]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
1 | /* | |
2 | BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux | |
3 | Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies). | |
4 | ||
5 | This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
6 | it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as | |
7 | published by the Free Software Foundation; | |
8 | ||
9 | THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS | |
10 | OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, | |
11 | FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS. | |
12 | IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY | |
13 | CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES | |
14 | WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN | |
15 | ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF | |
16 | OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. | |
17 | ||
18 | ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS, | |
19 | COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS | |
20 | SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED. | |
21 | */ | |
22 | ||
23 | #include <linux/crypto.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/scatterlist.h> | |
25 | #include <crypto/b128ops.h> | |
26 | ||
27 | #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h> | |
28 | #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h> | |
29 | #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h> | |
30 | #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h> | |
31 | ||
32 | #include "smp.h" | |
33 | ||
34 | #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd) | |
35 | ||
36 | #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000) | |
37 | ||
38 | #define AUTH_REQ_MASK 0x07 | |
39 | #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07 | |
40 | ||
41 | enum { | |
42 | SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, | |
43 | SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, | |
44 | SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, | |
45 | SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, | |
46 | SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, | |
47 | }; | |
48 | ||
49 | struct smp_chan { | |
50 | struct l2cap_conn *conn; | |
51 | struct delayed_work security_timer; | |
52 | unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */ | |
53 | ||
54 | u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */ | |
55 | u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */ | |
56 | u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */ | |
57 | u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */ | |
58 | u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */ | |
59 | u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */ | |
60 | u8 enc_key_size; | |
61 | u8 remote_key_dist; | |
62 | bdaddr_t id_addr; | |
63 | u8 id_addr_type; | |
64 | u8 irk[16]; | |
65 | struct smp_csrk *csrk; | |
66 | struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk; | |
67 | struct smp_ltk *ltk; | |
68 | struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk; | |
69 | struct smp_irk *remote_irk; | |
70 | unsigned long flags; | |
71 | ||
72 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes; | |
73 | }; | |
74 | ||
75 | static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len) | |
76 | { | |
77 | size_t i; | |
78 | ||
79 | for (i = 0; i < len; i++) | |
80 | dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i]; | |
81 | } | |
82 | ||
83 | static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r) | |
84 | { | |
85 | struct blkcipher_desc desc; | |
86 | struct scatterlist sg; | |
87 | uint8_t tmp[16], data[16]; | |
88 | int err; | |
89 | ||
90 | if (tfm == NULL) { | |
91 | BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm); | |
92 | return -EINVAL; | |
93 | } | |
94 | ||
95 | desc.tfm = tfm; | |
96 | desc.flags = 0; | |
97 | ||
98 | /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */ | |
99 | swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); | |
100 | ||
101 | err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16); | |
102 | if (err) { | |
103 | BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); | |
104 | return err; | |
105 | } | |
106 | ||
107 | /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */ | |
108 | swap_buf(r, data, 16); | |
109 | ||
110 | sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16); | |
111 | ||
112 | err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16); | |
113 | if (err) | |
114 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err); | |
115 | ||
116 | /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */ | |
117 | swap_buf(data, r, 16); | |
118 | ||
119 | return err; | |
120 | } | |
121 | ||
122 | static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3]) | |
123 | { | |
124 | u8 _res[16]; | |
125 | int err; | |
126 | ||
127 | /* r' = padding || r */ | |
128 | memcpy(_res, r, 3); | |
129 | memset(_res + 3, 0, 13); | |
130 | ||
131 | err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res); | |
132 | if (err) { | |
133 | BT_ERR("Encrypt error"); | |
134 | return err; | |
135 | } | |
136 | ||
137 | /* The output of the random address function ah is: | |
138 | * ah(h, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24 | |
139 | * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits | |
140 | * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the | |
141 | * result of ah. | |
142 | */ | |
143 | memcpy(res, _res, 3); | |
144 | ||
145 | return 0; | |
146 | } | |
147 | ||
148 | bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *bdaddr) | |
149 | { | |
150 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; | |
151 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm; | |
152 | u8 hash[3]; | |
153 | int err; | |
154 | ||
155 | if (!chan || !chan->data) | |
156 | return false; | |
157 | ||
158 | tfm = chan->data; | |
159 | ||
160 | BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk); | |
161 | ||
162 | err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash); | |
163 | if (err) | |
164 | return false; | |
165 | ||
166 | return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3); | |
167 | } | |
168 | ||
169 | int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa) | |
170 | { | |
171 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; | |
172 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm; | |
173 | int err; | |
174 | ||
175 | if (!chan || !chan->data) | |
176 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
177 | ||
178 | tfm = chan->data; | |
179 | ||
180 | get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3); | |
181 | ||
182 | rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */ | |
183 | rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */ | |
184 | ||
185 | err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b); | |
186 | if (err < 0) | |
187 | return err; | |
188 | ||
189 | BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa); | |
190 | ||
191 | return 0; | |
192 | } | |
193 | ||
194 | static int smp_c1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], u8 preq[7], | |
195 | u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra, | |
196 | u8 res[16]) | |
197 | { | |
198 | struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev; | |
199 | u8 p1[16], p2[16]; | |
200 | int err; | |
201 | ||
202 | BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); | |
203 | ||
204 | memset(p1, 0, 16); | |
205 | ||
206 | /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */ | |
207 | p1[0] = _iat; | |
208 | p1[1] = _rat; | |
209 | memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7); | |
210 | memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7); | |
211 | ||
212 | /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */ | |
213 | memcpy(p2, ra, 6); | |
214 | memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6); | |
215 | memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4); | |
216 | ||
217 | /* res = r XOR p1 */ | |
218 | u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1); | |
219 | ||
220 | /* res = e(k, res) */ | |
221 | err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, res); | |
222 | if (err) { | |
223 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); | |
224 | return err; | |
225 | } | |
226 | ||
227 | /* res = res XOR p2 */ | |
228 | u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2); | |
229 | ||
230 | /* res = e(k, res) */ | |
231 | err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, res); | |
232 | if (err) | |
233 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); | |
234 | ||
235 | return err; | |
236 | } | |
237 | ||
238 | static int smp_s1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16], u8 r2[16], | |
239 | u8 _r[16]) | |
240 | { | |
241 | struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev; | |
242 | int err; | |
243 | ||
244 | BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); | |
245 | ||
246 | /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */ | |
247 | memcpy(_r, r2, 8); | |
248 | memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8); | |
249 | ||
250 | err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, _r); | |
251 | if (err) | |
252 | BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); | |
253 | ||
254 | return err; | |
255 | } | |
256 | ||
257 | static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data) | |
258 | { | |
259 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
260 | struct smp_chan *smp; | |
261 | struct kvec iv[2]; | |
262 | struct msghdr msg; | |
263 | ||
264 | if (!chan) | |
265 | return; | |
266 | ||
267 | BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code); | |
268 | ||
269 | iv[0].iov_base = &code; | |
270 | iv[0].iov_len = 1; | |
271 | ||
272 | iv[1].iov_base = data; | |
273 | iv[1].iov_len = len; | |
274 | ||
275 | memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); | |
276 | ||
277 | msg.msg_iov = (struct iovec *) &iv; | |
278 | msg.msg_iovlen = 2; | |
279 | ||
280 | l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len); | |
281 | ||
282 | if (!chan->data) | |
283 | return; | |
284 | ||
285 | smp = chan->data; | |
286 | ||
287 | cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); | |
288 | schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT); | |
289 | } | |
290 | ||
291 | static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq) | |
292 | { | |
293 | if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) | |
294 | return BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
295 | else | |
296 | return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; | |
297 | } | |
298 | ||
299 | static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level) | |
300 | { | |
301 | switch (sec_level) { | |
302 | case BT_SECURITY_HIGH: | |
303 | return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
304 | case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM: | |
305 | return SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
306 | default: | |
307 | return SMP_AUTH_NONE; | |
308 | } | |
309 | } | |
310 | ||
311 | static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, | |
312 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, | |
313 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq) | |
314 | { | |
315 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
316 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
317 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
318 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
319 | u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0; | |
320 | ||
321 | if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) { | |
322 | local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
323 | remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
324 | authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
325 | } else { | |
326 | authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING; | |
327 | } | |
328 | ||
329 | if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags)) | |
330 | remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
331 | ||
332 | if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags)) | |
333 | local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
334 | ||
335 | if (rsp == NULL) { | |
336 | req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; | |
337 | req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; | |
338 | req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
339 | req->init_key_dist = local_dist; | |
340 | req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist; | |
341 | req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK); | |
342 | ||
343 | smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist; | |
344 | return; | |
345 | } | |
346 | ||
347 | rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; | |
348 | rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; | |
349 | rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
350 | rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist; | |
351 | rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist; | |
352 | rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK); | |
353 | ||
354 | smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist; | |
355 | } | |
356 | ||
357 | static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size) | |
358 | { | |
359 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
360 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
361 | ||
362 | if ((max_key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) || | |
363 | (max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)) | |
364 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
365 | ||
366 | smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size; | |
367 | ||
368 | return 0; | |
369 | } | |
370 | ||
371 | static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) | |
372 | { | |
373 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
374 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
375 | bool complete; | |
376 | ||
377 | BUG_ON(!smp); | |
378 | ||
379 | cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); | |
380 | ||
381 | complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); | |
382 | mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete); | |
383 | ||
384 | kfree(smp->csrk); | |
385 | kfree(smp->slave_csrk); | |
386 | ||
387 | crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes); | |
388 | ||
389 | /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */ | |
390 | if (!complete) { | |
391 | if (smp->ltk) { | |
392 | list_del(&smp->ltk->list); | |
393 | kfree(smp->ltk); | |
394 | } | |
395 | ||
396 | if (smp->slave_ltk) { | |
397 | list_del(&smp->slave_ltk->list); | |
398 | kfree(smp->slave_ltk); | |
399 | } | |
400 | ||
401 | if (smp->remote_irk) { | |
402 | list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list); | |
403 | kfree(smp->remote_irk); | |
404 | } | |
405 | } | |
406 | ||
407 | chan->data = NULL; | |
408 | kfree(smp); | |
409 | hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon); | |
410 | } | |
411 | ||
412 | static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason) | |
413 | { | |
414 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
415 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
416 | ||
417 | if (reason) | |
418 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason), | |
419 | &reason); | |
420 | ||
421 | clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags); | |
422 | mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); | |
423 | ||
424 | if (chan->data) | |
425 | smp_chan_destroy(conn); | |
426 | } | |
427 | ||
428 | #define JUST_WORKS 0x00 | |
429 | #define JUST_CFM 0x01 | |
430 | #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02 | |
431 | #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03 | |
432 | #define REQ_OOB 0x04 | |
433 | #define OVERLAP 0xFF | |
434 | ||
435 | static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = { | |
436 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, | |
437 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, | |
438 | { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, | |
439 | { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM }, | |
440 | { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP }, | |
441 | }; | |
442 | ||
443 | static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) | |
444 | { | |
445 | /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets | |
446 | * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators. | |
447 | */ | |
448 | if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY || | |
449 | remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) | |
450 | return JUST_CFM; | |
451 | ||
452 | return gen_method[remote_io][local_io]; | |
453 | } | |
454 | ||
455 | static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, | |
456 | u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) | |
457 | { | |
458 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
459 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
460 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
461 | u8 method; | |
462 | u32 passkey = 0; | |
463 | int ret = 0; | |
464 | ||
465 | /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */ | |
466 | memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); | |
467 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); | |
468 | ||
469 | BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io); | |
470 | ||
471 | /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming | |
472 | * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM | |
473 | * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this | |
474 | * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the | |
475 | * table. | |
476 | */ | |
477 | if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM)) | |
478 | method = JUST_CFM; | |
479 | else | |
480 | method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); | |
481 | ||
482 | /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ | |
483 | if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) | |
484 | method = JUST_WORKS; | |
485 | ||
486 | /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */ | |
487 | if (method == JUST_CFM && hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) | |
488 | method = JUST_WORKS; | |
489 | ||
490 | /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */ | |
491 | if (method == JUST_WORKS) { | |
492 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); | |
493 | return 0; | |
494 | } | |
495 | ||
496 | /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */ | |
497 | if (method != JUST_CFM) { | |
498 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags); | |
499 | if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH) | |
500 | hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
501 | } | |
502 | ||
503 | /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master | |
504 | * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey. | |
505 | */ | |
506 | if (method == OVERLAP) { | |
507 | if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) | |
508 | method = CFM_PASSKEY; | |
509 | else | |
510 | method = REQ_PASSKEY; | |
511 | } | |
512 | ||
513 | /* Generate random passkey. */ | |
514 | if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) { | |
515 | memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); | |
516 | get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey)); | |
517 | passkey %= 1000000; | |
518 | put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk); | |
519 | BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey); | |
520 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); | |
521 | } | |
522 | ||
523 | hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev); | |
524 | ||
525 | if (method == REQ_PASSKEY) | |
526 | ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, | |
527 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type); | |
528 | else if (method == JUST_CFM) | |
529 | ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, | |
530 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, | |
531 | passkey, 1); | |
532 | else | |
533 | ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, | |
534 | hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, | |
535 | passkey, 0); | |
536 | ||
537 | hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev); | |
538 | ||
539 | return ret; | |
540 | } | |
541 | ||
542 | static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) | |
543 | { | |
544 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
545 | struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp; | |
546 | int ret; | |
547 | ||
548 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
549 | ||
550 | ret = smp_c1(smp, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, | |
551 | conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr, | |
552 | conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr, | |
553 | cp.confirm_val); | |
554 | if (ret) | |
555 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
556 | ||
557 | clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); | |
558 | ||
559 | smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp); | |
560 | ||
561 | if (conn->hcon->out) | |
562 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
563 | else | |
564 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
565 | ||
566 | return 0; | |
567 | } | |
568 | ||
569 | static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) | |
570 | { | |
571 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
572 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
573 | u8 confirm[16]; | |
574 | int ret; | |
575 | ||
576 | if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes)) | |
577 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
578 | ||
579 | BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); | |
580 | ||
581 | ret = smp_c1(smp, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, | |
582 | hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, | |
583 | hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm); | |
584 | if (ret) | |
585 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
586 | ||
587 | if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) { | |
588 | BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)"); | |
589 | return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; | |
590 | } | |
591 | ||
592 | if (hcon->out) { | |
593 | u8 stk[16]; | |
594 | __le64 rand = 0; | |
595 | __le16 ediv = 0; | |
596 | ||
597 | smp_s1(smp, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk); | |
598 | ||
599 | memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, | |
600 | SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size); | |
601 | ||
602 | if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) | |
603 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
604 | ||
605 | hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk); | |
606 | hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; | |
607 | set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); | |
608 | } else { | |
609 | u8 stk[16], auth; | |
610 | __le64 rand = 0; | |
611 | __le16 ediv = 0; | |
612 | ||
613 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), | |
614 | smp->prnd); | |
615 | ||
616 | smp_s1(smp, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk); | |
617 | ||
618 | memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, | |
619 | SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size); | |
620 | ||
621 | if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH) | |
622 | auth = 1; | |
623 | else | |
624 | auth = 0; | |
625 | ||
626 | /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the | |
627 | * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master | |
628 | * STK never needs to be stored). | |
629 | */ | |
630 | hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, | |
631 | SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); | |
632 | } | |
633 | ||
634 | return 0; | |
635 | } | |
636 | ||
637 | static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) | |
638 | { | |
639 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
640 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
641 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
642 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
643 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
644 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; | |
645 | bool persistent; | |
646 | ||
647 | if (smp->remote_irk) { | |
648 | mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk); | |
649 | /* Now that user space can be considered to know the | |
650 | * identity address track the connection based on it | |
651 | * from now on. | |
652 | */ | |
653 | bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr); | |
654 | hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type; | |
655 | queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work); | |
656 | ||
657 | /* When receiving an indentity resolving key for | |
658 | * a remote device that does not use a resolvable | |
659 | * private address, just remove the key so that | |
660 | * it is possible to use the controller white | |
661 | * list for scanning. | |
662 | * | |
663 | * Userspace will have been told to not store | |
664 | * this key at this point. So it is safe to | |
665 | * just remove it. | |
666 | */ | |
667 | if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) { | |
668 | list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list); | |
669 | kfree(smp->remote_irk); | |
670 | smp->remote_irk = NULL; | |
671 | } | |
672 | } | |
673 | ||
674 | /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides | |
675 | * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests. | |
676 | */ | |
677 | persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING); | |
678 | ||
679 | if (smp->csrk) { | |
680 | smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
681 | bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
682 | mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); | |
683 | } | |
684 | ||
685 | if (smp->slave_csrk) { | |
686 | smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
687 | bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
688 | mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent); | |
689 | } | |
690 | ||
691 | if (smp->ltk) { | |
692 | smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
693 | bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
694 | mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); | |
695 | } | |
696 | ||
697 | if (smp->slave_ltk) { | |
698 | smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; | |
699 | bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); | |
700 | mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent); | |
701 | } | |
702 | } | |
703 | ||
704 | static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp) | |
705 | { | |
706 | /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs | |
707 | * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive | |
708 | * them in the correct order. | |
709 | */ | |
710 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) | |
711 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO); | |
712 | else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) | |
713 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); | |
714 | else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) | |
715 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); | |
716 | } | |
717 | ||
718 | static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) | |
719 | { | |
720 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; | |
721 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
722 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
723 | struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; | |
724 | __u8 *keydist; | |
725 | ||
726 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
727 | ||
728 | rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; | |
729 | ||
730 | /* The responder sends its keys first */ | |
731 | if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) { | |
732 | smp_allow_key_dist(smp); | |
733 | return; | |
734 | } | |
735 | ||
736 | req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
737 | ||
738 | if (hcon->out) { | |
739 | keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; | |
740 | *keydist &= req->init_key_dist; | |
741 | } else { | |
742 | keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist; | |
743 | *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist; | |
744 | } | |
745 | ||
746 | BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist); | |
747 | ||
748 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { | |
749 | struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; | |
750 | struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; | |
751 | struct smp_ltk *ltk; | |
752 | u8 authenticated; | |
753 | __le16 ediv; | |
754 | __le64 rand; | |
755 | ||
756 | get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk)); | |
757 | get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); | |
758 | get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand)); | |
759 | ||
760 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); | |
761 | ||
762 | authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; | |
763 | ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, | |
764 | SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk, | |
765 | smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); | |
766 | smp->slave_ltk = ltk; | |
767 | ||
768 | ident.ediv = ediv; | |
769 | ident.rand = rand; | |
770 | ||
771 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); | |
772 | ||
773 | *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; | |
774 | } | |
775 | ||
776 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) { | |
777 | struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; | |
778 | struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; | |
779 | ||
780 | memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); | |
781 | ||
782 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); | |
783 | ||
784 | /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address | |
785 | * after the connection has been established. | |
786 | * | |
787 | * This is true even when the connection has been | |
788 | * established using a resolvable random address. | |
789 | */ | |
790 | bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src); | |
791 | addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type; | |
792 | ||
793 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), | |
794 | &addrinfo); | |
795 | ||
796 | *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
797 | } | |
798 | ||
799 | if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { | |
800 | struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; | |
801 | struct smp_csrk *csrk; | |
802 | ||
803 | /* Generate a new random key */ | |
804 | get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); | |
805 | ||
806 | csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); | |
807 | if (csrk) { | |
808 | csrk->master = 0x00; | |
809 | memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); | |
810 | } | |
811 | smp->slave_csrk = csrk; | |
812 | ||
813 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); | |
814 | ||
815 | *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
816 | } | |
817 | ||
818 | /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */ | |
819 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) { | |
820 | smp_allow_key_dist(smp); | |
821 | return; | |
822 | } | |
823 | ||
824 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); | |
825 | smp_notify_keys(conn); | |
826 | ||
827 | smp_chan_destroy(conn); | |
828 | } | |
829 | ||
830 | static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work) | |
831 | { | |
832 | struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, | |
833 | security_timer.work); | |
834 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; | |
835 | ||
836 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
837 | ||
838 | hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM); | |
839 | } | |
840 | ||
841 | static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) | |
842 | { | |
843 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
844 | struct smp_chan *smp; | |
845 | ||
846 | smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC); | |
847 | if (!smp) | |
848 | return NULL; | |
849 | ||
850 | smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); | |
851 | if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) { | |
852 | BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context"); | |
853 | kfree(smp); | |
854 | return NULL; | |
855 | } | |
856 | ||
857 | smp->conn = conn; | |
858 | chan->data = smp; | |
859 | ||
860 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL); | |
861 | ||
862 | INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout); | |
863 | ||
864 | hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon); | |
865 | ||
866 | return smp; | |
867 | } | |
868 | ||
869 | int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) | |
870 | { | |
871 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; | |
872 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; | |
873 | struct smp_chan *smp; | |
874 | u32 value; | |
875 | int err; | |
876 | ||
877 | BT_DBG(""); | |
878 | ||
879 | if (!conn) | |
880 | return -ENOTCONN; | |
881 | ||
882 | chan = conn->smp; | |
883 | if (!chan) | |
884 | return -ENOTCONN; | |
885 | ||
886 | l2cap_chan_lock(chan); | |
887 | if (!chan->data) { | |
888 | err = -ENOTCONN; | |
889 | goto unlock; | |
890 | } | |
891 | ||
892 | smp = chan->data; | |
893 | ||
894 | switch (mgmt_op) { | |
895 | case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: | |
896 | value = le32_to_cpu(passkey); | |
897 | memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); | |
898 | BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value); | |
899 | put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk); | |
900 | /* Fall Through */ | |
901 | case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY: | |
902 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); | |
903 | break; | |
904 | case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY: | |
905 | case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY: | |
906 | smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); | |
907 | err = 0; | |
908 | goto unlock; | |
909 | default: | |
910 | smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); | |
911 | err = -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
912 | goto unlock; | |
913 | } | |
914 | ||
915 | err = 0; | |
916 | ||
917 | /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */ | |
918 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) { | |
919 | u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp); | |
920 | if (rsp) | |
921 | smp_failure(conn, rsp); | |
922 | } | |
923 | ||
924 | unlock: | |
925 | l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); | |
926 | return err; | |
927 | } | |
928 | ||
929 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
930 | { | |
931 | struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data; | |
932 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
933 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; | |
934 | struct smp_chan *smp; | |
935 | u8 key_size, auth, sec_level; | |
936 | int ret; | |
937 | ||
938 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
939 | ||
940 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*req)) | |
941 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
942 | ||
943 | if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) | |
944 | return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; | |
945 | ||
946 | if (!chan->data) | |
947 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); | |
948 | else | |
949 | smp = chan->data; | |
950 | ||
951 | if (!smp) | |
952 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
953 | ||
954 | /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */ | |
955 | auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK; | |
956 | ||
957 | if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) && | |
958 | (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) | |
959 | return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; | |
960 | ||
961 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; | |
962 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req)); | |
963 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req)); | |
964 | ||
965 | if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) | |
966 | sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; | |
967 | else | |
968 | sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); | |
969 | ||
970 | if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level) | |
971 | conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; | |
972 | ||
973 | /* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */ | |
974 | if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { | |
975 | u8 method; | |
976 | ||
977 | method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability, | |
978 | req->io_capability); | |
979 | if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) | |
980 | return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; | |
981 | } | |
982 | ||
983 | build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth); | |
984 | ||
985 | key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size); | |
986 | if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) | |
987 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
988 | ||
989 | get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); | |
990 | ||
991 | smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; | |
992 | memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp)); | |
993 | ||
994 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp); | |
995 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); | |
996 | ||
997 | /* Request setup of TK */ | |
998 | ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability); | |
999 | if (ret) | |
1000 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1001 | ||
1002 | return 0; | |
1003 | } | |
1004 | ||
1005 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1006 | { | |
1007 | struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data; | |
1008 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
1009 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1010 | u8 key_size, auth; | |
1011 | int ret; | |
1012 | ||
1013 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1014 | ||
1015 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp)) | |
1016 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
1017 | ||
1018 | if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) | |
1019 | return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; | |
1020 | ||
1021 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp)); | |
1022 | ||
1023 | req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; | |
1024 | ||
1025 | key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size); | |
1026 | if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) | |
1027 | return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; | |
1028 | ||
1029 | auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK; | |
1030 | ||
1031 | /* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */ | |
1032 | if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { | |
1033 | u8 method; | |
1034 | ||
1035 | method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability, | |
1036 | rsp->io_capability); | |
1037 | if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) | |
1038 | return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; | |
1039 | } | |
1040 | ||
1041 | get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); | |
1042 | ||
1043 | smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; | |
1044 | memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp)); | |
1045 | ||
1046 | /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared | |
1047 | * some bits that we had enabled in our request. | |
1048 | */ | |
1049 | smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; | |
1050 | ||
1051 | auth |= req->auth_req; | |
1052 | ||
1053 | ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability); | |
1054 | if (ret) | |
1055 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1056 | ||
1057 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); | |
1058 | ||
1059 | /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */ | |
1060 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) | |
1061 | return smp_confirm(smp); | |
1062 | ||
1063 | return 0; | |
1064 | } | |
1065 | ||
1066 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1067 | { | |
1068 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
1069 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1070 | ||
1071 | BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); | |
1072 | ||
1073 | if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf)) | |
1074 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
1075 | ||
1076 | memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); | |
1077 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); | |
1078 | ||
1079 | if (conn->hcon->out) { | |
1080 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), | |
1081 | smp->prnd); | |
1082 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); | |
1083 | return 0; | |
1084 | } | |
1085 | ||
1086 | if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) | |
1087 | return smp_confirm(smp); | |
1088 | else | |
1089 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); | |
1090 | ||
1091 | return 0; | |
1092 | } | |
1093 | ||
1094 | static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1095 | { | |
1096 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
1097 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1098 | ||
1099 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1100 | ||
1101 | if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd)) | |
1102 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
1103 | ||
1104 | memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); | |
1105 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); | |
1106 | ||
1107 | return smp_random(smp); | |
1108 | } | |
1109 | ||
1110 | static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) | |
1111 | { | |
1112 | struct smp_ltk *key; | |
1113 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1114 | ||
1115 | key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, | |
1116 | hcon->role); | |
1117 | if (!key) | |
1118 | return false; | |
1119 | ||
1120 | if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level) | |
1121 | return false; | |
1122 | ||
1123 | if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) | |
1124 | return true; | |
1125 | ||
1126 | hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val); | |
1127 | hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size; | |
1128 | ||
1129 | /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */ | |
1130 | clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); | |
1131 | ||
1132 | return true; | |
1133 | } | |
1134 | ||
1135 | bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level) | |
1136 | { | |
1137 | if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) | |
1138 | return true; | |
1139 | ||
1140 | /* If we're encrypted with an STK always claim insufficient | |
1141 | * security. This way we allow the connection to be re-encrypted | |
1142 | * with an LTK, even if the LTK provides the same level of | |
1143 | * security. Only exception is if we don't have an LTK (e.g. | |
1144 | * because of key distribution bits). | |
1145 | */ | |
1146 | if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && | |
1147 | hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, | |
1148 | hcon->role)) | |
1149 | return false; | |
1150 | ||
1151 | if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level) | |
1152 | return true; | |
1153 | ||
1154 | return false; | |
1155 | } | |
1156 | ||
1157 | static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1158 | { | |
1159 | struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data; | |
1160 | struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; | |
1161 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1162 | struct smp_chan *smp; | |
1163 | u8 sec_level, auth; | |
1164 | ||
1165 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1166 | ||
1167 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
1168 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
1169 | ||
1170 | if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) | |
1171 | return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; | |
1172 | ||
1173 | auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK; | |
1174 | ||
1175 | if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) | |
1176 | sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; | |
1177 | else | |
1178 | sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); | |
1179 | ||
1180 | if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level)) | |
1181 | return 0; | |
1182 | ||
1183 | if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) | |
1184 | hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; | |
1185 | ||
1186 | if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) | |
1187 | return 0; | |
1188 | ||
1189 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); | |
1190 | if (!smp) | |
1191 | return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; | |
1192 | ||
1193 | if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) && | |
1194 | (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) | |
1195 | return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; | |
1196 | ||
1197 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); | |
1198 | ||
1199 | memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); | |
1200 | build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth); | |
1201 | ||
1202 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; | |
1203 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); | |
1204 | ||
1205 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); | |
1206 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); | |
1207 | ||
1208 | return 0; | |
1209 | } | |
1210 | ||
1211 | int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) | |
1212 | { | |
1213 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; | |
1214 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; | |
1215 | struct smp_chan *smp; | |
1216 | __u8 authreq; | |
1217 | int ret; | |
1218 | ||
1219 | BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level); | |
1220 | ||
1221 | /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */ | |
1222 | if (!conn) | |
1223 | return 1; | |
1224 | ||
1225 | chan = conn->smp; | |
1226 | ||
1227 | if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) | |
1228 | return 1; | |
1229 | ||
1230 | if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level)) | |
1231 | return 1; | |
1232 | ||
1233 | if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) | |
1234 | hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; | |
1235 | ||
1236 | if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) | |
1237 | if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) | |
1238 | return 0; | |
1239 | ||
1240 | l2cap_chan_lock(chan); | |
1241 | ||
1242 | /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */ | |
1243 | if (chan->data) { | |
1244 | ret = 0; | |
1245 | goto unlock; | |
1246 | } | |
1247 | ||
1248 | smp = smp_chan_create(conn); | |
1249 | if (!smp) { | |
1250 | ret = 1; | |
1251 | goto unlock; | |
1252 | } | |
1253 | ||
1254 | authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level); | |
1255 | ||
1256 | /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level | |
1257 | * requires it. | |
1258 | */ | |
1259 | if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT || | |
1260 | hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) | |
1261 | authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; | |
1262 | ||
1263 | if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) { | |
1264 | struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; | |
1265 | ||
1266 | build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq); | |
1267 | smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; | |
1268 | memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); | |
1269 | ||
1270 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); | |
1271 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); | |
1272 | } else { | |
1273 | struct smp_cmd_security_req cp; | |
1274 | cp.auth_req = authreq; | |
1275 | smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); | |
1276 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ); | |
1277 | } | |
1278 | ||
1279 | set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); | |
1280 | ret = 0; | |
1281 | ||
1282 | unlock: | |
1283 | l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); | |
1284 | return ret; | |
1285 | } | |
1286 | ||
1287 | static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1288 | { | |
1289 | struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; | |
1290 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
1291 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1292 | ||
1293 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1294 | ||
1295 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
1296 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
1297 | ||
1298 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT); | |
1299 | ||
1300 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); | |
1301 | ||
1302 | memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk)); | |
1303 | ||
1304 | return 0; | |
1305 | } | |
1306 | ||
1307 | static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1308 | { | |
1309 | struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data; | |
1310 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
1311 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1312 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; | |
1313 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1314 | struct smp_ltk *ltk; | |
1315 | u8 authenticated; | |
1316 | ||
1317 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1318 | ||
1319 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
1320 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
1321 | ||
1322 | /* Mark the information as received */ | |
1323 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; | |
1324 | ||
1325 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) | |
1326 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); | |
1327 | else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) | |
1328 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); | |
1329 | ||
1330 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); | |
1331 | ||
1332 | hci_dev_lock(hdev); | |
1333 | authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH); | |
1334 | ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK, | |
1335 | authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, | |
1336 | rp->ediv, rp->rand); | |
1337 | smp->ltk = ltk; | |
1338 | if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) | |
1339 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); | |
1340 | hci_dev_unlock(hdev); | |
1341 | ||
1342 | return 0; | |
1343 | } | |
1344 | ||
1345 | static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1346 | { | |
1347 | struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data; | |
1348 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
1349 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1350 | ||
1351 | BT_DBG(""); | |
1352 | ||
1353 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) | |
1354 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
1355 | ||
1356 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO); | |
1357 | ||
1358 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); | |
1359 | ||
1360 | memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16); | |
1361 | ||
1362 | return 0; | |
1363 | } | |
1364 | ||
1365 | static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, | |
1366 | struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1367 | { | |
1368 | struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data; | |
1369 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
1370 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1371 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1372 | bdaddr_t rpa; | |
1373 | ||
1374 | BT_DBG(""); | |
1375 | ||
1376 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) | |
1377 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
1378 | ||
1379 | /* Mark the information as received */ | |
1380 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; | |
1381 | ||
1382 | if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) | |
1383 | SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); | |
1384 | ||
1385 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); | |
1386 | ||
1387 | hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev); | |
1388 | ||
1389 | /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending | |
1390 | * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK | |
1391 | * as "identity information". However, since such | |
1392 | * implementations are not known of and in order to not over | |
1393 | * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never | |
1394 | * received an IRK for such a device. | |
1395 | */ | |
1396 | if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY)) { | |
1397 | BT_ERR("Ignoring IRK with no identity address"); | |
1398 | goto distribute; | |
1399 | } | |
1400 | ||
1401 | bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr); | |
1402 | smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type; | |
1403 | ||
1404 | if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type)) | |
1405 | bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst); | |
1406 | else | |
1407 | bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY); | |
1408 | ||
1409 | smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr, | |
1410 | smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa); | |
1411 | ||
1412 | distribute: | |
1413 | if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) | |
1414 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); | |
1415 | ||
1416 | hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev); | |
1417 | ||
1418 | return 0; | |
1419 | } | |
1420 | ||
1421 | static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1422 | { | |
1423 | struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; | |
1424 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; | |
1425 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1426 | struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; | |
1427 | struct smp_csrk *csrk; | |
1428 | ||
1429 | BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); | |
1430 | ||
1431 | if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) | |
1432 | return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; | |
1433 | ||
1434 | /* Mark the information as received */ | |
1435 | smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; | |
1436 | ||
1437 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); | |
1438 | ||
1439 | hci_dev_lock(hdev); | |
1440 | csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1441 | if (csrk) { | |
1442 | csrk->master = 0x01; | |
1443 | memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); | |
1444 | } | |
1445 | smp->csrk = csrk; | |
1446 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); | |
1447 | hci_dev_unlock(hdev); | |
1448 | ||
1449 | return 0; | |
1450 | } | |
1451 | ||
1452 | static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1453 | { | |
1454 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; | |
1455 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1456 | struct smp_chan *smp; | |
1457 | __u8 code, reason; | |
1458 | int err = 0; | |
1459 | ||
1460 | if (hcon->type != LE_LINK) { | |
1461 | kfree_skb(skb); | |
1462 | return 0; | |
1463 | } | |
1464 | ||
1465 | if (skb->len < 1) | |
1466 | return -EILSEQ; | |
1467 | ||
1468 | if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) { | |
1469 | reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; | |
1470 | goto done; | |
1471 | } | |
1472 | ||
1473 | code = skb->data[0]; | |
1474 | skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code)); | |
1475 | ||
1476 | smp = chan->data; | |
1477 | ||
1478 | if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX) | |
1479 | goto drop; | |
1480 | ||
1481 | if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)) | |
1482 | goto drop; | |
1483 | ||
1484 | /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are | |
1485 | * pairing request and security request. | |
1486 | */ | |
1487 | if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ) | |
1488 | goto drop; | |
1489 | ||
1490 | switch (code) { | |
1491 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ: | |
1492 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb); | |
1493 | break; | |
1494 | ||
1495 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL: | |
1496 | smp_failure(conn, 0); | |
1497 | err = -EPERM; | |
1498 | break; | |
1499 | ||
1500 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP: | |
1501 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb); | |
1502 | break; | |
1503 | ||
1504 | case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ: | |
1505 | reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb); | |
1506 | break; | |
1507 | ||
1508 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: | |
1509 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb); | |
1510 | break; | |
1511 | ||
1512 | case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: | |
1513 | reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb); | |
1514 | break; | |
1515 | ||
1516 | case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO: | |
1517 | reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); | |
1518 | break; | |
1519 | ||
1520 | case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: | |
1521 | reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb); | |
1522 | break; | |
1523 | ||
1524 | case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: | |
1525 | reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb); | |
1526 | break; | |
1527 | ||
1528 | case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: | |
1529 | reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb); | |
1530 | break; | |
1531 | ||
1532 | case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: | |
1533 | reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb); | |
1534 | break; | |
1535 | ||
1536 | default: | |
1537 | BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); | |
1538 | reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; | |
1539 | goto done; | |
1540 | } | |
1541 | ||
1542 | done: | |
1543 | if (!err) { | |
1544 | if (reason) | |
1545 | smp_failure(conn, reason); | |
1546 | kfree_skb(skb); | |
1547 | } | |
1548 | ||
1549 | return err; | |
1550 | ||
1551 | drop: | |
1552 | BT_ERR("%s unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", hcon->hdev->name, | |
1553 | code, &hcon->dst); | |
1554 | kfree_skb(skb); | |
1555 | return 0; | |
1556 | } | |
1557 | ||
1558 | static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) | |
1559 | { | |
1560 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; | |
1561 | ||
1562 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
1563 | ||
1564 | if (chan->data) | |
1565 | smp_chan_destroy(conn); | |
1566 | ||
1567 | conn->smp = NULL; | |
1568 | l2cap_chan_put(chan); | |
1569 | } | |
1570 | ||
1571 | static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) | |
1572 | { | |
1573 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1574 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; | |
1575 | struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; | |
1576 | ||
1577 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
1578 | ||
1579 | if (!smp) | |
1580 | return; | |
1581 | ||
1582 | if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) | |
1583 | return; | |
1584 | ||
1585 | cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer); | |
1586 | ||
1587 | smp_distribute_keys(smp); | |
1588 | } | |
1589 | ||
1590 | static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) | |
1591 | { | |
1592 | struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; | |
1593 | ||
1594 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
1595 | ||
1596 | conn->smp = chan; | |
1597 | l2cap_chan_hold(chan); | |
1598 | } | |
1599 | ||
1600 | static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1601 | { | |
1602 | int err; | |
1603 | ||
1604 | BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); | |
1605 | ||
1606 | err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb); | |
1607 | if (err) { | |
1608 | struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; | |
1609 | ||
1610 | if (smp) | |
1611 | cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); | |
1612 | ||
1613 | hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); | |
1614 | } | |
1615 | ||
1616 | return err; | |
1617 | } | |
1618 | ||
1619 | static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, | |
1620 | unsigned long hdr_len, | |
1621 | unsigned long len, int nb) | |
1622 | { | |
1623 | struct sk_buff *skb; | |
1624 | ||
1625 | skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1626 | if (!skb) | |
1627 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | |
1628 | ||
1629 | skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX; | |
1630 | bt_cb(skb)->chan = chan; | |
1631 | ||
1632 | return skb; | |
1633 | } | |
1634 | ||
1635 | static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = { | |
1636 | .name = "Security Manager", | |
1637 | .ready = smp_ready_cb, | |
1638 | .recv = smp_recv_cb, | |
1639 | .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb, | |
1640 | .teardown = smp_teardown_cb, | |
1641 | .resume = smp_resume_cb, | |
1642 | ||
1643 | .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection, | |
1644 | .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, | |
1645 | .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, | |
1646 | .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, | |
1647 | .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, | |
1648 | .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, | |
1649 | .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, | |
1650 | .memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec, | |
1651 | }; | |
1652 | ||
1653 | static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) | |
1654 | { | |
1655 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; | |
1656 | ||
1657 | BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan); | |
1658 | ||
1659 | chan = l2cap_chan_create(); | |
1660 | if (!chan) | |
1661 | return NULL; | |
1662 | ||
1663 | chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type; | |
1664 | chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops; | |
1665 | chan->scid = pchan->scid; | |
1666 | chan->dcid = chan->scid; | |
1667 | chan->imtu = pchan->imtu; | |
1668 | chan->omtu = pchan->omtu; | |
1669 | chan->mode = pchan->mode; | |
1670 | ||
1671 | BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan); | |
1672 | ||
1673 | return chan; | |
1674 | } | |
1675 | ||
1676 | static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = { | |
1677 | .name = "Security Manager Root", | |
1678 | .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb, | |
1679 | ||
1680 | /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */ | |
1681 | .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, | |
1682 | .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb, | |
1683 | .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv, | |
1684 | .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, | |
1685 | .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown, | |
1686 | .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready, | |
1687 | .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, | |
1688 | .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, | |
1689 | .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume, | |
1690 | .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, | |
1691 | .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, | |
1692 | .memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec, | |
1693 | }; | |
1694 | ||
1695 | int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev) | |
1696 | { | |
1697 | struct l2cap_chan *chan; | |
1698 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes; | |
1699 | ||
1700 | BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); | |
1701 | ||
1702 | tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); | |
1703 | if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) { | |
1704 | int err = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes); | |
1705 | BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context"); | |
1706 | return err; | |
1707 | } | |
1708 | ||
1709 | chan = l2cap_chan_create(); | |
1710 | if (!chan) { | |
1711 | crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes); | |
1712 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1713 | } | |
1714 | ||
1715 | chan->data = tfm_aes; | |
1716 | ||
1717 | l2cap_add_scid(chan, L2CAP_CID_SMP); | |
1718 | ||
1719 | l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan); | |
1720 | ||
1721 | bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr); | |
1722 | chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC; | |
1723 | chan->state = BT_LISTEN; | |
1724 | chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC; | |
1725 | chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU; | |
1726 | chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops; | |
1727 | ||
1728 | hdev->smp_data = chan; | |
1729 | ||
1730 | return 0; | |
1731 | } | |
1732 | ||
1733 | void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev) | |
1734 | { | |
1735 | struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; | |
1736 | struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes; | |
1737 | ||
1738 | if (!chan) | |
1739 | return; | |
1740 | ||
1741 | BT_DBG("%s chan %p", hdev->name, chan); | |
1742 | ||
1743 | tfm_aes = chan->data; | |
1744 | if (tfm_aes) { | |
1745 | chan->data = NULL; | |
1746 | crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes); | |
1747 | } | |
1748 | ||
1749 | hdev->smp_data = NULL; | |
1750 | l2cap_chan_put(chan); | |
1751 | } |