]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_qemu.git/blame - target/arm/ptw.c
target/arm: NSTable is RES0 for the RME EL3 regime
[mirror_qemu.git] / target / arm / ptw.c
CommitLineData
8ae08860
RH
1/*
2 * ARM page table walking.
3 *
4 * This code is licensed under the GNU GPL v2 or later.
5 *
6 * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
7 */
8
9#include "qemu/osdep.h"
10#include "qemu/log.h"
1f2e87e5 11#include "qemu/range.h"
71943a1e 12#include "qemu/main-loop.h"
f3639a64 13#include "exec/exec-all.h"
8ae08860
RH
14#include "cpu.h"
15#include "internals.h"
2c1f429d 16#include "idau.h"
007cd176
RH
17#ifdef CONFIG_TCG
18# include "tcg/oversized-guest.h"
19#endif
8ae08860 20
6d2654ff
RH
21typedef struct S1Translate {
22 ARMMMUIdx in_mmu_idx;
48da29e4 23 ARMMMUIdx in_ptw_idx;
90c66293 24 ARMSecuritySpace in_space;
6d2654ff 25 bool in_secure;
4a358556 26 bool in_debug;
6d2654ff 27 bool out_secure;
71943a1e 28 bool out_rw;
4e7a2c98 29 bool out_be;
90c66293 30 ARMSecuritySpace out_space;
71943a1e 31 hwaddr out_virt;
6d2654ff 32 hwaddr out_phys;
f3639a64 33 void *out_host;
6d2654ff
RH
34} S1Translate;
35
36static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
37 uint64_t address,
38 MMUAccessType access_type, bool s1_is_el0,
86a438b4 39 GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi);
11552bb0 40
3f5a74c5
RH
41static bool get_phys_addr_with_struct(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
42 target_ulong address,
43 MMUAccessType access_type,
44 GetPhysAddrResult *result,
86a438b4 45 ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi);
3f5a74c5 46
1c73d848
RH
47/* This mapping is common between ID_AA64MMFR0.PARANGE and TCR_ELx.{I}PS. */
48static const uint8_t pamax_map[] = {
49 [0] = 32,
50 [1] = 36,
51 [2] = 40,
52 [3] = 42,
53 [4] = 44,
54 [5] = 48,
55 [6] = 52,
56};
57
58/* The cpu-specific constant value of PAMax; also used by hw/arm/virt. */
59unsigned int arm_pamax(ARMCPU *cpu)
60{
22536b13
RH
61 if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_AARCH64)) {
62 unsigned int parange =
63 FIELD_EX64(cpu->isar.id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, PARANGE);
1c73d848 64
22536b13
RH
65 /*
66 * id_aa64mmfr0 is a read-only register so values outside of the
67 * supported mappings can be considered an implementation error.
68 */
69 assert(parange < ARRAY_SIZE(pamax_map));
70 return pamax_map[parange];
71 }
59e1b8a2
RH
72
73 /*
74 * In machvirt_init, we call arm_pamax on a cpu that is not fully
75 * initialized, so we can't rely on the propagation done in realize.
76 */
77 if (arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_LPAE) ||
78 arm_feature(&cpu->env, ARM_FEATURE_V7VE)) {
22536b13
RH
79 /* v7 with LPAE */
80 return 40;
81 }
82 /* Anything else */
83 return 32;
1c73d848
RH
84}
85
1d261255
RH
86/*
87 * Convert a possible stage1+2 MMU index into the appropriate stage 1 MMU index
88 */
89ARMMMUIdx stage_1_mmu_idx(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
90{
91 switch (mmu_idx) {
1d261255
RH
92 case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
93 return ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0;
94 case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
95 return ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1;
96 case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
97 return ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN;
98 default:
99 return mmu_idx;
100 }
101}
102
103ARMMMUIdx arm_stage1_mmu_idx(CPUARMState *env)
104{
105 return stage_1_mmu_idx(arm_mmu_idx(env));
106}
107
fcc0b041
PM
108/*
109 * Return where we should do ptw loads from for a stage 2 walk.
110 * This depends on whether the address we are looking up is a
111 * Secure IPA or a NonSecure IPA, which we know from whether this is
112 * Stage2 or Stage2_S.
113 * If this is the Secure EL1&0 regime we need to check the NSW and SW bits.
114 */
115static ARMMMUIdx ptw_idx_for_stage_2(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx stage2idx)
116{
117 bool s2walk_secure;
118
119 /*
120 * We're OK to check the current state of the CPU here because
121 * (1) we always invalidate all TLBs when the SCR_EL3.NS bit changes
122 * (2) there's no way to do a lookup that cares about Stage 2 for a
123 * different security state to the current one for AArch64, and AArch32
124 * never has a secure EL2. (AArch32 ATS12NSO[UP][RW] allow EL3 to do
125 * an NS stage 1+2 lookup while the NS bit is 0.)
126 */
127 if (!arm_is_secure_below_el3(env) || !arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3)) {
128 return ARMMMUIdx_Phys_NS;
129 }
130 if (stage2idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) {
131 s2walk_secure = !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & VSTCR_SW);
132 } else {
133 s2walk_secure = !(env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & VTCR_NSW);
134 }
135 return s2walk_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Phys_S : ARMMMUIdx_Phys_NS;
136
137}
138
11552bb0
RH
139static bool regime_translation_big_endian(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
140{
141 return (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_EE) != 0;
142}
143
3b318aae
RH
144/* Return the TTBR associated with this translation regime */
145static uint64_t regime_ttbr(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, int ttbrn)
146{
147 if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2) {
148 return env->cp15.vttbr_el2;
149 }
150 if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) {
151 return env->cp15.vsttbr_el2;
152 }
153 if (ttbrn == 0) {
154 return env->cp15.ttbr0_el[regime_el(env, mmu_idx)];
155 } else {
156 return env->cp15.ttbr1_el[regime_el(env, mmu_idx)];
157 }
158}
159
8db1a3a0 160/* Return true if the specified stage of address translation is disabled */
7e80c0a4
RH
161static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
162 bool is_secure)
8db1a3a0
RH
163{
164 uint64_t hcr_el2;
165
166 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
7e80c0a4 167 switch (env->v7m.mpu_ctrl[is_secure] &
8db1a3a0
RH
168 (R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_ENABLE_MASK | R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_HFNMIENA_MASK)) {
169 case R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_ENABLE_MASK:
170 /* Enabled, but not for HardFault and NMI */
171 return mmu_idx & ARM_MMU_IDX_M_NEGPRI;
172 case R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_ENABLE_MASK | R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_HFNMIENA_MASK:
173 /* Enabled for all cases */
174 return false;
175 case 0:
176 default:
177 /*
178 * HFNMIENA set and ENABLE clear is UNPREDICTABLE, but
179 * we warned about that in armv7m_nvic.c when the guest set it.
180 */
181 return true;
182 }
183 }
184
2189c798 185 hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
8db1a3a0 186
3b2af993
RH
187 switch (mmu_idx) {
188 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2:
189 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S:
8db1a3a0
RH
190 /* HCR.DC means HCR.VM behaves as 1 */
191 return (hcr_el2 & (HCR_DC | HCR_VM)) == 0;
8db1a3a0 192
3b2af993
RH
193 case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
194 case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
195 case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
fdf12933
RH
196 /* TGE means that EL0/1 act as if SCTLR_EL1.M is zero */
197 if (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE) {
8db1a3a0
RH
198 return true;
199 }
3b2af993 200 break;
8db1a3a0 201
3b2af993
RH
202 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0:
203 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1:
204 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN:
8db1a3a0 205 /* HCR.DC means SCTLR_EL1.M behaves as 0 */
3b2af993
RH
206 if (hcr_el2 & HCR_DC) {
207 return true;
208 }
209 break;
210
211 case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0:
212 case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2:
213 case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
214 case ARMMMUIdx_E2:
215 case ARMMMUIdx_E3:
216 break;
217
a1ce3084 218 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_S:
bb5cc2c8
RH
219 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_NS:
220 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_Root:
221 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_Realm:
a1ce3084
RH
222 /* No translation for physical address spaces. */
223 return true;
224
3b2af993
RH
225 default:
226 g_assert_not_reached();
8db1a3a0
RH
227 }
228
229 return (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_M) == 0;
230}
231
f3639a64 232static bool S2_attrs_are_device(uint64_t hcr, uint8_t attrs)
11552bb0
RH
233{
234 /*
235 * For an S1 page table walk, the stage 1 attributes are always
236 * some form of "this is Normal memory". The combined S1+S2
237 * attributes are therefore only Device if stage 2 specifies Device.
238 * With HCR_EL2.FWB == 0 this is when descriptor bits [5:4] are 0b00,
239 * ie when cacheattrs.attrs bits [3:2] are 0b00.
240 * With HCR_EL2.FWB == 1 this is when descriptor bit [4] is 0, ie
241 * when cacheattrs.attrs bit [2] is 0.
242 */
ac76c2e5 243 if (hcr & HCR_FWB) {
f3639a64 244 return (attrs & 0x4) == 0;
11552bb0 245 } else {
f3639a64 246 return (attrs & 0xc) == 0;
11552bb0
RH
247 }
248}
249
250/* Translate a S1 pagetable walk through S2 if needed. */
6d2654ff
RH
251static bool S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
252 hwaddr addr, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
11552bb0 253{
90c66293 254 ARMSecuritySpace space = ptw->in_space;
6d2654ff 255 bool is_secure = ptw->in_secure;
f3639a64 256 ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx = ptw->in_mmu_idx;
48da29e4 257 ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx = ptw->in_ptw_idx;
f3639a64 258 uint8_t pte_attrs;
f3639a64 259
71943a1e
RH
260 ptw->out_virt = addr;
261
f3639a64
RH
262 if (unlikely(ptw->in_debug)) {
263 /*
264 * From gdbstub, do not use softmmu so that we don't modify the
265 * state of the cpu at all, including softmmu tlb contents.
266 */
48da29e4 267 if (regime_is_stage2(s2_mmu_idx)) {
f3639a64
RH
268 S1Translate s2ptw = {
269 .in_mmu_idx = s2_mmu_idx,
fcc0b041
PM
270 .in_ptw_idx = ptw_idx_for_stage_2(env, s2_mmu_idx),
271 .in_secure = s2_mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S,
90c66293
RH
272 .in_space = (s2_mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S ? ARMSS_Secure
273 : space == ARMSS_Realm ? ARMSS_Realm
274 : ARMSS_NonSecure),
f3639a64
RH
275 .in_debug = true,
276 };
277 GetPhysAddrResult s2 = { };
48da29e4 278
4a1103af
RH
279 if (get_phys_addr_lpae(env, &s2ptw, addr, MMU_DATA_LOAD,
280 false, &s2, fi)) {
f3639a64
RH
281 goto fail;
282 }
283 ptw->out_phys = s2.f.phys_addr;
284 pte_attrs = s2.cacheattrs.attrs;
fcc0b041 285 ptw->out_secure = s2.f.attrs.secure;
90c66293 286 ptw->out_space = s2.f.attrs.space;
48da29e4
RH
287 } else {
288 /* Regime is physical. */
289 ptw->out_phys = addr;
290 pte_attrs = 0;
fcc0b041 291 ptw->out_secure = s2_mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Phys_S;
90c66293
RH
292 ptw->out_space = (s2_mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Phys_S ? ARMSS_Secure
293 : space == ARMSS_Realm ? ARMSS_Realm
294 : ARMSS_NonSecure);
11552bb0 295 }
f3639a64 296 ptw->out_host = NULL;
71943a1e 297 ptw->out_rw = false;
f3639a64 298 } else {
0d3de77a 299#ifdef CONFIG_TCG
f3639a64
RH
300 CPUTLBEntryFull *full;
301 int flags;
302
303 env->tlb_fi = fi;
d507e6c5 304 flags = probe_access_full(env, addr, 0, MMU_DATA_LOAD,
f3639a64
RH
305 arm_to_core_mmu_idx(s2_mmu_idx),
306 true, &ptw->out_host, &full, 0);
307 env->tlb_fi = NULL;
308
309 if (unlikely(flags & TLB_INVALID_MASK)) {
310 goto fail;
311 }
9d2617ac 312 ptw->out_phys = full->phys_addr | (addr & ~TARGET_PAGE_MASK);
71943a1e 313 ptw->out_rw = full->prot & PAGE_WRITE;
f3639a64 314 pte_attrs = full->pte_attrs;
fcc0b041 315 ptw->out_secure = full->attrs.secure;
90c66293 316 ptw->out_space = full->attrs.space;
0d3de77a
FR
317#else
318 g_assert_not_reached();
319#endif
f3639a64 320 }
ac76c2e5 321
48da29e4 322 if (regime_is_stage2(s2_mmu_idx)) {
f3639a64
RH
323 uint64_t hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
324
325 if ((hcr & HCR_PTW) && S2_attrs_are_device(hcr, pte_attrs)) {
11552bb0
RH
326 /*
327 * PTW set and S1 walk touched S2 Device memory:
328 * generate Permission fault.
329 */
330 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
331 fi->s2addr = addr;
332 fi->stage2 = true;
333 fi->s1ptw = true;
ab1f7885 334 fi->s1ns = !is_secure;
6d2654ff 335 return false;
11552bb0 336 }
11552bb0 337 }
6d2654ff 338
f3639a64 339 ptw->out_be = regime_translation_big_endian(env, mmu_idx);
6d2654ff 340 return true;
f3639a64
RH
341
342 fail:
343 assert(fi->type != ARMFault_None);
344 fi->s2addr = addr;
345 fi->stage2 = true;
346 fi->s1ptw = true;
347 fi->s1ns = !is_secure;
348 return false;
11552bb0
RH
349}
350
351/* All loads done in the course of a page table walk go through here. */
93e5b3a6 352static uint32_t arm_ldl_ptw(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
6d2654ff 353 ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
11552bb0 354{
5e79887b 355 CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env);
71943a1e 356 void *host = ptw->out_host;
11552bb0
RH
357 uint32_t data;
358
71943a1e 359 if (likely(host)) {
f3639a64 360 /* Page tables are in RAM, and we have the host address. */
71943a1e 361 data = qatomic_read((uint32_t *)host);
f3639a64 362 if (ptw->out_be) {
71943a1e 363 data = be32_to_cpu(data);
f3639a64 364 } else {
71943a1e 365 data = le32_to_cpu(data);
f3639a64 366 }
11552bb0 367 } else {
f3639a64 368 /* Page tables are in MMIO. */
90c66293
RH
369 MemTxAttrs attrs = {
370 .secure = ptw->out_secure,
371 .space = ptw->out_space,
372 };
f3639a64
RH
373 AddressSpace *as = arm_addressspace(cs, attrs);
374 MemTxResult result = MEMTX_OK;
375
376 if (ptw->out_be) {
377 data = address_space_ldl_be(as, ptw->out_phys, attrs, &result);
378 } else {
379 data = address_space_ldl_le(as, ptw->out_phys, attrs, &result);
380 }
381 if (unlikely(result != MEMTX_OK)) {
382 fi->type = ARMFault_SyncExternalOnWalk;
383 fi->ea = arm_extabort_type(result);
384 return 0;
385 }
11552bb0 386 }
f3639a64 387 return data;
11552bb0
RH
388}
389
93e5b3a6 390static uint64_t arm_ldq_ptw(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
6d2654ff 391 ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
11552bb0 392{
5e79887b 393 CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env);
71943a1e 394 void *host = ptw->out_host;
11552bb0
RH
395 uint64_t data;
396
71943a1e 397 if (likely(host)) {
f3639a64 398 /* Page tables are in RAM, and we have the host address. */
71943a1e
RH
399#ifdef CONFIG_ATOMIC64
400 data = qatomic_read__nocheck((uint64_t *)host);
401 if (ptw->out_be) {
402 data = be64_to_cpu(data);
403 } else {
404 data = le64_to_cpu(data);
405 }
406#else
f3639a64 407 if (ptw->out_be) {
71943a1e 408 data = ldq_be_p(host);
f3639a64 409 } else {
71943a1e 410 data = ldq_le_p(host);
f3639a64 411 }
71943a1e 412#endif
11552bb0 413 } else {
f3639a64 414 /* Page tables are in MMIO. */
90c66293
RH
415 MemTxAttrs attrs = {
416 .secure = ptw->out_secure,
417 .space = ptw->out_space,
418 };
f3639a64
RH
419 AddressSpace *as = arm_addressspace(cs, attrs);
420 MemTxResult result = MEMTX_OK;
421
422 if (ptw->out_be) {
423 data = address_space_ldq_be(as, ptw->out_phys, attrs, &result);
424 } else {
425 data = address_space_ldq_le(as, ptw->out_phys, attrs, &result);
426 }
427 if (unlikely(result != MEMTX_OK)) {
428 fi->type = ARMFault_SyncExternalOnWalk;
429 fi->ea = arm_extabort_type(result);
430 return 0;
431 }
11552bb0 432 }
f3639a64 433 return data;
11552bb0
RH
434}
435
71943a1e
RH
436static uint64_t arm_casq_ptw(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t old_val,
437 uint64_t new_val, S1Translate *ptw,
438 ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
439{
d3ae5f5d 440#ifdef TARGET_AARCH64
71943a1e
RH
441 uint64_t cur_val;
442 void *host = ptw->out_host;
443
444 if (unlikely(!host)) {
445 fi->type = ARMFault_UnsuppAtomicUpdate;
446 fi->s1ptw = true;
447 return 0;
448 }
449
450 /*
451 * Raising a stage2 Protection fault for an atomic update to a read-only
452 * page is delayed until it is certain that there is a change to make.
453 */
454 if (unlikely(!ptw->out_rw)) {
455 int flags;
456 void *discard;
457
458 env->tlb_fi = fi;
1770b2f2 459 flags = probe_access_flags(env, ptw->out_virt, 0, MMU_DATA_STORE,
71943a1e
RH
460 arm_to_core_mmu_idx(ptw->in_ptw_idx),
461 true, &discard, 0);
462 env->tlb_fi = NULL;
463
464 if (unlikely(flags & TLB_INVALID_MASK)) {
465 assert(fi->type != ARMFault_None);
466 fi->s2addr = ptw->out_virt;
467 fi->stage2 = true;
468 fi->s1ptw = true;
469 fi->s1ns = !ptw->in_secure;
470 return 0;
471 }
472
473 /* In case CAS mismatches and we loop, remember writability. */
474 ptw->out_rw = true;
475 }
476
477#ifdef CONFIG_ATOMIC64
478 if (ptw->out_be) {
479 old_val = cpu_to_be64(old_val);
480 new_val = cpu_to_be64(new_val);
481 cur_val = qatomic_cmpxchg__nocheck((uint64_t *)host, old_val, new_val);
482 cur_val = be64_to_cpu(cur_val);
483 } else {
484 old_val = cpu_to_le64(old_val);
485 new_val = cpu_to_le64(new_val);
486 cur_val = qatomic_cmpxchg__nocheck((uint64_t *)host, old_val, new_val);
487 cur_val = le64_to_cpu(cur_val);
488 }
489#else
490 /*
491 * We can't support the full 64-bit atomic cmpxchg on the host.
492 * Because this is only used for FEAT_HAFDBS, which is only for AA64,
493 * we know that TCG_OVERSIZED_GUEST is set, which means that we are
494 * running in round-robin mode and could only race with dma i/o.
495 */
d3ae5f5d 496#if !TCG_OVERSIZED_GUEST
71943a1e
RH
497# error "Unexpected configuration"
498#endif
499 bool locked = qemu_mutex_iothread_locked();
500 if (!locked) {
501 qemu_mutex_lock_iothread();
502 }
503 if (ptw->out_be) {
504 cur_val = ldq_be_p(host);
505 if (cur_val == old_val) {
506 stq_be_p(host, new_val);
507 }
508 } else {
509 cur_val = ldq_le_p(host);
510 if (cur_val == old_val) {
511 stq_le_p(host, new_val);
512 }
513 }
514 if (!locked) {
515 qemu_mutex_unlock_iothread();
516 }
517#endif
518
519 return cur_val;
d3ae5f5d
RH
520#else
521 /* AArch32 does not have FEAT_HADFS. */
522 g_assert_not_reached();
523#endif
71943a1e
RH
524}
525
4c74ab15
RH
526static bool get_level1_table_address(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
527 uint32_t *table, uint32_t address)
528{
529 /* Note that we can only get here for an AArch32 PL0/PL1 lookup */
c1547bba 530 uint64_t tcr = regime_tcr(env, mmu_idx);
9e70e26c
PM
531 int maskshift = extract32(tcr, 0, 3);
532 uint32_t mask = ~(((uint32_t)0xffffffffu) >> maskshift);
533 uint32_t base_mask;
4c74ab15 534
9e70e26c
PM
535 if (address & mask) {
536 if (tcr & TTBCR_PD1) {
4c74ab15
RH
537 /* Translation table walk disabled for TTBR1 */
538 return false;
539 }
540 *table = regime_ttbr(env, mmu_idx, 1) & 0xffffc000;
541 } else {
9e70e26c 542 if (tcr & TTBCR_PD0) {
4c74ab15
RH
543 /* Translation table walk disabled for TTBR0 */
544 return false;
545 }
9e70e26c
PM
546 base_mask = ~((uint32_t)0x3fffu >> maskshift);
547 *table = regime_ttbr(env, mmu_idx, 0) & base_mask;
4c74ab15
RH
548 }
549 *table |= (address >> 18) & 0x3ffc;
550 return true;
551}
552
4845d3be
RH
553/*
554 * Translate section/page access permissions to page R/W protection flags
555 * @env: CPUARMState
556 * @mmu_idx: MMU index indicating required translation regime
557 * @ap: The 3-bit access permissions (AP[2:0])
558 * @domain_prot: The 2-bit domain access permissions
6f2d9d74 559 * @is_user: TRUE if accessing from PL0
4845d3be 560 */
6f2d9d74
TK
561static int ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
562 int ap, int domain_prot, bool is_user)
4845d3be 563{
4845d3be
RH
564 if (domain_prot == 3) {
565 return PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
566 }
567
568 switch (ap) {
569 case 0:
570 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V7)) {
571 return 0;
572 }
573 switch (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & (SCTLR_S | SCTLR_R)) {
574 case SCTLR_S:
575 return is_user ? 0 : PAGE_READ;
576 case SCTLR_R:
577 return PAGE_READ;
578 default:
579 return 0;
580 }
581 case 1:
582 return is_user ? 0 : PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
583 case 2:
584 if (is_user) {
585 return PAGE_READ;
586 } else {
587 return PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
588 }
589 case 3:
590 return PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
591 case 4: /* Reserved. */
592 return 0;
593 case 5:
594 return is_user ? 0 : PAGE_READ;
595 case 6:
596 return PAGE_READ;
597 case 7:
598 if (!arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V6K)) {
599 return 0;
600 }
601 return PAGE_READ;
602 default:
603 g_assert_not_reached();
604 }
605}
606
6f2d9d74
TK
607/*
608 * Translate section/page access permissions to page R/W protection flags
609 * @env: CPUARMState
610 * @mmu_idx: MMU index indicating required translation regime
611 * @ap: The 3-bit access permissions (AP[2:0])
612 * @domain_prot: The 2-bit domain access permissions
613 */
614static int ap_to_rw_prot(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
615 int ap, int domain_prot)
616{
617 return ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(env, mmu_idx, ap, domain_prot,
618 regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx));
619}
620
4845d3be
RH
621/*
622 * Translate section/page access permissions to page R/W protection flags.
623 * @ap: The 2-bit simple AP (AP[2:1])
624 * @is_user: TRUE if accessing from PL0
625 */
626static int simple_ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(int ap, bool is_user)
627{
628 switch (ap) {
629 case 0:
630 return is_user ? 0 : PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
631 case 1:
632 return PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
633 case 2:
634 return is_user ? 0 : PAGE_READ;
635 case 3:
636 return PAGE_READ;
637 default:
638 g_assert_not_reached();
639 }
640}
641
642static int simple_ap_to_rw_prot(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, int ap)
643{
644 return simple_ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(ap, regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx));
645}
646
6d2654ff
RH
647static bool get_phys_addr_v5(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
648 uint32_t address, MMUAccessType access_type,
649 GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
f2d2f5ce 650{
f2d2f5ce
RH
651 int level = 1;
652 uint32_t table;
653 uint32_t desc;
654 int type;
655 int ap;
656 int domain = 0;
657 int domain_prot;
658 hwaddr phys_addr;
659 uint32_t dacr;
660
661 /* Pagetable walk. */
662 /* Lookup l1 descriptor. */
6d2654ff 663 if (!get_level1_table_address(env, ptw->in_mmu_idx, &table, address)) {
f2d2f5ce
RH
664 /* Section translation fault if page walk is disabled by PD0 or PD1 */
665 fi->type = ARMFault_Translation;
666 goto do_fault;
667 }
93e5b3a6
RH
668 if (!S1_ptw_translate(env, ptw, table, fi)) {
669 goto do_fault;
670 }
671 desc = arm_ldl_ptw(env, ptw, fi);
f2d2f5ce
RH
672 if (fi->type != ARMFault_None) {
673 goto do_fault;
674 }
675 type = (desc & 3);
676 domain = (desc >> 5) & 0x0f;
6d2654ff 677 if (regime_el(env, ptw->in_mmu_idx) == 1) {
f2d2f5ce
RH
678 dacr = env->cp15.dacr_ns;
679 } else {
680 dacr = env->cp15.dacr_s;
681 }
682 domain_prot = (dacr >> (domain * 2)) & 3;
683 if (type == 0) {
684 /* Section translation fault. */
685 fi->type = ARMFault_Translation;
686 goto do_fault;
687 }
688 if (type != 2) {
689 level = 2;
690 }
691 if (domain_prot == 0 || domain_prot == 2) {
692 fi->type = ARMFault_Domain;
693 goto do_fault;
694 }
695 if (type == 2) {
696 /* 1Mb section. */
697 phys_addr = (desc & 0xfff00000) | (address & 0x000fffff);
698 ap = (desc >> 10) & 3;
7fa7ea8f 699 result->f.lg_page_size = 20; /* 1MB */
f2d2f5ce
RH
700 } else {
701 /* Lookup l2 entry. */
702 if (type == 1) {
703 /* Coarse pagetable. */
704 table = (desc & 0xfffffc00) | ((address >> 10) & 0x3fc);
705 } else {
706 /* Fine pagetable. */
707 table = (desc & 0xfffff000) | ((address >> 8) & 0xffc);
708 }
93e5b3a6
RH
709 if (!S1_ptw_translate(env, ptw, table, fi)) {
710 goto do_fault;
711 }
712 desc = arm_ldl_ptw(env, ptw, fi);
f2d2f5ce
RH
713 if (fi->type != ARMFault_None) {
714 goto do_fault;
715 }
716 switch (desc & 3) {
717 case 0: /* Page translation fault. */
718 fi->type = ARMFault_Translation;
719 goto do_fault;
720 case 1: /* 64k page. */
721 phys_addr = (desc & 0xffff0000) | (address & 0xffff);
722 ap = (desc >> (4 + ((address >> 13) & 6))) & 3;
7fa7ea8f 723 result->f.lg_page_size = 16;
f2d2f5ce
RH
724 break;
725 case 2: /* 4k page. */
726 phys_addr = (desc & 0xfffff000) | (address & 0xfff);
727 ap = (desc >> (4 + ((address >> 9) & 6))) & 3;
7fa7ea8f 728 result->f.lg_page_size = 12;
f2d2f5ce
RH
729 break;
730 case 3: /* 1k page, or ARMv6/XScale "extended small (4k) page" */
731 if (type == 1) {
732 /* ARMv6/XScale extended small page format */
733 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_XSCALE)
734 || arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V6)) {
735 phys_addr = (desc & 0xfffff000) | (address & 0xfff);
7fa7ea8f 736 result->f.lg_page_size = 12;
f2d2f5ce
RH
737 } else {
738 /*
739 * UNPREDICTABLE in ARMv5; we choose to take a
740 * page translation fault.
741 */
742 fi->type = ARMFault_Translation;
743 goto do_fault;
744 }
745 } else {
746 phys_addr = (desc & 0xfffffc00) | (address & 0x3ff);
7fa7ea8f 747 result->f.lg_page_size = 10;
f2d2f5ce
RH
748 }
749 ap = (desc >> 4) & 3;
750 break;
751 default:
752 /* Never happens, but compiler isn't smart enough to tell. */
753 g_assert_not_reached();
754 }
755 }
6d2654ff 756 result->f.prot = ap_to_rw_prot(env, ptw->in_mmu_idx, ap, domain_prot);
7fa7ea8f
RH
757 result->f.prot |= result->f.prot ? PAGE_EXEC : 0;
758 if (!(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type))) {
f2d2f5ce
RH
759 /* Access permission fault. */
760 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
761 goto do_fault;
762 }
7fa7ea8f 763 result->f.phys_addr = phys_addr;
f2d2f5ce 764 return false;
53c038ef
RH
765do_fault:
766 fi->domain = domain;
767 fi->level = level;
768 return true;
769}
770
6d2654ff
RH
771static bool get_phys_addr_v6(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
772 uint32_t address, MMUAccessType access_type,
773 GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
53c038ef 774{
53c038ef 775 ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
6d2654ff 776 ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx = ptw->in_mmu_idx;
53c038ef
RH
777 int level = 1;
778 uint32_t table;
779 uint32_t desc;
780 uint32_t xn;
781 uint32_t pxn = 0;
782 int type;
783 int ap;
784 int domain = 0;
785 int domain_prot;
786 hwaddr phys_addr;
787 uint32_t dacr;
788 bool ns;
6f2d9d74 789 int user_prot;
53c038ef
RH
790
791 /* Pagetable walk. */
792 /* Lookup l1 descriptor. */
793 if (!get_level1_table_address(env, mmu_idx, &table, address)) {
794 /* Section translation fault if page walk is disabled by PD0 or PD1 */
795 fi->type = ARMFault_Translation;
796 goto do_fault;
797 }
93e5b3a6
RH
798 if (!S1_ptw_translate(env, ptw, table, fi)) {
799 goto do_fault;
800 }
801 desc = arm_ldl_ptw(env, ptw, fi);
53c038ef
RH
802 if (fi->type != ARMFault_None) {
803 goto do_fault;
804 }
805 type = (desc & 3);
806 if (type == 0 || (type == 3 && !cpu_isar_feature(aa32_pxn, cpu))) {
807 /* Section translation fault, or attempt to use the encoding
808 * which is Reserved on implementations without PXN.
809 */
810 fi->type = ARMFault_Translation;
811 goto do_fault;
812 }
813 if ((type == 1) || !(desc & (1 << 18))) {
814 /* Page or Section. */
815 domain = (desc >> 5) & 0x0f;
816 }
817 if (regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 1) {
818 dacr = env->cp15.dacr_ns;
819 } else {
820 dacr = env->cp15.dacr_s;
821 }
822 if (type == 1) {
823 level = 2;
824 }
825 domain_prot = (dacr >> (domain * 2)) & 3;
826 if (domain_prot == 0 || domain_prot == 2) {
827 /* Section or Page domain fault */
828 fi->type = ARMFault_Domain;
829 goto do_fault;
830 }
831 if (type != 1) {
832 if (desc & (1 << 18)) {
833 /* Supersection. */
834 phys_addr = (desc & 0xff000000) | (address & 0x00ffffff);
835 phys_addr |= (uint64_t)extract32(desc, 20, 4) << 32;
836 phys_addr |= (uint64_t)extract32(desc, 5, 4) << 36;
7fa7ea8f 837 result->f.lg_page_size = 24; /* 16MB */
53c038ef
RH
838 } else {
839 /* Section. */
840 phys_addr = (desc & 0xfff00000) | (address & 0x000fffff);
7fa7ea8f 841 result->f.lg_page_size = 20; /* 1MB */
53c038ef
RH
842 }
843 ap = ((desc >> 10) & 3) | ((desc >> 13) & 4);
844 xn = desc & (1 << 4);
845 pxn = desc & 1;
846 ns = extract32(desc, 19, 1);
847 } else {
848 if (cpu_isar_feature(aa32_pxn, cpu)) {
849 pxn = (desc >> 2) & 1;
850 }
851 ns = extract32(desc, 3, 1);
852 /* Lookup l2 entry. */
853 table = (desc & 0xfffffc00) | ((address >> 10) & 0x3fc);
93e5b3a6
RH
854 if (!S1_ptw_translate(env, ptw, table, fi)) {
855 goto do_fault;
856 }
857 desc = arm_ldl_ptw(env, ptw, fi);
53c038ef
RH
858 if (fi->type != ARMFault_None) {
859 goto do_fault;
860 }
861 ap = ((desc >> 4) & 3) | ((desc >> 7) & 4);
862 switch (desc & 3) {
863 case 0: /* Page translation fault. */
864 fi->type = ARMFault_Translation;
865 goto do_fault;
866 case 1: /* 64k page. */
867 phys_addr = (desc & 0xffff0000) | (address & 0xffff);
868 xn = desc & (1 << 15);
7fa7ea8f 869 result->f.lg_page_size = 16;
53c038ef
RH
870 break;
871 case 2: case 3: /* 4k page. */
872 phys_addr = (desc & 0xfffff000) | (address & 0xfff);
873 xn = desc & 1;
7fa7ea8f 874 result->f.lg_page_size = 12;
53c038ef
RH
875 break;
876 default:
877 /* Never happens, but compiler isn't smart enough to tell. */
878 g_assert_not_reached();
879 }
880 }
881 if (domain_prot == 3) {
7fa7ea8f 882 result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
53c038ef
RH
883 } else {
884 if (pxn && !regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx)) {
885 xn = 1;
886 }
887 if (xn && access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) {
888 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
889 goto do_fault;
890 }
891
892 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V6K) &&
893 (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_AFE)) {
894 /* The simplified model uses AP[0] as an access control bit. */
895 if ((ap & 1) == 0) {
896 /* Access flag fault. */
897 fi->type = ARMFault_AccessFlag;
898 goto do_fault;
899 }
7fa7ea8f 900 result->f.prot = simple_ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap >> 1);
6f2d9d74 901 user_prot = simple_ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(ap >> 1, 1);
53c038ef 902 } else {
7fa7ea8f 903 result->f.prot = ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap, domain_prot);
6f2d9d74 904 user_prot = ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(env, mmu_idx, ap, domain_prot, 1);
53c038ef 905 }
7fa7ea8f
RH
906 if (result->f.prot && !xn) {
907 result->f.prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
53c038ef 908 }
7fa7ea8f 909 if (!(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type))) {
53c038ef
RH
910 /* Access permission fault. */
911 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
912 goto do_fault;
913 }
6f2d9d74
TK
914 if (regime_is_pan(env, mmu_idx) &&
915 !regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx) &&
916 user_prot &&
917 access_type != MMU_INST_FETCH) {
918 /* Privileged Access Never fault */
919 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
920 goto do_fault;
921 }
53c038ef
RH
922 }
923 if (ns) {
924 /* The NS bit will (as required by the architecture) have no effect if
925 * the CPU doesn't support TZ or this is a non-secure translation
926 * regime, because the attribute will already be non-secure.
927 */
7fa7ea8f 928 result->f.attrs.secure = false;
90c66293 929 result->f.attrs.space = ARMSS_NonSecure;
53c038ef 930 }
7fa7ea8f 931 result->f.phys_addr = phys_addr;
53c038ef 932 return false;
f2d2f5ce
RH
933do_fault:
934 fi->domain = domain;
935 fi->level = level;
936 return true;
937}
938
f8526edc
RH
939/*
940 * Translate S2 section/page access permissions to protection flags
941 * @env: CPUARMState
942 * @s2ap: The 2-bit stage2 access permissions (S2AP)
943 * @xn: XN (execute-never) bits
944 * @s1_is_el0: true if this is S2 of an S1+2 walk for EL0
945 */
946static int get_S2prot(CPUARMState *env, int s2ap, int xn, bool s1_is_el0)
947{
948 int prot = 0;
949
950 if (s2ap & 1) {
951 prot |= PAGE_READ;
952 }
953 if (s2ap & 2) {
954 prot |= PAGE_WRITE;
955 }
956
957 if (cpu_isar_feature(any_tts2uxn, env_archcpu(env))) {
958 switch (xn) {
959 case 0:
960 prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
961 break;
962 case 1:
963 if (s1_is_el0) {
964 prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
965 }
966 break;
967 case 2:
968 break;
969 case 3:
970 if (!s1_is_el0) {
971 prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
972 }
973 break;
974 default:
975 g_assert_not_reached();
976 }
977 } else {
978 if (!extract32(xn, 1, 1)) {
979 if (arm_el_is_aa64(env, 2) || prot & PAGE_READ) {
980 prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
981 }
982 }
983 }
984 return prot;
985}
986
987/*
988 * Translate section/page access permissions to protection flags
989 * @env: CPUARMState
990 * @mmu_idx: MMU index indicating required translation regime
991 * @is_aa64: TRUE if AArch64
992 * @ap: The 2-bit simple AP (AP[2:1])
993 * @ns: NS (non-secure) bit
994 * @xn: XN (execute-never) bit
995 * @pxn: PXN (privileged execute-never) bit
996 */
997static int get_S1prot(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool is_aa64,
998 int ap, int ns, int xn, int pxn)
999{
dd17143f 1000 ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
f8526edc
RH
1001 bool is_user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx);
1002 int prot_rw, user_rw;
1003 bool have_wxn;
1004 int wxn = 0;
1005
edc05dd4 1006 assert(!regime_is_stage2(mmu_idx));
f8526edc
RH
1007
1008 user_rw = simple_ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(ap, true);
1009 if (is_user) {
1010 prot_rw = user_rw;
1011 } else {
dd17143f
PM
1012 /*
1013 * PAN controls can forbid data accesses but don't affect insn fetch.
1014 * Plain PAN forbids data accesses if EL0 has data permissions;
1015 * PAN3 forbids data accesses if EL0 has either data or exec perms.
1016 * Note that for AArch64 the 'user can exec' case is exactly !xn.
1017 * We make the IMPDEF choices that SCR_EL3.SIF and Realm EL2&0
1018 * do not affect EPAN.
1019 */
f8526edc 1020 if (user_rw && regime_is_pan(env, mmu_idx)) {
dd17143f
PM
1021 prot_rw = 0;
1022 } else if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_pan3, cpu) && is_aa64 &&
1023 regime_is_pan(env, mmu_idx) &&
1024 (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_EPAN) && !xn) {
f8526edc
RH
1025 prot_rw = 0;
1026 } else {
1027 prot_rw = simple_ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(ap, false);
1028 }
1029 }
1030
1031 if (ns && arm_is_secure(env) && (env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_SIF)) {
1032 return prot_rw;
1033 }
1034
1035 /* TODO have_wxn should be replaced with
1036 * ARM_FEATURE_V8 || (ARM_FEATURE_V7 && ARM_FEATURE_EL2)
1037 * when ARM_FEATURE_EL2 starts getting set. For now we assume all LPAE
1038 * compatible processors have EL2, which is required for [U]WXN.
1039 */
1040 have_wxn = arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_LPAE);
1041
1042 if (have_wxn) {
1043 wxn = regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_WXN;
1044 }
1045
1046 if (is_aa64) {
1047 if (regime_has_2_ranges(mmu_idx) && !is_user) {
1048 xn = pxn || (user_rw & PAGE_WRITE);
1049 }
1050 } else if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V7)) {
1051 switch (regime_el(env, mmu_idx)) {
1052 case 1:
1053 case 3:
1054 if (is_user) {
1055 xn = xn || !(user_rw & PAGE_READ);
1056 } else {
1057 int uwxn = 0;
1058 if (have_wxn) {
1059 uwxn = regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_UWXN;
1060 }
1061 xn = xn || !(prot_rw & PAGE_READ) || pxn ||
1062 (uwxn && (user_rw & PAGE_WRITE));
1063 }
1064 break;
1065 case 2:
1066 break;
1067 }
1068 } else {
1069 xn = wxn = 0;
1070 }
1071
1072 if (xn || (wxn && (prot_rw & PAGE_WRITE))) {
1073 return prot_rw;
1074 }
1075 return prot_rw | PAGE_EXEC;
1076}
1077
2f0ec92e
RH
1078static ARMVAParameters aa32_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t va,
1079 ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
1080{
c1547bba 1081 uint64_t tcr = regime_tcr(env, mmu_idx);
2f0ec92e
RH
1082 uint32_t el = regime_el(env, mmu_idx);
1083 int select, tsz;
1084 bool epd, hpd;
1085
1086 assert(mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S);
1087
1088 if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2) {
1089 /* VTCR */
1090 bool sext = extract32(tcr, 4, 1);
1091 bool sign = extract32(tcr, 3, 1);
1092
1093 /*
1094 * If the sign-extend bit is not the same as t0sz[3], the result
1095 * is unpredictable. Flag this as a guest error.
1096 */
1097 if (sign != sext) {
1098 qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
1099 "AArch32: VTCR.S / VTCR.T0SZ[3] mismatch\n");
1100 }
1101 tsz = sextract32(tcr, 0, 4) + 8;
1102 select = 0;
1103 hpd = false;
1104 epd = false;
1105 } else if (el == 2) {
1106 /* HTCR */
1107 tsz = extract32(tcr, 0, 3);
1108 select = 0;
1109 hpd = extract64(tcr, 24, 1);
1110 epd = false;
1111 } else {
1112 int t0sz = extract32(tcr, 0, 3);
1113 int t1sz = extract32(tcr, 16, 3);
1114
1115 if (t1sz == 0) {
1116 select = va > (0xffffffffu >> t0sz);
1117 } else {
1118 /* Note that we will detect errors later. */
1119 select = va >= ~(0xffffffffu >> t1sz);
1120 }
1121 if (!select) {
1122 tsz = t0sz;
1123 epd = extract32(tcr, 7, 1);
1124 hpd = extract64(tcr, 41, 1);
1125 } else {
1126 tsz = t1sz;
1127 epd = extract32(tcr, 23, 1);
1128 hpd = extract64(tcr, 42, 1);
1129 }
1130 /* For aarch32, hpd0 is not enabled without t2e as well. */
1131 hpd &= extract32(tcr, 6, 1);
1132 }
1133
1134 return (ARMVAParameters) {
1135 .tsz = tsz,
1136 .select = select,
1137 .epd = epd,
1138 .hpd = hpd,
1139 };
1140}
1141
c5168785
RH
1142/*
1143 * check_s2_mmu_setup
1144 * @cpu: ARMCPU
1145 * @is_aa64: True if the translation regime is in AArch64 state
0ffe5b7b
RH
1146 * @tcr: VTCR_EL2 or VSTCR_EL2
1147 * @ds: Effective value of TCR.DS.
1148 * @iasize: Bitsize of IPAs
c5168785
RH
1149 * @stride: Page-table stride (See the ARM ARM)
1150 *
0ffe5b7b
RH
1151 * Decode the starting level of the S2 lookup, returning INT_MIN if
1152 * the configuration is invalid.
c5168785 1153 */
0ffe5b7b
RH
1154static int check_s2_mmu_setup(ARMCPU *cpu, bool is_aa64, uint64_t tcr,
1155 bool ds, int iasize, int stride)
c5168785 1156{
0ffe5b7b
RH
1157 int sl0, sl2, startlevel, granulebits, levels;
1158 int s1_min_iasize, s1_max_iasize;
c5168785 1159
0ffe5b7b 1160 sl0 = extract32(tcr, 6, 2);
c5168785 1161 if (is_aa64) {
0ffe5b7b
RH
1162 /*
1163 * AArch64.S2InvalidSL: Interpretation of SL depends on the page size,
1164 * so interleave AArch64.S2StartLevel.
1165 */
c5168785 1166 switch (stride) {
0ffe5b7b
RH
1167 case 9: /* 4KB */
1168 /* SL2 is RES0 unless DS=1 & 4KB granule. */
1169 sl2 = extract64(tcr, 33, 1);
1170 if (ds && sl2) {
1171 if (sl0 != 0) {
1172 goto fail;
1173 }
1174 startlevel = -1;
1175 } else {
1176 startlevel = 2 - sl0;
1177 switch (sl0) {
1178 case 2:
1179 if (arm_pamax(cpu) < 44) {
1180 goto fail;
1181 }
1182 break;
1183 case 3:
1184 if (!cpu_isar_feature(aa64_st, cpu)) {
1185 goto fail;
1186 }
1187 startlevel = 3;
1188 break;
1189 }
c5168785
RH
1190 }
1191 break;
0ffe5b7b
RH
1192 case 11: /* 16KB */
1193 switch (sl0) {
1194 case 2:
1195 if (arm_pamax(cpu) < 42) {
1196 goto fail;
1197 }
1198 break;
1199 case 3:
1200 if (!ds) {
1201 goto fail;
1202 }
1203 break;
c5168785 1204 }
0ffe5b7b 1205 startlevel = 3 - sl0;
c5168785 1206 break;
0ffe5b7b
RH
1207 case 13: /* 64KB */
1208 switch (sl0) {
1209 case 2:
1210 if (arm_pamax(cpu) < 44) {
1211 goto fail;
1212 }
1213 break;
1214 case 3:
1215 goto fail;
c5168785 1216 }
0ffe5b7b 1217 startlevel = 3 - sl0;
c5168785
RH
1218 break;
1219 default:
1220 g_assert_not_reached();
1221 }
c5168785 1222 } else {
0ffe5b7b
RH
1223 /*
1224 * Things are simpler for AArch32 EL2, with only 4k pages.
1225 * There is no separate S2InvalidSL function, but AArch32.S2Walk
1226 * begins with walkparms.sl0 in {'1x'}.
1227 */
c5168785 1228 assert(stride == 9);
0ffe5b7b
RH
1229 if (sl0 >= 2) {
1230 goto fail;
c5168785 1231 }
0ffe5b7b 1232 startlevel = 2 - sl0;
c5168785 1233 }
0ffe5b7b
RH
1234
1235 /* AArch{64,32}.S2InconsistentSL are functionally equivalent. */
1236 levels = 3 - startlevel;
1237 granulebits = stride + 3;
1238
1239 s1_min_iasize = levels * stride + granulebits + 1;
1240 s1_max_iasize = s1_min_iasize + (stride - 1) + 4;
1241
1242 if (iasize >= s1_min_iasize && iasize <= s1_max_iasize) {
1243 return startlevel;
1244 }
1245
1246 fail:
1247 return INT_MIN;
c5168785
RH
1248}
1249
3283222a
RH
1250/**
1251 * get_phys_addr_lpae: perform one stage of page table walk, LPAE format
1252 *
1253 * Returns false if the translation was successful. Otherwise, phys_ptr,
1254 * attrs, prot and page_size may not be filled in, and the populated fsr
1255 * value provides information on why the translation aborted, in the format
1256 * of a long-format DFSR/IFSR fault register, with the following caveat:
1257 * the WnR bit is never set (the caller must do this).
1258 *
1259 * @env: CPUARMState
6d2654ff 1260 * @ptw: Current and next stage parameters for the walk.
3283222a
RH
1261 * @address: virtual address to get physical address for
1262 * @access_type: MMU_DATA_LOAD, MMU_DATA_STORE or MMU_INST_FETCH
6d2654ff
RH
1263 * @s1_is_el0: if @ptw->in_mmu_idx is ARMMMUIdx_Stage2
1264 * (so this is a stage 2 page table walk),
1265 * must be true if this is stage 2 of a stage 1+2
3283222a
RH
1266 * walk for an EL0 access. If @mmu_idx is anything else,
1267 * @s1_is_el0 is ignored.
03ee9bbe 1268 * @result: set on translation success,
3283222a 1269 * @fi: set to fault info if the translation fails
3283222a 1270 */
6d2654ff
RH
1271static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
1272 uint64_t address,
1273 MMUAccessType access_type, bool s1_is_el0,
c23f08a5 1274 GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
3283222a
RH
1275{
1276 ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
6d2654ff 1277 ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx = ptw->in_mmu_idx;
15f8f467 1278 int32_t level;
3283222a
RH
1279 ARMVAParameters param;
1280 uint64_t ttbr;
1281 hwaddr descaddr, indexmask, indexmask_grainsize;
1282 uint32_t tableattrs;
1283 target_ulong page_size;
45666091 1284 uint64_t attrs;
3283222a
RH
1285 int32_t stride;
1286 int addrsize, inputsize, outputsize;
c1547bba 1287 uint64_t tcr = regime_tcr(env, mmu_idx);
3283222a
RH
1288 int ap, ns, xn, pxn;
1289 uint32_t el = regime_el(env, mmu_idx);
1290 uint64_t descaddrmask;
1291 bool aarch64 = arm_el_is_aa64(env, el);
71943a1e 1292 uint64_t descriptor, new_descriptor;
3283222a
RH
1293
1294 /* TODO: This code does not support shareability levels. */
1295 if (aarch64) {
1296 int ps;
1297
1298 param = aa64_va_parameters(env, address, mmu_idx,
478dccbb
PM
1299 access_type != MMU_INST_FETCH,
1300 !arm_el_is_aa64(env, 1));
3283222a
RH
1301 level = 0;
1302
1303 /*
1304 * If TxSZ is programmed to a value larger than the maximum,
1305 * or smaller than the effective minimum, it is IMPLEMENTATION
1306 * DEFINED whether we behave as if the field were programmed
1307 * within bounds, or if a level 0 Translation fault is generated.
1308 *
1309 * With FEAT_LVA, fault on less than minimum becomes required,
1310 * so our choice is to always raise the fault.
1311 */
1312 if (param.tsz_oob) {
27c1b81d 1313 goto do_translation_fault;
3283222a
RH
1314 }
1315
1316 addrsize = 64 - 8 * param.tbi;
1317 inputsize = 64 - param.tsz;
1318
1319 /*
1320 * Bound PS by PARANGE to find the effective output address size.
1321 * ID_AA64MMFR0 is a read-only register so values outside of the
1322 * supported mappings can be considered an implementation error.
1323 */
1324 ps = FIELD_EX64(cpu->isar.id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, PARANGE);
1325 ps = MIN(ps, param.ps);
1326 assert(ps < ARRAY_SIZE(pamax_map));
1327 outputsize = pamax_map[ps];
312b71ab
AB
1328
1329 /*
1330 * With LPA2, the effective output address (OA) size is at most 48 bits
1331 * unless TCR.DS == 1
1332 */
1333 if (!param.ds && param.gran != Gran64K) {
1334 outputsize = MIN(outputsize, 48);
1335 }
3283222a
RH
1336 } else {
1337 param = aa32_va_parameters(env, address, mmu_idx);
1338 level = 1;
1339 addrsize = (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 ? 40 : 32);
1340 inputsize = addrsize - param.tsz;
1341 outputsize = 40;
1342 }
1343
1344 /*
1345 * We determined the region when collecting the parameters, but we
1346 * have not yet validated that the address is valid for the region.
1347 * Extract the top bits and verify that they all match select.
1348 *
1349 * For aa32, if inputsize == addrsize, then we have selected the
1350 * region by exclusion in aa32_va_parameters and there is no more
1351 * validation to do here.
1352 */
1353 if (inputsize < addrsize) {
1354 target_ulong top_bits = sextract64(address, inputsize,
1355 addrsize - inputsize);
1356 if (-top_bits != param.select) {
1357 /* The gap between the two regions is a Translation fault */
27c1b81d 1358 goto do_translation_fault;
3283222a
RH
1359 }
1360 }
1361
3c003f70 1362 stride = arm_granule_bits(param.gran) - 3;
3283222a
RH
1363
1364 /*
1365 * Note that QEMU ignores shareability and cacheability attributes,
1366 * so we don't need to do anything with the SH, ORGN, IRGN fields
1367 * in the TTBCR. Similarly, TTBCR:A1 selects whether we get the
1368 * ASID from TTBR0 or TTBR1, but QEMU's TLB doesn't currently
1369 * implement any ASID-like capability so we can ignore it (instead
1370 * we will always flush the TLB any time the ASID is changed).
1371 */
1372 ttbr = regime_ttbr(env, mmu_idx, param.select);
1373
1374 /*
1375 * Here we should have set up all the parameters for the translation:
1376 * inputsize, ttbr, epd, stride, tbi
1377 */
1378
1379 if (param.epd) {
1380 /*
1381 * Translation table walk disabled => Translation fault on TLB miss
1382 * Note: This is always 0 on 64-bit EL2 and EL3.
1383 */
27c1b81d 1384 goto do_translation_fault;
3283222a
RH
1385 }
1386
edc05dd4 1387 if (!regime_is_stage2(mmu_idx)) {
3283222a
RH
1388 /*
1389 * The starting level depends on the virtual address size (which can
1390 * be up to 48 bits) and the translation granule size. It indicates
1391 * the number of strides (stride bits at a time) needed to
1392 * consume the bits of the input address. In the pseudocode this is:
1393 * level = 4 - RoundUp((inputsize - grainsize) / stride)
1394 * where their 'inputsize' is our 'inputsize', 'grainsize' is
1395 * our 'stride + 3' and 'stride' is our 'stride'.
1396 * Applying the usual "rounded up m/n is (m+n-1)/n" and simplifying:
1397 * = 4 - (inputsize - stride - 3 + stride - 1) / stride
1398 * = 4 - (inputsize - 4) / stride;
1399 */
1400 level = 4 - (inputsize - 4) / stride;
1401 } else {
0ffe5b7b
RH
1402 int startlevel = check_s2_mmu_setup(cpu, aarch64, tcr, param.ds,
1403 inputsize, stride);
1404 if (startlevel == INT_MIN) {
1405 level = 0;
27c1b81d 1406 goto do_translation_fault;
3283222a
RH
1407 }
1408 level = startlevel;
1409 }
1410
1411 indexmask_grainsize = MAKE_64BIT_MASK(0, stride + 3);
1412 indexmask = MAKE_64BIT_MASK(0, inputsize - (stride * (4 - level)));
1413
1414 /* Now we can extract the actual base address from the TTBR */
1415 descaddr = extract64(ttbr, 0, 48);
1416
1417 /*
1418 * For FEAT_LPA and PS=6, bits [51:48] of descaddr are in [5:2] of TTBR.
1419 *
1420 * Otherwise, if the base address is out of range, raise AddressSizeFault.
1421 * In the pseudocode, this is !IsZero(baseregister<47:outputsize>),
1422 * but we've just cleared the bits above 47, so simplify the test.
1423 */
1424 if (outputsize > 48) {
1425 descaddr |= extract64(ttbr, 2, 4) << 48;
1426 } else if (descaddr >> outputsize) {
1427 level = 0;
27c1b81d 1428 fi->type = ARMFault_AddressSize;
3283222a
RH
1429 goto do_fault;
1430 }
1431
1432 /*
1433 * We rely on this masking to clear the RES0 bits at the bottom of the TTBR
1434 * and also to mask out CnP (bit 0) which could validly be non-zero.
1435 */
1436 descaddr &= ~indexmask;
1437
1438 /*
1439 * For AArch32, the address field in the descriptor goes up to bit 39
1440 * for both v7 and v8. However, for v8 the SBZ bits [47:40] must be 0
1441 * or an AddressSize fault is raised. So for v8 we extract those SBZ
1442 * bits as part of the address, which will be checked via outputsize.
1443 * For AArch64, the address field goes up to bit 47, or 49 with FEAT_LPA2;
1444 * the highest bits of a 52-bit output are placed elsewhere.
1445 */
1446 if (param.ds) {
1447 descaddrmask = MAKE_64BIT_MASK(0, 50);
1448 } else if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
1449 descaddrmask = MAKE_64BIT_MASK(0, 48);
1450 } else {
1451 descaddrmask = MAKE_64BIT_MASK(0, 40);
1452 }
1453 descaddrmask &= ~indexmask_grainsize;
26d19945 1454 tableattrs = 0;
3283222a 1455
fe4ddc15
RH
1456 next_level:
1457 descaddr |= (address >> (stride * (4 - level))) & indexmask;
1458 descaddr &= ~7ULL;
26d19945
RH
1459
1460 /*
1461 * Process the NSTable bit from the previous level. This changes
1462 * the table address space and the output space from Secure to
1463 * NonSecure. With RME, the EL3 translation regime does not change
1464 * from Root to NonSecure.
1465 */
1466 if (ptw->in_space == ARMSS_Secure
1467 && !regime_is_stage2(mmu_idx)
1468 && extract32(tableattrs, 4, 1)) {
3283222a 1469 /*
fe4ddc15 1470 * Stage2_S -> Stage2 or Phys_S -> Phys_NS
d38fa967 1471 * Assert the relative order of the secure/non-secure indexes.
3283222a 1472 */
d38fa967
RH
1473 QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(ARMMMUIdx_Phys_S + 1 != ARMMMUIdx_Phys_NS);
1474 QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S + 1 != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2);
1475 ptw->in_ptw_idx += 1;
fe4ddc15 1476 ptw->in_secure = false;
26d19945 1477 ptw->in_space = ARMSS_NonSecure;
fe4ddc15 1478 }
26d19945 1479
fe4ddc15
RH
1480 if (!S1_ptw_translate(env, ptw, descaddr, fi)) {
1481 goto do_fault;
1482 }
1483 descriptor = arm_ldq_ptw(env, ptw, fi);
1484 if (fi->type != ARMFault_None) {
1485 goto do_fault;
1486 }
71943a1e 1487 new_descriptor = descriptor;
3283222a 1488
71943a1e 1489 restart_atomic_update:
fe4ddc15
RH
1490 if (!(descriptor & 1) || (!(descriptor & 2) && (level == 3))) {
1491 /* Invalid, or the Reserved level 3 encoding */
27c1b81d 1492 goto do_translation_fault;
fe4ddc15
RH
1493 }
1494
1495 descaddr = descriptor & descaddrmask;
1496
1497 /*
1498 * For FEAT_LPA and PS=6, bits [51:48] of descaddr are in [15:12]
1499 * of descriptor. For FEAT_LPA2 and effective DS, bits [51:50] of
1500 * descaddr are in [9:8]. Otherwise, if descaddr is out of range,
1501 * raise AddressSizeFault.
1502 */
1503 if (outputsize > 48) {
1504 if (param.ds) {
1505 descaddr |= extract64(descriptor, 8, 2) << 50;
1506 } else {
1507 descaddr |= extract64(descriptor, 12, 4) << 48;
3283222a 1508 }
fe4ddc15 1509 } else if (descaddr >> outputsize) {
27c1b81d 1510 fi->type = ARMFault_AddressSize;
fe4ddc15
RH
1511 goto do_fault;
1512 }
1513
1514 if ((descriptor & 2) && (level < 3)) {
3283222a 1515 /*
fe4ddc15
RH
1516 * Table entry. The top five bits are attributes which may
1517 * propagate down through lower levels of the table (and
1518 * which are all arranged so that 0 means "no effect", so
1519 * we can gather them up by ORing in the bits at each level).
3283222a 1520 */
fe4ddc15
RH
1521 tableattrs |= extract64(descriptor, 59, 5);
1522 level++;
1523 indexmask = indexmask_grainsize;
1524 goto next_level;
3283222a 1525 }
fe4ddc15
RH
1526
1527 /*
1528 * Block entry at level 1 or 2, or page entry at level 3.
1529 * These are basically the same thing, although the number
1530 * of bits we pull in from the vaddr varies. Note that although
1531 * descaddrmask masks enough of the low bits of the descriptor
1532 * to give a correct page or table address, the address field
1533 * in a block descriptor is smaller; so we need to explicitly
1534 * clear the lower bits here before ORing in the low vaddr bits.
71943a1e
RH
1535 *
1536 * Afterward, descaddr is the final physical address.
fe4ddc15
RH
1537 */
1538 page_size = (1ULL << ((stride * (4 - level)) + 3));
1539 descaddr &= ~(hwaddr)(page_size - 1);
1540 descaddr |= (address & (page_size - 1));
fe4ddc15 1541
71943a1e
RH
1542 if (likely(!ptw->in_debug)) {
1543 /*
1544 * Access flag.
1545 * If HA is enabled, prepare to update the descriptor below.
1546 * Otherwise, pass the access fault on to software.
1547 */
1548 if (!(descriptor & (1 << 10))) {
1549 if (param.ha) {
1550 new_descriptor |= 1 << 10; /* AF */
1551 } else {
1552 fi->type = ARMFault_AccessFlag;
1553 goto do_fault;
1554 }
1555 }
65c123fd
RH
1556
1557 /*
1558 * Dirty Bit.
1559 * If HD is enabled, pre-emptively set/clear the appropriate AP/S2AP
1560 * bit for writeback. The actual write protection test may still be
1561 * overridden by tableattrs, to be merged below.
1562 */
1563 if (param.hd
1564 && extract64(descriptor, 51, 1) /* DBM */
1565 && access_type == MMU_DATA_STORE) {
1566 if (regime_is_stage2(mmu_idx)) {
1567 new_descriptor |= 1ull << 7; /* set S2AP[1] */
1568 } else {
1569 new_descriptor &= ~(1ull << 7); /* clear AP[2] */
1570 }
1571 }
71943a1e
RH
1572 }
1573
fe4ddc15 1574 /*
71943a1e
RH
1575 * Extract attributes from the (modified) descriptor, and apply
1576 * table descriptors. Stage 2 table descriptors do not include
1577 * any attribute fields. HPD disables all the table attributes
1578 * except NSTable.
fe4ddc15 1579 */
71943a1e 1580 attrs = new_descriptor & (MAKE_64BIT_MASK(2, 10) | MAKE_64BIT_MASK(50, 14));
34a57fae 1581 if (!regime_is_stage2(mmu_idx)) {
26d19945 1582 attrs |= !ptw->in_secure << 5; /* NS */
34a57fae
RH
1583 if (!param.hpd) {
1584 attrs |= extract64(tableattrs, 0, 2) << 53; /* XN, PXN */
1585 /*
1586 * The sense of AP[1] vs APTable[0] is reversed, as APTable[0] == 1
1587 * means "force PL1 access only", which means forcing AP[1] to 0.
1588 */
1589 attrs &= ~(extract64(tableattrs, 2, 1) << 6); /* !APT[0] => AP[1] */
1590 attrs |= extract32(tableattrs, 3, 1) << 7; /* APT[1] => AP[2] */
1591 }
1592 }
fe4ddc15 1593
45666091 1594 ap = extract32(attrs, 6, 2);
edc05dd4 1595 if (regime_is_stage2(mmu_idx)) {
3283222a 1596 ns = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2;
45666091 1597 xn = extract64(attrs, 53, 2);
7fa7ea8f 1598 result->f.prot = get_S2prot(env, ap, xn, s1_is_el0);
3283222a 1599 } else {
45666091
RH
1600 ns = extract32(attrs, 5, 1);
1601 xn = extract64(attrs, 54, 1);
1602 pxn = extract64(attrs, 53, 1);
7fa7ea8f 1603 result->f.prot = get_S1prot(env, mmu_idx, aarch64, ap, ns, xn, pxn);
3283222a
RH
1604 }
1605
7fa7ea8f 1606 if (!(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type))) {
27c1b81d 1607 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
3283222a
RH
1608 goto do_fault;
1609 }
1610
71943a1e
RH
1611 /* If FEAT_HAFDBS has made changes, update the PTE. */
1612 if (new_descriptor != descriptor) {
1613 new_descriptor = arm_casq_ptw(env, descriptor, new_descriptor, ptw, fi);
1614 if (fi->type != ARMFault_None) {
1615 goto do_fault;
1616 }
1617 /*
1618 * I_YZSVV says that if the in-memory descriptor has changed,
1619 * then we must use the information in that new value
1620 * (which might include a different output address, different
1621 * attributes, or generate a fault).
1622 * Restart the handling of the descriptor value from scratch.
1623 */
1624 if (new_descriptor != descriptor) {
1625 descriptor = new_descriptor;
1626 goto restart_atomic_update;
1627 }
1628 }
1629
3283222a
RH
1630 if (ns) {
1631 /*
1632 * The NS bit will (as required by the architecture) have no effect if
1633 * the CPU doesn't support TZ or this is a non-secure translation
1634 * regime, because the attribute will already be non-secure.
1635 */
7fa7ea8f 1636 result->f.attrs.secure = false;
90c66293 1637 result->f.attrs.space = ARMSS_NonSecure;
3283222a 1638 }
937f2245 1639
edc05dd4 1640 if (regime_is_stage2(mmu_idx)) {
03ee9bbe 1641 result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = true;
45666091 1642 result->cacheattrs.attrs = extract32(attrs, 2, 4);
3283222a
RH
1643 } else {
1644 /* Index into MAIR registers for cache attributes */
45666091 1645 uint8_t attrindx = extract32(attrs, 2, 3);
3283222a
RH
1646 uint64_t mair = env->cp15.mair_el[regime_el(env, mmu_idx)];
1647 assert(attrindx <= 7);
03ee9bbe
RH
1648 result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false;
1649 result->cacheattrs.attrs = extract64(mair, attrindx * 8, 8);
6a3b1e44
RH
1650
1651 /* When in aarch64 mode, and BTI is enabled, remember GP in the TLB. */
1652 if (aarch64 && cpu_isar_feature(aa64_bti, cpu)) {
1653 result->f.guarded = extract64(attrs, 50, 1); /* GP */
1654 }
3283222a
RH
1655 }
1656
1657 /*
1658 * For FEAT_LPA2 and effective DS, the SH field in the attributes
1659 * was re-purposed for output address bits. The SH attribute in
1660 * that case comes from TCR_ELx, which we extracted earlier.
1661 */
1662 if (param.ds) {
03ee9bbe 1663 result->cacheattrs.shareability = param.sh;
3283222a 1664 } else {
45666091 1665 result->cacheattrs.shareability = extract32(attrs, 8, 2);
3283222a
RH
1666 }
1667
7fa7ea8f
RH
1668 result->f.phys_addr = descaddr;
1669 result->f.lg_page_size = ctz64(page_size);
3283222a
RH
1670 return false;
1671
27c1b81d
RH
1672 do_translation_fault:
1673 fi->type = ARMFault_Translation;
1674 do_fault:
3283222a
RH
1675 fi->level = level;
1676 /* Tag the error as S2 for failed S1 PTW at S2 or ordinary S2. */
edc05dd4 1677 fi->stage2 = fi->s1ptw || regime_is_stage2(mmu_idx);
3283222a
RH
1678 fi->s1ns = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2;
1679 return true;
1680}
1681
9a12fb36
RH
1682static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
1683 MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
a5b5092f 1684 bool is_secure, GetPhysAddrResult *result,
9a12fb36
RH
1685 ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
1686{
1687 int n;
1688 uint32_t mask;
1689 uint32_t base;
1690 bool is_user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx);
1691
7e80c0a4 1692 if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, is_secure)) {
9a12fb36 1693 /* MPU disabled. */
7fa7ea8f
RH
1694 result->f.phys_addr = address;
1695 result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
9a12fb36
RH
1696 return false;
1697 }
1698
7fa7ea8f 1699 result->f.phys_addr = address;
9a12fb36
RH
1700 for (n = 7; n >= 0; n--) {
1701 base = env->cp15.c6_region[n];
1702 if ((base & 1) == 0) {
1703 continue;
1704 }
1705 mask = 1 << ((base >> 1) & 0x1f);
1706 /* Keep this shift separate from the above to avoid an
1707 (undefined) << 32. */
1708 mask = (mask << 1) - 1;
1709 if (((base ^ address) & ~mask) == 0) {
1710 break;
1711 }
1712 }
1713 if (n < 0) {
1714 fi->type = ARMFault_Background;
1715 return true;
1716 }
1717
1718 if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) {
1719 mask = env->cp15.pmsav5_insn_ap;
1720 } else {
1721 mask = env->cp15.pmsav5_data_ap;
1722 }
1723 mask = (mask >> (n * 4)) & 0xf;
1724 switch (mask) {
1725 case 0:
1726 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
1727 fi->level = 1;
1728 return true;
1729 case 1:
1730 if (is_user) {
1731 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
1732 fi->level = 1;
1733 return true;
1734 }
7fa7ea8f 1735 result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
9a12fb36
RH
1736 break;
1737 case 2:
7fa7ea8f 1738 result->f.prot = PAGE_READ;
9a12fb36 1739 if (!is_user) {
7fa7ea8f 1740 result->f.prot |= PAGE_WRITE;
9a12fb36
RH
1741 }
1742 break;
1743 case 3:
7fa7ea8f 1744 result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
9a12fb36
RH
1745 break;
1746 case 5:
1747 if (is_user) {
1748 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
1749 fi->level = 1;
1750 return true;
1751 }
7fa7ea8f 1752 result->f.prot = PAGE_READ;
9a12fb36
RH
1753 break;
1754 case 6:
7fa7ea8f 1755 result->f.prot = PAGE_READ;
9a12fb36
RH
1756 break;
1757 default:
1758 /* Bad permission. */
1759 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
1760 fi->level = 1;
1761 return true;
1762 }
7fa7ea8f 1763 result->f.prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
9a12fb36
RH
1764 return false;
1765}
1766
fedbaa05 1767static void get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
7fa7ea8f 1768 int32_t address, uint8_t *prot)
7d2e08c9
RH
1769{
1770 if (!arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
1771 *prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
1772 switch (address) {
1773 case 0xF0000000 ... 0xFFFFFFFF:
1774 if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_V) {
1775 /* hivecs execing is ok */
1776 *prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
1777 }
1778 break;
1779 case 0x00000000 ... 0x7FFFFFFF:
1780 *prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
1781 break;
1782 }
1783 } else {
1784 /* Default system address map for M profile cores.
1785 * The architecture specifies which regions are execute-never;
1786 * at the MPU level no other checks are defined.
1787 */
1788 switch (address) {
1789 case 0x00000000 ... 0x1fffffff: /* ROM */
1790 case 0x20000000 ... 0x3fffffff: /* SRAM */
1791 case 0x60000000 ... 0x7fffffff: /* RAM */
1792 case 0x80000000 ... 0x9fffffff: /* RAM */
1793 *prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
1794 break;
1795 case 0x40000000 ... 0x5fffffff: /* Peripheral */
1796 case 0xa0000000 ... 0xbfffffff: /* Device */
1797 case 0xc0000000 ... 0xdfffffff: /* Device */
1798 case 0xe0000000 ... 0xffffffff: /* System */
1799 *prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
1800 break;
1801 default:
1802 g_assert_not_reached();
1803 }
1804 }
1805}
1806
47ff5ba9
RH
1807static bool m_is_ppb_region(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address)
1808{
1809 /* True if address is in the M profile PPB region 0xe0000000 - 0xe00fffff */
1810 return arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M) &&
1811 extract32(address, 20, 12) == 0xe00;
1812}
1813
1814static bool m_is_system_region(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address)
1815{
1816 /*
1817 * True if address is in the M profile system region
1818 * 0xe0000000 - 0xffffffff
1819 */
1820 return arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M) && extract32(address, 29, 3) == 0x7;
1821}
1822
c8e436c9 1823static bool pmsav7_use_background_region(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
1a469cf7 1824 bool is_secure, bool is_user)
c8e436c9
RH
1825{
1826 /*
1827 * Return true if we should use the default memory map as a
1828 * "background" region if there are no hits against any MPU regions.
1829 */
1830 CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
1831
1832 if (is_user) {
1833 return false;
1834 }
1835
1836 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
1a469cf7 1837 return env->v7m.mpu_ctrl[is_secure] & R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_PRIVDEFENA_MASK;
c8e436c9 1838 }
fca45e34
TR
1839
1840 if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2) {
1841 return false;
1842 }
1843
1844 return regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_BR;
c8e436c9
RH
1845}
1846
1f2e87e5
RH
1847static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
1848 MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
957a0bb7 1849 bool secure, GetPhysAddrResult *result,
1f2e87e5
RH
1850 ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
1851{
1852 ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
1853 int n;
1854 bool is_user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx);
1855
7fa7ea8f
RH
1856 result->f.phys_addr = address;
1857 result->f.lg_page_size = TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
1858 result->f.prot = 0;
1f2e87e5 1859
7e80c0a4 1860 if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, secure) ||
1f2e87e5
RH
1861 m_is_ppb_region(env, address)) {
1862 /*
1863 * MPU disabled or M profile PPB access: use default memory map.
1864 * The other case which uses the default memory map in the
1865 * v7M ARM ARM pseudocode is exception vector reads from the vector
1866 * table. In QEMU those accesses are done in arm_v7m_load_vector(),
1867 * which always does a direct read using address_space_ldl(), rather
1868 * than going via this function, so we don't need to check that here.
1869 */
7fa7ea8f 1870 get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, &result->f.prot);
1f2e87e5
RH
1871 } else { /* MPU enabled */
1872 for (n = (int)cpu->pmsav7_dregion - 1; n >= 0; n--) {
1873 /* region search */
1874 uint32_t base = env->pmsav7.drbar[n];
1875 uint32_t rsize = extract32(env->pmsav7.drsr[n], 1, 5);
1876 uint32_t rmask;
1877 bool srdis = false;
1878
1879 if (!(env->pmsav7.drsr[n] & 0x1)) {
1880 continue;
1881 }
1882
1883 if (!rsize) {
1884 qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
1885 "DRSR[%d]: Rsize field cannot be 0\n", n);
1886 continue;
1887 }
1888 rsize++;
1889 rmask = (1ull << rsize) - 1;
1890
1891 if (base & rmask) {
1892 qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
1893 "DRBAR[%d]: 0x%" PRIx32 " misaligned "
1894 "to DRSR region size, mask = 0x%" PRIx32 "\n",
1895 n, base, rmask);
1896 continue;
1897 }
1898
1899 if (address < base || address > base + rmask) {
1900 /*
1901 * Address not in this region. We must check whether the
1902 * region covers addresses in the same page as our address.
1903 * In that case we must not report a size that covers the
1904 * whole page for a subsequent hit against a different MPU
1905 * region or the background region, because it would result in
1906 * incorrect TLB hits for subsequent accesses to addresses that
1907 * are in this MPU region.
1908 */
1909 if (ranges_overlap(base, rmask,
1910 address & TARGET_PAGE_MASK,
1911 TARGET_PAGE_SIZE)) {
7fa7ea8f 1912 result->f.lg_page_size = 0;
1f2e87e5
RH
1913 }
1914 continue;
1915 }
1916
1917 /* Region matched */
1918
1919 if (rsize >= 8) { /* no subregions for regions < 256 bytes */
1920 int i, snd;
1921 uint32_t srdis_mask;
1922
1923 rsize -= 3; /* sub region size (power of 2) */
1924 snd = ((address - base) >> rsize) & 0x7;
1925 srdis = extract32(env->pmsav7.drsr[n], snd + 8, 1);
1926
1927 srdis_mask = srdis ? 0x3 : 0x0;
1928 for (i = 2; i <= 8 && rsize < TARGET_PAGE_BITS; i *= 2) {
1929 /*
1930 * This will check in groups of 2, 4 and then 8, whether
1931 * the subregion bits are consistent. rsize is incremented
1932 * back up to give the region size, considering consistent
1933 * adjacent subregions as one region. Stop testing if rsize
1934 * is already big enough for an entire QEMU page.
1935 */
1936 int snd_rounded = snd & ~(i - 1);
1937 uint32_t srdis_multi = extract32(env->pmsav7.drsr[n],
1938 snd_rounded + 8, i);
1939 if (srdis_mask ^ srdis_multi) {
1940 break;
1941 }
1942 srdis_mask = (srdis_mask << i) | srdis_mask;
1943 rsize++;
1944 }
1945 }
1946 if (srdis) {
1947 continue;
1948 }
1949 if (rsize < TARGET_PAGE_BITS) {
7fa7ea8f 1950 result->f.lg_page_size = rsize;
1f2e87e5
RH
1951 }
1952 break;
1953 }
1954
1955 if (n == -1) { /* no hits */
1a469cf7 1956 if (!pmsav7_use_background_region(cpu, mmu_idx, secure, is_user)) {
1f2e87e5
RH
1957 /* background fault */
1958 fi->type = ARMFault_Background;
1959 return true;
1960 }
7fa7ea8f
RH
1961 get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address,
1962 &result->f.prot);
1f2e87e5
RH
1963 } else { /* a MPU hit! */
1964 uint32_t ap = extract32(env->pmsav7.dracr[n], 8, 3);
1965 uint32_t xn = extract32(env->pmsav7.dracr[n], 12, 1);
1966
1967 if (m_is_system_region(env, address)) {
1968 /* System space is always execute never */
1969 xn = 1;
1970 }
1971
1972 if (is_user) { /* User mode AP bit decoding */
1973 switch (ap) {
1974 case 0:
1975 case 1:
1976 case 5:
1977 break; /* no access */
1978 case 3:
7fa7ea8f 1979 result->f.prot |= PAGE_WRITE;
1f2e87e5
RH
1980 /* fall through */
1981 case 2:
1982 case 6:
7fa7ea8f 1983 result->f.prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC;
1f2e87e5
RH
1984 break;
1985 case 7:
1986 /* for v7M, same as 6; for R profile a reserved value */
1987 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
7fa7ea8f 1988 result->f.prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC;
1f2e87e5
RH
1989 break;
1990 }
1991 /* fall through */
1992 default:
1993 qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
1994 "DRACR[%d]: Bad value for AP bits: 0x%"
1995 PRIx32 "\n", n, ap);
1996 }
1997 } else { /* Priv. mode AP bits decoding */
1998 switch (ap) {
1999 case 0:
2000 break; /* no access */
2001 case 1:
2002 case 2:
2003 case 3:
7fa7ea8f 2004 result->f.prot |= PAGE_WRITE;
1f2e87e5
RH
2005 /* fall through */
2006 case 5:
2007 case 6:
7fa7ea8f 2008 result->f.prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC;
1f2e87e5
RH
2009 break;
2010 case 7:
2011 /* for v7M, same as 6; for R profile a reserved value */
2012 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
7fa7ea8f 2013 result->f.prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC;
1f2e87e5
RH
2014 break;
2015 }
2016 /* fall through */
2017 default:
2018 qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
2019 "DRACR[%d]: Bad value for AP bits: 0x%"
2020 PRIx32 "\n", n, ap);
2021 }
2022 }
2023
2024 /* execute never */
2025 if (xn) {
7fa7ea8f 2026 result->f.prot &= ~PAGE_EXEC;
1f2e87e5
RH
2027 }
2028 }
2029 }
2030
2031 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
2032 fi->level = 1;
7fa7ea8f 2033 return !(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type));
1f2e87e5
RH
2034}
2035
fca45e34
TR
2036static uint32_t *regime_rbar(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
2037 uint32_t secure)
2038{
2039 if (regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 2) {
2040 return env->pmsav8.hprbar;
2041 } else {
2042 return env->pmsav8.rbar[secure];
2043 }
2044}
2045
2046static uint32_t *regime_rlar(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
2047 uint32_t secure)
2048{
2049 if (regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 2) {
2050 return env->pmsav8.hprlar;
2051 } else {
2052 return env->pmsav8.rlar[secure];
2053 }
2054}
2055
fedbaa05
RH
2056bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
2057 MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
e9fb7090
RH
2058 bool secure, GetPhysAddrResult *result,
2059 ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi, uint32_t *mregion)
fedbaa05
RH
2060{
2061 /*
2062 * Perform a PMSAv8 MPU lookup (without also doing the SAU check
2063 * that a full phys-to-virt translation does).
2064 * mregion is (if not NULL) set to the region number which matched,
2065 * or -1 if no region number is returned (MPU off, address did not
2066 * hit a region, address hit in multiple regions).
652c750e
RH
2067 * If the region hit doesn't cover the entire TARGET_PAGE the address
2068 * is within, then we set the result page_size to 1 to force the
2069 * memory system to use a subpage.
fedbaa05
RH
2070 */
2071 ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
2072 bool is_user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx);
fedbaa05
RH
2073 int n;
2074 int matchregion = -1;
2075 bool hit = false;
2076 uint32_t addr_page_base = address & TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
2077 uint32_t addr_page_limit = addr_page_base + (TARGET_PAGE_SIZE - 1);
fca45e34
TR
2078 int region_counter;
2079
2080 if (regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 2) {
2081 region_counter = cpu->pmsav8r_hdregion;
2082 } else {
2083 region_counter = cpu->pmsav7_dregion;
2084 }
fedbaa05 2085
7fa7ea8f
RH
2086 result->f.lg_page_size = TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
2087 result->f.phys_addr = address;
2088 result->f.prot = 0;
fedbaa05
RH
2089 if (mregion) {
2090 *mregion = -1;
2091 }
2092
fca45e34
TR
2093 if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2) {
2094 fi->stage2 = true;
2095 }
2096
fedbaa05
RH
2097 /*
2098 * Unlike the ARM ARM pseudocode, we don't need to check whether this
2099 * was an exception vector read from the vector table (which is always
2100 * done using the default system address map), because those accesses
2101 * are done in arm_v7m_load_vector(), which always does a direct
2102 * read using address_space_ldl(), rather than going via this function.
2103 */
7e80c0a4 2104 if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, secure)) { /* MPU disabled */
fedbaa05
RH
2105 hit = true;
2106 } else if (m_is_ppb_region(env, address)) {
2107 hit = true;
2108 } else {
1a469cf7 2109 if (pmsav7_use_background_region(cpu, mmu_idx, secure, is_user)) {
fedbaa05
RH
2110 hit = true;
2111 }
2112
fca45e34
TR
2113 uint32_t bitmask;
2114 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
2115 bitmask = 0x1f;
2116 } else {
2117 bitmask = 0x3f;
2118 fi->level = 0;
2119 }
2120
2121 for (n = region_counter - 1; n >= 0; n--) {
fedbaa05
RH
2122 /* region search */
2123 /*
fca45e34
TR
2124 * Note that the base address is bits [31:x] from the register
2125 * with bits [x-1:0] all zeroes, but the limit address is bits
2126 * [31:x] from the register with bits [x:0] all ones. Where x is
2127 * 5 for Cortex-M and 6 for Cortex-R
fedbaa05 2128 */
fca45e34
TR
2129 uint32_t base = regime_rbar(env, mmu_idx, secure)[n] & ~bitmask;
2130 uint32_t limit = regime_rlar(env, mmu_idx, secure)[n] | bitmask;
fedbaa05 2131
fca45e34 2132 if (!(regime_rlar(env, mmu_idx, secure)[n] & 0x1)) {
fedbaa05
RH
2133 /* Region disabled */
2134 continue;
2135 }
2136
2137 if (address < base || address > limit) {
2138 /*
2139 * Address not in this region. We must check whether the
2140 * region covers addresses in the same page as our address.
2141 * In that case we must not report a size that covers the
2142 * whole page for a subsequent hit against a different MPU
2143 * region or the background region, because it would result in
2144 * incorrect TLB hits for subsequent accesses to addresses that
2145 * are in this MPU region.
2146 */
2147 if (limit >= base &&
2148 ranges_overlap(base, limit - base + 1,
2149 addr_page_base,
2150 TARGET_PAGE_SIZE)) {
7fa7ea8f 2151 result->f.lg_page_size = 0;
fedbaa05
RH
2152 }
2153 continue;
2154 }
2155
2156 if (base > addr_page_base || limit < addr_page_limit) {
7fa7ea8f 2157 result->f.lg_page_size = 0;
fedbaa05
RH
2158 }
2159
2160 if (matchregion != -1) {
2161 /*
2162 * Multiple regions match -- always a failure (unlike
2163 * PMSAv7 where highest-numbered-region wins)
2164 */
2165 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
fca45e34
TR
2166 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
2167 fi->level = 1;
2168 }
fedbaa05
RH
2169 return true;
2170 }
2171
2172 matchregion = n;
2173 hit = true;
2174 }
2175 }
2176
2177 if (!hit) {
fca45e34
TR
2178 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
2179 fi->type = ARMFault_Background;
2180 } else {
2181 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
2182 }
fedbaa05
RH
2183 return true;
2184 }
2185
2186 if (matchregion == -1) {
2187 /* hit using the background region */
7fa7ea8f 2188 get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, &result->f.prot);
fedbaa05 2189 } else {
fca45e34
TR
2190 uint32_t matched_rbar = regime_rbar(env, mmu_idx, secure)[matchregion];
2191 uint32_t matched_rlar = regime_rlar(env, mmu_idx, secure)[matchregion];
2192 uint32_t ap = extract32(matched_rbar, 1, 2);
2193 uint32_t xn = extract32(matched_rbar, 0, 1);
fedbaa05
RH
2194 bool pxn = false;
2195
2196 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8_1M)) {
fca45e34 2197 pxn = extract32(matched_rlar, 4, 1);
fedbaa05
RH
2198 }
2199
2200 if (m_is_system_region(env, address)) {
2201 /* System space is always execute never */
2202 xn = 1;
2203 }
2204
fca45e34
TR
2205 if (regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 2) {
2206 result->f.prot = simple_ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(ap,
2207 mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_E2);
2208 } else {
2209 result->f.prot = simple_ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap);
2210 }
2211
2212 if (!arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
2213 uint8_t attrindx = extract32(matched_rlar, 1, 3);
2214 uint64_t mair = env->cp15.mair_el[regime_el(env, mmu_idx)];
2215 uint8_t sh = extract32(matched_rlar, 3, 2);
2216
2217 if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_WXN &&
2218 result->f.prot & PAGE_WRITE && mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2) {
2219 xn = 0x1;
2220 }
2221
2222 if ((regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 1) &&
2223 regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_UWXN && ap == 0x1) {
2224 pxn = 0x1;
2225 }
2226
2227 result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false;
2228 result->cacheattrs.attrs = extract64(mair, attrindx * 8, 8);
2229 result->cacheattrs.shareability = sh;
2230 }
2231
7fa7ea8f
RH
2232 if (result->f.prot && !xn && !(pxn && !is_user)) {
2233 result->f.prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
fedbaa05 2234 }
fca45e34 2235
fedbaa05
RH
2236 if (mregion) {
2237 *mregion = matchregion;
2238 }
2239 }
2240
2241 fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
fca45e34
TR
2242 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
2243 fi->level = 1;
2244 }
7fa7ea8f 2245 return !(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type));
fedbaa05
RH
2246}
2247
2c1f429d
RH
2248static bool v8m_is_sau_exempt(CPUARMState *env,
2249 uint32_t address, MMUAccessType access_type)
2250{
2251 /*
2252 * The architecture specifies that certain address ranges are
2253 * exempt from v8M SAU/IDAU checks.
2254 */
2255 return
2256 (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH && m_is_system_region(env, address)) ||
2257 (address >= 0xe0000000 && address <= 0xe0002fff) ||
2258 (address >= 0xe000e000 && address <= 0xe000efff) ||
2259 (address >= 0xe002e000 && address <= 0xe002efff) ||
2260 (address >= 0xe0040000 && address <= 0xe0041fff) ||
2261 (address >= 0xe00ff000 && address <= 0xe00fffff);
2262}
2263
2264void v8m_security_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
dbf2a71a
RH
2265 MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
2266 bool is_secure, V8M_SAttributes *sattrs)
2c1f429d
RH
2267{
2268 /*
2269 * Look up the security attributes for this address. Compare the
2270 * pseudocode SecurityCheck() function.
2271 * We assume the caller has zero-initialized *sattrs.
2272 */
2273 ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
2274 int r;
2275 bool idau_exempt = false, idau_ns = true, idau_nsc = true;
2276 int idau_region = IREGION_NOTVALID;
2277 uint32_t addr_page_base = address & TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
2278 uint32_t addr_page_limit = addr_page_base + (TARGET_PAGE_SIZE - 1);
2279
2280 if (cpu->idau) {
2281 IDAUInterfaceClass *iic = IDAU_INTERFACE_GET_CLASS(cpu->idau);
2282 IDAUInterface *ii = IDAU_INTERFACE(cpu->idau);
2283
2284 iic->check(ii, address, &idau_region, &idau_exempt, &idau_ns,
2285 &idau_nsc);
2286 }
2287
2288 if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH && extract32(address, 28, 4) == 0xf) {
2289 /* 0xf0000000..0xffffffff is always S for insn fetches */
2290 return;
2291 }
2292
2293 if (idau_exempt || v8m_is_sau_exempt(env, address, access_type)) {
dbf2a71a 2294 sattrs->ns = !is_secure;
2c1f429d
RH
2295 return;
2296 }
2297
2298 if (idau_region != IREGION_NOTVALID) {
2299 sattrs->irvalid = true;
2300 sattrs->iregion = idau_region;
2301 }
2302
2303 switch (env->sau.ctrl & 3) {
2304 case 0: /* SAU.ENABLE == 0, SAU.ALLNS == 0 */
2305 break;
2306 case 2: /* SAU.ENABLE == 0, SAU.ALLNS == 1 */
2307 sattrs->ns = true;
2308 break;
2309 default: /* SAU.ENABLE == 1 */
2310 for (r = 0; r < cpu->sau_sregion; r++) {
2311 if (env->sau.rlar[r] & 1) {
2312 uint32_t base = env->sau.rbar[r] & ~0x1f;
2313 uint32_t limit = env->sau.rlar[r] | 0x1f;
2314
2315 if (base <= address && limit >= address) {
2316 if (base > addr_page_base || limit < addr_page_limit) {
2317 sattrs->subpage = true;
2318 }
2319 if (sattrs->srvalid) {
2320 /*
2321 * If we hit in more than one region then we must report
2322 * as Secure, not NS-Callable, with no valid region
2323 * number info.
2324 */
2325 sattrs->ns = false;
2326 sattrs->nsc = false;
2327 sattrs->sregion = 0;
2328 sattrs->srvalid = false;
2329 break;
2330 } else {
2331 if (env->sau.rlar[r] & 2) {
2332 sattrs->nsc = true;
2333 } else {
2334 sattrs->ns = true;
2335 }
2336 sattrs->srvalid = true;
2337 sattrs->sregion = r;
2338 }
2339 } else {
2340 /*
2341 * Address not in this region. We must check whether the
2342 * region covers addresses in the same page as our address.
2343 * In that case we must not report a size that covers the
2344 * whole page for a subsequent hit against a different MPU
2345 * region or the background region, because it would result
2346 * in incorrect TLB hits for subsequent accesses to
2347 * addresses that are in this MPU region.
2348 */
2349 if (limit >= base &&
2350 ranges_overlap(base, limit - base + 1,
2351 addr_page_base,
2352 TARGET_PAGE_SIZE)) {
2353 sattrs->subpage = true;
2354 }
2355 }
2356 }
2357 }
2358 break;
2359 }
2360
2361 /*
2362 * The IDAU will override the SAU lookup results if it specifies
2363 * higher security than the SAU does.
2364 */
2365 if (!idau_ns) {
2366 if (sattrs->ns || (!idau_nsc && sattrs->nsc)) {
2367 sattrs->ns = false;
2368 sattrs->nsc = idau_nsc;
2369 }
2370 }
2371}
2372
730d5c31
RH
2373static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
2374 MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
be0ca948 2375 bool secure, GetPhysAddrResult *result,
730d5c31
RH
2376 ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
2377{
730d5c31
RH
2378 V8M_SAttributes sattrs = {};
2379 bool ret;
730d5c31
RH
2380
2381 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
dbf2a71a
RH
2382 v8m_security_lookup(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
2383 secure, &sattrs);
730d5c31
RH
2384 if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) {
2385 /*
2386 * Instruction fetches always use the MMU bank and the
2387 * transaction attribute determined by the fetch address,
2388 * regardless of CPU state. This is painful for QEMU
2389 * to handle, because it would mean we need to encode
2390 * into the mmu_idx not just the (user, negpri) information
2391 * for the current security state but also that for the
2392 * other security state, which would balloon the number
2393 * of mmu_idx values needed alarmingly.
2394 * Fortunately we can avoid this because it's not actually
2395 * possible to arbitrarily execute code from memory with
2396 * the wrong security attribute: it will always generate
2397 * an exception of some kind or another, apart from the
2398 * special case of an NS CPU executing an SG instruction
2399 * in S&NSC memory. So we always just fail the translation
2400 * here and sort things out in the exception handler
2401 * (including possibly emulating an SG instruction).
2402 */
2403 if (sattrs.ns != !secure) {
2404 if (sattrs.nsc) {
2405 fi->type = ARMFault_QEMU_NSCExec;
2406 } else {
2407 fi->type = ARMFault_QEMU_SFault;
2408 }
7fa7ea8f
RH
2409 result->f.lg_page_size = sattrs.subpage ? 0 : TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
2410 result->f.phys_addr = address;
2411 result->f.prot = 0;
730d5c31
RH
2412 return true;
2413 }
2414 } else {
2415 /*
2416 * For data accesses we always use the MMU bank indicated
2417 * by the current CPU state, but the security attributes
2418 * might downgrade a secure access to nonsecure.
2419 */
2420 if (sattrs.ns) {
7fa7ea8f 2421 result->f.attrs.secure = false;
90c66293 2422 result->f.attrs.space = ARMSS_NonSecure;
730d5c31
RH
2423 } else if (!secure) {
2424 /*
2425 * NS access to S memory must fault.
2426 * Architecturally we should first check whether the
2427 * MPU information for this address indicates that we
2428 * are doing an unaligned access to Device memory, which
2429 * should generate a UsageFault instead. QEMU does not
2430 * currently check for that kind of unaligned access though.
2431 * If we added it we would need to do so as a special case
2432 * for M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT in arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt().
2433 */
2434 fi->type = ARMFault_QEMU_SFault;
7fa7ea8f
RH
2435 result->f.lg_page_size = sattrs.subpage ? 0 : TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
2436 result->f.phys_addr = address;
2437 result->f.prot = 0;
730d5c31
RH
2438 return true;
2439 }
2440 }
2441 }
2442
e9fb7090 2443 ret = pmsav8_mpu_lookup(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, secure,
652c750e
RH
2444 result, fi, NULL);
2445 if (sattrs.subpage) {
7fa7ea8f 2446 result->f.lg_page_size = 0;
652c750e 2447 }
730d5c31
RH
2448 return ret;
2449}
2450
966f4bb7
RH
2451/*
2452 * Translate from the 4-bit stage 2 representation of
2453 * memory attributes (without cache-allocation hints) to
2454 * the 8-bit representation of the stage 1 MAIR registers
2455 * (which includes allocation hints).
2456 *
2457 * ref: shared/translation/attrs/S2AttrDecode()
2458 * .../S2ConvertAttrsHints()
2459 */
ac76c2e5 2460static uint8_t convert_stage2_attrs(uint64_t hcr, uint8_t s2attrs)
966f4bb7
RH
2461{
2462 uint8_t hiattr = extract32(s2attrs, 2, 2);
2463 uint8_t loattr = extract32(s2attrs, 0, 2);
2464 uint8_t hihint = 0, lohint = 0;
2465
2466 if (hiattr != 0) { /* normal memory */
ac76c2e5 2467 if (hcr & HCR_CD) { /* cache disabled */
966f4bb7
RH
2468 hiattr = loattr = 1; /* non-cacheable */
2469 } else {
2470 if (hiattr != 1) { /* Write-through or write-back */
2471 hihint = 3; /* RW allocate */
2472 }
2473 if (loattr != 1) { /* Write-through or write-back */
2474 lohint = 3; /* RW allocate */
2475 }
2476 }
2477 }
2478
2479 return (hiattr << 6) | (hihint << 4) | (loattr << 2) | lohint;
2480}
2481
2482/*
2483 * Combine either inner or outer cacheability attributes for normal
2484 * memory, according to table D4-42 and pseudocode procedure
2485 * CombineS1S2AttrHints() of ARM DDI 0487B.b (the ARMv8 ARM).
2486 *
2487 * NB: only stage 1 includes allocation hints (RW bits), leading to
2488 * some asymmetry.
2489 */
2490static uint8_t combine_cacheattr_nibble(uint8_t s1, uint8_t s2)
2491{
2492 if (s1 == 4 || s2 == 4) {
2493 /* non-cacheable has precedence */
2494 return 4;
2495 } else if (extract32(s1, 2, 2) == 0 || extract32(s1, 2, 2) == 2) {
2496 /* stage 1 write-through takes precedence */
2497 return s1;
2498 } else if (extract32(s2, 2, 2) == 2) {
2499 /* stage 2 write-through takes precedence, but the allocation hint
2500 * is still taken from stage 1
2501 */
2502 return (2 << 2) | extract32(s1, 0, 2);
2503 } else { /* write-back */
2504 return s1;
2505 }
2506}
2507
2508/*
2509 * Combine the memory type and cacheability attributes of
2510 * s1 and s2 for the HCR_EL2.FWB == 0 case, returning the
2511 * combined attributes in MAIR_EL1 format.
2512 */
ac76c2e5 2513static uint8_t combined_attrs_nofwb(uint64_t hcr,
966f4bb7
RH
2514 ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2)
2515{
2516 uint8_t s1lo, s2lo, s1hi, s2hi, s2_mair_attrs, ret_attrs;
2517
faa1451e
TR
2518 if (s2.is_s2_format) {
2519 s2_mair_attrs = convert_stage2_attrs(hcr, s2.attrs);
2520 } else {
2521 s2_mair_attrs = s2.attrs;
2522 }
966f4bb7
RH
2523
2524 s1lo = extract32(s1.attrs, 0, 4);
2525 s2lo = extract32(s2_mair_attrs, 0, 4);
2526 s1hi = extract32(s1.attrs, 4, 4);
2527 s2hi = extract32(s2_mair_attrs, 4, 4);
2528
2529 /* Combine memory type and cacheability attributes */
2530 if (s1hi == 0 || s2hi == 0) {
2531 /* Device has precedence over normal */
2532 if (s1lo == 0 || s2lo == 0) {
2533 /* nGnRnE has precedence over anything */
2534 ret_attrs = 0;
2535 } else if (s1lo == 4 || s2lo == 4) {
2536 /* non-Reordering has precedence over Reordering */
2537 ret_attrs = 4; /* nGnRE */
2538 } else if (s1lo == 8 || s2lo == 8) {
2539 /* non-Gathering has precedence over Gathering */
2540 ret_attrs = 8; /* nGRE */
2541 } else {
2542 ret_attrs = 0xc; /* GRE */
2543 }
2544 } else { /* Normal memory */
2545 /* Outer/inner cacheability combine independently */
2546 ret_attrs = combine_cacheattr_nibble(s1hi, s2hi) << 4
2547 | combine_cacheattr_nibble(s1lo, s2lo);
2548 }
2549 return ret_attrs;
2550}
2551
2552static uint8_t force_cacheattr_nibble_wb(uint8_t attr)
2553{
2554 /*
2555 * Given the 4 bits specifying the outer or inner cacheability
2556 * in MAIR format, return a value specifying Normal Write-Back,
2557 * with the allocation and transient hints taken from the input
2558 * if the input specified some kind of cacheable attribute.
2559 */
2560 if (attr == 0 || attr == 4) {
2561 /*
2562 * 0 == an UNPREDICTABLE encoding
2563 * 4 == Non-cacheable
2564 * Either way, force Write-Back RW allocate non-transient
2565 */
2566 return 0xf;
2567 }
2568 /* Change WriteThrough to WriteBack, keep allocation and transient hints */
2569 return attr | 4;
2570}
2571
2572/*
2573 * Combine the memory type and cacheability attributes of
2574 * s1 and s2 for the HCR_EL2.FWB == 1 case, returning the
2575 * combined attributes in MAIR_EL1 format.
2576 */
72cef09c 2577static uint8_t combined_attrs_fwb(ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2)
966f4bb7 2578{
faa1451e
TR
2579 assert(s2.is_s2_format && !s1.is_s2_format);
2580
966f4bb7
RH
2581 switch (s2.attrs) {
2582 case 7:
2583 /* Use stage 1 attributes */
2584 return s1.attrs;
2585 case 6:
2586 /*
2587 * Force Normal Write-Back. Note that if S1 is Normal cacheable
2588 * then we take the allocation hints from it; otherwise it is
2589 * RW allocate, non-transient.
2590 */
2591 if ((s1.attrs & 0xf0) == 0) {
2592 /* S1 is Device */
2593 return 0xff;
2594 }
2595 /* Need to check the Inner and Outer nibbles separately */
2596 return force_cacheattr_nibble_wb(s1.attrs & 0xf) |
2597 force_cacheattr_nibble_wb(s1.attrs >> 4) << 4;
2598 case 5:
2599 /* If S1 attrs are Device, use them; otherwise Normal Non-cacheable */
2600 if ((s1.attrs & 0xf0) == 0) {
2601 return s1.attrs;
2602 }
2603 return 0x44;
2604 case 0 ... 3:
2605 /* Force Device, of subtype specified by S2 */
2606 return s2.attrs << 2;
2607 default:
2608 /*
2609 * RESERVED values (including RES0 descriptor bit [5] being nonzero);
2610 * arbitrarily force Device.
2611 */
2612 return 0;
2613 }
2614}
2615
2616/*
2617 * Combine S1 and S2 cacheability/shareability attributes, per D4.5.4
2618 * and CombineS1S2Desc()
2619 *
2620 * @env: CPUARMState
2621 * @s1: Attributes from stage 1 walk
2622 * @s2: Attributes from stage 2 walk
2623 */
ac76c2e5 2624static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(uint64_t hcr,
966f4bb7
RH
2625 ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2)
2626{
2627 ARMCacheAttrs ret;
2628 bool tagged = false;
2629
faa1451e 2630 assert(!s1.is_s2_format);
966f4bb7 2631 ret.is_s2_format = false;
8539dc00 2632 ret.guarded = s1.guarded;
966f4bb7
RH
2633
2634 if (s1.attrs == 0xf0) {
2635 tagged = true;
2636 s1.attrs = 0xff;
2637 }
2638
2639 /* Combine shareability attributes (table D4-43) */
2640 if (s1.shareability == 2 || s2.shareability == 2) {
2641 /* if either are outer-shareable, the result is outer-shareable */
2642 ret.shareability = 2;
2643 } else if (s1.shareability == 3 || s2.shareability == 3) {
2644 /* if either are inner-shareable, the result is inner-shareable */
2645 ret.shareability = 3;
2646 } else {
2647 /* both non-shareable */
2648 ret.shareability = 0;
2649 }
2650
2651 /* Combine memory type and cacheability attributes */
ac76c2e5 2652 if (hcr & HCR_FWB) {
72cef09c 2653 ret.attrs = combined_attrs_fwb(s1, s2);
966f4bb7 2654 } else {
ac76c2e5 2655 ret.attrs = combined_attrs_nofwb(hcr, s1, s2);
966f4bb7
RH
2656 }
2657
2658 /*
2659 * Any location for which the resultant memory type is any
2660 * type of Device memory is always treated as Outer Shareable.
2661 * Any location for which the resultant memory type is Normal
2662 * Inner Non-cacheable, Outer Non-cacheable is always treated
2663 * as Outer Shareable.
2664 * TODO: FEAT_XS adds another value (0x40) also meaning iNCoNC
2665 */
2666 if ((ret.attrs & 0xf0) == 0 || ret.attrs == 0x44) {
2667 ret.shareability = 2;
2668 }
2669
2670 /* TODO: CombineS1S2Desc does not consider transient, only WB, RWA. */
2671 if (tagged && ret.attrs == 0xff) {
2672 ret.attrs = 0xf0;
2673 }
2674
2675 return ret;
2676}
2677
448e42fd
RH
2678/*
2679 * MMU disabled. S1 addresses within aa64 translation regimes are
2680 * still checked for bounds -- see AArch64.S1DisabledOutput().
2681 */
2682static bool get_phys_addr_disabled(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
2683 MMUAccessType access_type,
2684 ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool is_secure,
2685 GetPhysAddrResult *result,
2686 ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
2687{
5b74f9b4
RH
2688 uint8_t memattr = 0x00; /* Device nGnRnE */
2689 uint8_t shareability = 0; /* non-sharable */
a1ce3084 2690 int r_el;
448e42fd 2691
a1ce3084
RH
2692 switch (mmu_idx) {
2693 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2:
2694 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S:
a1ce3084 2695 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_S:
bb5cc2c8
RH
2696 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_NS:
2697 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_Root:
2698 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_Realm:
a1ce3084 2699 break;
5b74f9b4 2700
a1ce3084
RH
2701 default:
2702 r_el = regime_el(env, mmu_idx);
448e42fd
RH
2703 if (arm_el_is_aa64(env, r_el)) {
2704 int pamax = arm_pamax(env_archcpu(env));
2705 uint64_t tcr = env->cp15.tcr_el[r_el];
2706 int addrtop, tbi;
2707
2708 tbi = aa64_va_parameter_tbi(tcr, mmu_idx);
2709 if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) {
2710 tbi &= ~aa64_va_parameter_tbid(tcr, mmu_idx);
2711 }
2712 tbi = (tbi >> extract64(address, 55, 1)) & 1;
2713 addrtop = (tbi ? 55 : 63);
2714
2715 if (extract64(address, pamax, addrtop - pamax + 1) != 0) {
2716 fi->type = ARMFault_AddressSize;
2717 fi->level = 0;
2718 fi->stage2 = false;
2719 return 1;
2720 }
2721
2722 /*
2723 * When TBI is disabled, we've just validated that all of the
2724 * bits above PAMax are zero, so logically we only need to
2725 * clear the top byte for TBI. But it's clearer to follow
2726 * the pseudocode set of addrdesc.paddress.
2727 */
2728 address = extract64(address, 0, 52);
2729 }
5b74f9b4
RH
2730
2731 /* Fill in cacheattr a-la AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. */
2732 if (r_el == 1) {
2733 uint64_t hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
2734 if (hcr & HCR_DC) {
2735 if (hcr & HCR_DCT) {
2736 memattr = 0xf0; /* Tagged, Normal, WB, RWA */
2737 } else {
2738 memattr = 0xff; /* Normal, WB, RWA */
2739 }
2740 }
2741 }
2742 if (memattr == 0 && access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) {
2743 if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_I) {
2744 memattr = 0xee; /* Normal, WT, RA, NT */
2745 } else {
2746 memattr = 0x44; /* Normal, NC, No */
2747 }
2748 shareability = 2; /* outer sharable */
2749 }
2750 result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false;
a1ce3084 2751 break;
448e42fd
RH
2752 }
2753
7fa7ea8f
RH
2754 result->f.phys_addr = address;
2755 result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
2756 result->f.lg_page_size = TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
5b74f9b4 2757 result->cacheattrs.shareability = shareability;
448e42fd 2758 result->cacheattrs.attrs = memattr;
6b72c542 2759 return false;
448e42fd
RH
2760}
2761
3f5a74c5
RH
2762static bool get_phys_addr_twostage(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
2763 target_ulong address,
2764 MMUAccessType access_type,
2765 GetPhysAddrResult *result,
2766 ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
2767{
2768 hwaddr ipa;
c8d6c286 2769 int s1_prot, s1_lgpgsz;
3f5a74c5 2770 bool is_secure = ptw->in_secure;
fcc0b041 2771 bool ret, ipa_secure;
3f5a74c5 2772 ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs1;
90c66293 2773 ARMSecuritySpace ipa_space;
3f5a74c5
RH
2774 bool is_el0;
2775 uint64_t hcr;
2776
2777 ret = get_phys_addr_with_struct(env, ptw, address, access_type, result, fi);
2778
26ba00cf
PM
2779 /* If S1 fails, return early. */
2780 if (ret) {
3f5a74c5
RH
2781 return ret;
2782 }
2783
2784 ipa = result->f.phys_addr;
2785 ipa_secure = result->f.attrs.secure;
90c66293 2786 ipa_space = result->f.attrs.space;
3f5a74c5
RH
2787
2788 is_el0 = ptw->in_mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0;
fcc0b041
PM
2789 ptw->in_mmu_idx = ipa_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2;
2790 ptw->in_secure = ipa_secure;
90c66293 2791 ptw->in_space = ipa_space;
fcc0b041 2792 ptw->in_ptw_idx = ptw_idx_for_stage_2(env, ptw->in_mmu_idx);
3f5a74c5
RH
2793
2794 /*
2795 * S1 is done, now do S2 translation.
2796 * Save the stage1 results so that we may merge prot and cacheattrs later.
2797 */
2798 s1_prot = result->f.prot;
c8d6c286 2799 s1_lgpgsz = result->f.lg_page_size;
3f5a74c5
RH
2800 cacheattrs1 = result->cacheattrs;
2801 memset(result, 0, sizeof(*result));
2802
fca45e34
TR
2803 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_PMSA)) {
2804 ret = get_phys_addr_pmsav8(env, ipa, access_type,
2805 ptw->in_mmu_idx, is_secure, result, fi);
2806 } else {
2807 ret = get_phys_addr_lpae(env, ptw, ipa, access_type,
2808 is_el0, result, fi);
2809 }
3f5a74c5
RH
2810 fi->s2addr = ipa;
2811
2812 /* Combine the S1 and S2 perms. */
2813 result->f.prot &= s1_prot;
2814
2815 /* If S2 fails, return early. */
2816 if (ret) {
2817 return ret;
2818 }
2819
c8d6c286 2820 /*
9e65f4e6
PM
2821 * If either S1 or S2 returned a result smaller than TARGET_PAGE_SIZE,
2822 * this means "don't put this in the TLB"; in this case, return a
2823 * result with lg_page_size == 0 to achieve that. Otherwise,
2824 * use the maximum of the S1 & S2 page size, so that invalidation
2825 * of pages > TARGET_PAGE_SIZE works correctly. (This works even though
2826 * we know the combined result permissions etc only cover the minimum
2827 * of the S1 and S2 page size, because we know that the common TLB code
2828 * never actually creates TLB entries bigger than TARGET_PAGE_SIZE,
2829 * and passing a larger page size value only affects invalidations.)
c8d6c286 2830 */
9e65f4e6
PM
2831 if (result->f.lg_page_size < TARGET_PAGE_BITS ||
2832 s1_lgpgsz < TARGET_PAGE_BITS) {
2833 result->f.lg_page_size = 0;
2834 } else if (result->f.lg_page_size < s1_lgpgsz) {
c8d6c286
RH
2835 result->f.lg_page_size = s1_lgpgsz;
2836 }
2837
3f5a74c5
RH
2838 /* Combine the S1 and S2 cache attributes. */
2839 hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
2840 if (hcr & HCR_DC) {
2841 /*
2842 * HCR.DC forces the first stage attributes to
2843 * Normal Non-Shareable,
2844 * Inner Write-Back Read-Allocate Write-Allocate,
2845 * Outer Write-Back Read-Allocate Write-Allocate.
2846 * Do not overwrite Tagged within attrs.
2847 */
2848 if (cacheattrs1.attrs != 0xf0) {
2849 cacheattrs1.attrs = 0xff;
2850 }
2851 cacheattrs1.shareability = 0;
2852 }
2853 result->cacheattrs = combine_cacheattrs(hcr, cacheattrs1,
2854 result->cacheattrs);
2855
2856 /*
2857 * Check if IPA translates to secure or non-secure PA space.
2858 * Note that VSTCR overrides VTCR and {N}SW overrides {N}SA.
2859 */
2860 result->f.attrs.secure =
2861 (is_secure
2862 && !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & (VSTCR_SA | VSTCR_SW))
2863 && (ipa_secure
2864 || !(env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & (VTCR_NSA | VTCR_NSW))));
2865
6b72c542 2866 return false;
3f5a74c5
RH
2867}
2868
4a358556
RH
2869static bool get_phys_addr_with_struct(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
2870 target_ulong address,
2871 MMUAccessType access_type,
2872 GetPhysAddrResult *result,
2873 ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
8ae08860 2874{
4a358556 2875 ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx = ptw->in_mmu_idx;
4a358556 2876 bool is_secure = ptw->in_secure;
48da29e4 2877 ARMMMUIdx s1_mmu_idx;
8ae08860 2878
cead7fa4 2879 /*
90c66293
RH
2880 * The page table entries may downgrade Secure to NonSecure, but
2881 * cannot upgrade a NonSecure translation regime's attributes
2882 * to Secure or Realm.
cead7fa4
RH
2883 */
2884 result->f.attrs.secure = is_secure;
90c66293 2885 result->f.attrs.space = ptw->in_space;
cead7fa4 2886
48da29e4
RH
2887 switch (mmu_idx) {
2888 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_S:
2889 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_NS:
bb5cc2c8
RH
2890 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_Root:
2891 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_Realm:
48da29e4
RH
2892 /* Checking Phys early avoids special casing later vs regime_el. */
2893 return get_phys_addr_disabled(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
2894 is_secure, result, fi);
2895
2896 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0:
2897 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1:
2898 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN:
2899 /* First stage lookup uses second stage for ptw. */
2900 ptw->in_ptw_idx = is_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2;
2901 break;
2902
fcc0b041
PM
2903 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2:
2904 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S:
2905 /*
2906 * Second stage lookup uses physical for ptw; whether this is S or
2907 * NS may depend on the SW/NSW bits if this is a stage 2 lookup for
2908 * the Secure EL2&0 regime.
2909 */
2910 ptw->in_ptw_idx = ptw_idx_for_stage_2(env, mmu_idx);
2911 break;
2912
48da29e4
RH
2913 case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
2914 s1_mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0;
2915 goto do_twostage;
2916 case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
2917 s1_mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1;
2918 goto do_twostage;
2919 case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
2920 s1_mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN;
2921 do_twostage:
8ae08860
RH
2922 /*
2923 * Call ourselves recursively to do the stage 1 and then stage 2
3f5a74c5
RH
2924 * translations if mmu_idx is a two-stage regime, and EL2 present.
2925 * Otherwise, a stage1+stage2 translation is just stage 1.
8ae08860 2926 */
3f5a74c5 2927 ptw->in_mmu_idx = mmu_idx = s1_mmu_idx;
26ba00cf
PM
2928 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_EL2) &&
2929 !regime_translation_disabled(env, ARMMMUIdx_Stage2, is_secure)) {
3f5a74c5
RH
2930 return get_phys_addr_twostage(env, ptw, address, access_type,
2931 result, fi);
8ae08860 2932 }
48da29e4
RH
2933 /* fall through */
2934
2935 default:
fcc0b041 2936 /* Single stage uses physical for ptw. */
90c66293 2937 ptw->in_ptw_idx = arm_space_to_phys(ptw->in_space);
48da29e4 2938 break;
8ae08860
RH
2939 }
2940
7fa7ea8f 2941 result->f.attrs.user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx);
8ae08860
RH
2942
2943 /*
2944 * Fast Context Switch Extension. This doesn't exist at all in v8.
2945 * In v7 and earlier it affects all stage 1 translations.
2946 */
2947 if (address < 0x02000000 && mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2
2948 && !arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
2949 if (regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 3) {
2950 address += env->cp15.fcseidr_s;
2951 } else {
2952 address += env->cp15.fcseidr_ns;
2953 }
2954 }
2955
2956 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_PMSA)) {
2957 bool ret;
7fa7ea8f 2958 result->f.lg_page_size = TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
8ae08860
RH
2959
2960 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
2961 /* PMSAv8 */
2962 ret = get_phys_addr_pmsav8(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
be0ca948 2963 is_secure, result, fi);
8ae08860
RH
2964 } else if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V7)) {
2965 /* PMSAv7 */
2966 ret = get_phys_addr_pmsav7(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
957a0bb7 2967 is_secure, result, fi);
8ae08860
RH
2968 } else {
2969 /* Pre-v7 MPU */
2970 ret = get_phys_addr_pmsav5(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
a5b5092f 2971 is_secure, result, fi);
8ae08860
RH
2972 }
2973 qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_MMU, "PMSA MPU lookup for %s at 0x%08" PRIx32
2974 " mmu_idx %u -> %s (prot %c%c%c)\n",
2975 access_type == MMU_DATA_LOAD ? "reading" :
2976 (access_type == MMU_DATA_STORE ? "writing" : "execute"),
2977 (uint32_t)address, mmu_idx,
2978 ret ? "Miss" : "Hit",
7fa7ea8f
RH
2979 result->f.prot & PAGE_READ ? 'r' : '-',
2980 result->f.prot & PAGE_WRITE ? 'w' : '-',
2981 result->f.prot & PAGE_EXEC ? 'x' : '-');
8ae08860
RH
2982
2983 return ret;
2984 }
2985
2986 /* Definitely a real MMU, not an MPU */
2987
7e80c0a4 2988 if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, is_secure)) {
448e42fd
RH
2989 return get_phys_addr_disabled(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
2990 is_secure, result, fi);
8ae08860 2991 }
6d2654ff 2992
8ae08860 2993 if (regime_using_lpae_format(env, mmu_idx)) {
4a358556 2994 return get_phys_addr_lpae(env, ptw, address, access_type, false,
6d2654ff 2995 result, fi);
6f2d9d74
TK
2996 } else if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V7) ||
2997 regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_XP) {
4a358556 2998 return get_phys_addr_v6(env, ptw, address, access_type, result, fi);
8ae08860 2999 } else {
4a358556 3000 return get_phys_addr_v5(env, ptw, address, access_type, result, fi);
8ae08860
RH
3001 }
3002}
23971205 3003
4a358556
RH
3004bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
3005 MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
3006 bool is_secure, GetPhysAddrResult *result,
3007 ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
3008{
3009 S1Translate ptw = {
3010 .in_mmu_idx = mmu_idx,
3011 .in_secure = is_secure,
90c66293 3012 .in_space = arm_secure_to_space(is_secure),
4a358556
RH
3013 };
3014 return get_phys_addr_with_struct(env, &ptw, address, access_type,
3015 result, fi);
3016}
3017
def8aa5b
RH
3018bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
3019 MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
3020 GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
3021{
90c66293
RH
3022 S1Translate ptw = {
3023 .in_mmu_idx = mmu_idx,
3024 };
3025 ARMSecuritySpace ss;
03bea66e
RH
3026
3027 switch (mmu_idx) {
3028 case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
3029 case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
3030 case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
3031 case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0:
3032 case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2:
3033 case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
3034 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0:
3035 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1:
3036 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN:
3037 case ARMMMUIdx_E2:
90c66293 3038 ss = arm_security_space_below_el3(env);
d902ae75 3039 break;
03bea66e 3040 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2:
90c66293
RH
3041 /*
3042 * For Secure EL2, we need this index to be NonSecure;
3043 * otherwise this will already be NonSecure or Realm.
3044 */
3045 ss = arm_security_space_below_el3(env);
3046 if (ss == ARMSS_Secure) {
3047 ss = ARMSS_NonSecure;
3048 }
3049 break;
a1ce3084 3050 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_NS:
03bea66e
RH
3051 case ARMMMUIdx_MPrivNegPri:
3052 case ARMMMUIdx_MUserNegPri:
3053 case ARMMMUIdx_MPriv:
3054 case ARMMMUIdx_MUser:
90c66293 3055 ss = ARMSS_NonSecure;
03bea66e 3056 break;
03bea66e 3057 case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S:
a1ce3084 3058 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_S:
03bea66e
RH
3059 case ARMMMUIdx_MSPrivNegPri:
3060 case ARMMMUIdx_MSUserNegPri:
3061 case ARMMMUIdx_MSPriv:
3062 case ARMMMUIdx_MSUser:
90c66293
RH
3063 ss = ARMSS_Secure;
3064 break;
3065 case ARMMMUIdx_E3:
3066 if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_AARCH64) &&
3067 cpu_isar_feature(aa64_rme, env_archcpu(env))) {
3068 ss = ARMSS_Root;
3069 } else {
3070 ss = ARMSS_Secure;
3071 }
3072 break;
3073 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_Root:
3074 ss = ARMSS_Root;
3075 break;
3076 case ARMMMUIdx_Phys_Realm:
3077 ss = ARMSS_Realm;
03bea66e
RH
3078 break;
3079 default:
3080 g_assert_not_reached();
3081 }
90c66293
RH
3082
3083 ptw.in_space = ss;
3084 ptw.in_secure = arm_space_is_secure(ss);
3085 return get_phys_addr_with_struct(env, &ptw, address, access_type,
3086 result, fi);
def8aa5b
RH
3087}
3088
23971205
RH
3089hwaddr arm_cpu_get_phys_page_attrs_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr,
3090 MemTxAttrs *attrs)
3091{
3092 ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
3093 CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
90c66293
RH
3094 ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx = arm_mmu_idx(env);
3095 ARMSecuritySpace ss = arm_security_space(env);
4a358556 3096 S1Translate ptw = {
90c66293
RH
3097 .in_mmu_idx = mmu_idx,
3098 .in_space = ss,
3099 .in_secure = arm_space_is_secure(ss),
4a358556
RH
3100 .in_debug = true,
3101 };
de05a709 3102 GetPhysAddrResult res = {};
23971205 3103 ARMMMUFaultInfo fi = {};
de05a709 3104 bool ret;
23971205 3105
4a358556 3106 ret = get_phys_addr_with_struct(env, &ptw, addr, MMU_DATA_LOAD, &res, &fi);
7fa7ea8f 3107 *attrs = res.f.attrs;
23971205
RH
3108
3109 if (ret) {
3110 return -1;
3111 }
7fa7ea8f 3112 return res.f.phys_addr;
23971205 3113}