security;
1498 dsec = dir->i_security;
1499 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1500
1501 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
44707fdf 1502 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1da177e4
LT
1503
1504 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1505 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1506 &ad);
1507 if (rc)
1508 return rc;
1509
1510 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1511 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1512 } else {
1513 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1514 &newsid);
1515 if (rc)
1516 return rc;
1517 }
1518
1519 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1520 if (rc)
1521 return rc;
1522
1523 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1524 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1525 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1526}
1527
4eb582cf
ML
1528/* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1529static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1530 struct task_struct *ctx)
1531{
1532 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1533
1534 tsec = ctx->security;
1535
1536 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1537}
1538
828dfe1d
EP
1539#define MAY_LINK 0
1540#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1541#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1da177e4
LT
1542
1543/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1544static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1545 struct dentry *dentry,
1546 int kind)
1547
1548{
1549 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1550 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1551 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1552 u32 av;
1553 int rc;
1554
1555 tsec = current->security;
1556 dsec = dir->i_security;
1557 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1558
1559 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
44707fdf 1560 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1da177e4
LT
1561
1562 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1563 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1564 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1565 if (rc)
1566 return rc;
1567
1568 switch (kind) {
1569 case MAY_LINK:
1570 av = FILE__LINK;
1571 break;
1572 case MAY_UNLINK:
1573 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1574 break;
1575 case MAY_RMDIR:
1576 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1577 break;
1578 default:
744ba35e
EP
1579 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1580 __func__, kind);
1da177e4
LT
1581 return 0;
1582 }
1583
1584 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1585 return rc;
1586}
1587
1588static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1589 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1590 struct inode *new_dir,
1591 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1592{
1593 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1594 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1595 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1596 u32 av;
1597 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1598 int rc;
1599
1600 tsec = current->security;
1601 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1602 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1603 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1604 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1605
1606 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1607
44707fdf 1608 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1da177e4
LT
1609 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1610 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1611 if (rc)
1612 return rc;
1613 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1614 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1615 if (rc)
1616 return rc;
1617 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1618 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1619 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1620 if (rc)
1621 return rc;
1622 }
1623
44707fdf 1624 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1da177e4
LT
1625 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1626 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1627 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1628 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1629 if (rc)
1630 return rc;
1631 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1632 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1633 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1634 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1635 new_isec->sclass,
1636 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1637 if (rc)
1638 return rc;
1639 }
1640
1641 return 0;
1642}
1643
1644/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1645static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1646 struct super_block *sb,
1647 u32 perms,
1648 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1649{
1650 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1651 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1652
1653 tsec = tsk->security;
1654 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1655 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1656 perms, ad);
1657}
1658
1659/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1660static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1661{
1662 u32 av = 0;
1663
1664 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1665 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1666 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1667 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1668 av |= FILE__READ;
1669
1670 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1671 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1672 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1673 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1674
1675 } else {
1676 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1677 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1678 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1679 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1680 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1681 av |= DIR__READ;
1682 }
1683
1684 return av;
1685}
1686
b0c636b9
EP
1687/*
1688 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1689 * open permission.
1690 */
1691static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1692{
1693 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1694
1695 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1696 /*
1697 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1698 */
1699 if (S_ISREG(mode))
1700 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1701 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1702 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1703 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1704 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1705 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1706 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1707 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1708 av |= DIR__OPEN;
1709 else
744ba35e
EP
1710 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1711 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
b0c636b9
EP
1712 }
1713 return av;
1714}
1715
1da177e4
LT
1716/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1717static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1718{
1719 u32 av = 0;
1720
1721 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1722 av |= FILE__READ;
1723 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1724 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1725 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1726 else
1727 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1728 }
0794c66d
SS
1729 if (!av) {
1730 /*
1731 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1732 */
1733 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1734 }
1da177e4
LT
1735
1736 return av;
1737}
1738
1da177e4
LT
1739/* Hook functions begin here. */
1740
5cd9c58f
DH
1741static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1742 unsigned int mode)
1da177e4 1743{
1da177e4
LT
1744 int rc;
1745
5cd9c58f 1746 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1da177e4
LT
1747 if (rc)
1748 return rc;
1749
006ebb40 1750 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
5cd9c58f 1751 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
006ebb40
SS
1752 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1753 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1754 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1755 }
1756
5cd9c58f
DH
1757 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1758}
1759
1760static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1761{
1762 int rc;
1763
1764 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1765 if (rc)
1766 return rc;
1767
1768 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1da177e4
LT
1769}
1770
1771static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
828dfe1d 1772 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1da177e4
LT
1773{
1774 int error;
1775
1776 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1777 if (error)
1778 return error;
1779
1780 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1781}
1782
1783static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
828dfe1d 1784 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1da177e4
LT
1785{
1786 int error;
1787
1788 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1789 if (error)
1790 return error;
1791
1792 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1793}
1794
1795static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
828dfe1d 1796 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1da177e4
LT
1797{
1798 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1799}
1800
1801static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1802{
1803 int rc;
1804
1805 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1806 if (rc)
1807 return rc;
1808
828dfe1d 1809 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1da177e4
LT
1810}
1811
3fbfa981
EB
1812static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1813{
1814 int buflen, rc;
1815 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1816
1817 rc = -ENOMEM;
828dfe1d 1818 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
3fbfa981
EB
1819 if (!buffer)
1820 goto out;
1821
1822 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1823 end = buffer+buflen;
1824 *--end = '\0';
1825 buflen--;
1826 path = end-1;
1827 *path = '/';
1828 while (table) {
1829 const char *name = table->procname;
1830 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1831 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1832 if (buflen < 0)
1833 goto out_free;
1834 end -= namelen;
1835 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1836 *--end = '/';
1837 path = end;
1838 table = table->parent;
1839 }
b599fdfd
EB
1840 buflen -= 4;
1841 if (buflen < 0)
1842 goto out_free;
1843 end -= 4;
1844 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1845 path = end;
3fbfa981
EB
1846 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1847out_free:
1848 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1849out:
1850 return rc;
1851}
1852
1da177e4
LT
1853static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1854{
1855 int error = 0;
1856 u32 av;
1857 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1858 u32 tsid;
1859 int rc;
1860
1861 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1862 if (rc)
1863 return rc;
1864
1865 tsec = current->security;
1866
3fbfa981
EB
1867 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1868 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1da177e4
LT
1869 if (rc) {
1870 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1871 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1872 }
1873
1874 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1875 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
828dfe1d 1876 if (op == 001) {
1da177e4
LT
1877 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1878 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1879 } else {
1880 av = 0;
1881 if (op & 004)
1882 av |= FILE__READ;
1883 if (op & 002)
1884 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1885 if (av)
1886 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1887 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
828dfe1d 1888 }
1da177e4
LT
1889
1890 return error;
1891}
1892
1893static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1894{
1895 int rc = 0;
1896
1897 if (!sb)
1898 return 0;
1899
1900 switch (cmds) {
828dfe1d
EP
1901 case Q_SYNC:
1902 case Q_QUOTAON:
1903 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1904 case Q_SETINFO:
1905 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1906 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1907 NULL);
1908 break;
1909 case Q_GETFMT:
1910 case Q_GETINFO:
1911 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1912 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1913 NULL);
1914 break;
1915 default:
1916 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1917 break;
1da177e4
LT
1918 }
1919 return rc;
1920}
1921
1922static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1923{
1924 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1925}
1926
1927static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1928{
1929 int rc;
1930
1931 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1932 if (rc)
1933 return rc;
1934
1935 switch (type) {
828dfe1d
EP
1936 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1937 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1938 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1939 break;
1940 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1941 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1942 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1943 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1944 break;
1945 case 0: /* Close log */
1946 case 1: /* Open log */
1947 case 2: /* Read from log */
1948 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1949 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1950 default:
1951 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1952 break;
1da177e4
LT
1953 }
1954 return rc;
1955}
1956
1957/*
1958 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1959 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1960 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1961 *
1962 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1963 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1964 * the capability is granted.
1965 *
1966 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1967 * processes that allocate mappings.
1968 */
34b4e4aa 1969static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1da177e4
LT
1970{
1971 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1972 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1973
1974 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1975 if (rc == 0)
1976 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2c3c05db
SS
1977 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1978 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1979 0,
1980 NULL);
1da177e4
LT
1981
1982 if (rc == 0)
1983 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1984
34b4e4aa 1985 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1da177e4
LT
1986}
1987
1988/* binprm security operations */
1989
1990static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1991{
1992 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1993
89d155ef 1994 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1da177e4
LT
1995 if (!bsec)
1996 return -ENOMEM;
1997
1da177e4
LT
1998 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1999 bsec->set = 0;
2000
2001 bprm->security = bsec;
2002 return 0;
2003}
2004
2005static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2006{
2007 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3d5ff529 2008 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1da177e4
LT
2009 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2010 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2011 u32 newsid;
2012 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2013 int rc;
2014
2015 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2016 if (rc)
2017 return rc;
2018
2019 bsec = bprm->security;
2020
2021 if (bsec->set)
2022 return 0;
2023
2024 tsec = current->security;
2025 isec = inode->i_security;
2026
2027 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2028 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2029
28eba5bf 2030 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1da177e4 2031 tsec->create_sid = 0;
28eba5bf 2032 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
42c3e03e 2033 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1da177e4
LT
2034
2035 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2036 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2037 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2038 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2039 } else {
2040 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2041 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
828dfe1d 2042 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1da177e4
LT
2043 if (rc)
2044 return rc;
2045 }
2046
2047 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
44707fdf 2048 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
1da177e4 2049
3d5ff529 2050 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1da177e4
LT
2051 newsid = tsec->sid;
2052
828dfe1d 2053 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1da177e4
LT
2054 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2055 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2056 if (rc)
2057 return rc;
2058 } else {
2059 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2060 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2061 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2062 if (rc)
2063 return rc;
2064
2065 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2066 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2067 if (rc)
2068 return rc;
2069
2070 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2071 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2072
2073 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2074 bsec->sid = newsid;
2075 }
2076
2077 bsec->set = 1;
2078 return 0;
2079}
2080
828dfe1d 2081static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1da177e4
LT
2082{
2083 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2084}
2085
2086
828dfe1d 2087static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1da177e4
LT
2088{
2089 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2090 int atsecure = 0;
2091
2092 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2093 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2094 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2095 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2096 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2097 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2098 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2099 }
2100
2101 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2102}
2103
2104static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2105{
9a5f04bf 2106 kfree(bprm->security);
1da177e4 2107 bprm->security = NULL;
1da177e4
LT
2108}
2109
2110extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2111extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2112
2113/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
828dfe1d 2114static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
1da177e4
LT
2115{
2116 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2117 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
b20c8122 2118 struct tty_struct *tty;
badf1662 2119 struct fdtable *fdt;
1da177e4 2120 long j = -1;
24ec839c 2121 int drop_tty = 0;
1da177e4 2122
b20c8122 2123 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
24ec839c 2124 tty = get_current_tty();
1da177e4
LT
2125 if (tty) {
2126 file_list_lock();
2f512016 2127 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1da177e4
LT
2128 if (file) {
2129 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2130 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2131 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2132 file may belong to another process and we are only
2133 interested in the inode-based check here. */
3d5ff529 2134 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1da177e4
LT
2135 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2136 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
24ec839c 2137 drop_tty = 1;
1da177e4
LT
2138 }
2139 }
2140 file_list_unlock();
2141 }
b20c8122 2142 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
98a27ba4
EB
2143 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2144 if (drop_tty)
2145 no_tty();
1da177e4
LT
2146
2147 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2148
828dfe1d 2149 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1da177e4
LT
2150
2151 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2152 for (;;) {
2153 unsigned long set, i;
2154 int fd;
2155
2156 j++;
2157 i = j * __NFDBITS;
badf1662 2158 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
bbea9f69 2159 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
1da177e4 2160 break;
badf1662 2161 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1da177e4
LT
2162 if (!set)
2163 continue;
2164 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
828dfe1d 2165 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
1da177e4
LT
2166 if (set & 1) {
2167 file = fget(i);
2168 if (!file)
2169 continue;
2170 if (file_has_perm(current,
2171 file,
2172 file_to_av(file))) {
2173 sys_close(i);
2174 fd = get_unused_fd();
2175 if (fd != i) {
2176 if (fd >= 0)
2177 put_unused_fd(fd);
2178 fput(file);
2179 continue;
2180 }
2181 if (devnull) {
095975da 2182 get_file(devnull);
1da177e4
LT
2183 } else {
2184 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
fc5d81e6
AM
2185 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2186 devnull = NULL;
1da177e4
LT
2187 put_unused_fd(fd);
2188 fput(file);
2189 continue;
2190 }
2191 }
2192 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2193 }
2194 fput(file);
2195 }
2196 }
2197 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2198
2199 }
2200 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2201}
2202
2203static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2204{
2205 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2206 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2207 u32 sid;
2208 int rc;
2209
2210 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2211
2212 tsec = current->security;
2213
2214 bsec = bprm->security;
2215 sid = bsec->sid;
2216
2217 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2218 bsec->unsafe = 0;
2219 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2220 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2221 unchanged and kill. */
2222 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2223 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2224 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2225 if (rc) {
2226 bsec->unsafe = 1;
2227 return;
2228 }
2229 }
2230
2231 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2232 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2233 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
0356357c
RM
2234 struct task_struct *tracer;
2235 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2236 u32 ptsid = 0;
2237
2238 rcu_read_lock();
0d094efe 2239 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
0356357c
RM
2240 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2241 sec = tracer->security;
2242 ptsid = sec->sid;
2243 }
2244 rcu_read_unlock();
2245
2246 if (ptsid != 0) {
2247 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2248 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2249 if (rc) {
2250 bsec->unsafe = 1;
2251 return;
2252 }
1da177e4
LT
2253 }
2254 }
2255 tsec->sid = sid;
2256 }
2257}
2258
2259/*
2260 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2261 */
2262static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2263{
2264 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2265 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2266 struct itimerval itimer;
2267 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2268 int rc, i;
2269
2270 tsec = current->security;
2271 bsec = bprm->security;
2272
2273 if (bsec->unsafe) {
2274 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2275 return;
2276 }
2277 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2278 return;
2279
2280 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2281 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2282
2283 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2284 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2285 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2286 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2287 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2288 will be checked against the new SID. */
2289 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2290 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2291 if (rc) {
2292 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2293 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2294 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2295 flush_signals(current);
2296 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2297 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2298 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2299 recalc_sigpending();
2300 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2301 }
2302
4ac212ad
SS
2303 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2304 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2305
1da177e4
LT
2306 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2307 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2308 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2309 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2310 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2311 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2312 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2313 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2314 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2315 RLIMIT_STACK.*/
2316 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2317 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2318 if (rc) {
2319 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2320 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2321 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
828dfe1d 2322 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
1da177e4
LT
2323 }
2324 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2325 /*
2326 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2327 * to be refigured.
2328 */
2329 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2330 }
2331 }
2332
2333 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2334 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2335 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2336}
2337
2338/* superblock security operations */
2339
2340static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2341{
2342 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2343}
2344
2345static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2346{
2347 superblock_free_security(sb);
2348}
2349
2350static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2351{
2352 if (plen > olen)
2353 return 0;
2354
2355 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2356}
2357
2358static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2359{
832cbd9a
EP
2360 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2361 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2362 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2363 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
1da177e4
LT
2364}
2365
2366static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2367{
2368 if (!*first) {
2369 **to = ',';
2370 *to += 1;
3528a953 2371 } else
1da177e4
LT
2372 *first = 0;
2373 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2374 *to += len;
2375}
2376
828dfe1d
EP
2377static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2378 int len)
3528a953
CO
2379{
2380 int current_size = 0;
2381
2382 if (!*first) {
2383 **to = '|';
2384 *to += 1;
828dfe1d 2385 } else
3528a953
CO
2386 *first = 0;
2387
2388 while (current_size < len) {
2389 if (*from != '"') {
2390 **to = *from;
2391 *to += 1;
2392 }
2393 from += 1;
2394 current_size += 1;
2395 }
2396}
2397
e0007529 2398static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
1da177e4
LT
2399{
2400 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2401 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2402 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
3528a953 2403 int open_quote = 0;
1da177e4
LT
2404
2405 in_curr = orig;
2406 sec_curr = copy;
2407
1da177e4
LT
2408 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2409 if (!nosec) {
2410 rc = -ENOMEM;
2411 goto out;
2412 }
2413
2414 nosec_save = nosec;
2415 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2416 in_save = in_end = orig;
2417
2418 do {
3528a953
CO
2419 if (*in_end == '"')
2420 open_quote = !open_quote;
2421 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2422 *in_end == '\0') {
1da177e4
LT
2423 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2424
2425 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
3528a953 2426 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1da177e4
LT
2427 else
2428 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2429
2430 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2431 }
2432 } while (*in_end++);
2433
6931dfc9 2434 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
da3caa20 2435 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1da177e4
LT
2436out:
2437 return rc;
2438}
2439
2440static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2441{
2442 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2443 int rc;
2444
2445 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2446 if (rc)
2447 return rc;
2448
828dfe1d 2449 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
44707fdf 2450 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
1da177e4
LT
2451 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2452}
2453
726c3342 2454static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
1da177e4
LT
2455{
2456 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2457
828dfe1d 2458 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
44707fdf 2459 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
726c3342 2460 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1da177e4
LT
2461}
2462
828dfe1d 2463static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
b5266eb4 2464 struct path *path,
828dfe1d
EP
2465 char *type,
2466 unsigned long flags,
2467 void *data)
1da177e4
LT
2468{
2469 int rc;
2470
b5266eb4 2471 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
1da177e4
LT
2472 if (rc)
2473 return rc;
2474
2475 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
b5266eb4 2476 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
828dfe1d 2477 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
1da177e4 2478 else
b5266eb4 2479 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
828dfe1d 2480 FILE__MOUNTON);
1da177e4
LT
2481}
2482
2483static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2484{
2485 int rc;
2486
2487 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2488 if (rc)
2489 return rc;
2490
828dfe1d
EP
2491 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2492 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
1da177e4
LT
2493}
2494
2495/* inode security operations */
2496
2497static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2498{
2499 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2500}
2501
2502static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2503{
2504 inode_free_security(inode);
2505}
2506
5e41ff9e
SS
2507static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2508 char **name, void **value,
2509 size_t *len)
2510{
2511 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2512 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2513 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
570bc1c2 2514 u32 newsid, clen;
5e41ff9e 2515 int rc;
570bc1c2 2516 char *namep = NULL, *context;
5e41ff9e
SS
2517
2518 tsec = current->security;
2519 dsec = dir->i_security;
2520 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
5e41ff9e
SS
2521
2522 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2523 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2524 } else {
2525 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2526 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2527 &newsid);
2528 if (rc) {
2529 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2530 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2531 "ino=%ld)\n",
dd6f953a 2532 __func__,
5e41ff9e
SS
2533 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2534 return rc;
2535 }
2536 }
2537
296fddf7
EP
2538 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2539 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2540 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2541 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2542 isec->sid = newsid;
2543 isec->initialized = 1;
2544 }
5e41ff9e 2545
8aad3875 2546 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
25a74f3b
SS
2547 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2548
570bc1c2 2549 if (name) {
a02fe132 2550 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
570bc1c2
SS
2551 if (!namep)
2552 return -ENOMEM;
2553 *name = namep;
2554 }
5e41ff9e 2555
570bc1c2 2556 if (value && len) {
12b29f34 2557 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
570bc1c2
SS
2558 if (rc) {
2559 kfree(namep);
2560 return rc;
2561 }
2562 *value = context;
2563 *len = clen;
5e41ff9e 2564 }
5e41ff9e 2565
5e41ff9e
SS
2566 return 0;
2567}
2568
1da177e4
LT
2569static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2570{
2571 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2572}
2573
1da177e4
LT
2574static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2575{
2576 int rc;
2577
828dfe1d 2578 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
1da177e4
LT
2579 if (rc)
2580 return rc;
2581 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2582}
2583
1da177e4
LT
2584static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2585{
2586 int rc;
2587
2588 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2589 if (rc)
2590 return rc;
2591 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2592}
2593
2594static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2595{
2596 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2597}
2598
1da177e4
LT
2599static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2600{
2601 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2602}
2603
1da177e4
LT
2604static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2605{
2606 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2607}
2608
2609static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2610{
2611 int rc;
2612
2613 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2614 if (rc)
2615 return rc;
2616
2617 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2618}
2619
1da177e4 2620static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
828dfe1d 2621 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
1da177e4
LT
2622{
2623 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2624}
2625
1da177e4
LT
2626static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2627{
2628 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2629}
2630
2631static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2632{
2633 int rc;
2634
828dfe1d 2635 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
1da177e4
LT
2636 if (rc)
2637 return rc;
2638 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2639}
2640
b77b0646 2641static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1da177e4
LT
2642{
2643 int rc;
2644
b77b0646 2645 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
1da177e4
LT
2646 if (rc)
2647 return rc;
2648
2649 if (!mask) {
2650 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2651 return 0;
2652 }
2653
2654 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
b0c636b9 2655 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
1da177e4
LT
2656}
2657
2658static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2659{
2660 int rc;
2661
2662 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2663 if (rc)
2664 return rc;
2665
2666 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2667 return 0;
2668
2669 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2670 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2671 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2672
2673 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2674}
2675
2676static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2677{
2678 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2679}
2680
8f0cfa52 2681static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
b5376771
SH
2682{
2683 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2684 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2685 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2686 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2687 return -EPERM;
2688 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2689 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2690 Restrict to administrator. */
2691 return -EPERM;
2692 }
2693 }
2694
2695 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2696 ordinary setattr permission. */
2697 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2698}
2699
8f0cfa52
DH
2700static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2701 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1da177e4
LT
2702{
2703 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2704 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2705 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2706 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2707 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2708 u32 newsid;
2709 int rc = 0;
2710
b5376771
SH
2711 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2712 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
1da177e4
LT
2713
2714 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2715 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2716 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2717
3bd858ab 2718 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
1da177e4
LT
2719 return -EPERM;
2720
828dfe1d 2721 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
44707fdf 2722 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1da177e4
LT
2723
2724 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2725 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2726 if (rc)
2727 return rc;
2728
2729 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
12b29f34
SS
2730 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2731 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2732 return rc;
2733 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2734 }
1da177e4
LT
2735 if (rc)
2736 return rc;
2737
2738 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2739 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2740 if (rc)
2741 return rc;
2742
2743 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
828dfe1d 2744 isec->sclass);
1da177e4
LT
2745 if (rc)
2746 return rc;
2747
2748 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2749 sbsec->sid,
2750 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2751 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2752 &ad);
2753}
2754
8f0cfa52 2755static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
f5269710 2756 const void *value, size_t size,
8f0cfa52 2757 int flags)
1da177e4
LT
2758{
2759 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2760 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2761 u32 newsid;
2762 int rc;
2763
2764 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2765 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2766 return;
2767 }
2768
12b29f34 2769 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
1da177e4 2770 if (rc) {
12b29f34
SS
2771 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2772 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2773 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
1da177e4
LT
2774 return;
2775 }
2776
2777 isec->sid = newsid;
2778 return;
2779}
2780
8f0cfa52 2781static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1da177e4 2782{
1da177e4
LT
2783 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2784}
2785
828dfe1d 2786static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
1da177e4
LT
2787{
2788 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2789}
2790
8f0cfa52 2791static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1da177e4 2792{
b5376771
SH
2793 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2794 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
1da177e4
LT
2795
2796 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2797 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2798 return -EACCES;
2799}
2800
d381d8a9 2801/*
abc69bb6 2802 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
d381d8a9
JM
2803 *
2804 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2805 */
42492594 2806static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
1da177e4 2807{
42492594
DQ
2808 u32 size;
2809 int error;
2810 char *context = NULL;
abc69bb6 2811 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1da177e4 2812 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
d381d8a9 2813
8c8570fb
DK
2814 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2815 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
d381d8a9 2816
abc69bb6
SS
2817 /*
2818 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2819 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2820 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2821 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2822 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2823 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2824 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2825 */
2826 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2827 if (!error)
2828 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2829 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2830 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2831 0,
2832 NULL);
2833 if (!error)
2834 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2835 &size);
2836 else
2837 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
42492594
DQ
2838 if (error)
2839 return error;
2840 error = size;
2841 if (alloc) {
2842 *buffer = context;
2843 goto out_nofree;
2844 }
2845 kfree(context);
2846out_nofree:
2847 return error;
1da177e4
LT
2848}
2849
2850static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
828dfe1d 2851 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1da177e4
LT
2852{
2853 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2854 u32 newsid;
2855 int rc;
2856
2857 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2858 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2859
2860 if (!value || !size)
2861 return -EACCES;
2862
828dfe1d 2863 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
1da177e4
LT
2864 if (rc)
2865 return rc;
2866
2867 isec->sid = newsid;
2868 return 0;
2869}
2870
2871static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2872{
2873 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2874 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2875 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2876 return len;
2877}
2878
b5376771
SH
2879static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2880{
2881 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2882}
2883
2884static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2885{
2886 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2887}
2888
713a04ae
AD
2889static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2890{
2891 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2892 *secid = isec->sid;
2893}
2894
1da177e4
LT
2895/* file security operations */
2896
788e7dd4 2897static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
1da177e4 2898{
7420ed23 2899 int rc;
3d5ff529 2900 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1da177e4
LT
2901
2902 if (!mask) {
2903 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2904 return 0;
2905 }
2906
2907 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2908 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2909 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2910
7420ed23
VY
2911 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2912 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2913 if (rc)
2914 return rc;
2915
2916 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
1da177e4
LT
2917}
2918
788e7dd4
YN
2919static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2920{
2921 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2922 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2923 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2924 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2925
2926 if (!mask) {
2927 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2928 return 0;
2929 }
2930
2931 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2932 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2933 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2934
2935 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2936}
2937
1da177e4
LT
2938static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2939{
2940 return file_alloc_security(file);
2941}
2942
2943static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2944{
2945 file_free_security(file);
2946}
2947
2948static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2949 unsigned long arg)
2950{
242631c4 2951 u32 av = 0;
1da177e4 2952
242631c4
SS
2953 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2954 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2955 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2956 av |= FILE__READ;
2957 if (!av)
2958 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1da177e4 2959
242631c4 2960 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
1da177e4
LT
2961}
2962
2963static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2964{
2965#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2966 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2967 /*
2968 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2969 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2970 * This has an additional check.
2971 */
2972 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2973 if (rc)
2974 return rc;
2975 }
2976#endif
2977
2978 if (file) {
2979 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2980 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2981
2982 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2983 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2984 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2985
2986 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2987 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2988
2989 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2990 }
2991 return 0;
2992}
2993
2994static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
ed032189
EP
2995 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2996 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
1da177e4 2997{
ed032189 2998 int rc = 0;
828dfe1d 2999 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
1da177e4 3000
ed032189
EP
3001 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3002 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3003 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3004 if (rc || addr_only)
1da177e4
LT
3005 return rc;
3006
3007 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3008 prot = reqprot;
3009
3010 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3011 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3012}
3013
3014static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3015 unsigned long reqprot,
3016 unsigned long prot)
3017{
3018 int rc;
3019
3020 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3021 if (rc)
3022 return rc;
3023
3024 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3025 prot = reqprot;
3026
3027#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
db4c9641
SS
3028 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3029 rc = 0;
3030 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3031 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3032 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3033 PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3034 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3035 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3036 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3037 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3038 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3039 /*
3040 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3041 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3042 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3043 * modified content. This typically should only
3044 * occur for text relocations.
3045 */
3046 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3047 FILE__EXECMOD);
3048 }