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1da177e4 LT |
1 | /* |
2 | * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module | |
3 | * | |
4 | * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. | |
5 | * | |
6 | * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> | |
7 | * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> | |
8 | * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> | |
9 | * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> | |
10 | * | |
11 | * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. | |
12 | * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> | |
13 | * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. | |
14 | * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> | |
15 | * | |
16 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
17 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, | |
18 | * as published by the Free Software Foundation. | |
19 | */ | |
20 | ||
21 | #include <linux/config.h> | |
22 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
23 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
25 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | |
26 | #include <linux/errno.h> | |
27 | #include <linux/sched.h> | |
28 | #include <linux/security.h> | |
29 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | |
30 | #include <linux/capability.h> | |
31 | #include <linux/unistd.h> | |
32 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
33 | #include <linux/mman.h> | |
34 | #include <linux/slab.h> | |
35 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> | |
36 | #include <linux/swap.h> | |
37 | #include <linux/smp_lock.h> | |
38 | #include <linux/spinlock.h> | |
39 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> | |
40 | #include <linux/file.h> | |
41 | #include <linux/namei.h> | |
42 | #include <linux/mount.h> | |
43 | #include <linux/ext2_fs.h> | |
44 | #include <linux/proc_fs.h> | |
45 | #include <linux/kd.h> | |
46 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> | |
47 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> | |
48 | #include <linux/tty.h> | |
49 | #include <net/icmp.h> | |
50 | #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */ | |
51 | #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ | |
52 | #include <asm/uaccess.h> | |
53 | #include <asm/semaphore.h> | |
54 | #include <asm/ioctls.h> | |
55 | #include <linux/bitops.h> | |
56 | #include <linux/interrupt.h> | |
57 | #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ | |
58 | #include <linux/netlink.h> | |
59 | #include <linux/tcp.h> | |
60 | #include <linux/udp.h> | |
61 | #include <linux/quota.h> | |
62 | #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */ | |
63 | #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */ | |
64 | #include <linux/parser.h> | |
65 | #include <linux/nfs_mount.h> | |
66 | #include <net/ipv6.h> | |
67 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> | |
68 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
69 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> | |
70 | #include <linux/audit.h> | |
6931dfc9 | 71 | #include <linux/string.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
72 | |
73 | #include "avc.h" | |
74 | #include "objsec.h" | |
75 | #include "netif.h" | |
d28d1e08 | 76 | #include "xfrm.h" |
1da177e4 LT |
77 | |
78 | #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" | |
79 | #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX | |
80 | ||
81 | extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; | |
82 | extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); | |
4e5ab4cb | 83 | extern int selinux_compat_net; |
1da177e4 LT |
84 | |
85 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP | |
86 | int selinux_enforcing = 0; | |
87 | ||
88 | static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) | |
89 | { | |
90 | selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0); | |
91 | return 1; | |
92 | } | |
93 | __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); | |
94 | #endif | |
95 | ||
96 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM | |
97 | int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; | |
98 | ||
99 | static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) | |
100 | { | |
101 | selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); | |
102 | return 1; | |
103 | } | |
104 | __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); | |
30d55280 SS |
105 | #else |
106 | int selinux_enabled = 1; | |
1da177e4 LT |
107 | #endif |
108 | ||
109 | /* Original (dummy) security module. */ | |
110 | static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL; | |
111 | ||
112 | /* Minimal support for a secondary security module, | |
113 | just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules. | |
114 | The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary | |
115 | module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */ | |
116 | static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL; | |
117 | ||
118 | /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized | |
119 | before the policy was loaded. */ | |
120 | static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head); | |
121 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock); | |
122 | ||
7cae7e26 JM |
123 | static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache; |
124 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
125 | /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context |
126 | length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */ | |
127 | static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size) | |
128 | { | |
129 | char *context; | |
130 | unsigned len; | |
131 | int rc; | |
132 | ||
133 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len); | |
134 | if (rc) | |
135 | return rc; | |
136 | ||
137 | if (!buffer || !size) | |
138 | goto getsecurity_exit; | |
139 | ||
140 | if (size < len) { | |
141 | len = -ERANGE; | |
142 | goto getsecurity_exit; | |
143 | } | |
144 | memcpy(buffer, context, len); | |
145 | ||
146 | getsecurity_exit: | |
147 | kfree(context); | |
148 | return len; | |
149 | } | |
150 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
151 | /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */ |
152 | ||
153 | static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task) | |
154 | { | |
155 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
156 | ||
89d155ef | 157 | tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
1da177e4 LT |
158 | if (!tsec) |
159 | return -ENOMEM; | |
160 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
161 | tsec->task = task; |
162 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
163 | task->security = tsec; | |
164 | ||
165 | return 0; | |
166 | } | |
167 | ||
168 | static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task) | |
169 | { | |
170 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security; | |
1da177e4 LT |
171 | task->security = NULL; |
172 | kfree(tsec); | |
173 | } | |
174 | ||
175 | static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) | |
176 | { | |
177 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
178 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
179 | ||
7cae7e26 | 180 | isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL); |
1da177e4 LT |
181 | if (!isec) |
182 | return -ENOMEM; | |
183 | ||
7cae7e26 | 184 | memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec)); |
1da177e4 LT |
185 | init_MUTEX(&isec->sem); |
186 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); | |
1da177e4 LT |
187 | isec->inode = inode; |
188 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
189 | isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; | |
9ac49d22 | 190 | isec->task_sid = tsec->sid; |
1da177e4 LT |
191 | inode->i_security = isec; |
192 | ||
193 | return 0; | |
194 | } | |
195 | ||
196 | static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) | |
197 | { | |
198 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
199 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
200 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
201 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
202 | if (!list_empty(&isec->list)) | |
203 | list_del_init(&isec->list); | |
204 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
205 | ||
206 | inode->i_security = NULL; | |
7cae7e26 | 207 | kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec); |
1da177e4 LT |
208 | } |
209 | ||
210 | static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file) | |
211 | { | |
212 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
213 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; | |
214 | ||
26d2a4be | 215 | fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
1da177e4 LT |
216 | if (!fsec) |
217 | return -ENOMEM; | |
218 | ||
1da177e4 | 219 | fsec->file = file; |
9ac49d22 SS |
220 | fsec->sid = tsec->sid; |
221 | fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid; | |
1da177e4 LT |
222 | file->f_security = fsec; |
223 | ||
224 | return 0; | |
225 | } | |
226 | ||
227 | static void file_free_security(struct file *file) | |
228 | { | |
229 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; | |
1da177e4 LT |
230 | file->f_security = NULL; |
231 | kfree(fsec); | |
232 | } | |
233 | ||
234 | static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
235 | { | |
236 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
237 | ||
89d155ef | 238 | sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
1da177e4 LT |
239 | if (!sbsec) |
240 | return -ENOMEM; | |
241 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
242 | init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem); |
243 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list); | |
244 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); | |
245 | spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
1da177e4 LT |
246 | sbsec->sb = sb; |
247 | sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
248 | sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; | |
249 | sb->s_security = sbsec; | |
250 | ||
251 | return 0; | |
252 | } | |
253 | ||
254 | static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
255 | { | |
256 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
257 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
258 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); |
259 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list)) | |
260 | list_del_init(&sbsec->list); | |
261 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
262 | ||
263 | sb->s_security = NULL; | |
264 | kfree(sbsec); | |
265 | } | |
266 | ||
7d877f3b | 267 | static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) |
1da177e4 LT |
268 | { |
269 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; | |
270 | ||
271 | if (family != PF_UNIX) | |
272 | return 0; | |
273 | ||
89d155ef | 274 | ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority); |
1da177e4 LT |
275 | if (!ssec) |
276 | return -ENOMEM; | |
277 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
278 | ssec->sk = sk; |
279 | ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
280 | sk->sk_security = ssec; | |
281 | ||
282 | return 0; | |
283 | } | |
284 | ||
285 | static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) | |
286 | { | |
287 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security; | |
288 | ||
9ac49d22 | 289 | if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) |
1da177e4 LT |
290 | return; |
291 | ||
292 | sk->sk_security = NULL; | |
293 | kfree(ssec); | |
294 | } | |
1da177e4 LT |
295 | |
296 | /* The security server must be initialized before | |
297 | any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */ | |
298 | extern int ss_initialized; | |
299 | ||
300 | /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */ | |
301 | ||
302 | static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = { | |
303 | "uses xattr", | |
304 | "uses transition SIDs", | |
305 | "uses task SIDs", | |
306 | "uses genfs_contexts", | |
307 | "not configured for labeling", | |
308 | "uses mountpoint labeling", | |
309 | }; | |
310 | ||
311 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); | |
312 | ||
313 | static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode) | |
314 | { | |
315 | return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); | |
316 | } | |
317 | ||
318 | enum { | |
319 | Opt_context = 1, | |
320 | Opt_fscontext = 2, | |
321 | Opt_defcontext = 4, | |
322 | }; | |
323 | ||
324 | static match_table_t tokens = { | |
325 | {Opt_context, "context=%s"}, | |
326 | {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"}, | |
327 | {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"}, | |
328 | }; | |
329 | ||
330 | #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n" | |
331 | ||
332 | static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |
333 | { | |
334 | char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL; | |
335 | const char *name; | |
336 | u32 sid; | |
337 | int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0; | |
338 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
339 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
340 | ||
341 | if (!data) | |
342 | goto out; | |
343 | ||
344 | name = sb->s_type->name; | |
345 | ||
346 | if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) { | |
347 | ||
348 | /* NFS we understand. */ | |
349 | if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) { | |
350 | struct nfs_mount_data *d = data; | |
351 | ||
352 | if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION) | |
353 | goto out; | |
354 | ||
355 | if (d->context[0]) { | |
356 | context = d->context; | |
357 | seen |= Opt_context; | |
358 | } | |
359 | } else | |
360 | goto out; | |
361 | ||
362 | } else { | |
363 | /* Standard string-based options. */ | |
364 | char *p, *options = data; | |
365 | ||
366 | while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) { | |
367 | int token; | |
368 | substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; | |
369 | ||
370 | if (!*p) | |
371 | continue; | |
372 | ||
373 | token = match_token(p, tokens, args); | |
374 | ||
375 | switch (token) { | |
376 | case Opt_context: | |
377 | if (seen) { | |
378 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
379 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
380 | goto out_free; | |
381 | } | |
382 | context = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
383 | if (!context) { | |
384 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
385 | goto out_free; | |
386 | } | |
387 | if (!alloc) | |
388 | alloc = 1; | |
389 | seen |= Opt_context; | |
390 | break; | |
391 | ||
392 | case Opt_fscontext: | |
393 | if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) { | |
394 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
395 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
396 | goto out_free; | |
397 | } | |
398 | context = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
399 | if (!context) { | |
400 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
401 | goto out_free; | |
402 | } | |
403 | if (!alloc) | |
404 | alloc = 1; | |
405 | seen |= Opt_fscontext; | |
406 | break; | |
407 | ||
408 | case Opt_defcontext: | |
409 | if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { | |
410 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
411 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: " | |
412 | "defcontext option is invalid " | |
413 | "for this filesystem type\n"); | |
414 | goto out_free; | |
415 | } | |
416 | if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) { | |
417 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
418 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
419 | goto out_free; | |
420 | } | |
421 | defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
422 | if (!defcontext) { | |
423 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
424 | goto out_free; | |
425 | } | |
426 | if (!alloc) | |
427 | alloc = 1; | |
428 | seen |= Opt_defcontext; | |
429 | break; | |
430 | ||
431 | default: | |
432 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
433 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount " | |
434 | "option\n"); | |
435 | goto out_free; | |
436 | ||
437 | } | |
438 | } | |
439 | } | |
440 | ||
441 | if (!seen) | |
442 | goto out; | |
443 | ||
444 | if (context) { | |
445 | rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid); | |
446 | if (rc) { | |
447 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" | |
448 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", | |
449 | context, sb->s_id, name, rc); | |
450 | goto out_free; | |
451 | } | |
452 | ||
453 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
454 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); | |
455 | if (rc) | |
456 | goto out_free; | |
457 | ||
458 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
459 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); | |
460 | if (rc) | |
461 | goto out_free; | |
462 | ||
463 | sbsec->sid = sid; | |
464 | ||
465 | if (seen & Opt_context) | |
466 | sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; | |
467 | } | |
468 | ||
469 | if (defcontext) { | |
470 | rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid); | |
471 | if (rc) { | |
472 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" | |
473 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", | |
474 | defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc); | |
475 | goto out_free; | |
476 | } | |
477 | ||
478 | if (sid == sbsec->def_sid) | |
479 | goto out_free; | |
480 | ||
481 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
482 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); | |
483 | if (rc) | |
484 | goto out_free; | |
485 | ||
486 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
487 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); | |
488 | if (rc) | |
489 | goto out_free; | |
490 | ||
491 | sbsec->def_sid = sid; | |
492 | } | |
493 | ||
494 | out_free: | |
495 | if (alloc) { | |
496 | kfree(context); | |
497 | kfree(defcontext); | |
498 | } | |
499 | out: | |
500 | return rc; | |
501 | } | |
502 | ||
503 | static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |
504 | { | |
505 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
506 | struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; | |
507 | struct inode *inode = root->d_inode; | |
508 | int rc = 0; | |
509 | ||
510 | down(&sbsec->sem); | |
511 | if (sbsec->initialized) | |
512 | goto out; | |
513 | ||
514 | if (!ss_initialized) { | |
515 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, | |
516 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security | |
517 | server is ready to handle calls. */ | |
518 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
519 | if (list_empty(&sbsec->list)) | |
520 | list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head); | |
521 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
522 | goto out; | |
523 | } | |
524 | ||
525 | /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ | |
526 | rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); | |
527 | if (rc) { | |
528 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", | |
529 | __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc); | |
530 | goto out; | |
531 | } | |
532 | ||
533 | rc = try_context_mount(sb, data); | |
534 | if (rc) | |
535 | goto out; | |
536 | ||
537 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { | |
538 | /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no | |
539 | error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on | |
540 | the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be | |
541 | the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have | |
542 | assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ | |
543 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { | |
544 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " | |
545 | "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | |
546 | rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
547 | goto out; | |
548 | } | |
549 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); | |
550 | if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { | |
551 | if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) | |
552 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " | |
553 | "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", | |
554 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | |
555 | else | |
556 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " | |
557 | "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, | |
558 | sb->s_type->name, -rc); | |
559 | goto out; | |
560 | } | |
561 | } | |
562 | ||
563 | if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) | |
564 | sbsec->proc = 1; | |
565 | ||
566 | sbsec->initialized = 1; | |
567 | ||
568 | if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) { | |
569 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", | |
570 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | |
571 | } | |
572 | else { | |
573 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", | |
574 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, | |
575 | labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); | |
576 | } | |
577 | ||
578 | /* Initialize the root inode. */ | |
579 | rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root); | |
580 | ||
581 | /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. | |
582 | inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created | |
583 | during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly | |
584 | populates itself. */ | |
585 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
586 | next_inode: | |
587 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { | |
588 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = | |
589 | list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next, | |
590 | struct inode_security_struct, list); | |
591 | struct inode *inode = isec->inode; | |
592 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
593 | inode = igrab(inode); | |
594 | if (inode) { | |
595 | if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode)) | |
596 | inode_doinit(inode); | |
597 | iput(inode); | |
598 | } | |
599 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
600 | list_del_init(&isec->list); | |
601 | goto next_inode; | |
602 | } | |
603 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
604 | out: | |
605 | up(&sbsec->sem); | |
606 | return rc; | |
607 | } | |
608 | ||
609 | static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) | |
610 | { | |
611 | switch (mode & S_IFMT) { | |
612 | case S_IFSOCK: | |
613 | return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE; | |
614 | case S_IFLNK: | |
615 | return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE; | |
616 | case S_IFREG: | |
617 | return SECCLASS_FILE; | |
618 | case S_IFBLK: | |
619 | return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE; | |
620 | case S_IFDIR: | |
621 | return SECCLASS_DIR; | |
622 | case S_IFCHR: | |
623 | return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; | |
624 | case S_IFIFO: | |
625 | return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE; | |
626 | ||
627 | } | |
628 | ||
629 | return SECCLASS_FILE; | |
630 | } | |
631 | ||
13402580 JM |
632 | static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol) |
633 | { | |
634 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP); | |
635 | } | |
636 | ||
637 | static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) | |
638 | { | |
639 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP); | |
640 | } | |
641 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
642 | static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) |
643 | { | |
644 | switch (family) { | |
645 | case PF_UNIX: | |
646 | switch (type) { | |
647 | case SOCK_STREAM: | |
648 | case SOCK_SEQPACKET: | |
649 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; | |
650 | case SOCK_DGRAM: | |
651 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; | |
652 | } | |
653 | break; | |
654 | case PF_INET: | |
655 | case PF_INET6: | |
656 | switch (type) { | |
657 | case SOCK_STREAM: | |
13402580 JM |
658 | if (default_protocol_stream(protocol)) |
659 | return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET; | |
660 | else | |
661 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; | |
1da177e4 | 662 | case SOCK_DGRAM: |
13402580 JM |
663 | if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol)) |
664 | return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; | |
665 | else | |
666 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; | |
667 | default: | |
1da177e4 LT |
668 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
669 | } | |
670 | break; | |
671 | case PF_NETLINK: | |
672 | switch (protocol) { | |
673 | case NETLINK_ROUTE: | |
674 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; | |
675 | case NETLINK_FIREWALL: | |
676 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET; | |
216efaaa | 677 | case NETLINK_INET_DIAG: |
1da177e4 LT |
678 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; |
679 | case NETLINK_NFLOG: | |
680 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET; | |
681 | case NETLINK_XFRM: | |
682 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; | |
683 | case NETLINK_SELINUX: | |
684 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; | |
685 | case NETLINK_AUDIT: | |
686 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; | |
687 | case NETLINK_IP6_FW: | |
688 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET; | |
689 | case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: | |
690 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; | |
0c9b7942 JM |
691 | case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: |
692 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; | |
1da177e4 LT |
693 | default: |
694 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; | |
695 | } | |
696 | case PF_PACKET: | |
697 | return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET; | |
698 | case PF_KEY: | |
699 | return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET; | |
3e3ff15e CP |
700 | case PF_APPLETALK: |
701 | return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET; | |
1da177e4 LT |
702 | } |
703 | ||
704 | return SECCLASS_SOCKET; | |
705 | } | |
706 | ||
707 | #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS | |
708 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, | |
709 | u16 tclass, | |
710 | u32 *sid) | |
711 | { | |
712 | int buflen, rc; | |
713 | char *buffer, *path, *end; | |
714 | ||
715 | buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); | |
716 | if (!buffer) | |
717 | return -ENOMEM; | |
718 | ||
719 | buflen = PAGE_SIZE; | |
720 | end = buffer+buflen; | |
721 | *--end = '\0'; | |
722 | buflen--; | |
723 | path = end-1; | |
724 | *path = '/'; | |
725 | while (de && de != de->parent) { | |
726 | buflen -= de->namelen + 1; | |
727 | if (buflen < 0) | |
728 | break; | |
729 | end -= de->namelen; | |
730 | memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen); | |
731 | *--end = '/'; | |
732 | path = end; | |
733 | de = de->parent; | |
734 | } | |
735 | rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); | |
736 | free_page((unsigned long)buffer); | |
737 | return rc; | |
738 | } | |
739 | #else | |
740 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, | |
741 | u16 tclass, | |
742 | u32 *sid) | |
743 | { | |
744 | return -EINVAL; | |
745 | } | |
746 | #endif | |
747 | ||
748 | /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ | |
749 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) | |
750 | { | |
751 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; | |
752 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
753 | u32 sid; | |
754 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
755 | #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 | |
756 | char *context = NULL; | |
757 | unsigned len = 0; | |
758 | int rc = 0; | |
759 | int hold_sem = 0; | |
760 | ||
761 | if (isec->initialized) | |
762 | goto out; | |
763 | ||
764 | down(&isec->sem); | |
765 | hold_sem = 1; | |
766 | if (isec->initialized) | |
767 | goto out; | |
768 | ||
769 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
770 | if (!sbsec->initialized) { | |
771 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, | |
772 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security | |
773 | server is ready to handle calls. */ | |
774 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
775 | if (list_empty(&isec->list)) | |
776 | list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); | |
777 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
778 | goto out; | |
779 | } | |
780 | ||
781 | switch (sbsec->behavior) { | |
782 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: | |
783 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { | |
784 | isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid; | |
785 | break; | |
786 | } | |
787 | ||
788 | /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. | |
789 | Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */ | |
790 | if (opt_dentry) { | |
791 | /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */ | |
792 | dentry = dget(opt_dentry); | |
793 | } else { | |
794 | /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */ | |
795 | dentry = d_find_alias(inode); | |
796 | } | |
797 | if (!dentry) { | |
798 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s " | |
799 | "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id, | |
800 | inode->i_ino); | |
801 | goto out; | |
802 | } | |
803 | ||
804 | len = INITCONTEXTLEN; | |
805 | context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
806 | if (!context) { | |
807 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
808 | dput(dentry); | |
809 | goto out; | |
810 | } | |
811 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | |
812 | context, len); | |
813 | if (rc == -ERANGE) { | |
814 | /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ | |
815 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | |
816 | NULL, 0); | |
817 | if (rc < 0) { | |
818 | dput(dentry); | |
819 | goto out; | |
820 | } | |
821 | kfree(context); | |
822 | len = rc; | |
823 | context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
824 | if (!context) { | |
825 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
826 | dput(dentry); | |
827 | goto out; | |
828 | } | |
829 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, | |
830 | XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | |
831 | context, len); | |
832 | } | |
833 | dput(dentry); | |
834 | if (rc < 0) { | |
835 | if (rc != -ENODATA) { | |
836 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned " | |
837 | "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, | |
838 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); | |
839 | kfree(context); | |
840 | goto out; | |
841 | } | |
842 | /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ | |
843 | sid = sbsec->def_sid; | |
844 | rc = 0; | |
845 | } else { | |
f5c1d5b2 JM |
846 | rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid, |
847 | sbsec->def_sid); | |
1da177e4 LT |
848 | if (rc) { |
849 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) " | |
850 | "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", | |
851 | __FUNCTION__, context, -rc, | |
852 | inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); | |
853 | kfree(context); | |
854 | /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ | |
855 | rc = 0; | |
856 | break; | |
857 | } | |
858 | } | |
859 | kfree(context); | |
860 | isec->sid = sid; | |
861 | break; | |
862 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: | |
863 | isec->sid = isec->task_sid; | |
864 | break; | |
865 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: | |
866 | /* Default to the fs SID. */ | |
867 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; | |
868 | ||
869 | /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ | |
870 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
871 | rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, | |
872 | sbsec->sid, | |
873 | isec->sclass, | |
874 | &sid); | |
875 | if (rc) | |
876 | goto out; | |
877 | isec->sid = sid; | |
878 | break; | |
879 | default: | |
880 | /* Default to the fs SID. */ | |
881 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; | |
882 | ||
883 | if (sbsec->proc) { | |
884 | struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode); | |
885 | if (proci->pde) { | |
886 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
887 | rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde, | |
888 | isec->sclass, | |
889 | &sid); | |
890 | if (rc) | |
891 | goto out; | |
892 | isec->sid = sid; | |
893 | } | |
894 | } | |
895 | break; | |
896 | } | |
897 | ||
898 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
899 | ||
900 | out: | |
901 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) | |
902 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
903 | ||
904 | if (hold_sem) | |
905 | up(&isec->sem); | |
906 | return rc; | |
907 | } | |
908 | ||
909 | /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */ | |
910 | static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) | |
911 | { | |
912 | u32 perm = 0; | |
913 | ||
914 | switch (sig) { | |
915 | case SIGCHLD: | |
916 | /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */ | |
917 | perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD; | |
918 | break; | |
919 | case SIGKILL: | |
920 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ | |
921 | perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL; | |
922 | break; | |
923 | case SIGSTOP: | |
924 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ | |
925 | perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP; | |
926 | break; | |
927 | default: | |
928 | /* All other signals. */ | |
929 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL; | |
930 | break; | |
931 | } | |
932 | ||
933 | return perm; | |
934 | } | |
935 | ||
936 | /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks, | |
937 | fork check, ptrace check, etc. */ | |
938 | static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1, | |
939 | struct task_struct *tsk2, | |
940 | u32 perms) | |
941 | { | |
942 | struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2; | |
943 | ||
944 | tsec1 = tsk1->security; | |
945 | tsec2 = tsk2->security; | |
946 | return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid, | |
947 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); | |
948 | } | |
949 | ||
950 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ | |
951 | static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
952 | int cap) | |
953 | { | |
954 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
955 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
956 | ||
957 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
958 | ||
959 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP); | |
960 | ad.tsk = tsk; | |
961 | ad.u.cap = cap; | |
962 | ||
963 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, | |
964 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad); | |
965 | } | |
966 | ||
967 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */ | |
968 | static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
969 | u32 perms) | |
970 | { | |
971 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
972 | ||
973 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
974 | ||
975 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, | |
976 | SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL); | |
977 | } | |
978 | ||
979 | /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode. | |
980 | The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit | |
981 | data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */ | |
982 | static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
983 | struct inode *inode, | |
984 | u32 perms, | |
985 | struct avc_audit_data *adp) | |
986 | { | |
987 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
988 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
989 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
990 | ||
991 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
992 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
993 | ||
994 | if (!adp) { | |
995 | adp = &ad; | |
996 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
997 | ad.u.fs.inode = inode; | |
998 | } | |
999 | ||
1000 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); | |
1001 | } | |
1002 | ||
1003 | /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing | |
1004 | the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the | |
1005 | pathname if needed. */ | |
1006 | static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1007 | struct vfsmount *mnt, | |
1008 | struct dentry *dentry, | |
1009 | u32 av) | |
1010 | { | |
1011 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
1012 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1013 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1014 | ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt; | |
1015 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1016 | return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad); | |
1017 | } | |
1018 | ||
1019 | /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to | |
1020 | access an inode in a given way. Check access to the | |
1021 | descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to | |
1022 | check a particular permission to the file. | |
1023 | Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it | |
1024 | has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then | |
1025 | access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases | |
1026 | where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ | |
858119e1 | 1027 | static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, |
1da177e4 LT |
1028 | struct file *file, |
1029 | u32 av) | |
1030 | { | |
1031 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; | |
1032 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; | |
1033 | struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt; | |
1034 | struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry; | |
1035 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
1036 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1037 | int rc; | |
1038 | ||
1039 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1040 | ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt; | |
1041 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1042 | ||
1043 | if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) { | |
1044 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid, | |
1045 | SECCLASS_FD, | |
1046 | FD__USE, | |
1047 | &ad); | |
1048 | if (rc) | |
1049 | return rc; | |
1050 | } | |
1051 | ||
1052 | /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ | |
1053 | if (av) | |
1054 | return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad); | |
1055 | ||
1056 | return 0; | |
1057 | } | |
1058 | ||
1059 | /* Check whether a task can create a file. */ | |
1060 | static int may_create(struct inode *dir, | |
1061 | struct dentry *dentry, | |
1062 | u16 tclass) | |
1063 | { | |
1064 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1065 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; | |
1066 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
1067 | u32 newsid; | |
1068 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1069 | int rc; | |
1070 | ||
1071 | tsec = current->security; | |
1072 | dsec = dir->i_security; | |
1073 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; | |
1074 | ||
1075 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1076 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1077 | ||
1078 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, | |
1079 | DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, | |
1080 | &ad); | |
1081 | if (rc) | |
1082 | return rc; | |
1083 | ||
1084 | if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { | |
1085 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; | |
1086 | } else { | |
1087 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass, | |
1088 | &newsid); | |
1089 | if (rc) | |
1090 | return rc; | |
1091 | } | |
1092 | ||
1093 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); | |
1094 | if (rc) | |
1095 | return rc; | |
1096 | ||
1097 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid, | |
1098 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
1099 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
1100 | } | |
1101 | ||
1102 | #define MAY_LINK 0 | |
1103 | #define MAY_UNLINK 1 | |
1104 | #define MAY_RMDIR 2 | |
1105 | ||
1106 | /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */ | |
1107 | static int may_link(struct inode *dir, | |
1108 | struct dentry *dentry, | |
1109 | int kind) | |
1110 | ||
1111 | { | |
1112 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1113 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; | |
1114 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1115 | u32 av; | |
1116 | int rc; | |
1117 | ||
1118 | tsec = current->security; | |
1119 | dsec = dir->i_security; | |
1120 | isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security; | |
1121 | ||
1122 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1123 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1124 | ||
1125 | av = DIR__SEARCH; | |
1126 | av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); | |
1127 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); | |
1128 | if (rc) | |
1129 | return rc; | |
1130 | ||
1131 | switch (kind) { | |
1132 | case MAY_LINK: | |
1133 | av = FILE__LINK; | |
1134 | break; | |
1135 | case MAY_UNLINK: | |
1136 | av = FILE__UNLINK; | |
1137 | break; | |
1138 | case MAY_RMDIR: | |
1139 | av = DIR__RMDIR; | |
1140 | break; | |
1141 | default: | |
1142 | printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind); | |
1143 | return 0; | |
1144 | } | |
1145 | ||
1146 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); | |
1147 | return rc; | |
1148 | } | |
1149 | ||
1150 | static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, | |
1151 | struct dentry *old_dentry, | |
1152 | struct inode *new_dir, | |
1153 | struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
1154 | { | |
1155 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1156 | struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; | |
1157 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1158 | u32 av; | |
1159 | int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; | |
1160 | int rc; | |
1161 | ||
1162 | tsec = current->security; | |
1163 | old_dsec = old_dir->i_security; | |
1164 | old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security; | |
1165 | old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); | |
1166 | new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; | |
1167 | ||
1168 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1169 | ||
1170 | ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry; | |
1171 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, | |
1172 | DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); | |
1173 | if (rc) | |
1174 | return rc; | |
1175 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid, | |
1176 | old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); | |
1177 | if (rc) | |
1178 | return rc; | |
1179 | if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { | |
1180 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid, | |
1181 | old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); | |
1182 | if (rc) | |
1183 | return rc; | |
1184 | } | |
1185 | ||
1186 | ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry; | |
1187 | av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; | |
1188 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) | |
1189 | av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; | |
1190 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); | |
1191 | if (rc) | |
1192 | return rc; | |
1193 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) { | |
1194 | new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security; | |
1195 | new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); | |
1196 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid, | |
1197 | new_isec->sclass, | |
1198 | (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); | |
1199 | if (rc) | |
1200 | return rc; | |
1201 | } | |
1202 | ||
1203 | return 0; | |
1204 | } | |
1205 | ||
1206 | /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */ | |
1207 | static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1208 | struct super_block *sb, | |
1209 | u32 perms, | |
1210 | struct avc_audit_data *ad) | |
1211 | { | |
1212 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1213 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
1214 | ||
1215 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
1216 | sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
1217 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
1218 | perms, ad); | |
1219 | } | |
1220 | ||
1221 | /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ | |
1222 | static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) | |
1223 | { | |
1224 | u32 av = 0; | |
1225 | ||
1226 | if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) { | |
1227 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) | |
1228 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; | |
1229 | if (mask & MAY_READ) | |
1230 | av |= FILE__READ; | |
1231 | ||
1232 | if (mask & MAY_APPEND) | |
1233 | av |= FILE__APPEND; | |
1234 | else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) | |
1235 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
1236 | ||
1237 | } else { | |
1238 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) | |
1239 | av |= DIR__SEARCH; | |
1240 | if (mask & MAY_WRITE) | |
1241 | av |= DIR__WRITE; | |
1242 | if (mask & MAY_READ) | |
1243 | av |= DIR__READ; | |
1244 | } | |
1245 | ||
1246 | return av; | |
1247 | } | |
1248 | ||
1249 | /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ | |
1250 | static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) | |
1251 | { | |
1252 | u32 av = 0; | |
1253 | ||
1254 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) | |
1255 | av |= FILE__READ; | |
1256 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { | |
1257 | if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND) | |
1258 | av |= FILE__APPEND; | |
1259 | else | |
1260 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
1261 | } | |
1262 | ||
1263 | return av; | |
1264 | } | |
1265 | ||
1266 | /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */ | |
1267 | static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid) | |
1268 | { | |
1269 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
1270 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
1271 | ||
1272 | if (!sbsec->initialized) { | |
1273 | /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ | |
1274 | return 0; | |
1275 | } | |
1276 | ||
1277 | down(&isec->sem); | |
1278 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
1279 | isec->sid = sid; | |
1280 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
1281 | up(&isec->sem); | |
1282 | return 0; | |
1283 | } | |
1284 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1285 | /* Hook functions begin here. */ |
1286 | ||
1287 | static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) | |
1288 | { | |
1289 | struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security; | |
1290 | struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security; | |
1291 | int rc; | |
1292 | ||
1293 | rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child); | |
1294 | if (rc) | |
1295 | return rc; | |
1296 | ||
1297 | rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE); | |
1298 | /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */ | |
341c2d80 | 1299 | if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc) |
1da177e4 LT |
1300 | csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid; |
1301 | return rc; | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
1304 | static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
1305 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1306 | { | |
1307 | int error; | |
1308 | ||
1309 | error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP); | |
1310 | if (error) | |
1311 | return error; | |
1312 | ||
1313 | return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); | |
1314 | } | |
1315 | ||
1316 | static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
1317 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1318 | { | |
1319 | int error; | |
1320 | ||
1321 | error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); | |
1322 | if (error) | |
1323 | return error; | |
1324 | ||
1325 | return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP); | |
1326 | } | |
1327 | ||
1328 | static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
1329 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1330 | { | |
1331 | secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); | |
1332 | } | |
1333 | ||
1334 | static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) | |
1335 | { | |
1336 | int rc; | |
1337 | ||
1338 | rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap); | |
1339 | if (rc) | |
1340 | return rc; | |
1341 | ||
1342 | return task_has_capability(tsk,cap); | |
1343 | } | |
1344 | ||
1345 | static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) | |
1346 | { | |
1347 | int error = 0; | |
1348 | u32 av; | |
1349 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1350 | u32 tsid; | |
1351 | int rc; | |
1352 | ||
1353 | rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op); | |
1354 | if (rc) | |
1355 | return rc; | |
1356 | ||
1357 | tsec = current->security; | |
1358 | ||
1359 | rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ? | |
1360 | SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid); | |
1361 | if (rc) { | |
1362 | /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */ | |
1363 | tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL; | |
1364 | } | |
1365 | ||
1366 | /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating | |
1367 | * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */ | |
1368 | if(op == 001) { | |
1369 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid, | |
1370 | SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL); | |
1371 | } else { | |
1372 | av = 0; | |
1373 | if (op & 004) | |
1374 | av |= FILE__READ; | |
1375 | if (op & 002) | |
1376 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
1377 | if (av) | |
1378 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid, | |
1379 | SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL); | |
1380 | } | |
1381 | ||
1382 | return error; | |
1383 | } | |
1384 | ||
1385 | static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) | |
1386 | { | |
1387 | int rc = 0; | |
1388 | ||
1389 | if (!sb) | |
1390 | return 0; | |
1391 | ||
1392 | switch (cmds) { | |
1393 | case Q_SYNC: | |
1394 | case Q_QUOTAON: | |
1395 | case Q_QUOTAOFF: | |
1396 | case Q_SETINFO: | |
1397 | case Q_SETQUOTA: | |
1398 | rc = superblock_has_perm(current, | |
1399 | sb, | |
1400 | FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL); | |
1401 | break; | |
1402 | case Q_GETFMT: | |
1403 | case Q_GETINFO: | |
1404 | case Q_GETQUOTA: | |
1405 | rc = superblock_has_perm(current, | |
1406 | sb, | |
1407 | FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL); | |
1408 | break; | |
1409 | default: | |
1410 | rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */ | |
1411 | break; | |
1412 | } | |
1413 | return rc; | |
1414 | } | |
1415 | ||
1416 | static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) | |
1417 | { | |
1418 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON); | |
1419 | } | |
1420 | ||
1421 | static int selinux_syslog(int type) | |
1422 | { | |
1423 | int rc; | |
1424 | ||
1425 | rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type); | |
1426 | if (rc) | |
1427 | return rc; | |
1428 | ||
1429 | switch (type) { | |
1430 | case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */ | |
1431 | case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */ | |
1432 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ); | |
1433 | break; | |
1434 | case 6: /* Disable logging to console */ | |
1435 | case 7: /* Enable logging to console */ | |
1436 | case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */ | |
1437 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE); | |
1438 | break; | |
1439 | case 0: /* Close log */ | |
1440 | case 1: /* Open log */ | |
1441 | case 2: /* Read from log */ | |
1442 | case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */ | |
1443 | case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */ | |
1444 | default: | |
1445 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD); | |
1446 | break; | |
1447 | } | |
1448 | return rc; | |
1449 | } | |
1450 | ||
1451 | /* | |
1452 | * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual | |
1453 | * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to | |
1454 | * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. | |
1455 | * | |
1456 | * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0 | |
1457 | * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if | |
1458 | * the capability is granted. | |
1459 | * | |
1460 | * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all | |
1461 | * processes that allocate mappings. | |
1462 | */ | |
1463 | static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages) | |
1464 | { | |
1465 | int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; | |
1466 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
1467 | ||
1468 | rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); | |
1469 | if (rc == 0) | |
1470 | rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, | |
1471 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, | |
1472 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), | |
1473 | NULL); | |
1474 | ||
1475 | if (rc == 0) | |
1476 | cap_sys_admin = 1; | |
1477 | ||
1478 | return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin); | |
1479 | } | |
1480 | ||
1481 | /* binprm security operations */ | |
1482 | ||
1483 | static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1484 | { | |
1485 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1486 | ||
89d155ef | 1487 | bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
1da177e4 LT |
1488 | if (!bsec) |
1489 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1490 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
1491 | bsec->bprm = bprm; |
1492 | bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
1493 | bsec->set = 0; | |
1494 | ||
1495 | bprm->security = bsec; | |
1496 | return 0; | |
1497 | } | |
1498 | ||
1499 | static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1500 | { | |
1501 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1502 | struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode; | |
1503 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
1504 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1505 | u32 newsid; | |
1506 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1507 | int rc; | |
1508 | ||
1509 | rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm); | |
1510 | if (rc) | |
1511 | return rc; | |
1512 | ||
1513 | bsec = bprm->security; | |
1514 | ||
1515 | if (bsec->set) | |
1516 | return 0; | |
1517 | ||
1518 | tsec = current->security; | |
1519 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
1520 | ||
1521 | /* Default to the current task SID. */ | |
1522 | bsec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
1523 | ||
1524 | /* Reset create SID on execve. */ | |
1525 | tsec->create_sid = 0; | |
1526 | ||
1527 | if (tsec->exec_sid) { | |
1528 | newsid = tsec->exec_sid; | |
1529 | /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ | |
1530 | tsec->exec_sid = 0; | |
1531 | } else { | |
1532 | /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ | |
1533 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid, | |
1534 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid); | |
1535 | if (rc) | |
1536 | return rc; | |
1537 | } | |
1538 | ||
1539 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1540 | ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt; | |
1541 | ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry; | |
1542 | ||
1543 | if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) | |
1544 | newsid = tsec->sid; | |
1545 | ||
1546 | if (tsec->sid == newsid) { | |
1547 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, | |
1548 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); | |
1549 | if (rc) | |
1550 | return rc; | |
1551 | } else { | |
1552 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ | |
1553 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, | |
1554 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); | |
1555 | if (rc) | |
1556 | return rc; | |
1557 | ||
1558 | rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid, | |
1559 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); | |
1560 | if (rc) | |
1561 | return rc; | |
1562 | ||
1563 | /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ | |
1564 | current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; | |
1565 | ||
1566 | /* Set the security field to the new SID. */ | |
1567 | bsec->sid = newsid; | |
1568 | } | |
1569 | ||
1570 | bsec->set = 1; | |
1571 | return 0; | |
1572 | } | |
1573 | ||
1574 | static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1575 | { | |
1576 | return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm); | |
1577 | } | |
1578 | ||
1579 | ||
1580 | static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1581 | { | |
1582 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
1583 | int atsecure = 0; | |
1584 | ||
1585 | if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) { | |
1586 | /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless | |
1587 | the noatsecure permission is granted between | |
1588 | the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ | |
1589 | atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, | |
1590 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1591 | PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); | |
1592 | } | |
1593 | ||
1594 | return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm)); | |
1595 | } | |
1596 | ||
1597 | static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1598 | { | |
9a5f04bf | 1599 | kfree(bprm->security); |
1da177e4 | 1600 | bprm->security = NULL; |
1da177e4 LT |
1601 | } |
1602 | ||
1603 | extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount; | |
1604 | extern struct dentry *selinux_null; | |
1605 | ||
1606 | /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ | |
1607 | static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files) | |
1608 | { | |
1609 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1610 | struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; | |
1611 | struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty; | |
badf1662 | 1612 | struct fdtable *fdt; |
1da177e4 LT |
1613 | long j = -1; |
1614 | ||
1615 | if (tty) { | |
1616 | file_list_lock(); | |
2f512016 | 1617 | file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list); |
1da177e4 LT |
1618 | if (file) { |
1619 | /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. | |
1620 | Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather | |
1621 | than using file_has_perm, as this particular open | |
1622 | file may belong to another process and we are only | |
1623 | interested in the inode-based check here. */ | |
1624 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; | |
1625 | if (inode_has_perm(current, inode, | |
1626 | FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) { | |
1627 | /* Reset controlling tty. */ | |
1628 | current->signal->tty = NULL; | |
1629 | current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0; | |
1630 | } | |
1631 | } | |
1632 | file_list_unlock(); | |
1633 | } | |
1634 | ||
1635 | /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ | |
1636 | ||
1637 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1638 | ||
1639 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); | |
1640 | for (;;) { | |
1641 | unsigned long set, i; | |
1642 | int fd; | |
1643 | ||
1644 | j++; | |
1645 | i = j * __NFDBITS; | |
badf1662 DS |
1646 | fdt = files_fdtable(files); |
1647 | if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset) | |
1da177e4 | 1648 | break; |
badf1662 | 1649 | set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j]; |
1da177e4 LT |
1650 | if (!set) |
1651 | continue; | |
1652 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); | |
1653 | for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) { | |
1654 | if (set & 1) { | |
1655 | file = fget(i); | |
1656 | if (!file) | |
1657 | continue; | |
1658 | if (file_has_perm(current, | |
1659 | file, | |
1660 | file_to_av(file))) { | |
1661 | sys_close(i); | |
1662 | fd = get_unused_fd(); | |
1663 | if (fd != i) { | |
1664 | if (fd >= 0) | |
1665 | put_unused_fd(fd); | |
1666 | fput(file); | |
1667 | continue; | |
1668 | } | |
1669 | if (devnull) { | |
095975da | 1670 | get_file(devnull); |
1da177e4 LT |
1671 | } else { |
1672 | devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR); | |
1673 | if (!devnull) { | |
1674 | put_unused_fd(fd); | |
1675 | fput(file); | |
1676 | continue; | |
1677 | } | |
1678 | } | |
1679 | fd_install(fd, devnull); | |
1680 | } | |
1681 | fput(file); | |
1682 | } | |
1683 | } | |
1684 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); | |
1685 | ||
1686 | } | |
1687 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); | |
1688 | } | |
1689 | ||
1690 | static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) | |
1691 | { | |
1692 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1693 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1694 | u32 sid; | |
1695 | int rc; | |
1696 | ||
1697 | secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe); | |
1698 | ||
1699 | tsec = current->security; | |
1700 | ||
1701 | bsec = bprm->security; | |
1702 | sid = bsec->sid; | |
1703 | ||
1704 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid; | |
1705 | bsec->unsafe = 0; | |
1706 | if (tsec->sid != sid) { | |
1707 | /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID | |
1708 | unchanged and kill. */ | |
1709 | if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { | |
1710 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1711 | PROCESS__SHARE, NULL); | |
1712 | if (rc) { | |
1713 | bsec->unsafe = 1; | |
1714 | return; | |
1715 | } | |
1716 | } | |
1717 | ||
1718 | /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. | |
1719 | Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */ | |
1720 | if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { | |
1721 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, | |
1722 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, | |
1723 | NULL); | |
1724 | if (rc) { | |
1725 | bsec->unsafe = 1; | |
1726 | return; | |
1727 | } | |
1728 | } | |
1729 | tsec->sid = sid; | |
1730 | } | |
1731 | } | |
1732 | ||
1733 | /* | |
1734 | * called after apply_creds without the task lock held | |
1735 | */ | |
1736 | static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1737 | { | |
1738 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1739 | struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; | |
1740 | struct itimerval itimer; | |
1741 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1742 | int rc, i; | |
1743 | ||
1744 | tsec = current->security; | |
1745 | bsec = bprm->security; | |
1746 | ||
1747 | if (bsec->unsafe) { | |
1748 | force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current); | |
1749 | return; | |
1750 | } | |
1751 | if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid) | |
1752 | return; | |
1753 | ||
1754 | /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ | |
1755 | flush_unauthorized_files(current->files); | |
1756 | ||
1757 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state | |
1758 | from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid | |
1759 | subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock | |
1760 | signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has | |
1761 | been updated so that any kill done after the flush | |
1762 | will be checked against the new SID. */ | |
1763 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1764 | PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); | |
1765 | if (rc) { | |
1766 | memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer); | |
1767 | for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) | |
1768 | do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL); | |
1769 | flush_signals(current); | |
1770 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); | |
1771 | flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); | |
1772 | sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); | |
1773 | recalc_sigpending(); | |
1774 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); | |
1775 | } | |
1776 | ||
1777 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits | |
1778 | from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to | |
1779 | the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init | |
1780 | task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits | |
1781 | (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit | |
1782 | check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into | |
1783 | the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher | |
1784 | than the default soft limit for cases where the default | |
1785 | is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or | |
1786 | RLIMIT_STACK.*/ | |
1787 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1788 | PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); | |
1789 | if (rc) { | |
1790 | for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { | |
1791 | rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; | |
1792 | initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i; | |
1793 | rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur); | |
1794 | } | |
1795 | if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) { | |
1796 | /* | |
1797 | * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations | |
1798 | * to be refigured. | |
1799 | */ | |
1800 | current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1); | |
1801 | } | |
1802 | } | |
1803 | ||
1804 | /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can | |
1805 | recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */ | |
1806 | wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit); | |
1807 | } | |
1808 | ||
1809 | /* superblock security operations */ | |
1810 | ||
1811 | static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
1812 | { | |
1813 | return superblock_alloc_security(sb); | |
1814 | } | |
1815 | ||
1816 | static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
1817 | { | |
1818 | superblock_free_security(sb); | |
1819 | } | |
1820 | ||
1821 | static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen) | |
1822 | { | |
1823 | if (plen > olen) | |
1824 | return 0; | |
1825 | ||
1826 | return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen); | |
1827 | } | |
1828 | ||
1829 | static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len) | |
1830 | { | |
1831 | return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) || | |
1832 | match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) || | |
1833 | match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len)); | |
1834 | } | |
1835 | ||
1836 | static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len) | |
1837 | { | |
1838 | if (!*first) { | |
1839 | **to = ','; | |
1840 | *to += 1; | |
1841 | } | |
1842 | else | |
1843 | *first = 0; | |
1844 | memcpy(*to, from, len); | |
1845 | *to += len; | |
1846 | } | |
1847 | ||
1848 | static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy) | |
1849 | { | |
1850 | int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0; | |
1851 | char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end; | |
1852 | char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec; | |
1853 | ||
1854 | in_curr = orig; | |
1855 | sec_curr = copy; | |
1856 | ||
1857 | /* Binary mount data: just copy */ | |
1858 | if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) { | |
1859 | copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr); | |
1860 | goto out; | |
1861 | } | |
1862 | ||
1863 | nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); | |
1864 | if (!nosec) { | |
1865 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
1866 | goto out; | |
1867 | } | |
1868 | ||
1869 | nosec_save = nosec; | |
1870 | fnosec = fsec = 1; | |
1871 | in_save = in_end = orig; | |
1872 | ||
1873 | do { | |
1874 | if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') { | |
1875 | int len = in_end - in_curr; | |
1876 | ||
1877 | if (selinux_option(in_curr, len)) | |
1878 | take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len); | |
1879 | else | |
1880 | take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len); | |
1881 | ||
1882 | in_curr = in_end + 1; | |
1883 | } | |
1884 | } while (*in_end++); | |
1885 | ||
6931dfc9 | 1886 | strcpy(in_save, nosec_save); |
da3caa20 | 1887 | free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save); |
1da177e4 LT |
1888 | out: |
1889 | return rc; | |
1890 | } | |
1891 | ||
1892 | static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |
1893 | { | |
1894 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1895 | int rc; | |
1896 | ||
1897 | rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data); | |
1898 | if (rc) | |
1899 | return rc; | |
1900 | ||
1901 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1902 | ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root; | |
1903 | return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); | |
1904 | } | |
1905 | ||
1906 | static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb) | |
1907 | { | |
1908 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1909 | ||
1910 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1911 | ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root; | |
1912 | return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); | |
1913 | } | |
1914 | ||
1915 | static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name, | |
1916 | struct nameidata *nd, | |
1917 | char * type, | |
1918 | unsigned long flags, | |
1919 | void * data) | |
1920 | { | |
1921 | int rc; | |
1922 | ||
1923 | rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data); | |
1924 | if (rc) | |
1925 | return rc; | |
1926 | ||
1927 | if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) | |
1928 | return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb, | |
1929 | FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL); | |
1930 | else | |
1931 | return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry, | |
1932 | FILE__MOUNTON); | |
1933 | } | |
1934 | ||
1935 | static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) | |
1936 | { | |
1937 | int rc; | |
1938 | ||
1939 | rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags); | |
1940 | if (rc) | |
1941 | return rc; | |
1942 | ||
1943 | return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb, | |
1944 | FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL); | |
1945 | } | |
1946 | ||
1947 | /* inode security operations */ | |
1948 | ||
1949 | static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) | |
1950 | { | |
1951 | return inode_alloc_security(inode); | |
1952 | } | |
1953 | ||
1954 | static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) | |
1955 | { | |
1956 | inode_free_security(inode); | |
1957 | } | |
1958 | ||
5e41ff9e SS |
1959 | static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, |
1960 | char **name, void **value, | |
1961 | size_t *len) | |
1962 | { | |
1963 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1964 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; | |
1965 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
570bc1c2 | 1966 | u32 newsid, clen; |
5e41ff9e | 1967 | int rc; |
570bc1c2 | 1968 | char *namep = NULL, *context; |
5e41ff9e SS |
1969 | |
1970 | tsec = current->security; | |
1971 | dsec = dir->i_security; | |
1972 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; | |
5e41ff9e SS |
1973 | |
1974 | if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { | |
1975 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; | |
1976 | } else { | |
1977 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, | |
1978 | inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), | |
1979 | &newsid); | |
1980 | if (rc) { | |
1981 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: " | |
1982 | "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s " | |
1983 | "ino=%ld)\n", | |
1984 | __FUNCTION__, | |
1985 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); | |
1986 | return rc; | |
1987 | } | |
1988 | } | |
1989 | ||
1990 | inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid); | |
1991 | ||
8aad3875 | 1992 | if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) |
25a74f3b SS |
1993 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
1994 | ||
570bc1c2 SS |
1995 | if (name) { |
1996 | namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1997 | if (!namep) | |
1998 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1999 | *name = namep; | |
2000 | } | |
5e41ff9e | 2001 | |
570bc1c2 SS |
2002 | if (value && len) { |
2003 | rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen); | |
2004 | if (rc) { | |
2005 | kfree(namep); | |
2006 | return rc; | |
2007 | } | |
2008 | *value = context; | |
2009 | *len = clen; | |
5e41ff9e | 2010 | } |
5e41ff9e | 2011 | |
5e41ff9e SS |
2012 | return 0; |
2013 | } | |
2014 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
2015 | static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask) |
2016 | { | |
2017 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); | |
2018 | } | |
2019 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
2020 | static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
2021 | { | |
2022 | int rc; | |
2023 | ||
2024 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry); | |
2025 | if (rc) | |
2026 | return rc; | |
2027 | return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); | |
2028 | } | |
2029 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
2030 | static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
2031 | { | |
2032 | int rc; | |
2033 | ||
2034 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry); | |
2035 | if (rc) | |
2036 | return rc; | |
2037 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); | |
2038 | } | |
2039 | ||
2040 | static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) | |
2041 | { | |
2042 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE); | |
2043 | } | |
2044 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
2045 | static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask) |
2046 | { | |
2047 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR); | |
2048 | } | |
2049 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
2050 | static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
2051 | { | |
2052 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR); | |
2053 | } | |
2054 | ||
2055 | static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) | |
2056 | { | |
2057 | int rc; | |
2058 | ||
2059 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev); | |
2060 | if (rc) | |
2061 | return rc; | |
2062 | ||
2063 | return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); | |
2064 | } | |
2065 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
2066 | static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, |
2067 | struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
2068 | { | |
2069 | return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry); | |
2070 | } | |
2071 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
2072 | static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) |
2073 | { | |
2074 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); | |
2075 | } | |
2076 | ||
2077 | static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata) | |
2078 | { | |
2079 | int rc; | |
2080 | ||
2081 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata); | |
2082 | if (rc) | |
2083 | return rc; | |
2084 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); | |
2085 | } | |
2086 | ||
2087 | static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, | |
2088 | struct nameidata *nd) | |
2089 | { | |
2090 | int rc; | |
2091 | ||
2092 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd); | |
2093 | if (rc) | |
2094 | return rc; | |
2095 | ||
2096 | if (!mask) { | |
2097 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ | |
2098 | return 0; | |
2099 | } | |
2100 | ||
2101 | return inode_has_perm(current, inode, | |
2102 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL); | |
2103 | } | |
2104 | ||
2105 | static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) | |
2106 | { | |
2107 | int rc; | |
2108 | ||
2109 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr); | |
2110 | if (rc) | |
2111 | return rc; | |
2112 | ||
2113 | if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) | |
2114 | return 0; | |
2115 | ||
2116 | if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | | |
2117 | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET)) | |
2118 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2119 | ||
2120 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE); | |
2121 | } | |
2122 | ||
2123 | static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) | |
2124 | { | |
2125 | return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2126 | } | |
2127 | ||
2128 | static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
2129 | { | |
2130 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
2131 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
2132 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2133 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
2134 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
2135 | u32 newsid; | |
2136 | int rc = 0; | |
2137 | ||
2138 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { | |
2139 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
2140 | sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) && | |
2141 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { | |
2142 | /* A different attribute in the security namespace. | |
2143 | Restrict to administrator. */ | |
2144 | return -EPERM; | |
2145 | } | |
2146 | ||
2147 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the | |
2148 | ordinary setattr permission. */ | |
2149 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2150 | } | |
2151 | ||
2152 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
2153 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) | |
2154 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2155 | ||
2156 | if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) | |
2157 | return -EPERM; | |
2158 | ||
2159 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
2160 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
2161 | ||
2162 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, | |
2163 | FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); | |
2164 | if (rc) | |
2165 | return rc; | |
2166 | ||
2167 | rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); | |
2168 | if (rc) | |
2169 | return rc; | |
2170 | ||
2171 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass, | |
2172 | FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); | |
2173 | if (rc) | |
2174 | return rc; | |
2175 | ||
2176 | rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid, | |
2177 | isec->sclass); | |
2178 | if (rc) | |
2179 | return rc; | |
2180 | ||
2181 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, | |
2182 | sbsec->sid, | |
2183 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
2184 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, | |
2185 | &ad); | |
2186 | } | |
2187 | ||
2188 | static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, | |
2189 | void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
2190 | { | |
2191 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
2192 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2193 | u32 newsid; | |
2194 | int rc; | |
2195 | ||
2196 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { | |
2197 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */ | |
2198 | return; | |
2199 | } | |
2200 | ||
2201 | rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); | |
2202 | if (rc) { | |
2203 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context " | |
2204 | "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc); | |
2205 | return; | |
2206 | } | |
2207 | ||
2208 | isec->sid = newsid; | |
2209 | return; | |
2210 | } | |
2211 | ||
2212 | static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) | |
2213 | { | |
1da177e4 LT |
2214 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); |
2215 | } | |
2216 | ||
2217 | static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry) | |
2218 | { | |
2219 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2220 | } | |
2221 | ||
2222 | static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) | |
2223 | { | |
2224 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { | |
2225 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
2226 | sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) && | |
2227 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { | |
2228 | /* A different attribute in the security namespace. | |
2229 | Restrict to administrator. */ | |
2230 | return -EPERM; | |
2231 | } | |
2232 | ||
2233 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the | |
2234 | ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate | |
2235 | permission for removexattr. */ | |
2236 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2237 | } | |
2238 | ||
2239 | /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. | |
2240 | You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ | |
2241 | return -EACCES; | |
2242 | } | |
2243 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
2244 | static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void) |
2245 | { | |
2246 | return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; | |
2247 | } | |
2248 | ||
d381d8a9 JM |
2249 | /* |
2250 | * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the | |
2251 | * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to | |
2252 | * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user. | |
2253 | * | |
2254 | * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. | |
2255 | */ | |
7306a0b9 | 2256 | static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) |
1da177e4 LT |
2257 | { |
2258 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
d381d8a9 | 2259 | |
8c8570fb DK |
2260 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) |
2261 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
d381d8a9 | 2262 | |
8c8570fb | 2263 | return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size); |
1da177e4 LT |
2264 | } |
2265 | ||
2266 | static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, | |
2267 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
2268 | { | |
2269 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2270 | u32 newsid; | |
2271 | int rc; | |
2272 | ||
2273 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) | |
2274 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2275 | ||
2276 | if (!value || !size) | |
2277 | return -EACCES; | |
2278 | ||
2279 | rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid); | |
2280 | if (rc) | |
2281 | return rc; | |
2282 | ||
2283 | isec->sid = newsid; | |
2284 | return 0; | |
2285 | } | |
2286 | ||
2287 | static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) | |
2288 | { | |
2289 | const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); | |
2290 | if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) | |
2291 | memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len); | |
2292 | return len; | |
2293 | } | |
2294 | ||
2295 | /* file security operations */ | |
2296 | ||
2297 | static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) | |
2298 | { | |
2299 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; | |
2300 | ||
2301 | if (!mask) { | |
2302 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ | |
2303 | return 0; | |
2304 | } | |
2305 | ||
2306 | /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ | |
2307 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) | |
2308 | mask |= MAY_APPEND; | |
2309 | ||
2310 | return file_has_perm(current, file, | |
2311 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); | |
2312 | } | |
2313 | ||
2314 | static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) | |
2315 | { | |
2316 | return file_alloc_security(file); | |
2317 | } | |
2318 | ||
2319 | static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file) | |
2320 | { | |
2321 | file_free_security(file); | |
2322 | } | |
2323 | ||
2324 | static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, | |
2325 | unsigned long arg) | |
2326 | { | |
2327 | int error = 0; | |
2328 | ||
2329 | switch (cmd) { | |
2330 | case FIONREAD: | |
2331 | /* fall through */ | |
2332 | case FIBMAP: | |
2333 | /* fall through */ | |
2334 | case FIGETBSZ: | |
2335 | /* fall through */ | |
2336 | case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS: | |
2337 | /* fall through */ | |
2338 | case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION: | |
2339 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2340 | break; | |
2341 | ||
2342 | case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS: | |
2343 | /* fall through */ | |
2344 | case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION: | |
2345 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2346 | break; | |
2347 | ||
2348 | /* sys_ioctl() checks */ | |
2349 | case FIONBIO: | |
2350 | /* fall through */ | |
2351 | case FIOASYNC: | |
2352 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0); | |
2353 | break; | |
2354 | ||
2355 | case KDSKBENT: | |
2356 | case KDSKBSENT: | |
2357 | error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG); | |
2358 | break; | |
2359 | ||
2360 | /* default case assumes that the command will go | |
2361 | * to the file's ioctl() function. | |
2362 | */ | |
2363 | default: | |
2364 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL); | |
2365 | ||
2366 | } | |
2367 | return error; | |
2368 | } | |
2369 | ||
2370 | static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) | |
2371 | { | |
2372 | #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32 | |
2373 | if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { | |
2374 | /* | |
2375 | * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a | |
2376 | * private file mapping that will also be writable. | |
2377 | * This has an additional check. | |
2378 | */ | |
2379 | int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM); | |
2380 | if (rc) | |
2381 | return rc; | |
2382 | } | |
2383 | #endif | |
2384 | ||
2385 | if (file) { | |
2386 | /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ | |
2387 | u32 av = FILE__READ; | |
2388 | ||
2389 | /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ | |
2390 | if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) | |
2391 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
2392 | ||
2393 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) | |
2394 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; | |
2395 | ||
2396 | return file_has_perm(current, file, av); | |
2397 | } | |
2398 | return 0; | |
2399 | } | |
2400 | ||
2401 | static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, | |
2402 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) | |
2403 | { | |
2404 | int rc; | |
2405 | ||
2406 | rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags); | |
2407 | if (rc) | |
2408 | return rc; | |
2409 | ||
2410 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) | |
2411 | prot = reqprot; | |
2412 | ||
2413 | return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, | |
2414 | (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); | |
2415 | } | |
2416 | ||
2417 | static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, | |
2418 | unsigned long reqprot, | |
2419 | unsigned long prot) | |
2420 | { | |
2421 | int rc; | |
2422 | ||
2423 | rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); | |
2424 | if (rc) | |
2425 | return rc; | |
2426 | ||
2427 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) | |
2428 | prot = reqprot; | |
2429 | ||
2430 | #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32 | |
db4c9641 SS |
2431 | if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { |
2432 | rc = 0; | |
2433 | if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && | |
2434 | vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { | |
2435 | rc = task_has_perm(current, current, | |
2436 | PROCESS__EXECHEAP); | |
2437 | } else if (!vma->vm_file && | |
2438 | vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && | |
2439 | vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) { | |
2440 | rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK); | |
2441 | } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { | |
2442 | /* | |
2443 | * We are making executable a file mapping that has | |
2444 | * had some COW done. Since pages might have been | |
2445 | * written, check ability to execute the possibly | |
2446 | * modified content. This typically should only | |
2447 | * occur for text relocations. | |
2448 | */ | |
2449 | rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file, | |
2450 | FILE__EXECMOD); | |
2451 | } | |