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1 | /* | |
2 | * AppArmor security module | |
3 | * | |
4 | * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks. | |
5 | * | |
6 | * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE | |
7 | * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. | |
8 | * | |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | |
10 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as | |
11 | * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the | |
12 | * License. | |
13 | */ | |
14 | ||
15 | #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> | |
16 | #include <linux/moduleparam.h> | |
17 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
18 | #include <linux/mman.h> | |
19 | #include <linux/mount.h> | |
20 | #include <linux/namei.h> | |
21 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | |
22 | #include <linux/ctype.h> | |
23 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/audit.h> | |
25 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> | |
26 | #include <linux/kmemleak.h> | |
27 | #include <net/sock.h> | |
28 | ||
29 | #include "include/af_unix.h" | |
30 | #include "include/apparmor.h" | |
31 | #include "include/apparmorfs.h" | |
32 | #include "include/audit.h" | |
33 | #include "include/capability.h" | |
34 | #include "include/context.h" | |
35 | #include "include/file.h" | |
36 | #include "include/ipc.h" | |
37 | #include "include/net.h" | |
38 | #include "include/path.h" | |
39 | #include "include/label.h" | |
40 | #include "include/policy.h" | |
41 | #include "include/policy_ns.h" | |
42 | #include "include/procattr.h" | |
43 | #include "include/mount.h" | |
44 | ||
45 | /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ | |
46 | int apparmor_initialized; | |
47 | ||
48 | DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers); | |
49 | ||
50 | ||
51 | /* | |
52 | * LSM hook functions | |
53 | */ | |
54 | ||
55 | /* | |
56 | * free the associated aa_task_ctx and put its labels | |
57 | */ | |
58 | static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) | |
59 | { | |
60 | aa_free_task_context(cred_ctx(cred)); | |
61 | } | |
62 | ||
63 | /* | |
64 | * prepare new aa_task_ctx for modification by prepare_cred block | |
65 | */ | |
66 | static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, | |
67 | gfp_t gfp) | |
68 | { | |
69 | aa_dup_task_context(cred_ctx(new), cred_ctx(old)); | |
70 | return 0; | |
71 | } | |
72 | ||
73 | /* | |
74 | * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds | |
75 | */ | |
76 | static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) | |
77 | { | |
78 | const struct aa_task_ctx *old_ctx = cred_ctx(old); | |
79 | struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(new); | |
80 | ||
81 | aa_dup_task_context(new_ctx, old_ctx); | |
82 | } | |
83 | ||
84 | static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, | |
85 | unsigned int mode) | |
86 | { | |
87 | struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; | |
88 | int error; | |
89 | ||
90 | tracer = begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
91 | tracee = aa_get_task_label(child); | |
92 | error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, | |
93 | mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ ? AA_PTRACE_READ : AA_PTRACE_TRACE); | |
94 | aa_put_label(tracee); | |
95 | end_current_label_crit_section(tracer); | |
96 | ||
97 | return error; | |
98 | } | |
99 | ||
100 | static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) | |
101 | { | |
102 | struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; | |
103 | int error; | |
104 | ||
105 | tracee = begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
106 | tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent); | |
107 | error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE); | |
108 | aa_put_label(tracer); | |
109 | end_current_label_crit_section(tracee); | |
110 | ||
111 | return error; | |
112 | } | |
113 | ||
114 | /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ | |
115 | static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
116 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
117 | { | |
118 | struct aa_label *label; | |
119 | const struct cred *cred; | |
120 | ||
121 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
122 | cred = __task_cred(target); | |
123 | label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); | |
124 | ||
125 | /* | |
126 | * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will | |
127 | * initialize effective and permitted. | |
128 | */ | |
129 | if (!unconfined(label)) { | |
130 | struct aa_profile *profile; | |
131 | struct label_it i; | |
132 | ||
133 | label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) { | |
134 | if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) | |
135 | continue; | |
136 | *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, | |
137 | profile->caps.allow); | |
138 | *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, | |
139 | profile->caps.allow); | |
140 | } | |
141 | } | |
142 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
143 | aa_put_label(label); | |
144 | ||
145 | return 0; | |
146 | } | |
147 | ||
148 | static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, | |
149 | int cap, int audit) | |
150 | { | |
151 | struct aa_label *label; | |
152 | int error = 0; | |
153 | ||
154 | label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); | |
155 | if (!unconfined(label)) | |
156 | error = aa_capable(label, cap, audit); | |
157 | aa_put_label(label); | |
158 | ||
159 | return error; | |
160 | } | |
161 | ||
162 | /** | |
163 | * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths | |
164 | * @op: operation being checked | |
165 | * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL) | |
166 | * @mask: requested permissions mask | |
167 | * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) | |
168 | * | |
169 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied | |
170 | */ | |
171 | static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask, | |
172 | struct path_cond *cond) | |
173 | { | |
174 | struct aa_label *label; | |
175 | int error = 0; | |
176 | ||
177 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
178 | if (!unconfined(label)) | |
179 | error = aa_path_perm(op, label, path, 0, mask, cond); | |
180 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); | |
181 | ||
182 | return error; | |
183 | } | |
184 | ||
185 | /** | |
186 | * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond | |
187 | * @op: operation being checked | |
188 | * @path: location to check (NOT NULL) | |
189 | * @mask: requested permissions mask | |
190 | * | |
191 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied | |
192 | */ | |
193 | static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask) | |
194 | { | |
195 | struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid, | |
196 | d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode | |
197 | }; | |
198 | ||
199 | if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry)) | |
200 | return 0; | |
201 | ||
202 | return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond); | |
203 | } | |
204 | ||
205 | /** | |
206 | * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry | |
207 | * @op: operation being checked | |
208 | * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL) | |
209 | * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) | |
210 | * @mask: requested permissions mask | |
211 | * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) | |
212 | * | |
213 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied | |
214 | */ | |
215 | static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir, | |
216 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, | |
217 | struct path_cond *cond) | |
218 | { | |
219 | struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry }; | |
220 | ||
221 | return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond); | |
222 | } | |
223 | ||
224 | /** | |
225 | * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm | |
226 | * @op: operation being checked | |
227 | * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL) | |
228 | * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL) | |
229 | * @mask: requested permission mask | |
230 | * | |
231 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied | |
232 | */ | |
233 | static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir, | |
234 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) | |
235 | { | |
236 | struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); | |
237 | struct path_cond cond = { }; | |
238 | ||
239 | if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry)) | |
240 | return 0; | |
241 | ||
242 | cond.uid = inode->i_uid; | |
243 | cond.mode = inode->i_mode; | |
244 | ||
245 | return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); | |
246 | } | |
247 | ||
248 | /** | |
249 | * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create | |
250 | * @op: operation being checked | |
251 | * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL) | |
252 | * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL) | |
253 | * @mask: request permission mask | |
254 | * @mode: created file mode | |
255 | * | |
256 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied | |
257 | */ | |
258 | static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir, | |
259 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode) | |
260 | { | |
261 | struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode }; | |
262 | ||
263 | if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry)) | |
264 | return 0; | |
265 | ||
266 | return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); | |
267 | } | |
268 | ||
269 | static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) | |
270 | { | |
271 | return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); | |
272 | } | |
273 | ||
274 | static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, | |
275 | umode_t mode) | |
276 | { | |
277 | return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, | |
278 | S_IFDIR); | |
279 | } | |
280 | ||
281 | static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) | |
282 | { | |
283 | return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); | |
284 | } | |
285 | ||
286 | static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, | |
287 | umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) | |
288 | { | |
289 | return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode); | |
290 | } | |
291 | ||
292 | static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path) | |
293 | { | |
294 | return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR); | |
295 | } | |
296 | ||
297 | static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, | |
298 | const char *old_name) | |
299 | { | |
300 | return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, | |
301 | S_IFLNK); | |
302 | } | |
303 | ||
304 | static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, | |
305 | struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
306 | { | |
307 | struct aa_label *label; | |
308 | int error = 0; | |
309 | ||
310 | if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry)) | |
311 | return 0; | |
312 | ||
313 | label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
314 | if (!unconfined(label)) | |
315 | error = aa_path_link(label, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); | |
316 | end_current_label_crit_section(label); | |
317 | ||
318 | return error; | |
319 | } | |
320 | ||
321 | static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, | |
322 | const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
323 | { | |
324 | struct aa_label *label; | |
325 | int error = 0; | |
326 | ||
327 | if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry)) | |
328 | return 0; | |
329 | ||
330 | label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
331 | if (!unconfined(label)) { | |
332 | struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt, | |
333 | .dentry = old_dentry }; | |
334 | struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, | |
335 | .dentry = new_dentry }; | |
336 | struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid, | |
337 | d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode | |
338 | }; | |
339 | ||
340 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0, | |
341 | MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | | |
342 | AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, | |
343 | &cond); | |
344 | if (!error) | |
345 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &new_path, | |
346 | 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | | |
347 | AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond); | |
348 | ||
349 | } | |
350 | end_current_label_crit_section(label); | |
351 | ||
352 | return error; | |
353 | } | |
354 | ||
355 | static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) | |
356 | { | |
357 | return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD); | |
358 | } | |
359 | ||
360 | static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) | |
361 | { | |
362 | return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN); | |
363 | } | |
364 | ||
365 | static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) | |
366 | { | |
367 | return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR); | |
368 | } | |
369 | ||
370 | static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) | |
371 | { | |
372 | struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file); | |
373 | struct aa_label *label; | |
374 | int error = 0; | |
375 | ||
376 | if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry)) | |
377 | return 0; | |
378 | ||
379 | /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks. | |
380 | * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with | |
381 | * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to | |
382 | * actually execute the image. | |
383 | */ | |
384 | if (current->in_execve) { | |
385 | fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; | |
386 | return 0; | |
387 | } | |
388 | ||
389 | label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); | |
390 | if (!unconfined(label)) { | |
391 | struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); | |
392 | struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; | |
393 | ||
394 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0, | |
395 | aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); | |
396 | /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ | |
397 | fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); | |
398 | } | |
399 | aa_put_label(label); | |
400 | ||
401 | return error; | |
402 | } | |
403 | ||
404 | static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) | |
405 | { | |
406 | struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); | |
407 | struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
408 | ||
409 | spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); | |
410 | rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); | |
411 | end_current_label_crit_section(label); | |
412 | return 0; | |
413 | } | |
414 | ||
415 | static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) | |
416 | { | |
417 | struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); | |
418 | ||
419 | if (ctx) | |
420 | aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)); | |
421 | } | |
422 | ||
423 | static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask) | |
424 | { | |
425 | struct aa_label *label; | |
426 | int error = 0; | |
427 | ||
428 | /* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */ | |
429 | if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry) | |
430 | return -EACCES; | |
431 | ||
432 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
433 | error = aa_file_perm(op, label, file, mask); | |
434 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); | |
435 | ||
436 | return error; | |
437 | } | |
438 | ||
439 | static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file) | |
440 | { | |
441 | return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file)); | |
442 | } | |
443 | ||
444 | static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) | |
445 | { | |
446 | return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask); | |
447 | } | |
448 | ||
449 | static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) | |
450 | { | |
451 | u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK; | |
452 | ||
453 | if (cmd == F_WRLCK) | |
454 | mask |= MAY_WRITE; | |
455 | ||
456 | return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask); | |
457 | } | |
458 | ||
459 | static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, | |
460 | unsigned long flags) | |
461 | { | |
462 | int mask = 0; | |
463 | ||
464 | if (!file || !file_ctx(file)) | |
465 | return 0; | |
466 | ||
467 | if (prot & PROT_READ) | |
468 | mask |= MAY_READ; | |
469 | /* | |
470 | * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't | |
471 | * write back to the files | |
472 | */ | |
473 | if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE)) | |
474 | mask |= MAY_WRITE; | |
475 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) | |
476 | mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; | |
477 | ||
478 | return common_file_perm(op, file, mask); | |
479 | } | |
480 | ||
481 | static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, | |
482 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) | |
483 | { | |
484 | return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags); | |
485 | } | |
486 | ||
487 | static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, | |
488 | unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) | |
489 | { | |
490 | return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot, | |
491 | !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0); | |
492 | } | |
493 | ||
494 | static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, | |
495 | const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) | |
496 | { | |
497 | struct aa_label *label; | |
498 | int error = 0; | |
499 | ||
500 | /* Discard magic */ | |
501 | if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL) | |
502 | flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK; | |
503 | ||
504 | flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK; | |
505 | ||
506 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
507 | if (!unconfined(label)) { | |
508 | if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) | |
509 | error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data); | |
510 | else if (flags & MS_BIND) | |
511 | error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags); | |
512 | else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | | |
513 | MS_UNBINDABLE)) | |
514 | error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags); | |
515 | else if (flags & MS_MOVE) | |
516 | error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name); | |
517 | else | |
518 | error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type, | |
519 | flags, data); | |
520 | } | |
521 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); | |
522 | ||
523 | return error; | |
524 | } | |
525 | ||
526 | static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) | |
527 | { | |
528 | struct aa_label *label; | |
529 | int error = 0; | |
530 | ||
531 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
532 | if (!unconfined(label)) | |
533 | error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags); | |
534 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); | |
535 | ||
536 | return error; | |
537 | } | |
538 | ||
539 | static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, | |
540 | const struct path *new_path) | |
541 | { | |
542 | struct aa_label *label; | |
543 | int error = 0; | |
544 | ||
545 | label = aa_get_current_label(); | |
546 | if (!unconfined(label)) | |
547 | error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path); | |
548 | aa_put_label(label); | |
549 | ||
550 | return error; | |
551 | } | |
552 | ||
553 | static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, | |
554 | char **value) | |
555 | { | |
556 | int error = -ENOENT; | |
557 | /* released below */ | |
558 | const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); | |
559 | struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred); | |
560 | struct aa_label *label = NULL; | |
561 | ||
562 | if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) | |
563 | label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label); | |
564 | else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous) | |
565 | label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); | |
566 | else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec) | |
567 | label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec); | |
568 | else | |
569 | error = -EINVAL; | |
570 | ||
571 | if (label) | |
572 | error = aa_getprocattr(label, value); | |
573 | ||
574 | aa_put_label(label); | |
575 | put_cred(cred); | |
576 | ||
577 | return error; | |
578 | } | |
579 | ||
580 | static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, | |
581 | size_t size) | |
582 | { | |
583 | char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value; | |
584 | size_t arg_size; | |
585 | int error; | |
586 | DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR); | |
587 | ||
588 | if (size == 0) | |
589 | return -EINVAL; | |
590 | ||
591 | /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */ | |
592 | if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { | |
593 | /* null terminate */ | |
594 | largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); | |
595 | if (!args) | |
596 | return -ENOMEM; | |
597 | memcpy(args, value, size); | |
598 | args[size] = '\0'; | |
599 | } | |
600 | ||
601 | error = -EINVAL; | |
602 | args = strim(args); | |
603 | command = strsep(&args, " "); | |
604 | if (!args) | |
605 | goto out; | |
606 | args = skip_spaces(args); | |
607 | if (!*args) | |
608 | goto out; | |
609 | ||
610 | arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value)); | |
611 | if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { | |
612 | if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { | |
613 | error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, | |
614 | AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS); | |
615 | } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) { | |
616 | error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, | |
617 | AA_CHANGE_TEST); | |
618 | } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) { | |
619 | error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS); | |
620 | } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) { | |
621 | error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST); | |
622 | } else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) { | |
623 | error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK); | |
624 | } else | |
625 | goto fail; | |
626 | } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) { | |
627 | if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0) | |
628 | error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC); | |
629 | else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) | |
630 | error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC | | |
631 | AA_CHANGE_STACK)); | |
632 | else | |
633 | goto fail; | |
634 | } else | |
635 | /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ | |
636 | goto fail; | |
637 | ||
638 | if (!error) | |
639 | error = size; | |
640 | out: | |
641 | kfree(largs); | |
642 | return error; | |
643 | ||
644 | fail: | |
645 | aad(&sa)->label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
646 | aad(&sa)->info = name; | |
647 | aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL; | |
648 | aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL); | |
649 | end_current_label_crit_section(aad(&sa)->label); | |
650 | goto out; | |
651 | } | |
652 | ||
653 | /** | |
654 | * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds | |
655 | * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) | |
656 | */ | |
657 | static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
658 | { | |
659 | struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label(); | |
660 | struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred); | |
661 | ||
662 | /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */ | |
663 | if ((new_ctx->label->proxy == label->proxy) || | |
664 | (unconfined(new_ctx->label))) | |
665 | return; | |
666 | ||
667 | aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files); | |
668 | ||
669 | current->pdeath_signal = 0; | |
670 | ||
671 | /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */ | |
672 | __aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_ctx->label); | |
673 | } | |
674 | ||
675 | /** | |
676 | * apparmor_bprm_committed_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed | |
677 | * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) | |
678 | */ | |
679 | static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
680 | { | |
681 | /* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */ | |
682 | return; | |
683 | } | |
684 | ||
685 | static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, | |
686 | unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) | |
687 | { | |
688 | struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
689 | int error = 0; | |
690 | ||
691 | if (!unconfined(label)) | |
692 | error = aa_task_setrlimit(label, task, resource, new_rlim); | |
693 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); | |
694 | ||
695 | return error; | |
696 | } | |
697 | ||
698 | static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info, | |
699 | int sig, u32 secid) | |
700 | { | |
701 | struct aa_label *cl, *tl; | |
702 | int error; | |
703 | ||
704 | if (secid) | |
705 | /* TODO: after secid to label mapping is done. | |
706 | * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior | |
707 | */ | |
708 | return 0; | |
709 | cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
710 | tl = aa_get_task_label(target); | |
711 | error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig); | |
712 | aa_put_label(tl); | |
713 | __end_current_label_crit_section(cl); | |
714 | ||
715 | return error; | |
716 | } | |
717 | ||
718 | /** | |
719 | * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field | |
720 | */ | |
721 | static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags) | |
722 | { | |
723 | /* allocated and cleared by LSM */ | |
724 | ||
725 | return 0; | |
726 | } | |
727 | ||
728 | /** | |
729 | * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field | |
730 | */ | |
731 | static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) | |
732 | { | |
733 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); | |
734 | ||
735 | aa_put_label(ctx->label); | |
736 | ctx->label = NULL; | |
737 | aa_put_label(ctx->peer); | |
738 | ctx->peer = NULL; | |
739 | path_put(&ctx->path); | |
740 | ctx->path.dentry = NULL; | |
741 | ctx->path.mnt = NULL; | |
742 | } | |
743 | ||
744 | /** | |
745 | * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field | |
746 | */ | |
747 | static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, | |
748 | struct sock *newsk) | |
749 | { | |
750 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); | |
751 | struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk); | |
752 | ||
753 | new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label); | |
754 | new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer); | |
755 | new->path = ctx->path; | |
756 | path_get(&new->path); | |
757 | } | |
758 | ||
759 | static struct path *UNIX_FS_CONN_PATH(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) | |
760 | { | |
761 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX && UNIX_FS(sk)) | |
762 | return &unix_sk(sk)->path; | |
763 | else if (newsk->sk_family == PF_UNIX && UNIX_FS(newsk)) | |
764 | return &unix_sk(newsk)->path; | |
765 | return NULL; | |
766 | } | |
767 | ||
768 | /** | |
769 | * apparmor_unix_stream_connect - check perms before making unix domain conn | |
770 | * | |
771 | * peer is locked when this hook is called | |
772 | */ | |
773 | static int apparmor_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk, | |
774 | struct sock *newsk) | |
775 | { | |
776 | struct aa_sk_ctx *sk_ctx = SK_CTX(sk); | |
777 | struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = SK_CTX(peer_sk); | |
778 | struct aa_sk_ctx *new_ctx = SK_CTX(newsk); | |
779 | struct aa_label *label; | |
780 | struct path *path; | |
781 | int error; | |
782 | ||
783 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
784 | error = aa_unix_peer_perm(label, OP_CONNECT, | |
785 | (AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE), | |
786 | sk, peer_sk, NULL); | |
787 | if (!UNIX_FS(peer_sk)) { | |
788 | last_error(error, | |
789 | aa_unix_peer_perm(peer_ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, | |
790 | (AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE), | |
791 | peer_sk, sk, label)); | |
792 | } | |
793 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); | |
794 | ||
795 | if (error) | |
796 | return error; | |
797 | ||
798 | /* label newsk if it wasn't labeled in post_create. Normally this | |
799 | * would be done in sock_graft, but because we are directly looking | |
800 | * at the peer_sk to obtain peer_labeling for unix socks this | |
801 | * does not work | |
802 | */ | |
803 | if (!new_ctx->label) | |
804 | new_ctx->label = aa_get_label(peer_ctx->label); | |
805 | ||
806 | /* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC */ | |
807 | if (new_ctx->peer) | |
808 | aa_put_label(new_ctx->peer); | |
809 | ||
810 | if (sk_ctx->peer) | |
811 | aa_put_label(sk_ctx->peer); | |
812 | ||
813 | new_ctx->peer = aa_get_label(sk_ctx->label); | |
814 | sk_ctx->peer = aa_get_label(peer_ctx->label); | |
815 | ||
816 | path = UNIX_FS_CONN_PATH(sk, peer_sk); | |
817 | if (path) { | |
818 | new_ctx->path = *path; | |
819 | sk_ctx->path = *path; | |
820 | path_get(path); | |
821 | path_get(path); | |
822 | } | |
823 | return 0; | |
824 | } | |
825 | ||
826 | /** | |
827 | * apparmor_unix_may_send - check perms before conn or sending unix dgrams | |
828 | * | |
829 | * other is locked when this hook is called | |
830 | * | |
831 | * dgram connect calls may_send, peer setup but path not copied????? | |
832 | */ | |
833 | static int apparmor_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *peer) | |
834 | { | |
835 | struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = SK_CTX(peer->sk); | |
836 | struct aa_label *label; | |
837 | int error; | |
838 | ||
839 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
840 | error = xcheck(aa_unix_peer_perm(label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, | |
841 | sock->sk, peer->sk, NULL), | |
842 | aa_unix_peer_perm(peer_ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, | |
843 | AA_MAY_RECEIVE, | |
844 | peer->sk, sock->sk, label)); | |
845 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); | |
846 | ||
847 | return error; | |
848 | } | |
849 | ||
850 | /** | |
851 | * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket | |
852 | */ | |
853 | static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) | |
854 | { | |
855 | struct aa_label *label; | |
856 | int error = 0; | |
857 | ||
858 | label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
859 | if (!(kern || unconfined(label))) | |
860 | error = aa_sock_create_perm(label, family, type, protocol); | |
861 | end_current_label_crit_section(label); | |
862 | ||
863 | return error; | |
864 | } | |
865 | ||
866 | /** | |
867 | * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct | |
868 | * | |
869 | * Note: | |
870 | * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to | |
871 | * move to a special kernel label | |
872 | * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or | |
873 | * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in | |
874 | * sock_graft. | |
875 | */ | |
876 | static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, | |
877 | int type, int protocol, int kern) | |
878 | { | |
879 | struct aa_label *label; | |
880 | ||
881 | if (kern) { | |
882 | struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns(); | |
883 | ||
884 | label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns)); | |
885 | aa_put_ns(ns); | |
886 | } else | |
887 | label = aa_get_current_label(); | |
888 | ||
889 | if (sock->sk) { | |
890 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk); | |
891 | ||
892 | aa_put_label(ctx->label); | |
893 | ctx->label = aa_get_label(label); | |
894 | } | |
895 | aa_put_label(label); | |
896 | ||
897 | return 0; | |
898 | } | |
899 | ||
900 | /** | |
901 | * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket | |
902 | */ | |
903 | static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, | |
904 | struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) | |
905 | { | |
906 | return aa_sock_bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen); | |
907 | } | |
908 | ||
909 | /** | |
910 | * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address | |
911 | */ | |
912 | static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, | |
913 | struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) | |
914 | { | |
915 | return aa_sock_connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen); | |
916 | } | |
917 | ||
918 | /** | |
919 | * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen | |
920 | */ | |
921 | static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) | |
922 | { | |
923 | return aa_sock_listen_perm(sock, backlog); | |
924 | } | |
925 | ||
926 | /** | |
927 | * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection. | |
928 | * | |
929 | * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept | |
930 | * has not been done. | |
931 | */ | |
932 | static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) | |
933 | { | |
934 | return aa_sock_accept_perm(sock, newsock); | |
935 | } | |
936 | ||
937 | /** | |
938 | * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket | |
939 | */ | |
940 | static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, | |
941 | struct msghdr *msg, int size) | |
942 | { | |
943 | return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); | |
944 | } | |
945 | ||
946 | /** | |
947 | * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message | |
948 | */ | |
949 | static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, | |
950 | struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) | |
951 | { | |
952 | return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size); | |
953 | } | |
954 | ||
955 | /** | |
956 | * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address | |
957 | */ | |
958 | static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) | |
959 | { | |
960 | return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); | |
961 | } | |
962 | ||
963 | /** | |
964 | * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address | |
965 | */ | |
966 | static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) | |
967 | { | |
968 | return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); | |
969 | } | |
970 | ||
971 | /** | |
972 | * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options | |
973 | */ | |
974 | static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, | |
975 | int optname) | |
976 | { | |
977 | return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock, | |
978 | level, optname); | |
979 | } | |
980 | ||
981 | /** | |
982 | * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options | |
983 | */ | |
984 | static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, | |
985 | int optname) | |
986 | { | |
987 | return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock, | |
988 | level, optname); | |
989 | } | |
990 | ||
991 | /** | |
992 | * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn | |
993 | */ | |
994 | static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) | |
995 | { | |
996 | return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock); | |
997 | } | |
998 | ||
999 | /** | |
1000 | * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk | |
1001 | * | |
1002 | * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held | |
1003 | * | |
1004 | * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram() | |
1005 | * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb() | |
1006 | */ | |
1007 | static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
1008 | { | |
1009 | return 0; | |
1010 | } | |
1011 | ||
1012 | ||
1013 | static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk) | |
1014 | { | |
1015 | struct sock *peer_sk; | |
1016 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); | |
1017 | ||
1018 | if (ctx->peer) | |
1019 | return ctx->peer; | |
1020 | ||
1021 | if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) | |
1022 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); | |
1023 | ||
1024 | /* check for sockpair peering which does not go through | |
1025 | * security_unix_stream_connect | |
1026 | */ | |
1027 | peer_sk = unix_peer(sk); | |
1028 | if (peer_sk) { | |
1029 | ctx = SK_CTX(peer_sk); | |
1030 | if (ctx->label) | |
1031 | return ctx->label; | |
1032 | } | |
1033 | ||
1034 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); | |
1035 | } | |
1036 | ||
1037 | /** | |
1038 | * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer | |
1039 | * | |
1040 | * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan | |
1041 | */ | |
1042 | static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, | |
1043 | char __user *optval, | |
1044 | int __user *optlen, | |
1045 | unsigned int len) | |
1046 | { | |
1047 | char *name; | |
1048 | int slen, error = 0; | |
1049 | struct aa_label *label; | |
1050 | struct aa_label *peer; | |
1051 | ||
1052 | label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); | |
1053 | peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk); | |
1054 | if (IS_ERR(peer)) { | |
1055 | error = PTR_ERR(peer); | |
1056 | goto done; | |
1057 | } | |
1058 | slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer, | |
1059 | FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | | |
1060 | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1061 | /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */ | |
1062 | if (slen < 0) { | |
1063 | error = -ENOMEM; | |
1064 | } else { | |
1065 | if (slen > len) { | |
1066 | error = -ERANGE; | |
1067 | } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) { | |
1068 | error = -EFAULT; | |
1069 | goto out; | |
1070 | } | |
1071 | if (put_user(slen, optlen)) | |
1072 | error = -EFAULT; | |
1073 | out: | |
1074 | kfree(name); | |
1075 | ||
1076 | } | |
1077 | ||
1078 | done: | |
1079 | end_current_label_crit_section(label); | |
1080 | ||
1081 | return error; | |
1082 | } | |
1083 | ||
1084 | /** | |
1085 | * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet | |
1086 | * @sock: the peer socket | |
1087 | * @skb: packet data | |
1088 | * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet | |
1089 | * | |
1090 | * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent | |
1091 | */ | |
1092 | static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, | |
1093 | struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) | |
1094 | ||
1095 | { | |
1096 | /* TODO: requires secid support */ | |
1097 | return -ENOPROTOOPT; | |
1098 | } | |
1099 | ||
1100 | /** | |
1101 | * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket | |
1102 | * @sk: child sock | |
1103 | * @parent: parent socket | |
1104 | * | |
1105 | * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can | |
1106 | * just set sk security information off of current creating process label | |
1107 | * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based | |
1108 | * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled | |
1109 | * socket is shared by different tasks. | |
1110 | */ | |
1111 | static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) | |
1112 | { | |
1113 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); | |
1114 | ||
1115 | if (!ctx->label) | |
1116 | ctx->label = aa_get_current_label(); | |
1117 | } | |
1118 | ||
1119 | struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes = { | |
1120 | .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), | |
1121 | .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), | |
1122 | .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), | |
1123 | }; | |
1124 | ||
1125 | static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { | |
1126 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), | |
1127 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), | |
1128 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget), | |
1129 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable), | |
1130 | ||
1131 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount), | |
1132 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount), | |
1133 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot), | |
1134 | ||
1135 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link), | |
1136 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink), | |
1137 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink), | |
1138 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir), | |
1139 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir), | |
1140 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod), | |
1141 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename), | |
1142 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod), | |
1143 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown), | |
1144 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate), | |
1145 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr), | |
1146 | ||
1147 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open), | |
1148 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive), | |
1149 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission), | |
1150 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security), | |
1151 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security), | |
1152 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file), | |
1153 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect), | |
1154 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock), | |
1155 | ||
1156 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), | |
1157 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), | |
1158 | ||
1159 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security), | |
1160 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), | |
1161 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security), | |
1162 | ||
1163 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, apparmor_unix_stream_connect), | |
1164 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, apparmor_unix_may_send), | |
1165 | ||
1166 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create), | |
1167 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create), | |
1168 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind), | |
1169 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect), | |
1170 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen), | |
1171 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept), | |
1172 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg), | |
1173 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg), | |
1174 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname), | |
1175 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername), | |
1176 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt), | |
1177 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt), | |
1178 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown), | |
1179 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb), | |
1180 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, | |
1181 | apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), | |
1182 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, | |
1183 | apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), | |
1184 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), | |
1185 | ||
1186 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), | |
1187 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), | |
1188 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer), | |
1189 | ||
1190 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds), | |
1191 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), | |
1192 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), | |
1193 | ||
1194 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), | |
1195 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), | |
1196 | }; | |
1197 | ||
1198 | /* | |
1199 | * AppArmor sysfs module parameters | |
1200 | */ | |
1201 | ||
1202 | static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); | |
1203 | static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); | |
1204 | #define param_check_aabool param_check_bool | |
1205 | static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = { | |
1206 | .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, | |
1207 | .set = param_set_aabool, | |
1208 | .get = param_get_aabool | |
1209 | }; | |
1210 | ||
1211 | static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); | |
1212 | static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); | |
1213 | #define param_check_aauint param_check_uint | |
1214 | static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = { | |
1215 | .set = param_set_aauint, | |
1216 | .get = param_get_aauint | |
1217 | }; | |
1218 | ||
1219 | static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); | |
1220 | static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); | |
1221 | #define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool | |
1222 | static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { | |
1223 | .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, | |
1224 | .set = param_set_aalockpolicy, | |
1225 | .get = param_get_aalockpolicy | |
1226 | }; | |
1227 | ||
1228 | static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); | |
1229 | static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); | |
1230 | ||
1231 | static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); | |
1232 | static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); | |
1233 | ||
1234 | /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters | |
1235 | * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. | |
1236 | */ | |
1237 | ||
1238 | /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ | |
1239 | enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; | |
1240 | module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, | |
1241 | &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); | |
1242 | ||
1243 | /* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */ | |
1244 | bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT); | |
1245 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH | |
1246 | module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); | |
1247 | #endif | |
1248 | ||
1249 | /* Debug mode */ | |
1250 | bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES); | |
1251 | module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); | |
1252 | ||
1253 | /* Audit mode */ | |
1254 | enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; | |
1255 | module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, | |
1256 | &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); | |
1257 | ||
1258 | /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This | |
1259 | * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running | |
1260 | */ | |
1261 | bool aa_g_audit_header = true; | |
1262 | module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, | |
1263 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); | |
1264 | ||
1265 | /* lock out loading/removal of policy | |
1266 | * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to | |
1267 | * load policy, if lock_policy is set | |
1268 | */ | |
1269 | bool aa_g_lock_policy; | |
1270 | module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, | |
1271 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); | |
1272 | ||
1273 | /* Syscall logging mode */ | |
1274 | bool aa_g_logsyscall; | |
1275 | module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); | |
1276 | ||
1277 | /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ | |
1278 | unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; | |
1279 | module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); | |
1280 | ||
1281 | /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification | |
1282 | * on the loaded policy is done. | |
1283 | * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now | |
1284 | * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy. | |
1285 | */ | |
1286 | bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true; | |
1287 | module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); | |
1288 | ||
1289 | /* Boot time disable flag */ | |
1290 | static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; | |
1291 | module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO); | |
1292 | ||
1293 | static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) | |
1294 | { | |
1295 | unsigned long enabled; | |
1296 | int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled); | |
1297 | if (!error) | |
1298 | apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; | |
1299 | return 1; | |
1300 | } | |
1301 | ||
1302 | __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); | |
1303 | ||
1304 | /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ | |
1305 | static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) | |
1306 | { | |
1307 | if (!apparmor_enabled) | |
1308 | return -EINVAL; | |
1309 | if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) | |
1310 | return -EPERM; | |
1311 | return param_set_bool(val, kp); | |
1312 | } | |
1313 | ||
1314 | static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) | |
1315 | { | |
1316 | if (!apparmor_enabled) | |
1317 | return -EINVAL; | |
1318 | if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) | |
1319 | return -EPERM; | |
1320 | return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); | |
1321 | } | |
1322 | ||
1323 | static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) | |
1324 | { | |
1325 | if (!apparmor_enabled) | |
1326 | return -EINVAL; | |
1327 | if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) | |
1328 | return -EPERM; | |
1329 | return param_set_bool(val, kp); | |
1330 | } | |
1331 | ||
1332 | static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) | |
1333 | { | |
1334 | if (!apparmor_enabled) | |
1335 | return -EINVAL; | |
1336 | if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) | |
1337 | return -EPERM; | |
1338 | return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); | |
1339 | } | |
1340 | ||
1341 | static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) | |
1342 | { | |
1343 | int error; | |
1344 | ||
1345 | if (!apparmor_enabled) | |
1346 | return -EINVAL; | |
1347 | /* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */ | |
1348 | if (apparmor_initialized) | |
1349 | return -EPERM; | |
1350 | ||
1351 | error = param_set_uint(val, kp); | |
1352 | pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max); | |
1353 | ||
1354 | return error; | |
1355 | } | |
1356 | ||
1357 | static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) | |
1358 | { | |
1359 | if (!apparmor_enabled) | |
1360 | return -EINVAL; | |
1361 | if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) | |
1362 | return -EPERM; | |
1363 | return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); | |
1364 | } | |
1365 | ||
1366 | static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) | |
1367 | { | |
1368 | if (!apparmor_enabled) | |
1369 | return -EINVAL; | |
1370 | if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) | |
1371 | return -EPERM; | |
1372 | return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); | |
1373 | } | |
1374 | ||
1375 | static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) | |
1376 | { | |
1377 | int i; | |
1378 | ||
1379 | if (!apparmor_enabled) | |
1380 | return -EINVAL; | |
1381 | if (!val) | |
1382 | return -EINVAL; | |
1383 | if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) | |
1384 | return -EPERM; | |
1385 | ||
1386 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) { | |
1387 | if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) { | |
1388 | aa_g_audit = i; | |
1389 | return 0; | |
1390 | } | |
1391 | } | |
1392 | ||
1393 | return -EINVAL; | |
1394 | } | |
1395 | ||
1396 | static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) | |
1397 | { | |
1398 | if (!apparmor_enabled) | |
1399 | return -EINVAL; | |
1400 | if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) | |
1401 | return -EPERM; | |
1402 | ||
1403 | return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); | |
1404 | } | |
1405 | ||
1406 | static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) | |
1407 | { | |
1408 | int i; | |
1409 | ||
1410 | if (!apparmor_enabled) | |
1411 | return -EINVAL; | |
1412 | if (!val) | |
1413 | return -EINVAL; | |
1414 | if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) | |
1415 | return -EPERM; | |
1416 | ||
1417 | for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) { | |
1418 | if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) { | |
1419 | aa_g_profile_mode = i; | |
1420 | return 0; | |
1421 | } | |
1422 | } | |
1423 | ||
1424 | return -EINVAL; | |
1425 | } | |
1426 | ||
1427 | /* | |
1428 | * AppArmor init functions | |
1429 | */ | |
1430 | ||
1431 | /** | |
1432 | * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task. | |
1433 | * | |
1434 | * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined | |
1435 | */ | |
1436 | static int __init set_init_ctx(void) | |
1437 | { | |
1438 | struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred; | |
1439 | struct aa_task_ctx *ctx; | |
1440 | ||
1441 | lsm_early_cred(cred); | |
1442 | ctx = apparmor_cred(cred); | |
1443 | ||
1444 | ctx->label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)); | |
1445 | ||
1446 | return 0; | |
1447 | } | |
1448 | ||
1449 | static void destroy_buffers(void) | |
1450 | { | |
1451 | u32 i, j; | |
1452 | ||
1453 | for_each_possible_cpu(i) { | |
1454 | for_each_cpu_buffer(j) { | |
1455 | kfree(per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j]); | |
1456 | per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = NULL; | |
1457 | } | |
1458 | } | |
1459 | } | |
1460 | ||
1461 | static int __init alloc_buffers(void) | |
1462 | { | |
1463 | u32 i, j; | |
1464 | ||
1465 | for_each_possible_cpu(i) { | |
1466 | for_each_cpu_buffer(j) { | |
1467 | char *buffer; | |
1468 | ||
1469 | if (cpu_to_node(i) > num_online_nodes()) | |
1470 | /* fallback to kmalloc for offline nodes */ | |
1471 | buffer = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1472 | else | |
1473 | buffer = kmalloc_node(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL, | |
1474 | cpu_to_node(i)); | |
1475 | if (!buffer) { | |
1476 | destroy_buffers(); | |
1477 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1478 | } | |
1479 | per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = buffer; | |
1480 | } | |
1481 | } | |
1482 | ||
1483 | return 0; | |
1484 | } | |
1485 | ||
1486 | #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL | |
1487 | static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, | |
1488 | void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) | |
1489 | { | |
1490 | if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL)) | |
1491 | return -EPERM; | |
1492 | if (!apparmor_enabled) | |
1493 | return -EINVAL; | |
1494 | ||
1495 | return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); | |
1496 | } | |
1497 | ||
1498 | static struct ctl_path apparmor_sysctl_path[] = { | |
1499 | { .procname = "kernel", }, | |
1500 | { } | |
1501 | }; | |
1502 | ||
1503 | static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = { | |
1504 | { | |
1505 | .procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy", | |
1506 | .data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy, | |
1507 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), | |
1508 | .mode = 0600, | |
1509 | .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, | |
1510 | }, | |
1511 | { } | |
1512 | }; | |
1513 | ||
1514 | static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void) | |
1515 | { | |
1516 | return register_sysctl_paths(apparmor_sysctl_path, | |
1517 | apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM; | |
1518 | } | |
1519 | #else | |
1520 | static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void) | |
1521 | { | |
1522 | return 0; | |
1523 | } | |
1524 | #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ | |
1525 | ||
1526 | static int __init apparmor_init(void) | |
1527 | { | |
1528 | static int finish; | |
1529 | int error; | |
1530 | ||
1531 | if (!finish) { | |
1532 | if (apparmor_enabled && | |
1533 | security_module_enable("apparmor", | |
1534 | IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED))) | |
1535 | security_add_blobs(&apparmor_blob_sizes); | |
1536 | else | |
1537 | apparmor_enabled = false; | |
1538 | finish = 1; | |
1539 | return 0; | |
1540 | } | |
1541 | ||
1542 | if (!apparmor_enabled) { | |
1543 | aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter"); | |
1544 | apparmor_enabled = false; | |
1545 | return 0; | |
1546 | } | |
1547 | ||
1548 | error = aa_setup_dfa_engine(); | |
1549 | if (error) { | |
1550 | AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n"); | |
1551 | goto alloc_out; | |
1552 | } | |
1553 | ||
1554 | error = aa_alloc_root_ns(); | |
1555 | if (error) { | |
1556 | AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n"); | |
1557 | goto alloc_out; | |
1558 | } | |
1559 | ||
1560 | error = apparmor_init_sysctl(); | |
1561 | if (error) { | |
1562 | AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n"); | |
1563 | goto alloc_out; | |
1564 | ||
1565 | } | |
1566 | ||
1567 | error = alloc_buffers(); | |
1568 | if (error) { | |
1569 | AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n"); | |
1570 | goto buffers_out; | |
1571 | } | |
1572 | ||
1573 | error = set_init_ctx(); | |
1574 | if (error) { | |
1575 | AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n"); | |
1576 | aa_free_root_ns(); | |
1577 | goto buffers_out; | |
1578 | } | |
1579 | security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks), | |
1580 | "apparmor"); | |
1581 | ||
1582 | /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ | |
1583 | apparmor_initialized = 1; | |
1584 | if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) | |
1585 | aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled"); | |
1586 | else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) | |
1587 | aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled"); | |
1588 | else | |
1589 | aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized"); | |
1590 | ||
1591 | return error; | |
1592 | ||
1593 | buffers_out: | |
1594 | destroy_buffers(); | |
1595 | ||
1596 | alloc_out: | |
1597 | aa_destroy_aafs(); | |
1598 | aa_teardown_dfa_engine(); | |
1599 | ||
1600 | apparmor_enabled = false; | |
1601 | return error; | |
1602 | } | |
1603 | ||
1604 | security_initcall(apparmor_init); |