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1 | # | |
2 | # Security configuration | |
3 | # | |
4 | ||
5 | menu "Security options" | |
6 | ||
7 | source security/keys/Kconfig | |
8 | ||
9 | config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT | |
10 | bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" | |
11 | default n | |
12 | help | |
13 | This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel | |
14 | syslog via dmesg(8). | |
15 | ||
16 | If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced | |
17 | unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). | |
18 | ||
19 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
20 | ||
21 | config SECURITY | |
22 | bool "Enable different security models" | |
23 | depends on SYSFS | |
24 | depends on MULTIUSER | |
25 | help | |
26 | This allows you to choose different security modules to be | |
27 | configured into your kernel. | |
28 | ||
29 | If this option is not selected, the default Linux security | |
30 | model will be used. | |
31 | ||
32 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
33 | ||
34 | config SECURITYFS | |
35 | bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem" | |
36 | help | |
37 | This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by | |
38 | the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is | |
39 | not used by SELinux or SMACK. | |
40 | ||
41 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
42 | ||
43 | config SECURITY_NETWORK | |
44 | bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" | |
45 | depends on SECURITY | |
46 | help | |
47 | This enables the socket and networking security hooks. | |
48 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
49 | implement socket and networking access controls. | |
50 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
51 | ||
52 | config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM | |
53 | bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks" | |
54 | depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK | |
55 | help | |
56 | This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks. | |
57 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
58 | implement per-packet access controls based on labels | |
59 | derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are | |
60 | designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized | |
61 | to communicate unlabelled data can send without using | |
62 | IPSec. | |
63 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
64 | ||
65 | config SECURITY_PATH | |
66 | bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" | |
67 | depends on SECURITY | |
68 | help | |
69 | This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. | |
70 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to | |
71 | implement pathname based access controls. | |
72 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. | |
73 | ||
74 | config INTEL_TXT | |
75 | bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)" | |
76 | depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT | |
77 | help | |
78 | This option enables support for booting the kernel with the | |
79 | Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize | |
80 | Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch | |
81 | of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this | |
82 | will have no effect. | |
83 | ||
84 | Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and | |
85 | initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to | |
86 | create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which | |
87 | helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning | |
88 | correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside | |
89 | of the kernel itself. | |
90 | ||
91 | Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having | |
92 | confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that | |
93 | it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for | |
94 | providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. | |
95 | ||
96 | See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information | |
97 | about Intel(R) TXT. | |
98 | See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot. | |
99 | See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable | |
100 | Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. | |
101 | ||
102 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. | |
103 | ||
104 | config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR | |
105 | int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" | |
106 | depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX | |
107 | default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT) | |
108 | default 65536 | |
109 | help | |
110 | This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected | |
111 | from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages | |
112 | can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. | |
113 | ||
114 | For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space | |
115 | a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. | |
116 | On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. | |
117 | Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map | |
118 | this low address space will need the permission specific to the | |
119 | systems running LSM. | |
120 | ||
121 | config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR | |
122 | bool | |
123 | help | |
124 | The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for | |
125 | validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in | |
126 | support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. | |
127 | ||
128 | config HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY | |
129 | bool | |
130 | help | |
131 | The architecture supports CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY by | |
132 | calling check_object_size() just before performing the | |
133 | userspace copies in the low level implementation of | |
134 | copy_to_user() and copy_from_user(). | |
135 | ||
136 | config HARDENED_USERCOPY | |
137 | bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" | |
138 | depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY | |
139 | depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR | |
140 | select BUG | |
141 | help | |
142 | This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when | |
143 | copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and | |
144 | copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that | |
145 | are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple | |
146 | separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack, | |
147 | or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes | |
148 | of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. | |
149 | ||
150 | config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN | |
151 | bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages" | |
152 | depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY | |
153 | depends on EXPERT | |
154 | help | |
155 | When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP, | |
156 | hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are, | |
157 | however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all | |
158 | been removed. This config is intended to be used only while | |
159 | trying to find such users. | |
160 | ||
161 | source security/selinux/Kconfig | |
162 | source security/smack/Kconfig | |
163 | source security/tomoyo/Kconfig | |
164 | source security/apparmor/Kconfig | |
165 | source security/loadpin/Kconfig | |
166 | source security/yama/Kconfig | |
167 | ||
168 | source security/integrity/Kconfig | |
169 | ||
170 | choice | |
171 | prompt "Default security module" | |
172 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX | |
173 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK | |
174 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
175 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
176 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC | |
177 | ||
178 | help | |
179 | Select the security module that will be used by default if the | |
180 | kernel parameter security= is not specified. | |
181 | ||
182 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX | |
183 | bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y | |
184 | ||
185 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK | |
186 | bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y | |
187 | ||
188 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
189 | bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y | |
190 | ||
191 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
192 | bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y | |
193 | ||
194 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC | |
195 | bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" | |
196 | ||
197 | endchoice | |
198 | ||
199 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY | |
200 | string | |
201 | default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX | |
202 | default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK | |
203 | default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
204 | default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
205 | default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC | |
206 | ||
207 | endmenu | |
208 |