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Commit | Line | Data |
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52ad194e | 1 | /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */ |
663996b3 | 2 | |
663996b3 MS |
3 | #include <errno.h> |
4 | #include <fcntl.h> | |
6300502b | 5 | #include <poll.h> |
8a584da2 | 6 | #include <sys/eventfd.h> |
e1f67bc7 | 7 | #include <sys/ioctl.h> |
5a920b42 | 8 | #include <sys/mman.h> |
6300502b | 9 | #include <sys/personality.h> |
663996b3 | 10 | #include <sys/prctl.h> |
8a584da2 | 11 | #include <sys/shm.h> |
8a584da2 | 12 | #include <sys/types.h> |
6300502b MP |
13 | #include <sys/un.h> |
14 | #include <unistd.h> | |
13d276d0 | 15 | #include <utmpx.h> |
663996b3 | 16 | |
f5e65279 | 17 | #if HAVE_PAM |
663996b3 MS |
18 | #include <security/pam_appl.h> |
19 | #endif | |
20 | ||
f5e65279 | 21 | #if HAVE_SELINUX |
60f067b4 JS |
22 | #include <selinux/selinux.h> |
23 | #endif | |
24 | ||
f5e65279 | 25 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
60f067b4 JS |
26 | #include <seccomp.h> |
27 | #endif | |
28 | ||
f5e65279 | 29 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR |
60f067b4 JS |
30 | #include <sys/apparmor.h> |
31 | #endif | |
32 | ||
86f210e9 | 33 | #include "sd-messages.h" |
6300502b MP |
34 | |
35 | #include "af-list.h" | |
db2df898 | 36 | #include "alloc-util.h" |
f5e65279 | 37 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR |
db2df898 MP |
38 | #include "apparmor-util.h" |
39 | #endif | |
6300502b MP |
40 | #include "async.h" |
41 | #include "barrier.h" | |
6300502b | 42 | #include "cap-list.h" |
db2df898 | 43 | #include "capability-util.h" |
f5e65279 | 44 | #include "chown-recursive.h" |
e1f67bc7 | 45 | #include "cgroup-setup.h" |
52ad194e | 46 | #include "cpu-set-util.h" |
663996b3 | 47 | #include "def.h" |
6e866b33 | 48 | #include "env-file.h" |
663996b3 | 49 | #include "env-util.h" |
60f067b4 | 50 | #include "errno-list.h" |
db2df898 | 51 | #include "execute.h" |
6300502b | 52 | #include "exit-status.h" |
db2df898 | 53 | #include "fd-util.h" |
2897b343 | 54 | #include "format-util.h" |
db2df898 MP |
55 | #include "fs-util.h" |
56 | #include "glob-util.h" | |
57 | #include "io-util.h" | |
6300502b | 58 | #include "ioprio.h" |
f5e65279 | 59 | #include "label.h" |
6300502b MP |
60 | #include "log.h" |
61 | #include "macro.h" | |
98393f85 | 62 | #include "manager.h" |
bb4f798a | 63 | #include "memory-util.h" |
e1f67bc7 | 64 | #include "missing_fs.h" |
6300502b MP |
65 | #include "mkdir.h" |
66 | #include "namespace.h" | |
db2df898 | 67 | #include "parse-util.h" |
6300502b | 68 | #include "path-util.h" |
e3bff60a | 69 | #include "process-util.h" |
db2df898 | 70 | #include "rlimit-util.h" |
6300502b | 71 | #include "rm-rf.h" |
f5e65279 | 72 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
db2df898 MP |
73 | #include "seccomp-util.h" |
74 | #endif | |
f5e65279 | 75 | #include "securebits-util.h" |
6300502b | 76 | #include "selinux-util.h" |
86f210e9 | 77 | #include "signal-util.h" |
6300502b | 78 | #include "smack-util.h" |
b012e921 | 79 | #include "socket-util.h" |
8a584da2 | 80 | #include "special.h" |
52ad194e | 81 | #include "stat-util.h" |
db2df898 MP |
82 | #include "string-table.h" |
83 | #include "string-util.h" | |
6300502b | 84 | #include "strv.h" |
db2df898 | 85 | #include "syslog-util.h" |
6300502b | 86 | #include "terminal-util.h" |
6e866b33 | 87 | #include "umask-util.h" |
6300502b | 88 | #include "unit.h" |
db2df898 | 89 | #include "user-util.h" |
6300502b | 90 | #include "utmp-wtmp.h" |
e3bff60a | 91 | |
663996b3 | 92 | #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC) |
14228c0d | 93 | #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC) |
663996b3 | 94 | |
60f067b4 JS |
95 | #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024) |
96 | ||
b012e921 | 97 | static int shift_fds(int fds[], size_t n_fds) { |
663996b3 MS |
98 | int start, restart_from; |
99 | ||
100 | if (n_fds <= 0) | |
101 | return 0; | |
102 | ||
103 | /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */ | |
104 | ||
105 | assert(fds); | |
106 | ||
107 | start = 0; | |
108 | for (;;) { | |
109 | int i; | |
110 | ||
111 | restart_from = -1; | |
112 | ||
113 | for (i = start; i < (int) n_fds; i++) { | |
114 | int nfd; | |
115 | ||
116 | /* Already at right index? */ | |
117 | if (fds[i] == i+3) | |
118 | continue; | |
119 | ||
6300502b MP |
120 | nfd = fcntl(fds[i], F_DUPFD, i + 3); |
121 | if (nfd < 0) | |
663996b3 MS |
122 | return -errno; |
123 | ||
60f067b4 | 124 | safe_close(fds[i]); |
663996b3 MS |
125 | fds[i] = nfd; |
126 | ||
127 | /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then | |
e735f4d4 | 128 | * let's remember that and try again from here */ |
663996b3 MS |
129 | if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0) |
130 | restart_from = i; | |
131 | } | |
132 | ||
133 | if (restart_from < 0) | |
134 | break; | |
135 | ||
136 | start = restart_from; | |
137 | } | |
138 | ||
139 | return 0; | |
140 | } | |
141 | ||
6e866b33 | 142 | static int flags_fds(const int fds[], size_t n_socket_fds, size_t n_storage_fds, bool nonblock) { |
b012e921 | 143 | size_t i, n_fds; |
663996b3 MS |
144 | int r; |
145 | ||
6e866b33 | 146 | n_fds = n_socket_fds + n_storage_fds; |
663996b3 MS |
147 | if (n_fds <= 0) |
148 | return 0; | |
149 | ||
150 | assert(fds); | |
151 | ||
81c58355 MB |
152 | /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags. |
153 | * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */ | |
663996b3 MS |
154 | |
155 | for (i = 0; i < n_fds; i++) { | |
156 | ||
81c58355 MB |
157 | if (i < n_socket_fds) { |
158 | r = fd_nonblock(fds[i], nonblock); | |
159 | if (r < 0) | |
160 | return r; | |
161 | } | |
663996b3 MS |
162 | |
163 | /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds, | |
164 | * since after all we want to pass these fds to our | |
165 | * children */ | |
166 | ||
6300502b MP |
167 | r = fd_cloexec(fds[i], false); |
168 | if (r < 0) | |
663996b3 MS |
169 | return r; |
170 | } | |
171 | ||
172 | return 0; | |
173 | } | |
174 | ||
4c89c718 | 175 | static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext *context) { |
663996b3 MS |
176 | assert(context); |
177 | ||
4c89c718 MP |
178 | if (context->stdio_as_fds) |
179 | return NULL; | |
180 | ||
663996b3 MS |
181 | if (context->tty_path) |
182 | return context->tty_path; | |
183 | ||
184 | return "/dev/console"; | |
185 | } | |
186 | ||
4c89c718 MP |
187 | static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *p) { |
188 | const char *path; | |
189 | ||
663996b3 MS |
190 | assert(context); |
191 | ||
4c89c718 | 192 | path = exec_context_tty_path(context); |
663996b3 | 193 | |
4c89c718 MP |
194 | if (context->tty_vhangup) { |
195 | if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0) | |
196 | (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p->stdin_fd); | |
197 | else if (path) | |
198 | (void) terminal_vhangup(path); | |
199 | } | |
200 | ||
201 | if (context->tty_reset) { | |
202 | if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0) | |
203 | (void) reset_terminal_fd(p->stdin_fd, true); | |
204 | else if (path) | |
205 | (void) reset_terminal(path); | |
206 | } | |
663996b3 | 207 | |
4c89c718 MP |
208 | if (context->tty_vt_disallocate && path) |
209 | (void) vt_disallocate(path); | |
663996b3 MS |
210 | } |
211 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
212 | static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i) { |
213 | return IN_SET(i, | |
214 | EXEC_INPUT_TTY, | |
215 | EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE, | |
216 | EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL); | |
217 | } | |
218 | ||
663996b3 | 219 | static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o) { |
8a584da2 MP |
220 | return IN_SET(o, |
221 | EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY, | |
222 | EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE, | |
223 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, | |
224 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE); | |
225 | } | |
226 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
227 | static bool is_syslog_output(ExecOutput o) { |
228 | return IN_SET(o, | |
229 | EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG, | |
230 | EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE); | |
231 | } | |
232 | ||
233 | static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o) { | |
234 | return IN_SET(o, | |
235 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, | |
236 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE); | |
237 | } | |
238 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
239 | static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext *c) { |
240 | assert(c); | |
241 | ||
242 | /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */ | |
243 | ||
244 | if (is_terminal_input(c->std_input)) | |
245 | return true; | |
246 | ||
247 | if (is_terminal_output(c->std_output)) | |
248 | return true; | |
249 | ||
250 | if (is_terminal_output(c->std_error)) | |
251 | return true; | |
252 | ||
253 | return !!c->tty_path; | |
663996b3 MS |
254 | } |
255 | ||
663996b3 | 256 | static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) { |
52ad194e | 257 | int fd; |
663996b3 MS |
258 | |
259 | assert(nfd >= 0); | |
260 | ||
60f067b4 JS |
261 | fd = open("/dev/null", flags|O_NOCTTY); |
262 | if (fd < 0) | |
663996b3 MS |
263 | return -errno; |
264 | ||
52ad194e | 265 | return move_fd(fd, nfd, false); |
663996b3 MS |
266 | } |
267 | ||
46cdbd49 BR |
268 | static int connect_journal_socket( |
269 | int fd, | |
270 | const char *log_namespace, | |
271 | uid_t uid, | |
272 | gid_t gid) { | |
273 | ||
274 | union sockaddr_union sa; | |
275 | socklen_t sa_len; | |
e735f4d4 MP |
276 | uid_t olduid = UID_INVALID; |
277 | gid_t oldgid = GID_INVALID; | |
46cdbd49 | 278 | const char *j; |
e735f4d4 MP |
279 | int r; |
280 | ||
46cdbd49 BR |
281 | j = log_namespace ? |
282 | strjoina("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace, "/stdout") : | |
283 | "/run/systemd/journal/stdout"; | |
284 | r = sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa.un, j); | |
285 | if (r < 0) | |
286 | return r; | |
287 | sa_len = r; | |
288 | ||
f5e65279 | 289 | if (gid_is_valid(gid)) { |
e735f4d4 MP |
290 | oldgid = getgid(); |
291 | ||
f5e65279 | 292 | if (setegid(gid) < 0) |
e735f4d4 MP |
293 | return -errno; |
294 | } | |
295 | ||
f5e65279 | 296 | if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { |
e735f4d4 MP |
297 | olduid = getuid(); |
298 | ||
f5e65279 | 299 | if (seteuid(uid) < 0) { |
e735f4d4 MP |
300 | r = -errno; |
301 | goto restore_gid; | |
302 | } | |
303 | } | |
304 | ||
46cdbd49 | 305 | r = connect(fd, &sa.sa, sa_len) < 0 ? -errno : 0; |
e735f4d4 MP |
306 | |
307 | /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely | |
308 | fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */ | |
309 | ||
f5e65279 | 310 | if (uid_is_valid(uid)) |
e735f4d4 MP |
311 | (void) seteuid(olduid); |
312 | ||
313 | restore_gid: | |
f5e65279 | 314 | if (gid_is_valid(gid)) |
e735f4d4 MP |
315 | (void) setegid(oldgid); |
316 | ||
317 | return r; | |
318 | } | |
319 | ||
5a920b42 | 320 | static int connect_logger_as( |
98393f85 | 321 | const Unit *unit, |
5a920b42 | 322 | const ExecContext *context, |
f5e65279 | 323 | const ExecParameters *params, |
5a920b42 MP |
324 | ExecOutput output, |
325 | const char *ident, | |
326 | int nfd, | |
327 | uid_t uid, | |
328 | gid_t gid) { | |
329 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
330 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; |
331 | int r; | |
663996b3 MS |
332 | |
333 | assert(context); | |
f5e65279 | 334 | assert(params); |
663996b3 MS |
335 | assert(output < _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX); |
336 | assert(ident); | |
337 | assert(nfd >= 0); | |
338 | ||
339 | fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); | |
340 | if (fd < 0) | |
341 | return -errno; | |
342 | ||
46cdbd49 | 343 | r = connect_journal_socket(fd, context->log_namespace, uid, gid); |
e735f4d4 MP |
344 | if (r < 0) |
345 | return r; | |
663996b3 | 346 | |
6e866b33 | 347 | if (shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) < 0) |
663996b3 | 348 | return -errno; |
663996b3 | 349 | |
5a920b42 | 350 | (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd, SNDBUF_SIZE); |
60f067b4 | 351 | |
6e866b33 | 352 | if (dprintf(fd, |
663996b3 MS |
353 | "%s\n" |
354 | "%s\n" | |
355 | "%i\n" | |
356 | "%i\n" | |
357 | "%i\n" | |
358 | "%i\n" | |
359 | "%i\n", | |
f5e65279 MB |
360 | context->syslog_identifier ?: ident, |
361 | params->flags & EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT ? unit->id : "", | |
663996b3 MS |
362 | context->syslog_priority, |
363 | !!context->syslog_level_prefix, | |
f5e65279 MB |
364 | is_syslog_output(output), |
365 | is_kmsg_output(output), | |
6e866b33 MB |
366 | is_terminal_output(output)) < 0) |
367 | return -errno; | |
663996b3 | 368 | |
6e866b33 | 369 | return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd), nfd, false); |
52ad194e | 370 | } |
6e866b33 | 371 | |
52ad194e MB |
372 | static int open_terminal_as(const char *path, int flags, int nfd) { |
373 | int fd; | |
5a920b42 | 374 | |
52ad194e MB |
375 | assert(path); |
376 | assert(nfd >= 0); | |
663996b3 | 377 | |
52ad194e MB |
378 | fd = open_terminal(path, flags | O_NOCTTY); |
379 | if (fd < 0) | |
380 | return fd; | |
381 | ||
382 | return move_fd(fd, nfd, false); | |
663996b3 | 383 | } |
52ad194e MB |
384 | |
385 | static int acquire_path(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) { | |
46cdbd49 BR |
386 | union sockaddr_union sa; |
387 | socklen_t sa_len; | |
6e866b33 | 388 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; |
46cdbd49 | 389 | int r; |
663996b3 MS |
390 | |
391 | assert(path); | |
663996b3 | 392 | |
52ad194e MB |
393 | if (IN_SET(flags & O_ACCMODE, O_WRONLY, O_RDWR)) |
394 | flags |= O_CREAT; | |
395 | ||
396 | fd = open(path, flags|O_NOCTTY, mode); | |
397 | if (fd >= 0) | |
6e866b33 | 398 | return TAKE_FD(fd); |
663996b3 | 399 | |
52ad194e MB |
400 | if (errno != ENXIO) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */ |
401 | return -errno; | |
52ad194e MB |
402 | |
403 | /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */ | |
404 | ||
46cdbd49 BR |
405 | r = sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa.un, path); |
406 | if (r < 0) | |
407 | return r == -EINVAL ? -ENXIO : r; | |
408 | sa_len = r; | |
409 | ||
52ad194e MB |
410 | fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); |
411 | if (fd < 0) | |
412 | return -errno; | |
413 | ||
46cdbd49 | 414 | if (connect(fd, &sa.sa, sa_len) < 0) |
52ad194e MB |
415 | return errno == EINVAL ? -ENXIO : -errno; /* Propagate initial error if we get EINVAL, i.e. we have |
416 | * indication that his wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */ | |
663996b3 | 417 | |
52ad194e MB |
418 | if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) |
419 | r = shutdown(fd, SHUT_WR); | |
420 | else if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY) | |
421 | r = shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD); | |
422 | else | |
46cdbd49 | 423 | r = 0; |
6e866b33 | 424 | if (r < 0) |
52ad194e | 425 | return -errno; |
52ad194e | 426 | |
6e866b33 | 427 | return TAKE_FD(fd); |
663996b3 MS |
428 | } |
429 | ||
52ad194e MB |
430 | static int fixup_input( |
431 | const ExecContext *context, | |
432 | int socket_fd, | |
433 | bool apply_tty_stdin) { | |
434 | ||
435 | ExecInput std_input; | |
436 | ||
437 | assert(context); | |
438 | ||
439 | std_input = context->std_input; | |
663996b3 MS |
440 | |
441 | if (is_terminal_input(std_input) && !apply_tty_stdin) | |
442 | return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; | |
443 | ||
444 | if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0) | |
445 | return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; | |
446 | ||
52ad194e MB |
447 | if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_DATA && context->stdin_data_size == 0) |
448 | return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; | |
449 | ||
663996b3 MS |
450 | return std_input; |
451 | } | |
452 | ||
453 | static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output, int socket_fd) { | |
454 | ||
455 | if (std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0) | |
456 | return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT; | |
457 | ||
458 | return std_output; | |
459 | } | |
460 | ||
db2df898 MP |
461 | static int setup_input( |
462 | const ExecContext *context, | |
463 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
8a584da2 | 464 | int socket_fd, |
f2dec872 | 465 | const int named_iofds[static 3]) { |
db2df898 | 466 | |
663996b3 MS |
467 | ExecInput i; |
468 | ||
469 | assert(context); | |
db2df898 | 470 | assert(params); |
f2dec872 | 471 | assert(named_iofds); |
db2df898 MP |
472 | |
473 | if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) { | |
474 | if (dup2(params->stdin_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) | |
475 | return -errno; | |
476 | ||
477 | /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */ | |
52ad194e MB |
478 | if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { |
479 | (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCSCTTY, context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE); | |
480 | (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO, true); | |
481 | } | |
db2df898 MP |
482 | |
483 | return STDIN_FILENO; | |
484 | } | |
663996b3 | 485 | |
52ad194e | 486 | i = fixup_input(context, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); |
663996b3 MS |
487 | |
488 | switch (i) { | |
489 | ||
490 | case EXEC_INPUT_NULL: | |
491 | return open_null_as(O_RDONLY, STDIN_FILENO); | |
492 | ||
493 | case EXEC_INPUT_TTY: | |
494 | case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE: | |
495 | case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL: { | |
52ad194e | 496 | int fd; |
663996b3 | 497 | |
4c89c718 | 498 | fd = acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context), |
98393f85 MB |
499 | i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL ? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY : |
500 | i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE ? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE : | |
501 | ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT, | |
5eef597e | 502 | USEC_INFINITY); |
60f067b4 | 503 | if (fd < 0) |
663996b3 MS |
504 | return fd; |
505 | ||
52ad194e | 506 | return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); |
663996b3 MS |
507 | } |
508 | ||
509 | case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET: | |
52ad194e MB |
510 | assert(socket_fd >= 0); |
511 | ||
663996b3 MS |
512 | return dup2(socket_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO; |
513 | ||
8a584da2 | 514 | case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD: |
52ad194e MB |
515 | assert(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] >= 0); |
516 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
517 | (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO], false); |
518 | return dup2(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO], STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO; | |
519 | ||
52ad194e MB |
520 | case EXEC_INPUT_DATA: { |
521 | int fd; | |
522 | ||
523 | fd = acquire_data_fd(context->stdin_data, context->stdin_data_size, 0); | |
524 | if (fd < 0) | |
525 | return fd; | |
526 | ||
527 | return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); | |
528 | } | |
529 | ||
530 | case EXEC_INPUT_FILE: { | |
531 | bool rw; | |
532 | int fd; | |
533 | ||
534 | assert(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); | |
535 | ||
536 | rw = (context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE && streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO])) || | |
537 | (context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE && streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO])); | |
538 | ||
539 | fd = acquire_path(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], rw ? O_RDWR : O_RDONLY, 0666 & ~context->umask); | |
540 | if (fd < 0) | |
541 | return fd; | |
542 | ||
543 | return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); | |
544 | } | |
545 | ||
663996b3 MS |
546 | default: |
547 | assert_not_reached("Unknown input type"); | |
548 | } | |
549 | } | |
550 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
551 | static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout( |
552 | const ExecContext *context, | |
553 | ExecOutput o, | |
554 | ExecOutput e) { | |
555 | ||
556 | assert(context); | |
557 | ||
558 | /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the | |
559 | * stderr fd */ | |
560 | ||
561 | if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) | |
562 | return true; | |
563 | if (e != o) | |
564 | return false; | |
565 | ||
566 | if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
567 | return streq_ptr(context->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO], context->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
568 | ||
569 | if (IN_SET(e, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND)) | |
570 | return streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
571 | ||
572 | return true; | |
573 | } | |
574 | ||
db2df898 | 575 | static int setup_output( |
98393f85 | 576 | const Unit *unit, |
db2df898 MP |
577 | const ExecContext *context, |
578 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
579 | int fileno, | |
580 | int socket_fd, | |
f2dec872 | 581 | const int named_iofds[static 3], |
db2df898 | 582 | const char *ident, |
5a920b42 MP |
583 | uid_t uid, |
584 | gid_t gid, | |
585 | dev_t *journal_stream_dev, | |
586 | ino_t *journal_stream_ino) { | |
db2df898 | 587 | |
663996b3 MS |
588 | ExecOutput o; |
589 | ExecInput i; | |
590 | int r; | |
591 | ||
e3bff60a | 592 | assert(unit); |
663996b3 | 593 | assert(context); |
db2df898 | 594 | assert(params); |
663996b3 | 595 | assert(ident); |
5a920b42 MP |
596 | assert(journal_stream_dev); |
597 | assert(journal_stream_ino); | |
663996b3 | 598 | |
db2df898 MP |
599 | if (fileno == STDOUT_FILENO && params->stdout_fd >= 0) { |
600 | ||
601 | if (dup2(params->stdout_fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) | |
602 | return -errno; | |
603 | ||
604 | return STDOUT_FILENO; | |
605 | } | |
606 | ||
607 | if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO && params->stderr_fd >= 0) { | |
608 | if (dup2(params->stderr_fd, STDERR_FILENO) < 0) | |
609 | return -errno; | |
610 | ||
611 | return STDERR_FILENO; | |
612 | } | |
613 | ||
52ad194e | 614 | i = fixup_input(context, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); |
663996b3 MS |
615 | o = fixup_output(context->std_output, socket_fd); |
616 | ||
617 | if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO) { | |
618 | ExecOutput e; | |
619 | e = fixup_output(context->std_error, socket_fd); | |
620 | ||
621 | /* This expects the input and output are already set up */ | |
622 | ||
623 | /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all | |
624 | * the way and are not on a tty */ | |
625 | if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT && | |
626 | o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT && | |
627 | i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && | |
628 | !is_terminal_input(context->std_input) && | |
629 | getppid () != 1) | |
630 | return fileno; | |
631 | ||
632 | /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */ | |
6e866b33 | 633 | if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context, o, e)) |
663996b3 MS |
634 | return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno; |
635 | ||
636 | o = e; | |
637 | ||
638 | } else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) { | |
639 | /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */ | |
640 | if (i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) | |
4c89c718 | 641 | return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno); |
663996b3 | 642 | |
52ad194e MB |
643 | /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */ |
644 | if (!IN_SET(i, EXEC_INPUT_NULL, EXEC_INPUT_DATA)) | |
663996b3 MS |
645 | return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno; |
646 | ||
647 | /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */ | |
648 | if (getppid() != 1) | |
649 | return fileno; | |
650 | ||
651 | /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */ | |
652 | return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); | |
653 | } | |
654 | ||
655 | switch (o) { | |
656 | ||
657 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL: | |
658 | return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); | |
659 | ||
660 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY: | |
661 | if (is_terminal_input(i)) | |
662 | return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno; | |
663 | ||
664 | /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */ | |
4c89c718 | 665 | return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno); |
663996b3 MS |
666 | |
667 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG: | |
668 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE: | |
669 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG: | |
670 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE: | |
671 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL: | |
672 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE: | |
f5e65279 | 673 | r = connect_logger_as(unit, context, params, o, ident, fileno, uid, gid); |
663996b3 | 674 | if (r < 0) { |
f5e65279 | 675 | log_unit_warning_errno(unit, r, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr"); |
663996b3 | 676 | r = open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); |
5a920b42 MP |
677 | } else { |
678 | struct stat st; | |
679 | ||
680 | /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed | |
681 | * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits | |
f5e65279 MB |
682 | * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not. |
683 | * | |
684 | * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data | |
685 | * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */ | |
5a920b42 | 686 | |
f5e65279 MB |
687 | if (fstat(fileno, &st) >= 0 && |
688 | (*journal_stream_ino == 0 || fileno == STDERR_FILENO)) { | |
5a920b42 MP |
689 | *journal_stream_dev = st.st_dev; |
690 | *journal_stream_ino = st.st_ino; | |
691 | } | |
663996b3 MS |
692 | } |
693 | return r; | |
694 | ||
695 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET: | |
696 | assert(socket_fd >= 0); | |
52ad194e | 697 | |
663996b3 MS |
698 | return dup2(socket_fd, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno; |
699 | ||
8a584da2 | 700 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD: |
52ad194e MB |
701 | assert(named_iofds[fileno] >= 0); |
702 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
703 | (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds[fileno], false); |
704 | return dup2(named_iofds[fileno], fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno; | |
705 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
706 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE: |
707 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND: { | |
52ad194e | 708 | bool rw; |
6e866b33 | 709 | int fd, flags; |
52ad194e MB |
710 | |
711 | assert(context->stdio_file[fileno]); | |
712 | ||
713 | rw = context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_FILE && | |
714 | streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[fileno], context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); | |
715 | ||
716 | if (rw) | |
717 | return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno; | |
718 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
719 | flags = O_WRONLY; |
720 | if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) | |
721 | flags |= O_APPEND; | |
722 | ||
723 | fd = acquire_path(context->stdio_file[fileno], flags, 0666 & ~context->umask); | |
52ad194e MB |
724 | if (fd < 0) |
725 | return fd; | |
726 | ||
6e866b33 | 727 | return move_fd(fd, fileno, 0); |
52ad194e MB |
728 | } |
729 | ||
663996b3 MS |
730 | default: |
731 | assert_not_reached("Unknown error type"); | |
732 | } | |
733 | } | |
734 | ||
735 | static int chown_terminal(int fd, uid_t uid) { | |
f2dec872 | 736 | int r; |
663996b3 MS |
737 | |
738 | assert(fd >= 0); | |
739 | ||
5a920b42 | 740 | /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */ |
f2dec872 BR |
741 | if (isatty(fd) < 1) { |
742 | if (IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, ENOTTY)) | |
743 | return 0; /* not a tty */ | |
663996b3 | 744 | |
663996b3 | 745 | return -errno; |
f2dec872 | 746 | } |
663996b3 | 747 | |
f2dec872 BR |
748 | /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */ |
749 | r = fchmod_and_chown(fd, TTY_MODE, uid, -1); | |
750 | if (r < 0) | |
751 | return r; | |
663996b3 | 752 | |
f2dec872 | 753 | return 1; |
663996b3 MS |
754 | } |
755 | ||
2897b343 | 756 | static int setup_confirm_stdio(const char *vc, int *_saved_stdin, int *_saved_stdout) { |
db2df898 MP |
757 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1, saved_stdin = -1, saved_stdout = -1; |
758 | int r; | |
663996b3 MS |
759 | |
760 | assert(_saved_stdin); | |
761 | assert(_saved_stdout); | |
762 | ||
763 | saved_stdin = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3); | |
764 | if (saved_stdin < 0) | |
765 | return -errno; | |
766 | ||
767 | saved_stdout = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3); | |
db2df898 MP |
768 | if (saved_stdout < 0) |
769 | return -errno; | |
663996b3 | 770 | |
98393f85 | 771 | fd = acquire_terminal(vc, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC); |
db2df898 MP |
772 | if (fd < 0) |
773 | return fd; | |
663996b3 MS |
774 | |
775 | r = chown_terminal(fd, getuid()); | |
776 | if (r < 0) | |
db2df898 | 777 | return r; |
663996b3 | 778 | |
db2df898 MP |
779 | r = reset_terminal_fd(fd, true); |
780 | if (r < 0) | |
781 | return r; | |
663996b3 | 782 | |
98393f85 | 783 | r = rearrange_stdio(fd, fd, STDERR_FILENO); |
db2df898 | 784 | fd = -1; |
98393f85 MB |
785 | if (r < 0) |
786 | return r; | |
663996b3 MS |
787 | |
788 | *_saved_stdin = saved_stdin; | |
789 | *_saved_stdout = saved_stdout; | |
790 | ||
db2df898 | 791 | saved_stdin = saved_stdout = -1; |
663996b3 | 792 | |
db2df898 | 793 | return 0; |
663996b3 MS |
794 | } |
795 | ||
2897b343 MP |
796 | static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err, int fd, const Unit *u) { |
797 | assert(err < 0); | |
798 | ||
799 | if (err == -ETIMEDOUT) | |
800 | dprintf(fd, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u->id); | |
801 | else { | |
802 | errno = -err; | |
803 | dprintf(fd, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u->id); | |
804 | } | |
805 | } | |
806 | ||
807 | static void write_confirm_error(int err, const char *vc, const Unit *u) { | |
60f067b4 | 808 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; |
663996b3 | 809 | |
2897b343 | 810 | assert(vc); |
663996b3 | 811 | |
2897b343 | 812 | fd = open_terminal(vc, O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC); |
663996b3 | 813 | if (fd < 0) |
2897b343 | 814 | return; |
663996b3 | 815 | |
2897b343 | 816 | write_confirm_error_fd(err, fd, u); |
663996b3 MS |
817 | } |
818 | ||
db2df898 | 819 | static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin, int *saved_stdout) { |
663996b3 MS |
820 | int r = 0; |
821 | ||
822 | assert(saved_stdin); | |
823 | assert(saved_stdout); | |
824 | ||
825 | release_terminal(); | |
826 | ||
827 | if (*saved_stdin >= 0) | |
828 | if (dup2(*saved_stdin, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) | |
829 | r = -errno; | |
830 | ||
831 | if (*saved_stdout >= 0) | |
832 | if (dup2(*saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) | |
833 | r = -errno; | |
834 | ||
db2df898 MP |
835 | *saved_stdin = safe_close(*saved_stdin); |
836 | *saved_stdout = safe_close(*saved_stdout); | |
663996b3 MS |
837 | |
838 | return r; | |
839 | } | |
840 | ||
2897b343 MP |
841 | enum { |
842 | CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE = -1, | |
843 | CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS = 0, | |
844 | CONFIRM_EXECUTE = 1, | |
845 | }; | |
846 | ||
847 | static int ask_for_confirmation(const char *vc, Unit *u, const char *cmdline) { | |
663996b3 | 848 | int saved_stdout = -1, saved_stdin = -1, r; |
2897b343 MP |
849 | _cleanup_free_ char *e = NULL; |
850 | char c; | |
663996b3 | 851 | |
2897b343 MP |
852 | /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */ |
853 | r = setup_confirm_stdio(vc, &saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); | |
854 | if (r < 0) { | |
855 | write_confirm_error(r, vc, u); | |
856 | return CONFIRM_EXECUTE; | |
857 | } | |
663996b3 | 858 | |
2897b343 MP |
859 | /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */ |
860 | if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u->manager)) { | |
861 | r = 1; | |
862 | goto restore_stdio; | |
863 | } | |
663996b3 | 864 | |
2897b343 MP |
865 | e = ellipsize(cmdline, 60, 100); |
866 | if (!e) { | |
867 | log_oom(); | |
868 | r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; | |
869 | goto restore_stdio; | |
870 | } | |
663996b3 | 871 | |
2897b343 MP |
872 | for (;;) { |
873 | r = ask_char(&c, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e); | |
874 | if (r < 0) { | |
875 | write_confirm_error_fd(r, STDOUT_FILENO, u); | |
876 | r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; | |
877 | goto restore_stdio; | |
878 | } | |
879 | ||
880 | switch (c) { | |
881 | case 'c': | |
882 | printf("Resuming normal execution.\n"); | |
883 | manager_disable_confirm_spawn(); | |
884 | r = 1; | |
885 | break; | |
886 | case 'D': | |
887 | unit_dump(u, stdout, " "); | |
888 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
889 | case 'f': | |
890 | printf("Failing execution.\n"); | |
891 | r = CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE; | |
892 | break; | |
893 | case 'h': | |
894 | printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n" | |
895 | " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n" | |
896 | " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n" | |
897 | " h - help\n" | |
898 | " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n" | |
899 | " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n" | |
900 | " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n" | |
901 | " y - yes, execute the command\n"); | |
902 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
903 | case 'i': | |
904 | printf(" Description: %s\n" | |
905 | " Unit: %s\n" | |
906 | " Command: %s\n", | |
907 | u->id, u->description, cmdline); | |
908 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
909 | case 'j': | |
910 | manager_dump_jobs(u->manager, stdout, " "); | |
911 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
912 | case 'n': | |
913 | /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */ | |
914 | printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n"); | |
915 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
916 | case 's': | |
917 | printf("Skipping execution.\n"); | |
918 | r = CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS; | |
919 | break; | |
920 | case 'y': | |
921 | r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; | |
922 | break; | |
923 | default: | |
924 | assert_not_reached("Unhandled choice"); | |
925 | } | |
926 | break; | |
927 | } | |
663996b3 | 928 | |
2897b343 MP |
929 | restore_stdio: |
930 | restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); | |
663996b3 MS |
931 | return r; |
932 | } | |
933 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
934 | static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext *c, const char **user, |
935 | uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid, | |
936 | const char **home, const char **shell) { | |
663996b3 | 937 | int r; |
8a584da2 | 938 | const char *name; |
663996b3 | 939 | |
8a584da2 | 940 | assert(c); |
663996b3 | 941 | |
8a584da2 MP |
942 | if (!c->user) |
943 | return 0; | |
944 | ||
945 | /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway | |
946 | * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */ | |
947 | ||
948 | name = c->user; | |
6e866b33 | 949 | r = get_user_creds(&name, uid, gid, home, shell, USER_CREDS_CLEAN); |
8a584da2 MP |
950 | if (r < 0) |
951 | return r; | |
663996b3 | 952 | |
8a584da2 MP |
953 | *user = name; |
954 | return 0; | |
955 | } | |
956 | ||
957 | static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext *c, const char **group, gid_t *gid) { | |
958 | int r; | |
959 | const char *name; | |
960 | ||
961 | assert(c); | |
962 | ||
963 | if (!c->group) | |
964 | return 0; | |
965 | ||
966 | name = c->group; | |
6e866b33 | 967 | r = get_group_creds(&name, gid, 0); |
8a584da2 MP |
968 | if (r < 0) |
969 | return r; | |
970 | ||
971 | *group = name; | |
972 | return 0; | |
973 | } | |
974 | ||
975 | static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext *c, const char *user, | |
976 | const char *group, gid_t gid, | |
977 | gid_t **supplementary_gids, int *ngids) { | |
978 | char **i; | |
979 | int r, k = 0; | |
980 | int ngroups_max; | |
981 | bool keep_groups = false; | |
982 | gid_t *groups = NULL; | |
983 | _cleanup_free_ gid_t *l_gids = NULL; | |
984 | ||
985 | assert(c); | |
986 | ||
987 | /* | |
988 | * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list. | |
989 | * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups | |
990 | * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary | |
991 | * groups of the caller. | |
992 | */ | |
993 | if (user && gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != 0) { | |
663996b3 | 994 | /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */ |
8a584da2 MP |
995 | if (initgroups(user, gid) < 0) |
996 | return -errno; | |
663996b3 | 997 | |
8a584da2 MP |
998 | keep_groups = true; |
999 | } | |
663996b3 | 1000 | |
f5e65279 | 1001 | if (strv_isempty(c->supplementary_groups)) |
8a584da2 MP |
1002 | return 0; |
1003 | ||
1004 | /* | |
1005 | * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to | |
1006 | * be positive, otherwise fail. | |
1007 | */ | |
1008 | errno = 0; | |
1009 | ngroups_max = (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX); | |
f2dec872 BR |
1010 | if (ngroups_max <= 0) |
1011 | return errno_or_else(EOPNOTSUPP); | |
663996b3 | 1012 | |
8a584da2 MP |
1013 | l_gids = new(gid_t, ngroups_max); |
1014 | if (!l_gids) | |
1015 | return -ENOMEM; | |
663996b3 | 1016 | |
8a584da2 MP |
1017 | if (keep_groups) { |
1018 | /* | |
1019 | * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we | |
1020 | * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0. | |
1021 | */ | |
1022 | k = ngroups_max; | |
1023 | if (getgrouplist(user, gid, l_gids, &k) < 0) | |
1024 | return -EINVAL; | |
1025 | } else | |
1026 | k = 0; | |
663996b3 | 1027 | |
8a584da2 MP |
1028 | STRV_FOREACH(i, c->supplementary_groups) { |
1029 | const char *g; | |
663996b3 | 1030 | |
8a584da2 MP |
1031 | if (k >= ngroups_max) |
1032 | return -E2BIG; | |
663996b3 | 1033 | |
8a584da2 | 1034 | g = *i; |
6e866b33 | 1035 | r = get_group_creds(&g, l_gids+k, 0); |
8a584da2 MP |
1036 | if (r < 0) |
1037 | return r; | |
663996b3 | 1038 | |
8a584da2 MP |
1039 | k++; |
1040 | } | |
663996b3 | 1041 | |
8a584da2 MP |
1042 | /* |
1043 | * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens | |
1044 | * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty. | |
1045 | */ | |
1046 | if (k == 0) { | |
1047 | *ngids = 0; | |
1048 | return 0; | |
1049 | } | |
663996b3 | 1050 | |
8a584da2 MP |
1051 | /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */ |
1052 | groups = memdup(l_gids, sizeof(gid_t) * k); | |
1053 | if (!groups) | |
1054 | return -ENOMEM; | |
663996b3 | 1055 | |
8a584da2 MP |
1056 | *supplementary_gids = groups; |
1057 | *ngids = k; | |
1058 | ||
1059 | groups = NULL; | |
663996b3 | 1060 | |
8a584da2 MP |
1061 | return 0; |
1062 | } | |
1063 | ||
98393f85 | 1064 | static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid, const gid_t *supplementary_gids, int ngids) { |
8a584da2 MP |
1065 | int r; |
1066 | ||
52ad194e MB |
1067 | /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */ |
1068 | if (ngids > 0) { | |
8a584da2 MP |
1069 | r = maybe_setgroups(ngids, supplementary_gids); |
1070 | if (r < 0) | |
1071 | return r; | |
1072 | } | |
1073 | ||
1074 | if (gid_is_valid(gid)) { | |
1075 | /* Then set our gids */ | |
1076 | if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0) | |
1077 | return -errno; | |
663996b3 MS |
1078 | } |
1079 | ||
1080 | return 0; | |
1081 | } | |
1082 | ||
1083 | static int enforce_user(const ExecContext *context, uid_t uid) { | |
663996b3 MS |
1084 | assert(context); |
1085 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
1086 | if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) |
1087 | return 0; | |
1088 | ||
aa27b158 | 1089 | /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the |
663996b3 MS |
1090 | * capabilities while doing so. */ |
1091 | ||
aa27b158 | 1092 | if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) { |
663996b3 MS |
1093 | |
1094 | /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but | |
1095 | * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our | |
1096 | * caps, while we drop privileges. */ | |
1097 | if (uid != 0) { | |
1098 | int sb = context->secure_bits | 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS; | |
1099 | ||
1100 | if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != sb) | |
1101 | if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, sb) < 0) | |
1102 | return -errno; | |
1103 | } | |
663996b3 MS |
1104 | } |
1105 | ||
aa27b158 | 1106 | /* Second step: actually set the uids */ |
663996b3 MS |
1107 | if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) |
1108 | return -errno; | |
1109 | ||
1110 | /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but | |
1111 | are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got | |
1112 | corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up | |
1113 | later. This is done outside of this call. */ | |
1114 | ||
1115 | return 0; | |
1116 | } | |
1117 | ||
f5e65279 | 1118 | #if HAVE_PAM |
663996b3 MS |
1119 | |
1120 | static int null_conv( | |
1121 | int num_msg, | |
1122 | const struct pam_message **msg, | |
1123 | struct pam_response **resp, | |
1124 | void *appdata_ptr) { | |
1125 | ||
1126 | /* We don't support conversations */ | |
1127 | ||
1128 | return PAM_CONV_ERR; | |
1129 | } | |
1130 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
1131 | #endif |
1132 | ||
663996b3 MS |
1133 | static int setup_pam( |
1134 | const char *name, | |
1135 | const char *user, | |
1136 | uid_t uid, | |
8a584da2 | 1137 | gid_t gid, |
663996b3 | 1138 | const char *tty, |
5a920b42 | 1139 | char ***env, |
46cdbd49 | 1140 | const int fds[], size_t n_fds) { |
663996b3 | 1141 | |
f5e65279 | 1142 | #if HAVE_PAM |
8a584da2 | 1143 | |
663996b3 MS |
1144 | static const struct pam_conv conv = { |
1145 | .conv = null_conv, | |
1146 | .appdata_ptr = NULL | |
1147 | }; | |
1148 | ||
6300502b | 1149 | _cleanup_(barrier_destroy) Barrier barrier = BARRIER_NULL; |
663996b3 | 1150 | pam_handle_t *handle = NULL; |
86f210e9 | 1151 | sigset_t old_ss; |
4c89c718 | 1152 | int pam_code = PAM_SUCCESS, r; |
5a920b42 | 1153 | char **nv, **e = NULL; |
663996b3 MS |
1154 | bool close_session = false; |
1155 | pid_t pam_pid = 0, parent_pid; | |
60f067b4 | 1156 | int flags = 0; |
663996b3 MS |
1157 | |
1158 | assert(name); | |
1159 | assert(user); | |
5a920b42 | 1160 | assert(env); |
663996b3 MS |
1161 | |
1162 | /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child | |
1163 | * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or | |
1164 | * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM | |
1165 | * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual | |
1166 | * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID | |
1167 | * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */ | |
1168 | ||
4c89c718 MP |
1169 | r = barrier_create(&barrier); |
1170 | if (r < 0) | |
6300502b MP |
1171 | goto fail; |
1172 | ||
e735f4d4 | 1173 | if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG) |
60f067b4 JS |
1174 | flags |= PAM_SILENT; |
1175 | ||
14228c0d MB |
1176 | pam_code = pam_start(name, user, &conv, &handle); |
1177 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) { | |
663996b3 MS |
1178 | handle = NULL; |
1179 | goto fail; | |
1180 | } | |
1181 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
1182 | if (!tty) { |
1183 | _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL; | |
1184 | ||
1185 | /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure | |
1186 | * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */ | |
1187 | ||
1188 | if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO, &q) >= 0) | |
1189 | tty = strjoina("/dev/", q); | |
1190 | } | |
1191 | ||
14228c0d MB |
1192 | if (tty) { |
1193 | pam_code = pam_set_item(handle, PAM_TTY, tty); | |
1194 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
663996b3 | 1195 | goto fail; |
14228c0d | 1196 | } |
663996b3 | 1197 | |
5a920b42 MP |
1198 | STRV_FOREACH(nv, *env) { |
1199 | pam_code = pam_putenv(handle, *nv); | |
1200 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
1201 | goto fail; | |
1202 | } | |
1203 | ||
60f067b4 | 1204 | pam_code = pam_acct_mgmt(handle, flags); |
14228c0d | 1205 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) |
663996b3 MS |
1206 | goto fail; |
1207 | ||
46cdbd49 BR |
1208 | pam_code = pam_setcred(handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | flags); |
1209 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
1210 | log_debug("pam_setcred() failed, ignoring: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code)); | |
1211 | ||
60f067b4 | 1212 | pam_code = pam_open_session(handle, flags); |
14228c0d | 1213 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) |
663996b3 MS |
1214 | goto fail; |
1215 | ||
1216 | close_session = true; | |
1217 | ||
14228c0d MB |
1218 | e = pam_getenvlist(handle); |
1219 | if (!e) { | |
663996b3 MS |
1220 | pam_code = PAM_BUF_ERR; |
1221 | goto fail; | |
1222 | } | |
1223 | ||
1224 | /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in | |
1225 | * the child */ | |
86f210e9 MP |
1226 | |
1227 | assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK, &old_ss, SIGTERM, -1) >= 0); | |
663996b3 | 1228 | |
f5e65279 | 1229 | parent_pid = getpid_cached(); |
663996b3 | 1230 | |
1d42b86d MB |
1231 | r = safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid); |
1232 | if (r < 0) | |
663996b3 | 1233 | goto fail; |
1d42b86d | 1234 | if (r == 0) { |
4c89c718 | 1235 | int sig, ret = EXIT_PAM; |
663996b3 MS |
1236 | |
1237 | /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on | |
1238 | * termination */ | |
6300502b | 1239 | barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_CHILD); |
663996b3 | 1240 | |
1d42b86d MB |
1241 | /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only those fds |
1242 | * are open here that have been opened by PAM. */ | |
1243 | (void) close_many(fds, n_fds); | |
663996b3 MS |
1244 | |
1245 | /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session | |
1246 | * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases. | |
1247 | * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads | |
1248 | * to fail to exit normally */ | |
8a584da2 MP |
1249 | |
1250 | r = maybe_setgroups(0, NULL); | |
1251 | if (r < 0) | |
1252 | log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m"); | |
1253 | if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0) | |
1254 | log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m"); | |
663996b3 | 1255 | if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) |
8a584da2 | 1256 | log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m"); |
663996b3 | 1257 | |
86f210e9 MP |
1258 | (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1); |
1259 | ||
663996b3 MS |
1260 | /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if |
1261 | * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel | |
1262 | * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged | |
1263 | * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic | |
1264 | * to do the rest for us. */ | |
1265 | if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) < 0) | |
1266 | goto child_finish; | |
1267 | ||
6300502b MP |
1268 | /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially |
1269 | * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit | |
2897b343 MP |
1270 | * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. |
1271 | * | |
1272 | * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore | |
1273 | * return failure here. */ | |
1274 | (void) barrier_place(&barrier); | |
6300502b | 1275 | |
2897b343 | 1276 | /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */ |
663996b3 | 1277 | if (getppid() == parent_pid) { |
86f210e9 MP |
1278 | sigset_t ss; |
1279 | ||
1280 | assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss) >= 0); | |
1281 | assert_se(sigaddset(&ss, SIGTERM) >= 0); | |
1282 | ||
663996b3 MS |
1283 | for (;;) { |
1284 | if (sigwait(&ss, &sig) < 0) { | |
1285 | if (errno == EINTR) | |
1286 | continue; | |
1287 | ||
1288 | goto child_finish; | |
1289 | } | |
1290 | ||
1291 | assert(sig == SIGTERM); | |
1292 | break; | |
1293 | } | |
1294 | } | |
1295 | ||
46cdbd49 BR |
1296 | pam_code = pam_setcred(handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED | flags); |
1297 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
1298 | goto child_finish; | |
1299 | ||
663996b3 | 1300 | /* If our parent died we'll end the session */ |
14228c0d | 1301 | if (getppid() != parent_pid) { |
60f067b4 | 1302 | pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags); |
14228c0d | 1303 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) |
663996b3 | 1304 | goto child_finish; |
14228c0d | 1305 | } |
663996b3 | 1306 | |
4c89c718 | 1307 | ret = 0; |
663996b3 MS |
1308 | |
1309 | child_finish: | |
60f067b4 | 1310 | pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags); |
4c89c718 | 1311 | _exit(ret); |
663996b3 MS |
1312 | } |
1313 | ||
6300502b MP |
1314 | barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_PARENT); |
1315 | ||
663996b3 MS |
1316 | /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the |
1317 | * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */ | |
1318 | handle = NULL; | |
1319 | ||
1320 | /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */ | |
86f210e9 | 1321 | assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_ss, NULL) >= 0); |
663996b3 MS |
1322 | |
1323 | /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules | |
1324 | * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */ | |
1325 | closelog(); | |
1326 | ||
6300502b MP |
1327 | /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for |
1328 | * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */ | |
1329 | if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier)) | |
1330 | log_error("PAM initialization failed"); | |
1331 | ||
b012e921 | 1332 | return strv_free_and_replace(*env, e); |
663996b3 MS |
1333 | |
1334 | fail: | |
60f067b4 JS |
1335 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
1336 | log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code)); | |
4c89c718 MP |
1337 | r = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */ |
1338 | } else | |
1339 | log_error_errno(r, "PAM failed: %m"); | |
663996b3 MS |
1340 | |
1341 | if (handle) { | |
1342 | if (close_session) | |
60f067b4 | 1343 | pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags); |
663996b3 | 1344 | |
60f067b4 | 1345 | pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags); |
663996b3 MS |
1346 | } |
1347 | ||
1348 | strv_free(e); | |
663996b3 MS |
1349 | closelog(); |
1350 | ||
4c89c718 | 1351 | return r; |
8a584da2 MP |
1352 | #else |
1353 | return 0; | |
663996b3 | 1354 | #endif |
8a584da2 | 1355 | } |
663996b3 MS |
1356 | |
1357 | static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) { | |
1358 | char process_name[11]; | |
1359 | const char *p; | |
1360 | size_t l; | |
1361 | ||
1362 | /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length | |
1363 | * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */ | |
1364 | ||
60f067b4 | 1365 | p = basename(path); |
663996b3 MS |
1366 | if (isempty(p)) { |
1367 | rename_process("(...)"); | |
1368 | return; | |
1369 | } | |
1370 | ||
1371 | l = strlen(p); | |
1372 | if (l > 8) { | |
1373 | /* The end of the process name is usually more | |
1374 | * interesting, since the first bit might just be | |
1375 | * "systemd-" */ | |
1376 | p = p + l - 8; | |
1377 | l = 8; | |
1378 | } | |
1379 | ||
1380 | process_name[0] = '('; | |
1381 | memcpy(process_name+1, p, l); | |
1382 | process_name[1+l] = ')'; | |
1383 | process_name[1+l+1] = 0; | |
1384 | ||
1385 | rename_process(process_name); | |
1386 | } | |
1387 | ||
2897b343 MP |
1388 | static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext *c) { |
1389 | assert(c); | |
1390 | ||
1391 | return c->address_families_whitelist || | |
1392 | !set_isempty(c->address_families); | |
1393 | } | |
1394 | ||
1395 | static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext *c) { | |
1396 | assert(c); | |
1397 | ||
1398 | return c->syscall_whitelist || | |
52ad194e | 1399 | !hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_filter); |
2897b343 MP |
1400 | } |
1401 | ||
1402 | static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) { | |
1403 | assert(c); | |
1404 | ||
1405 | if (c->no_new_privileges) | |
1406 | return true; | |
1407 | ||
1408 | if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */ | |
1409 | return false; | |
1410 | ||
1411 | /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */ | |
1412 | return context_has_address_families(c) || | |
1413 | c->memory_deny_write_execute || | |
1414 | c->restrict_realtime || | |
bb4f798a | 1415 | c->restrict_suid_sgid || |
2897b343 | 1416 | exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c) || |
46cdbd49 | 1417 | c->protect_clock || |
2897b343 MP |
1418 | c->protect_kernel_tunables || |
1419 | c->protect_kernel_modules || | |
e1f67bc7 | 1420 | c->protect_kernel_logs || |
2897b343 MP |
1421 | c->private_devices || |
1422 | context_has_syscall_filters(c) || | |
f5e65279 | 1423 | !set_isempty(c->syscall_archs) || |
bb4f798a MB |
1424 | c->lock_personality || |
1425 | c->protect_hostname; | |
2897b343 MP |
1426 | } |
1427 | ||
f5e65279 | 1428 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
60f067b4 | 1429 | |
8a584da2 MP |
1430 | static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit* u, const char* msg) { |
1431 | ||
1432 | if (is_seccomp_available()) | |
1433 | return false; | |
1434 | ||
8a584da2 | 1435 | log_unit_debug(u, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg); |
8a584da2 MP |
1436 | return true; |
1437 | } | |
1438 | ||
f5e65279 | 1439 | static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c, bool needs_ambient_hack) { |
2897b343 | 1440 | uint32_t negative_action, default_action, action; |
f5e65279 | 1441 | int r; |
663996b3 | 1442 | |
2897b343 | 1443 | assert(u); |
60f067b4 | 1444 | assert(c); |
663996b3 | 1445 | |
2897b343 | 1446 | if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c)) |
8a584da2 MP |
1447 | return 0; |
1448 | ||
2897b343 MP |
1449 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallFilter=")) |
1450 | return 0; | |
663996b3 | 1451 | |
f2dec872 | 1452 | negative_action = c->syscall_errno == 0 ? scmp_act_kill_process() : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno); |
663996b3 | 1453 | |
2897b343 MP |
1454 | if (c->syscall_whitelist) { |
1455 | default_action = negative_action; | |
1456 | action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; | |
60f067b4 | 1457 | } else { |
2897b343 MP |
1458 | default_action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; |
1459 | action = negative_action; | |
60f067b4 | 1460 | } |
663996b3 | 1461 | |
f5e65279 MB |
1462 | if (needs_ambient_hack) { |
1463 | r = seccomp_filter_set_add(c->syscall_filter, c->syscall_whitelist, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID); | |
1464 | if (r < 0) | |
1465 | return r; | |
1466 | } | |
1467 | ||
6e866b33 | 1468 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action, c->syscall_filter, action, false); |
60f067b4 JS |
1469 | } |
1470 | ||
2897b343 MP |
1471 | static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
1472 | assert(u); | |
60f067b4 JS |
1473 | assert(c); |
1474 | ||
2897b343 | 1475 | if (set_isempty(c->syscall_archs)) |
8a584da2 | 1476 | return 0; |
60f067b4 | 1477 | |
2897b343 MP |
1478 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallArchitectures=")) |
1479 | return 0; | |
60f067b4 | 1480 | |
2897b343 MP |
1481 | return seccomp_restrict_archs(c->syscall_archs); |
1482 | } | |
60f067b4 | 1483 | |
2897b343 MP |
1484 | static int apply_address_families(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { |
1485 | assert(u); | |
1486 | assert(c); | |
60f067b4 | 1487 | |
2897b343 MP |
1488 | if (!context_has_address_families(c)) |
1489 | return 0; | |
60f067b4 | 1490 | |
2897b343 MP |
1491 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictAddressFamilies=")) |
1492 | return 0; | |
60f067b4 | 1493 | |
2897b343 | 1494 | return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c->address_families, c->address_families_whitelist); |
663996b3 MS |
1495 | } |
1496 | ||
8a584da2 | 1497 | static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { |
2897b343 | 1498 | assert(u); |
5a920b42 MP |
1499 | assert(c); |
1500 | ||
2897b343 | 1501 | if (!c->memory_deny_write_execute) |
8a584da2 MP |
1502 | return 0; |
1503 | ||
2897b343 MP |
1504 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute=")) |
1505 | return 0; | |
5a920b42 | 1506 | |
2897b343 | 1507 | return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(); |
5a920b42 MP |
1508 | } |
1509 | ||
8a584da2 | 1510 | static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { |
2897b343 | 1511 | assert(u); |
5a920b42 MP |
1512 | assert(c); |
1513 | ||
2897b343 | 1514 | if (!c->restrict_realtime) |
8a584da2 MP |
1515 | return 0; |
1516 | ||
2897b343 MP |
1517 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictRealtime=")) |
1518 | return 0; | |
8a584da2 | 1519 | |
2897b343 | 1520 | return seccomp_restrict_realtime(); |
8a584da2 MP |
1521 | } |
1522 | ||
bb4f798a MB |
1523 | static int apply_restrict_suid_sgid(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { |
1524 | assert(u); | |
1525 | assert(c); | |
1526 | ||
1527 | if (!c->restrict_suid_sgid) | |
1528 | return 0; | |
1529 | ||
1530 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictSUIDSGID=")) | |
1531 | return 0; | |
1532 | ||
1533 | return seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid(); | |
1534 | } | |
1535 | ||
8a584da2 | 1536 | static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
2897b343 | 1537 | assert(u); |
8a584da2 MP |
1538 | assert(c); |
1539 | ||
1540 | /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but | |
1541 | * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */ | |
1542 | ||
2897b343 | 1543 | if (!c->protect_kernel_tunables) |
8a584da2 MP |
1544 | return 0; |
1545 | ||
2897b343 MP |
1546 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelTunables=")) |
1547 | return 0; | |
5a920b42 | 1548 | |
2897b343 | 1549 | return seccomp_protect_sysctl(); |
5a920b42 MP |
1550 | } |
1551 | ||
8a584da2 | 1552 | static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
2897b343 | 1553 | assert(u); |
8a584da2 MP |
1554 | assert(c); |
1555 | ||
1556 | /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */ | |
1557 | ||
2897b343 MP |
1558 | if (!c->protect_kernel_modules) |
1559 | return 0; | |
1560 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
1561 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelModules=")) |
1562 | return 0; | |
1563 | ||
6e866b33 | 1564 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); |
8a584da2 MP |
1565 | } |
1566 | ||
e1f67bc7 MB |
1567 | static int apply_protect_kernel_logs(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
1568 | assert(u); | |
1569 | assert(c); | |
1570 | ||
1571 | if (!c->protect_kernel_logs) | |
1572 | return 0; | |
1573 | ||
1574 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelLogs=")) | |
1575 | return 0; | |
1576 | ||
1577 | return seccomp_protect_syslog(); | |
1578 | } | |
1579 | ||
d0648cfe | 1580 | static int apply_protect_clock(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
46cdbd49 BR |
1581 | assert(u); |
1582 | assert(c); | |
1583 | ||
1584 | if (!c->protect_clock) | |
1585 | return 0; | |
1586 | ||
1587 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectClock=")) | |
1588 | return 0; | |
1589 | ||
1590 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); | |
1591 | } | |
1592 | ||
8a584da2 | 1593 | static int apply_private_devices(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
2897b343 | 1594 | assert(u); |
8a584da2 MP |
1595 | assert(c); |
1596 | ||
1597 | /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */ | |
1598 | ||
2897b343 MP |
1599 | if (!c->private_devices) |
1600 | return 0; | |
1601 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
1602 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "PrivateDevices=")) |
1603 | return 0; | |
1604 | ||
6e866b33 | 1605 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); |
2897b343 MP |
1606 | } |
1607 | ||
98393f85 | 1608 | static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { |
2897b343 MP |
1609 | assert(u); |
1610 | assert(c); | |
1611 | ||
1612 | if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c)) | |
1613 | return 0; | |
1614 | ||
1615 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictNamespaces=")) | |
1616 | return 0; | |
1617 | ||
1618 | return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c->restrict_namespaces); | |
8a584da2 MP |
1619 | } |
1620 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
1621 | static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { |
1622 | unsigned long personality; | |
1623 | int r; | |
1624 | ||
1625 | assert(u); | |
1626 | assert(c); | |
1627 | ||
1628 | if (!c->lock_personality) | |
1629 | return 0; | |
1630 | ||
1631 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "LockPersonality=")) | |
1632 | return 0; | |
1633 | ||
1634 | personality = c->personality; | |
1635 | ||
1636 | /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */ | |
1637 | if (personality == PERSONALITY_INVALID) { | |
1638 | ||
1639 | r = opinionated_personality(&personality); | |
1640 | if (r < 0) | |
1641 | return r; | |
1642 | } | |
1643 | ||
1644 | return seccomp_lock_personality(personality); | |
1645 | } | |
1646 | ||
60f067b4 JS |
1647 | #endif |
1648 | ||
d0648cfe | 1649 | static int apply_protect_hostname(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c, int *ret_exit_status) { |
d0648cfe MB |
1650 | assert(u); |
1651 | assert(c); | |
1652 | ||
1653 | if (!c->protect_hostname) | |
1654 | return 0; | |
1655 | ||
1656 | if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS)) { | |
1657 | if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS) < 0) { | |
1658 | if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno)) { | |
1659 | *ret_exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; | |
1660 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m"); | |
1661 | } | |
1662 | ||
1663 | log_unit_warning(u, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but UTS namespace setup is prohibited (container manager?), ignoring namespace setup."); | |
1664 | } | |
1665 | } else | |
1666 | log_unit_warning(u, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup."); | |
1667 | ||
1668 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP | |
20a6e51f MB |
1669 | int r; |
1670 | ||
d0648cfe MB |
1671 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectHostname=")) |
1672 | return 0; | |
1673 | ||
1674 | r = seccomp_protect_hostname(); | |
1675 | if (r < 0) { | |
1676 | *ret_exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
1677 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m"); | |
1678 | } | |
1679 | #endif | |
1680 | ||
1681 | return 0; | |
1682 | } | |
1683 | ||
7c20daf6 | 1684 | static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[static 4]) { |
14228c0d MB |
1685 | assert(idle_pipe); |
1686 | ||
6300502b MP |
1687 | idle_pipe[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe[1]); |
1688 | idle_pipe[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe[2]); | |
14228c0d MB |
1689 | |
1690 | if (idle_pipe[0] >= 0) { | |
1691 | int r; | |
1692 | ||
1693 | r = fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC); | |
1694 | ||
1695 | if (idle_pipe[3] >= 0 && r == 0 /* timeout */) { | |
6300502b MP |
1696 | ssize_t n; |
1697 | ||
14228c0d | 1698 | /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */ |
6300502b MP |
1699 | n = write(idle_pipe[3], "x", 1); |
1700 | if (n > 0) | |
e3bff60a | 1701 | /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */ |
e1f67bc7 | 1702 | (void) fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC); |
14228c0d MB |
1703 | } |
1704 | ||
6300502b | 1705 | idle_pipe[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe[0]); |
60f067b4 JS |
1706 | |
1707 | } | |
1708 | ||
6300502b | 1709 | idle_pipe[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe[3]); |
60f067b4 JS |
1710 | } |
1711 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
1712 | static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t); |
1713 | ||
60f067b4 | 1714 | static int build_environment( |
98393f85 | 1715 | const Unit *u, |
5eef597e | 1716 | const ExecContext *c, |
4c89c718 | 1717 | const ExecParameters *p, |
b012e921 | 1718 | size_t n_fds, |
60f067b4 JS |
1719 | const char *home, |
1720 | const char *username, | |
1721 | const char *shell, | |
5a920b42 MP |
1722 | dev_t journal_stream_dev, |
1723 | ino_t journal_stream_ino, | |
60f067b4 JS |
1724 | char ***ret) { |
1725 | ||
1726 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL; | |
6e866b33 | 1727 | ExecDirectoryType t; |
b012e921 | 1728 | size_t n_env = 0; |
60f067b4 | 1729 | char *x; |
14228c0d | 1730 | |
8a584da2 | 1731 | assert(u); |
60f067b4 | 1732 | assert(c); |
6e866b33 | 1733 | assert(p); |
60f067b4 JS |
1734 | assert(ret); |
1735 | ||
478ed938 MB |
1736 | #define N_ENV_VARS 15 |
1737 | our_env = new0(char*, N_ENV_VARS + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); | |
60f067b4 JS |
1738 | if (!our_env) |
1739 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1740 | ||
1741 | if (n_fds > 0) { | |
6300502b MP |
1742 | _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; |
1743 | ||
f5e65279 | 1744 | if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) |
60f067b4 JS |
1745 | return -ENOMEM; |
1746 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1747 | ||
b012e921 | 1748 | if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds) < 0) |
60f067b4 JS |
1749 | return -ENOMEM; |
1750 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
6300502b | 1751 | |
4c89c718 | 1752 | joined = strv_join(p->fd_names, ":"); |
6300502b MP |
1753 | if (!joined) |
1754 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1755 | ||
2897b343 | 1756 | x = strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined); |
6300502b MP |
1757 | if (!x) |
1758 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1759 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
60f067b4 JS |
1760 | } |
1761 | ||
8a584da2 | 1762 | if ((p->flags & EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG) && p->watchdog_usec > 0) { |
f5e65279 | 1763 | if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) |
60f067b4 JS |
1764 | return -ENOMEM; |
1765 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1766 | ||
4c89c718 | 1767 | if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT, p->watchdog_usec) < 0) |
60f067b4 JS |
1768 | return -ENOMEM; |
1769 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1770 | } | |
1771 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
1772 | /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic |
1773 | * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but | |
1774 | * check the database directly. */ | |
f5e65279 | 1775 | if (p->flags & EXEC_NSS_BYPASS_BUS) { |
8a584da2 MP |
1776 | x = strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1"); |
1777 | if (!x) | |
1778 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1779 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1780 | } | |
1781 | ||
60f067b4 | 1782 | if (home) { |
f2dec872 | 1783 | x = strjoin("HOME=", home); |
60f067b4 JS |
1784 | if (!x) |
1785 | return -ENOMEM; | |
bb4f798a MB |
1786 | |
1787 | path_simplify(x + 5, true); | |
60f067b4 JS |
1788 | our_env[n_env++] = x; |
1789 | } | |
1790 | ||
1791 | if (username) { | |
f2dec872 | 1792 | x = strjoin("LOGNAME=", username); |
60f067b4 JS |
1793 | if (!x) |
1794 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1795 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1796 | ||
f2dec872 | 1797 | x = strjoin("USER=", username); |
60f067b4 JS |
1798 | if (!x) |
1799 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1800 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1801 | } | |
1802 | ||
1803 | if (shell) { | |
f2dec872 | 1804 | x = strjoin("SHELL=", shell); |
60f067b4 JS |
1805 | if (!x) |
1806 | return -ENOMEM; | |
bb4f798a MB |
1807 | |
1808 | path_simplify(x + 6, true); | |
60f067b4 JS |
1809 | our_env[n_env++] = x; |
1810 | } | |
1811 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
1812 | if (!sd_id128_is_null(u->invocation_id)) { |
1813 | if (asprintf(&x, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u->invocation_id)) < 0) | |
1814 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1815 | ||
1816 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1817 | } | |
1818 | ||
1819 | if (exec_context_needs_term(c)) { | |
1820 | const char *tty_path, *term = NULL; | |
1821 | ||
1822 | tty_path = exec_context_tty_path(c); | |
60f067b4 | 1823 | |
20a6e51f MB |
1824 | /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try |
1825 | * to inherit the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the | |
1826 | * container manager passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */ | |
8a584da2 | 1827 | |
20a6e51f | 1828 | if (path_equal_ptr(tty_path, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1) |
8a584da2 | 1829 | term = getenv("TERM"); |
20a6e51f | 1830 | |
8a584da2 MP |
1831 | if (!term) |
1832 | term = default_term_for_tty(tty_path); | |
1833 | ||
f2dec872 | 1834 | x = strjoin("TERM=", term); |
60f067b4 JS |
1835 | if (!x) |
1836 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1837 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
14228c0d MB |
1838 | } |
1839 | ||
5a920b42 MP |
1840 | if (journal_stream_dev != 0 && journal_stream_ino != 0) { |
1841 | if (asprintf(&x, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT ":" INO_FMT, journal_stream_dev, journal_stream_ino) < 0) | |
1842 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1843 | ||
1844 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1845 | } | |
1846 | ||
46cdbd49 BR |
1847 | if (c->log_namespace) { |
1848 | x = strjoin("LOG_NAMESPACE=", c->log_namespace); | |
1849 | if (!x) | |
1850 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1851 | ||
1852 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1853 | } | |
1854 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
1855 | for (t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { |
1856 | _cleanup_free_ char *pre = NULL, *joined = NULL; | |
1857 | const char *n; | |
1858 | ||
1859 | if (!p->prefix[t]) | |
1860 | continue; | |
1861 | ||
1862 | if (strv_isempty(c->directories[t].paths)) | |
1863 | continue; | |
1864 | ||
1865 | n = exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t); | |
1866 | if (!n) | |
1867 | continue; | |
1868 | ||
1869 | pre = strjoin(p->prefix[t], "/"); | |
1870 | if (!pre) | |
1871 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1872 | ||
1873 | joined = strv_join_prefix(c->directories[t].paths, ":", pre); | |
1874 | if (!joined) | |
1875 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1876 | ||
1877 | x = strjoin(n, "=", joined); | |
1878 | if (!x) | |
1879 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1880 | ||
1881 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1882 | } | |
1883 | ||
60f067b4 | 1884 | our_env[n_env++] = NULL; |
478ed938 MB |
1885 | assert(n_env <= N_ENV_VARS + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); |
1886 | #undef N_ENV_VARS | |
60f067b4 | 1887 | |
b012e921 | 1888 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(our_env); |
60f067b4 JS |
1889 | |
1890 | return 0; | |
14228c0d MB |
1891 | } |
1892 | ||
db2df898 MP |
1893 | static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) { |
1894 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **pass_env = NULL; | |
1895 | size_t n_env = 0, n_bufsize = 0; | |
1896 | char **i; | |
1897 | ||
1898 | STRV_FOREACH(i, c->pass_environment) { | |
1899 | _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL; | |
1900 | char *v; | |
1901 | ||
1902 | v = getenv(*i); | |
1903 | if (!v) | |
1904 | continue; | |
2897b343 | 1905 | x = strjoin(*i, "=", v); |
db2df898 MP |
1906 | if (!x) |
1907 | return -ENOMEM; | |
f5e65279 | 1908 | |
db2df898 MP |
1909 | if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env, n_bufsize, n_env + 2)) |
1910 | return -ENOMEM; | |
f5e65279 | 1911 | |
b012e921 | 1912 | pass_env[n_env++] = TAKE_PTR(x); |
db2df898 | 1913 | pass_env[n_env] = NULL; |
db2df898 MP |
1914 | } |
1915 | ||
b012e921 | 1916 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(pass_env); |
8a584da2 MP |
1917 | |
1918 | return 0; | |
1919 | } | |
1920 | ||
1921 | static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace( | |
1922 | const ExecContext *context, | |
1923 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
1d42b86d | 1924 | const ExecRuntime *runtime) { |
8a584da2 MP |
1925 | |
1926 | assert(context); | |
1927 | assert(params); | |
1928 | ||
2897b343 MP |
1929 | if (context->root_image) |
1930 | return true; | |
1931 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
1932 | if (!strv_isempty(context->read_write_paths) || |
1933 | !strv_isempty(context->read_only_paths) || | |
1934 | !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_paths)) | |
1935 | return true; | |
1936 | ||
1d42b86d | 1937 | if (context->n_bind_mounts > 0) |
2897b343 MP |
1938 | return true; |
1939 | ||
98393f85 MB |
1940 | if (context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0) |
1941 | return true; | |
1942 | ||
bb4f798a | 1943 | if (!IN_SET(context->mount_flags, 0, MS_SHARED)) |
8a584da2 MP |
1944 | return true; |
1945 | ||
1946 | if (context->private_tmp && runtime && (runtime->tmp_dir || runtime->var_tmp_dir)) | |
1947 | return true; | |
1948 | ||
1949 | if (context->private_devices || | |
b012e921 | 1950 | context->private_mounts || |
8a584da2 MP |
1951 | context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO || |
1952 | context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO || | |
1953 | context->protect_kernel_tunables || | |
1954 | context->protect_kernel_modules || | |
e1f67bc7 | 1955 | context->protect_kernel_logs || |
8a584da2 MP |
1956 | context->protect_control_groups) |
1957 | return true; | |
1958 | ||
b012e921 MB |
1959 | if (context->root_directory) { |
1960 | ExecDirectoryType t; | |
1961 | ||
1962 | if (context->mount_apivfs) | |
1963 | return true; | |
1964 | ||
1965 | for (t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { | |
1966 | if (!params->prefix[t]) | |
1967 | continue; | |
1968 | ||
1969 | if (!strv_isempty(context->directories[t].paths)) | |
1970 | return true; | |
1971 | } | |
1972 | } | |
2897b343 | 1973 | |
1d42b86d MB |
1974 | if (context->dynamic_user && |
1975 | (!strv_isempty(context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE].paths) || | |
1976 | !strv_isempty(context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE].paths) || | |
1977 | !strv_isempty(context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS].paths))) | |
1978 | return true; | |
1979 | ||
46cdbd49 BR |
1980 | if (context->log_namespace) |
1981 | return true; | |
1982 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
1983 | return false; |
1984 | } | |
1985 | ||
46cdbd49 | 1986 | static int setup_private_users(uid_t ouid, gid_t ogid, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { |
8a584da2 MP |
1987 | _cleanup_free_ char *uid_map = NULL, *gid_map = NULL; |
1988 | _cleanup_close_pair_ int errno_pipe[2] = { -1, -1 }; | |
1989 | _cleanup_close_ int unshare_ready_fd = -1; | |
1990 | _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp) pid_t pid = 0; | |
1991 | uint64_t c = 1; | |
8a584da2 MP |
1992 | ssize_t n; |
1993 | int r; | |
1994 | ||
46cdbd49 BR |
1995 | /* Set up a user namespace and map the original UID/GID (IDs from before any user or group changes, i.e. |
1996 | * the IDs from the user or system manager(s)) to itself, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to | |
8a584da2 MP |
1997 | * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which |
1998 | * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process, | |
1999 | * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The | |
2000 | * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and | |
46cdbd49 BR |
2001 | * continues execution normally. |
2002 | * For unprivileged users (i.e. without capabilities), the root to root mapping is excluded. As such, it | |
2003 | * does not need CAP_SETUID to write the single line mapping to itself. */ | |
8a584da2 | 2004 | |
46cdbd49 BR |
2005 | /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETUID. */ |
2006 | if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETUID) && uid != ouid && uid_is_valid(uid)) | |
2897b343 | 2007 | r = asprintf(&uid_map, |
46cdbd49 | 2008 | UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n" /* Map $OUID → $OUID */ |
2897b343 | 2009 | UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */ |
46cdbd49 BR |
2010 | ouid, ouid, uid, uid); |
2011 | else | |
2012 | r = asprintf(&uid_map, | |
2013 | UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $OUID → $OUID */ | |
2014 | ouid, ouid); | |
8a584da2 | 2015 | |
46cdbd49 BR |
2016 | if (r < 0) |
2017 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2018 | ||
2019 | /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETGID. */ | |
2020 | if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETGID) && gid != ogid && gid_is_valid(gid)) | |
2897b343 | 2021 | r = asprintf(&gid_map, |
46cdbd49 | 2022 | GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n" /* Map $OGID → $OGID */ |
2897b343 | 2023 | GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */ |
46cdbd49 BR |
2024 | ogid, ogid, gid, gid); |
2025 | else | |
2026 | r = asprintf(&gid_map, | |
2027 | GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $OGID -> $OGID */ | |
2028 | ogid, ogid); | |
2029 | ||
2030 | if (r < 0) | |
2031 | return -ENOMEM; | |
8a584da2 MP |
2032 | |
2033 | /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user | |
2034 | * namespace. */ | |
2035 | unshare_ready_fd = eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC); | |
2036 | if (unshare_ready_fd < 0) | |
2037 | return -errno; | |
2038 | ||
2039 | /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it | |
2040 | * failed. */ | |
2041 | if (pipe2(errno_pipe, O_CLOEXEC) < 0) | |
2042 | return -errno; | |
2043 | ||
1d42b86d MB |
2044 | r = safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS|FORK_DEATHSIG, &pid); |
2045 | if (r < 0) | |
2046 | return r; | |
2047 | if (r == 0) { | |
8a584da2 MP |
2048 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; |
2049 | const char *a; | |
2050 | pid_t ppid; | |
2051 | ||
2052 | /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from | |
2053 | * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */ | |
2054 | ||
2055 | ppid = getppid(); | |
2056 | errno_pipe[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe[0]); | |
2057 | ||
2058 | /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */ | |
2059 | if (read(unshare_ready_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) < 0) { | |
2060 | r = -errno; | |
2061 | goto child_fail; | |
2062 | } | |
2063 | ||
2064 | /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */ | |
2065 | a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "setgroups"); | |
2066 | fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); | |
2067 | if (fd < 0) { | |
2068 | if (errno != ENOENT) { | |
2069 | r = -errno; | |
2070 | goto child_fail; | |
2071 | } | |
2072 | ||
2073 | /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */ | |
2074 | } else { | |
2075 | if (write(fd, "deny\n", 5) < 0) { | |
2076 | r = -errno; | |
2077 | goto child_fail; | |
2078 | } | |
2079 | ||
2080 | fd = safe_close(fd); | |
2081 | } | |
2082 | ||
2083 | /* First write the GID map */ | |
2084 | a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "gid_map"); | |
2085 | fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); | |
2086 | if (fd < 0) { | |
2087 | r = -errno; | |
2088 | goto child_fail; | |
2089 | } | |
2090 | if (write(fd, gid_map, strlen(gid_map)) < 0) { | |
2091 | r = -errno; | |
2092 | goto child_fail; | |
2093 | } | |
2094 | fd = safe_close(fd); | |
2095 | ||
2096 | /* The write the UID map */ | |
2097 | a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "uid_map"); | |
2098 | fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); | |
2099 | if (fd < 0) { | |
2100 | r = -errno; | |
2101 | goto child_fail; | |
2102 | } | |
2103 | if (write(fd, uid_map, strlen(uid_map)) < 0) { | |
2104 | r = -errno; | |
2105 | goto child_fail; | |
2106 | } | |
2107 | ||
2108 | _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); | |
2109 | ||
2110 | child_fail: | |
2111 | (void) write(errno_pipe[1], &r, sizeof(r)); | |
2112 | _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); | |
2113 | } | |
2114 | ||
2115 | errno_pipe[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe[1]); | |
2116 | ||
2117 | if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) < 0) | |
2118 | return -errno; | |
2119 | ||
2120 | /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */ | |
2121 | if (write(unshare_ready_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) < 0) | |
2122 | return -errno; | |
2123 | ||
2124 | /* Try to read an error code from the child */ | |
2125 | n = read(errno_pipe[0], &r, sizeof(r)); | |
2126 | if (n < 0) | |
2127 | return -errno; | |
2128 | if (n == sizeof(r)) { /* an error code was sent to us */ | |
2129 | if (r < 0) | |
2130 | return r; | |
2131 | return -EIO; | |
2132 | } | |
2133 | if (n != 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */ | |
2134 | return -EIO; | |
2135 | ||
1d42b86d MB |
2136 | r = wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", pid, 0); |
2137 | pid = 0; | |
8a584da2 MP |
2138 | if (r < 0) |
2139 | return r; | |
1d42b86d | 2140 | if (r != EXIT_SUCCESS) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */ |
8a584da2 MP |
2141 | return -EIO; |
2142 | ||
2143 | return 0; | |
2144 | } | |
2145 | ||
812752cc MB |
2146 | static bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext *context, ExecDirectoryType type) { |
2147 | if (!context->dynamic_user) | |
2148 | return false; | |
2149 | ||
2150 | if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) | |
2151 | return false; | |
2152 | ||
2153 | if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME && context->runtime_directory_preserve_mode == EXEC_PRESERVE_NO) | |
2154 | return false; | |
2155 | ||
2156 | return true; | |
2157 | } | |
2158 | ||
f5e65279 | 2159 | static int setup_exec_directory( |
8a584da2 MP |
2160 | const ExecContext *context, |
2161 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
2162 | uid_t uid, | |
f5e65279 MB |
2163 | gid_t gid, |
2164 | ExecDirectoryType type, | |
2165 | int *exit_status) { | |
8a584da2 | 2166 | |
f5e65279 MB |
2167 | static const int exit_status_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { |
2168 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY, | |
2169 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY, | |
2170 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY, | |
2171 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY, | |
2172 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY, | |
2173 | }; | |
8a584da2 MP |
2174 | char **rt; |
2175 | int r; | |
2176 | ||
2177 | assert(context); | |
2178 | assert(params); | |
f5e65279 MB |
2179 | assert(type >= 0 && type < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); |
2180 | assert(exit_status); | |
8a584da2 | 2181 | |
f5e65279 MB |
2182 | if (!params->prefix[type]) |
2183 | return 0; | |
8a584da2 | 2184 | |
f5e65279 MB |
2185 | if (params->flags & EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES) { |
2186 | if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) | |
2187 | uid = 0; | |
2188 | if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) | |
2189 | gid = 0; | |
2190 | } | |
2191 | ||
2192 | STRV_FOREACH(rt, context->directories[type].paths) { | |
2193 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *pp = NULL; | |
f5e65279 | 2194 | |
bb4f798a | 2195 | p = path_join(params->prefix[type], *rt); |
f5e65279 MB |
2196 | if (!p) { |
2197 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2198 | goto fail; | |
2199 | } | |
8a584da2 | 2200 | |
f5e65279 | 2201 | r = mkdir_parents_label(p, 0755); |
8a584da2 | 2202 | if (r < 0) |
f5e65279 MB |
2203 | goto fail; |
2204 | ||
812752cc | 2205 | if (exec_directory_is_private(context, type)) { |
6e866b33 | 2206 | _cleanup_free_ char *private_root = NULL; |
f5e65279 | 2207 | |
f2dec872 BR |
2208 | /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that |
2209 | * case we want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by | |
2210 | * a dynamic user whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same | |
2211 | * trick used by container managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of | |
2212 | * the same UID in containers: we place everything inside a directory that has an | |
2213 | * access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root, so that it acts as security boundary | |
2214 | * for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing to make this directory | |
2215 | * permeable for the service itself. | |
f5e65279 | 2216 | * |
f2dec872 BR |
2217 | * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create |
2218 | * a directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place | |
2219 | * "foo" inside of that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to | |
2220 | * "private/foo". This way, privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but | |
2221 | * unprivileged host users can't look into it. Inside of the namespace of the unit | |
2222 | * "private/" is replaced by a more liberally accessible tmpfs, into which the host's | |
2223 | * "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus disabling the access boundary | |
2224 | * for the service and making sure it only gets access to the dirs it needs but no | |
2225 | * others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works! | |
f5e65279 | 2226 | * |
f2dec872 BR |
2227 | * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not |
2228 | * to be owned by the service itself. | |
2229 | * | |
2230 | * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used | |
2231 | * for sharing files or sockets with other services. */ | |
f5e65279 | 2232 | |
bb4f798a | 2233 | private_root = path_join(params->prefix[type], "private"); |
f5e65279 MB |
2234 | if (!private_root) { |
2235 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2236 | goto fail; | |
2237 | } | |
2238 | ||
2239 | /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */ | |
b012e921 | 2240 | r = mkdir_safe_label(private_root, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE); |
f5e65279 MB |
2241 | if (r < 0) |
2242 | goto fail; | |
2243 | ||
bb4f798a | 2244 | pp = path_join(private_root, *rt); |
f5e65279 MB |
2245 | if (!pp) { |
2246 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2247 | goto fail; | |
2248 | } | |
2249 | ||
2250 | /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */ | |
2251 | r = mkdir_parents_label(pp, 0755); | |
2252 | if (r < 0) | |
2253 | goto fail; | |
2254 | ||
52ad194e MB |
2255 | if (is_dir(p, false) > 0 && |
2256 | (laccess(pp, F_OK) < 0 && errno == ENOENT)) { | |
2257 | ||
2258 | /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move | |
2259 | * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use | |
2260 | * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */ | |
2261 | ||
f2dec872 BR |
2262 | log_info("Found pre-existing public %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" |
2263 | "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned off, and has now turned it on.", | |
2264 | exec_directory_type_to_string(type), p, pp); | |
2265 | ||
52ad194e MB |
2266 | if (rename(p, pp) < 0) { |
2267 | r = -errno; | |
2268 | goto fail; | |
2269 | } | |
2270 | } else { | |
2271 | /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */ | |
2272 | ||
2273 | r = mkdir_label(pp, context->directories[type].mode); | |
2274 | if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) | |
2275 | goto fail; | |
2276 | } | |
f5e65279 | 2277 | |
f5e65279 | 2278 | /* And link it up from the original place */ |
6e866b33 | 2279 | r = symlink_idempotent(pp, p, true); |
f5e65279 MB |
2280 | if (r < 0) |
2281 | goto fail; | |
2282 | ||
f5e65279 | 2283 | } else { |
f2dec872 BR |
2284 | _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL; |
2285 | ||
2286 | if (type != EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION && | |
2287 | readlink_and_make_absolute(p, &target) >= 0) { | |
cb695f0e | 2288 | _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL, *q_resolved = NULL, *target_resolved = NULL; |
f2dec872 BR |
2289 | |
2290 | /* This already exists and is a symlink? Interesting. Maybe it's one created | |
2291 | * by DynamicUser=1 (see above)? | |
2292 | * | |
2293 | * We do this for all directory types except for ConfigurationDirectory=, | |
2294 | * since they all support the private/ symlink logic at least in some | |
2295 | * configurations, see above. */ | |
2296 | ||
cb695f0e MB |
2297 | r = chase_symlinks(target, NULL, 0, &target_resolved, NULL); |
2298 | if (r < 0) | |
2299 | goto fail; | |
2300 | ||
f2dec872 BR |
2301 | q = path_join(params->prefix[type], "private", *rt); |
2302 | if (!q) { | |
2303 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2304 | goto fail; | |
2305 | } | |
2306 | ||
cb695f0e MB |
2307 | /* /var/lib or friends may be symlinks. So, let's chase them also. */ |
2308 | r = chase_symlinks(q, NULL, CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &q_resolved, NULL); | |
2309 | if (r < 0) | |
2310 | goto fail; | |
2311 | ||
2312 | if (path_equal(q_resolved, target_resolved)) { | |
f2dec872 BR |
2313 | |
2314 | /* Hmm, apparently DynamicUser= was once turned on for this service, | |
2315 | * but is no longer. Let's move the directory back up. */ | |
2316 | ||
2317 | log_info("Found pre-existing private %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" | |
2318 | "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned on, and has now turned it off.", | |
2319 | exec_directory_type_to_string(type), q, p); | |
2320 | ||
2321 | if (unlink(p) < 0) { | |
2322 | r = -errno; | |
2323 | goto fail; | |
2324 | } | |
2325 | ||
2326 | if (rename(q, p) < 0) { | |
2327 | r = -errno; | |
2328 | goto fail; | |
2329 | } | |
2330 | } | |
2331 | } | |
2332 | ||
f5e65279 | 2333 | r = mkdir_label(p, context->directories[type].mode); |
bb4f798a MB |
2334 | if (r < 0) { |
2335 | if (r != -EEXIST) | |
7c20daf6 | 2336 | goto fail; |
bb4f798a MB |
2337 | |
2338 | if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) { | |
2339 | struct stat st; | |
2340 | ||
2341 | /* Don't change the owner/access mode of the configuration directory, | |
2342 | * as in the common case it is not written to by a service, and shall | |
2343 | * not be writable. */ | |
2344 | ||
2345 | if (stat(p, &st) < 0) { | |
2346 | r = -errno; | |
2347 | goto fail; | |
2348 | } | |
2349 | ||
2350 | /* Still complain if the access mode doesn't match */ | |
2351 | if (((st.st_mode ^ context->directories[type].mode) & 07777) != 0) | |
2352 | log_warning("%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. " | |
2353 | "(File system: %o %sMode: %o)", | |
2354 | exec_directory_type_to_string(type), *rt, | |
2355 | st.st_mode & 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type), context->directories[type].mode & 07777); | |
2356 | ||
7c20daf6 | 2357 | continue; |
bb4f798a | 2358 | } |
7c20daf6 | 2359 | } |
f5e65279 MB |
2360 | } |
2361 | ||
bb4f798a | 2362 | /* Lock down the access mode (we use chmod_and_chown() to make this idempotent. We don't |
f2dec872 | 2363 | * specify UID/GID here, so that path_chown_recursive() can optimize things depending on the |
bb4f798a MB |
2364 | * current UID/GID ownership.) */ |
2365 | r = chmod_and_chown(pp ?: p, context->directories[type].mode, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID); | |
2366 | if (r < 0) | |
2367 | goto fail; | |
f5e65279 | 2368 | |
bb4f798a MB |
2369 | /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary. When dynamic users are used we |
2370 | * drop the suid/sgid bits, since we really don't want SUID/SGID files for dynamic UID/GID | |
2371 | * assignments to exist.*/ | |
2372 | r = path_chown_recursive(pp ?: p, uid, gid, context->dynamic_user ? 01777 : 07777); | |
8a584da2 | 2373 | if (r < 0) |
f5e65279 | 2374 | goto fail; |
8a584da2 MP |
2375 | } |
2376 | ||
2377 | return 0; | |
f5e65279 MB |
2378 | |
2379 | fail: | |
2380 | *exit_status = exit_status_table[type]; | |
2381 | return r; | |
8a584da2 MP |
2382 | } |
2383 | ||
52ad194e | 2384 | #if ENABLE_SMACK |
8a584da2 MP |
2385 | static int setup_smack( |
2386 | const ExecContext *context, | |
2387 | const ExecCommand *command) { | |
2388 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
2389 | int r; |
2390 | ||
2391 | assert(context); | |
2392 | assert(command); | |
2393 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
2394 | if (context->smack_process_label) { |
2395 | r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label); | |
2396 | if (r < 0) | |
2397 | return r; | |
2398 | } | |
2399 | #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL | |
2400 | else { | |
2401 | _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL; | |
2402 | ||
2403 | r = mac_smack_read(command->path, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label); | |
f5e65279 | 2404 | if (r < 0 && !IN_SET(r, -ENODATA, -EOPNOTSUPP)) |
8a584da2 MP |
2405 | return r; |
2406 | ||
2407 | r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL); | |
2408 | if (r < 0) | |
2409 | return r; | |
2410 | } | |
8a584da2 MP |
2411 | #endif |
2412 | ||
2413 | return 0; | |
2414 | } | |
52ad194e | 2415 | #endif |
8a584da2 | 2416 | |
f5e65279 MB |
2417 | static int compile_bind_mounts( |
2418 | const ExecContext *context, | |
2419 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
2420 | BindMount **ret_bind_mounts, | |
b012e921 | 2421 | size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts, |
f5e65279 MB |
2422 | char ***ret_empty_directories) { |
2423 | ||
2424 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL; | |
2425 | BindMount *bind_mounts; | |
b012e921 | 2426 | size_t n, h = 0, i; |
f5e65279 MB |
2427 | ExecDirectoryType t; |
2428 | int r; | |
2429 | ||
2430 | assert(context); | |
2431 | assert(params); | |
2432 | assert(ret_bind_mounts); | |
2433 | assert(ret_n_bind_mounts); | |
2434 | assert(ret_empty_directories); | |
2435 | ||
2436 | n = context->n_bind_mounts; | |
2437 | for (t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { | |
2438 | if (!params->prefix[t]) | |
2439 | continue; | |
2440 | ||
2441 | n += strv_length(context->directories[t].paths); | |
2442 | } | |
2443 | ||
2444 | if (n <= 0) { | |
2445 | *ret_bind_mounts = NULL; | |
2446 | *ret_n_bind_mounts = 0; | |
2447 | *ret_empty_directories = NULL; | |
2448 | return 0; | |
2449 | } | |
2450 | ||
2451 | bind_mounts = new(BindMount, n); | |
2452 | if (!bind_mounts) | |
2453 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2454 | ||
52ad194e | 2455 | for (i = 0; i < context->n_bind_mounts; i++) { |
f5e65279 MB |
2456 | BindMount *item = context->bind_mounts + i; |
2457 | char *s, *d; | |
2458 | ||
2459 | s = strdup(item->source); | |
2460 | if (!s) { | |
2461 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2462 | goto finish; | |
2463 | } | |
2464 | ||
2465 | d = strdup(item->destination); | |
2466 | if (!d) { | |
2467 | free(s); | |
2468 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2469 | goto finish; | |
2470 | } | |
2471 | ||
2472 | bind_mounts[h++] = (BindMount) { | |
2473 | .source = s, | |
2474 | .destination = d, | |
2475 | .read_only = item->read_only, | |
2476 | .recursive = item->recursive, | |
2477 | .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent, | |
2478 | }; | |
2479 | } | |
2480 | ||
2481 | for (t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { | |
2482 | char **suffix; | |
2483 | ||
2484 | if (!params->prefix[t]) | |
2485 | continue; | |
2486 | ||
2487 | if (strv_isempty(context->directories[t].paths)) | |
2488 | continue; | |
2489 | ||
812752cc | 2490 | if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t) && |
b012e921 | 2491 | !(context->root_directory || context->root_image)) { |
f5e65279 MB |
2492 | char *private_root; |
2493 | ||
2494 | /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own | |
2495 | * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a | |
2496 | * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */ | |
2497 | ||
f2dec872 | 2498 | private_root = path_join(params->prefix[t], "private"); |
f5e65279 MB |
2499 | if (!private_root) { |
2500 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2501 | goto finish; | |
2502 | } | |
2503 | ||
2504 | r = strv_consume(&empty_directories, private_root); | |
98393f85 | 2505 | if (r < 0) |
f5e65279 | 2506 | goto finish; |
f5e65279 MB |
2507 | } |
2508 | ||
2509 | STRV_FOREACH(suffix, context->directories[t].paths) { | |
2510 | char *s, *d; | |
2511 | ||
812752cc | 2512 | if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t)) |
f2dec872 | 2513 | s = path_join(params->prefix[t], "private", *suffix); |
f5e65279 | 2514 | else |
f2dec872 | 2515 | s = path_join(params->prefix[t], *suffix); |
f5e65279 MB |
2516 | if (!s) { |
2517 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2518 | goto finish; | |
2519 | } | |
2520 | ||
812752cc | 2521 | if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t) && |
b012e921 MB |
2522 | (context->root_directory || context->root_image)) |
2523 | /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private | |
2524 | * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory | |
2525 | * on the 'non-private' place. */ | |
f2dec872 | 2526 | d = path_join(params->prefix[t], *suffix); |
b012e921 MB |
2527 | else |
2528 | d = strdup(s); | |
f5e65279 MB |
2529 | if (!d) { |
2530 | free(s); | |
2531 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2532 | goto finish; | |
2533 | } | |
2534 | ||
2535 | bind_mounts[h++] = (BindMount) { | |
2536 | .source = s, | |
2537 | .destination = d, | |
2538 | .read_only = false, | |
bb4f798a | 2539 | .nosuid = context->dynamic_user, /* don't allow suid/sgid when DynamicUser= is on */ |
f5e65279 MB |
2540 | .recursive = true, |
2541 | .ignore_enoent = false, | |
2542 | }; | |
2543 | } | |
2544 | } | |
2545 | ||
2546 | assert(h == n); | |
2547 | ||
2548 | *ret_bind_mounts = bind_mounts; | |
2549 | *ret_n_bind_mounts = n; | |
b012e921 | 2550 | *ret_empty_directories = TAKE_PTR(empty_directories); |
f5e65279 MB |
2551 | |
2552 | return (int) n; | |
2553 | ||
2554 | finish: | |
2555 | bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts, h); | |
2556 | return r; | |
2557 | } | |
2558 | ||
e1f67bc7 MB |
2559 | static bool insist_on_sandboxing( |
2560 | const ExecContext *context, | |
2561 | const char *root_dir, | |
2562 | const char *root_image, | |
2563 | const BindMount *bind_mounts, | |
2564 | size_t n_bind_mounts) { | |
2565 | ||
2566 | size_t i; | |
2567 | ||
2568 | assert(context); | |
2569 | assert(n_bind_mounts == 0 || bind_mounts); | |
2570 | ||
2571 | /* Checks whether we need to insist on fs namespacing. i.e. whether we have settings configured that | |
2572 | * would alter the view on the file system beyond making things read-only or invisble, i.e. would | |
2573 | * rearrange stuff in a way we cannot ignore gracefully. */ | |
2574 | ||
2575 | if (context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0) | |
2576 | return true; | |
2577 | ||
2578 | if (root_dir || root_image) | |
2579 | return true; | |
2580 | ||
2581 | if (context->dynamic_user) | |
2582 | return true; | |
2583 | ||
2584 | /* If there are any bind mounts set that don't map back onto themselves, fs namespacing becomes | |
2585 | * essential. */ | |
2586 | for (i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++) | |
2587 | if (!path_equal(bind_mounts[i].source, bind_mounts[i].destination)) | |
2588 | return true; | |
2589 | ||
46cdbd49 BR |
2590 | if (context->log_namespace) |
2591 | return true; | |
2592 | ||
e1f67bc7 MB |
2593 | return false; |
2594 | } | |
2595 | ||
2897b343 | 2596 | static int apply_mount_namespace( |
98393f85 MB |
2597 | const Unit *u, |
2598 | const ExecCommand *command, | |
2897b343 MP |
2599 | const ExecContext *context, |
2600 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
f2dec872 BR |
2601 | const ExecRuntime *runtime, |
2602 | char **error_path) { | |
2897b343 | 2603 | |
52ad194e | 2604 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL; |
8a584da2 | 2605 | char *tmp = NULL, *var = NULL; |
2897b343 | 2606 | const char *root_dir = NULL, *root_image = NULL; |
b012e921 | 2607 | NamespaceInfo ns_info; |
f5e65279 MB |
2608 | bool needs_sandboxing; |
2609 | BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL; | |
b012e921 | 2610 | size_t n_bind_mounts = 0; |
2897b343 | 2611 | int r; |
8a584da2 MP |
2612 | |
2613 | assert(context); | |
2614 | ||
2897b343 MP |
2615 | if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) { |
2616 | root_image = context->root_image; | |
2617 | ||
2618 | if (!root_image) | |
2619 | root_dir = context->root_directory; | |
2620 | } | |
2621 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
2622 | r = compile_bind_mounts(context, params, &bind_mounts, &n_bind_mounts, &empty_directories); |
2623 | if (r < 0) | |
2624 | return r; | |
2625 | ||
f5e65279 | 2626 | needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED); |
46cdbd49 BR |
2627 | if (needs_sandboxing) { |
2628 | /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp, | |
2629 | * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp | |
2630 | * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here. */ | |
2631 | ||
2632 | if (context->private_tmp && runtime) { | |
2633 | if (runtime->tmp_dir) | |
2634 | tmp = strjoina(runtime->tmp_dir, "/tmp"); | |
2635 | if (runtime->var_tmp_dir) | |
2636 | var = strjoina(runtime->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp"); | |
2637 | } | |
2638 | ||
b012e921 MB |
2639 | ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) { |
2640 | .ignore_protect_paths = false, | |
2641 | .private_dev = context->private_devices, | |
2642 | .protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups, | |
2643 | .protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables, | |
2644 | .protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules, | |
e1f67bc7 | 2645 | .protect_kernel_logs = context->protect_kernel_logs, |
bb4f798a | 2646 | .protect_hostname = context->protect_hostname, |
b012e921 MB |
2647 | .mount_apivfs = context->mount_apivfs, |
2648 | .private_mounts = context->private_mounts, | |
2649 | }; | |
46cdbd49 | 2650 | } else if (!context->dynamic_user && root_dir) |
b012e921 MB |
2651 | /* |
2652 | * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed | |
2653 | * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and | |
2654 | * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace. | |
2655 | */ | |
2656 | ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) { | |
2657 | .ignore_protect_paths = true, | |
2658 | }; | |
2659 | else | |
2660 | ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) {}; | |
2897b343 | 2661 | |
bb4f798a MB |
2662 | if (context->mount_flags == MS_SHARED) |
2663 | log_unit_debug(u, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring"); | |
2664 | ||
2897b343 | 2665 | r = setup_namespace(root_dir, root_image, |
52ad194e | 2666 | &ns_info, context->read_write_paths, |
f5e65279 MB |
2667 | needs_sandboxing ? context->read_only_paths : NULL, |
2668 | needs_sandboxing ? context->inaccessible_paths : NULL, | |
2669 | empty_directories, | |
2670 | bind_mounts, | |
2671 | n_bind_mounts, | |
98393f85 MB |
2672 | context->temporary_filesystems, |
2673 | context->n_temporary_filesystems, | |
8a584da2 MP |
2674 | tmp, |
2675 | var, | |
46cdbd49 | 2676 | context->log_namespace, |
f5e65279 MB |
2677 | needs_sandboxing ? context->protect_home : PROTECT_HOME_NO, |
2678 | needs_sandboxing ? context->protect_system : PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO, | |
2897b343 | 2679 | context->mount_flags, |
46cdbd49 | 2680 | DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP|DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK|DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK, |
f2dec872 | 2681 | error_path); |
8a584da2 | 2682 | |
6e866b33 | 2683 | /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports |
f2dec872 | 2684 | * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively |
6e866b33 MB |
2685 | * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a |
2686 | * completely different execution environment. */ | |
2687 | if (r == -ENOANO) { | |
e1f67bc7 MB |
2688 | if (insist_on_sandboxing( |
2689 | context, | |
2690 | root_dir, root_image, | |
2691 | bind_mounts, | |
2692 | n_bind_mounts)) { | |
2693 | log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n" | |
2694 | "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s", | |
2695 | n_bind_mounts, context->n_temporary_filesystems, yes_no(root_dir), yes_no(root_image), yes_no(context->dynamic_user)); | |
2696 | ||
2697 | r = -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2698 | } else { | |
6e866b33 | 2699 | log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring."); |
e1f67bc7 | 2700 | r = 0; |
6e866b33 | 2701 | } |
8a584da2 MP |
2702 | } |
2703 | ||
e1f67bc7 | 2704 | bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts); |
8a584da2 | 2705 | return r; |
db2df898 MP |
2706 | } |
2707 | ||
2897b343 MP |
2708 | static int apply_working_directory( |
2709 | const ExecContext *context, | |
2710 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
2711 | const char *home, | |
2897b343 MP |
2712 | int *exit_status) { |
2713 | ||
2714 | const char *d, *wd; | |
e3bff60a MP |
2715 | |
2716 | assert(context); | |
2897b343 MP |
2717 | assert(exit_status); |
2718 | ||
2719 | if (context->working_directory_home) { | |
2720 | ||
2721 | if (!home) { | |
2722 | *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; | |
2723 | return -ENXIO; | |
2724 | } | |
e3bff60a | 2725 | |
8a584da2 | 2726 | wd = home; |
2897b343 MP |
2727 | |
2728 | } else if (context->working_directory) | |
8a584da2 MP |
2729 | wd = context->working_directory; |
2730 | else | |
2731 | wd = "/"; | |
e3bff60a | 2732 | |
f2dec872 | 2733 | if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) |
8a584da2 | 2734 | d = wd; |
f2dec872 | 2735 | else |
2897b343 | 2736 | d = prefix_roota(context->root_directory, wd); |
e3bff60a | 2737 | |
2897b343 MP |
2738 | if (chdir(d) < 0 && !context->working_directory_missing_ok) { |
2739 | *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; | |
8a584da2 | 2740 | return -errno; |
2897b343 MP |
2741 | } |
2742 | ||
2743 | return 0; | |
2744 | } | |
2745 | ||
f2dec872 BR |
2746 | static int apply_root_directory( |
2747 | const ExecContext *context, | |
2748 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
2749 | const bool needs_mount_ns, | |
2750 | int *exit_status) { | |
2751 | ||
2752 | assert(context); | |
2753 | assert(exit_status); | |
2754 | ||
2755 | if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) { | |
2756 | if (!needs_mount_ns && context->root_directory) | |
2757 | if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) { | |
2758 | *exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT; | |
2759 | return -errno; | |
2760 | } | |
2761 | } | |
2762 | ||
2763 | return 0; | |
2764 | } | |
2765 | ||
f5e65279 | 2766 | static int setup_keyring( |
98393f85 | 2767 | const Unit *u, |
f5e65279 MB |
2768 | const ExecContext *context, |
2769 | const ExecParameters *p, | |
2770 | uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { | |
2771 | ||
2897b343 | 2772 | key_serial_t keyring; |
b012e921 MB |
2773 | int r = 0; |
2774 | uid_t saved_uid; | |
2775 | gid_t saved_gid; | |
2897b343 MP |
2776 | |
2777 | assert(u); | |
f5e65279 | 2778 | assert(context); |
2897b343 MP |
2779 | assert(p); |
2780 | ||
2781 | /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that | |
2782 | * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond | |
2783 | * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be | |
2784 | * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in | |
2785 | * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where | |
2786 | * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */ | |
2787 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
2788 | if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT) |
2789 | return 0; | |
2790 | ||
b012e921 MB |
2791 | /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up |
2792 | * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel | |
2793 | * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user | |
2794 | * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */ | |
2795 | ||
2796 | saved_uid = getuid(); | |
2797 | saved_gid = getgid(); | |
2798 | ||
2799 | if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) { | |
2800 | if (setregid(gid, -1) < 0) | |
2801 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m"); | |
2802 | } | |
2803 | ||
2804 | if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) { | |
2805 | if (setreuid(uid, -1) < 0) { | |
2806 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m"); | |
2807 | goto out; | |
2808 | } | |
2809 | } | |
2810 | ||
2897b343 MP |
2811 | keyring = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0, 0, 0); |
2812 | if (keyring == -1) { | |
2813 | if (errno == ENOSYS) | |
f5e65279 | 2814 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring."); |
2897b343 | 2815 | else if (IN_SET(errno, EACCES, EPERM)) |
f5e65279 | 2816 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring."); |
2897b343 | 2817 | else if (errno == EDQUOT) |
f5e65279 | 2818 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring."); |
2897b343 | 2819 | else |
b012e921 | 2820 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m"); |
2897b343 | 2821 | |
b012e921 MB |
2822 | goto out; |
2823 | } | |
2824 | ||
2825 | /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */ | |
2826 | if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED) { | |
2827 | ||
2828 | if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK, | |
2829 | KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, | |
2830 | KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0) < 0) { | |
2831 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m"); | |
2832 | goto out; | |
2833 | } | |
2834 | } | |
2835 | ||
2836 | /* Restore uid/gid back */ | |
2837 | if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) { | |
2838 | if (setreuid(saved_uid, -1) < 0) { | |
2839 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m"); | |
2840 | goto out; | |
2841 | } | |
2897b343 MP |
2842 | } |
2843 | ||
b012e921 MB |
2844 | if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) { |
2845 | if (setregid(saved_gid, -1) < 0) | |
2846 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m"); | |
2847 | } | |
2848 | ||
2849 | /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */ | |
2897b343 MP |
2850 | if (!sd_id128_is_null(u->invocation_id)) { |
2851 | key_serial_t key; | |
2852 | ||
2853 | key = add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u->invocation_id, sizeof(u->invocation_id), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); | |
2854 | if (key == -1) | |
f5e65279 | 2855 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m"); |
2897b343 MP |
2856 | else { |
2857 | if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key, | |
2858 | KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_READ|KEY_POS_SEARCH| | |
2859 | KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_READ|KEY_USR_SEARCH, 0, 0) < 0) | |
b012e921 | 2860 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m"); |
2897b343 MP |
2861 | } |
2862 | } | |
2863 | ||
b012e921 MB |
2864 | out: |
2865 | /* Revert back uid & gid for the the last time, and exit */ | |
2866 | /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */ | |
2867 | if (getuid() != saved_uid) | |
2868 | (void) setreuid(saved_uid, -1); | |
f5e65279 | 2869 | |
b012e921 MB |
2870 | if (getgid() != saved_gid) |
2871 | (void) setregid(saved_gid, -1); | |
f5e65279 | 2872 | |
b012e921 | 2873 | return r; |
8a584da2 MP |
2874 | } |
2875 | ||
7c20daf6 | 2876 | static void append_socket_pair(int *array, size_t *n, const int pair[static 2]) { |
8a584da2 MP |
2877 | assert(array); |
2878 | assert(n); | |
f2dec872 | 2879 | assert(pair); |
8a584da2 MP |
2880 | |
2881 | if (pair[0] >= 0) | |
2882 | array[(*n)++] = pair[0]; | |
2883 | if (pair[1] >= 0) | |
2884 | array[(*n)++] = pair[1]; | |
e3bff60a MP |
2885 | } |
2886 | ||
db2df898 MP |
2887 | static int close_remaining_fds( |
2888 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
98393f85 MB |
2889 | const ExecRuntime *runtime, |
2890 | const DynamicCreds *dcreds, | |
8a584da2 | 2891 | int user_lookup_fd, |
db2df898 | 2892 | int socket_fd, |
6e866b33 | 2893 | int exec_fd, |
46cdbd49 | 2894 | const int *fds, size_t n_fds) { |
db2df898 | 2895 | |
b012e921 | 2896 | size_t n_dont_close = 0; |
8a584da2 | 2897 | int dont_close[n_fds + 12]; |
db2df898 MP |
2898 | |
2899 | assert(params); | |
2900 | ||
2901 | if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) | |
2902 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdin_fd; | |
2903 | if (params->stdout_fd >= 0) | |
2904 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdout_fd; | |
2905 | if (params->stderr_fd >= 0) | |
2906 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stderr_fd; | |
2907 | ||
2908 | if (socket_fd >= 0) | |
2909 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd; | |
6e866b33 MB |
2910 | if (exec_fd >= 0) |
2911 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = exec_fd; | |
db2df898 MP |
2912 | if (n_fds > 0) { |
2913 | memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds); | |
2914 | n_dont_close += n_fds; | |
2915 | } | |
2916 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
2917 | if (runtime) |
2918 | append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->netns_storage_socket); | |
2919 | ||
2920 | if (dcreds) { | |
2921 | if (dcreds->user) | |
2922 | append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, dcreds->user->storage_socket); | |
2923 | if (dcreds->group) | |
2924 | append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, dcreds->group->storage_socket); | |
db2df898 MP |
2925 | } |
2926 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
2927 | if (user_lookup_fd >= 0) |
2928 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = user_lookup_fd; | |
2929 | ||
db2df898 MP |
2930 | return close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close); |
2931 | } | |
2932 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
2933 | static int send_user_lookup( |
2934 | Unit *unit, | |
2935 | int user_lookup_fd, | |
2936 | uid_t uid, | |
2937 | gid_t gid) { | |
2938 | ||
2939 | assert(unit); | |
2940 | ||
2941 | /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID | |
2942 | * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was | |
2943 | * specified. */ | |
2944 | ||
2945 | if (user_lookup_fd < 0) | |
2946 | return 0; | |
2947 | ||
2948 | if (!uid_is_valid(uid) && !gid_is_valid(gid)) | |
2949 | return 0; | |
2950 | ||
2951 | if (writev(user_lookup_fd, | |
2952 | (struct iovec[]) { | |
f5e65279 MB |
2953 | IOVEC_INIT(&uid, sizeof(uid)), |
2954 | IOVEC_INIT(&gid, sizeof(gid)), | |
2955 | IOVEC_INIT_STRING(unit->id) }, 3) < 0) | |
8a584da2 MP |
2956 | return -errno; |
2957 | ||
2958 | return 0; | |
2959 | } | |
2960 | ||
2897b343 MP |
2961 | static int acquire_home(const ExecContext *c, uid_t uid, const char** home, char **buf) { |
2962 | int r; | |
2963 | ||
2964 | assert(c); | |
2965 | assert(home); | |
2966 | assert(buf); | |
2967 | ||
2968 | /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */ | |
2969 | ||
2970 | if (*home) | |
2971 | return 0; | |
2972 | ||
2973 | if (!c->working_directory_home) | |
2974 | return 0; | |
2975 | ||
2897b343 MP |
2976 | r = get_home_dir(buf); |
2977 | if (r < 0) | |
2978 | return r; | |
2979 | ||
2980 | *home = *buf; | |
2981 | return 1; | |
2982 | } | |
2983 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
2984 | static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, char ***ret) { |
2985 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char ** list = NULL; | |
2986 | ExecDirectoryType t; | |
2987 | int r; | |
2988 | ||
2989 | assert(c); | |
2990 | assert(p); | |
2991 | assert(ret); | |
2992 | ||
2993 | assert(c->dynamic_user); | |
2994 | ||
2995 | /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for | |
2996 | * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special | |
2997 | * directories. */ | |
2998 | ||
2999 | for (t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { | |
3000 | char **i; | |
3001 | ||
3002 | if (t == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) | |
3003 | continue; | |
3004 | ||
3005 | if (!p->prefix[t]) | |
3006 | continue; | |
3007 | ||
3008 | STRV_FOREACH(i, c->directories[t].paths) { | |
3009 | char *e; | |
3010 | ||
812752cc | 3011 | if (exec_directory_is_private(c, t)) |
f2dec872 | 3012 | e = path_join(p->prefix[t], "private", *i); |
812752cc MB |
3013 | else |
3014 | e = path_join(p->prefix[t], *i); | |
f5e65279 MB |
3015 | if (!e) |
3016 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3017 | ||
3018 | r = strv_consume(&list, e); | |
3019 | if (r < 0) | |
3020 | return r; | |
3021 | } | |
3022 | } | |
3023 | ||
b012e921 | 3024 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(list); |
f5e65279 MB |
3025 | |
3026 | return 0; | |
3027 | } | |
3028 | ||
98393f85 MB |
3029 | static char *exec_command_line(char **argv); |
3030 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
3031 | static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(const ExecParameters *params, char **ret) { |
3032 | bool using_subcgroup; | |
3033 | char *p; | |
3034 | ||
3035 | assert(params); | |
3036 | assert(ret); | |
3037 | ||
3038 | if (!params->cgroup_path) | |
3039 | return -EINVAL; | |
3040 | ||
3041 | /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated | |
3042 | * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control | |
3043 | * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one, | |
3044 | * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process, | |
3045 | * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=, | |
3046 | * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre= | |
3047 | * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP | |
3048 | * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */ | |
3049 | ||
3050 | using_subcgroup = FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP|EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE|EXEC_IS_CONTROL); | |
3051 | if (using_subcgroup) | |
f2dec872 | 3052 | p = path_join(params->cgroup_path, ".control"); |
6e866b33 MB |
3053 | else |
3054 | p = strdup(params->cgroup_path); | |
3055 | if (!p) | |
3056 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3057 | ||
3058 | *ret = p; | |
3059 | return using_subcgroup; | |
3060 | } | |
3061 | ||
7d4b9ad6 MB |
3062 | static int exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c, CPUSet *ret) { |
3063 | _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset) CPUSet s = {}; | |
3064 | int r; | |
3065 | ||
3066 | assert(c); | |
3067 | assert(ret); | |
3068 | ||
3069 | if (!c->numa_policy.nodes.set) { | |
3070 | log_debug("Can't derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask because NUMA mask is not set, ignoring"); | |
3071 | return 0; | |
3072 | } | |
3073 | ||
3074 | r = numa_to_cpu_set(&c->numa_policy, &s); | |
3075 | if (r < 0) | |
3076 | return r; | |
3077 | ||
3078 | cpu_set_reset(ret); | |
3079 | ||
3080 | return cpu_set_add_all(ret, &s); | |
3081 | } | |
3082 | ||
3083 | bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c) { | |
3084 | assert(c); | |
3085 | ||
3086 | return c->cpu_affinity_from_numa; | |
3087 | } | |
3088 | ||
e735f4d4 | 3089 | static int exec_child( |
e3bff60a | 3090 | Unit *unit, |
98393f85 | 3091 | const ExecCommand *command, |
e735f4d4 MP |
3092 | const ExecContext *context, |
3093 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3094 | ExecRuntime *runtime, | |
8a584da2 | 3095 | DynamicCreds *dcreds, |
e735f4d4 | 3096 | int socket_fd, |
f2dec872 | 3097 | const int named_iofds[static 3], |
81c58355 | 3098 | int *fds, |
b012e921 | 3099 | size_t n_socket_fds, |
6e866b33 | 3100 | size_t n_storage_fds, |
e735f4d4 | 3101 | char **files_env, |
8a584da2 | 3102 | int user_lookup_fd, |
f5e65279 | 3103 | int *exit_status) { |
5eef597e | 3104 | |
bb4f798a | 3105 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **accum_env = NULL, **replaced_argv = NULL; |
6e866b33 | 3106 | int *fds_with_exec_fd, n_fds_with_exec_fd, r, ngids = 0, exec_fd = -1; |
8a584da2 MP |
3107 | _cleanup_free_ gid_t *supplementary_gids = NULL; |
3108 | const char *username = NULL, *groupname = NULL; | |
6e866b33 | 3109 | _cleanup_free_ char *home_buffer = NULL; |
8a584da2 | 3110 | const char *home = NULL, *shell = NULL; |
bb4f798a | 3111 | char **final_argv = NULL; |
5a920b42 MP |
3112 | dev_t journal_stream_dev = 0; |
3113 | ino_t journal_stream_ino = 0; | |
46cdbd49 | 3114 | bool userns_set_up = false; |
f5e65279 MB |
3115 | bool needs_sandboxing, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */ |
3116 | needs_setuid, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */ | |
3117 | needs_mount_namespace, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */ | |
3118 | needs_ambient_hack; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */ | |
3119 | #if HAVE_SELINUX | |
52ad194e | 3120 | _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL; |
f5e65279 MB |
3121 | bool use_selinux = false; |
3122 | #endif | |
3123 | #if ENABLE_SMACK | |
3124 | bool use_smack = false; | |
3125 | #endif | |
3126 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR | |
3127 | bool use_apparmor = false; | |
3128 | #endif | |
46cdbd49 BR |
3129 | uid_t saved_uid = getuid(); |
3130 | gid_t saved_gid = getgid(); | |
f47781d8 MP |
3131 | uid_t uid = UID_INVALID; |
3132 | gid_t gid = GID_INVALID; | |
b012e921 | 3133 | size_t n_fds; |
f5e65279 MB |
3134 | ExecDirectoryType dt; |
3135 | int secure_bits; | |
46cdbd49 BR |
3136 | _cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids_after_pam = NULL; |
3137 | int ngids_after_pam = 0; | |
663996b3 | 3138 | |
e3bff60a | 3139 | assert(unit); |
663996b3 MS |
3140 | assert(command); |
3141 | assert(context); | |
5eef597e | 3142 | assert(params); |
e735f4d4 | 3143 | assert(exit_status); |
5eef597e MP |
3144 | |
3145 | rename_process_from_path(command->path); | |
3146 | ||
3147 | /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the | |
3148 | * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All | |
3149 | * others we leave untouched because we set them to | |
3150 | * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which | |
3151 | * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */ | |
86f210e9 MP |
3152 | (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER, |
3153 | SIGNALS_IGNORE, -1); | |
5eef597e MP |
3154 | |
3155 | if (context->ignore_sigpipe) | |
86f210e9 | 3156 | (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1); |
5eef597e | 3157 | |
e735f4d4 MP |
3158 | r = reset_signal_mask(); |
3159 | if (r < 0) { | |
3160 | *exit_status = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK; | |
f5e65279 | 3161 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m"); |
5eef597e | 3162 | } |
663996b3 | 3163 | |
5eef597e MP |
3164 | if (params->idle_pipe) |
3165 | do_idle_pipe_dance(params->idle_pipe); | |
663996b3 | 3166 | |
f5e65279 MB |
3167 | /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its |
3168 | * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have | |
3169 | * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the | |
3170 | * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */ | |
e735f4d4 | 3171 | |
5eef597e | 3172 | log_forget_fds(); |
f5e65279 MB |
3173 | log_set_open_when_needed(true); |
3174 | ||
3175 | /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */ | |
3176 | closelog(); | |
663996b3 | 3177 | |
6e866b33 MB |
3178 | n_fds = n_socket_fds + n_storage_fds; |
3179 | r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, dcreds, user_lookup_fd, socket_fd, params->exec_fd, fds, n_fds); | |
e735f4d4 MP |
3180 | if (r < 0) { |
3181 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
f5e65279 | 3182 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m"); |
5eef597e | 3183 | } |
663996b3 | 3184 | |
5eef597e MP |
3185 | if (!context->same_pgrp) |
3186 | if (setsid() < 0) { | |
e735f4d4 | 3187 | *exit_status = EXIT_SETSID; |
f5e65279 | 3188 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to create new process session: %m"); |
5eef597e MP |
3189 | } |
3190 | ||
4c89c718 | 3191 | exec_context_tty_reset(context, params); |
5eef597e | 3192 | |
2897b343 MP |
3193 | if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit)) { |
3194 | const char *vc = params->confirm_spawn; | |
3195 | _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL; | |
3196 | ||
6e866b33 | 3197 | cmdline = exec_command_line(command->argv); |
2897b343 | 3198 | if (!cmdline) { |
f5e65279 MB |
3199 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; |
3200 | return log_oom(); | |
2897b343 | 3201 | } |
5eef597e | 3202 | |
2897b343 MP |
3203 | r = ask_for_confirmation(vc, unit, cmdline); |
3204 | if (r != CONFIRM_EXECUTE) { | |
3205 | if (r == CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS) { | |
3206 | *exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS; | |
3207 | return 0; | |
3208 | } | |
e735f4d4 | 3209 | *exit_status = EXIT_CONFIRM; |
f5e65279 | 3210 | log_unit_error(unit, "Execution cancelled by the user"); |
5eef597e | 3211 | return -ECANCELED; |
5eef597e | 3212 | } |
663996b3 MS |
3213 | } |
3214 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
3215 | /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is |
3216 | * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note | |
3217 | * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS | |
3218 | * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they | |
3219 | * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */ | |
3220 | if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit->id, true) != 0 || | |
3221 | setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(unit->manager) ? "system" : "user", true) != 0) { | |
3222 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
3223 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); | |
3224 | } | |
3225 | ||
8a584da2 | 3226 | if (context->dynamic_user && dcreds) { |
f5e65279 | 3227 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **suggested_paths = NULL; |
8a584da2 | 3228 | |
6e866b33 MB |
3229 | /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS |
3230 | * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here.*/ | |
8a584da2 MP |
3231 | if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) { |
3232 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
f5e65279 MB |
3233 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); |
3234 | } | |
3235 | ||
3236 | r = compile_suggested_paths(context, params, &suggested_paths); | |
3237 | if (r < 0) { | |
3238 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
3239 | return log_oom(); | |
8a584da2 MP |
3240 | } |
3241 | ||
f5e65279 | 3242 | r = dynamic_creds_realize(dcreds, suggested_paths, &uid, &gid); |
e735f4d4 MP |
3243 | if (r < 0) { |
3244 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
52ad194e MB |
3245 | if (r == -EILSEQ) { |
3246 | log_unit_error(unit, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists."); | |
3247 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
3248 | } | |
f5e65279 | 3249 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m"); |
e735f4d4 | 3250 | } |
e735f4d4 | 3251 | |
2897b343 | 3252 | if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) { |
8a584da2 | 3253 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; |
f5e65279 | 3254 | log_unit_error(unit, "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT"\"", uid); |
2897b343 MP |
3255 | return -ESRCH; |
3256 | } | |
3257 | ||
3258 | if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) { | |
3259 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
f5e65279 | 3260 | log_unit_error(unit, "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT"\"", gid); |
8a584da2 MP |
3261 | return -ESRCH; |
3262 | } | |
3263 | ||
3264 | if (dcreds->user) | |
3265 | username = dcreds->user->name; | |
6300502b | 3266 | |
8a584da2 MP |
3267 | } else { |
3268 | r = get_fixed_user(context, &username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell); | |
3269 | if (r < 0) { | |
3270 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
f5e65279 | 3271 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m"); |
8a584da2 MP |
3272 | } |
3273 | ||
3274 | r = get_fixed_group(context, &groupname, &gid); | |
6300502b MP |
3275 | if (r < 0) { |
3276 | *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; | |
f5e65279 | 3277 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m"); |
6300502b MP |
3278 | } |
3279 | } | |
3280 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
3281 | /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */ |
3282 | r = get_supplementary_groups(context, username, groupname, gid, | |
3283 | &supplementary_gids, &ngids); | |
3284 | if (r < 0) { | |
3285 | *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; | |
f5e65279 | 3286 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m"); |
8a584da2 MP |
3287 | } |
3288 | ||
3289 | r = send_user_lookup(unit, user_lookup_fd, uid, gid); | |
3290 | if (r < 0) { | |
3291 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
f5e65279 | 3292 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m"); |
8a584da2 MP |
3293 | } |
3294 | ||
3295 | user_lookup_fd = safe_close(user_lookup_fd); | |
6300502b | 3296 | |
2897b343 MP |
3297 | r = acquire_home(context, uid, &home, &home_buffer); |
3298 | if (r < 0) { | |
3299 | *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; | |
f5e65279 | 3300 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m"); |
2897b343 MP |
3301 | } |
3302 | ||
5eef597e MP |
3303 | /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we |
3304 | * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */ | |
3305 | if (socket_fd >= 0) | |
db2df898 | 3306 | (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false); |
663996b3 | 3307 | |
6e866b33 MB |
3308 | /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields. |
3309 | * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */ | |
3310 | if (params->cgroup_path) { | |
3311 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; | |
3312 | ||
3313 | r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, &p); | |
3314 | if (r < 0) { | |
3315 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
3316 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m"); | |
3317 | } | |
3318 | ||
3319 | r = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, p, 0, NULL, NULL); | |
3320 | if (r < 0) { | |
3321 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
3322 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p); | |
3323 | } | |
3324 | } | |
3325 | ||
bb4f798a MB |
3326 | if (context->network_namespace_path && runtime && runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { |
3327 | r = open_netns_path(runtime->netns_storage_socket, context->network_namespace_path); | |
3328 | if (r < 0) { | |
3329 | *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; | |
3330 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context->network_namespace_path); | |
3331 | } | |
3332 | } | |
3333 | ||
8a584da2 | 3334 | r = setup_input(context, params, socket_fd, named_iofds); |
e735f4d4 MP |
3335 | if (r < 0) { |
3336 | *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; | |
f5e65279 | 3337 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard input: %m"); |
5eef597e | 3338 | } |
663996b3 | 3339 | |
8a584da2 | 3340 | r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); |
e735f4d4 MP |
3341 | if (r < 0) { |
3342 | *exit_status = EXIT_STDOUT; | |
f5e65279 | 3343 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard output: %m"); |
5eef597e | 3344 | } |
663996b3 | 3345 | |
8a584da2 | 3346 | r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); |
e735f4d4 MP |
3347 | if (r < 0) { |
3348 | *exit_status = EXIT_STDERR; | |
f5e65279 | 3349 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m"); |
5eef597e | 3350 | } |
663996b3 | 3351 | |
5eef597e | 3352 | if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) { |
b012e921 MB |
3353 | /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User namespaces |
3354 | * prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */ | |
3355 | r = set_oom_score_adjust(context->oom_score_adjust); | |
f5e65279 | 3356 | if (IN_SET(r, -EPERM, -EACCES)) |
e3bff60a | 3357 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m"); |
f5e65279 | 3358 | else if (r < 0) { |
e735f4d4 | 3359 | *exit_status = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST; |
f5e65279 | 3360 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m"); |
60f067b4 | 3361 | } |
5eef597e | 3362 | } |
60f067b4 | 3363 | |
46cdbd49 BR |
3364 | if (context->nice_set) { |
3365 | r = setpriority_closest(context->nice); | |
3366 | if (r < 0) | |
3367 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m"); | |
3368 | } | |
663996b3 | 3369 | |
5eef597e MP |
3370 | if (context->cpu_sched_set) { |
3371 | struct sched_param param = { | |
3372 | .sched_priority = context->cpu_sched_priority, | |
3373 | }; | |
663996b3 | 3374 | |
e735f4d4 MP |
3375 | r = sched_setscheduler(0, |
3376 | context->cpu_sched_policy | | |
3377 | (context->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork ? | |
3378 | SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK : 0), | |
3379 | ¶m); | |
3380 | if (r < 0) { | |
3381 | *exit_status = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER; | |
f5e65279 | 3382 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m"); |
5eef597e MP |
3383 | } |
3384 | } | |
663996b3 | 3385 | |
7d4b9ad6 MB |
3386 | if (context->cpu_affinity_from_numa || context->cpu_set.set) { |
3387 | _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset) CPUSet converted_cpu_set = {}; | |
3388 | const CPUSet *cpu_set; | |
3389 | ||
3390 | if (context->cpu_affinity_from_numa) { | |
3391 | r = exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(context, &converted_cpu_set); | |
3392 | if (r < 0) { | |
3393 | *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; | |
3394 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask: %m"); | |
3395 | } | |
3396 | ||
3397 | cpu_set = &converted_cpu_set; | |
3398 | } else | |
3399 | cpu_set = &context->cpu_set; | |
3400 | ||
3401 | if (sched_setaffinity(0, cpu_set->allocated, cpu_set->set) < 0) { | |
e735f4d4 | 3402 | *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; |
f5e65279 | 3403 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m"); |
663996b3 | 3404 | } |
7d4b9ad6 | 3405 | } |
663996b3 | 3406 | |
f2dec872 BR |
3407 | if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&context->numa_policy))) { |
3408 | r = apply_numa_policy(&context->numa_policy); | |
3409 | if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) | |
3410 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "NUMA support not available, ignoring."); | |
3411 | else if (r < 0) { | |
3412 | *exit_status = EXIT_NUMA_POLICY; | |
3413 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set NUMA memory policy: %m"); | |
3414 | } | |
3415 | } | |
3416 | ||
5eef597e MP |
3417 | if (context->ioprio_set) |
3418 | if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) { | |
e735f4d4 | 3419 | *exit_status = EXIT_IOPRIO; |
f5e65279 | 3420 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m"); |
5eef597e | 3421 | } |
663996b3 | 3422 | |
5eef597e MP |
3423 | if (context->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) |
3424 | if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) { | |
e735f4d4 | 3425 | *exit_status = EXIT_TIMERSLACK; |
f5e65279 | 3426 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m"); |
663996b3 MS |
3427 | } |
3428 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
3429 | if (context->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) { |
3430 | r = safe_personality(context->personality); | |
3431 | if (r < 0) { | |
e735f4d4 | 3432 | *exit_status = EXIT_PERSONALITY; |
f5e65279 | 3433 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m"); |
663996b3 | 3434 | } |
f5e65279 | 3435 | } |
663996b3 | 3436 | |
5eef597e | 3437 | if (context->utmp_id) |
f5e65279 | 3438 | utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid_cached(), getsid(0), |
2897b343 | 3439 | context->tty_path, |
13d276d0 MP |
3440 | context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_INIT ? INIT_PROCESS : |
3441 | context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN ? LOGIN_PROCESS : | |
3442 | USER_PROCESS, | |
2897b343 | 3443 | username); |
5eef597e | 3444 | |
bb4f798a | 3445 | if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { |
e735f4d4 MP |
3446 | r = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid); |
3447 | if (r < 0) { | |
3448 | *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; | |
f5e65279 | 3449 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m"); |
663996b3 | 3450 | } |
5eef597e | 3451 | } |
663996b3 | 3452 | |
7c20daf6 | 3453 | /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1 |
52ad194e | 3454 | * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not |
7c20daf6 | 3455 | * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only |
52ad194e | 3456 | * touch a single hierarchy too. */ |
f5e65279 | 3457 | if (params->cgroup_path && context->user && (params->flags & EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE)) { |
52ad194e | 3458 | r = cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, uid, gid); |
e735f4d4 MP |
3459 | if (r < 0) { |
3460 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
f5e65279 | 3461 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m"); |
663996b3 | 3462 | } |
5eef597e | 3463 | } |
663996b3 | 3464 | |
f5e65279 MB |
3465 | for (dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { |
3466 | r = setup_exec_directory(context, params, uid, gid, dt, exit_status); | |
3467 | if (r < 0) | |
3468 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params->prefix[dt]); | |
5eef597e | 3469 | } |
663996b3 | 3470 | |
5a920b42 | 3471 | r = build_environment( |
8a584da2 | 3472 | unit, |
5a920b42 MP |
3473 | context, |
3474 | params, | |
3475 | n_fds, | |
3476 | home, | |
3477 | username, | |
3478 | shell, | |
3479 | journal_stream_dev, | |
3480 | journal_stream_ino, | |
3481 | &our_env); | |
3482 | if (r < 0) { | |
3483 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
f5e65279 | 3484 | return log_oom(); |
5a920b42 MP |
3485 | } |
3486 | ||
3487 | r = build_pass_environment(context, &pass_env); | |
3488 | if (r < 0) { | |
3489 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
f5e65279 | 3490 | return log_oom(); |
5a920b42 MP |
3491 | } |
3492 | ||
3493 | accum_env = strv_env_merge(5, | |
3494 | params->environment, | |
3495 | our_env, | |
3496 | pass_env, | |
3497 | context->environment, | |
46cdbd49 | 3498 | files_env); |
5a920b42 MP |
3499 | if (!accum_env) { |
3500 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
f5e65279 | 3501 | return log_oom(); |
5a920b42 MP |
3502 | } |
3503 | accum_env = strv_env_clean(accum_env); | |
3504 | ||
8a584da2 | 3505 | (void) umask(context->umask); |
14228c0d | 3506 | |
f5e65279 | 3507 | r = setup_keyring(unit, context, params, uid, gid); |
2897b343 MP |
3508 | if (r < 0) { |
3509 | *exit_status = EXIT_KEYRING; | |
f5e65279 | 3510 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m"); |
2897b343 MP |
3511 | } |
3512 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
3513 | /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted from it */ |
3514 | needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED); | |
3515 | ||
3516 | /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps */ | |
3517 | needs_ambient_hack = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC) && !ambient_capabilities_supported(); | |
3518 | ||
3519 | /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not desired */ | |
3520 | if (needs_ambient_hack) | |
3521 | needs_setuid = false; | |
3522 | else | |
3523 | needs_setuid = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID)); | |
3524 | ||
3525 | if (needs_sandboxing) { | |
3526 | /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on /sys being | |
3527 | * present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as possible, to avoid | |
3528 | * impacting our own code paths. */ | |
3529 | ||
3530 | #if HAVE_SELINUX | |
3531 | use_selinux = mac_selinux_use(); | |
3532 | #endif | |
3533 | #if ENABLE_SMACK | |
3534 | use_smack = mac_smack_use(); | |
3535 | #endif | |
3536 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR | |
3537 | use_apparmor = mac_apparmor_use(); | |
3538 | #endif | |
3539 | } | |
3540 | ||
7c20daf6 FS |
3541 | if (needs_sandboxing) { |
3542 | int which_failed; | |
3543 | ||
3544 | /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what | |
3545 | * is set here. (See below.) */ | |
3546 | ||
3547 | r = setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit* const *) context->rlimit, &which_failed); | |
3548 | if (r < 0) { | |
3549 | *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; | |
3550 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed)); | |
3551 | } | |
3552 | } | |
3553 | ||
f5e65279 | 3554 | if (needs_setuid) { |
7c20daf6 FS |
3555 | |
3556 | /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits | |
3557 | * wins here. (See above.) */ | |
3558 | ||
6300502b | 3559 | if (context->pam_name && username) { |
8a584da2 | 3560 | r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, gid, context->tty_path, &accum_env, fds, n_fds); |
6300502b MP |
3561 | if (r < 0) { |
3562 | *exit_status = EXIT_PAM; | |
f5e65279 | 3563 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m"); |
6300502b | 3564 | } |
46cdbd49 BR |
3565 | |
3566 | ngids_after_pam = getgroups_alloc(&gids_after_pam); | |
3567 | if (ngids_after_pam < 0) { | |
3568 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
3569 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, ngids_after_pam, "Failed to obtain groups after setting up PAM: %m"); | |
3570 | } | |
3571 | } | |
3572 | } | |
3573 | ||
3574 | if (needs_sandboxing) { | |
3575 | #if HAVE_SELINUX | |
3576 | if (use_selinux && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) { | |
3577 | r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net); | |
3578 | if (r < 0) { | |
3579 | *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; | |
3580 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m"); | |
3581 | } | |
3582 | } | |
3583 | #endif | |
3584 | ||
3585 | /* If we're unprivileged, set up the user namespace first to enable use of the other namespaces. | |
3586 | * Users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can set up user namespaces last because they will be able to | |
3587 | * set up the all of the other namespaces (i.e. network, mount, UTS) without a user namespace. */ | |
3588 | if (context->private_users && !have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { | |
3589 | userns_set_up = true; | |
3590 | r = setup_private_users(saved_uid, saved_gid, uid, gid); | |
3591 | if (r < 0) { | |
3592 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
3593 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user: %m"); | |
3594 | } | |
663996b3 | 3595 | } |
6300502b | 3596 | } |
663996b3 | 3597 | |
bb4f798a MB |
3598 | if ((context->private_network || context->network_namespace_path) && runtime && runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { |
3599 | ||
52ad194e MB |
3600 | if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET)) { |
3601 | r = setup_netns(runtime->netns_storage_socket); | |
46cdbd49 BR |
3602 | if (r == -EPERM) |
3603 | log_unit_warning_errno(unit, r, | |
3604 | "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but network namespace setup failed, ignoring: %m"); | |
3605 | else if (r < 0) { | |
52ad194e MB |
3606 | *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; |
3607 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m"); | |
3608 | } | |
bb4f798a MB |
3609 | } else if (context->network_namespace_path) { |
3610 | *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; | |
46cdbd49 BR |
3611 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), |
3612 | "NetworkNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing."); | |
52ad194e MB |
3613 | } else |
3614 | log_unit_warning(unit, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support network namespaces, ignoring."); | |
5eef597e | 3615 | } |
60f067b4 | 3616 | |
e3bff60a | 3617 | needs_mount_namespace = exec_needs_mount_namespace(context, params, runtime); |
e3bff60a | 3618 | if (needs_mount_namespace) { |
f2dec872 BR |
3619 | _cleanup_free_ char *error_path = NULL; |
3620 | ||
3621 | r = apply_mount_namespace(unit, command, context, params, runtime, &error_path); | |
8a584da2 | 3622 | if (r < 0) { |
e735f4d4 | 3623 | *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; |
f2dec872 BR |
3624 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up mount namespacing%s%s: %m", |
3625 | error_path ? ": " : "", strempty(error_path)); | |
5eef597e MP |
3626 | } |
3627 | } | |
60f067b4 | 3628 | |
d0648cfe MB |
3629 | if (needs_sandboxing) { |
3630 | r = apply_protect_hostname(unit, context, exit_status); | |
3631 | if (r < 0) | |
3632 | return r; | |
bb4f798a MB |
3633 | } |
3634 | ||
46cdbd49 BR |
3635 | /* Drop groups as early as possible. |
3636 | * This needs to be done after PrivateDevices=y setup as device nodes should be owned by the host's root. | |
3637 | * For non-root in a userns, devices will be owned by the user/group before the group change, and nobody. */ | |
f5e65279 | 3638 | if (needs_setuid) { |
46cdbd49 BR |
3639 | _cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids_to_enforce = NULL; |
3640 | int ngids_to_enforce = 0; | |
3641 | ||
3642 | ngids_to_enforce = merge_gid_lists(supplementary_gids, | |
3643 | ngids, | |
3644 | gids_after_pam, | |
3645 | ngids_after_pam, | |
3646 | &gids_to_enforce); | |
3647 | if (ngids_to_enforce < 0) { | |
3648 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
3649 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, | |
3650 | ngids_to_enforce, | |
3651 | "Failed to merge group lists. Group membership might be incorrect: %m"); | |
3652 | } | |
3653 | ||
3654 | r = enforce_groups(gid, gids_to_enforce, ngids_to_enforce); | |
8a584da2 MP |
3655 | if (r < 0) { |
3656 | *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; | |
f5e65279 | 3657 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Changing group credentials failed: %m"); |
5eef597e MP |
3658 | } |
3659 | } | |
663996b3 | 3660 | |
46cdbd49 BR |
3661 | /* If the user namespace was not set up above, try to do it now. |
3662 | * It's preferred to set up the user namespace later (after all other namespaces) so as not to be | |
3663 | * restricted by rules pertaining to combining user namspaces with other namespaces (e.g. in the | |
3664 | * case of mount namespaces being less privileged when the mount point list is copied from a | |
3665 | * different user namespace). */ | |
f47781d8 | 3666 | |
46cdbd49 BR |
3667 | if (needs_sandboxing && context->private_users && !userns_set_up) { |
3668 | r = setup_private_users(saved_uid, saved_gid, uid, gid); | |
3669 | if (r < 0) { | |
3670 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
3671 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m"); | |
8a584da2 MP |
3672 | } |
3673 | } | |
3674 | ||
f5e65279 | 3675 | /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that we are |
6e866b33 MB |
3676 | * more aggressive this time since socket_fd and the netns fds we don't need anymore. We do keep the exec_fd |
3677 | * however if we have it as we want to keep it open until the final execve(). */ | |
3678 | ||
3679 | if (params->exec_fd >= 0) { | |
3680 | exec_fd = params->exec_fd; | |
3681 | ||
3682 | if (exec_fd < 3 + (int) n_fds) { | |
3683 | int moved_fd; | |
3684 | ||
3685 | /* Let's move the exec fd far up, so that it's outside of the fd range we want to pass to the | |
3686 | * process we are about to execute. */ | |
3687 | ||
3688 | moved_fd = fcntl(exec_fd, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 3 + (int) n_fds); | |
3689 | if (moved_fd < 0) { | |
3690 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
3691 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Couldn't move exec fd up: %m"); | |
3692 | } | |
3693 | ||
3694 | safe_close(exec_fd); | |
3695 | exec_fd = moved_fd; | |
3696 | } else { | |
3697 | /* This fd should be FD_CLOEXEC already, but let's make sure. */ | |
3698 | r = fd_cloexec(exec_fd, true); | |
3699 | if (r < 0) { | |
3700 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
3701 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to make exec fd FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); | |
3702 | } | |
3703 | } | |
3704 | ||
3705 | fds_with_exec_fd = newa(int, n_fds + 1); | |
3706 | memcpy_safe(fds_with_exec_fd, fds, n_fds * sizeof(int)); | |
3707 | fds_with_exec_fd[n_fds] = exec_fd; | |
3708 | n_fds_with_exec_fd = n_fds + 1; | |
3709 | } else { | |
3710 | fds_with_exec_fd = fds; | |
3711 | n_fds_with_exec_fd = n_fds; | |
3712 | } | |
3713 | ||
3714 | r = close_all_fds(fds_with_exec_fd, n_fds_with_exec_fd); | |
e735f4d4 MP |
3715 | if (r >= 0) |
3716 | r = shift_fds(fds, n_fds); | |
3717 | if (r >= 0) | |
6e866b33 | 3718 | r = flags_fds(fds, n_socket_fds, n_storage_fds, context->non_blocking); |
e735f4d4 MP |
3719 | if (r < 0) { |
3720 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
f5e65279 | 3721 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m"); |
5eef597e MP |
3722 | } |
3723 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
3724 | /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off |
3725 | * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined, | |
3726 | * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we | |
3727 | * came this far. */ | |
3728 | ||
f5e65279 | 3729 | secure_bits = context->secure_bits; |
5eef597e | 3730 | |
f5e65279 MB |
3731 | if (needs_sandboxing) { |
3732 | uint64_t bset; | |
5a920b42 | 3733 | |
7c20daf6 FS |
3734 | /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly |
3735 | * requested. (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see | |
3736 | * above, in order to take precedence.) */ | |
5a920b42 MP |
3737 | if (context->restrict_realtime && !context->rlimit[RLIMIT_RTPRIO]) { |
3738 | if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) { | |
e735f4d4 | 3739 | *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; |
f5e65279 | 3740 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m"); |
663996b3 MS |
3741 | } |
3742 | } | |
5eef597e | 3743 | |
52ad194e MB |
3744 | #if ENABLE_SMACK |
3745 | /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the | |
3746 | * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */ | |
3747 | if (use_smack) { | |
3748 | r = setup_smack(context, command); | |
3749 | if (r < 0) { | |
3750 | *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL; | |
3751 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m"); | |
3752 | } | |
3753 | } | |
3754 | #endif | |
3755 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
3756 | bset = context->capability_bounding_set; |
3757 | /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for | |
3758 | * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own, | |
3759 | * instead of us doing that */ | |
3760 | if (needs_ambient_hack) | |
3761 | bset |= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP) | | |
3762 | (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID) | | |
3763 | (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID); | |
3764 | ||
3765 | if (!cap_test_all(bset)) { | |
3766 | r = capability_bounding_set_drop(bset, false); | |
e735f4d4 MP |
3767 | if (r < 0) { |
3768 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
f5e65279 | 3769 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m"); |
663996b3 | 3770 | } |
663996b3 MS |
3771 | } |
3772 | ||
4c89c718 MP |
3773 | /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set |
3774 | * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */ | |
46cdbd49 | 3775 | if (!needs_ambient_hack) { |
4c89c718 MP |
3776 | r = capability_ambient_set_apply(context->capability_ambient_set, true); |
3777 | if (r < 0) { | |
3778 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
f5e65279 | 3779 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m"); |
4c89c718 | 3780 | } |
4c89c718 | 3781 | } |
f5e65279 | 3782 | } |
4c89c718 | 3783 | |
f2dec872 BR |
3784 | /* chroot to root directory first, before we lose the ability to chroot */ |
3785 | r = apply_root_directory(context, params, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status); | |
3786 | if (r < 0) | |
3787 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Chrooting to the requested root directory failed: %m"); | |
3788 | ||
f5e65279 | 3789 | if (needs_setuid) { |
bb4f798a | 3790 | if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { |
e735f4d4 MP |
3791 | r = enforce_user(context, uid); |
3792 | if (r < 0) { | |
3793 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
f5e65279 | 3794 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT ": %m", uid); |
663996b3 | 3795 | } |
f5e65279 MB |
3796 | |
3797 | if (!needs_ambient_hack && | |
3798 | context->capability_ambient_set != 0) { | |
4c89c718 MP |
3799 | |
3800 | /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */ | |
3801 | r = capability_ambient_set_apply(context->capability_ambient_set, false); | |
3802 | if (r < 0) { | |
3803 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
f5e65279 | 3804 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m"); |
4c89c718 MP |
3805 | } |
3806 | ||
3807 | /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities | |
3808 | * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits | |
3809 | * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set | |
3810 | * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added | |
3811 | * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to | |
3812 | * drop the bit away next. */ | |
3813 | ||
aa27b158 | 3814 | secure_bits |= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS; |
4c89c718 | 3815 | } |
663996b3 | 3816 | } |
f5e65279 | 3817 | } |
663996b3 | 3818 | |
6e866b33 MB |
3819 | /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running |
3820 | * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */ | |
f2dec872 | 3821 | r = apply_working_directory(context, params, home, exit_status); |
6e866b33 MB |
3822 | if (r < 0) |
3823 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m"); | |
3824 | ||
f5e65279 | 3825 | if (needs_sandboxing) { |
52ad194e | 3826 | /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to |
8a584da2 MP |
3827 | * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires |
3828 | * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls | |
3829 | * are restricted. */ | |
3830 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
3831 | #if HAVE_SELINUX |
3832 | if (use_selinux) { | |
8a584da2 MP |
3833 | char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context; |
3834 | ||
3835 | if (exec_context) { | |
3836 | r = setexeccon(exec_context); | |
3837 | if (r < 0) { | |
3838 | *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; | |
f5e65279 | 3839 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context); |
8a584da2 MP |
3840 | } |
3841 | } | |
3842 | } | |
3843 | #endif | |
3844 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
3845 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR |
3846 | if (use_apparmor && context->apparmor_profile) { | |
8a584da2 MP |
3847 | r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile); |
3848 | if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) { | |
3849 | *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE; | |
f5e65279 | 3850 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context->apparmor_profile); |
8a584da2 MP |
3851 | } |
3852 | } | |
3853 | #endif | |
3854 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
3855 | /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential EPERMs |
3856 | * we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */ | |
4c89c718 MP |
3857 | if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != secure_bits) |
3858 | if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secure_bits) < 0) { | |
e735f4d4 | 3859 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECUREBITS; |
f5e65279 | 3860 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m"); |
5eef597e | 3861 | } |
663996b3 | 3862 | |
8a584da2 | 3863 | if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context)) |
5eef597e | 3864 | if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) { |
e735f4d4 | 3865 | *exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES; |
f5e65279 | 3866 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m"); |
663996b3 MS |
3867 | } |
3868 | ||
f5e65279 | 3869 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
2897b343 MP |
3870 | r = apply_address_families(unit, context); |
3871 | if (r < 0) { | |
3872 | *exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES; | |
f5e65279 | 3873 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to restrict address families: %m"); |
663996b3 MS |
3874 | } |
3875 | ||
2897b343 MP |
3876 | r = apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit, context); |
3877 | if (r < 0) { | |
3878 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
f5e65279 | 3879 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m"); |
5a920b42 MP |
3880 | } |
3881 | ||
2897b343 MP |
3882 | r = apply_restrict_realtime(unit, context); |
3883 | if (r < 0) { | |
3884 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
f5e65279 | 3885 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m"); |
5a920b42 MP |
3886 | } |
3887 | ||
bb4f798a MB |
3888 | r = apply_restrict_suid_sgid(unit, context); |
3889 | if (r < 0) { | |
3890 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
3891 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply SUID/SGID restrictions: %m"); | |
3892 | } | |
3893 | ||
2897b343 MP |
3894 | r = apply_restrict_namespaces(unit, context); |
3895 | if (r < 0) { | |
3896 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
f5e65279 | 3897 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m"); |
663996b3 MS |
3898 | } |
3899 | ||
2897b343 MP |
3900 | r = apply_protect_sysctl(unit, context); |
3901 | if (r < 0) { | |
3902 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
f5e65279 | 3903 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m"); |
8a584da2 | 3904 | } |
663996b3 | 3905 | |
2897b343 MP |
3906 | r = apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit, context); |
3907 | if (r < 0) { | |
3908 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
f5e65279 | 3909 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m"); |
2897b343 MP |
3910 | } |
3911 | ||
e1f67bc7 MB |
3912 | r = apply_protect_kernel_logs(unit, context); |
3913 | if (r < 0) { | |
3914 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
3915 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply kernel log restrictions: %m"); | |
3916 | } | |
3917 | ||
46cdbd49 BR |
3918 | r = apply_protect_clock(unit, context); |
3919 | if (r < 0) { | |
3920 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
3921 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply clock restrictions: %m"); | |
3922 | } | |
3923 | ||
2897b343 MP |
3924 | r = apply_private_devices(unit, context); |
3925 | if (r < 0) { | |
3926 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
f5e65279 | 3927 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up private devices: %m"); |
2897b343 MP |
3928 | } |
3929 | ||
3930 | r = apply_syscall_archs(unit, context); | |
3931 | if (r < 0) { | |
3932 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
f5e65279 MB |
3933 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m"); |
3934 | } | |
3935 | ||
3936 | r = apply_lock_personality(unit, context); | |
3937 | if (r < 0) { | |
3938 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
3939 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to lock personalities: %m"); | |
5eef597e | 3940 | } |
663996b3 | 3941 | |
8a584da2 MP |
3942 | /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected |
3943 | * by the filter as little as possible. */ | |
f5e65279 | 3944 | r = apply_syscall_filter(unit, context, needs_ambient_hack); |
2897b343 MP |
3945 | if (r < 0) { |
3946 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
f5e65279 | 3947 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m"); |
5eef597e MP |
3948 | } |
3949 | #endif | |
3950 | } | |
663996b3 | 3951 | |
f5e65279 MB |
3952 | if (!strv_isempty(context->unset_environment)) { |
3953 | char **ee = NULL; | |
3954 | ||
3955 | ee = strv_env_delete(accum_env, 1, context->unset_environment); | |
3956 | if (!ee) { | |
3957 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
3958 | return log_oom(); | |
3959 | } | |
3960 | ||
b012e921 | 3961 | strv_free_and_replace(accum_env, ee); |
f5e65279 MB |
3962 | } |
3963 | ||
bb4f798a MB |
3964 | if (!FLAGS_SET(command->flags, EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND)) { |
3965 | replaced_argv = replace_env_argv(command->argv, accum_env); | |
3966 | if (!replaced_argv) { | |
3967 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
3968 | return log_oom(); | |
3969 | } | |
3970 | final_argv = replaced_argv; | |
3971 | } else | |
3972 | final_argv = command->argv; | |
663996b3 | 3973 | |
1d42b86d | 3974 | if (DEBUG_LOGGING) { |
5eef597e | 3975 | _cleanup_free_ char *line; |
663996b3 | 3976 | |
5eef597e | 3977 | line = exec_command_line(final_argv); |
b012e921 | 3978 | if (line) |
e3bff60a | 3979 | log_struct(LOG_DEBUG, |
e3bff60a MP |
3980 | "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path, |
3981 | LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Executing: %s", line), | |
81c58355 | 3982 | LOG_UNIT_ID(unit), |
b012e921 | 3983 | LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit)); |
5eef597e | 3984 | } |
e3bff60a | 3985 | |
6e866b33 MB |
3986 | if (exec_fd >= 0) { |
3987 | uint8_t hot = 1; | |
3988 | ||
3989 | /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point | |
3990 | * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */ | |
3991 | ||
3992 | if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) { | |
3993 | *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; | |
3994 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m"); | |
3995 | } | |
3996 | } | |
3997 | ||
5a920b42 | 3998 | execve(command->path, final_argv, accum_env); |
6e866b33 MB |
3999 | r = -errno; |
4000 | ||
4001 | if (exec_fd >= 0) { | |
4002 | uint8_t hot = 0; | |
f5e65279 | 4003 | |
6e866b33 MB |
4004 | /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager |
4005 | * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */ | |
4006 | ||
4007 | if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) { | |
4008 | *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; | |
4009 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m"); | |
4010 | } | |
4011 | } | |
4012 | ||
4013 | if (r == -ENOENT && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE)) { | |
4014 | log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO, r, | |
f5e65279 MB |
4015 | "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, |
4016 | LOG_UNIT_ID(unit), | |
4017 | LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit), | |
4018 | LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m", | |
4019 | command->path), | |
b012e921 | 4020 | "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); |
f5e65279 MB |
4021 | return 0; |
4022 | } | |
4023 | ||
e735f4d4 | 4024 | *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; |
6e866b33 | 4025 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to execute command: %m"); |
5eef597e | 4026 | } |
663996b3 | 4027 | |
98393f85 | 4028 | static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l); |
f2dec872 | 4029 | static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int named_iofds[static 3]); |
98393f85 | 4030 | |
e3bff60a MP |
4031 | int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, |
4032 | ExecCommand *command, | |
5eef597e MP |
4033 | const ExecContext *context, |
4034 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
4035 | ExecRuntime *runtime, | |
8a584da2 | 4036 | DynamicCreds *dcreds, |
5eef597e | 4037 | pid_t *ret) { |
663996b3 | 4038 | |
6e866b33 MB |
4039 | int socket_fd, r, named_iofds[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds = NULL; |
4040 | _cleanup_free_ char *subcgroup_path = NULL; | |
5eef597e | 4041 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files_env = NULL; |
b012e921 | 4042 | size_t n_storage_fds = 0, n_socket_fds = 0; |
e735f4d4 | 4043 | _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; |
5eef597e | 4044 | pid_t pid; |
663996b3 | 4045 | |
e3bff60a | 4046 | assert(unit); |
5eef597e MP |
4047 | assert(command); |
4048 | assert(context); | |
4049 | assert(ret); | |
4050 | assert(params); | |
6e866b33 | 4051 | assert(params->fds || (params->n_socket_fds + params->n_storage_fds <= 0)); |
663996b3 | 4052 | |
5eef597e MP |
4053 | if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET || |
4054 | context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET || | |
4055 | context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) { | |
4056 | ||
81c58355 | 4057 | if (params->n_socket_fds > 1) { |
e3bff60a | 4058 | log_unit_error(unit, "Got more than one socket."); |
5eef597e | 4059 | return -EINVAL; |
e735f4d4 | 4060 | } |
5eef597e | 4061 | |
81c58355 MB |
4062 | if (params->n_socket_fds == 0) { |
4063 | log_unit_error(unit, "Got no socket."); | |
4064 | return -EINVAL; | |
4065 | } | |
4066 | ||
5eef597e MP |
4067 | socket_fd = params->fds[0]; |
4068 | } else { | |
4069 | socket_fd = -1; | |
4070 | fds = params->fds; | |
81c58355 | 4071 | n_socket_fds = params->n_socket_fds; |
6e866b33 | 4072 | n_storage_fds = params->n_storage_fds; |
5eef597e MP |
4073 | } |
4074 | ||
98393f85 | 4075 | r = exec_context_named_iofds(context, params, named_iofds); |
8a584da2 MP |
4076 | if (r < 0) |
4077 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m"); | |
4078 | ||
e3bff60a | 4079 | r = exec_context_load_environment(unit, context, &files_env); |
e735f4d4 | 4080 | if (r < 0) |
e3bff60a | 4081 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load environment files: %m"); |
5eef597e | 4082 | |
6e866b33 | 4083 | line = exec_command_line(command->argv); |
5eef597e MP |
4084 | if (!line) |
4085 | return log_oom(); | |
4086 | ||
e3bff60a | 4087 | log_struct(LOG_DEBUG, |
e3bff60a MP |
4088 | LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "About to execute: %s", line), |
4089 | "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path, | |
81c58355 | 4090 | LOG_UNIT_ID(unit), |
b012e921 | 4091 | LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit)); |
f5e65279 | 4092 | |
6e866b33 MB |
4093 | if (params->cgroup_path) { |
4094 | r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, &subcgroup_path); | |
4095 | if (r < 0) | |
4096 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m"); | |
4097 | if (r > 0) { /* We are using a child cgroup */ | |
4098 | r = cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, subcgroup_path); | |
4099 | if (r < 0) | |
4100 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to create control group '%s': %m", subcgroup_path); | |
4101 | } | |
4102 | } | |
4103 | ||
5eef597e MP |
4104 | pid = fork(); |
4105 | if (pid < 0) | |
4c89c718 | 4106 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to fork: %m"); |
663996b3 | 4107 | |
5eef597e | 4108 | if (pid == 0) { |
f5e65279 | 4109 | int exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS; |
e735f4d4 | 4110 | |
e3bff60a MP |
4111 | r = exec_child(unit, |
4112 | command, | |
e735f4d4 MP |
4113 | context, |
4114 | params, | |
4115 | runtime, | |
8a584da2 | 4116 | dcreds, |
e735f4d4 | 4117 | socket_fd, |
8a584da2 | 4118 | named_iofds, |
81c58355 | 4119 | fds, |
81c58355 | 4120 | n_socket_fds, |
6e866b33 | 4121 | n_storage_fds, |
e735f4d4 | 4122 | files_env, |
8a584da2 | 4123 | unit->manager->user_lookup_fds[1], |
f5e65279 MB |
4124 | &exit_status); |
4125 | ||
f2dec872 BR |
4126 | if (r < 0) { |
4127 | const char *status = | |
4128 | exit_status_to_string(exit_status, | |
4129 | EXIT_STATUS_LIBC | EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD); | |
4130 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
4131 | log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR, r, |
4132 | "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, | |
4133 | LOG_UNIT_ID(unit), | |
4134 | LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit), | |
4135 | LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m", | |
f2dec872 | 4136 | status, command->path), |
b012e921 | 4137 | "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); |
f2dec872 | 4138 | } |
663996b3 | 4139 | |
e735f4d4 | 4140 | _exit(exit_status); |
663996b3 MS |
4141 | } |
4142 | ||
e3bff60a | 4143 | log_unit_debug(unit, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT, command->path, pid); |
663996b3 | 4144 | |
6e866b33 MB |
4145 | /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever |
4146 | * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the | |
4147 | * process will be killed too). */ | |
4148 | if (subcgroup_path) | |
4149 | (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, subcgroup_path, pid); | |
663996b3 MS |
4150 | |
4151 | exec_status_start(&command->exec_status, pid); | |
4152 | ||
4153 | *ret = pid; | |
4154 | return 0; | |
4155 | } | |
4156 | ||
4157 | void exec_context_init(ExecContext *c) { | |
f5e65279 MB |
4158 | ExecDirectoryType i; |
4159 | ||
663996b3 MS |
4160 | assert(c); |
4161 | ||
4162 | c->umask = 0022; | |
4163 | c->ioprio = IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE, 0); | |
4164 | c->cpu_sched_policy = SCHED_OTHER; | |
4165 | c->syslog_priority = LOG_DAEMON|LOG_INFO; | |
4166 | c->syslog_level_prefix = true; | |
663996b3 | 4167 | c->ignore_sigpipe = true; |
5eef597e | 4168 | c->timer_slack_nsec = NSEC_INFINITY; |
e3bff60a | 4169 | c->personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID; |
f5e65279 MB |
4170 | for (i = 0; i < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; i++) |
4171 | c->directories[i].mode = 0755; | |
812752cc | 4172 | c->timeout_clean_usec = USEC_INFINITY; |
4c89c718 | 4173 | c->capability_bounding_set = CAP_ALL; |
b012e921 MB |
4174 | assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL != NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL); |
4175 | c->restrict_namespaces = NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL; | |
52ad194e | 4176 | c->log_level_max = -1; |
f2dec872 | 4177 | numa_policy_reset(&c->numa_policy); |
663996b3 MS |
4178 | } |
4179 | ||
60f067b4 | 4180 | void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) { |
f5e65279 | 4181 | ExecDirectoryType i; |
52ad194e | 4182 | size_t l; |
663996b3 MS |
4183 | |
4184 | assert(c); | |
4185 | ||
6300502b MP |
4186 | c->environment = strv_free(c->environment); |
4187 | c->environment_files = strv_free(c->environment_files); | |
db2df898 | 4188 | c->pass_environment = strv_free(c->pass_environment); |
f5e65279 | 4189 | c->unset_environment = strv_free(c->unset_environment); |
663996b3 | 4190 | |
b012e921 | 4191 | rlimit_free_all(c->rlimit); |
663996b3 | 4192 | |
52ad194e | 4193 | for (l = 0; l < 3; l++) { |
8a584da2 | 4194 | c->stdio_fdname[l] = mfree(c->stdio_fdname[l]); |
52ad194e MB |
4195 | c->stdio_file[l] = mfree(c->stdio_file[l]); |
4196 | } | |
8a584da2 | 4197 | |
6300502b MP |
4198 | c->working_directory = mfree(c->working_directory); |
4199 | c->root_directory = mfree(c->root_directory); | |
2897b343 | 4200 | c->root_image = mfree(c->root_image); |
6300502b MP |
4201 | c->tty_path = mfree(c->tty_path); |
4202 | c->syslog_identifier = mfree(c->syslog_identifier); | |
4203 | c->user = mfree(c->user); | |
4204 | c->group = mfree(c->group); | |
663996b3 | 4205 | |
6300502b | 4206 | c->supplementary_groups = strv_free(c->supplementary_groups); |
663996b3 | 4207 | |
6300502b | 4208 | c->pam_name = mfree(c->pam_name); |
663996b3 | 4209 | |
5a920b42 MP |
4210 | c->read_only_paths = strv_free(c->read_only_paths); |
4211 | c->read_write_paths = strv_free(c->read_write_paths); | |
4212 | c->inaccessible_paths = strv_free(c->inaccessible_paths); | |
663996b3 | 4213 | |
2897b343 | 4214 | bind_mount_free_many(c->bind_mounts, c->n_bind_mounts); |
98393f85 MB |
4215 | c->bind_mounts = NULL; |
4216 | c->n_bind_mounts = 0; | |
4217 | temporary_filesystem_free_many(c->temporary_filesystems, c->n_temporary_filesystems); | |
4218 | c->temporary_filesystems = NULL; | |
4219 | c->n_temporary_filesystems = 0; | |
2897b343 | 4220 | |
f2dec872 BR |
4221 | cpu_set_reset(&c->cpu_set); |
4222 | numa_policy_reset(&c->numa_policy); | |
663996b3 | 4223 | |
6300502b MP |
4224 | c->utmp_id = mfree(c->utmp_id); |
4225 | c->selinux_context = mfree(c->selinux_context); | |
4226 | c->apparmor_profile = mfree(c->apparmor_profile); | |
f5e65279 | 4227 | c->smack_process_label = mfree(c->smack_process_label); |
60f067b4 | 4228 | |
52ad194e | 4229 | c->syscall_filter = hashmap_free(c->syscall_filter); |
6300502b MP |
4230 | c->syscall_archs = set_free(c->syscall_archs); |
4231 | c->address_families = set_free(c->address_families); | |
60f067b4 | 4232 | |
f5e65279 MB |
4233 | for (i = 0; i < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; i++) |
4234 | c->directories[i].paths = strv_free(c->directories[i].paths); | |
52ad194e MB |
4235 | |
4236 | c->log_level_max = -1; | |
4237 | ||
4238 | exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c); | |
4239 | ||
e1f67bc7 MB |
4240 | c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec = 0; |
4241 | c->log_ratelimit_burst = 0; | |
6e866b33 | 4242 | |
52ad194e MB |
4243 | c->stdin_data = mfree(c->stdin_data); |
4244 | c->stdin_data_size = 0; | |
bb4f798a MB |
4245 | |
4246 | c->network_namespace_path = mfree(c->network_namespace_path); | |
46cdbd49 BR |
4247 | |
4248 | c->log_namespace = mfree(c->log_namespace); | |
60f067b4 JS |
4249 | } |
4250 | ||
98393f85 | 4251 | int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix) { |
60f067b4 JS |
4252 | char **i; |
4253 | ||
4254 | assert(c); | |
4255 | ||
4256 | if (!runtime_prefix) | |
4257 | return 0; | |
4258 | ||
f5e65279 | 4259 | STRV_FOREACH(i, c->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME].paths) { |
60f067b4 JS |
4260 | _cleanup_free_ char *p; |
4261 | ||
812752cc MB |
4262 | if (exec_directory_is_private(c, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME)) |
4263 | p = path_join(runtime_prefix, "private", *i); | |
4264 | else | |
4265 | p = path_join(runtime_prefix, *i); | |
60f067b4 JS |
4266 | if (!p) |
4267 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4268 | ||
bb4f798a MB |
4269 | /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the |
4270 | * service next. */ | |
e3bff60a | 4271 | (void) rm_rf(p, REMOVE_ROOT); |
60f067b4 JS |
4272 | } |
4273 | ||
4274 | return 0; | |
663996b3 MS |
4275 | } |
4276 | ||
98393f85 | 4277 | static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c) { |
663996b3 MS |
4278 | assert(c); |
4279 | ||
6300502b | 4280 | c->path = mfree(c->path); |
6300502b | 4281 | c->argv = strv_free(c->argv); |
663996b3 MS |
4282 | } |
4283 | ||
b012e921 MB |
4284 | void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand *c, size_t n) { |
4285 | size_t i; | |
663996b3 MS |
4286 | |
4287 | for (i = 0; i < n; i++) | |
4288 | exec_command_done(c+i); | |
4289 | } | |
4290 | ||
e735f4d4 | 4291 | ExecCommand* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) { |
663996b3 MS |
4292 | ExecCommand *i; |
4293 | ||
4294 | while ((i = c)) { | |
60f067b4 | 4295 | LIST_REMOVE(command, c, i); |
663996b3 MS |
4296 | exec_command_done(i); |
4297 | free(i); | |
4298 | } | |
e735f4d4 MP |
4299 | |
4300 | return NULL; | |
663996b3 MS |
4301 | } |
4302 | ||
b012e921 MB |
4303 | void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, size_t n) { |
4304 | size_t i; | |
663996b3 | 4305 | |
e735f4d4 MP |
4306 | for (i = 0; i < n; i++) |
4307 | c[i] = exec_command_free_list(c[i]); | |
4308 | } | |
4309 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
4310 | void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand *c, size_t n) { |
4311 | size_t i; | |
4312 | ||
4313 | for (i = 0; i < n; i++) | |
4314 | exec_status_reset(&c[i].exec_status); | |
4315 | } | |
4316 | ||
4317 | void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand **c, size_t n) { | |
4318 | size_t i; | |
4319 | ||
4320 | for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { | |
4321 | ExecCommand *z; | |
4322 | ||
4323 | LIST_FOREACH(command, z, c[i]) | |
4324 | exec_status_reset(&z->exec_status); | |
4325 | } | |
4326 | } | |
4327 | ||
e735f4d4 | 4328 | typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo { |
98393f85 | 4329 | const Unit *unit; |
e735f4d4 MP |
4330 | const char *path; |
4331 | } InvalidEnvInfo; | |
4332 | ||
4333 | static void invalid_env(const char *p, void *userdata) { | |
4334 | InvalidEnvInfo *info = userdata; | |
4335 | ||
e3bff60a | 4336 | log_unit_error(info->unit, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p, info->path); |
663996b3 MS |
4337 | } |
4338 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
4339 | const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext *c, int fd_index) { |
4340 | assert(c); | |
4341 | ||
4342 | switch (fd_index) { | |
52ad194e | 4343 | |
8a584da2 MP |
4344 | case STDIN_FILENO: |
4345 | if (c->std_input != EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
4346 | return NULL; | |
52ad194e | 4347 | |
8a584da2 | 4348 | return c->stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO] ?: "stdin"; |
52ad194e | 4349 | |
8a584da2 MP |
4350 | case STDOUT_FILENO: |
4351 | if (c->std_output != EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
4352 | return NULL; | |
52ad194e | 4353 | |
8a584da2 | 4354 | return c->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO] ?: "stdout"; |
52ad194e | 4355 | |
8a584da2 MP |
4356 | case STDERR_FILENO: |
4357 | if (c->std_error != EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
4358 | return NULL; | |
52ad194e | 4359 | |
8a584da2 | 4360 | return c->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO] ?: "stderr"; |
52ad194e | 4361 | |
8a584da2 MP |
4362 | default: |
4363 | return NULL; | |
4364 | } | |
4365 | } | |
4366 | ||
f2dec872 BR |
4367 | static int exec_context_named_iofds( |
4368 | const ExecContext *c, | |
4369 | const ExecParameters *p, | |
4370 | int named_iofds[static 3]) { | |
4371 | ||
b012e921 | 4372 | size_t i, targets; |
2897b343 | 4373 | const char* stdio_fdname[3]; |
b012e921 | 4374 | size_t n_fds; |
8a584da2 MP |
4375 | |
4376 | assert(c); | |
4377 | assert(p); | |
f2dec872 | 4378 | assert(named_iofds); |
8a584da2 MP |
4379 | |
4380 | targets = (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) + | |
4381 | (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) + | |
4382 | (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD); | |
4383 | ||
4384 | for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) | |
4385 | stdio_fdname[i] = exec_context_fdname(c, i); | |
4386 | ||
81c58355 MB |
4387 | n_fds = p->n_storage_fds + p->n_socket_fds; |
4388 | ||
4389 | for (i = 0; i < n_fds && targets > 0; i++) | |
2897b343 MP |
4390 | if (named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] < 0 && |
4391 | c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD && | |
4392 | stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO] && | |
4393 | streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO])) { | |
4394 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
4395 | named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; |
4396 | targets--; | |
2897b343 MP |
4397 | |
4398 | } else if (named_iofds[STDOUT_FILENO] < 0 && | |
4399 | c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD && | |
4400 | stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO] && | |
4401 | streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO])) { | |
4402 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
4403 | named_iofds[STDOUT_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; |
4404 | targets--; | |
2897b343 MP |
4405 | |
4406 | } else if (named_iofds[STDERR_FILENO] < 0 && | |
4407 | c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD && | |
4408 | stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO] && | |
4409 | streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO])) { | |
4410 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
4411 | named_iofds[STDERR_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; |
4412 | targets--; | |
4413 | } | |
4414 | ||
2897b343 | 4415 | return targets == 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT; |
8a584da2 MP |
4416 | } |
4417 | ||
98393f85 | 4418 | static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l) { |
663996b3 MS |
4419 | char **i, **r = NULL; |
4420 | ||
4421 | assert(c); | |
4422 | assert(l); | |
4423 | ||
4424 | STRV_FOREACH(i, c->environment_files) { | |
4425 | char *fn; | |
4426 | int k; | |
81c58355 | 4427 | unsigned n; |
663996b3 MS |
4428 | bool ignore = false; |
4429 | char **p; | |
4430 | _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob = {}; | |
663996b3 MS |
4431 | |
4432 | fn = *i; | |
4433 | ||
4434 | if (fn[0] == '-') { | |
4435 | ignore = true; | |
aa27b158 | 4436 | fn++; |
663996b3 MS |
4437 | } |
4438 | ||
4439 | if (!path_is_absolute(fn)) { | |
4440 | if (ignore) | |
4441 | continue; | |
4442 | ||
4443 | strv_free(r); | |
4444 | return -EINVAL; | |
4445 | } | |
4446 | ||
4447 | /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */ | |
81c58355 MB |
4448 | k = safe_glob(fn, 0, &pglob); |
4449 | if (k < 0) { | |
663996b3 MS |
4450 | if (ignore) |
4451 | continue; | |
4452 | ||
4453 | strv_free(r); | |
81c58355 | 4454 | return k; |
663996b3 | 4455 | } |
663996b3 | 4456 | |
81c58355 MB |
4457 | /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */ |
4458 | assert(pglob.gl_pathc > 0); | |
4459 | ||
4460 | for (n = 0; n < pglob.gl_pathc; n++) { | |
6e866b33 | 4461 | k = load_env_file(NULL, pglob.gl_pathv[n], &p); |
663996b3 MS |
4462 | if (k < 0) { |
4463 | if (ignore) | |
4464 | continue; | |
4465 | ||
4466 | strv_free(r); | |
4467 | return k; | |
14228c0d | 4468 | } |
663996b3 | 4469 | /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */ |
e735f4d4 MP |
4470 | if (p) { |
4471 | InvalidEnvInfo info = { | |
e3bff60a | 4472 | .unit = unit, |
e735f4d4 MP |
4473 | .path = pglob.gl_pathv[n] |
4474 | }; | |
4475 | ||
4476 | p = strv_env_clean_with_callback(p, invalid_env, &info); | |
4477 | } | |
663996b3 | 4478 | |
52ad194e | 4479 | if (!r) |
663996b3 MS |
4480 | r = p; |
4481 | else { | |
4482 | char **m; | |
4483 | ||
4484 | m = strv_env_merge(2, r, p); | |
4485 | strv_free(r); | |
4486 | strv_free(p); | |
4487 | if (!m) | |
4488 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4489 | ||
4490 | r = m; | |
4491 | } | |
4492 | } | |
4493 | } | |
4494 | ||
4495 | *l = r; | |
4496 | ||
4497 | return 0; | |
4498 | } | |
4499 | ||
4500 | static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty) { | |
98393f85 | 4501 | _cleanup_free_ char *resolved = NULL; |
663996b3 | 4502 | |
4c89c718 MP |
4503 | if (!tty) |
4504 | return true; | |
4505 | ||
f5e65279 | 4506 | tty = skip_dev_prefix(tty); |
663996b3 MS |
4507 | |
4508 | /* trivial identity? */ | |
4509 | if (streq(tty, "console")) | |
4510 | return true; | |
4511 | ||
98393f85 MB |
4512 | if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved) < 0) |
4513 | return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */ | |
663996b3 MS |
4514 | |
4515 | /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */ | |
bb4f798a | 4516 | return path_equal(resolved, tty) || (streq(resolved, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty)); |
663996b3 MS |
4517 | } |
4518 | ||
bb4f798a MB |
4519 | static bool exec_context_may_touch_tty(const ExecContext *ec) { |
4520 | assert(ec); | |
4c89c718 | 4521 | |
bb4f798a | 4522 | return ec->tty_reset || |
4c89c718 MP |
4523 | ec->tty_vhangup || |
4524 | ec->tty_vt_disallocate || | |
663996b3 MS |
4525 | is_terminal_input(ec->std_input) || |
4526 | is_terminal_output(ec->std_output) || | |
bb4f798a MB |
4527 | is_terminal_output(ec->std_error); |
4528 | } | |
4529 | ||
4530 | bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext *ec) { | |
4531 | ||
4532 | return exec_context_may_touch_tty(ec) && | |
4c89c718 | 4533 | tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec)); |
663996b3 MS |
4534 | } |
4535 | ||
4536 | static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f, char **l) { | |
4537 | char **g; | |
4538 | ||
4539 | assert(f); | |
4540 | ||
4541 | STRV_FOREACH(g, l) | |
4542 | fprintf(f, " %s", *g); | |
4543 | } | |
4544 | ||
98393f85 | 4545 | void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { |
812752cc | 4546 | char **e, **d, buf_clean[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX]; |
52ad194e | 4547 | ExecDirectoryType dt; |
663996b3 | 4548 | unsigned i; |
2897b343 | 4549 | int r; |
663996b3 MS |
4550 | |
4551 | assert(c); | |
4552 | assert(f); | |
4553 | ||
14228c0d | 4554 | prefix = strempty(prefix); |
663996b3 MS |
4555 | |
4556 | fprintf(f, | |
4557 | "%sUMask: %04o\n" | |
4558 | "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n" | |
4559 | "%sRootDirectory: %s\n" | |
4560 | "%sNonBlocking: %s\n" | |
4561 | "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n" | |
60f067b4 | 4562 | "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n" |
8a584da2 MP |
4563 | "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n" |
4564 | "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n" | |
e1f67bc7 | 4565 | "%sProtectKernelLogs: %s\n" |
46cdbd49 | 4566 | "%sProtectClock: %s\n" |
8a584da2 MP |
4567 | "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n" |
4568 | "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n" | |
4569 | "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n" | |
60f067b4 JS |
4570 | "%sProtectHome: %s\n" |
4571 | "%sProtectSystem: %s\n" | |
2897b343 | 4572 | "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n" |
5a920b42 MP |
4573 | "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n" |
4574 | "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n" | |
f5e65279 | 4575 | "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n" |
bb4f798a MB |
4576 | "%sRestrictSUIDSGID: %s\n" |
4577 | "%sKeyringMode: %s\n" | |
4578 | "%sProtectHostname: %s\n", | |
663996b3 MS |
4579 | prefix, c->umask, |
4580 | prefix, c->working_directory ? c->working_directory : "/", | |
4581 | prefix, c->root_directory ? c->root_directory : "/", | |
4582 | prefix, yes_no(c->non_blocking), | |
4583 | prefix, yes_no(c->private_tmp), | |
60f067b4 | 4584 | prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices), |
8a584da2 MP |
4585 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_tunables), |
4586 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_modules), | |
e1f67bc7 | 4587 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_logs), |
46cdbd49 | 4588 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_clock), |
8a584da2 MP |
4589 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_control_groups), |
4590 | prefix, yes_no(c->private_network), | |
4591 | prefix, yes_no(c->private_users), | |
60f067b4 JS |
4592 | prefix, protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home), |
4593 | prefix, protect_system_to_string(c->protect_system), | |
2897b343 | 4594 | prefix, yes_no(c->mount_apivfs), |
5a920b42 MP |
4595 | prefix, yes_no(c->ignore_sigpipe), |
4596 | prefix, yes_no(c->memory_deny_write_execute), | |
f5e65279 | 4597 | prefix, yes_no(c->restrict_realtime), |
bb4f798a MB |
4598 | prefix, yes_no(c->restrict_suid_sgid), |
4599 | prefix, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c->keyring_mode), | |
4600 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_hostname)); | |
663996b3 | 4601 | |
2897b343 MP |
4602 | if (c->root_image) |
4603 | fprintf(f, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix, c->root_image); | |
4604 | ||
663996b3 MS |
4605 | STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment) |
4606 | fprintf(f, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); | |
4607 | ||
4608 | STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment_files) | |
4609 | fprintf(f, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix, *e); | |
4610 | ||
db2df898 MP |
4611 | STRV_FOREACH(e, c->pass_environment) |
4612 | fprintf(f, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); | |
4613 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
4614 | STRV_FOREACH(e, c->unset_environment) |
4615 | fprintf(f, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); | |
4616 | ||
4617 | fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c->runtime_directory_preserve_mode)); | |
4618 | ||
4619 | for (dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { | |
4620 | fprintf(f, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt), c->directories[dt].mode); | |
db2df898 | 4621 | |
f5e65279 MB |
4622 | STRV_FOREACH(d, c->directories[dt].paths) |
4623 | fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt), *d); | |
4624 | } | |
db2df898 | 4625 | |
812752cc MB |
4626 | fprintf(f, |
4627 | "%sTimeoutCleanSec: %s\n", | |
4628 | prefix, format_timespan(buf_clean, sizeof(buf_clean), c->timeout_clean_usec, USEC_PER_SEC)); | |
4629 | ||
663996b3 MS |
4630 | if (c->nice_set) |
4631 | fprintf(f, | |
4632 | "%sNice: %i\n", | |
4633 | prefix, c->nice); | |
4634 | ||
4635 | if (c->oom_score_adjust_set) | |
4636 | fprintf(f, | |
4637 | "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n", | |
4638 | prefix, c->oom_score_adjust); | |
4639 | ||
4640 | for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) | |
4c89c718 | 4641 | if (c->rlimit[i]) { |
6e866b33 | 4642 | fprintf(f, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT "\n", |
60f067b4 | 4643 | prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_max); |
6e866b33 | 4644 | fprintf(f, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT "\n", |
4c89c718 MP |
4645 | prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_cur); |
4646 | } | |
663996b3 MS |
4647 | |
4648 | if (c->ioprio_set) { | |
60f067b4 | 4649 | _cleanup_free_ char *class_str = NULL; |
663996b3 | 4650 | |
f5e65279 MB |
4651 | r = ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c->ioprio), &class_str); |
4652 | if (r >= 0) | |
4653 | fprintf(f, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix, class_str); | |
4654 | ||
4655 | fprintf(f, "%sIOPriority: %lu\n", prefix, IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c->ioprio)); | |
663996b3 MS |
4656 | } |
4657 | ||
4658 | if (c->cpu_sched_set) { | |
60f067b4 | 4659 | _cleanup_free_ char *policy_str = NULL; |
663996b3 | 4660 | |
f5e65279 MB |
4661 | r = sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c->cpu_sched_policy, &policy_str); |
4662 | if (r >= 0) | |
4663 | fprintf(f, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix, policy_str); | |
4664 | ||
663996b3 | 4665 | fprintf(f, |
663996b3 MS |
4666 | "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n" |
4667 | "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n", | |
663996b3 MS |
4668 | prefix, c->cpu_sched_priority, |
4669 | prefix, yes_no(c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork)); | |
663996b3 MS |
4670 | } |
4671 | ||
f2dec872 BR |
4672 | if (c->cpu_set.set) { |
4673 | _cleanup_free_ char *affinity = NULL; | |
4674 | ||
4675 | affinity = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->cpu_set); | |
4676 | fprintf(f, "%sCPUAffinity: %s\n", prefix, affinity); | |
4677 | } | |
4678 | ||
4679 | if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&c->numa_policy))) { | |
4680 | _cleanup_free_ char *nodes = NULL; | |
4681 | ||
4682 | nodes = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->numa_policy.nodes); | |
4683 | fprintf(f, "%sNUMAPolicy: %s\n", prefix, mpol_to_string(numa_policy_get_type(&c->numa_policy))); | |
4684 | fprintf(f, "%sNUMAMask: %s\n", prefix, strnull(nodes)); | |
663996b3 MS |
4685 | } |
4686 | ||
5eef597e | 4687 | if (c->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) |
60f067b4 | 4688 | fprintf(f, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT "\n", prefix, c->timer_slack_nsec); |
663996b3 MS |
4689 | |
4690 | fprintf(f, | |
4691 | "%sStandardInput: %s\n" | |
4692 | "%sStandardOutput: %s\n" | |
4693 | "%sStandardError: %s\n", | |
4694 | prefix, exec_input_to_string(c->std_input), | |
4695 | prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_output), | |
4696 | prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_error)); | |
4697 | ||
52ad194e MB |
4698 | if (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) |
4699 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO]); | |
4700 | if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
4701 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO]); | |
4702 | if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
4703 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
4704 | ||
4705 | if (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_FILE) | |
4706 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); | |
4707 | if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE) | |
4708 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]); | |
6e866b33 MB |
4709 | if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) |
4710 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]); | |
52ad194e MB |
4711 | if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE) |
4712 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
6e866b33 MB |
4713 | if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) |
4714 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
52ad194e | 4715 | |
663996b3 MS |
4716 | if (c->tty_path) |
4717 | fprintf(f, | |
4718 | "%sTTYPath: %s\n" | |
4719 | "%sTTYReset: %s\n" | |
4720 | "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n" | |
4721 | "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n", | |
4722 | prefix, c->tty_path, | |
4723 | prefix, yes_no(c->tty_reset), | |
4724 | prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vhangup), | |
4725 | prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vt_disallocate)); | |
4726 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
4727 | if (IN_SET(c->std_output, |
4728 | EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG, | |
4729 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, | |
4730 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL, | |
4731 | EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE, | |
4732 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, | |
4733 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE) || | |
4734 | IN_SET(c->std_error, | |
4735 | EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG, | |
4736 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, | |
4737 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL, | |
4738 | EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE, | |
4739 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, | |
4740 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE)) { | |
663996b3 | 4741 | |
60f067b4 | 4742 | _cleanup_free_ char *fac_str = NULL, *lvl_str = NULL; |
663996b3 | 4743 | |
f5e65279 MB |
4744 | r = log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c->syslog_priority >> 3, &fac_str); |
4745 | if (r >= 0) | |
4746 | fprintf(f, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix, fac_str); | |
663996b3 | 4747 | |
f5e65279 MB |
4748 | r = log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c->syslog_priority), &lvl_str); |
4749 | if (r >= 0) | |
4750 | fprintf(f, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix, lvl_str); | |
4751 | } | |
663996b3 | 4752 | |
52ad194e MB |
4753 | if (c->log_level_max >= 0) { |
4754 | _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL; | |
4755 | ||
4756 | (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c->log_level_max, &t); | |
4757 | ||
4758 | fprintf(f, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix, strna(t)); | |
4759 | } | |
4760 | ||
e1f67bc7 | 4761 | if (c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec > 0) { |
6e866b33 MB |
4762 | char buf_timespan[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX]; |
4763 | ||
4764 | fprintf(f, | |
4765 | "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n", | |
e1f67bc7 | 4766 | prefix, format_timespan(buf_timespan, sizeof(buf_timespan), c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec, USEC_PER_SEC)); |
6e866b33 MB |
4767 | } |
4768 | ||
e1f67bc7 MB |
4769 | if (c->log_ratelimit_burst > 0) |
4770 | fprintf(f, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix, c->log_ratelimit_burst); | |
6e866b33 | 4771 | |
52ad194e MB |
4772 | if (c->n_log_extra_fields > 0) { |
4773 | size_t j; | |
4774 | ||
4775 | for (j = 0; j < c->n_log_extra_fields; j++) { | |
4776 | fprintf(f, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix); | |
4777 | fwrite(c->log_extra_fields[j].iov_base, | |
4778 | 1, c->log_extra_fields[j].iov_len, | |
4779 | f); | |
4780 | fputc('\n', f); | |
4781 | } | |
4782 | } | |
4783 | ||
46cdbd49 BR |
4784 | if (c->log_namespace) |
4785 | fprintf(f, "%sLogNamespace: %s\n", prefix, c->log_namespace); | |
4786 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
4787 | if (c->secure_bits) { |
4788 | _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL; | |
663996b3 | 4789 | |
f5e65279 MB |
4790 | r = secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c->secure_bits, &str); |
4791 | if (r >= 0) | |
4792 | fprintf(f, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix, str); | |
4793 | } | |
4c89c718 | 4794 | |
f5e65279 MB |
4795 | if (c->capability_bounding_set != CAP_ALL) { |
4796 | _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL; | |
4797 | ||
4798 | r = capability_set_to_string_alloc(c->capability_bounding_set, &str); | |
4799 | if (r >= 0) | |
4800 | fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix, str); | |
4c89c718 MP |
4801 | } |
4802 | ||
4803 | if (c->capability_ambient_set != 0) { | |
f5e65279 | 4804 | _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL; |
663996b3 | 4805 | |
f5e65279 MB |
4806 | r = capability_set_to_string_alloc(c->capability_ambient_set, &str); |
4807 | if (r >= 0) | |
4808 | fprintf(f, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix, str); | |
663996b3 MS |
4809 | } |
4810 | ||
4811 | if (c->user) | |
4812 | fprintf(f, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix, c->user); | |
4813 | if (c->group) | |
4814 | fprintf(f, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix, c->group); | |
4815 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
4816 | fprintf(f, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix, yes_no(c->dynamic_user)); |
4817 | ||
f5e65279 | 4818 | if (!strv_isempty(c->supplementary_groups)) { |
663996b3 MS |
4819 | fprintf(f, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix); |
4820 | strv_fprintf(f, c->supplementary_groups); | |
4821 | fputs("\n", f); | |
4822 | } | |
4823 | ||
4824 | if (c->pam_name) | |
4825 | fprintf(f, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix, c->pam_name); | |
4826 | ||
1d42b86d | 4827 | if (!strv_isempty(c->read_write_paths)) { |
5a920b42 MP |
4828 | fprintf(f, "%sReadWritePaths:", prefix); |
4829 | strv_fprintf(f, c->read_write_paths); | |
663996b3 MS |
4830 | fputs("\n", f); |
4831 | } | |
4832 | ||
1d42b86d | 4833 | if (!strv_isempty(c->read_only_paths)) { |
5a920b42 MP |
4834 | fprintf(f, "%sReadOnlyPaths:", prefix); |
4835 | strv_fprintf(f, c->read_only_paths); | |
663996b3 MS |
4836 | fputs("\n", f); |
4837 | } | |
4838 | ||
1d42b86d | 4839 | if (!strv_isempty(c->inaccessible_paths)) { |
5a920b42 MP |
4840 | fprintf(f, "%sInaccessiblePaths:", prefix); |
4841 | strv_fprintf(f, c->inaccessible_paths); | |
663996b3 MS |
4842 | fputs("\n", f); |
4843 | } | |
4844 | ||
2897b343 | 4845 | if (c->n_bind_mounts > 0) |
98393f85 MB |
4846 | for (i = 0; i < c->n_bind_mounts; i++) |
4847 | fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix, | |
2897b343 | 4848 | c->bind_mounts[i].read_only ? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths", |
98393f85 | 4849 | c->bind_mounts[i].ignore_enoent ? "-": "", |
2897b343 MP |
4850 | c->bind_mounts[i].source, |
4851 | c->bind_mounts[i].destination, | |
4852 | c->bind_mounts[i].recursive ? "rbind" : "norbind"); | |
98393f85 MB |
4853 | |
4854 | if (c->n_temporary_filesystems > 0) | |
4855 | for (i = 0; i < c->n_temporary_filesystems; i++) { | |
4856 | TemporaryFileSystem *t = c->temporary_filesystems + i; | |
4857 | ||
4858 | fprintf(f, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix, | |
4859 | t->path, | |
4860 | isempty(t->options) ? "" : ":", | |
4861 | strempty(t->options)); | |
2897b343 MP |
4862 | } |
4863 | ||
663996b3 MS |
4864 | if (c->utmp_id) |
4865 | fprintf(f, | |
4866 | "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n", | |
4867 | prefix, c->utmp_id); | |
60f067b4 JS |
4868 | |
4869 | if (c->selinux_context) | |
4870 | fprintf(f, | |
4871 | "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n", | |
4872 | prefix, c->selinux_context_ignore ? "-" : "", c->selinux_context); | |
4873 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
4874 | if (c->apparmor_profile) |
4875 | fprintf(f, | |
4876 | "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n", | |
4877 | prefix, c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", c->apparmor_profile); | |
4878 | ||
4879 | if (c->smack_process_label) | |
4880 | fprintf(f, | |
4881 | "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n", | |
4882 | prefix, c->smack_process_label_ignore ? "-" : "", c->smack_process_label); | |
4883 | ||
e3bff60a | 4884 | if (c->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) |
60f067b4 JS |
4885 | fprintf(f, |
4886 | "%sPersonality: %s\n", | |
4887 | prefix, strna(personality_to_string(c->personality))); | |
4888 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
4889 | fprintf(f, |
4890 | "%sLockPersonality: %s\n", | |
4891 | prefix, yes_no(c->lock_personality)); | |
4892 | ||
60f067b4 | 4893 | if (c->syscall_filter) { |
f5e65279 | 4894 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
60f067b4 | 4895 | Iterator j; |
52ad194e | 4896 | void *id, *val; |
60f067b4 JS |
4897 | bool first = true; |
4898 | #endif | |
4899 | ||
4900 | fprintf(f, | |
4901 | "%sSystemCallFilter: ", | |
4902 | prefix); | |
4903 | ||
4904 | if (!c->syscall_whitelist) | |
4905 | fputc('~', f); | |
4906 | ||
f5e65279 | 4907 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
52ad194e | 4908 | HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val, id, c->syscall_filter, j) { |
60f067b4 | 4909 | _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL; |
52ad194e MB |
4910 | const char *errno_name = NULL; |
4911 | int num = PTR_TO_INT(val); | |
60f067b4 JS |
4912 | |
4913 | if (first) | |
4914 | first = false; | |
4915 | else | |
4916 | fputc(' ', f); | |
4917 | ||
4918 | name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1); | |
4919 | fputs(strna(name), f); | |
52ad194e MB |
4920 | |
4921 | if (num >= 0) { | |
4922 | errno_name = errno_to_name(num); | |
4923 | if (errno_name) | |
4924 | fprintf(f, ":%s", errno_name); | |
4925 | else | |
4926 | fprintf(f, ":%d", num); | |
4927 | } | |
60f067b4 JS |
4928 | } |
4929 | #endif | |
4930 | ||
4931 | fputc('\n', f); | |
4932 | } | |
4933 | ||
4934 | if (c->syscall_archs) { | |
f5e65279 | 4935 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
60f067b4 JS |
4936 | Iterator j; |
4937 | void *id; | |
4938 | #endif | |
4939 | ||
4940 | fprintf(f, | |
4941 | "%sSystemCallArchitectures:", | |
4942 | prefix); | |
4943 | ||
f5e65279 | 4944 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP |
60f067b4 JS |
4945 | SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, j) |
4946 | fprintf(f, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1))); | |
4947 | #endif | |
4948 | fputc('\n', f); | |
4949 | } | |
4950 | ||
2897b343 MP |
4951 | if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c)) { |
4952 | _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL; | |
4953 | ||
b012e921 | 4954 | r = namespace_flags_to_string(c->restrict_namespaces, &s); |
2897b343 MP |
4955 | if (r >= 0) |
4956 | fprintf(f, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n", | |
46cdbd49 | 4957 | prefix, strna(s)); |
2897b343 MP |
4958 | } |
4959 | ||
bb4f798a MB |
4960 | if (c->network_namespace_path) |
4961 | fprintf(f, | |
4962 | "%sNetworkNamespacePath: %s\n", | |
4963 | prefix, c->network_namespace_path); | |
4964 | ||
52ad194e MB |
4965 | if (c->syscall_errno > 0) { |
4966 | const char *errno_name; | |
4967 | ||
4968 | fprintf(f, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix); | |
4969 | ||
4970 | errno_name = errno_to_name(c->syscall_errno); | |
4971 | if (errno_name) | |
4972 | fprintf(f, "%s\n", errno_name); | |
4973 | else | |
4974 | fprintf(f, "%d\n", c->syscall_errno); | |
4975 | } | |
663996b3 MS |
4976 | } |
4977 | ||
98393f85 | 4978 | bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext *c) { |
f47781d8 MP |
4979 | assert(c); |
4980 | ||
5a920b42 | 4981 | /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under |
f47781d8 MP |
4982 | * an unchanged UID or as root. */ |
4983 | ||
4984 | if (!c->user) | |
4985 | return true; | |
4986 | ||
4987 | if (streq(c->user, "root") || streq(c->user, "0")) | |
4988 | return true; | |
4989 | ||
4990 | return false; | |
4991 | } | |
4992 | ||
98393f85 | 4993 | int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext *c) { |
81c58355 MB |
4994 | int p; |
4995 | ||
4996 | assert(c); | |
4997 | ||
4998 | if (c->ioprio_set) | |
4999 | return c->ioprio; | |
5000 | ||
5001 | p = ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0); | |
5002 | if (p < 0) | |
5003 | return IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE, 4); | |
5004 | ||
5005 | return p; | |
5006 | } | |
5007 | ||
52ad194e MB |
5008 | void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext *c) { |
5009 | size_t l; | |
5010 | ||
5011 | assert(c); | |
5012 | ||
5013 | for (l = 0; l < c->n_log_extra_fields; l++) | |
5014 | free(c->log_extra_fields[l].iov_base); | |
5015 | c->log_extra_fields = mfree(c->log_extra_fields); | |
5016 | c->n_log_extra_fields = 0; | |
5017 | } | |
5018 | ||
bb4f798a MB |
5019 | void exec_context_revert_tty(ExecContext *c) { |
5020 | int r; | |
5021 | ||
5022 | assert(c); | |
5023 | ||
5024 | /* First, reset the TTY (possibly kicking everybody else from the TTY) */ | |
5025 | exec_context_tty_reset(c, NULL); | |
5026 | ||
5027 | /* And then undo what chown_terminal() did earlier. Note that we only do this if we have a path | |
5028 | * configured. If the TTY was passed to us as file descriptor we assume the TTY is opened and managed | |
5029 | * by whoever passed it to us and thus knows better when and how to chmod()/chown() it back. */ | |
5030 | ||
5031 | if (exec_context_may_touch_tty(c)) { | |
5032 | const char *path; | |
5033 | ||
5034 | path = exec_context_tty_path(c); | |
5035 | if (path) { | |
5036 | r = chmod_and_chown(path, TTY_MODE, 0, TTY_GID); | |
5037 | if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) | |
5038 | log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to reset TTY ownership/access mode of %s, ignoring: %m", path); | |
5039 | } | |
5040 | } | |
5041 | } | |
5042 | ||
f2dec872 BR |
5043 | int exec_context_get_clean_directories( |
5044 | ExecContext *c, | |
5045 | char **prefix, | |
5046 | ExecCleanMask mask, | |
5047 | char ***ret) { | |
5048 | ||
5049 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; | |
5050 | ExecDirectoryType t; | |
5051 | int r; | |
5052 | ||
5053 | assert(c); | |
5054 | assert(prefix); | |
5055 | assert(ret); | |
5056 | ||
5057 | for (t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { | |
5058 | char **i; | |
5059 | ||
5060 | if (!FLAGS_SET(mask, 1U << t)) | |
5061 | continue; | |
5062 | ||
5063 | if (!prefix[t]) | |
5064 | continue; | |
5065 | ||
5066 | STRV_FOREACH(i, c->directories[t].paths) { | |
5067 | char *j; | |
5068 | ||
5069 | j = path_join(prefix[t], *i); | |
5070 | if (!j) | |
5071 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5072 | ||
5073 | r = strv_consume(&l, j); | |
5074 | if (r < 0) | |
5075 | return r; | |
812752cc MB |
5076 | |
5077 | /* Also remove private directories unconditionally. */ | |
5078 | if (t != EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) { | |
5079 | j = path_join(prefix[t], "private", *i); | |
5080 | if (!j) | |
5081 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5082 | ||
5083 | r = strv_consume(&l, j); | |
5084 | if (r < 0) | |
5085 | return r; | |
5086 | } | |
f2dec872 BR |
5087 | } |
5088 | } | |
5089 | ||
5090 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(l); | |
5091 | return 0; | |
5092 | } | |
5093 | ||
5094 | int exec_context_get_clean_mask(ExecContext *c, ExecCleanMask *ret) { | |
5095 | ExecCleanMask mask = 0; | |
5096 | ||
5097 | assert(c); | |
5098 | assert(ret); | |
5099 | ||
5100 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) | |
5101 | if (!strv_isempty(c->directories[t].paths)) | |
5102 | mask |= 1U << t; | |
5103 | ||
5104 | *ret = mask; | |
5105 | return 0; | |
5106 | } | |
5107 | ||
663996b3 MS |
5108 | void exec_status_start(ExecStatus *s, pid_t pid) { |
5109 | assert(s); | |
5110 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
5111 | *s = (ExecStatus) { |
5112 | .pid = pid, | |
5113 | }; | |
5114 | ||
663996b3 MS |
5115 | dual_timestamp_get(&s->start_timestamp); |
5116 | } | |
5117 | ||
98393f85 | 5118 | void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus *s, const ExecContext *context, pid_t pid, int code, int status) { |
663996b3 MS |
5119 | assert(s); |
5120 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
5121 | if (s->pid != pid) { |
5122 | *s = (ExecStatus) { | |
5123 | .pid = pid, | |
5124 | }; | |
5125 | } | |
663996b3 | 5126 | |
663996b3 MS |
5127 | dual_timestamp_get(&s->exit_timestamp); |
5128 | ||
5129 | s->code = code; | |
5130 | s->status = status; | |
5131 | ||
bb4f798a MB |
5132 | if (context && context->utmp_id) |
5133 | (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context->utmp_id, pid, code, status); | |
663996b3 MS |
5134 | } |
5135 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
5136 | void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus *s) { |
5137 | assert(s); | |
5138 | ||
5139 | *s = (ExecStatus) {}; | |
5140 | } | |
5141 | ||
98393f85 | 5142 | void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus *s, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { |
663996b3 MS |
5143 | char buf[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX]; |
5144 | ||
5145 | assert(s); | |
5146 | assert(f); | |
5147 | ||
663996b3 MS |
5148 | if (s->pid <= 0) |
5149 | return; | |
5150 | ||
5eef597e MP |
5151 | prefix = strempty(prefix); |
5152 | ||
663996b3 | 5153 | fprintf(f, |
60f067b4 JS |
5154 | "%sPID: "PID_FMT"\n", |
5155 | prefix, s->pid); | |
663996b3 | 5156 | |
8a584da2 | 5157 | if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s->start_timestamp)) |
663996b3 MS |
5158 | fprintf(f, |
5159 | "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n", | |
5160 | prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->start_timestamp.realtime)); | |
5161 | ||
8a584da2 | 5162 | if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s->exit_timestamp)) |
663996b3 MS |
5163 | fprintf(f, |
5164 | "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n" | |
5165 | "%sExit Code: %s\n" | |
5166 | "%sExit Status: %i\n", | |
5167 | prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->exit_timestamp.realtime), | |
5168 | prefix, sigchld_code_to_string(s->code), | |
5169 | prefix, s->status); | |
5170 | } | |
5171 | ||
98393f85 | 5172 | static char *exec_command_line(char **argv) { |
663996b3 MS |
5173 | size_t k; |
5174 | char *n, *p, **a; | |
5175 | bool first = true; | |
5176 | ||
5177 | assert(argv); | |
5178 | ||
5179 | k = 1; | |
5180 | STRV_FOREACH(a, argv) | |
5181 | k += strlen(*a)+3; | |
5182 | ||
8a584da2 MP |
5183 | n = new(char, k); |
5184 | if (!n) | |
663996b3 MS |
5185 | return NULL; |
5186 | ||
5187 | p = n; | |
5188 | STRV_FOREACH(a, argv) { | |
5189 | ||
5190 | if (!first) | |
5191 | *(p++) = ' '; | |
5192 | else | |
5193 | first = false; | |
5194 | ||
5195 | if (strpbrk(*a, WHITESPACE)) { | |
5196 | *(p++) = '\''; | |
5197 | p = stpcpy(p, *a); | |
5198 | *(p++) = '\''; | |
5199 | } else | |
5200 | p = stpcpy(p, *a); | |
5201 | ||
5202 | } | |
5203 | ||
5204 | *p = 0; | |
5205 | ||
5206 | /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have | |
5207 | * spaces and ticks in them */ | |
5208 | ||
5209 | return n; | |
5210 | } | |
5211 | ||
98393f85 | 5212 | static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { |
e842803a | 5213 | _cleanup_free_ char *cmd = NULL; |
5eef597e | 5214 | const char *prefix2; |
663996b3 MS |
5215 | |
5216 | assert(c); | |
5217 | assert(f); | |
5218 | ||
5eef597e | 5219 | prefix = strempty(prefix); |
e735f4d4 | 5220 | prefix2 = strjoina(prefix, "\t"); |
663996b3 MS |
5221 | |
5222 | cmd = exec_command_line(c->argv); | |
663996b3 MS |
5223 | fprintf(f, |
5224 | "%sCommand Line: %s\n", | |
f2dec872 | 5225 | prefix, cmd ? cmd : strerror_safe(ENOMEM)); |
663996b3 | 5226 | |
663996b3 | 5227 | exec_status_dump(&c->exec_status, f, prefix2); |
663996b3 MS |
5228 | } |
5229 | ||
5230 | void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { | |
5231 | assert(f); | |
5232 | ||
5eef597e | 5233 | prefix = strempty(prefix); |
663996b3 MS |
5234 | |
5235 | LIST_FOREACH(command, c, c) | |
5236 | exec_command_dump(c, f, prefix); | |
5237 | } | |
5238 | ||
5239 | void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand **l, ExecCommand *e) { | |
5240 | ExecCommand *end; | |
5241 | ||
5242 | assert(l); | |
5243 | assert(e); | |
5244 | ||
5245 | if (*l) { | |
5246 | /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */ | |
60f067b4 JS |
5247 | LIST_FIND_TAIL(command, *l, end); |
5248 | LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command, *l, end, e); | |
663996b3 MS |
5249 | } else |
5250 | *l = e; | |
5251 | } | |
5252 | ||
5253 | int exec_command_set(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) { | |
5254 | va_list ap; | |
5255 | char **l, *p; | |
5256 | ||
5257 | assert(c); | |
5258 | assert(path); | |
5259 | ||
5260 | va_start(ap, path); | |
5261 | l = strv_new_ap(path, ap); | |
5262 | va_end(ap); | |
5263 | ||
5264 | if (!l) | |
5265 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5266 | ||
60f067b4 JS |
5267 | p = strdup(path); |
5268 | if (!p) { | |
663996b3 MS |
5269 | strv_free(l); |
5270 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5271 | } | |
5272 | ||
6e866b33 | 5273 | free_and_replace(c->path, p); |
663996b3 | 5274 | |
b012e921 | 5275 | return strv_free_and_replace(c->argv, l); |
663996b3 MS |
5276 | } |
5277 | ||
5eef597e MP |
5278 | int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) { |
5279 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; | |
5280 | va_list ap; | |
5281 | int r; | |
5282 | ||
5283 | assert(c); | |
5284 | assert(path); | |
5285 | ||
5286 | va_start(ap, path); | |
5287 | l = strv_new_ap(path, ap); | |
5288 | va_end(ap); | |
5289 | ||
5290 | if (!l) | |
5291 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5292 | ||
6300502b | 5293 | r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l, false); |
5eef597e MP |
5294 | if (r < 0) |
5295 | return r; | |
5296 | ||
5297 | return 0; | |
5298 | } | |
5299 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5300 | static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p) { |
5301 | _cleanup_free_ char *path = p; | |
5eef597e | 5302 | |
98393f85 MB |
5303 | (void) rm_rf(path, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_PHYSICAL); |
5304 | return NULL; | |
5305 | } | |
5306 | ||
5307 | static ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime *rt, bool destroy) { | |
5308 | int r; | |
5309 | ||
5310 | if (!rt) | |
5311 | return NULL; | |
5312 | ||
5313 | if (rt->manager) | |
5314 | (void) hashmap_remove(rt->manager->exec_runtime_by_id, rt->id); | |
5315 | ||
5316 | /* When destroy is true, then rm_rf tmp_dir and var_tmp_dir. */ | |
5317 | if (destroy && rt->tmp_dir) { | |
5318 | log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->tmp_dir); | |
5319 | ||
5320 | r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->tmp_dir); | |
5321 | if (r < 0) { | |
5322 | log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->tmp_dir); | |
5323 | free(rt->tmp_dir); | |
5324 | } | |
60f067b4 | 5325 | |
98393f85 MB |
5326 | rt->tmp_dir = NULL; |
5327 | } | |
5328 | ||
5329 | if (destroy && rt->var_tmp_dir) { | |
5330 | log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
5331 | ||
5332 | r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
5333 | if (r < 0) { | |
5334 | log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
5335 | free(rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
5336 | } | |
5337 | ||
5338 | rt->var_tmp_dir = NULL; | |
5339 | } | |
5340 | ||
5341 | rt->id = mfree(rt->id); | |
5342 | rt->tmp_dir = mfree(rt->tmp_dir); | |
5343 | rt->var_tmp_dir = mfree(rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
5344 | safe_close_pair(rt->netns_storage_socket); | |
5345 | return mfree(rt); | |
5346 | } | |
5347 | ||
5348 | static void exec_runtime_freep(ExecRuntime **rt) { | |
bb4f798a | 5349 | (void) exec_runtime_free(*rt, false); |
98393f85 MB |
5350 | } |
5351 | ||
bb4f798a MB |
5352 | static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime **ret) { |
5353 | ExecRuntime *n; | |
60f067b4 | 5354 | |
bb4f798a MB |
5355 | assert(ret); |
5356 | ||
5357 | n = new(ExecRuntime, 1); | |
5358 | if (!n) | |
60f067b4 JS |
5359 | return -ENOMEM; |
5360 | ||
bb4f798a MB |
5361 | *n = (ExecRuntime) { |
5362 | .netns_storage_socket = { -1, -1 }, | |
5363 | }; | |
5364 | ||
5365 | *ret = n; | |
60f067b4 JS |
5366 | return 0; |
5367 | } | |
5368 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5369 | static int exec_runtime_add( |
5370 | Manager *m, | |
5371 | const char *id, | |
5372 | const char *tmp_dir, | |
5373 | const char *var_tmp_dir, | |
5374 | const int netns_storage_socket[2], | |
5375 | ExecRuntime **ret) { | |
5376 | ||
5377 | _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep) ExecRuntime *rt = NULL; | |
60f067b4 JS |
5378 | int r; |
5379 | ||
98393f85 | 5380 | assert(m); |
60f067b4 JS |
5381 | assert(id); |
5382 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5383 | r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&m->exec_runtime_by_id, &string_hash_ops); |
5384 | if (r < 0) | |
5385 | return r; | |
60f067b4 | 5386 | |
98393f85 | 5387 | r = exec_runtime_allocate(&rt); |
60f067b4 JS |
5388 | if (r < 0) |
5389 | return r; | |
5390 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5391 | rt->id = strdup(id); |
5392 | if (!rt->id) | |
5393 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5394 | ||
5395 | if (tmp_dir) { | |
5396 | rt->tmp_dir = strdup(tmp_dir); | |
5397 | if (!rt->tmp_dir) | |
5398 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5399 | ||
5400 | /* When tmp_dir is set, then we require var_tmp_dir is also set. */ | |
5401 | assert(var_tmp_dir); | |
5402 | rt->var_tmp_dir = strdup(var_tmp_dir); | |
5403 | if (!rt->var_tmp_dir) | |
5404 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5405 | } | |
5406 | ||
5407 | if (netns_storage_socket) { | |
5408 | rt->netns_storage_socket[0] = netns_storage_socket[0]; | |
5409 | rt->netns_storage_socket[1] = netns_storage_socket[1]; | |
60f067b4 JS |
5410 | } |
5411 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5412 | r = hashmap_put(m->exec_runtime_by_id, rt->id, rt); |
5413 | if (r < 0) | |
5414 | return r; | |
5415 | ||
5416 | rt->manager = m; | |
5417 | ||
5418 | if (ret) | |
5419 | *ret = rt; | |
5420 | ||
5421 | /* do not remove created ExecRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */ | |
5422 | rt = NULL; | |
5423 | return 0; | |
5424 | } | |
5425 | ||
5426 | static int exec_runtime_make(Manager *m, const ExecContext *c, const char *id, ExecRuntime **ret) { | |
5427 | _cleanup_free_ char *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; | |
bb4f798a | 5428 | _cleanup_close_pair_ int netns_storage_socket[2] = { -1, -1 }; |
98393f85 MB |
5429 | int r; |
5430 | ||
5431 | assert(m); | |
5432 | assert(c); | |
5433 | assert(id); | |
5434 | ||
5435 | /* It is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */ | |
bb4f798a | 5436 | if (!c->private_network && !c->private_tmp && !c->network_namespace_path) |
98393f85 MB |
5437 | return 0; |
5438 | ||
5439 | if (c->private_tmp) { | |
5440 | r = setup_tmp_dirs(id, &tmp_dir, &var_tmp_dir); | |
60f067b4 JS |
5441 | if (r < 0) |
5442 | return r; | |
5443 | } | |
5444 | ||
bb4f798a | 5445 | if (c->private_network || c->network_namespace_path) { |
98393f85 MB |
5446 | if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, netns_storage_socket) < 0) |
5447 | return -errno; | |
5448 | } | |
5449 | ||
5450 | r = exec_runtime_add(m, id, tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, netns_storage_socket, ret); | |
5451 | if (r < 0) | |
5452 | return r; | |
5453 | ||
5454 | /* Avoid cleanup */ | |
bb4f798a | 5455 | netns_storage_socket[0] = netns_storage_socket[1] = -1; |
60f067b4 JS |
5456 | return 1; |
5457 | } | |
5458 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5459 | int exec_runtime_acquire(Manager *m, const ExecContext *c, const char *id, bool create, ExecRuntime **ret) { |
5460 | ExecRuntime *rt; | |
5461 | int r; | |
60f067b4 | 5462 | |
98393f85 MB |
5463 | assert(m); |
5464 | assert(id); | |
5465 | assert(ret); | |
5466 | ||
5467 | rt = hashmap_get(m->exec_runtime_by_id, id); | |
5468 | if (rt) | |
5469 | /* We already have a ExecRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */ | |
5470 | goto ref; | |
60f067b4 | 5471 | |
98393f85 MB |
5472 | if (!create) |
5473 | return 0; | |
60f067b4 | 5474 | |
98393f85 MB |
5475 | /* If not found, then create a new object. */ |
5476 | r = exec_runtime_make(m, c, id, &rt); | |
5477 | if (r <= 0) | |
5478 | /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */ | |
5479 | return r; | |
5480 | ||
5481 | ref: | |
5482 | /* increment reference counter. */ | |
5483 | rt->n_ref++; | |
5484 | *ret = rt; | |
5485 | return 1; | |
5486 | } | |
5487 | ||
5488 | ExecRuntime *exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime *rt, bool destroy) { | |
5489 | if (!rt) | |
60f067b4 JS |
5490 | return NULL; |
5491 | ||
98393f85 | 5492 | assert(rt->n_ref > 0); |
60f067b4 | 5493 | |
98393f85 MB |
5494 | rt->n_ref--; |
5495 | if (rt->n_ref > 0) | |
e3bff60a MP |
5496 | return NULL; |
5497 | ||
98393f85 | 5498 | return exec_runtime_free(rt, destroy); |
60f067b4 JS |
5499 | } |
5500 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5501 | int exec_runtime_serialize(const Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { |
5502 | ExecRuntime *rt; | |
5503 | Iterator i; | |
5504 | ||
5505 | assert(m); | |
60f067b4 JS |
5506 | assert(f); |
5507 | assert(fds); | |
5508 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5509 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt, m->exec_runtime_by_id, i) { |
5510 | fprintf(f, "exec-runtime=%s", rt->id); | |
60f067b4 | 5511 | |
98393f85 MB |
5512 | if (rt->tmp_dir) |
5513 | fprintf(f, " tmp-dir=%s", rt->tmp_dir); | |
60f067b4 | 5514 | |
98393f85 MB |
5515 | if (rt->var_tmp_dir) |
5516 | fprintf(f, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
60f067b4 | 5517 | |
98393f85 MB |
5518 | if (rt->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { |
5519 | int copy; | |
60f067b4 | 5520 | |
98393f85 MB |
5521 | copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[0]); |
5522 | if (copy < 0) | |
5523 | return copy; | |
60f067b4 | 5524 | |
98393f85 MB |
5525 | fprintf(f, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy); |
5526 | } | |
60f067b4 | 5527 | |
98393f85 MB |
5528 | if (rt->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) { |
5529 | int copy; | |
60f067b4 | 5530 | |
98393f85 MB |
5531 | copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[1]); |
5532 | if (copy < 0) | |
5533 | return copy; | |
5534 | ||
5535 | fprintf(f, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy); | |
5536 | } | |
60f067b4 | 5537 | |
98393f85 | 5538 | fputc('\n', f); |
60f067b4 JS |
5539 | } |
5540 | ||
5541 | return 0; | |
5542 | } | |
5543 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5544 | int exec_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit *u, const char *key, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { |
5545 | _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep) ExecRuntime *rt_create = NULL; | |
5546 | ExecRuntime *rt; | |
60f067b4 JS |
5547 | int r; |
5548 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5549 | /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text. |
5550 | * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=. | |
5551 | * Even if the ExecRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge | |
5552 | * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */ | |
5553 | ||
5554 | assert(u); | |
60f067b4 JS |
5555 | assert(key); |
5556 | assert(value); | |
5557 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5558 | /* Manager manages ExecRuntime objects by the unit id. |
5559 | * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */ | |
5560 | if (isempty(u->id)) { | |
5561 | log_unit_debug(u, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter."); | |
5562 | return 0; | |
5563 | } | |
60f067b4 | 5564 | |
98393f85 MB |
5565 | r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u->manager->exec_runtime_by_id, &string_hash_ops); |
5566 | if (r < 0) { | |
5567 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, r, "Failed to allocate storage for runtime parameter: %m"); | |
5568 | return 0; | |
5569 | } | |
5570 | ||
5571 | rt = hashmap_get(u->manager->exec_runtime_by_id, u->id); | |
5572 | if (!rt) { | |
5573 | r = exec_runtime_allocate(&rt_create); | |
60f067b4 | 5574 | if (r < 0) |
e3bff60a | 5575 | return log_oom(); |
60f067b4 | 5576 | |
98393f85 MB |
5577 | rt_create->id = strdup(u->id); |
5578 | if (!rt_create->id) | |
5579 | return log_oom(); | |
5580 | ||
5581 | rt = rt_create; | |
5582 | } | |
5583 | ||
5584 | if (streq(key, "tmp-dir")) { | |
5585 | char *copy; | |
5586 | ||
60f067b4 JS |
5587 | copy = strdup(value); |
5588 | if (!copy) | |
5589 | return log_oom(); | |
5590 | ||
98393f85 | 5591 | free_and_replace(rt->tmp_dir, copy); |
60f067b4 JS |
5592 | |
5593 | } else if (streq(key, "var-tmp-dir")) { | |
5594 | char *copy; | |
5595 | ||
60f067b4 JS |
5596 | copy = strdup(value); |
5597 | if (!copy) | |
5598 | return log_oom(); | |
5599 | ||
98393f85 | 5600 | free_and_replace(rt->var_tmp_dir, copy); |
60f067b4 JS |
5601 | |
5602 | } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-0")) { | |
5603 | int fd; | |
5604 | ||
98393f85 | 5605 | if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) { |
e3bff60a | 5606 | log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value); |
98393f85 | 5607 | return 0; |
60f067b4 | 5608 | } |
98393f85 MB |
5609 | |
5610 | safe_close(rt->netns_storage_socket[0]); | |
5611 | rt->netns_storage_socket[0] = fdset_remove(fds, fd); | |
5612 | ||
60f067b4 JS |
5613 | } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-1")) { |
5614 | int fd; | |
5615 | ||
98393f85 | 5616 | if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) { |
e3bff60a | 5617 | log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value); |
98393f85 | 5618 | return 0; |
60f067b4 | 5619 | } |
98393f85 MB |
5620 | |
5621 | safe_close(rt->netns_storage_socket[1]); | |
5622 | rt->netns_storage_socket[1] = fdset_remove(fds, fd); | |
60f067b4 JS |
5623 | } else |
5624 | return 0; | |
5625 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5626 | /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecRuntime objects. */ |
5627 | if (rt_create) { | |
5628 | r = hashmap_put(u->manager->exec_runtime_by_id, rt_create->id, rt_create); | |
5629 | if (r < 0) { | |
b012e921 | 5630 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, r, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m"); |
98393f85 MB |
5631 | return 0; |
5632 | } | |
60f067b4 | 5633 | |
98393f85 | 5634 | rt_create->manager = u->manager; |
60f067b4 | 5635 | |
98393f85 MB |
5636 | /* Avoid cleanup */ |
5637 | rt_create = NULL; | |
5638 | } | |
60f067b4 | 5639 | |
98393f85 MB |
5640 | return 1; |
5641 | } | |
60f067b4 | 5642 | |
98393f85 MB |
5643 | void exec_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { |
5644 | char *id = NULL, *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; | |
5645 | int r, fd0 = -1, fd1 = -1; | |
5646 | const char *p, *v = value; | |
5647 | size_t n; | |
60f067b4 | 5648 | |
98393f85 MB |
5649 | assert(m); |
5650 | assert(value); | |
5651 | assert(fds); | |
60f067b4 | 5652 | |
98393f85 MB |
5653 | n = strcspn(v, " "); |
5654 | id = strndupa(v, n); | |
5655 | if (v[n] != ' ') | |
5656 | goto finalize; | |
5657 | p = v + n + 1; | |
5658 | ||
5659 | v = startswith(p, "tmp-dir="); | |
5660 | if (v) { | |
5661 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
5662 | tmp_dir = strndupa(v, n); | |
5663 | if (v[n] != ' ') | |
5664 | goto finalize; | |
5665 | p = v + n + 1; | |
5666 | } | |
5667 | ||
5668 | v = startswith(p, "var-tmp-dir="); | |
5669 | if (v) { | |
5670 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
5671 | var_tmp_dir = strndupa(v, n); | |
5672 | if (v[n] != ' ') | |
5673 | goto finalize; | |
5674 | p = v + n + 1; | |
5675 | } | |
5676 | ||
5677 | v = startswith(p, "netns-socket-0="); | |
5678 | if (v) { | |
5679 | char *buf; | |
5680 | ||
5681 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
5682 | buf = strndupa(v, n); | |
5683 | if (safe_atoi(buf, &fd0) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd0)) { | |
5684 | log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification."); | |
5685 | return; | |
60f067b4 | 5686 | } |
98393f85 MB |
5687 | fd0 = fdset_remove(fds, fd0); |
5688 | if (v[n] != ' ') | |
5689 | goto finalize; | |
5690 | p = v + n + 1; | |
60f067b4 JS |
5691 | } |
5692 | ||
98393f85 MB |
5693 | v = startswith(p, "netns-socket-1="); |
5694 | if (v) { | |
5695 | char *buf; | |
60f067b4 | 5696 | |
98393f85 MB |
5697 | n = strcspn(v, " "); |
5698 | buf = strndupa(v, n); | |
5699 | if (safe_atoi(buf, &fd1) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd1)) { | |
5700 | log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification."); | |
5701 | return; | |
60f067b4 | 5702 | } |
98393f85 MB |
5703 | fd1 = fdset_remove(fds, fd1); |
5704 | } | |
60f067b4 | 5705 | |
98393f85 MB |
5706 | finalize: |
5707 | ||
5708 | r = exec_runtime_add(m, id, tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, (int[]) { fd0, fd1 }, NULL); | |
6e866b33 | 5709 | if (r < 0) |
98393f85 | 5710 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m"); |
98393f85 | 5711 | } |
60f067b4 | 5712 | |
98393f85 MB |
5713 | void exec_runtime_vacuum(Manager *m) { |
5714 | ExecRuntime *rt; | |
5715 | Iterator i; | |
5716 | ||
5717 | assert(m); | |
5718 | ||
5719 | /* Free unreferenced ExecRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */ | |
5720 | ||
5721 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt, m->exec_runtime_by_id, i) { | |
5722 | if (rt->n_ref > 0) | |
5723 | continue; | |
5724 | ||
5725 | (void) exec_runtime_free(rt, false); | |
5726 | } | |
60f067b4 JS |
5727 | } |
5728 | ||
6e866b33 MB |
5729 | void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters *p) { |
5730 | if (!p) | |
5731 | return; | |
5732 | ||
5733 | strv_free(p->environment); | |
5734 | } | |
5735 | ||
663996b3 MS |
5736 | static const char* const exec_input_table[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX] = { |
5737 | [EXEC_INPUT_NULL] = "null", | |
5738 | [EXEC_INPUT_TTY] = "tty", | |
5739 | [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE] = "tty-force", | |
5740 | [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL] = "tty-fail", | |
8a584da2 MP |
5741 | [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET] = "socket", |
5742 | [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD] = "fd", | |
52ad194e MB |
5743 | [EXEC_INPUT_DATA] = "data", |
5744 | [EXEC_INPUT_FILE] = "file", | |
663996b3 MS |
5745 | }; |
5746 | ||
5747 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input, ExecInput); | |
5748 | ||
5749 | static const char* const exec_output_table[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX] = { | |
5750 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT] = "inherit", | |
5751 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL] = "null", | |
5752 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY] = "tty", | |
5753 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG] = "syslog", | |
5754 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE] = "syslog+console", | |
5755 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG] = "kmsg", | |
5756 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE] = "kmsg+console", | |
5757 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL] = "journal", | |
5758 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE] = "journal+console", | |
8a584da2 MP |
5759 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET] = "socket", |
5760 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD] = "fd", | |
52ad194e | 5761 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE] = "file", |
6e866b33 | 5762 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND] = "append", |
663996b3 MS |
5763 | }; |
5764 | ||
5765 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output, ExecOutput); | |
13d276d0 MP |
5766 | |
5767 | static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX] = { | |
5768 | [EXEC_UTMP_INIT] = "init", | |
5769 | [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN] = "login", | |
5770 | [EXEC_UTMP_USER] = "user", | |
5771 | }; | |
5772 | ||
5773 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode, ExecUtmpMode); | |
f5e65279 MB |
5774 | |
5775 | static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX] = { | |
5776 | [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO] = "no", | |
5777 | [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES] = "yes", | |
5778 | [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART] = "restart", | |
5779 | }; | |
5780 | ||
5781 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode, ExecPreserveMode, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES); | |
5782 | ||
f2dec872 | 5783 | /* This table maps ExecDirectoryType to the setting it is configured with in the unit */ |
f5e65279 MB |
5784 | static const char* const exec_directory_type_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { |
5785 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RuntimeDirectory", | |
5786 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "StateDirectory", | |
5787 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CacheDirectory", | |
5788 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LogsDirectory", | |
5789 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "ConfigurationDirectory", | |
5790 | }; | |
5791 | ||
5792 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type, ExecDirectoryType); | |
5793 | ||
f2dec872 BR |
5794 | /* And this table maps ExecDirectoryType too, but to a generic term identifying the type of resource. This |
5795 | * one is supposed to be generic enough to be used for unit types that don't use ExecContext and per-unit | |
5796 | * directories, specifically .timer units with their timestamp touch file. */ | |
5797 | static const char* const exec_resource_type_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { | |
5798 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "runtime", | |
5799 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "state", | |
5800 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "cache", | |
5801 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "logs", | |
5802 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "configuration", | |
5803 | }; | |
5804 | ||
5805 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_resource_type, ExecDirectoryType); | |
5806 | ||
5807 | /* And this table also maps ExecDirectoryType, to the environment variable we pass the selected directory to | |
5808 | * the service payload in. */ | |
6e866b33 MB |
5809 | static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { |
5810 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY", | |
5811 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "STATE_DIRECTORY", | |
5812 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY", | |
5813 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY", | |
5814 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY", | |
5815 | }; | |
5816 | ||
5817 | DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name, ExecDirectoryType); | |
5818 | ||
f5e65279 MB |
5819 | static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX] = { |
5820 | [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT] = "inherit", | |
5821 | [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE] = "private", | |
5822 | [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED] = "shared", | |
5823 | }; | |
5824 | ||
5825 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode, ExecKeyringMode); |