]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
031e5cce SM |
1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent |
2 | ||
f898777d MG |
3 | /* |
4 | * shim - trivial UEFI first-stage bootloader | |
5 | * | |
031e5cce SM |
6 | * Copyright Red Hat, Inc |
7 | * Author: Matthew Garrett | |
f898777d MG |
8 | * |
9 | * Significant portions of this code are derived from Tianocore | |
10 | * (http://tianocore.sf.net) and are Copyright 2009-2012 Intel | |
11 | * Corporation. | |
12 | */ | |
13 | ||
f4b24734 | 14 | #include "shim.h" |
031e5cce SM |
15 | #if defined(ENABLE_SHIM_CERT) |
16 | #include "shim_cert.h" | |
17 | #endif /* defined(ENABLE_SHIM_CERT) */ | |
7bf7a6d0 | 18 | |
b6f94dbe MTL |
19 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
20 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | |
21 | #include <openssl/dh.h> | |
22 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> | |
23 | #include <openssl/pkcs12.h> | |
24 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
25 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> | |
26 | #include <openssl/ssl.h> | |
62f0afa2 MTL |
27 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
28 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
b6f94dbe | 29 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
031e5cce | 30 | #include <openssl/dso.h> |
b6f94dbe MTL |
31 | |
32 | #include <Library/BaseCryptLib.h> | |
62f0afa2 | 33 | |
f892ac66 | 34 | #include <stdint.h> |
62f0afa2 MTL |
35 | |
36 | #define OID_EKU_MODSIGN "1.3.6.1.4.1.2312.16.1.2" | |
f898777d | 37 | |
7f055335 | 38 | static EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *systab; |
f4173af1 | 39 | static EFI_HANDLE global_image_handle; |
031e5cce SM |
40 | static EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *shim_li; |
41 | static EFI_LOADED_IMAGE shim_li_bak; | |
7f055335 | 42 | |
031e5cce | 43 | list_t sbat_var; |
cb59de38 | 44 | |
f898777d MG |
45 | /* |
46 | * The vendor certificate used for validating the second stage loader | |
47 | */ | |
a1f28635 | 48 | extern struct { |
031e5cce SM |
49 | UINT32 vendor_authorized_size; |
50 | UINT32 vendor_deauthorized_size; | |
51 | UINT32 vendor_authorized_offset; | |
52 | UINT32 vendor_deauthorized_offset; | |
a1f28635 PJ |
53 | } cert_table; |
54 | ||
c13fc2f7 MG |
55 | #define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID { 0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, { 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f }} |
56 | ||
c16548d0 MG |
57 | typedef enum { |
58 | DATA_FOUND, | |
59 | DATA_NOT_FOUND, | |
60 | VAR_NOT_FOUND | |
61 | } CHECK_STATUS; | |
62 | ||
13422973 GCPL |
63 | typedef struct { |
64 | UINT32 MokSize; | |
65 | UINT8 *Mok; | |
66 | } MokListNode; | |
67 | ||
b6f94dbe MTL |
68 | static void |
69 | drain_openssl_errors(void) | |
70 | { | |
71 | unsigned long err = -1; | |
72 | while (err != 0) | |
73 | err = ERR_get_error(); | |
74 | } | |
75 | ||
b8070380 GCPL |
76 | static BOOLEAN verify_x509(UINT8 *Cert, UINTN CertSize) |
77 | { | |
78 | UINTN length; | |
79 | ||
80 | if (!Cert || CertSize < 4) | |
81 | return FALSE; | |
82 | ||
83 | /* | |
84 | * A DER encoding x509 certificate starts with SEQUENCE(0x30), | |
85 | * the number of length bytes, and the number of value bytes. | |
86 | * The size of a x509 certificate is usually between 127 bytes | |
87 | * and 64KB. For convenience, assume the number of value bytes | |
88 | * is 2, i.e. the second byte is 0x82. | |
89 | */ | |
031e5cce SM |
90 | if (Cert[0] != 0x30 || Cert[1] != 0x82) { |
91 | dprint(L"cert[0:1] is [%02x%02x], should be [%02x%02x]\n", | |
92 | Cert[0], Cert[1], 0x30, 0x82); | |
b8070380 | 93 | return FALSE; |
031e5cce | 94 | } |
b8070380 GCPL |
95 | |
96 | length = Cert[2]<<8 | Cert[3]; | |
031e5cce SM |
97 | if (length != (CertSize - 4)) { |
98 | dprint(L"Cert length is %ld, expecting %ld\n", | |
99 | length, CertSize); | |
b8070380 | 100 | return FALSE; |
031e5cce | 101 | } |
b8070380 GCPL |
102 | |
103 | return TRUE; | |
104 | } | |
105 | ||
62f0afa2 MTL |
106 | static BOOLEAN verify_eku(UINT8 *Cert, UINTN CertSize) |
107 | { | |
108 | X509 *x509; | |
109 | CONST UINT8 *Temp = Cert; | |
110 | EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku; | |
111 | ASN1_OBJECT *module_signing; | |
112 | ||
031e5cce SM |
113 | module_signing = OBJ_nid2obj(OBJ_create(OID_EKU_MODSIGN, |
114 | "modsign-eku", | |
115 | "modsign-eku")); | |
62f0afa2 MTL |
116 | |
117 | x509 = d2i_X509 (NULL, &Temp, (long) CertSize); | |
118 | if (x509 != NULL) { | |
119 | eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL); | |
120 | ||
121 | if (eku) { | |
122 | int i = 0; | |
123 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) { | |
124 | ASN1_OBJECT *key_usage = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i); | |
125 | ||
126 | if (OBJ_cmp(module_signing, key_usage) == 0) | |
127 | return FALSE; | |
128 | } | |
129 | EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(eku); | |
130 | } | |
131 | ||
132 | X509_free(x509); | |
133 | } | |
134 | ||
031e5cce | 135 | OBJ_cleanup(); |
62f0afa2 | 136 | |
031e5cce | 137 | return TRUE; |
7bf7a6d0 MTL |
138 | } |
139 | ||
5f0a358b PJ |
140 | static CHECK_STATUS check_db_cert_in_ram(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList, |
141 | UINTN dbsize, | |
142 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *data, | |
b6f94dbe MTL |
143 | UINT8 *hash, CHAR16 *dbname, |
144 | EFI_GUID guid) | |
3df68c18 | 145 | { |
3df68c18 | 146 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert; |
b8070380 | 147 | UINTN CertSize; |
c13fc2f7 | 148 | BOOLEAN IsFound = FALSE; |
031e5cce | 149 | int i = 0; |
c16548d0 | 150 | |
c16548d0 | 151 | while ((dbsize > 0) && (dbsize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) { |
f892ac66 | 152 | if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &EFI_CERT_TYPE_X509_GUID) == 0) { |
c16548d0 | 153 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize); |
b8070380 | 154 | CertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof(EFI_GUID); |
031e5cce | 155 | dprint(L"trying to verify cert %d (%s)\n", i++, dbname); |
b8070380 | 156 | if (verify_x509(Cert->SignatureData, CertSize)) { |
62f0afa2 | 157 | if (verify_eku(Cert->SignatureData, CertSize)) { |
031e5cce | 158 | drain_openssl_errors(); |
62f0afa2 MTL |
159 | IsFound = AuthenticodeVerify (data->CertData, |
160 | data->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(data->Hdr), | |
161 | Cert->SignatureData, | |
162 | CertSize, | |
163 | hash, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); | |
b6f94dbe | 164 | if (IsFound) { |
031e5cce SM |
165 | dprint(L"AuthenticodeVerify() succeeded: %d\n", IsFound); |
166 | tpm_measure_variable(dbname, guid, CertList->SignatureSize, Cert); | |
b6f94dbe | 167 | drain_openssl_errors(); |
f892ac66 | 168 | return DATA_FOUND; |
b6f94dbe MTL |
169 | } else { |
170 | LogError(L"AuthenticodeVerify(): %d\n", IsFound); | |
171 | } | |
62f0afa2 | 172 | } |
b8070380 | 173 | } else if (verbose) { |
031e5cce SM |
174 | console_print(L"Not a DER encoded x.509 Certificate"); |
175 | dprint(L"cert:\n"); | |
176 | dhexdumpat(Cert->SignatureData, CertSize, 0); | |
c16548d0 | 177 | } |
c16548d0 MG |
178 | } |
179 | ||
180 | dbsize -= CertList->SignatureListSize; | |
181 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize); | |
182 | } | |
183 | ||
c16548d0 MG |
184 | return DATA_NOT_FOUND; |
185 | } | |
186 | ||
5f0a358b PJ |
187 | static CHECK_STATUS check_db_cert(CHAR16 *dbname, EFI_GUID guid, |
188 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *data, UINT8 *hash) | |
c16548d0 | 189 | { |
5f0a358b | 190 | CHECK_STATUS rc; |
c16548d0 | 191 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; |
c16548d0 | 192 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList; |
c16548d0 | 193 | UINTN dbsize = 0; |
7f0208a0 | 194 | UINT8 *db; |
3df68c18 | 195 | |
7f0208a0 | 196 | efi_status = get_variable(dbname, &db, &dbsize, guid); |
f892ac66 | 197 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) |
c16548d0 | 198 | return VAR_NOT_FOUND; |
3df68c18 | 199 | |
7f0208a0 | 200 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)db; |
3df68c18 | 201 | |
b6f94dbe | 202 | rc = check_db_cert_in_ram(CertList, dbsize, data, hash, dbname, guid); |
5f0a358b PJ |
203 | |
204 | FreePool(db); | |
205 | ||
206 | return rc; | |
207 | } | |
208 | ||
20f6cde6 MG |
209 | /* |
210 | * Check a hash against an EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST in a buffer | |
211 | */ | |
5f0a358b PJ |
212 | static CHECK_STATUS check_db_hash_in_ram(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList, |
213 | UINTN dbsize, UINT8 *data, | |
b6f94dbe MTL |
214 | int SignatureSize, EFI_GUID CertType, |
215 | CHAR16 *dbname, EFI_GUID guid) | |
5f0a358b PJ |
216 | { |
217 | EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert; | |
218 | UINTN CertCount, Index; | |
219 | BOOLEAN IsFound = FALSE; | |
220 | ||
c16548d0 | 221 | while ((dbsize > 0) && (dbsize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) { |
d71240bf | 222 | CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize -sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize; |
3df68c18 | 223 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize); |
c13fc2f7 | 224 | if (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, &CertType) == 0) { |
3df68c18 | 225 | for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) { |
c16548d0 | 226 | if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, data, SignatureSize) == 0) { |
3df68c18 MG |
227 | // |
228 | // Find the signature in database. | |
229 | // | |
230 | IsFound = TRUE; | |
031e5cce | 231 | tpm_measure_variable(dbname, guid, CertList->SignatureSize, Cert); |
3df68c18 MG |
232 | break; |
233 | } | |
234 | ||
235 | Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize); | |
236 | } | |
237 | if (IsFound) { | |
238 | break; | |
239 | } | |
240 | } | |
241 | ||
c16548d0 | 242 | dbsize -= CertList->SignatureListSize; |
3df68c18 MG |
243 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize); |
244 | } | |
245 | ||
3df68c18 | 246 | if (IsFound) |
c16548d0 MG |
247 | return DATA_FOUND; |
248 | ||
249 | return DATA_NOT_FOUND; | |
250 | } | |
251 | ||
20f6cde6 MG |
252 | /* |
253 | * Check a hash against an EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST in a UEFI variable | |
254 | */ | |
5f0a358b PJ |
255 | static CHECK_STATUS check_db_hash(CHAR16 *dbname, EFI_GUID guid, UINT8 *data, |
256 | int SignatureSize, EFI_GUID CertType) | |
257 | { | |
258 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; | |
259 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList; | |
5f0a358b | 260 | UINTN dbsize = 0; |
7f0208a0 | 261 | UINT8 *db; |
5f0a358b | 262 | |
7f0208a0 | 263 | efi_status = get_variable(dbname, &db, &dbsize, guid); |
f892ac66 | 264 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
5f0a358b PJ |
265 | return VAR_NOT_FOUND; |
266 | } | |
267 | ||
7f0208a0 | 268 | CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)db; |
5f0a358b PJ |
269 | |
270 | CHECK_STATUS rc = check_db_hash_in_ram(CertList, dbsize, data, | |
b6f94dbe MTL |
271 | SignatureSize, CertType, |
272 | dbname, guid); | |
5f0a358b PJ |
273 | FreePool(db); |
274 | return rc; | |
275 | ||
276 | } | |
277 | ||
20f6cde6 MG |
278 | /* |
279 | * Check whether the binary signature or hash are present in dbx or the | |
031e5cce | 280 | * built-in denylist |
20f6cde6 | 281 | */ |
031e5cce SM |
282 | static EFI_STATUS check_denylist (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *cert, |
283 | UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash) | |
c16548d0 | 284 | { |
031e5cce | 285 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *dbx = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)vendor_deauthorized; |
0a6565c5 | 286 | |
031e5cce | 287 | if (check_db_hash_in_ram(dbx, vendor_deauthorized_size, sha256hash, |
f892ac66 MTL |
288 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, L"dbx", |
289 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID) == DATA_FOUND) { | |
b6f94dbe | 290 | LogError(L"binary sha256hash found in vendor dbx\n"); |
f4173af1 | 291 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; |
b6f94dbe | 292 | } |
031e5cce | 293 | if (check_db_hash_in_ram(dbx, vendor_deauthorized_size, sha1hash, |
f892ac66 MTL |
294 | SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, L"dbx", |
295 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID) == DATA_FOUND) { | |
b6f94dbe | 296 | LogError(L"binary sha1hash found in vendor dbx\n"); |
f4173af1 | 297 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; |
b6f94dbe | 298 | } |
f892ac66 | 299 | if (cert && |
031e5cce | 300 | check_db_cert_in_ram(dbx, vendor_deauthorized_size, cert, sha256hash, L"dbx", |
f892ac66 | 301 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID) == DATA_FOUND) { |
b6f94dbe | 302 | LogError(L"cert sha256hash found in vendor dbx\n"); |
f4173af1 | 303 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; |
b6f94dbe | 304 | } |
f892ac66 MTL |
305 | if (check_db_hash(L"dbx", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID, sha256hash, |
306 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID) == DATA_FOUND) { | |
b6f94dbe | 307 | LogError(L"binary sha256hash found in system dbx\n"); |
f4173af1 | 308 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; |
b6f94dbe | 309 | } |
f892ac66 MTL |
310 | if (check_db_hash(L"dbx", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID, sha1hash, |
311 | SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID) == DATA_FOUND) { | |
b6f94dbe | 312 | LogError(L"binary sha1hash found in system dbx\n"); |
f4173af1 | 313 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; |
b6f94dbe | 314 | } |
f892ac66 MTL |
315 | if (cert && |
316 | check_db_cert(L"dbx", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID, | |
317 | cert, sha256hash) == DATA_FOUND) { | |
b6f94dbe | 318 | LogError(L"cert sha256hash found in system dbx\n"); |
f4173af1 | 319 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; |
b6f94dbe | 320 | } |
f892ac66 MTL |
321 | if (check_db_hash(L"MokListX", SHIM_LOCK_GUID, sha256hash, |
322 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID) == DATA_FOUND) { | |
b6f94dbe | 323 | LogError(L"binary sha256hash found in Mok dbx\n"); |
f4173af1 | 324 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; |
d3819813 | 325 | } |
f892ac66 MTL |
326 | if (cert && |
327 | check_db_cert(L"MokListX", SHIM_LOCK_GUID, | |
328 | cert, sha256hash) == DATA_FOUND) { | |
b6f94dbe | 329 | LogError(L"cert sha256hash found in Mok dbx\n"); |
f4173af1 | 330 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; |
d3819813 | 331 | } |
3df68c18 | 332 | |
b6f94dbe | 333 | drain_openssl_errors(); |
3df68c18 MG |
334 | return EFI_SUCCESS; |
335 | } | |
336 | ||
cbef697a PJ |
337 | static void update_verification_method(verification_method_t method) |
338 | { | |
339 | if (verification_method == VERIFIED_BY_NOTHING) | |
340 | verification_method = method; | |
341 | } | |
342 | ||
20f6cde6 MG |
343 | /* |
344 | * Check whether the binary signature or hash are present in db or MokList | |
345 | */ | |
031e5cce | 346 | static EFI_STATUS check_allowlist (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *cert, |
ce6a5748 | 347 | UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash) |
b2058cf8 | 348 | { |
47ebeb62 | 349 | if (!ignore_db) { |
f892ac66 | 350 | if (check_db_hash(L"db", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID, sha256hash, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, |
47ebeb62 JB |
351 | EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID) == DATA_FOUND) { |
352 | update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_HASH); | |
353 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
b6f94dbe MTL |
354 | } else { |
355 | LogError(L"check_db_hash(db, sha256hash) != DATA_FOUND\n"); | |
47ebeb62 | 356 | } |
f892ac66 | 357 | if (check_db_hash(L"db", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID, sha1hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, |
47ebeb62 JB |
358 | EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID) == DATA_FOUND) { |
359 | verification_method = VERIFIED_BY_HASH; | |
360 | update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_HASH); | |
361 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
b6f94dbe MTL |
362 | } else { |
363 | LogError(L"check_db_hash(db, sha1hash) != DATA_FOUND\n"); | |
47ebeb62 | 364 | } |
f892ac66 | 365 | if (cert && check_db_cert(L"db", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID, cert, sha256hash) |
8044a321 | 366 | == DATA_FOUND) { |
47ebeb62 JB |
367 | verification_method = VERIFIED_BY_CERT; |
368 | update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_CERT); | |
369 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
031e5cce | 370 | } else if (cert) { |
b6f94dbe | 371 | LogError(L"check_db_cert(db, sha256hash) != DATA_FOUND\n"); |
47ebeb62 | 372 | } |
cbef697a | 373 | } |
47ebeb62 | 374 | |
031e5cce SM |
375 | #if defined(VENDOR_DB_FILE) |
376 | EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *db = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)vendor_db; | |
377 | ||
378 | if (check_db_hash_in_ram(db, vendor_db_size, | |
379 | sha256hash, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, | |
380 | EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, L"vendor_db", | |
381 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID) == DATA_FOUND) { | |
382 | verification_method = VERIFIED_BY_HASH; | |
383 | update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_HASH); | |
384 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
385 | } else { | |
386 | LogError(L"check_db_hash(vendor_db, sha256hash) != DATA_FOUND\n"); | |
387 | } | |
388 | if (cert && | |
389 | check_db_cert_in_ram(db, vendor_db_size, | |
390 | cert, sha256hash, L"vendor_db", | |
391 | EFI_SECURE_BOOT_DB_GUID) == DATA_FOUND) { | |
392 | verification_method = VERIFIED_BY_CERT; | |
393 | update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_CERT); | |
394 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
395 | } else if (cert) { | |
396 | LogError(L"check_db_cert(vendor_db, sha256hash) != DATA_FOUND\n"); | |
397 | } | |
398 | #endif | |
399 | ||
f892ac66 MTL |
400 | if (check_db_hash(L"MokList", SHIM_LOCK_GUID, sha256hash, |
401 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID) | |
402 | == DATA_FOUND) { | |
cbef697a PJ |
403 | verification_method = VERIFIED_BY_HASH; |
404 | update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_HASH); | |
0a6565c5 | 405 | return EFI_SUCCESS; |
b6f94dbe MTL |
406 | } else { |
407 | LogError(L"check_db_hash(MokList, sha256hash) != DATA_FOUND\n"); | |
cbef697a | 408 | } |
f892ac66 MTL |
409 | if (cert && check_db_cert(L"MokList", SHIM_LOCK_GUID, cert, sha256hash) |
410 | == DATA_FOUND) { | |
cbef697a PJ |
411 | verification_method = VERIFIED_BY_CERT; |
412 | update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_CERT); | |
b2058cf8 | 413 | return EFI_SUCCESS; |
031e5cce | 414 | } else if (cert) { |
b6f94dbe | 415 | LogError(L"check_db_cert(MokList, sha256hash) != DATA_FOUND\n"); |
cbef697a | 416 | } |
b2058cf8 | 417 | |
cbef697a | 418 | update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_NOTHING); |
031e5cce | 419 | return EFI_NOT_FOUND; |
b2058cf8 MG |
420 | } |
421 | ||
6279b58e MG |
422 | /* |
423 | * Check whether we're in Secure Boot and user mode | |
424 | */ | |
031e5cce | 425 | BOOLEAN secure_mode (void) |
6279b58e | 426 | { |
d3819813 | 427 | static int first = 1; |
e60f1181 | 428 | if (user_insecure_mode) |
9eaadb0d MG |
429 | return FALSE; |
430 | ||
7a72592b | 431 | if (variable_is_secureboot() != 1) { |
8529e0f7 SM |
432 | if (verbose && !in_protocol && first) { |
433 | CHAR16 *title = L"Secure boot not enabled"; | |
434 | CHAR16 *message = L"Press any key to continue"; | |
435 | console_countdown(title, message, 5); | |
436 | } | |
d3819813 | 437 | first = 0; |
6b1f8796 PJ |
438 | return FALSE; |
439 | } | |
6279b58e | 440 | |
9ea3d9b4 PJ |
441 | /* If we /do/ have "SecureBoot", but /don't/ have "SetupMode", |
442 | * then the implementation is bad, but we assume that secure boot is | |
443 | * enabled according to the status of "SecureBoot". If we have both | |
444 | * of them, then "SetupMode" may tell us additional data, and we need | |
445 | * to consider it. | |
446 | */ | |
447 | if (variable_is_setupmode(0) == 1) { | |
8529e0f7 SM |
448 | if (verbose && !in_protocol && first) { |
449 | CHAR16 *title = L"Platform is in setup mode"; | |
450 | CHAR16 *message = L"Press any key to continue"; | |
451 | console_countdown(title, message, 5); | |
452 | } | |
031e5cce SM |
453 | first = 0; |
454 | return FALSE; | |
cbe21407 MG |
455 | } |
456 | ||
031e5cce SM |
457 | first = 0; |
458 | return TRUE; | |
b2fe1780 MG |
459 | } |
460 | ||
031e5cce SM |
461 | static EFI_STATUS |
462 | verify_one_signature(WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *sig, | |
463 | UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash) | |
b2fe1780 MG |
464 | { |
465 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; | |
7f055335 | 466 | |
20f6cde6 | 467 | /* |
031e5cce | 468 | * Ensure that the binary isn't forbidden |
20f6cde6 | 469 | */ |
031e5cce SM |
470 | drain_openssl_errors(); |
471 | efi_status = check_denylist(sig, sha256hash, sha1hash); | |
f892ac66 | 472 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
031e5cce SM |
473 | perror(L"Binary is forbidden: %r\n", efi_status); |
474 | PrintErrors(); | |
475 | ClearErrors(); | |
476 | crypterr(efi_status); | |
b2fe1780 MG |
477 | return efi_status; |
478 | } | |
479 | ||
20f6cde6 | 480 | /* |
031e5cce SM |
481 | * Check whether the binary is authorized in any of the firmware |
482 | * databases | |
20f6cde6 | 483 | */ |
031e5cce SM |
484 | drain_openssl_errors(); |
485 | efi_status = check_allowlist(sig, sha256hash, sha1hash); | |
486 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
487 | if (efi_status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { | |
488 | dprint(L"check_allowlist(): %r\n", efi_status); | |
489 | PrintErrors(); | |
490 | ClearErrors(); | |
491 | crypterr(efi_status); | |
492 | } | |
493 | } else { | |
494 | drain_openssl_errors(); | |
f892ac66 MTL |
495 | return efi_status; |
496 | } | |
7f055335 | 497 | |
031e5cce SM |
498 | efi_status = EFI_NOT_FOUND; |
499 | #if defined(ENABLE_SHIM_CERT) | |
500 | /* | |
501 | * Check against the shim build key | |
502 | */ | |
503 | drain_openssl_errors(); | |
504 | if (build_cert && build_cert_size) { | |
505 | dprint("verifying against shim cert\n"); | |
506 | } | |
507 | if (build_cert && build_cert_size && | |
508 | AuthenticodeVerify(sig->CertData, | |
509 | sig->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(sig->Hdr), | |
510 | build_cert, build_cert_size, sha256hash, | |
511 | SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) { | |
512 | dprint(L"AuthenticodeVerify(shim_cert) succeeded\n"); | |
513 | update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_CERT); | |
514 | tpm_measure_variable(L"Shim", SHIM_LOCK_GUID, | |
515 | build_cert_size, build_cert); | |
516 | efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS; | |
517 | drain_openssl_errors(); | |
518 | return efi_status; | |
519 | } else { | |
520 | dprint(L"AuthenticodeVerify(shim_cert) failed\n"); | |
521 | PrintErrors(); | |
522 | ClearErrors(); | |
523 | crypterr(EFI_NOT_FOUND); | |
7f055335 | 524 | } |
031e5cce | 525 | #endif /* defined(ENABLE_SHIM_CERT) */ |
7f055335 | 526 | |
031e5cce SM |
527 | #if defined(VENDOR_CERT_FILE) |
528 | /* | |
529 | * And finally, check against shim's built-in key | |
d3819813 | 530 | */ |
031e5cce SM |
531 | drain_openssl_errors(); |
532 | if (vendor_cert_size) { | |
533 | dprint("verifying against vendor_cert\n"); | |
534 | } | |
535 | if (vendor_cert_size && | |
536 | AuthenticodeVerify(sig->CertData, | |
537 | sig->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(sig->Hdr), | |
538 | vendor_cert, vendor_cert_size, | |
539 | sha256hash, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) { | |
540 | dprint(L"AuthenticodeVerify(vendor_cert) succeeded\n"); | |
541 | update_verification_method(VERIFIED_BY_CERT); | |
542 | tpm_measure_variable(L"Shim", SHIM_LOCK_GUID, | |
543 | vendor_cert_size, vendor_cert); | |
544 | efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS; | |
545 | drain_openssl_errors(); | |
546 | return efi_status; | |
547 | } else { | |
548 | dprint(L"AuthenticodeVerify(vendor_cert) failed\n"); | |
549 | PrintErrors(); | |
550 | ClearErrors(); | |
551 | crypterr(EFI_NOT_FOUND); | |
0e6b0195 | 552 | } |
031e5cce | 553 | #endif /* defined(VENDOR_CERT_FILE) */ |
0e6b0195 | 554 | |
031e5cce SM |
555 | return efi_status; |
556 | } | |
b2fe1780 | 557 | |
031e5cce SM |
558 | /* |
559 | * Check that the signature is valid and matches the binary | |
560 | */ | |
561 | EFI_STATUS | |
562 | verify_buffer (char *data, int datasize, | |
563 | PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context, | |
564 | UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash) | |
565 | { | |
566 | EFI_STATUS ret_efi_status; | |
567 | size_t size = datasize; | |
568 | size_t offset = 0; | |
569 | unsigned int i = 0; | |
d3819813 | 570 | |
031e5cce SM |
571 | if (datasize < 0) |
572 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; | |
d3819813 | 573 | |
d3819813 | 574 | /* |
031e5cce SM |
575 | * Clear OpenSSL's error log, because we get some DSO unimplemented |
576 | * errors during its intialization, and we don't want those to look | |
577 | * like they're the reason for validation failures. | |
d3819813 | 578 | */ |
031e5cce | 579 | drain_openssl_errors(); |
a16340e3 | 580 | |
031e5cce SM |
581 | ret_efi_status = generate_hash(data, datasize, context, sha256hash, sha1hash); |
582 | if (EFI_ERROR(ret_efi_status)) { | |
583 | dprint(L"generate_hash: %r\n", ret_efi_status); | |
584 | PrintErrors(); | |
585 | ClearErrors(); | |
586 | crypterr(ret_efi_status); | |
587 | return ret_efi_status; | |
588 | } | |
a16340e3 | 589 | |
20f6cde6 | 590 | /* |
031e5cce | 591 | * Ensure that the binary isn't forbidden by hash |
20f6cde6 | 592 | */ |
031e5cce SM |
593 | drain_openssl_errors(); |
594 | ret_efi_status = check_denylist(NULL, sha256hash, sha1hash); | |
595 | if (EFI_ERROR(ret_efi_status)) { | |
596 | // perror(L"Binary is forbidden\n"); | |
597 | // dprint(L"Binary is forbidden: %r\n", ret_efi_status); | |
598 | PrintErrors(); | |
599 | ClearErrors(); | |
600 | crypterr(ret_efi_status); | |
601 | return ret_efi_status; | |
602 | } | |
7de74e67 | 603 | |
031e5cce SM |
604 | /* |
605 | * Check whether the binary is authorized by hash in any of the | |
606 | * firmware databases | |
607 | */ | |
608 | drain_openssl_errors(); | |
609 | ret_efi_status = check_allowlist(NULL, sha256hash, sha1hash); | |
610 | if (EFI_ERROR(ret_efi_status)) { | |
611 | LogError(L"check_allowlist(): %r\n", ret_efi_status); | |
612 | dprint(L"check_allowlist: %r\n", ret_efi_status); | |
613 | if (ret_efi_status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { | |
614 | dprint(L"check_allowlist(): %r\n", ret_efi_status); | |
615 | PrintErrors(); | |
616 | ClearErrors(); | |
617 | crypterr(ret_efi_status); | |
618 | return ret_efi_status; | |
a16340e3 | 619 | } |
031e5cce SM |
620 | } else { |
621 | drain_openssl_errors(); | |
622 | return ret_efi_status; | |
623 | } | |
a16340e3 | 624 | |
031e5cce SM |
625 | if (context->SecDir->Size == 0) { |
626 | dprint(L"No signatures found\n"); | |
627 | return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; | |
628 | } | |
a16340e3 | 629 | |
031e5cce SM |
630 | if (context->SecDir->Size >= size) { |
631 | perror(L"Certificate Database size is too large\n"); | |
632 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; | |
633 | } | |
d3819813 | 634 | |
031e5cce SM |
635 | ret_efi_status = EFI_NOT_FOUND; |
636 | do { | |
637 | WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *sig = NULL; | |
638 | size_t sz; | |
d3819813 | 639 | |
031e5cce SM |
640 | sig = ImageAddress(data, size, |
641 | context->SecDir->VirtualAddress + offset); | |
642 | if (!sig) | |
643 | break; | |
62f0afa2 | 644 | |
031e5cce SM |
645 | sz = offset + offsetof(WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS, Hdr.dwLength) |
646 | + sizeof(sig->Hdr.dwLength); | |
647 | if (sz > context->SecDir->Size) { | |
648 | perror(L"Certificate size is too large for secruity database"); | |
649 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; | |
650 | } | |
b2fe1780 | 651 | |
031e5cce SM |
652 | sz = sig->Hdr.dwLength; |
653 | if (sz > context->SecDir->Size - offset) { | |
654 | perror(L"Certificate size is too large for secruity database"); | |
655 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; | |
62f0afa2 | 656 | } |
b2fe1780 | 657 | |
031e5cce SM |
658 | if (sz < sizeof(sig->Hdr)) { |
659 | perror(L"Certificate size is too small for certificate data"); | |
660 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; | |
661 | } | |
486bf03e | 662 | |
031e5cce SM |
663 | if (sig->Hdr.wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) { |
664 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; | |
486bf03e | 665 | |
031e5cce | 666 | dprint(L"Attempting to verify signature %d:\n", i++); |
b2fe1780 | 667 | |
031e5cce | 668 | efi_status = verify_one_signature(sig, sha256hash, sha1hash); |
5fe882ba | 669 | |
031e5cce SM |
670 | /* |
671 | * If we didn't get EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION from | |
672 | * checking the hashes above, then any dbx entries are | |
673 | * for a certificate, not this individual binary. | |
674 | * | |
675 | * So don't clobber successes with security violation | |
676 | * here; that just means it isn't a success. | |
677 | */ | |
678 | if (ret_efi_status != EFI_SUCCESS) | |
679 | ret_efi_status = efi_status; | |
680 | } else { | |
681 | perror(L"Unsupported certificate type %x\n", | |
682 | sig->Hdr.wCertificateType); | |
683 | } | |
684 | offset = ALIGN_VALUE(offset + sz, 8); | |
685 | } while (offset < context->SecDir->Size); | |
09e2c939 | 686 | |
031e5cce SM |
687 | if (ret_efi_status != EFI_SUCCESS) { |
688 | dprint(L"Binary is not authorized\n"); | |
689 | PrintErrors(); | |
690 | ClearErrors(); | |
691 | crypterr(EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION); | |
692 | ret_efi_status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; | |
0e6b0195 | 693 | } |
031e5cce SM |
694 | drain_openssl_errors(); |
695 | return ret_efi_status; | |
b2fe1780 MG |
696 | } |
697 | ||
6d6b0221 | 698 | static int |
8529e0f7 | 699 | is_removable_media_path(EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li) |
6d6b0221 | 700 | { |
6d6b0221 | 701 | unsigned int pathlen = 0; |
fe8527aa | 702 | CHAR16 *bootpath = NULL; |
fe8527aa | 703 | int ret = 0; |
6d6b0221 | 704 | |
2e7fc28d | 705 | bootpath = DevicePathToStr(li->FilePath); |
6d6b0221 PJ |
706 | |
707 | /* Check the beginning of the string and the end, to avoid | |
708 | * caring about which arch this is. */ | |
709 | /* I really don't know why, but sometimes bootpath gives us | |
710 | * L"\\EFI\\BOOT\\/BOOTX64.EFI". So just handle that here... | |
711 | */ | |
712 | if (StrnCaseCmp(bootpath, L"\\EFI\\BOOT\\BOOT", 14) && | |
d3819813 MTL |
713 | StrnCaseCmp(bootpath, L"\\EFI\\BOOT\\/BOOT", 15) && |
714 | StrnCaseCmp(bootpath, L"EFI\\BOOT\\BOOT", 13) && | |
715 | StrnCaseCmp(bootpath, L"EFI\\BOOT\\/BOOT", 14)) | |
fe8527aa | 716 | goto error; |
2e7fc28d | 717 | |
6d6b0221 PJ |
718 | pathlen = StrLen(bootpath); |
719 | if (pathlen < 5 || StrCaseCmp(bootpath + pathlen - 4, L".EFI")) | |
fe8527aa | 720 | goto error; |
6d6b0221 | 721 | |
8529e0f7 SM |
722 | ret = 1; |
723 | ||
724 | error: | |
725 | if (bootpath) | |
726 | FreePool(bootpath); | |
727 | ||
728 | return ret; | |
729 | } | |
730 | ||
731 | static int | |
732 | should_use_fallback(EFI_HANDLE image_handle) | |
733 | { | |
734 | EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li; | |
735 | EFI_FILE_IO_INTERFACE *fio = NULL; | |
736 | EFI_FILE *vh = NULL; | |
737 | EFI_FILE *fh = NULL; | |
738 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; | |
739 | int ret = 0; | |
740 | ||
741 | efi_status = BS->HandleProtocol(image_handle, &EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_GUID, | |
742 | (void **)&li); | |
743 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
744 | perror(L"Could not get image for boot" EFI_ARCH L".efi: %r\n", | |
745 | efi_status); | |
746 | return 0; | |
747 | } | |
748 | ||
749 | if (!is_removable_media_path(li)) | |
750 | goto error; | |
751 | ||
752 | efi_status = BS->HandleProtocol(li->DeviceHandle, &FileSystemProtocol, | |
753 | (void **) &fio); | |
f892ac66 MTL |
754 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
755 | perror(L"Could not get fio for li->DeviceHandle: %r\n", | |
756 | efi_status); | |
fe8527aa | 757 | goto error; |
c9d11306 | 758 | } |
e50cfe37 | 759 | |
f892ac66 MTL |
760 | efi_status = fio->OpenVolume(fio, &vh); |
761 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
762 | perror(L"Could not open fio volume: %r\n", efi_status); | |
fe8527aa | 763 | goto error; |
c9d11306 | 764 | } |
6d6b0221 | 765 | |
f892ac66 MTL |
766 | efi_status = vh->Open(vh, &fh, L"\\EFI\\BOOT" FALLBACK, |
767 | EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, 0); | |
768 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
b32a3ce1 PJ |
769 | /* Do not print the error here - this is an acceptable case |
770 | * for removable media, where we genuinely don't want | |
771 | * fallback.efi to exist. | |
f892ac66 MTL |
772 | * Print(L"Could not open \"\\EFI\\BOOT%s\": %r\n", FALLBACK, |
773 | * efi_status); | |
b32a3ce1 | 774 | */ |
fe8527aa | 775 | goto error; |
6d6b0221 | 776 | } |
6d6b0221 | 777 | |
fe8527aa GCPL |
778 | ret = 1; |
779 | error: | |
d3819813 | 780 | if (fh) |
f892ac66 | 781 | fh->Close(fh); |
d3819813 | 782 | if (vh) |
f892ac66 | 783 | vh->Close(vh); |
fe8527aa GCPL |
784 | |
785 | return ret; | |
6d6b0221 | 786 | } |
db54b0a4 | 787 | /* |
20f6cde6 | 788 | * Open the second stage bootloader and read it into a buffer |
db54b0a4 | 789 | */ |
822d089e GCPL |
790 | static EFI_STATUS load_image (EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li, void **data, |
791 | int *datasize, CHAR16 *PathName) | |
db54b0a4 | 792 | { |
db54b0a4 MG |
793 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; |
794 | EFI_HANDLE device; | |
795 | EFI_FILE_INFO *fileinfo = NULL; | |
796 | EFI_FILE_IO_INTERFACE *drive; | |
797 | EFI_FILE *root, *grub; | |
6eb1eca4 | 798 | UINTN buffersize = sizeof(EFI_FILE_INFO); |
db54b0a4 MG |
799 | |
800 | device = li->DeviceHandle; | |
f898777d | 801 | |
031e5cce | 802 | dprint(L"attempting to load %s\n", PathName); |
20f6cde6 MG |
803 | /* |
804 | * Open the device | |
805 | */ | |
8529e0f7 SM |
806 | efi_status = BS->HandleProtocol(device, &EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID, |
807 | (void **) &drive); | |
f892ac66 | 808 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
e50cfe37 | 809 | perror(L"Failed to find fs: %r\n", efi_status); |
0db1af8a MG |
810 | goto error; |
811 | } | |
f898777d | 812 | |
f892ac66 MTL |
813 | efi_status = drive->OpenVolume(drive, &root); |
814 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
e50cfe37 | 815 | perror(L"Failed to open fs: %r\n", efi_status); |
0db1af8a MG |
816 | goto error; |
817 | } | |
f898777d | 818 | |
20f6cde6 MG |
819 | /* |
820 | * And then open the file | |
821 | */ | |
f892ac66 MTL |
822 | efi_status = root->Open(root, &grub, PathName, EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, 0); |
823 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
e50cfe37 | 824 | perror(L"Failed to open %s - %r\n", PathName, efi_status); |
0db1af8a MG |
825 | goto error; |
826 | } | |
827 | ||
828 | fileinfo = AllocatePool(buffersize); | |
829 | ||
830 | if (!fileinfo) { | |
e50cfe37 | 831 | perror(L"Unable to allocate file info buffer\n"); |
0db1af8a MG |
832 | efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; |
833 | goto error; | |
f898777d MG |
834 | } |
835 | ||
20f6cde6 MG |
836 | /* |
837 | * Find out how big the file is in order to allocate the storage | |
838 | * buffer | |
839 | */ | |
f892ac66 MTL |
840 | efi_status = grub->GetInfo(grub, &EFI_FILE_INFO_GUID, &buffersize, |
841 | fileinfo); | |
f898777d | 842 | if (efi_status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { |
cbe21407 | 843 | FreePool(fileinfo); |
f898777d MG |
844 | fileinfo = AllocatePool(buffersize); |
845 | if (!fileinfo) { | |
e50cfe37 | 846 | perror(L"Unable to allocate file info buffer\n"); |
0db1af8a MG |
847 | efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; |
848 | goto error; | |
f898777d | 849 | } |
f892ac66 MTL |
850 | efi_status = grub->GetInfo(grub, &EFI_FILE_INFO_GUID, |
851 | &buffersize, fileinfo); | |
f898777d MG |
852 | } |
853 | ||
f892ac66 | 854 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
e50cfe37 | 855 | perror(L"Unable to get file info: %r\n", efi_status); |
0db1af8a | 856 | goto error; |
f898777d MG |
857 | } |
858 | ||
859 | buffersize = fileinfo->FileSize; | |
7db60bd8 | 860 | *data = AllocatePool(buffersize); |
7db60bd8 | 861 | if (!*data) { |
e50cfe37 | 862 | perror(L"Unable to allocate file buffer\n"); |
0db1af8a MG |
863 | efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; |
864 | goto error; | |
f898777d | 865 | } |
20f6cde6 MG |
866 | |
867 | /* | |
868 | * Perform the actual read | |
869 | */ | |
f892ac66 | 870 | efi_status = grub->Read(grub, &buffersize, *data); |
0db1af8a MG |
871 | if (efi_status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { |
872 | FreePool(*data); | |
873 | *data = AllocatePool(buffersize); | |
f892ac66 | 874 | efi_status = grub->Read(grub, &buffersize, *data); |
f898777d | 875 | } |
f892ac66 MTL |
876 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
877 | perror(L"Unexpected return from initial read: %r, buffersize %x\n", | |
878 | efi_status, buffersize); | |
0db1af8a | 879 | goto error; |
f898777d MG |
880 | } |
881 | ||
7db60bd8 | 882 | *datasize = buffersize; |
f898777d | 883 | |
cbe21407 MG |
884 | FreePool(fileinfo); |
885 | ||
f898777d | 886 | return EFI_SUCCESS; |
0db1af8a MG |
887 | error: |
888 | if (*data) { | |
889 | FreePool(*data); | |
890 | *data = NULL; | |
891 | } | |
6f161626 | 892 | |
0db1af8a MG |
893 | if (fileinfo) |
894 | FreePool(fileinfo); | |
895 | return efi_status; | |
f898777d MG |
896 | } |
897 | ||
20f6cde6 MG |
898 | /* |
899 | * Protocol entry point. If secure boot is enabled, verify that the provided | |
900 | * buffer is signed with a trusted key. | |
901 | */ | |
db54b0a4 | 902 | EFI_STATUS shim_verify (void *buffer, UINT32 size) |
f4b24734 | 903 | { |
f892ac66 | 904 | EFI_STATUS efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS; |
f4b24734 | 905 | PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT context; |
b6f94dbe MTL |
906 | UINT8 sha1hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; |
907 | UINT8 sha256hash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; | |
f4b24734 | 908 | |
f892ac66 MTL |
909 | if ((INT32)size < 0) |
910 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; | |
911 | ||
cbef697a | 912 | loader_is_participating = 1; |
e50cfe37 | 913 | in_protocol = 1; |
cbef697a | 914 | |
f892ac66 MTL |
915 | efi_status = read_header(buffer, size, &context); |
916 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) | |
d3819813 | 917 | goto done; |
6279b58e | 918 | |
f892ac66 MTL |
919 | efi_status = generate_hash(buffer, size, &context, |
920 | sha256hash, sha1hash); | |
921 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) | |
e50cfe37 | 922 | goto done; |
f4b24734 | 923 | |
f892ac66 MTL |
924 | /* Measure the binary into the TPM */ |
925 | #ifdef REQUIRE_TPM | |
926 | efi_status = | |
927 | #endif | |
031e5cce SM |
928 | tpm_log_pe((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)buffer, size, 0, NULL, |
929 | sha1hash, 4); | |
f892ac66 MTL |
930 | #ifdef REQUIRE_TPM |
931 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) | |
932 | goto done; | |
933 | #endif | |
934 | ||
935 | if (!secure_mode()) { | |
936 | efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS; | |
b6f94dbe | 937 | goto done; |
f892ac66 | 938 | } |
b6f94dbe | 939 | |
031e5cce SM |
940 | efi_status = verify_buffer(buffer, size, |
941 | &context, sha256hash, sha1hash); | |
e50cfe37 GCPL |
942 | done: |
943 | in_protocol = 0; | |
f892ac66 | 944 | return efi_status; |
e50cfe37 GCPL |
945 | } |
946 | ||
947 | static EFI_STATUS shim_hash (char *data, int datasize, | |
948 | PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context, | |
949 | UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash) | |
950 | { | |
f892ac66 MTL |
951 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; |
952 | ||
953 | if (datasize < 0) | |
954 | return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; | |
e50cfe37 GCPL |
955 | |
956 | in_protocol = 1; | |
f892ac66 MTL |
957 | efi_status = generate_hash(data, datasize, context, |
958 | sha256hash, sha1hash); | |
e50cfe37 GCPL |
959 | in_protocol = 0; |
960 | ||
f892ac66 | 961 | return efi_status; |
e50cfe37 GCPL |
962 | } |
963 | ||
964 | static EFI_STATUS shim_read_header(void *data, unsigned int datasize, | |
965 | PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context) | |
966 | { | |
f892ac66 | 967 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; |
e50cfe37 GCPL |
968 | |
969 | in_protocol = 1; | |
f892ac66 | 970 | efi_status = read_header(data, datasize, context); |
e50cfe37 | 971 | in_protocol = 0; |
f4b24734 | 972 | |
f892ac66 | 973 | return efi_status; |
f4b24734 MG |
974 | } |
975 | ||
031e5cce SM |
976 | VOID |
977 | restore_loaded_image(VOID) | |
978 | { | |
979 | if (shim_li->FilePath) | |
980 | FreePool(shim_li->FilePath); | |
981 | ||
982 | /* | |
983 | * Restore our original loaded image values | |
984 | */ | |
985 | CopyMem(shim_li, &shim_li_bak, sizeof(shim_li_bak)); | |
986 | } | |
987 | ||
20f6cde6 MG |
988 | /* |
989 | * Load and run an EFI executable | |
990 | */ | |
cec6a0a9 | 991 | EFI_STATUS start_image(EFI_HANDLE image_handle, CHAR16 *ImagePath) |
822d089e GCPL |
992 | { |
993 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; | |
f892ac66 MTL |
994 | EFI_IMAGE_ENTRY_POINT entry_point; |
995 | EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS alloc_address; | |
996 | UINTN alloc_pages; | |
1c595706 MG |
997 | CHAR16 *PathName = NULL; |
998 | void *sourcebuffer = NULL; | |
fbc486b5 | 999 | UINT64 sourcesize = 0; |
822d089e | 1000 | void *data = NULL; |
031e5cce | 1001 | int datasize = 0; |
822d089e | 1002 | |
20f6cde6 MG |
1003 | /* |
1004 | * We need to refer to the loaded image protocol on the running | |
1005 | * binary in order to find our path | |
1006 | */ | |
8529e0f7 SM |
1007 | efi_status = BS->HandleProtocol(image_handle, &EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_GUID, |
1008 | (void **)&shim_li); | |
f892ac66 | 1009 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
e50cfe37 | 1010 | perror(L"Unable to init protocol\n"); |
cec6a0a9 GCPL |
1011 | return efi_status; |
1012 | } | |
1013 | ||
20f6cde6 MG |
1014 | /* |
1015 | * Build a new path from the existing one plus the executable name | |
1016 | */ | |
031e5cce | 1017 | efi_status = generate_path_from_image_path(shim_li, ImagePath, &PathName); |
f892ac66 MTL |
1018 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
1019 | perror(L"Unable to generate path %s: %r\n", ImagePath, | |
1020 | efi_status); | |
cec6a0a9 GCPL |
1021 | goto done; |
1022 | } | |
1023 | ||
031e5cce | 1024 | if (findNetboot(shim_li->DeviceHandle)) { |
1c595706 | 1025 | efi_status = parseNetbootinfo(image_handle); |
f892ac66 | 1026 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
e50cfe37 | 1027 | perror(L"Netboot parsing failed: %r\n", efi_status); |
1c595706 MG |
1028 | return EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR; |
1029 | } | |
1030 | efi_status = FetchNetbootimage(image_handle, &sourcebuffer, | |
1031 | &sourcesize); | |
f892ac66 MTL |
1032 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
1033 | perror(L"Unable to fetch TFTP image: %r\n", | |
1034 | efi_status); | |
1c595706 MG |
1035 | return efi_status; |
1036 | } | |
1037 | data = sourcebuffer; | |
1038 | datasize = sourcesize; | |
031e5cce | 1039 | } else if (find_httpboot(shim_li->DeviceHandle)) { |
f892ac66 MTL |
1040 | efi_status = httpboot_fetch_buffer (image_handle, |
1041 | &sourcebuffer, | |
62f0afa2 | 1042 | &sourcesize); |
f892ac66 MTL |
1043 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
1044 | perror(L"Unable to fetch HTTP image: %r\n", | |
1045 | efi_status); | |
62f0afa2 MTL |
1046 | return efi_status; |
1047 | } | |
1048 | data = sourcebuffer; | |
1049 | datasize = sourcesize; | |
1c595706 | 1050 | } else { |
4ad234f1 MG |
1051 | /* |
1052 | * Read the new executable off disk | |
1053 | */ | |
031e5cce | 1054 | efi_status = load_image(shim_li, &data, &datasize, PathName); |
f892ac66 MTL |
1055 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
1056 | perror(L"Failed to load image %s: %r\n", | |
1057 | PathName, efi_status); | |
b6f94dbe MTL |
1058 | PrintErrors(); |
1059 | ClearErrors(); | |
1c595706 MG |
1060 | goto done; |
1061 | } | |
822d089e GCPL |
1062 | } |
1063 | ||
f892ac66 MTL |
1064 | if (datasize < 0) { |
1065 | efi_status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; | |
1066 | goto done; | |
1067 | } | |
1068 | ||
20f6cde6 MG |
1069 | /* |
1070 | * We need to modify the loaded image protocol entry before running | |
1071 | * the new binary, so back it up | |
1072 | */ | |
031e5cce SM |
1073 | CopyMem(&shim_li_bak, shim_li, sizeof(shim_li_bak)); |
1074 | ||
1075 | /* | |
1076 | * Update the loaded image with the second stage loader file path | |
1077 | */ | |
1078 | shim_li->FilePath = FileDevicePath(NULL, PathName); | |
1079 | if (!shim_li->FilePath) { | |
1080 | perror(L"Unable to update loaded image file path\n"); | |
1081 | efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; | |
1082 | goto restore; | |
1083 | } | |
822d089e | 1084 | |
20f6cde6 MG |
1085 | /* |
1086 | * Verify and, if appropriate, relocate and execute the executable | |
1087 | */ | |
031e5cce | 1088 | efi_status = handle_image(data, datasize, shim_li, &entry_point, |
f892ac66 MTL |
1089 | &alloc_address, &alloc_pages); |
1090 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
e50cfe37 | 1091 | perror(L"Failed to load image: %r\n", efi_status); |
b6f94dbe MTL |
1092 | PrintErrors(); |
1093 | ClearErrors(); | |
031e5cce | 1094 | goto restore; |
822d089e GCPL |
1095 | } |
1096 | ||
cbef697a PJ |
1097 | loader_is_participating = 0; |
1098 | ||
20f6cde6 MG |
1099 | /* |
1100 | * The binary is trusted and relocated. Run it | |
1101 | */ | |
f892ac66 | 1102 | efi_status = entry_point(image_handle, systab); |
822d089e | 1103 | |
031e5cce SM |
1104 | restore: |
1105 | restore_loaded_image(); | |
822d089e | 1106 | done: |
cbe21407 MG |
1107 | if (PathName) |
1108 | FreePool(PathName); | |
1109 | ||
1110 | if (data) | |
1111 | FreePool(data); | |
1112 | ||
822d089e GCPL |
1113 | return efi_status; |
1114 | } | |
1115 | ||
20f6cde6 MG |
1116 | /* |
1117 | * Load and run grub. If that fails because grub isn't trusted, load and | |
1118 | * run MokManager. | |
1119 | */ | |
db54b0a4 | 1120 | EFI_STATUS init_grub(EFI_HANDLE image_handle) |
b2fe1780 MG |
1121 | { |
1122 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; | |
d3819813 | 1123 | int use_fb = should_use_fallback(image_handle); |
f4b24734 | 1124 | |
d3819813 | 1125 | efi_status = start_image(image_handle, use_fb ? FALLBACK :second_stage); |
f4173af1 MTL |
1126 | if (efi_status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION || |
1127 | efi_status == EFI_ACCESS_DENIED) { | |
ef8c9962 | 1128 | efi_status = start_image(image_handle, MOK_MANAGER); |
f892ac66 MTL |
1129 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
1130 | console_print(L"start_image() returned %r\n", efi_status); | |
b6f94dbe | 1131 | msleep(2000000); |
d3819813 MTL |
1132 | return efi_status; |
1133 | } | |
1134 | ||
1135 | efi_status = start_image(image_handle, | |
1136 | use_fb ? FALLBACK : second_stage); | |
1137 | } | |
1138 | ||
8529e0f7 SM |
1139 | // If the filename is invalid, or the file does not exist, |
1140 | // just fallback to the default loader. | |
1141 | if (!use_fb && (efi_status == EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER || | |
1142 | efi_status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)) { | |
1143 | console_print( | |
1144 | L"start_image() returned %r, falling back to default loader\n", | |
1145 | efi_status); | |
b6f94dbe | 1146 | msleep(2000000); |
8529e0f7 SM |
1147 | load_options = NULL; |
1148 | load_options_size = 0; | |
1149 | efi_status = start_image(image_handle, DEFAULT_LOADER); | |
d3819813 MTL |
1150 | } |
1151 | ||
031e5cce | 1152 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
8529e0f7 SM |
1153 | console_print(L"start_image() returned %r\n", efi_status); |
1154 | msleep(2000000); | |
031e5cce SM |
1155 | } |
1156 | ||
8529e0f7 | 1157 | return efi_status; |
f4173af1 MTL |
1158 | } |
1159 | ||
09e2c939 GCPL |
1160 | /* |
1161 | * Check the load options to specify the second stage loader | |
1162 | */ | |
1163 | EFI_STATUS set_second_stage (EFI_HANDLE image_handle) | |
1164 | { | |
f892ac66 | 1165 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; |
f4173af1 | 1166 | EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li = NULL; |
8529e0f7 SM |
1167 | |
1168 | second_stage = DEFAULT_LOADER; | |
09e2c939 GCPL |
1169 | load_options = NULL; |
1170 | load_options_size = 0; | |
1171 | ||
8529e0f7 SM |
1172 | efi_status = BS->HandleProtocol(image_handle, &LoadedImageProtocol, |
1173 | (void **) &li); | |
f892ac66 MTL |
1174 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
1175 | perror (L"Failed to get load options: %r\n", efi_status); | |
1176 | return efi_status; | |
09e2c939 GCPL |
1177 | } |
1178 | ||
8529e0f7 | 1179 | #if defined(DISABLE_REMOVABLE_LOAD_OPTIONS) |
f892ac66 | 1180 | /* |
8529e0f7 SM |
1181 | * boot services build very strange load options, and we might misparse them, |
1182 | * causing boot failures on removable media. | |
f892ac66 | 1183 | */ |
8529e0f7 SM |
1184 | if (is_removable_media_path(li)) { |
1185 | dprint("Invoked from removable media path, ignoring boot options"); | |
f892ac66 | 1186 | return EFI_SUCCESS; |
031e5cce | 1187 | } |
8529e0f7 | 1188 | #endif |
031e5cce | 1189 | |
8529e0f7 SM |
1190 | efi_status = parse_load_options(li); |
1191 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
1192 | perror (L"Failed to get load options: %r\n", efi_status); | |
1193 | return efi_status; | |
09e2c939 GCPL |
1194 | } |
1195 | ||
1196 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
1197 | } | |
1198 | ||
b6f94dbe | 1199 | static void * |
031e5cce | 1200 | ossl_malloc(size_t num) |
b6f94dbe MTL |
1201 | { |
1202 | return AllocatePool(num); | |
1203 | } | |
1204 | ||
1205 | static void | |
031e5cce | 1206 | ossl_free(void *addr) |
b6f94dbe MTL |
1207 | { |
1208 | FreePool(addr); | |
1209 | } | |
1210 | ||
1211 | static void | |
1212 | init_openssl(void) | |
1213 | { | |
1214 | CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(ossl_malloc, NULL, ossl_free); | |
1215 | OPENSSL_init(); | |
1216 | CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(ossl_malloc, NULL, ossl_free); | |
1217 | ERR_load_ERR_strings(); | |
1218 | ERR_load_BN_strings(); | |
1219 | ERR_load_RSA_strings(); | |
1220 | ERR_load_DH_strings(); | |
1221 | ERR_load_EVP_strings(); | |
1222 | ERR_load_BUF_strings(); | |
1223 | ERR_load_OBJ_strings(); | |
1224 | ERR_load_PEM_strings(); | |
1225 | ERR_load_X509_strings(); | |
1226 | ERR_load_ASN1_strings(); | |
1227 | ERR_load_CONF_strings(); | |
1228 | ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(); | |
1229 | ERR_load_COMP_strings(); | |
1230 | ERR_load_BIO_strings(); | |
1231 | ERR_load_PKCS7_strings(); | |
1232 | ERR_load_X509V3_strings(); | |
1233 | ERR_load_PKCS12_strings(); | |
1234 | ERR_load_RAND_strings(); | |
1235 | ERR_load_DSO_strings(); | |
1236 | ERR_load_OCSP_strings(); | |
1237 | } | |
1238 | ||
cf90edff PJ |
1239 | static SHIM_LOCK shim_lock_interface; |
1240 | static EFI_HANDLE shim_lock_handle; | |
1241 | ||
1242 | EFI_STATUS | |
1243 | install_shim_protocols(void) | |
1244 | { | |
f892ac66 | 1245 | SHIM_LOCK *shim_lock; |
cf90edff | 1246 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; |
d3819813 | 1247 | |
f892ac66 MTL |
1248 | /* |
1249 | * Did another instance of shim earlier already install the | |
1250 | * protocol? If so, get rid of it. | |
1251 | * | |
1252 | * We have to uninstall shim's protocol here, because if we're | |
1253 | * On the fallback.efi path, then our call pathway is: | |
1254 | * | |
1255 | * shim->fallback->shim->grub | |
1256 | * ^ ^ ^ | |
1257 | * | | \- gets protocol #0 | |
1258 | * | \- installs its protocol (#1) | |
1259 | * \- installs its protocol (#0) | |
1260 | * and if we haven't removed this, then grub will get the *first* | |
1261 | * shim's protocol, but it'll get the second shim's systab | |
1262 | * replacements. So even though it will participate and verify | |
1263 | * the kernel, the systab never finds out. | |
1264 | */ | |
1265 | efi_status = LibLocateProtocol(&SHIM_LOCK_GUID, (VOID **)&shim_lock); | |
1266 | if (!EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) | |
1267 | uninstall_shim_protocols(); | |
d3819813 | 1268 | |
cf90edff PJ |
1269 | /* |
1270 | * Install the protocol | |
1271 | */ | |
8529e0f7 SM |
1272 | efi_status = BS->InstallProtocolInterface(&shim_lock_handle, |
1273 | &SHIM_LOCK_GUID, | |
1274 | EFI_NATIVE_INTERFACE, | |
1275 | &shim_lock_interface); | |
cf90edff PJ |
1276 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
1277 | console_error(L"Could not install security protocol", | |
1278 | efi_status); | |
1279 | return efi_status; | |
1280 | } | |
1281 | ||
f892ac66 MTL |
1282 | if (!secure_mode()) |
1283 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
1284 | ||
cf90edff PJ |
1285 | #if defined(OVERRIDE_SECURITY_POLICY) |
1286 | /* | |
1287 | * Install the security protocol hook | |
1288 | */ | |
1289 | security_policy_install(shim_verify); | |
1290 | #endif | |
1291 | ||
1292 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
1293 | } | |
1294 | ||
1295 | void | |
1296 | uninstall_shim_protocols(void) | |
db54b0a4 | 1297 | { |
f892ac66 MTL |
1298 | /* |
1299 | * If we're back here then clean everything up before exiting | |
1300 | */ | |
8529e0f7 SM |
1301 | BS->UninstallProtocolInterface(shim_lock_handle, &SHIM_LOCK_GUID, |
1302 | &shim_lock_interface); | |
d3819813 MTL |
1303 | |
1304 | if (!secure_mode()) | |
1305 | return; | |
1306 | ||
cf90edff PJ |
1307 | #if defined(OVERRIDE_SECURITY_POLICY) |
1308 | /* | |
1309 | * Clean up the security protocol hook | |
1310 | */ | |
1311 | security_policy_uninstall(); | |
1312 | #endif | |
cf90edff PJ |
1313 | } |
1314 | ||
d3819813 MTL |
1315 | EFI_STATUS |
1316 | shim_init(void) | |
1317 | { | |
031e5cce SM |
1318 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; |
1319 | ||
f892ac66 | 1320 | dprint(L"%a", shim_version); |
d3819813 MTL |
1321 | |
1322 | /* Set the second stage loader */ | |
031e5cce SM |
1323 | efi_status = set_second_stage(global_image_handle); |
1324 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
1325 | perror(L"set_second_stage() failed: %r\n", efi_status); | |
1326 | return efi_status; | |
1327 | } | |
d3819813 MTL |
1328 | |
1329 | if (secure_mode()) { | |
031e5cce | 1330 | if (vendor_authorized_size || vendor_deauthorized_size) { |
d3819813 MTL |
1331 | /* |
1332 | * If shim includes its own certificates then ensure | |
1333 | * that anything it boots has performed some | |
1334 | * validation of the next image. | |
1335 | */ | |
1336 | hook_system_services(systab); | |
1337 | loader_is_participating = 0; | |
1338 | } | |
1339 | ||
d3819813 | 1340 | } |
f892ac66 | 1341 | |
031e5cce SM |
1342 | hook_exit(systab); |
1343 | ||
1344 | efi_status = install_shim_protocols(); | |
1345 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) | |
1346 | perror(L"install_shim_protocols() failed: %r\n", efi_status); | |
1347 | ||
1348 | return efi_status; | |
d3819813 MTL |
1349 | } |
1350 | ||
1351 | void | |
1352 | shim_fini(void) | |
1353 | { | |
031e5cce SM |
1354 | if (secure_mode()) |
1355 | cleanup_sbat_var(&sbat_var); | |
1356 | ||
f892ac66 MTL |
1357 | /* |
1358 | * Remove our protocols | |
1359 | */ | |
1360 | uninstall_shim_protocols(); | |
1361 | ||
d3819813 | 1362 | if (secure_mode()) { |
d3819813 MTL |
1363 | |
1364 | /* | |
1365 | * Remove our hooks from system services. | |
1366 | */ | |
1367 | unhook_system_services(); | |
d3819813 MTL |
1368 | } |
1369 | ||
031e5cce SM |
1370 | unhook_exit(); |
1371 | ||
f892ac66 | 1372 | console_fini(); |
d3819813 MTL |
1373 | } |
1374 | ||
1375 | extern EFI_STATUS | |
1376 | efi_main(EFI_HANDLE passed_image_handle, EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *passed_systab); | |
1377 | ||
1378 | static void | |
1379 | __attribute__((__optimize__("0"))) | |
1380 | debug_hook(void) | |
1381 | { | |
d3819813 MTL |
1382 | UINT8 *data = NULL; |
1383 | UINTN dataSize = 0; | |
1384 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; | |
031e5cce | 1385 | register volatile UINTN x = 0; |
d3819813 MTL |
1386 | extern char _text, _data; |
1387 | ||
031e5cce SM |
1388 | const CHAR16 * const debug_var_name = |
1389 | #ifdef ENABLE_SHIM_DEVEL | |
1390 | L"SHIM_DEVEL_DEBUG"; | |
1391 | #else | |
1392 | L"SHIM_DEBUG"; | |
1393 | #endif | |
1394 | ||
d3819813 MTL |
1395 | if (x) |
1396 | return; | |
1397 | ||
031e5cce | 1398 | efi_status = get_variable(debug_var_name, &data, &dataSize, |
f892ac66 | 1399 | SHIM_LOCK_GUID); |
d3819813 MTL |
1400 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
1401 | return; | |
1402 | } | |
1403 | ||
f892ac66 MTL |
1404 | FreePool(data); |
1405 | ||
1406 | console_print(L"add-symbol-file "DEBUGDIR | |
1407 | L"shim" EFI_ARCH L".efi.debug 0x%08x -s .data 0x%08x\n", | |
1408 | &_text, &_data); | |
d3819813 | 1409 | |
f892ac66 | 1410 | console_print(L"Pausing for debugger attachment.\n"); |
031e5cce SM |
1411 | console_print(L"To disable this, remove the EFI variable %s-%g .\n", |
1412 | debug_var_name, &SHIM_LOCK_GUID); | |
d3819813 MTL |
1413 | x = 1; |
1414 | while (x++) { | |
1415 | /* Make this so it can't /totally/ DoS us. */ | |
1416 | #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__i686__) | |
1417 | if (x > 4294967294ULL) | |
1418 | break; | |
d3819813 MTL |
1419 | #elif defined(__aarch64__) |
1420 | if (x > 1000) | |
1421 | break; | |
d3819813 MTL |
1422 | #else |
1423 | if (x > 12000) | |
1424 | break; | |
d3819813 | 1425 | #endif |
8529e0f7 | 1426 | wait_for_debug(); |
d3819813 MTL |
1427 | } |
1428 | x = 1; | |
1429 | } | |
1430 | ||
031e5cce SM |
1431 | typedef enum { |
1432 | COLD_RESET, | |
1433 | EXIT_FAILURE, | |
1434 | EXIT_SUCCESS, // keep this one last | |
1435 | } devel_egress_action; | |
1436 | ||
1437 | void | |
1438 | devel_egress(devel_egress_action action UNUSED) | |
1439 | { | |
1440 | #ifdef ENABLE_SHIM_DEVEL | |
1441 | char *reasons[] = { | |
1442 | [COLD_RESET] = "reset", | |
1443 | [EXIT_FAILURE] = "exit", | |
1444 | }; | |
1445 | if (action == EXIT_SUCCESS) | |
1446 | return; | |
1447 | ||
1448 | console_print(L"Waiting to %a...", reasons[action]); | |
1449 | for (size_t sleepcount = 0; sleepcount < 10; sleepcount++) { | |
1450 | console_print(L"%d...", 10 - sleepcount); | |
1451 | msleep(1000000); | |
1452 | } | |
1453 | console_print(L"\ndoing %a\n", action); | |
1454 | ||
1455 | if (action == COLD_RESET) | |
8529e0f7 | 1456 | RT->ResetSystem(EfiResetCold, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, 0, NULL); |
031e5cce SM |
1457 | #endif |
1458 | } | |
1459 | ||
d3819813 MTL |
1460 | EFI_STATUS |
1461 | efi_main (EFI_HANDLE passed_image_handle, EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *passed_systab) | |
cf90edff | 1462 | { |
0a232ca9 | 1463 | EFI_STATUS efi_status; |
f4173af1 | 1464 | EFI_HANDLE image_handle; |
db54b0a4 | 1465 | |
cbef697a PJ |
1466 | verification_method = VERIFIED_BY_NOTHING; |
1467 | ||
031e5cce SM |
1468 | vendor_authorized_size = cert_table.vendor_authorized_size; |
1469 | vendor_authorized = (UINT8 *)&cert_table + cert_table.vendor_authorized_offset; | |
1470 | ||
1471 | vendor_deauthorized_size = cert_table.vendor_deauthorized_size; | |
1472 | vendor_deauthorized = (UINT8 *)&cert_table + cert_table.vendor_deauthorized_offset; | |
1473 | ||
1474 | #if defined(ENABLE_SHIM_CERT) | |
1475 | build_cert_size = sizeof(shim_cert); | |
1476 | build_cert = shim_cert; | |
1477 | #endif /* defined(ENABLE_SHIM_CERT) */ | |
1478 | ||
f892ac66 | 1479 | CHAR16 *msgs[] = { |
031e5cce SM |
1480 | L"import_mok_state() failed", |
1481 | L"shim_init() failed", | |
1482 | L"import of SBAT data failed", | |
1483 | L"SBAT self-check failed", | |
8119f718 | 1484 | SBAT_VAR_NAME L" UEFI variable setting failed", |
f892ac66 MTL |
1485 | NULL |
1486 | }; | |
031e5cce SM |
1487 | enum { |
1488 | IMPORT_MOK_STATE, | |
1489 | SHIM_INIT, | |
1490 | IMPORT_SBAT, | |
1491 | SBAT_SELF_CHECK, | |
1492 | SET_SBAT, | |
1493 | } msg = IMPORT_MOK_STATE; | |
a1f28635 | 1494 | |
20f6cde6 MG |
1495 | /* |
1496 | * Set up the shim lock protocol so that grub and MokManager can | |
1497 | * call back in and use shim functions | |
1498 | */ | |
db54b0a4 | 1499 | shim_lock_interface.Verify = shim_verify; |
e50cfe37 GCPL |
1500 | shim_lock_interface.Hash = shim_hash; |
1501 | shim_lock_interface.Context = shim_read_header; | |
db54b0a4 MG |
1502 | |
1503 | systab = passed_systab; | |
f4173af1 | 1504 | image_handle = global_image_handle = passed_image_handle; |
db54b0a4 | 1505 | |
20f6cde6 MG |
1506 | /* |
1507 | * Ensure that gnu-efi functions are available | |
1508 | */ | |
db54b0a4 | 1509 | InitializeLib(image_handle, systab); |
031e5cce | 1510 | setup_verbosity(); |
db54b0a4 | 1511 | |
031e5cce SM |
1512 | dprint(L"vendor_authorized:0x%08lx vendor_authorized_size:%lu\n", |
1513 | vendor_authorized, vendor_authorized_size); | |
1514 | dprint(L"vendor_deauthorized:0x%08lx vendor_deauthorized_size:%lu\n", | |
1515 | vendor_deauthorized, vendor_deauthorized_size); | |
b6f94dbe | 1516 | |
d3819813 MTL |
1517 | /* |
1518 | * if SHIM_DEBUG is set, wait for a debugger to attach. | |
1519 | */ | |
1520 | debug_hook(); | |
0fb089ee | 1521 | |
031e5cce SM |
1522 | efi_status = set_sbat_uefi_variable(); |
1523 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status) && secure_mode()) { | |
8119f718 | 1524 | perror(L"%s variable initialization failed\n", SBAT_VAR_NAME); |
031e5cce SM |
1525 | msg = SET_SBAT; |
1526 | goto die; | |
1527 | } else if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
8119f718 SM |
1528 | dprint(L"%s variable initialization failed: %r\n", |
1529 | SBAT_VAR_NAME, efi_status); | |
031e5cce SM |
1530 | } |
1531 | ||
1532 | if (secure_mode()) { | |
1533 | char *sbat_start = (char *)&_sbat; | |
1534 | char *sbat_end = (char *)&_esbat; | |
1535 | ||
1536 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbat_var); | |
1537 | efi_status = parse_sbat_var(&sbat_var); | |
1538 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
8119f718 SM |
1539 | perror(L"Parsing %s variable failed: %r\n", |
1540 | SBAT_VAR_NAME, efi_status); | |
031e5cce SM |
1541 | msg = IMPORT_SBAT; |
1542 | goto die; | |
1543 | } | |
1544 | ||
8119f718 | 1545 | efi_status = handle_sbat(sbat_start, sbat_end - sbat_start - 1); |
031e5cce SM |
1546 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { |
1547 | perror(L"Verifiying shim SBAT data failed: %r\n", | |
1548 | efi_status); | |
1549 | msg = SBAT_SELF_CHECK; | |
1550 | goto die; | |
1551 | } | |
8119f718 | 1552 | dprint(L"SBAT self-check succeeded\n"); |
031e5cce SM |
1553 | } |
1554 | ||
1555 | init_openssl(); | |
1556 | ||
d3819813 | 1557 | /* |
f892ac66 MTL |
1558 | * Before we do anything else, validate our non-volatile, |
1559 | * boot-services-only state variables are what we think they are. | |
d3819813 | 1560 | */ |
f892ac66 | 1561 | efi_status = import_mok_state(image_handle); |
8529e0f7 SM |
1562 | if (!secure_mode() && |
1563 | (efi_status == EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER || | |
1564 | efi_status == EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES)) { | |
031e5cce SM |
1565 | /* |
1566 | * Make copy failures fatal only if secure_mode is enabled, or | |
8529e0f7 SM |
1567 | * the error was anything else than EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER or |
1568 | * EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES. | |
031e5cce SM |
1569 | * There are non-secureboot firmware implementations that don't |
1570 | * reserve enough EFI variable memory to fit the variable. | |
1571 | */ | |
1572 | console_print(L"Importing MOK states has failed: %s: %r\n", | |
1573 | msgs[msg], efi_status); | |
1574 | console_print(L"Continuing boot since secure mode is disabled"); | |
1575 | } else if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
f892ac66 MTL |
1576 | die: |
1577 | console_print(L"Something has gone seriously wrong: %s: %r\n", | |
1578 | msgs[msg], efi_status); | |
031e5cce SM |
1579 | #if defined(ENABLE_SHIM_DEVEL) |
1580 | devel_egress(COLD_RESET); | |
1581 | #else | |
b6f94dbe | 1582 | msleep(5000000); |
8529e0f7 SM |
1583 | RT->ResetSystem(EfiResetShutdown, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, |
1584 | 0, NULL); | |
031e5cce | 1585 | #endif |
d3819813 | 1586 | } |
09e2c939 | 1587 | |
d3819813 MTL |
1588 | efi_status = shim_init(); |
1589 | if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) { | |
031e5cce | 1590 | msg = SHIM_INIT; |
f892ac66 | 1591 | goto die; |
d3819813 MTL |
1592 | } |
1593 | ||
20f6cde6 MG |
1594 | /* |
1595 | * Tell the user that we're in insecure mode if necessary | |
1596 | */ | |
e60f1181 | 1597 | if (user_insecure_mode) { |
f892ac66 | 1598 | console_print(L"Booting in insecure mode\n"); |
b6f94dbe | 1599 | msleep(2000000); |
9eaadb0d MG |
1600 | } |
1601 | ||
0283024e | 1602 | /* |
d3819813 | 1603 | * Hand over control to the second stage bootloader |
0283024e | 1604 | */ |
d3819813 | 1605 | efi_status = init_grub(image_handle); |
bc71a15e | 1606 | |
d3819813 | 1607 | shim_fini(); |
031e5cce | 1608 | devel_egress(EFI_ERROR(efi_status) ? EXIT_FAILURE : EXIT_SUCCESS); |
0a232ca9 | 1609 | return efi_status; |
b2fe1780 | 1610 | } |