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1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 | |
2 | /* | |
3 | * linux/kernel/sys.c | |
4 | * | |
5 | * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds | |
6 | */ | |
7 | ||
8 | #include <linux/export.h> | |
9 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
10 | #include <linux/utsname.h> | |
11 | #include <linux/mman.h> | |
12 | #include <linux/reboot.h> | |
13 | #include <linux/prctl.h> | |
14 | #include <linux/highuid.h> | |
15 | #include <linux/fs.h> | |
16 | #include <linux/kmod.h> | |
17 | #include <linux/perf_event.h> | |
18 | #include <linux/resource.h> | |
19 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
20 | #include <linux/workqueue.h> | |
21 | #include <linux/capability.h> | |
22 | #include <linux/device.h> | |
23 | #include <linux/key.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/times.h> | |
25 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h> | |
26 | #include <linux/security.h> | |
27 | #include <linux/dcookies.h> | |
28 | #include <linux/suspend.h> | |
29 | #include <linux/tty.h> | |
30 | #include <linux/signal.h> | |
31 | #include <linux/cn_proc.h> | |
32 | #include <linux/getcpu.h> | |
33 | #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> | |
34 | #include <linux/seccomp.h> | |
35 | #include <linux/cpu.h> | |
36 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
37 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | |
38 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h> | |
39 | #include <linux/file.h> | |
40 | #include <linux/mount.h> | |
41 | #include <linux/gfp.h> | |
42 | #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> | |
43 | #include <linux/version.h> | |
44 | #include <linux/ctype.h> | |
45 | ||
46 | #include <linux/compat.h> | |
47 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> | |
48 | #include <linux/kprobes.h> | |
49 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> | |
50 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> | |
51 | ||
52 | #include <linux/sched.h> | |
53 | #include <linux/sched/autogroup.h> | |
54 | #include <linux/sched/loadavg.h> | |
55 | #include <linux/sched/stat.h> | |
56 | #include <linux/sched/mm.h> | |
57 | #include <linux/sched/coredump.h> | |
58 | #include <linux/sched/task.h> | |
59 | #include <linux/sched/cputime.h> | |
60 | #include <linux/rcupdate.h> | |
61 | #include <linux/uidgid.h> | |
62 | #include <linux/cred.h> | |
63 | ||
64 | #include <linux/nospec.h> | |
65 | ||
66 | #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> | |
67 | /* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */ | |
68 | #include <generated/utsrelease.h> | |
69 | ||
70 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> | |
71 | #include <asm/io.h> | |
72 | #include <asm/unistd.h> | |
73 | ||
74 | #include "uid16.h" | |
75 | ||
76 | #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL | |
77 | # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) | |
78 | #endif | |
79 | #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL | |
80 | # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) | |
81 | #endif | |
82 | #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL | |
83 | # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) | |
84 | #endif | |
85 | #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL | |
86 | # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) | |
87 | #endif | |
88 | #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL | |
89 | # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) | |
90 | #endif | |
91 | #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL | |
92 | # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) | |
93 | #endif | |
94 | #ifndef GET_ENDIAN | |
95 | # define GET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) | |
96 | #endif | |
97 | #ifndef SET_ENDIAN | |
98 | # define SET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) | |
99 | #endif | |
100 | #ifndef GET_TSC_CTL | |
101 | # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) | |
102 | #endif | |
103 | #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL | |
104 | # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) | |
105 | #endif | |
106 | #ifndef MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT | |
107 | # define MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT() (-EINVAL) | |
108 | #endif | |
109 | #ifndef MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT | |
110 | # define MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT() (-EINVAL) | |
111 | #endif | |
112 | #ifndef GET_FP_MODE | |
113 | # define GET_FP_MODE(a) (-EINVAL) | |
114 | #endif | |
115 | #ifndef SET_FP_MODE | |
116 | # define SET_FP_MODE(a,b) (-EINVAL) | |
117 | #endif | |
118 | #ifndef SVE_SET_VL | |
119 | # define SVE_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL) | |
120 | #endif | |
121 | #ifndef SVE_GET_VL | |
122 | # define SVE_GET_VL() (-EINVAL) | |
123 | #endif | |
124 | #ifndef PAC_RESET_KEYS | |
125 | # define PAC_RESET_KEYS(a, b) (-EINVAL) | |
126 | #endif | |
127 | #ifndef SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL | |
128 | # define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(a) (-EINVAL) | |
129 | #endif | |
130 | #ifndef GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL | |
131 | # define GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL() (-EINVAL) | |
132 | #endif | |
133 | ||
134 | /* | |
135 | * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for | |
136 | * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past | |
137 | */ | |
138 | ||
139 | int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID; | |
140 | int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID; | |
141 | ||
142 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid); | |
143 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid); | |
144 | ||
145 | /* | |
146 | * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit | |
147 | * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures | |
148 | */ | |
149 | ||
150 | int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; | |
151 | int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWGID; | |
152 | ||
153 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid); | |
154 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid); | |
155 | ||
156 | /* | |
157 | * Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid, | |
158 | * or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns. | |
159 | * | |
160 | * Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe | |
161 | */ | |
162 | static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p) | |
163 | { | |
164 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p); | |
165 | ||
166 | if (uid_eq(pcred->uid, cred->euid) || | |
167 | uid_eq(pcred->euid, cred->euid)) | |
168 | return true; | |
169 | if (ns_capable(pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) | |
170 | return true; | |
171 | return false; | |
172 | } | |
173 | ||
174 | /* | |
175 | * set the priority of a task | |
176 | * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock | |
177 | */ | |
178 | static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) | |
179 | { | |
180 | int no_nice; | |
181 | ||
182 | if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) { | |
183 | error = -EPERM; | |
184 | goto out; | |
185 | } | |
186 | if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) { | |
187 | error = -EACCES; | |
188 | goto out; | |
189 | } | |
190 | no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval); | |
191 | if (no_nice) { | |
192 | error = no_nice; | |
193 | goto out; | |
194 | } | |
195 | if (error == -ESRCH) | |
196 | error = 0; | |
197 | set_user_nice(p, niceval); | |
198 | out: | |
199 | return error; | |
200 | } | |
201 | ||
202 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval) | |
203 | { | |
204 | struct task_struct *g, *p; | |
205 | struct user_struct *user; | |
206 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); | |
207 | int error = -EINVAL; | |
208 | struct pid *pgrp; | |
209 | kuid_t uid; | |
210 | ||
211 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) | |
212 | goto out; | |
213 | ||
214 | /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */ | |
215 | error = -ESRCH; | |
216 | if (niceval < MIN_NICE) | |
217 | niceval = MIN_NICE; | |
218 | if (niceval > MAX_NICE) | |
219 | niceval = MAX_NICE; | |
220 | ||
221 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
222 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); | |
223 | switch (which) { | |
224 | case PRIO_PROCESS: | |
225 | if (who) | |
226 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who); | |
227 | else | |
228 | p = current; | |
229 | if (p) | |
230 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); | |
231 | break; | |
232 | case PRIO_PGRP: | |
233 | if (who) | |
234 | pgrp = find_vpid(who); | |
235 | else | |
236 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current); | |
237 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { | |
238 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); | |
239 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); | |
240 | break; | |
241 | case PRIO_USER: | |
242 | uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); | |
243 | user = cred->user; | |
244 | if (!who) | |
245 | uid = cred->uid; | |
246 | else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) { | |
247 | user = find_user(uid); | |
248 | if (!user) | |
249 | goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ | |
250 | } | |
251 | do_each_thread(g, p) { | |
252 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) && task_pid_vnr(p)) | |
253 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); | |
254 | } while_each_thread(g, p); | |
255 | if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) | |
256 | free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */ | |
257 | break; | |
258 | } | |
259 | out_unlock: | |
260 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); | |
261 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
262 | out: | |
263 | return error; | |
264 | } | |
265 | ||
266 | /* | |
267 | * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will | |
268 | * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that | |
269 | * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19) | |
270 | * to stay compatible. | |
271 | */ | |
272 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who) | |
273 | { | |
274 | struct task_struct *g, *p; | |
275 | struct user_struct *user; | |
276 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); | |
277 | long niceval, retval = -ESRCH; | |
278 | struct pid *pgrp; | |
279 | kuid_t uid; | |
280 | ||
281 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) | |
282 | return -EINVAL; | |
283 | ||
284 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
285 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); | |
286 | switch (which) { | |
287 | case PRIO_PROCESS: | |
288 | if (who) | |
289 | p = find_task_by_vpid(who); | |
290 | else | |
291 | p = current; | |
292 | if (p) { | |
293 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); | |
294 | if (niceval > retval) | |
295 | retval = niceval; | |
296 | } | |
297 | break; | |
298 | case PRIO_PGRP: | |
299 | if (who) | |
300 | pgrp = find_vpid(who); | |
301 | else | |
302 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current); | |
303 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { | |
304 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); | |
305 | if (niceval > retval) | |
306 | retval = niceval; | |
307 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); | |
308 | break; | |
309 | case PRIO_USER: | |
310 | uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); | |
311 | user = cred->user; | |
312 | if (!who) | |
313 | uid = cred->uid; | |
314 | else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) { | |
315 | user = find_user(uid); | |
316 | if (!user) | |
317 | goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ | |
318 | } | |
319 | do_each_thread(g, p) { | |
320 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) && task_pid_vnr(p)) { | |
321 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); | |
322 | if (niceval > retval) | |
323 | retval = niceval; | |
324 | } | |
325 | } while_each_thread(g, p); | |
326 | if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) | |
327 | free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */ | |
328 | break; | |
329 | } | |
330 | out_unlock: | |
331 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); | |
332 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
333 | ||
334 | return retval; | |
335 | } | |
336 | ||
337 | /* | |
338 | * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid | |
339 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style) | |
340 | * | |
341 | * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not | |
342 | * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid. | |
343 | * | |
344 | * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its | |
345 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing | |
346 | * a security audit over a program. | |
347 | * | |
348 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be | |
349 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be | |
350 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. | |
351 | * | |
352 | * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem | |
353 | * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned). | |
354 | */ | |
355 | #ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER | |
356 | long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) | |
357 | { | |
358 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); | |
359 | const struct cred *old; | |
360 | struct cred *new; | |
361 | int retval; | |
362 | kgid_t krgid, kegid; | |
363 | ||
364 | krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); | |
365 | kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); | |
366 | ||
367 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) | |
368 | return -EINVAL; | |
369 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) | |
370 | return -EINVAL; | |
371 | ||
372 | new = prepare_creds(); | |
373 | if (!new) | |
374 | return -ENOMEM; | |
375 | old = current_cred(); | |
376 | ||
377 | retval = -EPERM; | |
378 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { | |
379 | if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) || | |
380 | gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) || | |
381 | ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) | |
382 | new->gid = krgid; | |
383 | else | |
384 | goto error; | |
385 | } | |
386 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { | |
387 | if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) || | |
388 | gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) || | |
389 | gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) || | |
390 | ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) | |
391 | new->egid = kegid; | |
392 | else | |
393 | goto error; | |
394 | } | |
395 | ||
396 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || | |
397 | (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid))) | |
398 | new->sgid = new->egid; | |
399 | new->fsgid = new->egid; | |
400 | ||
401 | return commit_creds(new); | |
402 | ||
403 | error: | |
404 | abort_creds(new); | |
405 | return retval; | |
406 | } | |
407 | ||
408 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid) | |
409 | { | |
410 | return __sys_setregid(rgid, egid); | |
411 | } | |
412 | ||
413 | /* | |
414 | * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS | |
415 | * | |
416 | * SMP: Same implicit races as above. | |
417 | */ | |
418 | long __sys_setgid(gid_t gid) | |
419 | { | |
420 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); | |
421 | const struct cred *old; | |
422 | struct cred *new; | |
423 | int retval; | |
424 | kgid_t kgid; | |
425 | ||
426 | kgid = make_kgid(ns, gid); | |
427 | if (!gid_valid(kgid)) | |
428 | return -EINVAL; | |
429 | ||
430 | new = prepare_creds(); | |
431 | if (!new) | |
432 | return -ENOMEM; | |
433 | old = current_cred(); | |
434 | ||
435 | retval = -EPERM; | |
436 | if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) | |
437 | new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid; | |
438 | else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid)) | |
439 | new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid; | |
440 | else | |
441 | goto error; | |
442 | ||
443 | return commit_creds(new); | |
444 | ||
445 | error: | |
446 | abort_creds(new); | |
447 | return retval; | |
448 | } | |
449 | ||
450 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid) | |
451 | { | |
452 | return __sys_setgid(gid); | |
453 | } | |
454 | ||
455 | /* | |
456 | * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID | |
457 | */ | |
458 | static int set_user(struct cred *new) | |
459 | { | |
460 | struct user_struct *new_user; | |
461 | ||
462 | new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid); | |
463 | if (!new_user) | |
464 | return -EAGAIN; | |
465 | ||
466 | /* | |
467 | * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many | |
468 | * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming | |
469 | * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit | |
470 | * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the | |
471 | * failure to the execve() stage. | |
472 | */ | |
473 | if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) && | |
474 | new_user != INIT_USER) | |
475 | current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; | |
476 | else | |
477 | current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; | |
478 | ||
479 | free_uid(new->user); | |
480 | new->user = new_user; | |
481 | return 0; | |
482 | } | |
483 | ||
484 | /* | |
485 | * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid | |
486 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style) | |
487 | * | |
488 | * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not | |
489 | * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid. | |
490 | * | |
491 | * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its | |
492 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing | |
493 | * a security audit over a program. | |
494 | * | |
495 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be | |
496 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be | |
497 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. | |
498 | */ | |
499 | long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) | |
500 | { | |
501 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); | |
502 | const struct cred *old; | |
503 | struct cred *new; | |
504 | int retval; | |
505 | kuid_t kruid, keuid; | |
506 | ||
507 | kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); | |
508 | keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); | |
509 | ||
510 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) | |
511 | return -EINVAL; | |
512 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) | |
513 | return -EINVAL; | |
514 | ||
515 | new = prepare_creds(); | |
516 | if (!new) | |
517 | return -ENOMEM; | |
518 | old = current_cred(); | |
519 | ||
520 | retval = -EPERM; | |
521 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { | |
522 | new->uid = kruid; | |
523 | if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) && | |
524 | !uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) && | |
525 | !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) | |
526 | goto error; | |
527 | } | |
528 | ||
529 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { | |
530 | new->euid = keuid; | |
531 | if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) && | |
532 | !uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) && | |
533 | !uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) && | |
534 | !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) | |
535 | goto error; | |
536 | } | |
537 | ||
538 | if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid)) { | |
539 | retval = set_user(new); | |
540 | if (retval < 0) | |
541 | goto error; | |
542 | } | |
543 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || | |
544 | (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid))) | |
545 | new->suid = new->euid; | |
546 | new->fsuid = new->euid; | |
547 | ||
548 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); | |
549 | if (retval < 0) | |
550 | goto error; | |
551 | ||
552 | return commit_creds(new); | |
553 | ||
554 | error: | |
555 | abort_creds(new); | |
556 | return retval; | |
557 | } | |
558 | ||
559 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid) | |
560 | { | |
561 | return __sys_setreuid(ruid, euid); | |
562 | } | |
563 | ||
564 | /* | |
565 | * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS | |
566 | * | |
567 | * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program | |
568 | * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal | |
569 | * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets | |
570 | * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people | |
571 | * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid() | |
572 | * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to | |
573 | * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid. | |
574 | */ | |
575 | long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid) | |
576 | { | |
577 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); | |
578 | const struct cred *old; | |
579 | struct cred *new; | |
580 | int retval; | |
581 | kuid_t kuid; | |
582 | ||
583 | kuid = make_kuid(ns, uid); | |
584 | if (!uid_valid(kuid)) | |
585 | return -EINVAL; | |
586 | ||
587 | new = prepare_creds(); | |
588 | if (!new) | |
589 | return -ENOMEM; | |
590 | old = current_cred(); | |
591 | ||
592 | retval = -EPERM; | |
593 | if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { | |
594 | new->suid = new->uid = kuid; | |
595 | if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) { | |
596 | retval = set_user(new); | |
597 | if (retval < 0) | |
598 | goto error; | |
599 | } | |
600 | } else if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kuid, new->suid)) { | |
601 | goto error; | |
602 | } | |
603 | ||
604 | new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid; | |
605 | ||
606 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); | |
607 | if (retval < 0) | |
608 | goto error; | |
609 | ||
610 | return commit_creds(new); | |
611 | ||
612 | error: | |
613 | abort_creds(new); | |
614 | return retval; | |
615 | } | |
616 | ||
617 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid) | |
618 | { | |
619 | return __sys_setuid(uid); | |
620 | } | |
621 | ||
622 | ||
623 | /* | |
624 | * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid, | |
625 | * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid(). | |
626 | */ | |
627 | long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) | |
628 | { | |
629 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); | |
630 | const struct cred *old; | |
631 | struct cred *new; | |
632 | int retval; | |
633 | kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid; | |
634 | ||
635 | kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); | |
636 | keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); | |
637 | ksuid = make_kuid(ns, suid); | |
638 | ||
639 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) | |
640 | return -EINVAL; | |
641 | ||
642 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) | |
643 | return -EINVAL; | |
644 | ||
645 | if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid)) | |
646 | return -EINVAL; | |
647 | ||
648 | new = prepare_creds(); | |
649 | if (!new) | |
650 | return -ENOMEM; | |
651 | ||
652 | old = current_cred(); | |
653 | ||
654 | retval = -EPERM; | |
655 | if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { | |
656 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) && | |
657 | !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid)) | |
658 | goto error; | |
659 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) && | |
660 | !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid)) | |
661 | goto error; | |
662 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) && | |
663 | !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid)) | |
664 | goto error; | |
665 | } | |
666 | ||
667 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { | |
668 | new->uid = kruid; | |
669 | if (!uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) { | |
670 | retval = set_user(new); | |
671 | if (retval < 0) | |
672 | goto error; | |
673 | } | |
674 | } | |
675 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) | |
676 | new->euid = keuid; | |
677 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1) | |
678 | new->suid = ksuid; | |
679 | new->fsuid = new->euid; | |
680 | ||
681 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); | |
682 | if (retval < 0) | |
683 | goto error; | |
684 | ||
685 | return commit_creds(new); | |
686 | ||
687 | error: | |
688 | abort_creds(new); | |
689 | return retval; | |
690 | } | |
691 | ||
692 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid) | |
693 | { | |
694 | return __sys_setresuid(ruid, euid, suid); | |
695 | } | |
696 | ||
697 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp) | |
698 | { | |
699 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); | |
700 | int retval; | |
701 | uid_t ruid, euid, suid; | |
702 | ||
703 | ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid); | |
704 | euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid); | |
705 | suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid); | |
706 | ||
707 | retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp); | |
708 | if (!retval) { | |
709 | retval = put_user(euid, euidp); | |
710 | if (!retval) | |
711 | return put_user(suid, suidp); | |
712 | } | |
713 | return retval; | |
714 | } | |
715 | ||
716 | /* | |
717 | * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid. | |
718 | */ | |
719 | long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) | |
720 | { | |
721 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); | |
722 | const struct cred *old; | |
723 | struct cred *new; | |
724 | int retval; | |
725 | kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid; | |
726 | ||
727 | krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); | |
728 | kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); | |
729 | ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid); | |
730 | ||
731 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) | |
732 | return -EINVAL; | |
733 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) | |
734 | return -EINVAL; | |
735 | if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid)) | |
736 | return -EINVAL; | |
737 | ||
738 | new = prepare_creds(); | |
739 | if (!new) | |
740 | return -ENOMEM; | |
741 | old = current_cred(); | |
742 | ||
743 | retval = -EPERM; | |
744 | if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { | |
745 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) && | |
746 | !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid)) | |
747 | goto error; | |
748 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) && | |
749 | !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid)) | |
750 | goto error; | |
751 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) && | |
752 | !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid)) | |
753 | goto error; | |
754 | } | |
755 | ||
756 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) | |
757 | new->gid = krgid; | |
758 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) | |
759 | new->egid = kegid; | |
760 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) | |
761 | new->sgid = ksgid; | |
762 | new->fsgid = new->egid; | |
763 | ||
764 | return commit_creds(new); | |
765 | ||
766 | error: | |
767 | abort_creds(new); | |
768 | return retval; | |
769 | } | |
770 | ||
771 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid) | |
772 | { | |
773 | return __sys_setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid); | |
774 | } | |
775 | ||
776 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp) | |
777 | { | |
778 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); | |
779 | int retval; | |
780 | gid_t rgid, egid, sgid; | |
781 | ||
782 | rgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid); | |
783 | egid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid); | |
784 | sgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->sgid); | |
785 | ||
786 | retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp); | |
787 | if (!retval) { | |
788 | retval = put_user(egid, egidp); | |
789 | if (!retval) | |
790 | retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp); | |
791 | } | |
792 | ||
793 | return retval; | |
794 | } | |
795 | ||
796 | ||
797 | /* | |
798 | * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This | |
799 | * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at | |
800 | * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when | |
801 | * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access.. | |
802 | */ | |
803 | long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid) | |
804 | { | |
805 | const struct cred *old; | |
806 | struct cred *new; | |
807 | uid_t old_fsuid; | |
808 | kuid_t kuid; | |
809 | ||
810 | old = current_cred(); | |
811 | old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsuid); | |
812 | ||
813 | kuid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, uid); | |
814 | if (!uid_valid(kuid)) | |
815 | return old_fsuid; | |
816 | ||
817 | new = prepare_creds(); | |
818 | if (!new) | |
819 | return old_fsuid; | |
820 | ||
821 | if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) || | |
822 | uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) || | |
823 | ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { | |
824 | if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) { | |
825 | new->fsuid = kuid; | |
826 | if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) | |
827 | goto change_okay; | |
828 | } | |
829 | } | |
830 | ||
831 | abort_creds(new); | |
832 | return old_fsuid; | |
833 | ||
834 | change_okay: | |
835 | commit_creds(new); | |
836 | return old_fsuid; | |
837 | } | |
838 | ||
839 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid) | |
840 | { | |
841 | return __sys_setfsuid(uid); | |
842 | } | |
843 | ||
844 | /* | |
845 | * Samma på svenska.. | |
846 | */ | |
847 | long __sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid) | |
848 | { | |
849 | const struct cred *old; | |
850 | struct cred *new; | |
851 | gid_t old_fsgid; | |
852 | kgid_t kgid; | |
853 | ||
854 | old = current_cred(); | |
855 | old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsgid); | |
856 | ||
857 | kgid = make_kgid(old->user_ns, gid); | |
858 | if (!gid_valid(kgid)) | |
859 | return old_fsgid; | |
860 | ||
861 | new = prepare_creds(); | |
862 | if (!new) | |
863 | return old_fsgid; | |
864 | ||
865 | if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) || | |
866 | gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) || | |
867 | ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { | |
868 | if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) { | |
869 | new->fsgid = kgid; | |
870 | goto change_okay; | |
871 | } | |
872 | } | |
873 | ||
874 | abort_creds(new); | |
875 | return old_fsgid; | |
876 | ||
877 | change_okay: | |
878 | commit_creds(new); | |
879 | return old_fsgid; | |
880 | } | |
881 | ||
882 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid) | |
883 | { | |
884 | return __sys_setfsgid(gid); | |
885 | } | |
886 | #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ | |
887 | ||
888 | /** | |
889 | * sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process | |
890 | * | |
891 | * Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and | |
892 | * the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in | |
893 | * which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group. | |
894 | * | |
895 | * This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change. | |
896 | */ | |
897 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid) | |
898 | { | |
899 | return task_tgid_vnr(current); | |
900 | } | |
901 | ||
902 | /* Thread ID - the internal kernel "pid" */ | |
903 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid) | |
904 | { | |
905 | return task_pid_vnr(current); | |
906 | } | |
907 | ||
908 | /* | |
909 | * Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could | |
910 | * change from under us. However, we can use a stale | |
911 | * value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see | |
912 | * release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct). | |
913 | */ | |
914 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid) | |
915 | { | |
916 | int pid; | |
917 | ||
918 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
919 | pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent)); | |
920 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
921 | ||
922 | return pid; | |
923 | } | |
924 | ||
925 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid) | |
926 | { | |
927 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ | |
928 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()); | |
929 | } | |
930 | ||
931 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid) | |
932 | { | |
933 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ | |
934 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid()); | |
935 | } | |
936 | ||
937 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid) | |
938 | { | |
939 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ | |
940 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid()); | |
941 | } | |
942 | ||
943 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid) | |
944 | { | |
945 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ | |
946 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid()); | |
947 | } | |
948 | ||
949 | static void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms) | |
950 | { | |
951 | u64 tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime; | |
952 | ||
953 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, &tgutime, &tgstime); | |
954 | cutime = current->signal->cutime; | |
955 | cstime = current->signal->cstime; | |
956 | tms->tms_utime = nsec_to_clock_t(tgutime); | |
957 | tms->tms_stime = nsec_to_clock_t(tgstime); | |
958 | tms->tms_cutime = nsec_to_clock_t(cutime); | |
959 | tms->tms_cstime = nsec_to_clock_t(cstime); | |
960 | } | |
961 | ||
962 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf) | |
963 | { | |
964 | if (tbuf) { | |
965 | struct tms tmp; | |
966 | ||
967 | do_sys_times(&tmp); | |
968 | if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms))) | |
969 | return -EFAULT; | |
970 | } | |
971 | force_successful_syscall_return(); | |
972 | return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64()); | |
973 | } | |
974 | ||
975 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT | |
976 | static compat_clock_t clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(clock_t x) | |
977 | { | |
978 | return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(clock_t_to_jiffies(x)); | |
979 | } | |
980 | ||
981 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct compat_tms __user *, tbuf) | |
982 | { | |
983 | if (tbuf) { | |
984 | struct tms tms; | |
985 | struct compat_tms tmp; | |
986 | ||
987 | do_sys_times(&tms); | |
988 | /* Convert our struct tms to the compat version. */ | |
989 | tmp.tms_utime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_utime); | |
990 | tmp.tms_stime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_stime); | |
991 | tmp.tms_cutime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_cutime); | |
992 | tmp.tms_cstime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_cstime); | |
993 | if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) | |
994 | return -EFAULT; | |
995 | } | |
996 | force_successful_syscall_return(); | |
997 | return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(jiffies); | |
998 | } | |
999 | #endif | |
1000 | ||
1001 | /* | |
1002 | * This needs some heavy checking ... | |
1003 | * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully | |
1004 | * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it. | |
1005 | * | |
1006 | * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really | |
1007 | * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user | |
1008 | * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91 | |
1009 | * | |
1010 | * !PF_FORKNOEXEC check to conform completely to POSIX. | |
1011 | */ | |
1012 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid) | |
1013 | { | |
1014 | struct task_struct *p; | |
1015 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; | |
1016 | struct pid *pgrp; | |
1017 | int err; | |
1018 | ||
1019 | if (!pid) | |
1020 | pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader); | |
1021 | if (!pgid) | |
1022 | pgid = pid; | |
1023 | if (pgid < 0) | |
1024 | return -EINVAL; | |
1025 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
1026 | ||
1027 | /* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock | |
1028 | * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM | |
1029 | */ | |
1030 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); | |
1031 | ||
1032 | err = -ESRCH; | |
1033 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); | |
1034 | if (!p) | |
1035 | goto out; | |
1036 | ||
1037 | err = -EINVAL; | |
1038 | if (!thread_group_leader(p)) | |
1039 | goto out; | |
1040 | ||
1041 | if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) { | |
1042 | err = -EPERM; | |
1043 | if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader)) | |
1044 | goto out; | |
1045 | err = -EACCES; | |
1046 | if (!(p->flags & PF_FORKNOEXEC)) | |
1047 | goto out; | |
1048 | } else { | |
1049 | err = -ESRCH; | |
1050 | if (p != group_leader) | |
1051 | goto out; | |
1052 | } | |
1053 | ||
1054 | err = -EPERM; | |
1055 | if (p->signal->leader) | |
1056 | goto out; | |
1057 | ||
1058 | pgrp = task_pid(p); | |
1059 | if (pgid != pid) { | |
1060 | struct task_struct *g; | |
1061 | ||
1062 | pgrp = find_vpid(pgid); | |
1063 | g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID); | |
1064 | if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader)) | |
1065 | goto out; | |
1066 | } | |
1067 | ||
1068 | err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid); | |
1069 | if (err) | |
1070 | goto out; | |
1071 | ||
1072 | if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp) | |
1073 | change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp); | |
1074 | ||
1075 | err = 0; | |
1076 | out: | |
1077 | /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */ | |
1078 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); | |
1079 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1080 | return err; | |
1081 | } | |
1082 | ||
1083 | static int do_getpgid(pid_t pid) | |
1084 | { | |
1085 | struct task_struct *p; | |
1086 | struct pid *grp; | |
1087 | int retval; | |
1088 | ||
1089 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
1090 | if (!pid) | |
1091 | grp = task_pgrp(current); | |
1092 | else { | |
1093 | retval = -ESRCH; | |
1094 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); | |
1095 | if (!p) | |
1096 | goto out; | |
1097 | grp = task_pgrp(p); | |
1098 | if (!grp) | |
1099 | goto out; | |
1100 | ||
1101 | retval = security_task_getpgid(p); | |
1102 | if (retval) | |
1103 | goto out; | |
1104 | } | |
1105 | retval = pid_vnr(grp); | |
1106 | out: | |
1107 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1108 | return retval; | |
1109 | } | |
1110 | ||
1111 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid) | |
1112 | { | |
1113 | return do_getpgid(pid); | |
1114 | } | |
1115 | ||
1116 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP | |
1117 | ||
1118 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp) | |
1119 | { | |
1120 | return do_getpgid(0); | |
1121 | } | |
1122 | ||
1123 | #endif | |
1124 | ||
1125 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid) | |
1126 | { | |
1127 | struct task_struct *p; | |
1128 | struct pid *sid; | |
1129 | int retval; | |
1130 | ||
1131 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
1132 | if (!pid) | |
1133 | sid = task_session(current); | |
1134 | else { | |
1135 | retval = -ESRCH; | |
1136 | p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); | |
1137 | if (!p) | |
1138 | goto out; | |
1139 | sid = task_session(p); | |
1140 | if (!sid) | |
1141 | goto out; | |
1142 | ||
1143 | retval = security_task_getsid(p); | |
1144 | if (retval) | |
1145 | goto out; | |
1146 | } | |
1147 | retval = pid_vnr(sid); | |
1148 | out: | |
1149 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1150 | return retval; | |
1151 | } | |
1152 | ||
1153 | static void set_special_pids(struct pid *pid) | |
1154 | { | |
1155 | struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader; | |
1156 | ||
1157 | if (task_session(curr) != pid) | |
1158 | change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_SID, pid); | |
1159 | ||
1160 | if (task_pgrp(curr) != pid) | |
1161 | change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid); | |
1162 | } | |
1163 | ||
1164 | int ksys_setsid(void) | |
1165 | { | |
1166 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; | |
1167 | struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader); | |
1168 | pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid); | |
1169 | int err = -EPERM; | |
1170 | ||
1171 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); | |
1172 | /* Fail if I am already a session leader */ | |
1173 | if (group_leader->signal->leader) | |
1174 | goto out; | |
1175 | ||
1176 | /* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the | |
1177 | * proposed session id. | |
1178 | */ | |
1179 | if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID)) | |
1180 | goto out; | |
1181 | ||
1182 | group_leader->signal->leader = 1; | |
1183 | set_special_pids(sid); | |
1184 | ||
1185 | proc_clear_tty(group_leader); | |
1186 | ||
1187 | err = session; | |
1188 | out: | |
1189 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); | |
1190 | if (err > 0) { | |
1191 | proc_sid_connector(group_leader); | |
1192 | sched_autogroup_create_attach(group_leader); | |
1193 | } | |
1194 | return err; | |
1195 | } | |
1196 | ||
1197 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid) | |
1198 | { | |
1199 | return ksys_setsid(); | |
1200 | } | |
1201 | ||
1202 | DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem); | |
1203 | ||
1204 | #ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE | |
1205 | #define override_architecture(name) \ | |
1206 | (personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \ | |
1207 | copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \ | |
1208 | sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE))) | |
1209 | #else | |
1210 | #define override_architecture(name) 0 | |
1211 | #endif | |
1212 | ||
1213 | /* | |
1214 | * Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0". | |
1215 | * Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40 | |
1216 | * And we map 4.x and later versions to 2.6.60+x, so 4.0/5.0/6.0/... would be | |
1217 | * 2.6.60. | |
1218 | */ | |
1219 | static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len) | |
1220 | { | |
1221 | int ret = 0; | |
1222 | ||
1223 | if (current->personality & UNAME26) { | |
1224 | const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE; | |
1225 | char buf[65] = { 0 }; | |
1226 | int ndots = 0; | |
1227 | unsigned v; | |
1228 | size_t copy; | |
1229 | ||
1230 | while (*rest) { | |
1231 | if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3) | |
1232 | break; | |
1233 | if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.') | |
1234 | break; | |
1235 | rest++; | |
1236 | } | |
1237 | v = ((LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff) + 60; | |
1238 | copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf)); | |
1239 | copy = scnprintf(buf, copy, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest); | |
1240 | ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, copy + 1); | |
1241 | } | |
1242 | return ret; | |
1243 | } | |
1244 | ||
1245 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name) | |
1246 | { | |
1247 | struct new_utsname tmp; | |
1248 | ||
1249 | down_read(&uts_sem); | |
1250 | memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp)); | |
1251 | up_read(&uts_sem); | |
1252 | if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) | |
1253 | return -EFAULT; | |
1254 | ||
1255 | if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) | |
1256 | return -EFAULT; | |
1257 | if (override_architecture(name)) | |
1258 | return -EFAULT; | |
1259 | return 0; | |
1260 | } | |
1261 | ||
1262 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME | |
1263 | /* | |
1264 | * Old cruft | |
1265 | */ | |
1266 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name) | |
1267 | { | |
1268 | struct old_utsname tmp; | |
1269 | ||
1270 | if (!name) | |
1271 | return -EFAULT; | |
1272 | ||
1273 | down_read(&uts_sem); | |
1274 | memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp)); | |
1275 | up_read(&uts_sem); | |
1276 | if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) | |
1277 | return -EFAULT; | |
1278 | ||
1279 | if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) | |
1280 | return -EFAULT; | |
1281 | if (override_architecture(name)) | |
1282 | return -EFAULT; | |
1283 | return 0; | |
1284 | } | |
1285 | ||
1286 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name) | |
1287 | { | |
1288 | struct oldold_utsname tmp = {}; | |
1289 | ||
1290 | if (!name) | |
1291 | return -EFAULT; | |
1292 | ||
1293 | down_read(&uts_sem); | |
1294 | memcpy(&tmp.sysname, &utsname()->sysname, __OLD_UTS_LEN); | |
1295 | memcpy(&tmp.nodename, &utsname()->nodename, __OLD_UTS_LEN); | |
1296 | memcpy(&tmp.release, &utsname()->release, __OLD_UTS_LEN); | |
1297 | memcpy(&tmp.version, &utsname()->version, __OLD_UTS_LEN); | |
1298 | memcpy(&tmp.machine, &utsname()->machine, __OLD_UTS_LEN); | |
1299 | up_read(&uts_sem); | |
1300 | if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) | |
1301 | return -EFAULT; | |
1302 | ||
1303 | if (override_architecture(name)) | |
1304 | return -EFAULT; | |
1305 | if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) | |
1306 | return -EFAULT; | |
1307 | return 0; | |
1308 | } | |
1309 | #endif | |
1310 | ||
1311 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) | |
1312 | { | |
1313 | int errno; | |
1314 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; | |
1315 | ||
1316 | if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
1317 | return -EPERM; | |
1318 | ||
1319 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) | |
1320 | return -EINVAL; | |
1321 | errno = -EFAULT; | |
1322 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { | |
1323 | struct new_utsname *u; | |
1324 | ||
1325 | down_write(&uts_sem); | |
1326 | u = utsname(); | |
1327 | memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len); | |
1328 | memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len); | |
1329 | errno = 0; | |
1330 | uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME); | |
1331 | up_write(&uts_sem); | |
1332 | } | |
1333 | return errno; | |
1334 | } | |
1335 | ||
1336 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME | |
1337 | ||
1338 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) | |
1339 | { | |
1340 | int i; | |
1341 | struct new_utsname *u; | |
1342 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN + 1]; | |
1343 | ||
1344 | if (len < 0) | |
1345 | return -EINVAL; | |
1346 | down_read(&uts_sem); | |
1347 | u = utsname(); | |
1348 | i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename); | |
1349 | if (i > len) | |
1350 | i = len; | |
1351 | memcpy(tmp, u->nodename, i); | |
1352 | up_read(&uts_sem); | |
1353 | if (copy_to_user(name, tmp, i)) | |
1354 | return -EFAULT; | |
1355 | return 0; | |
1356 | } | |
1357 | ||
1358 | #endif | |
1359 | ||
1360 | /* | |
1361 | * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling | |
1362 | * uname() | |
1363 | */ | |
1364 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len) | |
1365 | { | |
1366 | int errno; | |
1367 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; | |
1368 | ||
1369 | if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
1370 | return -EPERM; | |
1371 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) | |
1372 | return -EINVAL; | |
1373 | ||
1374 | errno = -EFAULT; | |
1375 | if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { | |
1376 | struct new_utsname *u; | |
1377 | ||
1378 | down_write(&uts_sem); | |
1379 | u = utsname(); | |
1380 | memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len); | |
1381 | memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len); | |
1382 | errno = 0; | |
1383 | uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME); | |
1384 | up_write(&uts_sem); | |
1385 | } | |
1386 | return errno; | |
1387 | } | |
1388 | ||
1389 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) | |
1390 | { | |
1391 | struct rlimit value; | |
1392 | int ret; | |
1393 | ||
1394 | ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &value); | |
1395 | if (!ret) | |
1396 | ret = copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0; | |
1397 | ||
1398 | return ret; | |
1399 | } | |
1400 | ||
1401 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT | |
1402 | ||
1403 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, | |
1404 | struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim) | |
1405 | { | |
1406 | struct rlimit r; | |
1407 | struct compat_rlimit r32; | |
1408 | ||
1409 | if (copy_from_user(&r32, rlim, sizeof(struct compat_rlimit))) | |
1410 | return -EFAULT; | |
1411 | ||
1412 | if (r32.rlim_cur == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) | |
1413 | r.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; | |
1414 | else | |
1415 | r.rlim_cur = r32.rlim_cur; | |
1416 | if (r32.rlim_max == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) | |
1417 | r.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; | |
1418 | else | |
1419 | r.rlim_max = r32.rlim_max; | |
1420 | return do_prlimit(current, resource, &r, NULL); | |
1421 | } | |
1422 | ||
1423 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, | |
1424 | struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim) | |
1425 | { | |
1426 | struct rlimit r; | |
1427 | int ret; | |
1428 | ||
1429 | ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &r); | |
1430 | if (!ret) { | |
1431 | struct compat_rlimit r32; | |
1432 | if (r.rlim_cur > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) | |
1433 | r32.rlim_cur = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY; | |
1434 | else | |
1435 | r32.rlim_cur = r.rlim_cur; | |
1436 | if (r.rlim_max > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) | |
1437 | r32.rlim_max = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY; | |
1438 | else | |
1439 | r32.rlim_max = r.rlim_max; | |
1440 | ||
1441 | if (copy_to_user(rlim, &r32, sizeof(struct compat_rlimit))) | |
1442 | return -EFAULT; | |
1443 | } | |
1444 | return ret; | |
1445 | } | |
1446 | ||
1447 | #endif | |
1448 | ||
1449 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT | |
1450 | ||
1451 | /* | |
1452 | * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps. | |
1453 | */ | |
1454 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, | |
1455 | struct rlimit __user *, rlim) | |
1456 | { | |
1457 | struct rlimit x; | |
1458 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) | |
1459 | return -EINVAL; | |
1460 | ||
1461 | resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS); | |
1462 | task_lock(current->group_leader); | |
1463 | x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; | |
1464 | task_unlock(current->group_leader); | |
1465 | if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) | |
1466 | x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; | |
1467 | if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) | |
1468 | x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; | |
1469 | return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x)) ? -EFAULT : 0; | |
1470 | } | |
1471 | ||
1472 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT | |
1473 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, | |
1474 | struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim) | |
1475 | { | |
1476 | struct rlimit r; | |
1477 | ||
1478 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) | |
1479 | return -EINVAL; | |
1480 | ||
1481 | resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS); | |
1482 | task_lock(current->group_leader); | |
1483 | r = current->signal->rlim[resource]; | |
1484 | task_unlock(current->group_leader); | |
1485 | if (r.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) | |
1486 | r.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; | |
1487 | if (r.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) | |
1488 | r.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; | |
1489 | ||
1490 | if (put_user(r.rlim_cur, &rlim->rlim_cur) || | |
1491 | put_user(r.rlim_max, &rlim->rlim_max)) | |
1492 | return -EFAULT; | |
1493 | return 0; | |
1494 | } | |
1495 | #endif | |
1496 | ||
1497 | #endif | |
1498 | ||
1499 | static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64) | |
1500 | { | |
1501 | #if BITS_PER_LONG < 64 | |
1502 | return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX; | |
1503 | #else | |
1504 | return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY; | |
1505 | #endif | |
1506 | } | |
1507 | ||
1508 | static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64) | |
1509 | { | |
1510 | if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) | |
1511 | rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY; | |
1512 | else | |
1513 | rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur; | |
1514 | if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY) | |
1515 | rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY; | |
1516 | else | |
1517 | rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max; | |
1518 | } | |
1519 | ||
1520 | static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim) | |
1521 | { | |
1522 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_cur)) | |
1523 | rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; | |
1524 | else | |
1525 | rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur; | |
1526 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_max)) | |
1527 | rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; | |
1528 | else | |
1529 | rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max; | |
1530 | } | |
1531 | ||
1532 | /* make sure you are allowed to change @tsk limits before calling this */ | |
1533 | int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource, | |
1534 | struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim) | |
1535 | { | |
1536 | struct rlimit *rlim; | |
1537 | int retval = 0; | |
1538 | ||
1539 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) | |
1540 | return -EINVAL; | |
1541 | if (new_rlim) { | |
1542 | if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max) | |
1543 | return -EINVAL; | |
1544 | if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && | |
1545 | new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open) | |
1546 | return -EPERM; | |
1547 | } | |
1548 | ||
1549 | /* protect tsk->signal and tsk->sighand from disappearing */ | |
1550 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); | |
1551 | if (!tsk->sighand) { | |
1552 | retval = -ESRCH; | |
1553 | goto out; | |
1554 | } | |
1555 | ||
1556 | rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource; | |
1557 | task_lock(tsk->group_leader); | |
1558 | if (new_rlim) { | |
1559 | /* Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until | |
1560 | cgroups can contain all limits */ | |
1561 | if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max && | |
1562 | !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) | |
1563 | retval = -EPERM; | |
1564 | if (!retval) | |
1565 | retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim); | |
1566 | if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim->rlim_cur == 0) { | |
1567 | /* | |
1568 | * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU | |
1569 | * expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was | |
1570 | * never set". So let's cheat and make it one second | |
1571 | * instead | |
1572 | */ | |
1573 | new_rlim->rlim_cur = 1; | |
1574 | } | |
1575 | } | |
1576 | if (!retval) { | |
1577 | if (old_rlim) | |
1578 | *old_rlim = *rlim; | |
1579 | if (new_rlim) | |
1580 | *rlim = *new_rlim; | |
1581 | } | |
1582 | task_unlock(tsk->group_leader); | |
1583 | ||
1584 | /* | |
1585 | * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error | |
1586 | * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a | |
1587 | * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of | |
1588 | * applications, so we live with it | |
1589 | */ | |
1590 | if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU && | |
1591 | new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY && | |
1592 | IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) | |
1593 | update_rlimit_cpu(tsk, new_rlim->rlim_cur); | |
1594 | out: | |
1595 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); | |
1596 | return retval; | |
1597 | } | |
1598 | ||
1599 | /* rcu lock must be held */ | |
1600 | static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task, | |
1601 | unsigned int flags) | |
1602 | { | |
1603 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; | |
1604 | bool id_match; | |
1605 | ||
1606 | if (current == task) | |
1607 | return 0; | |
1608 | ||
1609 | tcred = __task_cred(task); | |
1610 | id_match = (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) && | |
1611 | uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && | |
1612 | uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) && | |
1613 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) && | |
1614 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) && | |
1615 | gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid)); | |
1616 | if (!id_match && !ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) | |
1617 | return -EPERM; | |
1618 | ||
1619 | return security_task_prlimit(cred, tcred, flags); | |
1620 | } | |
1621 | ||
1622 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource, | |
1623 | const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim, | |
1624 | struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim) | |
1625 | { | |
1626 | struct rlimit64 old64, new64; | |
1627 | struct rlimit old, new; | |
1628 | struct task_struct *tsk; | |
1629 | unsigned int checkflags = 0; | |
1630 | int ret; | |
1631 | ||
1632 | if (old_rlim) | |
1633 | checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_READ; | |
1634 | ||
1635 | if (new_rlim) { | |
1636 | if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64))) | |
1637 | return -EFAULT; | |
1638 | rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new); | |
1639 | checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE; | |
1640 | } | |
1641 | ||
1642 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
1643 | tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current; | |
1644 | if (!tsk) { | |
1645 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1646 | return -ESRCH; | |
1647 | } | |
1648 | ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk, checkflags); | |
1649 | if (ret) { | |
1650 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1651 | return ret; | |
1652 | } | |
1653 | get_task_struct(tsk); | |
1654 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1655 | ||
1656 | ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim ? &new : NULL, | |
1657 | old_rlim ? &old : NULL); | |
1658 | ||
1659 | if (!ret && old_rlim) { | |
1660 | rlim_to_rlim64(&old, &old64); | |
1661 | if (copy_to_user(old_rlim, &old64, sizeof(old64))) | |
1662 | ret = -EFAULT; | |
1663 | } | |
1664 | ||
1665 | put_task_struct(tsk); | |
1666 | return ret; | |
1667 | } | |
1668 | ||
1669 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) | |
1670 | { | |
1671 | struct rlimit new_rlim; | |
1672 | ||
1673 | if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim))) | |
1674 | return -EFAULT; | |
1675 | return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL); | |
1676 | } | |
1677 | ||
1678 | /* | |
1679 | * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct, | |
1680 | * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After | |
1681 | * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would | |
1682 | * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information | |
1683 | * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not | |
1684 | * measuring them yet). | |
1685 | * | |
1686 | * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have | |
1687 | * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word | |
1688 | * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't | |
1689 | * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading | |
1690 | * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those | |
1691 | * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a | |
1692 | * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping. | |
1693 | * | |
1694 | * Locking: | |
1695 | * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH | |
1696 | * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded | |
1697 | * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with | |
1698 | * the siglock held. | |
1699 | * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and | |
1700 | * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one | |
1701 | * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else | |
1702 | * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the | |
1703 | * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just | |
1704 | * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock. | |
1705 | * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal | |
1706 | * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal-> | |
1707 | * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple. | |
1708 | * | |
1709 | */ | |
1710 | ||
1711 | static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r) | |
1712 | { | |
1713 | r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw; | |
1714 | r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw; | |
1715 | r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt; | |
1716 | r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt; | |
1717 | r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t); | |
1718 | r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t); | |
1719 | } | |
1720 | ||
1721 | void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) | |
1722 | { | |
1723 | struct task_struct *t; | |
1724 | unsigned long flags; | |
1725 | u64 tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime; | |
1726 | unsigned long maxrss = 0; | |
1727 | ||
1728 | memset((char *)r, 0, sizeof (*r)); | |
1729 | utime = stime = 0; | |
1730 | ||
1731 | if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) { | |
1732 | task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime); | |
1733 | accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r); | |
1734 | maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; | |
1735 | goto out; | |
1736 | } | |
1737 | ||
1738 | if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) | |
1739 | return; | |
1740 | ||
1741 | switch (who) { | |
1742 | case RUSAGE_BOTH: | |
1743 | case RUSAGE_CHILDREN: | |
1744 | utime = p->signal->cutime; | |
1745 | stime = p->signal->cstime; | |
1746 | r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw; | |
1747 | r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw; | |
1748 | r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt; | |
1749 | r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt; | |
1750 | r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock; | |
1751 | r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock; | |
1752 | maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss; | |
1753 | ||
1754 | if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) | |
1755 | break; | |
1756 | /* fall through */ | |
1757 | ||
1758 | case RUSAGE_SELF: | |
1759 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime); | |
1760 | utime += tgutime; | |
1761 | stime += tgstime; | |
1762 | r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw; | |
1763 | r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw; | |
1764 | r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt; | |
1765 | r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt; | |
1766 | r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock; | |
1767 | r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock; | |
1768 | if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss) | |
1769 | maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; | |
1770 | t = p; | |
1771 | do { | |
1772 | accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); | |
1773 | } while_each_thread(p, t); | |
1774 | break; | |
1775 | ||
1776 | default: | |
1777 | BUG(); | |
1778 | } | |
1779 | unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags); | |
1780 | ||
1781 | out: | |
1782 | r->ru_utime = ns_to_timeval(utime); | |
1783 | r->ru_stime = ns_to_timeval(stime); | |
1784 | ||
1785 | if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) { | |
1786 | struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p); | |
1787 | ||
1788 | if (mm) { | |
1789 | setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm); | |
1790 | mmput(mm); | |
1791 | } | |
1792 | } | |
1793 | r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */ | |
1794 | } | |
1795 | ||
1796 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru) | |
1797 | { | |
1798 | struct rusage r; | |
1799 | ||
1800 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && | |
1801 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD) | |
1802 | return -EINVAL; | |
1803 | ||
1804 | getrusage(current, who, &r); | |
1805 | return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0; | |
1806 | } | |
1807 | ||
1808 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT | |
1809 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct compat_rusage __user *, ru) | |
1810 | { | |
1811 | struct rusage r; | |
1812 | ||
1813 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && | |
1814 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD) | |
1815 | return -EINVAL; | |
1816 | ||
1817 | getrusage(current, who, &r); | |
1818 | return put_compat_rusage(&r, ru); | |
1819 | } | |
1820 | #endif | |
1821 | ||
1822 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask) | |
1823 | { | |
1824 | mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO); | |
1825 | return mask; | |
1826 | } | |
1827 | ||
1828 | static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd) | |
1829 | { | |
1830 | struct fd exe; | |
1831 | struct file *old_exe, *exe_file; | |
1832 | struct inode *inode; | |
1833 | int err; | |
1834 | ||
1835 | exe = fdget(fd); | |
1836 | if (!exe.file) | |
1837 | return -EBADF; | |
1838 | ||
1839 | inode = file_inode(exe.file); | |
1840 | ||
1841 | /* | |
1842 | * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make | |
1843 | * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an | |
1844 | * overall picture. | |
1845 | */ | |
1846 | err = -EACCES; | |
1847 | if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path)) | |
1848 | goto exit; | |
1849 | ||
1850 | err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC); | |
1851 | if (err) | |
1852 | goto exit; | |
1853 | ||
1854 | /* | |
1855 | * Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped. | |
1856 | */ | |
1857 | exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm); | |
1858 | err = -EBUSY; | |
1859 | if (exe_file) { | |
1860 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; | |
1861 | ||
1862 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
1863 | for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { | |
1864 | if (!vma->vm_file) | |
1865 | continue; | |
1866 | if (path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path, | |
1867 | &exe_file->f_path)) | |
1868 | goto exit_err; | |
1869 | } | |
1870 | ||
1871 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
1872 | fput(exe_file); | |
1873 | } | |
1874 | ||
1875 | err = 0; | |
1876 | /* set the new file, lockless */ | |
1877 | get_file(exe.file); | |
1878 | old_exe = xchg(&mm->exe_file, exe.file); | |
1879 | if (old_exe) | |
1880 | fput(old_exe); | |
1881 | exit: | |
1882 | fdput(exe); | |
1883 | return err; | |
1884 | exit_err: | |
1885 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
1886 | fput(exe_file); | |
1887 | goto exit; | |
1888 | } | |
1889 | ||
1890 | /* | |
1891 | * Check arithmetic relations of passed addresses. | |
1892 | * | |
1893 | * WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful | |
1894 | * in what is allowed for modification from userspace. | |
1895 | */ | |
1896 | static int validate_prctl_map_addr(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) | |
1897 | { | |
1898 | unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE; | |
1899 | int error = -EINVAL, i; | |
1900 | ||
1901 | static const unsigned char offsets[] = { | |
1902 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_code), | |
1903 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_code), | |
1904 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_data), | |
1905 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_data), | |
1906 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_brk), | |
1907 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, brk), | |
1908 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_stack), | |
1909 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_start), | |
1910 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_end), | |
1911 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_start), | |
1912 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_end), | |
1913 | }; | |
1914 | ||
1915 | /* | |
1916 | * Make sure the members are not somewhere outside | |
1917 | * of allowed address space. | |
1918 | */ | |
1919 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(offsets); i++) { | |
1920 | u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)prctl_map + offsets[i]); | |
1921 | ||
1922 | if ((unsigned long)val >= mmap_max_addr || | |
1923 | (unsigned long)val < mmap_min_addr) | |
1924 | goto out; | |
1925 | } | |
1926 | ||
1927 | /* | |
1928 | * Make sure the pairs are ordered. | |
1929 | */ | |
1930 | #define __prctl_check_order(__m1, __op, __m2) \ | |
1931 | ((unsigned long)prctl_map->__m1 __op \ | |
1932 | (unsigned long)prctl_map->__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL | |
1933 | error = __prctl_check_order(start_code, <, end_code); | |
1934 | error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data,<=, end_data); | |
1935 | error |= __prctl_check_order(start_brk, <=, brk); | |
1936 | error |= __prctl_check_order(arg_start, <=, arg_end); | |
1937 | error |= __prctl_check_order(env_start, <=, env_end); | |
1938 | if (error) | |
1939 | goto out; | |
1940 | #undef __prctl_check_order | |
1941 | ||
1942 | error = -EINVAL; | |
1943 | ||
1944 | /* | |
1945 | * @brk should be after @end_data in traditional maps. | |
1946 | */ | |
1947 | if (prctl_map->start_brk <= prctl_map->end_data || | |
1948 | prctl_map->brk <= prctl_map->end_data) | |
1949 | goto out; | |
1950 | ||
1951 | /* | |
1952 | * Neither we should allow to override limits if they set. | |
1953 | */ | |
1954 | if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), prctl_map->brk, | |
1955 | prctl_map->start_brk, prctl_map->end_data, | |
1956 | prctl_map->start_data)) | |
1957 | goto out; | |
1958 | ||
1959 | error = 0; | |
1960 | out: | |
1961 | return error; | |
1962 | } | |
1963 | ||
1964 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE | |
1965 | static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data_size) | |
1966 | { | |
1967 | struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .exe_fd = (u32)-1, }; | |
1968 | unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE]; | |
1969 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; | |
1970 | int error; | |
1971 | ||
1972 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); | |
1973 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct prctl_mm_map) > 256); | |
1974 | ||
1975 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE) | |
1976 | return put_user((unsigned int)sizeof(prctl_map), | |
1977 | (unsigned int __user *)addr); | |
1978 | ||
1979 | if (data_size != sizeof(prctl_map)) | |
1980 | return -EINVAL; | |
1981 | ||
1982 | if (copy_from_user(&prctl_map, addr, sizeof(prctl_map))) | |
1983 | return -EFAULT; | |
1984 | ||
1985 | error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map); | |
1986 | if (error) | |
1987 | return error; | |
1988 | ||
1989 | if (prctl_map.auxv_size) { | |
1990 | /* | |
1991 | * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector. | |
1992 | */ | |
1993 | if (!prctl_map.auxv || | |
1994 | prctl_map.auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)) | |
1995 | return -EINVAL; | |
1996 | ||
1997 | memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv)); | |
1998 | if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, | |
1999 | (const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv, | |
2000 | prctl_map.auxv_size)) | |
2001 | return -EFAULT; | |
2002 | ||
2003 | /* Last entry must be AT_NULL as specification requires */ | |
2004 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = AT_NULL; | |
2005 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = AT_NULL; | |
2006 | } | |
2007 | ||
2008 | if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) { | |
2009 | /* | |
2010 | * Make sure the caller has the rights to | |
2011 | * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should | |
2012 | * be allowed to. | |
2013 | */ | |
2014 | if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
2015 | return -EINVAL; | |
2016 | ||
2017 | error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd); | |
2018 | if (error) | |
2019 | return error; | |
2020 | } | |
2021 | ||
2022 | /* | |
2023 | * arg_lock protects concurent updates but we still need mmap_sem for | |
2024 | * read to exclude races with sys_brk. | |
2025 | */ | |
2026 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
2027 | ||
2028 | /* | |
2029 | * We don't validate if these members are pointing to | |
2030 | * real present VMAs because application may have correspond | |
2031 | * VMAs already unmapped and kernel uses these members for statistics | |
2032 | * output in procfs mostly, except | |
2033 | * | |
2034 | * - @start_brk/@brk which are used in do_brk but kernel lookups | |
2035 | * for VMAs when updating these memvers so anything wrong written | |
2036 | * here cause kernel to swear at userspace program but won't lead | |
2037 | * to any problem in kernel itself | |
2038 | */ | |
2039 | ||
2040 | spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock); | |
2041 | mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code; | |
2042 | mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code; | |
2043 | mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data; | |
2044 | mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data; | |
2045 | mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk; | |
2046 | mm->brk = prctl_map.brk; | |
2047 | mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack; | |
2048 | mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start; | |
2049 | mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end; | |
2050 | mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start; | |
2051 | mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end; | |
2052 | spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock); | |
2053 | ||
2054 | /* | |
2055 | * Note this update of @saved_auxv is lockless thus | |
2056 | * if someone reads this member in procfs while we're | |
2057 | * updating -- it may get partly updated results. It's | |
2058 | * known and acceptable trade off: we leave it as is to | |
2059 | * not introduce additional locks here making the kernel | |
2060 | * more complex. | |
2061 | */ | |
2062 | if (prctl_map.auxv_size) | |
2063 | memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, sizeof(user_auxv)); | |
2064 | ||
2065 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
2066 | return 0; | |
2067 | } | |
2068 | #endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ | |
2069 | ||
2070 | static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, | |
2071 | unsigned long len) | |
2072 | { | |
2073 | /* | |
2074 | * This doesn't move the auxiliary vector itself since it's pinned to | |
2075 | * mm_struct, but it permits filling the vector with new values. It's | |
2076 | * up to the caller to provide sane values here, otherwise userspace | |
2077 | * tools which use this vector might be unhappy. | |
2078 | */ | |
2079 | unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE]; | |
2080 | ||
2081 | if (len > sizeof(user_auxv)) | |
2082 | return -EINVAL; | |
2083 | ||
2084 | if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)addr, len)) | |
2085 | return -EFAULT; | |
2086 | ||
2087 | /* Make sure the last entry is always AT_NULL */ | |
2088 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = 0; | |
2089 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = 0; | |
2090 | ||
2091 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); | |
2092 | ||
2093 | task_lock(current); | |
2094 | memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, len); | |
2095 | task_unlock(current); | |
2096 | ||
2097 | return 0; | |
2098 | } | |
2099 | ||
2100 | static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, | |
2101 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) | |
2102 | { | |
2103 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; | |
2104 | struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { | |
2105 | .auxv = NULL, | |
2106 | .auxv_size = 0, | |
2107 | .exe_fd = -1, | |
2108 | }; | |
2109 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; | |
2110 | int error; | |
2111 | ||
2112 | if (arg5 || (arg4 && (opt != PR_SET_MM_AUXV && | |
2113 | opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP && | |
2114 | opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE))) | |
2115 | return -EINVAL; | |
2116 | ||
2117 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE | |
2118 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP || opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE) | |
2119 | return prctl_set_mm_map(opt, (const void __user *)addr, arg4); | |
2120 | #endif | |
2121 | ||
2122 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) | |
2123 | return -EPERM; | |
2124 | ||
2125 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE) | |
2126 | return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, (unsigned int)addr); | |
2127 | ||
2128 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_AUXV) | |
2129 | return prctl_set_auxv(mm, addr, arg4); | |
2130 | ||
2131 | if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr) | |
2132 | return -EINVAL; | |
2133 | ||
2134 | error = -EINVAL; | |
2135 | ||
2136 | /* | |
2137 | * arg_lock protects concurent updates of arg boundaries, we need | |
2138 | * mmap_sem for a) concurrent sys_brk, b) finding VMA for addr | |
2139 | * validation. | |
2140 | */ | |
2141 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
2142 | vma = find_vma(mm, addr); | |
2143 | ||
2144 | spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock); | |
2145 | prctl_map.start_code = mm->start_code; | |
2146 | prctl_map.end_code = mm->end_code; | |
2147 | prctl_map.start_data = mm->start_data; | |
2148 | prctl_map.end_data = mm->end_data; | |
2149 | prctl_map.start_brk = mm->start_brk; | |
2150 | prctl_map.brk = mm->brk; | |
2151 | prctl_map.start_stack = mm->start_stack; | |
2152 | prctl_map.arg_start = mm->arg_start; | |
2153 | prctl_map.arg_end = mm->arg_end; | |
2154 | prctl_map.env_start = mm->env_start; | |
2155 | prctl_map.env_end = mm->env_end; | |
2156 | ||
2157 | switch (opt) { | |
2158 | case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE: | |
2159 | prctl_map.start_code = addr; | |
2160 | break; | |
2161 | case PR_SET_MM_END_CODE: | |
2162 | prctl_map.end_code = addr; | |
2163 | break; | |
2164 | case PR_SET_MM_START_DATA: | |
2165 | prctl_map.start_data = addr; | |
2166 | break; | |
2167 | case PR_SET_MM_END_DATA: | |
2168 | prctl_map.end_data = addr; | |
2169 | break; | |
2170 | case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK: | |
2171 | prctl_map.start_stack = addr; | |
2172 | break; | |
2173 | case PR_SET_MM_START_BRK: | |
2174 | prctl_map.start_brk = addr; | |
2175 | break; | |
2176 | case PR_SET_MM_BRK: | |
2177 | prctl_map.brk = addr; | |
2178 | break; | |
2179 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START: | |
2180 | prctl_map.arg_start = addr; | |
2181 | break; | |
2182 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END: | |
2183 | prctl_map.arg_end = addr; | |
2184 | break; | |
2185 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START: | |
2186 | prctl_map.env_start = addr; | |
2187 | break; | |
2188 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END: | |
2189 | prctl_map.env_end = addr; | |
2190 | break; | |
2191 | default: | |
2192 | goto out; | |
2193 | } | |
2194 | ||
2195 | error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map); | |
2196 | if (error) | |
2197 | goto out; | |
2198 | ||
2199 | switch (opt) { | |
2200 | /* | |
2201 | * If command line arguments and environment | |
2202 | * are placed somewhere else on stack, we can | |
2203 | * set them up here, ARG_START/END to setup | |
2204 | * command line argumets and ENV_START/END | |
2205 | * for environment. | |
2206 | */ | |
2207 | case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK: | |
2208 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START: | |
2209 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END: | |
2210 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START: | |
2211 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END: | |
2212 | if (!vma) { | |
2213 | error = -EFAULT; | |
2214 | goto out; | |
2215 | } | |
2216 | } | |
2217 | ||
2218 | mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code; | |
2219 | mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code; | |
2220 | mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data; | |
2221 | mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data; | |
2222 | mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk; | |
2223 | mm->brk = prctl_map.brk; | |
2224 | mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack; | |
2225 | mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start; | |
2226 | mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end; | |
2227 | mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start; | |
2228 | mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end; | |
2229 | ||
2230 | error = 0; | |
2231 | out: | |
2232 | spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock); | |
2233 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
2234 | return error; | |
2235 | } | |
2236 | ||
2237 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE | |
2238 | static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr) | |
2239 | { | |
2240 | return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr); | |
2241 | } | |
2242 | #else | |
2243 | static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr) | |
2244 | { | |
2245 | return -EINVAL; | |
2246 | } | |
2247 | #endif | |
2248 | ||
2249 | static int propagate_has_child_subreaper(struct task_struct *p, void *data) | |
2250 | { | |
2251 | /* | |
2252 | * If task has has_child_subreaper - all its decendants | |
2253 | * already have these flag too and new decendants will | |
2254 | * inherit it on fork, skip them. | |
2255 | * | |
2256 | * If we've found child_reaper - skip descendants in | |
2257 | * it's subtree as they will never get out pidns. | |
2258 | */ | |
2259 | if (p->signal->has_child_subreaper || | |
2260 | is_child_reaper(task_pid(p))) | |
2261 | return 0; | |
2262 | ||
2263 | p->signal->has_child_subreaper = 1; | |
2264 | return 1; | |
2265 | } | |
2266 | ||
2267 | int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which) | |
2268 | { | |
2269 | return -EINVAL; | |
2270 | } | |
2271 | ||
2272 | int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which, | |
2273 | unsigned long ctrl) | |
2274 | { | |
2275 | return -EINVAL; | |
2276 | } | |
2277 | ||
2278 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, | |
2279 | unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) | |
2280 | { | |
2281 | struct task_struct *me = current; | |
2282 | unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)]; | |
2283 | long error; | |
2284 | ||
2285 | error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); | |
2286 | if (error != -ENOSYS) | |
2287 | return error; | |
2288 | ||
2289 | error = 0; | |
2290 | switch (option) { | |
2291 | case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG: | |
2292 | if (!valid_signal(arg2)) { | |
2293 | error = -EINVAL; | |
2294 | break; | |
2295 | } | |
2296 | me->pdeath_signal = arg2; | |
2297 | break; | |
2298 | case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: | |
2299 | error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); | |
2300 | break; | |
2301 | case PR_GET_DUMPABLE: | |
2302 | error = get_dumpable(me->mm); | |
2303 | break; | |
2304 | case PR_SET_DUMPABLE: | |
2305 | if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) { | |
2306 | error = -EINVAL; | |
2307 | break; | |
2308 | } | |
2309 | set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2); | |
2310 | break; | |
2311 | ||
2312 | case PR_SET_UNALIGN: | |
2313 | error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); | |
2314 | break; | |
2315 | case PR_GET_UNALIGN: | |
2316 | error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); | |
2317 | break; | |
2318 | case PR_SET_FPEMU: | |
2319 | error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); | |
2320 | break; | |
2321 | case PR_GET_FPEMU: | |
2322 | error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); | |
2323 | break; | |
2324 | case PR_SET_FPEXC: | |
2325 | error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); | |
2326 | break; | |
2327 | case PR_GET_FPEXC: | |
2328 | error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); | |
2329 | break; | |
2330 | case PR_GET_TIMING: | |
2331 | error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL; | |
2332 | break; | |
2333 | case PR_SET_TIMING: | |
2334 | if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL) | |
2335 | error = -EINVAL; | |
2336 | break; | |
2337 | case PR_SET_NAME: | |
2338 | comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0; | |
2339 | if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2, | |
2340 | sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0) | |
2341 | return -EFAULT; | |
2342 | set_task_comm(me, comm); | |
2343 | proc_comm_connector(me); | |
2344 | break; | |
2345 | case PR_GET_NAME: | |
2346 | get_task_comm(comm, me); | |
2347 | if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm))) | |
2348 | return -EFAULT; | |
2349 | break; | |
2350 | case PR_GET_ENDIAN: | |
2351 | error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); | |
2352 | break; | |
2353 | case PR_SET_ENDIAN: | |
2354 | error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); | |
2355 | break; | |
2356 | case PR_GET_SECCOMP: | |
2357 | error = prctl_get_seccomp(); | |
2358 | break; | |
2359 | case PR_SET_SECCOMP: | |
2360 | error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3); | |
2361 | break; | |
2362 | case PR_GET_TSC: | |
2363 | error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2); | |
2364 | break; | |
2365 | case PR_SET_TSC: | |
2366 | error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2); | |
2367 | break; | |
2368 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE: | |
2369 | error = perf_event_task_disable(); | |
2370 | break; | |
2371 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE: | |
2372 | error = perf_event_task_enable(); | |
2373 | break; | |
2374 | case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: | |
2375 | if (current->timer_slack_ns > ULONG_MAX) | |
2376 | error = ULONG_MAX; | |
2377 | else | |
2378 | error = current->timer_slack_ns; | |
2379 | break; | |
2380 | case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: | |
2381 | if (arg2 <= 0) | |
2382 | current->timer_slack_ns = | |
2383 | current->default_timer_slack_ns; | |
2384 | else | |
2385 | current->timer_slack_ns = arg2; | |
2386 | break; | |
2387 | case PR_MCE_KILL: | |
2388 | if (arg4 | arg5) | |
2389 | return -EINVAL; | |
2390 | switch (arg2) { | |
2391 | case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR: | |
2392 | if (arg3 != 0) | |
2393 | return -EINVAL; | |
2394 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS; | |
2395 | break; | |
2396 | case PR_MCE_KILL_SET: | |
2397 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS; | |
2398 | if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY) | |
2399 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY; | |
2400 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE) | |
2401 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY; | |
2402 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT) | |
2403 | current->flags &= | |
2404 | ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS); | |
2405 | else | |
2406 | return -EINVAL; | |
2407 | break; | |
2408 | default: | |
2409 | return -EINVAL; | |
2410 | } | |
2411 | break; | |
2412 | case PR_MCE_KILL_GET: | |
2413 | if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5) | |
2414 | return -EINVAL; | |
2415 | if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS) | |
2416 | error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ? | |
2417 | PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE; | |
2418 | else | |
2419 | error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT; | |
2420 | break; | |
2421 | case PR_SET_MM: | |
2422 | error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); | |
2423 | break; | |
2424 | case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS: | |
2425 | error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user **)arg2); | |
2426 | break; | |
2427 | case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: | |
2428 | me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2; | |
2429 | if (!arg2) | |
2430 | break; | |
2431 | ||
2432 | walk_process_tree(me, propagate_has_child_subreaper, NULL); | |
2433 | break; | |
2434 | case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: | |
2435 | error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper, | |
2436 | (int __user *)arg2); | |
2437 | break; | |
2438 | case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: | |
2439 | if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) | |
2440 | return -EINVAL; | |
2441 | ||
2442 | task_set_no_new_privs(current); | |
2443 | break; | |
2444 | case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: | |
2445 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) | |
2446 | return -EINVAL; | |
2447 | return task_no_new_privs(current) ? 1 : 0; | |
2448 | case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE: | |
2449 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) | |
2450 | return -EINVAL; | |
2451 | error = !!test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags); | |
2452 | break; | |
2453 | case PR_SET_THP_DISABLE: | |
2454 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) | |
2455 | return -EINVAL; | |
2456 | if (down_write_killable(&me->mm->mmap_sem)) | |
2457 | return -EINTR; | |
2458 | if (arg2) | |
2459 | set_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags); | |
2460 | else | |
2461 | clear_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags); | |
2462 | up_write(&me->mm->mmap_sem); | |
2463 | break; | |
2464 | case PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT: | |
2465 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) | |
2466 | return -EINVAL; | |
2467 | error = MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT(); | |
2468 | break; | |
2469 | case PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT: | |
2470 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) | |
2471 | return -EINVAL; | |
2472 | error = MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT(); | |
2473 | break; | |
2474 | case PR_SET_FP_MODE: | |
2475 | error = SET_FP_MODE(me, arg2); | |
2476 | break; | |
2477 | case PR_GET_FP_MODE: | |
2478 | error = GET_FP_MODE(me); | |
2479 | break; | |
2480 | case PR_SVE_SET_VL: | |
2481 | error = SVE_SET_VL(arg2); | |
2482 | break; | |
2483 | case PR_SVE_GET_VL: | |
2484 | error = SVE_GET_VL(); | |
2485 | break; | |
2486 | case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL: | |
2487 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) | |
2488 | return -EINVAL; | |
2489 | error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(me, arg2); | |
2490 | break; | |
2491 | case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL: | |
2492 | if (arg4 || arg5) | |
2493 | return -EINVAL; | |
2494 | error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(me, arg2, arg3); | |
2495 | break; | |
2496 | case PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS: | |
2497 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) | |
2498 | return -EINVAL; | |
2499 | error = PAC_RESET_KEYS(me, arg2); | |
2500 | break; | |
2501 | case PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: | |
2502 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) | |
2503 | return -EINVAL; | |
2504 | error = SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(arg2); | |
2505 | break; | |
2506 | case PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: | |
2507 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) | |
2508 | return -EINVAL; | |
2509 | error = GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(); | |
2510 | break; | |
2511 | default: | |
2512 | error = -EINVAL; | |
2513 | break; | |
2514 | } | |
2515 | return error; | |
2516 | } | |
2517 | ||
2518 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep, | |
2519 | struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused) | |
2520 | { | |
2521 | int err = 0; | |
2522 | int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); | |
2523 | ||
2524 | if (cpup) | |
2525 | err |= put_user(cpu, cpup); | |
2526 | if (nodep) | |
2527 | err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep); | |
2528 | return err ? -EFAULT : 0; | |
2529 | } | |
2530 | ||
2531 | /** | |
2532 | * do_sysinfo - fill in sysinfo struct | |
2533 | * @info: pointer to buffer to fill | |
2534 | */ | |
2535 | static int do_sysinfo(struct sysinfo *info) | |
2536 | { | |
2537 | unsigned long mem_total, sav_total; | |
2538 | unsigned int mem_unit, bitcount; | |
2539 | struct timespec64 tp; | |
2540 | ||
2541 | memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo)); | |
2542 | ||
2543 | ktime_get_boottime_ts64(&tp); | |
2544 | info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0); | |
2545 | ||
2546 | get_avenrun(info->loads, 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT); | |
2547 | ||
2548 | info->procs = nr_threads; | |
2549 | ||
2550 | si_meminfo(info); | |
2551 | si_swapinfo(info); | |
2552 | ||
2553 | /* | |
2554 | * If the sum of all the available memory (i.e. ram + swap) | |
2555 | * is less than can be stored in a 32 bit unsigned long then | |
2556 | * we can be binary compatible with 2.2.x kernels. If not, | |
2557 | * well, in that case 2.2.x was broken anyways... | |
2558 | * | |
2559 | * -Erik Andersen <andersee@debian.org> | |
2560 | */ | |
2561 | ||
2562 | mem_total = info->totalram + info->totalswap; | |
2563 | if (mem_total < info->totalram || mem_total < info->totalswap) | |
2564 | goto out; | |
2565 | bitcount = 0; | |
2566 | mem_unit = info->mem_unit; | |
2567 | while (mem_unit > 1) { | |
2568 | bitcount++; | |
2569 | mem_unit >>= 1; | |
2570 | sav_total = mem_total; | |
2571 | mem_total <<= 1; | |
2572 | if (mem_total < sav_total) | |
2573 | goto out; | |
2574 | } | |
2575 | ||
2576 | /* | |
2577 | * If mem_total did not overflow, multiply all memory values by | |
2578 | * info->mem_unit and set it to 1. This leaves things compatible | |
2579 | * with 2.2.x, and also retains compatibility with earlier 2.4.x | |
2580 | * kernels... | |
2581 | */ | |
2582 | ||
2583 | info->mem_unit = 1; | |
2584 | info->totalram <<= bitcount; | |
2585 | info->freeram <<= bitcount; | |
2586 | info->sharedram <<= bitcount; | |
2587 | info->bufferram <<= bitcount; | |
2588 | info->totalswap <<= bitcount; | |
2589 | info->freeswap <<= bitcount; | |
2590 | info->totalhigh <<= bitcount; | |
2591 | info->freehigh <<= bitcount; | |
2592 | ||
2593 | out: | |
2594 | return 0; | |
2595 | } | |
2596 | ||
2597 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct sysinfo __user *, info) | |
2598 | { | |
2599 | struct sysinfo val; | |
2600 | ||
2601 | do_sysinfo(&val); | |
2602 | ||
2603 | if (copy_to_user(info, &val, sizeof(struct sysinfo))) | |
2604 | return -EFAULT; | |
2605 | ||
2606 | return 0; | |
2607 | } | |
2608 | ||
2609 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT | |
2610 | struct compat_sysinfo { | |
2611 | s32 uptime; | |
2612 | u32 loads[3]; | |
2613 | u32 totalram; | |
2614 | u32 freeram; | |
2615 | u32 sharedram; | |
2616 | u32 bufferram; | |
2617 | u32 totalswap; | |
2618 | u32 freeswap; | |
2619 | u16 procs; | |
2620 | u16 pad; | |
2621 | u32 totalhigh; | |
2622 | u32 freehigh; | |
2623 | u32 mem_unit; | |
2624 | char _f[20-2*sizeof(u32)-sizeof(int)]; | |
2625 | }; | |
2626 | ||
2627 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info) | |
2628 | { | |
2629 | struct sysinfo s; | |
2630 | ||
2631 | do_sysinfo(&s); | |
2632 | ||
2633 | /* Check to see if any memory value is too large for 32-bit and scale | |
2634 | * down if needed | |
2635 | */ | |
2636 | if (upper_32_bits(s.totalram) || upper_32_bits(s.totalswap)) { | |
2637 | int bitcount = 0; | |
2638 | ||
2639 | while (s.mem_unit < PAGE_SIZE) { | |
2640 | s.mem_unit <<= 1; | |
2641 | bitcount++; | |
2642 | } | |
2643 | ||
2644 | s.totalram >>= bitcount; | |
2645 | s.freeram >>= bitcount; | |
2646 | s.sharedram >>= bitcount; | |
2647 | s.bufferram >>= bitcount; | |
2648 | s.totalswap >>= bitcount; | |
2649 | s.freeswap >>= bitcount; | |
2650 | s.totalhigh >>= bitcount; | |
2651 | s.freehigh >>= bitcount; | |
2652 | } | |
2653 | ||
2654 | if (!access_ok(info, sizeof(struct compat_sysinfo)) || | |
2655 | __put_user(s.uptime, &info->uptime) || | |
2656 | __put_user(s.loads[0], &info->loads[0]) || | |
2657 | __put_user(s.loads[1], &info->loads[1]) || | |
2658 | __put_user(s.loads[2], &info->loads[2]) || | |
2659 | __put_user(s.totalram, &info->totalram) || | |
2660 | __put_user(s.freeram, &info->freeram) || | |
2661 | __put_user(s.sharedram, &info->sharedram) || | |
2662 | __put_user(s.bufferram, &info->bufferram) || | |
2663 | __put_user(s.totalswap, &info->totalswap) || | |
2664 | __put_user(s.freeswap, &info->freeswap) || | |
2665 | __put_user(s.procs, &info->procs) || | |
2666 | __put_user(s.totalhigh, &info->totalhigh) || | |
2667 | __put_user(s.freehigh, &info->freehigh) || | |
2668 | __put_user(s.mem_unit, &info->mem_unit)) | |
2669 | return -EFAULT; | |
2670 | ||
2671 | return 0; | |
2672 | } | |
2673 | #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ |