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1/*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
7 * Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
8 *
e0d1caa7
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9 * Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
10 *
11 * Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments.
12 *
d28d1e08 13 * Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
e0d1caa7 14 * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
d28d1e08
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15 *
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19 */
20
21/*
22 * USAGE:
23 * NOTES:
24 * 1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config:
25 * CONFIG_SECURITY=y
26 * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
27 * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y
28 * CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y
29 * ISSUES:
30 * 1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation
31 * 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
32 * 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
33 */
d28d1e08
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34#include <linux/module.h>
35#include <linux/kernel.h>
36#include <linux/init.h>
37#include <linux/security.h>
38#include <linux/types.h>
39#include <linux/netfilter.h>
40#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
41#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
42#include <linux/ip.h>
43#include <linux/tcp.h>
44#include <linux/skbuff.h>
45#include <linux/xfrm.h>
46#include <net/xfrm.h>
47#include <net/checksum.h>
48#include <net/udp.h>
49#include <asm/semaphore.h>
50
51#include "avc.h"
52#include "objsec.h"
53#include "xfrm.h"
54
55
56/*
57 * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context
58 */
59static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
60{
61 return (ctx &&
62 (ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) &&
63 (ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX));
64}
65
66/*
67 * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux
68 */
69static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
70{
71 return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security);
72}
73
74/*
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75 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
76 * a xfrm policy rule.
d28d1e08 77 */
e0d1caa7 78int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
d28d1e08
TJ
79{
80 int rc = 0;
81 u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
82 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
83
84 /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
85 if ((ctx = xp->security)) {
86 if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
87 return -EINVAL;
88
89 sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
90 }
91
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92 rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
93 ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
d28d1e08
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94 NULL);
95
96 return rc;
97}
98
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99/*
100 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
101 * the given policy, flow combo.
102 */
103
104int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
105 struct flowi *fl)
106{
107 u32 state_sid;
108 u32 pol_sid;
109 int err;
110
111 if (x->security)
112 state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
113 else
114 state_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
115
116 if (xp->security)
117 pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid;
118 else
119 pol_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
120
121 err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
122 ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
123 NULL);
124
125 if (err)
126 return 0;
127
128 return selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, x);
129}
130
131/*
132 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow
133 * can use a given security association.
134 */
135
136int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm)
137{
138 int rc = 0;
139 u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
140 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
141
142 /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
143 if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) {
144 if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
145 return 0;
146
147 sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
148 }
149
150 rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
151 ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
152 NULL)? 0:1;
153
154 return rc;
155}
156
157/*
158 * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
159 */
160
beb8d13b 161int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
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162{
163 struct sec_path *sp;
164
beb8d13b 165 *sid = SECSID_NULL;
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166
167 if (skb == NULL)
168 return 0;
169
170 sp = skb->sp;
171 if (sp) {
172 int i, sid_set = 0;
173
174 for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
175 struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
176 if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
177 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
178
179 if (!sid_set) {
beb8d13b 180 *sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
e0d1caa7 181 sid_set = 1;
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182
183 if (!ckall)
184 break;
e0d1caa7 185 }
beb8d13b 186 else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
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187 return -EINVAL;
188 }
189 }
190 }
191
192 return 0;
193}
194
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195/*
196 * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
197 * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
198 */
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199static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
200 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 sid)
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201{
202 int rc = 0;
203 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
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204 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
205 char *ctx_str = NULL;
206 u32 str_len;
207 u32 ctx_sid;
208
209 BUG_ON(uctx && pol);
210
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211 if (!uctx)
212 goto not_from_user;
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213
214 if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
215 return -EINVAL;
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216
217 if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
218 return -ENOMEM;
219
220 *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
221 uctx->ctx_len,
222 GFP_KERNEL);
223
224 if (!ctx)
225 return -ENOMEM;
226
227 ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi;
228 ctx->ctx_len = uctx->ctx_len;
229 ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg;
230
231 memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
232 uctx+1,
233 ctx->ctx_len);
234 rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str,
235 ctx->ctx_len,
236 &ctx->ctx_sid);
237
238 if (rc)
239 goto out;
240
241 /*
c8c05a8e 242 * Does the subject have permission to set security context?
d28d1e08 243 */
d28d1e08
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244 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
245 SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
5f8ac64b 246 ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
d28d1e08
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247 if (rc)
248 goto out;
249
250 return rc;
251
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252not_from_user:
253 if (pol) {
254 rc = security_sid_mls_copy(pol->ctx_sid, sid, &ctx_sid);
255 if (rc)
256 goto out;
257 }
258 else
259 ctx_sid = sid;
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260
261 rc = security_sid_to_context(ctx_sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
262 if (rc)
263 goto out;
264
265 *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
266 str_len,
267 GFP_ATOMIC);
268
269 if (!ctx) {
270 rc = -ENOMEM;
271 goto out;
272 }
273
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274 ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
275 ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
276 ctx->ctx_sid = ctx_sid;
277 ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
278 memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
279 ctx_str,
280 str_len);
281
282 goto out2;
283
d28d1e08 284out:
ee2e6841 285 *ctxp = NULL;
d28d1e08 286 kfree(ctx);
e0d1caa7
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287out2:
288 kfree(ctx_str);
d28d1e08
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289 return rc;
290}
291
292/*
293 * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
294 * xfrm_policy.
295 */
cb969f07
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296int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
297 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, struct sock *sk)
d28d1e08
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298{
299 int err;
cb969f07 300 u32 sid;
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301
302 BUG_ON(!xp);
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303 BUG_ON(uctx && sk);
304
305 if (sk) {
306 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
307 sid = ssec->sid;
308 }
309 else
310 sid = SECSID_NULL;
d28d1e08 311
cb969f07 312 err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, NULL, sid);
d28d1e08
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313 return err;
314}
315
316
317/*
318 * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to
319 * new for policy cloning.
320 */
321int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new)
322{
323 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, *new_ctx;
324
325 old_ctx = old->security;
326
327 if (old_ctx) {
328 new_ctx = new->security = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_ctx) +
329 old_ctx->ctx_len,
330 GFP_KERNEL);
331
332 if (!new_ctx)
333 return -ENOMEM;
334
335 memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx));
336 memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len);
337 }
338 return 0;
339}
340
341/*
342 * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_policy security information.
343 */
344void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
345{
346 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
347 if (ctx)
348 kfree(ctx);
349}
350
c8c05a8e
CZ
351/*
352 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
353 */
354int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
355{
356 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
357 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
358 int rc = 0;
359
360 if (ctx)
361 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
362 SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
363 ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
364
365 return rc;
366}
367
d28d1e08
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368/*
369 * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
370 * xfrm_state.
371 */
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372int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
373 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol, u32 secid)
d28d1e08
TJ
374{
375 int err;
376
377 BUG_ON(!x);
378
e0d1caa7 379 err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, pol, secid);
d28d1e08
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380 return err;
381}
382
383/*
384 * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information.
385 */
386void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
387{
388 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
389 if (ctx)
390 kfree(ctx);
391}
392
2c7946a7
CZ
393/*
394 * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a connected
395 * (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket based on its security
396 * association used to connect to the remote socket.
397 *
398 * Retrieve via getsockopt SO_PEERSEC.
399 */
400u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
401{
402 struct dst_entry *dst, *dst_test;
403 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
404
405 if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
406 goto out;
407
408 dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
409 if (!dst)
410 goto out;
411
412 for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
413 dst_test = dst_test->child) {
414 struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
415
416 if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
417 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
418 peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
419 break;
420 }
421 }
422 dst_release(dst);
423
424out:
425 return peer_sid;
426}
427
428/*
429 * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a UDP packet
430 * based on its security association used to connect to the remote socket.
431 *
432 * Retrieve via setsockopt IP_PASSSEC and recvmsg with control message
433 * type SCM_SECURITY.
434 */
435u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
436{
437 struct sec_path *sp;
438
439 if (skb == NULL)
440 return SECSID_NULL;
441
442 if (skb->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
443 return SECSID_NULL;
444
445 sp = skb->sp;
446 if (sp) {
447 int i;
448
449 for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
67644726 450 struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
2c7946a7
CZ
451 if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
452 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
453 return ctx->ctx_sid;
454 }
455 }
456 }
457
458 return SECSID_NULL;
459}
460
c8c05a8e
CZ
461 /*
462 * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
463 */
464int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
465{
466 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
467 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
468 int rc = 0;
469
470 if (ctx)
471 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
472 SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
473 ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
474
475 return rc;
476}
477
d28d1e08
TJ
478/*
479 * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets. If
480 * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
481 * already authorized by the IPSec process. If not, then
482 * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
483 * gone thru the IPSec process.
484 */
e0d1caa7
VY
485int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
486 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
d28d1e08
TJ
487{
488 int i, rc = 0;
489 struct sec_path *sp;
e0d1caa7 490 u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
d28d1e08
TJ
491
492 sp = skb->sp;
493
494 if (sp) {
d28d1e08 495 for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
67644726 496 struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
d28d1e08 497
e0d1caa7
VY
498 if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
499 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
500 sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
501 break;
502 }
d28d1e08
TJ
503 }
504 }
505
e0d1caa7
VY
506 rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
507 ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
d28d1e08 508
d28d1e08
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509 return rc;
510}
511
512/*
513 * POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing:
514 * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
515 * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
516 * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
517 * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook.
518 */
e0d1caa7
VY
519int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
520 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
d28d1e08
TJ
521{
522 struct dst_entry *dst;
523 int rc = 0;
524
525 dst = skb->dst;
526
527 if (dst) {
528 struct dst_entry *dst_test;
529
530 for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
531 dst_test = dst_test->child) {
532 struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
533
534 if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
4e5ab4cb 535 goto out;
d28d1e08
TJ
536 }
537 }
538
539 rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
e0d1caa7 540 ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
4e5ab4cb
JM
541out:
542 return rc;
d28d1e08 543}