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1 | /* | |
2 | * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module | |
3 | * | |
4 | * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. | |
5 | * | |
6 | * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> | |
7 | * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> | |
8 | * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> | |
9 | * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> | |
10 | * | |
11 | * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. | |
12 | * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> | |
13 | * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. | |
14 | * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> | |
15 | * | |
16 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
17 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, | |
18 | * as published by the Free Software Foundation. | |
19 | */ | |
20 | ||
21 | #include <linux/config.h> | |
22 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
23 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
25 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | |
26 | #include <linux/errno.h> | |
27 | #include <linux/sched.h> | |
28 | #include <linux/security.h> | |
29 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | |
30 | #include <linux/capability.h> | |
31 | #include <linux/unistd.h> | |
32 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
33 | #include <linux/mman.h> | |
34 | #include <linux/slab.h> | |
35 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> | |
36 | #include <linux/swap.h> | |
37 | #include <linux/smp_lock.h> | |
38 | #include <linux/spinlock.h> | |
39 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> | |
40 | #include <linux/file.h> | |
41 | #include <linux/namei.h> | |
42 | #include <linux/mount.h> | |
43 | #include <linux/ext2_fs.h> | |
44 | #include <linux/proc_fs.h> | |
45 | #include <linux/kd.h> | |
46 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> | |
47 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> | |
48 | #include <linux/tty.h> | |
49 | #include <net/icmp.h> | |
50 | #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */ | |
51 | #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ | |
52 | #include <asm/uaccess.h> | |
53 | #include <asm/semaphore.h> | |
54 | #include <asm/ioctls.h> | |
55 | #include <linux/bitops.h> | |
56 | #include <linux/interrupt.h> | |
57 | #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ | |
58 | #include <linux/netlink.h> | |
59 | #include <linux/tcp.h> | |
60 | #include <linux/udp.h> | |
61 | #include <linux/quota.h> | |
62 | #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */ | |
63 | #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */ | |
64 | #include <linux/parser.h> | |
65 | #include <linux/nfs_mount.h> | |
66 | #include <net/ipv6.h> | |
67 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> | |
68 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
69 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> | |
70 | #include <linux/audit.h> | |
71 | #include <linux/string.h> | |
72 | ||
73 | #include "avc.h" | |
74 | #include "objsec.h" | |
75 | #include "netif.h" | |
76 | #include "xfrm.h" | |
77 | ||
78 | #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" | |
79 | #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX | |
80 | ||
81 | extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; | |
82 | extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); | |
83 | ||
84 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP | |
85 | int selinux_enforcing = 0; | |
86 | ||
87 | static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) | |
88 | { | |
89 | selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0); | |
90 | return 1; | |
91 | } | |
92 | __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); | |
93 | #endif | |
94 | ||
95 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM | |
96 | int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; | |
97 | ||
98 | static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) | |
99 | { | |
100 | selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); | |
101 | return 1; | |
102 | } | |
103 | __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); | |
104 | #endif | |
105 | ||
106 | /* Original (dummy) security module. */ | |
107 | static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL; | |
108 | ||
109 | /* Minimal support for a secondary security module, | |
110 | just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules. | |
111 | The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary | |
112 | module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */ | |
113 | static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL; | |
114 | ||
115 | /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized | |
116 | before the policy was loaded. */ | |
117 | static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head); | |
118 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock); | |
119 | ||
120 | /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */ | |
121 | ||
122 | static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task) | |
123 | { | |
124 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
125 | ||
126 | tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
127 | if (!tsec) | |
128 | return -ENOMEM; | |
129 | ||
130 | tsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
131 | tsec->task = task; | |
132 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
133 | task->security = tsec; | |
134 | ||
135 | return 0; | |
136 | } | |
137 | ||
138 | static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task) | |
139 | { | |
140 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security; | |
141 | ||
142 | if (!tsec || tsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
143 | return; | |
144 | ||
145 | task->security = NULL; | |
146 | kfree(tsec); | |
147 | } | |
148 | ||
149 | static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) | |
150 | { | |
151 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
152 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
153 | ||
154 | isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
155 | if (!isec) | |
156 | return -ENOMEM; | |
157 | ||
158 | init_MUTEX(&isec->sem); | |
159 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); | |
160 | isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
161 | isec->inode = inode; | |
162 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
163 | isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; | |
164 | if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
165 | isec->task_sid = tsec->sid; | |
166 | else | |
167 | isec->task_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
168 | inode->i_security = isec; | |
169 | ||
170 | return 0; | |
171 | } | |
172 | ||
173 | static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) | |
174 | { | |
175 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
176 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
177 | ||
178 | if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
179 | return; | |
180 | ||
181 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
182 | if (!list_empty(&isec->list)) | |
183 | list_del_init(&isec->list); | |
184 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
185 | ||
186 | inode->i_security = NULL; | |
187 | kfree(isec); | |
188 | } | |
189 | ||
190 | static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file) | |
191 | { | |
192 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
193 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; | |
194 | ||
195 | fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_ATOMIC); | |
196 | if (!fsec) | |
197 | return -ENOMEM; | |
198 | ||
199 | fsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
200 | fsec->file = file; | |
201 | if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) { | |
202 | fsec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
203 | fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid; | |
204 | } else { | |
205 | fsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
206 | fsec->fown_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
207 | } | |
208 | file->f_security = fsec; | |
209 | ||
210 | return 0; | |
211 | } | |
212 | ||
213 | static void file_free_security(struct file *file) | |
214 | { | |
215 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; | |
216 | ||
217 | if (!fsec || fsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
218 | return; | |
219 | ||
220 | file->f_security = NULL; | |
221 | kfree(fsec); | |
222 | } | |
223 | ||
224 | static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
225 | { | |
226 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
227 | ||
228 | sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
229 | if (!sbsec) | |
230 | return -ENOMEM; | |
231 | ||
232 | init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem); | |
233 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list); | |
234 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); | |
235 | spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
236 | sbsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
237 | sbsec->sb = sb; | |
238 | sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
239 | sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; | |
240 | sb->s_security = sbsec; | |
241 | ||
242 | return 0; | |
243 | } | |
244 | ||
245 | static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
246 | { | |
247 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
248 | ||
249 | if (!sbsec || sbsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
250 | return; | |
251 | ||
252 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
253 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list)) | |
254 | list_del_init(&sbsec->list); | |
255 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
256 | ||
257 | sb->s_security = NULL; | |
258 | kfree(sbsec); | |
259 | } | |
260 | ||
261 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK | |
262 | static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) | |
263 | { | |
264 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; | |
265 | ||
266 | if (family != PF_UNIX) | |
267 | return 0; | |
268 | ||
269 | ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority); | |
270 | if (!ssec) | |
271 | return -ENOMEM; | |
272 | ||
273 | ssec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
274 | ssec->sk = sk; | |
275 | ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
276 | sk->sk_security = ssec; | |
277 | ||
278 | return 0; | |
279 | } | |
280 | ||
281 | static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) | |
282 | { | |
283 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security; | |
284 | ||
285 | if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX || ssec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
286 | return; | |
287 | ||
288 | sk->sk_security = NULL; | |
289 | kfree(ssec); | |
290 | } | |
291 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ | |
292 | ||
293 | /* The security server must be initialized before | |
294 | any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */ | |
295 | extern int ss_initialized; | |
296 | ||
297 | /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */ | |
298 | ||
299 | static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = { | |
300 | "uses xattr", | |
301 | "uses transition SIDs", | |
302 | "uses task SIDs", | |
303 | "uses genfs_contexts", | |
304 | "not configured for labeling", | |
305 | "uses mountpoint labeling", | |
306 | }; | |
307 | ||
308 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); | |
309 | ||
310 | static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode) | |
311 | { | |
312 | return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); | |
313 | } | |
314 | ||
315 | enum { | |
316 | Opt_context = 1, | |
317 | Opt_fscontext = 2, | |
318 | Opt_defcontext = 4, | |
319 | }; | |
320 | ||
321 | static match_table_t tokens = { | |
322 | {Opt_context, "context=%s"}, | |
323 | {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"}, | |
324 | {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"}, | |
325 | }; | |
326 | ||
327 | #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n" | |
328 | ||
329 | static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |
330 | { | |
331 | char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL; | |
332 | const char *name; | |
333 | u32 sid; | |
334 | int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0; | |
335 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
336 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
337 | ||
338 | if (!data) | |
339 | goto out; | |
340 | ||
341 | name = sb->s_type->name; | |
342 | ||
343 | if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) { | |
344 | ||
345 | /* NFS we understand. */ | |
346 | if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) { | |
347 | struct nfs_mount_data *d = data; | |
348 | ||
349 | if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION) | |
350 | goto out; | |
351 | ||
352 | if (d->context[0]) { | |
353 | context = d->context; | |
354 | seen |= Opt_context; | |
355 | } | |
356 | } else | |
357 | goto out; | |
358 | ||
359 | } else { | |
360 | /* Standard string-based options. */ | |
361 | char *p, *options = data; | |
362 | ||
363 | while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) { | |
364 | int token; | |
365 | substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; | |
366 | ||
367 | if (!*p) | |
368 | continue; | |
369 | ||
370 | token = match_token(p, tokens, args); | |
371 | ||
372 | switch (token) { | |
373 | case Opt_context: | |
374 | if (seen) { | |
375 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
376 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
377 | goto out_free; | |
378 | } | |
379 | context = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
380 | if (!context) { | |
381 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
382 | goto out_free; | |
383 | } | |
384 | if (!alloc) | |
385 | alloc = 1; | |
386 | seen |= Opt_context; | |
387 | break; | |
388 | ||
389 | case Opt_fscontext: | |
390 | if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) { | |
391 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
392 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
393 | goto out_free; | |
394 | } | |
395 | context = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
396 | if (!context) { | |
397 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
398 | goto out_free; | |
399 | } | |
400 | if (!alloc) | |
401 | alloc = 1; | |
402 | seen |= Opt_fscontext; | |
403 | break; | |
404 | ||
405 | case Opt_defcontext: | |
406 | if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { | |
407 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
408 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: " | |
409 | "defcontext option is invalid " | |
410 | "for this filesystem type\n"); | |
411 | goto out_free; | |
412 | } | |
413 | if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) { | |
414 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
415 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
416 | goto out_free; | |
417 | } | |
418 | defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
419 | if (!defcontext) { | |
420 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
421 | goto out_free; | |
422 | } | |
423 | if (!alloc) | |
424 | alloc = 1; | |
425 | seen |= Opt_defcontext; | |
426 | break; | |
427 | ||
428 | default: | |
429 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
430 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount " | |
431 | "option\n"); | |
432 | goto out_free; | |
433 | ||
434 | } | |
435 | } | |
436 | } | |
437 | ||
438 | if (!seen) | |
439 | goto out; | |
440 | ||
441 | if (context) { | |
442 | rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid); | |
443 | if (rc) { | |
444 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" | |
445 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", | |
446 | context, sb->s_id, name, rc); | |
447 | goto out_free; | |
448 | } | |
449 | ||
450 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
451 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); | |
452 | if (rc) | |
453 | goto out_free; | |
454 | ||
455 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
456 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); | |
457 | if (rc) | |
458 | goto out_free; | |
459 | ||
460 | sbsec->sid = sid; | |
461 | ||
462 | if (seen & Opt_context) | |
463 | sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; | |
464 | } | |
465 | ||
466 | if (defcontext) { | |
467 | rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid); | |
468 | if (rc) { | |
469 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" | |
470 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", | |
471 | defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc); | |
472 | goto out_free; | |
473 | } | |
474 | ||
475 | if (sid == sbsec->def_sid) | |
476 | goto out_free; | |
477 | ||
478 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
479 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); | |
480 | if (rc) | |
481 | goto out_free; | |
482 | ||
483 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
484 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); | |
485 | if (rc) | |
486 | goto out_free; | |
487 | ||
488 | sbsec->def_sid = sid; | |
489 | } | |
490 | ||
491 | out_free: | |
492 | if (alloc) { | |
493 | kfree(context); | |
494 | kfree(defcontext); | |
495 | } | |
496 | out: | |
497 | return rc; | |
498 | } | |
499 | ||
500 | static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |
501 | { | |
502 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
503 | struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; | |
504 | struct inode *inode = root->d_inode; | |
505 | int rc = 0; | |
506 | ||
507 | down(&sbsec->sem); | |
508 | if (sbsec->initialized) | |
509 | goto out; | |
510 | ||
511 | if (!ss_initialized) { | |
512 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, | |
513 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security | |
514 | server is ready to handle calls. */ | |
515 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
516 | if (list_empty(&sbsec->list)) | |
517 | list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head); | |
518 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
519 | goto out; | |
520 | } | |
521 | ||
522 | /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ | |
523 | rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); | |
524 | if (rc) { | |
525 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", | |
526 | __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc); | |
527 | goto out; | |
528 | } | |
529 | ||
530 | rc = try_context_mount(sb, data); | |
531 | if (rc) | |
532 | goto out; | |
533 | ||
534 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { | |
535 | /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no | |
536 | error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on | |
537 | the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be | |
538 | the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have | |
539 | assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ | |
540 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { | |
541 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " | |
542 | "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | |
543 | rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
544 | goto out; | |
545 | } | |
546 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); | |
547 | if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { | |
548 | if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) | |
549 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " | |
550 | "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", | |
551 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | |
552 | else | |
553 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " | |
554 | "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, | |
555 | sb->s_type->name, -rc); | |
556 | goto out; | |
557 | } | |
558 | } | |
559 | ||
560 | if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) | |
561 | sbsec->proc = 1; | |
562 | ||
563 | sbsec->initialized = 1; | |
564 | ||
565 | if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) { | |
566 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", | |
567 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | |
568 | } | |
569 | else { | |
570 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", | |
571 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, | |
572 | labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); | |
573 | } | |
574 | ||
575 | /* Initialize the root inode. */ | |
576 | rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root); | |
577 | ||
578 | /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. | |
579 | inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created | |
580 | during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly | |
581 | populates itself. */ | |
582 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
583 | next_inode: | |
584 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { | |
585 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = | |
586 | list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next, | |
587 | struct inode_security_struct, list); | |
588 | struct inode *inode = isec->inode; | |
589 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
590 | inode = igrab(inode); | |
591 | if (inode) { | |
592 | if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode)) | |
593 | inode_doinit(inode); | |
594 | iput(inode); | |
595 | } | |
596 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
597 | list_del_init(&isec->list); | |
598 | goto next_inode; | |
599 | } | |
600 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
601 | out: | |
602 | up(&sbsec->sem); | |
603 | return rc; | |
604 | } | |
605 | ||
606 | static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) | |
607 | { | |
608 | switch (mode & S_IFMT) { | |
609 | case S_IFSOCK: | |
610 | return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE; | |
611 | case S_IFLNK: | |
612 | return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE; | |
613 | case S_IFREG: | |
614 | return SECCLASS_FILE; | |
615 | case S_IFBLK: | |
616 | return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE; | |
617 | case S_IFDIR: | |
618 | return SECCLASS_DIR; | |
619 | case S_IFCHR: | |
620 | return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; | |
621 | case S_IFIFO: | |
622 | return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE; | |
623 | ||
624 | } | |
625 | ||
626 | return SECCLASS_FILE; | |
627 | } | |
628 | ||
629 | static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol) | |
630 | { | |
631 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP); | |
632 | } | |
633 | ||
634 | static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) | |
635 | { | |
636 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP); | |
637 | } | |
638 | ||
639 | static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) | |
640 | { | |
641 | switch (family) { | |
642 | case PF_UNIX: | |
643 | switch (type) { | |
644 | case SOCK_STREAM: | |
645 | case SOCK_SEQPACKET: | |
646 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; | |
647 | case SOCK_DGRAM: | |
648 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; | |
649 | } | |
650 | break; | |
651 | case PF_INET: | |
652 | case PF_INET6: | |
653 | switch (type) { | |
654 | case SOCK_STREAM: | |
655 | if (default_protocol_stream(protocol)) | |
656 | return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET; | |
657 | else | |
658 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; | |
659 | case SOCK_DGRAM: | |
660 | if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol)) | |
661 | return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; | |
662 | else | |
663 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; | |
664 | default: | |
665 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; | |
666 | } | |
667 | break; | |
668 | case PF_NETLINK: | |
669 | switch (protocol) { | |
670 | case NETLINK_ROUTE: | |
671 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; | |
672 | case NETLINK_FIREWALL: | |
673 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET; | |
674 | case NETLINK_INET_DIAG: | |
675 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; | |
676 | case NETLINK_NFLOG: | |
677 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET; | |
678 | case NETLINK_XFRM: | |
679 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; | |
680 | case NETLINK_SELINUX: | |
681 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; | |
682 | case NETLINK_AUDIT: | |
683 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; | |
684 | case NETLINK_IP6_FW: | |
685 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET; | |
686 | case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: | |
687 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; | |
688 | case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: | |
689 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; | |
690 | default: | |
691 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; | |
692 | } | |
693 | case PF_PACKET: | |
694 | return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET; | |
695 | case PF_KEY: | |
696 | return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET; | |
697 | } | |
698 | ||
699 | return SECCLASS_SOCKET; | |
700 | } | |
701 | ||
702 | #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS | |
703 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, | |
704 | u16 tclass, | |
705 | u32 *sid) | |
706 | { | |
707 | int buflen, rc; | |
708 | char *buffer, *path, *end; | |
709 | ||
710 | buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); | |
711 | if (!buffer) | |
712 | return -ENOMEM; | |
713 | ||
714 | buflen = PAGE_SIZE; | |
715 | end = buffer+buflen; | |
716 | *--end = '\0'; | |
717 | buflen--; | |
718 | path = end-1; | |
719 | *path = '/'; | |
720 | while (de && de != de->parent) { | |
721 | buflen -= de->namelen + 1; | |
722 | if (buflen < 0) | |
723 | break; | |
724 | end -= de->namelen; | |
725 | memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen); | |
726 | *--end = '/'; | |
727 | path = end; | |
728 | de = de->parent; | |
729 | } | |
730 | rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); | |
731 | free_page((unsigned long)buffer); | |
732 | return rc; | |
733 | } | |
734 | #else | |
735 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, | |
736 | u16 tclass, | |
737 | u32 *sid) | |
738 | { | |
739 | return -EINVAL; | |
740 | } | |
741 | #endif | |
742 | ||
743 | /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ | |
744 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) | |
745 | { | |
746 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; | |
747 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
748 | u32 sid; | |
749 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
750 | #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 | |
751 | char *context = NULL; | |
752 | unsigned len = 0; | |
753 | int rc = 0; | |
754 | int hold_sem = 0; | |
755 | ||
756 | if (isec->initialized) | |
757 | goto out; | |
758 | ||
759 | down(&isec->sem); | |
760 | hold_sem = 1; | |
761 | if (isec->initialized) | |
762 | goto out; | |
763 | ||
764 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
765 | if (!sbsec->initialized) { | |
766 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, | |
767 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security | |
768 | server is ready to handle calls. */ | |
769 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
770 | if (list_empty(&isec->list)) | |
771 | list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); | |
772 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
773 | goto out; | |
774 | } | |
775 | ||
776 | switch (sbsec->behavior) { | |
777 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: | |
778 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { | |
779 | isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid; | |
780 | break; | |
781 | } | |
782 | ||
783 | /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. | |
784 | Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */ | |
785 | if (opt_dentry) { | |
786 | /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */ | |
787 | dentry = dget(opt_dentry); | |
788 | } else { | |
789 | /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */ | |
790 | dentry = d_find_alias(inode); | |
791 | } | |
792 | if (!dentry) { | |
793 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s " | |
794 | "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id, | |
795 | inode->i_ino); | |
796 | goto out; | |
797 | } | |
798 | ||
799 | len = INITCONTEXTLEN; | |
800 | context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
801 | if (!context) { | |
802 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
803 | dput(dentry); | |
804 | goto out; | |
805 | } | |
806 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | |
807 | context, len); | |
808 | if (rc == -ERANGE) { | |
809 | /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ | |
810 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | |
811 | NULL, 0); | |
812 | if (rc < 0) { | |
813 | dput(dentry); | |
814 | goto out; | |
815 | } | |
816 | kfree(context); | |
817 | len = rc; | |
818 | context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
819 | if (!context) { | |
820 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
821 | dput(dentry); | |
822 | goto out; | |
823 | } | |
824 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, | |
825 | XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | |
826 | context, len); | |
827 | } | |
828 | dput(dentry); | |
829 | if (rc < 0) { | |
830 | if (rc != -ENODATA) { | |
831 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned " | |
832 | "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, | |
833 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); | |
834 | kfree(context); | |
835 | goto out; | |
836 | } | |
837 | /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ | |
838 | sid = sbsec->def_sid; | |
839 | rc = 0; | |
840 | } else { | |
841 | rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid, | |
842 | sbsec->def_sid); | |
843 | if (rc) { | |
844 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) " | |
845 | "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", | |
846 | __FUNCTION__, context, -rc, | |
847 | inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); | |
848 | kfree(context); | |
849 | /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ | |
850 | rc = 0; | |
851 | break; | |
852 | } | |
853 | } | |
854 | kfree(context); | |
855 | isec->sid = sid; | |
856 | break; | |
857 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: | |
858 | isec->sid = isec->task_sid; | |
859 | break; | |
860 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: | |
861 | /* Default to the fs SID. */ | |
862 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; | |
863 | ||
864 | /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ | |
865 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
866 | rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, | |
867 | sbsec->sid, | |
868 | isec->sclass, | |
869 | &sid); | |
870 | if (rc) | |
871 | goto out; | |
872 | isec->sid = sid; | |
873 | break; | |
874 | default: | |
875 | /* Default to the fs SID. */ | |
876 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; | |
877 | ||
878 | if (sbsec->proc) { | |
879 | struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode); | |
880 | if (proci->pde) { | |
881 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
882 | rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde, | |
883 | isec->sclass, | |
884 | &sid); | |
885 | if (rc) | |
886 | goto out; | |
887 | isec->sid = sid; | |
888 | } | |
889 | } | |
890 | break; | |
891 | } | |
892 | ||
893 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
894 | ||
895 | out: | |
896 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) | |
897 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
898 | ||
899 | if (hold_sem) | |
900 | up(&isec->sem); | |
901 | return rc; | |
902 | } | |
903 | ||
904 | /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */ | |
905 | static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) | |
906 | { | |
907 | u32 perm = 0; | |
908 | ||
909 | switch (sig) { | |
910 | case SIGCHLD: | |
911 | /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */ | |
912 | perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD; | |
913 | break; | |
914 | case SIGKILL: | |
915 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ | |
916 | perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL; | |
917 | break; | |
918 | case SIGSTOP: | |
919 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ | |
920 | perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP; | |
921 | break; | |
922 | default: | |
923 | /* All other signals. */ | |
924 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL; | |
925 | break; | |
926 | } | |
927 | ||
928 | return perm; | |
929 | } | |
930 | ||
931 | /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks, | |
932 | fork check, ptrace check, etc. */ | |
933 | static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1, | |
934 | struct task_struct *tsk2, | |
935 | u32 perms) | |
936 | { | |
937 | struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2; | |
938 | ||
939 | tsec1 = tsk1->security; | |
940 | tsec2 = tsk2->security; | |
941 | return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid, | |
942 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); | |
943 | } | |
944 | ||
945 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ | |
946 | static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
947 | int cap) | |
948 | { | |
949 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
950 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
951 | ||
952 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
953 | ||
954 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP); | |
955 | ad.tsk = tsk; | |
956 | ad.u.cap = cap; | |
957 | ||
958 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, | |
959 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad); | |
960 | } | |
961 | ||
962 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */ | |
963 | static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
964 | u32 perms) | |
965 | { | |
966 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
967 | ||
968 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
969 | ||
970 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, | |
971 | SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL); | |
972 | } | |
973 | ||
974 | /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode. | |
975 | The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit | |
976 | data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */ | |
977 | static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
978 | struct inode *inode, | |
979 | u32 perms, | |
980 | struct avc_audit_data *adp) | |
981 | { | |
982 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
983 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
984 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
985 | ||
986 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
987 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
988 | ||
989 | if (!adp) { | |
990 | adp = &ad; | |
991 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
992 | ad.u.fs.inode = inode; | |
993 | } | |
994 | ||
995 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); | |
996 | } | |
997 | ||
998 | /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing | |
999 | the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the | |
1000 | pathname if needed. */ | |
1001 | static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1002 | struct vfsmount *mnt, | |
1003 | struct dentry *dentry, | |
1004 | u32 av) | |
1005 | { | |
1006 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
1007 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1008 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1009 | ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt; | |
1010 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1011 | return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad); | |
1012 | } | |
1013 | ||
1014 | /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to | |
1015 | access an inode in a given way. Check access to the | |
1016 | descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to | |
1017 | check a particular permission to the file. | |
1018 | Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it | |
1019 | has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then | |
1020 | access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases | |
1021 | where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ | |
1022 | static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1023 | struct file *file, | |
1024 | u32 av) | |
1025 | { | |
1026 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; | |
1027 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; | |
1028 | struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt; | |
1029 | struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry; | |
1030 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
1031 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1032 | int rc; | |
1033 | ||
1034 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1035 | ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt; | |
1036 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1037 | ||
1038 | if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) { | |
1039 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid, | |
1040 | SECCLASS_FD, | |
1041 | FD__USE, | |
1042 | &ad); | |
1043 | if (rc) | |
1044 | return rc; | |
1045 | } | |
1046 | ||
1047 | /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ | |
1048 | if (av) | |
1049 | return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad); | |
1050 | ||
1051 | return 0; | |
1052 | } | |
1053 | ||
1054 | /* Check whether a task can create a file. */ | |
1055 | static int may_create(struct inode *dir, | |
1056 | struct dentry *dentry, | |
1057 | u16 tclass) | |
1058 | { | |
1059 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1060 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; | |
1061 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
1062 | u32 newsid; | |
1063 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1064 | int rc; | |
1065 | ||
1066 | tsec = current->security; | |
1067 | dsec = dir->i_security; | |
1068 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; | |
1069 | ||
1070 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1071 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1072 | ||
1073 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, | |
1074 | DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, | |
1075 | &ad); | |
1076 | if (rc) | |
1077 | return rc; | |
1078 | ||
1079 | if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { | |
1080 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; | |
1081 | } else { | |
1082 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass, | |
1083 | &newsid); | |
1084 | if (rc) | |
1085 | return rc; | |
1086 | } | |
1087 | ||
1088 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); | |
1089 | if (rc) | |
1090 | return rc; | |
1091 | ||
1092 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid, | |
1093 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
1094 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
1095 | } | |
1096 | ||
1097 | #define MAY_LINK 0 | |
1098 | #define MAY_UNLINK 1 | |
1099 | #define MAY_RMDIR 2 | |
1100 | ||
1101 | /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */ | |
1102 | static int may_link(struct inode *dir, | |
1103 | struct dentry *dentry, | |
1104 | int kind) | |
1105 | ||
1106 | { | |
1107 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1108 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; | |
1109 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1110 | u32 av; | |
1111 | int rc; | |
1112 | ||
1113 | tsec = current->security; | |
1114 | dsec = dir->i_security; | |
1115 | isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security; | |
1116 | ||
1117 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1118 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1119 | ||
1120 | av = DIR__SEARCH; | |
1121 | av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); | |
1122 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); | |
1123 | if (rc) | |
1124 | return rc; | |
1125 | ||
1126 | switch (kind) { | |
1127 | case MAY_LINK: | |
1128 | av = FILE__LINK; | |
1129 | break; | |
1130 | case MAY_UNLINK: | |
1131 | av = FILE__UNLINK; | |
1132 | break; | |
1133 | case MAY_RMDIR: | |
1134 | av = DIR__RMDIR; | |
1135 | break; | |
1136 | default: | |
1137 | printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind); | |
1138 | return 0; | |
1139 | } | |
1140 | ||
1141 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); | |
1142 | return rc; | |
1143 | } | |
1144 | ||
1145 | static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, | |
1146 | struct dentry *old_dentry, | |
1147 | struct inode *new_dir, | |
1148 | struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
1149 | { | |
1150 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1151 | struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; | |
1152 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1153 | u32 av; | |
1154 | int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; | |
1155 | int rc; | |
1156 | ||
1157 | tsec = current->security; | |
1158 | old_dsec = old_dir->i_security; | |
1159 | old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security; | |
1160 | old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); | |
1161 | new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; | |
1162 | ||
1163 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1164 | ||
1165 | ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry; | |
1166 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, | |
1167 | DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); | |
1168 | if (rc) | |
1169 | return rc; | |
1170 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid, | |
1171 | old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); | |
1172 | if (rc) | |
1173 | return rc; | |
1174 | if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { | |
1175 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid, | |
1176 | old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); | |
1177 | if (rc) | |
1178 | return rc; | |
1179 | } | |
1180 | ||
1181 | ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry; | |
1182 | av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; | |
1183 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) | |
1184 | av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; | |
1185 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); | |
1186 | if (rc) | |
1187 | return rc; | |
1188 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) { | |
1189 | new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security; | |
1190 | new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); | |
1191 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid, | |
1192 | new_isec->sclass, | |
1193 | (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); | |
1194 | if (rc) | |
1195 | return rc; | |
1196 | } | |
1197 | ||
1198 | return 0; | |
1199 | } | |
1200 | ||
1201 | /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */ | |
1202 | static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1203 | struct super_block *sb, | |
1204 | u32 perms, | |
1205 | struct avc_audit_data *ad) | |
1206 | { | |
1207 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1208 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
1209 | ||
1210 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
1211 | sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
1212 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
1213 | perms, ad); | |
1214 | } | |
1215 | ||
1216 | /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ | |
1217 | static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) | |
1218 | { | |
1219 | u32 av = 0; | |
1220 | ||
1221 | if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) { | |
1222 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) | |
1223 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; | |
1224 | if (mask & MAY_READ) | |
1225 | av |= FILE__READ; | |
1226 | ||
1227 | if (mask & MAY_APPEND) | |
1228 | av |= FILE__APPEND; | |
1229 | else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) | |
1230 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
1231 | ||
1232 | } else { | |
1233 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) | |
1234 | av |= DIR__SEARCH; | |
1235 | if (mask & MAY_WRITE) | |
1236 | av |= DIR__WRITE; | |
1237 | if (mask & MAY_READ) | |
1238 | av |= DIR__READ; | |
1239 | } | |
1240 | ||
1241 | return av; | |
1242 | } | |
1243 | ||
1244 | /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ | |
1245 | static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) | |
1246 | { | |
1247 | u32 av = 0; | |
1248 | ||
1249 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) | |
1250 | av |= FILE__READ; | |
1251 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { | |
1252 | if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND) | |
1253 | av |= FILE__APPEND; | |
1254 | else | |
1255 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
1256 | } | |
1257 | ||
1258 | return av; | |
1259 | } | |
1260 | ||
1261 | /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */ | |
1262 | static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid) | |
1263 | { | |
1264 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
1265 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
1266 | ||
1267 | if (!sbsec->initialized) { | |
1268 | /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ | |
1269 | return 0; | |
1270 | } | |
1271 | ||
1272 | down(&isec->sem); | |
1273 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
1274 | isec->sid = sid; | |
1275 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
1276 | up(&isec->sem); | |
1277 | return 0; | |
1278 | } | |
1279 | ||
1280 | /* Hook functions begin here. */ | |
1281 | ||
1282 | static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) | |
1283 | { | |
1284 | struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security; | |
1285 | struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security; | |
1286 | int rc; | |
1287 | ||
1288 | rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child); | |
1289 | if (rc) | |
1290 | return rc; | |
1291 | ||
1292 | rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE); | |
1293 | /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */ | |
1294 | if (!rc) | |
1295 | csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid; | |
1296 | return rc; | |
1297 | } | |
1298 | ||
1299 | static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
1300 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1301 | { | |
1302 | int error; | |
1303 | ||
1304 | error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP); | |
1305 | if (error) | |
1306 | return error; | |
1307 | ||
1308 | return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); | |
1309 | } | |
1310 | ||
1311 | static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
1312 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1313 | { | |
1314 | int error; | |
1315 | ||
1316 | error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); | |
1317 | if (error) | |
1318 | return error; | |
1319 | ||
1320 | return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP); | |
1321 | } | |
1322 | ||
1323 | static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
1324 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1325 | { | |
1326 | secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); | |
1327 | } | |
1328 | ||
1329 | static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) | |
1330 | { | |
1331 | int rc; | |
1332 | ||
1333 | rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap); | |
1334 | if (rc) | |
1335 | return rc; | |
1336 | ||
1337 | return task_has_capability(tsk,cap); | |
1338 | } | |
1339 | ||
1340 | static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) | |
1341 | { | |
1342 | int error = 0; | |
1343 | u32 av; | |
1344 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1345 | u32 tsid; | |
1346 | int rc; | |
1347 | ||
1348 | rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op); | |
1349 | if (rc) | |
1350 | return rc; | |
1351 | ||
1352 | tsec = current->security; | |
1353 | ||
1354 | rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ? | |
1355 | SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid); | |
1356 | if (rc) { | |
1357 | /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */ | |
1358 | tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL; | |
1359 | } | |
1360 | ||
1361 | /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating | |
1362 | * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */ | |
1363 | if(op == 001) { | |
1364 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid, | |
1365 | SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL); | |
1366 | } else { | |
1367 | av = 0; | |
1368 | if (op & 004) | |
1369 | av |= FILE__READ; | |
1370 | if (op & 002) | |
1371 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
1372 | if (av) | |
1373 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid, | |
1374 | SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL); | |
1375 | } | |
1376 | ||
1377 | return error; | |
1378 | } | |
1379 | ||
1380 | static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) | |
1381 | { | |
1382 | int rc = 0; | |
1383 | ||
1384 | if (!sb) | |
1385 | return 0; | |
1386 | ||
1387 | switch (cmds) { | |
1388 | case Q_SYNC: | |
1389 | case Q_QUOTAON: | |
1390 | case Q_QUOTAOFF: | |
1391 | case Q_SETINFO: | |
1392 | case Q_SETQUOTA: | |
1393 | rc = superblock_has_perm(current, | |
1394 | sb, | |
1395 | FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL); | |
1396 | break; | |
1397 | case Q_GETFMT: | |
1398 | case Q_GETINFO: | |
1399 | case Q_GETQUOTA: | |
1400 | rc = superblock_has_perm(current, | |
1401 | sb, | |
1402 | FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL); | |
1403 | break; | |
1404 | default: | |
1405 | rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */ | |
1406 | break; | |
1407 | } | |
1408 | return rc; | |
1409 | } | |
1410 | ||
1411 | static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) | |
1412 | { | |
1413 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON); | |
1414 | } | |
1415 | ||
1416 | static int selinux_syslog(int type) | |
1417 | { | |
1418 | int rc; | |
1419 | ||
1420 | rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type); | |
1421 | if (rc) | |
1422 | return rc; | |
1423 | ||
1424 | switch (type) { | |
1425 | case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */ | |
1426 | case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */ | |
1427 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ); | |
1428 | break; | |
1429 | case 6: /* Disable logging to console */ | |
1430 | case 7: /* Enable logging to console */ | |
1431 | case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */ | |
1432 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE); | |
1433 | break; | |
1434 | case 0: /* Close log */ | |
1435 | case 1: /* Open log */ | |
1436 | case 2: /* Read from log */ | |
1437 | case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */ | |
1438 | case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */ | |
1439 | default: | |
1440 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD); | |
1441 | break; | |
1442 | } | |
1443 | return rc; | |
1444 | } | |
1445 | ||
1446 | /* | |
1447 | * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual | |
1448 | * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to | |
1449 | * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. | |
1450 | * | |
1451 | * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0 | |
1452 | * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if | |
1453 | * the capability is granted. | |
1454 | * | |
1455 | * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all | |
1456 | * processes that allocate mappings. | |
1457 | */ | |
1458 | static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages) | |
1459 | { | |
1460 | int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; | |
1461 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
1462 | ||
1463 | rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); | |
1464 | if (rc == 0) | |
1465 | rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, | |
1466 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, | |
1467 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), | |
1468 | NULL); | |
1469 | ||
1470 | if (rc == 0) | |
1471 | cap_sys_admin = 1; | |
1472 | ||
1473 | return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin); | |
1474 | } | |
1475 | ||
1476 | /* binprm security operations */ | |
1477 | ||
1478 | static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1479 | { | |
1480 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1481 | ||
1482 | bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1483 | if (!bsec) | |
1484 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1485 | ||
1486 | bsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
1487 | bsec->bprm = bprm; | |
1488 | bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
1489 | bsec->set = 0; | |
1490 | ||
1491 | bprm->security = bsec; | |
1492 | return 0; | |
1493 | } | |
1494 | ||
1495 | static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1496 | { | |
1497 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1498 | struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode; | |
1499 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
1500 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1501 | u32 newsid; | |
1502 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1503 | int rc; | |
1504 | ||
1505 | rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm); | |
1506 | if (rc) | |
1507 | return rc; | |
1508 | ||
1509 | bsec = bprm->security; | |
1510 | ||
1511 | if (bsec->set) | |
1512 | return 0; | |
1513 | ||
1514 | tsec = current->security; | |
1515 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
1516 | ||
1517 | /* Default to the current task SID. */ | |
1518 | bsec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
1519 | ||
1520 | /* Reset create SID on execve. */ | |
1521 | tsec->create_sid = 0; | |
1522 | ||
1523 | if (tsec->exec_sid) { | |
1524 | newsid = tsec->exec_sid; | |
1525 | /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ | |
1526 | tsec->exec_sid = 0; | |
1527 | } else { | |
1528 | /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ | |
1529 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid, | |
1530 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid); | |
1531 | if (rc) | |
1532 | return rc; | |
1533 | } | |
1534 | ||
1535 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1536 | ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt; | |
1537 | ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry; | |
1538 | ||
1539 | if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) | |
1540 | newsid = tsec->sid; | |
1541 | ||
1542 | if (tsec->sid == newsid) { | |
1543 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, | |
1544 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); | |
1545 | if (rc) | |
1546 | return rc; | |
1547 | } else { | |
1548 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ | |
1549 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, | |
1550 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); | |
1551 | if (rc) | |
1552 | return rc; | |
1553 | ||
1554 | rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid, | |
1555 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); | |
1556 | if (rc) | |
1557 | return rc; | |
1558 | ||
1559 | /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ | |
1560 | current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; | |
1561 | ||
1562 | /* Set the security field to the new SID. */ | |
1563 | bsec->sid = newsid; | |
1564 | } | |
1565 | ||
1566 | bsec->set = 1; | |
1567 | return 0; | |
1568 | } | |
1569 | ||
1570 | static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1571 | { | |
1572 | return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm); | |
1573 | } | |
1574 | ||
1575 | ||
1576 | static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1577 | { | |
1578 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
1579 | int atsecure = 0; | |
1580 | ||
1581 | if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) { | |
1582 | /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless | |
1583 | the noatsecure permission is granted between | |
1584 | the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ | |
1585 | atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, | |
1586 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1587 | PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); | |
1588 | } | |
1589 | ||
1590 | return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm)); | |
1591 | } | |
1592 | ||
1593 | static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1594 | { | |
1595 | kfree(bprm->security); | |
1596 | bprm->security = NULL; | |
1597 | } | |
1598 | ||
1599 | extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount; | |
1600 | extern struct dentry *selinux_null; | |
1601 | ||
1602 | /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ | |
1603 | static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files) | |
1604 | { | |
1605 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1606 | struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; | |
1607 | struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty; | |
1608 | struct fdtable *fdt; | |
1609 | long j = -1; | |
1610 | ||
1611 | if (tty) { | |
1612 | file_list_lock(); | |
1613 | file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list); | |
1614 | if (file) { | |
1615 | /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. | |
1616 | Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather | |
1617 | than using file_has_perm, as this particular open | |
1618 | file may belong to another process and we are only | |
1619 | interested in the inode-based check here. */ | |
1620 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; | |
1621 | if (inode_has_perm(current, inode, | |
1622 | FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) { | |
1623 | /* Reset controlling tty. */ | |
1624 | current->signal->tty = NULL; | |
1625 | current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0; | |
1626 | } | |
1627 | } | |
1628 | file_list_unlock(); | |
1629 | } | |
1630 | ||
1631 | /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ | |
1632 | ||
1633 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1634 | ||
1635 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); | |
1636 | for (;;) { | |
1637 | unsigned long set, i; | |
1638 | int fd; | |
1639 | ||
1640 | j++; | |
1641 | i = j * __NFDBITS; | |
1642 | fdt = files_fdtable(files); | |
1643 | if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset) | |
1644 | break; | |
1645 | set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j]; | |
1646 | if (!set) | |
1647 | continue; | |
1648 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); | |
1649 | for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) { | |
1650 | if (set & 1) { | |
1651 | file = fget(i); | |
1652 | if (!file) | |
1653 | continue; | |
1654 | if (file_has_perm(current, | |
1655 | file, | |
1656 | file_to_av(file))) { | |
1657 | sys_close(i); | |
1658 | fd = get_unused_fd(); | |
1659 | if (fd != i) { | |
1660 | if (fd >= 0) | |
1661 | put_unused_fd(fd); | |
1662 | fput(file); | |
1663 | continue; | |
1664 | } | |
1665 | if (devnull) { | |
1666 | get_file(devnull); | |
1667 | } else { | |
1668 | devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR); | |
1669 | if (!devnull) { | |
1670 | put_unused_fd(fd); | |
1671 | fput(file); | |
1672 | continue; | |
1673 | } | |
1674 | } | |
1675 | fd_install(fd, devnull); | |
1676 | } | |
1677 | fput(file); | |
1678 | } | |
1679 | } | |
1680 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); | |
1681 | ||
1682 | } | |
1683 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); | |
1684 | } | |
1685 | ||
1686 | static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) | |
1687 | { | |
1688 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1689 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1690 | u32 sid; | |
1691 | int rc; | |
1692 | ||
1693 | secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe); | |
1694 | ||
1695 | tsec = current->security; | |
1696 | ||
1697 | bsec = bprm->security; | |
1698 | sid = bsec->sid; | |
1699 | ||
1700 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid; | |
1701 | bsec->unsafe = 0; | |
1702 | if (tsec->sid != sid) { | |
1703 | /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID | |
1704 | unchanged and kill. */ | |
1705 | if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { | |
1706 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1707 | PROCESS__SHARE, NULL); | |
1708 | if (rc) { | |
1709 | bsec->unsafe = 1; | |
1710 | return; | |
1711 | } | |
1712 | } | |
1713 | ||
1714 | /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. | |
1715 | Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */ | |
1716 | if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { | |
1717 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, | |
1718 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, | |
1719 | NULL); | |
1720 | if (rc) { | |
1721 | bsec->unsafe = 1; | |
1722 | return; | |
1723 | } | |
1724 | } | |
1725 | tsec->sid = sid; | |
1726 | } | |
1727 | } | |
1728 | ||
1729 | /* | |
1730 | * called after apply_creds without the task lock held | |
1731 | */ | |
1732 | static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1733 | { | |
1734 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1735 | struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; | |
1736 | struct itimerval itimer; | |
1737 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1738 | int rc, i; | |
1739 | ||
1740 | tsec = current->security; | |
1741 | bsec = bprm->security; | |
1742 | ||
1743 | if (bsec->unsafe) { | |
1744 | force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current); | |
1745 | return; | |
1746 | } | |
1747 | if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid) | |
1748 | return; | |
1749 | ||
1750 | /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ | |
1751 | flush_unauthorized_files(current->files); | |
1752 | ||
1753 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state | |
1754 | from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid | |
1755 | subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock | |
1756 | signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has | |
1757 | been updated so that any kill done after the flush | |
1758 | will be checked against the new SID. */ | |
1759 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1760 | PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); | |
1761 | if (rc) { | |
1762 | memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer); | |
1763 | for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) | |
1764 | do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL); | |
1765 | flush_signals(current); | |
1766 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); | |
1767 | flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); | |
1768 | sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); | |
1769 | recalc_sigpending(); | |
1770 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); | |
1771 | } | |
1772 | ||
1773 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits | |
1774 | from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to | |
1775 | the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init | |
1776 | task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits | |
1777 | (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit | |
1778 | check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into | |
1779 | the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher | |
1780 | than the default soft limit for cases where the default | |
1781 | is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or | |
1782 | RLIMIT_STACK.*/ | |
1783 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1784 | PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); | |
1785 | if (rc) { | |
1786 | for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { | |
1787 | rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; | |
1788 | initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i; | |
1789 | rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur); | |
1790 | } | |
1791 | if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) { | |
1792 | /* | |
1793 | * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations | |
1794 | * to be refigured. | |
1795 | */ | |
1796 | current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1); | |
1797 | } | |
1798 | } | |
1799 | ||
1800 | /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can | |
1801 | recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */ | |
1802 | wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit); | |
1803 | } | |
1804 | ||
1805 | /* superblock security operations */ | |
1806 | ||
1807 | static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
1808 | { | |
1809 | return superblock_alloc_security(sb); | |
1810 | } | |
1811 | ||
1812 | static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
1813 | { | |
1814 | superblock_free_security(sb); | |
1815 | } | |
1816 | ||
1817 | static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen) | |
1818 | { | |
1819 | if (plen > olen) | |
1820 | return 0; | |
1821 | ||
1822 | return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen); | |
1823 | } | |
1824 | ||
1825 | static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len) | |
1826 | { | |
1827 | return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) || | |
1828 | match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) || | |
1829 | match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len)); | |
1830 | } | |
1831 | ||
1832 | static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len) | |
1833 | { | |
1834 | if (!*first) { | |
1835 | **to = ','; | |
1836 | *to += 1; | |
1837 | } | |
1838 | else | |
1839 | *first = 0; | |
1840 | memcpy(*to, from, len); | |
1841 | *to += len; | |
1842 | } | |
1843 | ||
1844 | static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy) | |
1845 | { | |
1846 | int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0; | |
1847 | char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end; | |
1848 | char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec; | |
1849 | ||
1850 | in_curr = orig; | |
1851 | sec_curr = copy; | |
1852 | ||
1853 | /* Binary mount data: just copy */ | |
1854 | if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) { | |
1855 | copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr); | |
1856 | goto out; | |
1857 | } | |
1858 | ||
1859 | nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); | |
1860 | if (!nosec) { | |
1861 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
1862 | goto out; | |
1863 | } | |
1864 | ||
1865 | nosec_save = nosec; | |
1866 | fnosec = fsec = 1; | |
1867 | in_save = in_end = orig; | |
1868 | ||
1869 | do { | |
1870 | if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') { | |
1871 | int len = in_end - in_curr; | |
1872 | ||
1873 | if (selinux_option(in_curr, len)) | |
1874 | take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len); | |
1875 | else | |
1876 | take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len); | |
1877 | ||
1878 | in_curr = in_end + 1; | |
1879 | } | |
1880 | } while (*in_end++); | |
1881 | ||
1882 | strcpy(in_save, nosec_save); | |
1883 | free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save); | |
1884 | out: | |
1885 | return rc; | |
1886 | } | |
1887 | ||
1888 | static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |
1889 | { | |
1890 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1891 | int rc; | |
1892 | ||
1893 | rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data); | |
1894 | if (rc) | |
1895 | return rc; | |
1896 | ||
1897 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1898 | ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root; | |
1899 | return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); | |
1900 | } | |
1901 | ||
1902 | static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb) | |
1903 | { | |
1904 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1905 | ||
1906 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1907 | ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root; | |
1908 | return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); | |
1909 | } | |
1910 | ||
1911 | static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name, | |
1912 | struct nameidata *nd, | |
1913 | char * type, | |
1914 | unsigned long flags, | |
1915 | void * data) | |
1916 | { | |
1917 | int rc; | |
1918 | ||
1919 | rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data); | |
1920 | if (rc) | |
1921 | return rc; | |
1922 | ||
1923 | if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) | |
1924 | return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb, | |
1925 | FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL); | |
1926 | else | |
1927 | return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry, | |
1928 | FILE__MOUNTON); | |
1929 | } | |
1930 | ||
1931 | static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) | |
1932 | { | |
1933 | int rc; | |
1934 | ||
1935 | rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags); | |
1936 | if (rc) | |
1937 | return rc; | |
1938 | ||
1939 | return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb, | |
1940 | FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL); | |
1941 | } | |
1942 | ||
1943 | /* inode security operations */ | |
1944 | ||
1945 | static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) | |
1946 | { | |
1947 | return inode_alloc_security(inode); | |
1948 | } | |
1949 | ||
1950 | static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) | |
1951 | { | |
1952 | inode_free_security(inode); | |
1953 | } | |
1954 | ||
1955 | static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, | |
1956 | char **name, void **value, | |
1957 | size_t *len) | |
1958 | { | |
1959 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1960 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; | |
1961 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
1962 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
1963 | u32 newsid, clen; | |
1964 | int rc; | |
1965 | char *namep = NULL, *context; | |
1966 | ||
1967 | tsec = current->security; | |
1968 | dsec = dir->i_security; | |
1969 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; | |
1970 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
1971 | ||
1972 | if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { | |
1973 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; | |
1974 | } else { | |
1975 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, | |
1976 | inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), | |
1977 | &newsid); | |
1978 | if (rc) { | |
1979 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: " | |
1980 | "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s " | |
1981 | "ino=%ld)\n", | |
1982 | __FUNCTION__, | |
1983 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); | |
1984 | return rc; | |
1985 | } | |
1986 | } | |
1987 | ||
1988 | inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid); | |
1989 | ||
1990 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) | |
1991 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
1992 | ||
1993 | if (name) { | |
1994 | namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1995 | if (!namep) | |
1996 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1997 | *name = namep; | |
1998 | } | |
1999 | ||
2000 | if (value && len) { | |
2001 | rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen); | |
2002 | if (rc) { | |
2003 | kfree(namep); | |
2004 | return rc; | |
2005 | } | |
2006 | *value = context; | |
2007 | *len = clen; | |
2008 | } | |
2009 | ||
2010 | return 0; | |
2011 | } | |
2012 | ||
2013 | static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask) | |
2014 | { | |
2015 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); | |
2016 | } | |
2017 | ||
2018 | static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
2019 | { | |
2020 | int rc; | |
2021 | ||
2022 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry); | |
2023 | if (rc) | |
2024 | return rc; | |
2025 | return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); | |
2026 | } | |
2027 | ||
2028 | static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) | |
2029 | { | |
2030 | int rc; | |
2031 | ||
2032 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry); | |
2033 | if (rc) | |
2034 | return rc; | |
2035 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); | |
2036 | } | |
2037 | ||
2038 | static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) | |
2039 | { | |
2040 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE); | |
2041 | } | |
2042 | ||
2043 | static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask) | |
2044 | { | |
2045 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR); | |
2046 | } | |
2047 | ||
2048 | static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) | |
2049 | { | |
2050 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR); | |
2051 | } | |
2052 | ||
2053 | static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) | |
2054 | { | |
2055 | int rc; | |
2056 | ||
2057 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev); | |
2058 | if (rc) | |
2059 | return rc; | |
2060 | ||
2061 | return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); | |
2062 | } | |
2063 | ||
2064 | static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, | |
2065 | struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
2066 | { | |
2067 | return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry); | |
2068 | } | |
2069 | ||
2070 | static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) | |
2071 | { | |
2072 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); | |
2073 | } | |
2074 | ||
2075 | static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata) | |
2076 | { | |
2077 | int rc; | |
2078 | ||
2079 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata); | |
2080 | if (rc) | |
2081 | return rc; | |
2082 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); | |
2083 | } | |
2084 | ||
2085 | static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, | |
2086 | struct nameidata *nd) | |
2087 | { | |
2088 | int rc; | |
2089 | ||
2090 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd); | |
2091 | if (rc) | |
2092 | return rc; | |
2093 | ||
2094 | if (!mask) { | |
2095 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ | |
2096 | return 0; | |
2097 | } | |
2098 | ||
2099 | return inode_has_perm(current, inode, | |
2100 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL); | |
2101 | } | |
2102 | ||
2103 | static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) | |
2104 | { | |
2105 | int rc; | |
2106 | ||
2107 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr); | |
2108 | if (rc) | |
2109 | return rc; | |
2110 | ||
2111 | if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) | |
2112 | return 0; | |
2113 | ||
2114 | if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | | |
2115 | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET)) | |
2116 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2117 | ||
2118 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE); | |
2119 | } | |
2120 | ||
2121 | static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) | |
2122 | { | |
2123 | return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2124 | } | |
2125 | ||
2126 | static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
2127 | { | |
2128 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
2129 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
2130 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2131 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
2132 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
2133 | u32 newsid; | |
2134 | int rc = 0; | |
2135 | ||
2136 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { | |
2137 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
2138 | sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) && | |
2139 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { | |
2140 | /* A different attribute in the security namespace. | |
2141 | Restrict to administrator. */ | |
2142 | return -EPERM; | |
2143 | } | |
2144 | ||
2145 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the | |
2146 | ordinary setattr permission. */ | |
2147 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2148 | } | |
2149 | ||
2150 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
2151 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) | |
2152 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2153 | ||
2154 | if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) | |
2155 | return -EPERM; | |
2156 | ||
2157 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
2158 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
2159 | ||
2160 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, | |
2161 | FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); | |
2162 | if (rc) | |
2163 | return rc; | |
2164 | ||
2165 | rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); | |
2166 | if (rc) | |
2167 | return rc; | |
2168 | ||
2169 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass, | |
2170 | FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); | |
2171 | if (rc) | |
2172 | return rc; | |
2173 | ||
2174 | rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid, | |
2175 | isec->sclass); | |
2176 | if (rc) | |
2177 | return rc; | |
2178 | ||
2179 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, | |
2180 | sbsec->sid, | |
2181 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
2182 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, | |
2183 | &ad); | |
2184 | } | |
2185 | ||
2186 | static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, | |
2187 | void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
2188 | { | |
2189 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
2190 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2191 | u32 newsid; | |
2192 | int rc; | |
2193 | ||
2194 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { | |
2195 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */ | |
2196 | return; | |
2197 | } | |
2198 | ||
2199 | rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); | |
2200 | if (rc) { | |
2201 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context " | |
2202 | "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc); | |
2203 | return; | |
2204 | } | |
2205 | ||
2206 | isec->sid = newsid; | |
2207 | return; | |
2208 | } | |
2209 | ||
2210 | static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) | |
2211 | { | |
2212 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2213 | } | |
2214 | ||
2215 | static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry) | |
2216 | { | |
2217 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2218 | } | |
2219 | ||
2220 | static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) | |
2221 | { | |
2222 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { | |
2223 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
2224 | sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) && | |
2225 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { | |
2226 | /* A different attribute in the security namespace. | |
2227 | Restrict to administrator. */ | |
2228 | return -EPERM; | |
2229 | } | |
2230 | ||
2231 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the | |
2232 | ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate | |
2233 | permission for removexattr. */ | |
2234 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2235 | } | |
2236 | ||
2237 | /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. | |
2238 | You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ | |
2239 | return -EACCES; | |
2240 | } | |
2241 | ||
2242 | /* | |
2243 | * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the | |
2244 | * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to | |
2245 | * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user. | |
2246 | * | |
2247 | * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. | |
2248 | */ | |
2249 | static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) | |
2250 | { | |
2251 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2252 | char *context; | |
2253 | unsigned len; | |
2254 | int rc; | |
2255 | ||
2256 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) { | |
2257 | rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2258 | goto out; | |
2259 | } | |
2260 | ||
2261 | rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len); | |
2262 | if (rc) | |
2263 | goto out; | |
2264 | ||
2265 | /* Probe for required buffer size */ | |
2266 | if (!buffer || !size) { | |
2267 | rc = len; | |
2268 | goto out_free; | |
2269 | } | |
2270 | ||
2271 | if (size < len) { | |
2272 | rc = -ERANGE; | |
2273 | goto out_free; | |
2274 | } | |
2275 | ||
2276 | if (err > 0) { | |
2277 | if ((len == err) && !(memcmp(context, buffer, len))) { | |
2278 | /* Don't need to canonicalize value */ | |
2279 | rc = err; | |
2280 | goto out_free; | |
2281 | } | |
2282 | memset(buffer, 0, size); | |
2283 | } | |
2284 | memcpy(buffer, context, len); | |
2285 | rc = len; | |
2286 | out_free: | |
2287 | kfree(context); | |
2288 | out: | |
2289 | return rc; | |
2290 | } | |
2291 | ||
2292 | static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, | |
2293 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
2294 | { | |
2295 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2296 | u32 newsid; | |
2297 | int rc; | |
2298 | ||
2299 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) | |
2300 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2301 | ||
2302 | if (!value || !size) | |
2303 | return -EACCES; | |
2304 | ||
2305 | rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid); | |
2306 | if (rc) | |
2307 | return rc; | |
2308 | ||
2309 | isec->sid = newsid; | |
2310 | return 0; | |
2311 | } | |
2312 | ||
2313 | static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) | |
2314 | { | |
2315 | const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); | |
2316 | if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) | |
2317 | memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len); | |
2318 | return len; | |
2319 | } | |
2320 | ||
2321 | /* file security operations */ | |
2322 | ||
2323 | static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) | |
2324 | { | |
2325 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; | |
2326 | ||
2327 | if (!mask) { | |
2328 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ | |
2329 | return 0; | |
2330 | } | |
2331 | ||
2332 | /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ | |
2333 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) | |
2334 | mask |= MAY_APPEND; | |
2335 | ||
2336 | return file_has_perm(current, file, | |
2337 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); | |
2338 | } | |
2339 | ||
2340 | static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) | |
2341 | { | |
2342 | return file_alloc_security(file); | |
2343 | } | |
2344 | ||
2345 | static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file) | |
2346 | { | |
2347 | file_free_security(file); | |
2348 | } | |
2349 | ||
2350 | static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, | |
2351 | unsigned long arg) | |
2352 | { | |
2353 | int error = 0; | |
2354 | ||
2355 | switch (cmd) { | |
2356 | case FIONREAD: | |
2357 | /* fall through */ | |
2358 | case FIBMAP: | |
2359 | /* fall through */ | |
2360 | case FIGETBSZ: | |
2361 | /* fall through */ | |
2362 | case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS: | |
2363 | /* fall through */ | |
2364 | case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION: | |
2365 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2366 | break; | |
2367 | ||
2368 | case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS: | |
2369 | /* fall through */ | |
2370 | case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION: | |
2371 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2372 | break; | |
2373 | ||
2374 | /* sys_ioctl() checks */ | |
2375 | case FIONBIO: | |
2376 | /* fall through */ | |
2377 | case FIOASYNC: | |
2378 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0); | |
2379 | break; | |
2380 | ||
2381 | case KDSKBENT: | |
2382 | case KDSKBSENT: | |
2383 | error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG); | |
2384 | break; | |
2385 | ||
2386 | /* default case assumes that the command will go | |
2387 | * to the file's ioctl() function. | |
2388 | */ | |
2389 | default: | |
2390 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL); | |
2391 | ||
2392 | } | |
2393 | return error; | |
2394 | } | |
2395 | ||
2396 | static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) | |
2397 | { | |
2398 | #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32 | |
2399 | if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { | |
2400 | /* | |
2401 | * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a | |
2402 | * private file mapping that will also be writable. | |
2403 | * This has an additional check. | |
2404 | */ | |
2405 | int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM); | |
2406 | if (rc) | |
2407 | return rc; | |
2408 | } | |
2409 | #endif | |
2410 | ||
2411 | if (file) { | |
2412 | /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ | |
2413 | u32 av = FILE__READ; | |
2414 | ||
2415 | /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ | |
2416 | if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) | |
2417 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
2418 | ||
2419 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) | |
2420 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; | |
2421 | ||
2422 | return file_has_perm(current, file, av); | |
2423 | } | |
2424 | return 0; | |
2425 | } | |
2426 | ||
2427 | static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, | |
2428 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) | |
2429 | { | |
2430 | int rc; | |
2431 | ||
2432 | rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags); | |
2433 | if (rc) | |
2434 | return rc; | |
2435 | ||
2436 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) | |
2437 | prot = reqprot; | |
2438 | ||
2439 | return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, | |
2440 | (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); | |
2441 | } | |
2442 | ||
2443 | static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, | |
2444 | unsigned long reqprot, | |
2445 | unsigned long prot) | |
2446 | { | |
2447 | int rc; | |
2448 | ||
2449 | rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); | |
2450 | if (rc) | |
2451 | return rc; | |
2452 | ||
2453 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) | |
2454 | prot = reqprot; | |
2455 | ||
2456 | #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32 | |
2457 | if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { | |
2458 | rc = 0; | |
2459 | if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && | |
2460 | vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { | |
2461 | rc = task_has_perm(current, current, | |
2462 | PROCESS__EXECHEAP); | |
2463 | } else if (!vma->vm_file && | |
2464 | vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && | |
2465 | vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) { | |
2466 | rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK); | |
2467 | } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { | |
2468 | /* | |
2469 | * We are making executable a file mapping that has | |
2470 | * had some COW done. Since pages might have been | |
2471 | * written, check ability to execute the possibly | |
2472 | * modified content. This typically should only | |
2473 | * occur for text relocations. | |
2474 | */ | |
2475 | rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file, | |
2476 | FILE__EXECMOD); | |
2477 | } | |
2478 | if (rc) | |
2479 | return rc; | |
2480 | } | |
2481 | #endif | |
2482 | ||
2483 | return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); | |
2484 | } | |
2485 | ||
2486 | static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) | |
2487 | { | |
2488 | return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK); | |
2489 | } | |
2490 | ||
2491 | static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, | |
2492 | unsigned long arg) | |
2493 | { | |
2494 | int err = 0; | |
2495 | ||
2496 | switch (cmd) { | |
2497 | case F_SETFL: | |
2498 | if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) { | |
2499 | err = -EINVAL; | |
2500 | break; | |
2501 | } | |
2502 | ||
2503 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) { | |
2504 | err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE); | |
2505 | break; | |
2506 | } | |
2507 | /* fall through */ | |
2508 | case F_SETOWN: | |
2509 | case F_SETSIG: | |
2510 | case F_GETFL: | |
2511 | case F_GETOWN: | |
2512 | case F_GETSIG: | |
2513 | /* Just check FD__USE permission */ | |
2514 | err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0); | |
2515 | break; | |
2516 | case F_GETLK: | |
2517 | case F_SETLK: | |
2518 | case F_SETLKW: | |
2519 | #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 | |
2520 | case F_GETLK64: | |
2521 | case F_SETLK64: | |
2522 | case F_SETLKW64: | |
2523 | #endif | |
2524 | if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) { | |
2525 | err = -EINVAL; | |
2526 | break; | |
2527 | } | |
2528 | err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK); | |
2529 | break; | |
2530 | } | |
2531 | ||
2532 | return err; | |
2533 | } | |
2534 | ||
2535 | static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) | |
2536 | { | |
2537 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2538 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; | |
2539 | ||
2540 | tsec = current->security; | |
2541 | fsec = file->f_security; | |
2542 | fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid; | |
2543 | ||
2544 | return 0; | |
2545 | } | |
2546 | ||
2547 | static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
2548 | struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) | |
2549 | { | |
2550 | struct file *file; | |
2551 | u32 perm; | |
2552 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2553 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; | |
2554 | ||
2555 | /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ | |
2556 | file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner)); | |
2557 | ||
2558 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
2559 | fsec = file->f_security; | |
2560 | ||
2561 | if (!signum) | |
2562 | perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */ | |
2563 | else | |
2564 | perm = signal_to_av(signum); | |
2565 | ||
2566 | return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid, | |
2567 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); | |
2568 | } | |
2569 | ||
2570 | static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) | |
2571 | { | |
2572 | return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file)); | |
2573 | } | |
2574 | ||
2575 | /* task security operations */ | |
2576 | ||
2577 | static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) | |
2578 | { | |
2579 | int rc; | |
2580 | ||
2581 | rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags); | |
2582 | if (rc) | |
2583 | return rc; | |
2584 | ||
2585 | return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK); | |
2586 | } | |
2587 | ||
2588 | static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
2589 | { | |
2590 | struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2; | |
2591 | int rc; | |
2592 | ||
2593 | tsec1 = current->security; | |
2594 | ||
2595 | rc = task_alloc_security(tsk); | |
2596 | if (rc) | |
2597 | return rc; | |
2598 | tsec2 = tsk->security; | |
2599 | ||
2600 | tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid; | |
2601 | tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid; | |
2602 | ||
2603 | /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */ | |
2604 | tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid; | |
2605 | tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid; | |
2606 | ||
2607 | /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any. | |
2608 | This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any | |
2609 | subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */ | |
2610 | tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid; | |
2611 | ||
2612 | return 0; | |
2613 | } | |
2614 | ||
2615 | static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
2616 | { | |
2617 | task_free_security(tsk); | |
2618 | } | |
2619 | ||
2620 | static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) | |
2621 | { | |
2622 | /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and | |
2623 | since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux | |
2624 | identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control | |
2625 | this operation. However, SELinux does control the use | |
2626 | of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the | |
2627 | capable hook. */ | |
2628 | return 0; | |
2629 | } | |
2630 | ||
2631 | static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) | |
2632 | { | |
2633 | return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags); | |
2634 | } | |
2635 | ||
2636 | static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags) | |
2637 | { | |
2638 | /* See the comment for setuid above. */ | |
2639 | return 0; | |
2640 | } | |
2641 | ||
2642 | static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) | |
2643 | { | |
2644 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID); | |
2645 | } | |
2646 | ||
2647 | static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) | |
2648 | { | |
2649 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID); | |
2650 | } | |
2651 | ||
2652 | static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) | |
2653 | { | |
2654 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION); | |
2655 | } | |
2656 | ||
2657 | static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info) | |
2658 | { | |
2659 | /* See the comment for setuid above. */ | |
2660 | return 0; | |
2661 | } | |
2662 | ||
2663 | static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) | |
2664 | { | |
2665 | int rc; | |
2666 | ||
2667 | rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice); | |
2668 | if (rc) | |
2669 | return rc; | |
2670 | ||
2671 | return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); | |
2672 | } | |
2673 | ||
2674 | static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) | |
2675 | { | |
2676 | struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource; | |
2677 | int rc; | |
2678 | ||
2679 | rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim); | |
2680 | if (rc) | |
2681 | return rc; | |
2682 | ||
2683 | /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether | |
2684 | lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can | |
2685 | later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit | |
2686 | upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */ | |
2687 | if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) | |
2688 | return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT); | |
2689 | ||
2690 | return 0; | |
2691 | } | |
2692 | ||
2693 | static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp) | |
2694 | { | |
2695 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); | |
2696 | } | |
2697 | ||
2698 | static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) | |
2699 | { | |
2700 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); | |
2701 | } | |
2702 | ||
2703 | static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig) | |
2704 | { | |
2705 | u32 perm; | |
2706 | int rc; | |
2707 | ||
2708 | rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig); | |
2709 | if (rc) | |
2710 | return rc; | |
2711 | ||
2712 | if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info))) | |
2713 | return 0; | |
2714 | ||
2715 | if (!sig) | |
2716 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ | |
2717 | else | |
2718 | perm = signal_to_av(sig); | |
2719 | ||
2720 | return task_has_perm(current, p, perm); | |
2721 | } | |
2722 | ||
2723 | static int selinux_task_prctl(int option, | |
2724 | unsigned long arg2, | |
2725 | unsigned long arg3, | |
2726 | unsigned long arg4, | |
2727 | unsigned long arg5) | |
2728 | { | |
2729 | /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require | |
2730 | any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify | |
2731 | the state of the current process. */ | |
2732 | return 0; | |
2733 | } | |
2734 | ||
2735 | static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) | |
2736 | { | |
2737 | u32 perm; | |
2738 | ||
2739 | perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal); | |
2740 | ||
2741 | return task_has_perm(p, current, perm); | |
2742 | } | |
2743 | ||
2744 | static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p) | |
2745 | { | |
2746 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2747 | ||
2748 | secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p); | |
2749 | ||
2750 | tsec = p->security; | |
2751 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid; | |
2752 | tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; | |
2753 | return; | |
2754 | } | |
2755 | ||
2756 | static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, | |
2757 | struct inode *inode) | |
2758 | { | |
2759 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security; | |
2760 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2761 | ||
2762 | isec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
2763 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
2764 | return; | |
2765 | } | |
2766 | ||
2767 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK | |
2768 | ||
2769 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ | |
2770 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad) | |
2771 | { | |
2772 | int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; | |
2773 | struct iphdr _iph, *ih; | |
2774 | ||
2775 | offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data; | |
2776 | ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph); | |
2777 | if (ih == NULL) | |
2778 | goto out; | |
2779 | ||
2780 | ihlen = ih->ihl * 4; | |
2781 | if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) | |
2782 | goto out; | |
2783 | ||
2784 | ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; | |
2785 | ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; | |
2786 | ret = 0; | |
2787 | ||
2788 | switch (ih->protocol) { | |
2789 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { | |
2790 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; | |
2791 | ||
2792 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) | |
2793 | break; | |
2794 | ||
2795 | offset += ihlen; | |
2796 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); | |
2797 | if (th == NULL) | |
2798 | break; | |
2799 | ||
2800 | ad->u.net.sport = th->source; | |
2801 | ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; | |
2802 | break; | |
2803 | } | |
2804 | ||
2805 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { | |
2806 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; | |
2807 | ||
2808 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) | |
2809 | break; | |
2810 | ||
2811 | offset += ihlen; | |
2812 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); | |
2813 | if (uh == NULL) | |
2814 | break; | |
2815 | ||
2816 | ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; | |
2817 | ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; | |
2818 | break; | |
2819 | } | |
2820 | ||
2821 | default: | |
2822 | break; | |
2823 | } | |
2824 | out: | |
2825 | return ret; | |
2826 | } | |
2827 | ||
2828 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
2829 | ||
2830 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ | |
2831 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad) | |
2832 | { | |
2833 | u8 nexthdr; | |
2834 | int ret = -EINVAL, offset; | |
2835 | struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6; | |
2836 | ||
2837 | offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data; | |
2838 | ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); | |
2839 | if (ip6 == NULL) | |
2840 | goto out; | |
2841 | ||
2842 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr); | |
2843 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr); | |
2844 | ret = 0; | |
2845 | ||
2846 | nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; | |
2847 | offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); | |
2848 | offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr); | |
2849 | if (offset < 0) | |
2850 | goto out; | |
2851 | ||
2852 | switch (nexthdr) { | |
2853 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { | |
2854 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; | |
2855 | ||
2856 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); | |
2857 | if (th == NULL) | |
2858 | break; | |
2859 | ||
2860 | ad->u.net.sport = th->source; | |
2861 | ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; | |
2862 | break; | |
2863 | } | |
2864 | ||
2865 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { | |
2866 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; | |
2867 | ||
2868 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); | |
2869 | if (uh == NULL) | |
2870 | break; | |
2871 | ||
2872 | ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; | |
2873 | ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; | |
2874 | break; | |
2875 | } | |
2876 | ||
2877 | /* includes fragments */ | |
2878 | default: | |
2879 | break; | |
2880 | } | |
2881 | out: | |
2882 | return ret; | |
2883 | } | |
2884 | ||
2885 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
2886 | ||
2887 | static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, | |
2888 | char **addrp, int *len, int src) | |
2889 | { | |
2890 | int ret = 0; | |
2891 | ||
2892 | switch (ad->u.net.family) { | |
2893 | case PF_INET: | |
2894 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad); | |
2895 | if (ret || !addrp) | |
2896 | break; | |
2897 | *len = 4; | |
2898 | *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr : | |
2899 | &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr); | |
2900 | break; | |
2901 | ||
2902 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
2903 | case PF_INET6: | |
2904 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad); | |
2905 | if (ret || !addrp) | |
2906 | break; | |
2907 | *len = 16; | |
2908 | *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr : | |
2909 | &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr); | |
2910 | break; | |
2911 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
2912 | default: | |
2913 | break; | |
2914 | } | |
2915 | ||
2916 | return ret; | |
2917 | } | |
2918 | ||
2919 | /* socket security operations */ | |
2920 | static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock, | |
2921 | u32 perms) | |
2922 | { | |
2923 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
2924 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2925 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
2926 | int err = 0; | |
2927 | ||
2928 | tsec = task->security; | |
2929 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
2930 | ||
2931 | if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) | |
2932 | goto out; | |
2933 | ||
2934 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
2935 | ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk; | |
2936 | err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); | |
2937 | ||
2938 | out: | |
2939 | return err; | |
2940 | } | |
2941 | ||
2942 | static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, | |
2943 | int protocol, int kern) | |
2944 | { | |
2945 | int err = 0; | |
2946 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2947 | ||
2948 | if (kern) | |
2949 | goto out; | |
2950 | ||
2951 | tsec = current->security; | |
2952 | err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, | |
2953 | socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, | |
2954 | protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); | |
2955 | ||
2956 | out: | |
2957 | return err; | |
2958 | } | |
2959 | ||
2960 | static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, | |
2961 | int type, int protocol, int kern) | |
2962 | { | |
2963 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
2964 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2965 | ||
2966 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
2967 | ||
2968 | tsec = current->security; | |
2969 | isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); | |
2970 | isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid; | |
2971 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
2972 | ||
2973 | return; | |
2974 | } | |
2975 | ||
2976 | /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. | |
2977 | Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind | |
2978 | permission check between the socket and the port number. */ | |
2979 | #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0] | |
2980 | #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1] | |
2981 | ||
2982 | static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) | |
2983 | { | |
2984 | u16 family; | |
2985 | int err; | |
2986 | ||
2987 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND); | |
2988 | if (err) | |
2989 | goto out; | |
2990 | ||
2991 | /* | |
2992 | * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. | |
2993 | * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just | |
2994 | * check the first address now. | |
2995 | */ | |
2996 | family = sock->sk->sk_family; | |
2997 | if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { | |
2998 | char *addrp; | |
2999 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3000 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3001 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3002 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; | |
3003 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; | |
3004 | unsigned short snum; | |
3005 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
3006 | u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen; | |
3007 | ||
3008 | tsec = current->security; | |
3009 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3010 | ||
3011 | if (family == PF_INET) { | |
3012 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; | |
3013 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); | |
3014 | addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr); | |
3015 | addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; | |
3016 | } else { | |
3017 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; | |
3018 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); | |
3019 | addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr); | |
3020 | addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; | |
3021 | } | |
3022 | ||
3023 | if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) || | |
3024 | snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) { | |
3025 | err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, | |
3026 | sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); | |
3027 | if (err) | |
3028 | goto out; | |
3029 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3030 | ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); | |
3031 | ad.u.net.family = family; | |
3032 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, | |
3033 | isec->sclass, | |
3034 | SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); | |
3035 | if (err) | |
3036 | goto out; | |
3037 | } | |
3038 | ||
3039 | switch(isec->sclass) { | |
3040 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: | |
3041 | node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; | |
3042 | break; | |
3043 | ||
3044 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: | |
3045 | node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; | |
3046 | break; | |
3047 | ||
3048 | default: | |
3049 | node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; | |
3050 | break; | |
3051 | } | |
3052 | ||
3053 | err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid); | |
3054 | if (err) | |
3055 | goto out; | |
3056 | ||
3057 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3058 | ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); | |
3059 | ad.u.net.family = family; | |
3060 | ||
3061 | if (family == PF_INET) | |
3062 | ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; | |
3063 | else | |
3064 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr); | |
3065 | ||
3066 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, | |
3067 | isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); | |
3068 | if (err) | |
3069 | goto out; | |
3070 | } | |
3071 | out: | |
3072 | return err; | |
3073 | } | |
3074 | ||
3075 | static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) | |
3076 | { | |
3077 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3078 | int err; | |
3079 | ||
3080 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT); | |
3081 | if (err) | |
3082 | return err; | |
3083 | ||
3084 | /* | |
3085 | * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port. | |
3086 | */ | |
3087 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3088 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) { | |
3089 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
3090 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3091 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; | |
3092 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; | |
3093 | unsigned short snum; | |
3094 | u32 sid; | |
3095 | ||
3096 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) { | |
3097 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; | |
3098 | if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) | |
3099 | return -EINVAL; | |
3100 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); | |
3101 | } else { | |
3102 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; | |
3103 | if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) | |
3104 | return -EINVAL; | |
3105 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); | |
3106 | } | |
3107 | ||
3108 | err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, | |
3109 | sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); | |
3110 | if (err) | |
3111 | goto out; | |
3112 | ||
3113 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3114 | ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum); | |
3115 | ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; | |
3116 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, | |
3117 | TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad); | |
3118 | if (err) | |
3119 | goto out; | |
3120 | } | |
3121 | ||
3122 | out: | |
3123 | return err; | |
3124 | } | |
3125 | ||
3126 | static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) | |
3127 | { | |
3128 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN); | |
3129 | } | |
3130 | ||
3131 | static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) | |
3132 | { | |
3133 | int err; | |
3134 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3135 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec; | |
3136 | ||
3137 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT); | |
3138 | if (err) | |
3139 | return err; | |
3140 | ||
3141 | newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security; | |
3142 | ||
3143 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3144 | newisec->sclass = isec->sclass; | |
3145 | newisec->sid = isec->sid; | |
3146 | newisec->initialized = 1; | |
3147 | ||
3148 | return 0; | |
3149 | } | |
3150 | ||
3151 | static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, | |
3152 | int size) | |
3153 | { | |
3154 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE); | |
3155 | } | |
3156 | ||
3157 | static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, | |
3158 | int size, int flags) | |
3159 | { | |
3160 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ); | |
3161 | } | |
3162 | ||
3163 | static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) | |
3164 | { | |
3165 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR); | |
3166 | } | |
3167 | ||
3168 | static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) | |
3169 | { | |
3170 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR); | |
3171 | } | |
3172 | ||
3173 | static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname) | |
3174 | { | |
3175 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT); | |
3176 | } | |
3177 | ||
3178 | static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, | |
3179 | int optname) | |
3180 | { | |
3181 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT); | |
3182 | } | |
3183 | ||
3184 | static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) | |
3185 | { | |
3186 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); | |
3187 | } | |
3188 | ||
3189 | static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, | |
3190 | struct socket *other, | |
3191 | struct sock *newsk) | |
3192 | { | |
3193 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; | |
3194 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3195 | struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; | |
3196 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3197 | int err; | |
3198 | ||
3199 | err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk); | |
3200 | if (err) | |
3201 | return err; | |
3202 | ||
3203 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3204 | other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security; | |
3205 | ||
3206 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3207 | ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; | |
3208 | ||
3209 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid, | |
3210 | isec->sclass, | |
3211 | UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); | |
3212 | if (err) | |
3213 | return err; | |
3214 | ||
3215 | /* connecting socket */ | |
3216 | ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; | |
3217 | ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid; | |
3218 | ||
3219 | /* server child socket */ | |
3220 | ssec = newsk->sk_security; | |
3221 | ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid; | |
3222 | ||
3223 | return 0; | |
3224 | } | |
3225 | ||
3226 | static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, | |
3227 | struct socket *other) | |
3228 | { | |
3229 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3230 | struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; | |
3231 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3232 | int err; | |
3233 | ||
3234 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3235 | other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security; | |
3236 | ||
3237 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3238 | ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; | |
3239 | ||
3240 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid, | |
3241 | isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); | |
3242 | if (err) | |
3243 | return err; | |
3244 | ||
3245 | return 0; | |
3246 | } | |
3247 | ||
3248 | static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3249 | { | |
3250 | u16 family; | |
3251 | char *addrp; | |
3252 | int len, err = 0; | |
3253 | u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0; | |
3254 | u32 sock_sid = 0; | |
3255 | u16 sock_class = 0; | |
3256 | struct socket *sock; | |
3257 | struct net_device *dev; | |
3258 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3259 | ||
3260 | family = sk->sk_family; | |
3261 | if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) | |
3262 | goto out; | |
3263 | ||
3264 | /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ | |
3265 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP)) | |
3266 | family = PF_INET; | |
3267 | ||
3268 | read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); | |
3269 | sock = sk->sk_socket; | |
3270 | if (sock) { | |
3271 | struct inode *inode; | |
3272 | inode = SOCK_INODE(sock); | |
3273 | if (inode) { | |
3274 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3275 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
3276 | sock_sid = isec->sid; | |
3277 | sock_class = isec->sclass; | |
3278 | } | |
3279 | } | |
3280 | read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); | |
3281 | if (!sock_sid) | |
3282 | goto out; | |
3283 | ||
3284 | dev = skb->dev; | |
3285 | if (!dev) | |
3286 | goto out; | |
3287 | ||
3288 | err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL); | |
3289 | if (err) | |
3290 | goto out; | |
3291 | ||
3292 | switch (sock_class) { | |
3293 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: | |
3294 | netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV; | |
3295 | node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV; | |
3296 | recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG; | |
3297 | break; | |
3298 | ||
3299 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: | |
3300 | netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV; | |
3301 | node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV; | |
3302 | recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG; | |
3303 | break; | |
3304 | ||
3305 | default: | |
3306 | netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV; | |
3307 | node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV; | |
3308 | break; | |
3309 | } | |
3310 | ||
3311 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); | |
3312 | ad.u.net.netif = dev->name; | |
3313 | ad.u.net.family = family; | |
3314 | ||
3315 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1); | |
3316 | if (err) | |
3317 | goto out; | |
3318 | ||
3319 | err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad); | |
3320 | if (err) | |
3321 | goto out; | |
3322 | ||
3323 | /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */ | |
3324 | err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid); | |
3325 | if (err) | |
3326 | goto out; | |
3327 | ||
3328 | err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad); | |
3329 | if (err) | |
3330 | goto out; | |
3331 | ||
3332 | if (recv_perm) { | |
3333 | u32 port_sid; | |
3334 | ||
3335 | /* Fixme: make this more efficient */ | |
3336 | err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, | |
3337 | sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport), | |
3338 | &port_sid); | |
3339 | if (err) | |
3340 | goto out; | |
3341 | ||
3342 | err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid, | |
3343 | sock_class, recv_perm, &ad); | |
3344 | } | |
3345 | ||
3346 | if (!err) | |
3347 | err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb); | |
3348 | ||
3349 | out: | |
3350 | return err; | |
3351 | } | |
3352 | ||
3353 | static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, | |
3354 | int __user *optlen, unsigned len) | |
3355 | { | |
3356 | int err = 0; | |
3357 | char *scontext; | |
3358 | u32 scontext_len; | |
3359 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; | |
3360 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3361 | ||
3362 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3363 | if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) { | |
3364 | err = -ENOPROTOOPT; | |
3365 | goto out; | |
3366 | } | |
3367 | ||
3368 | ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; | |
3369 | ||
3370 | err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); | |
3371 | if (err) | |
3372 | goto out; | |
3373 | ||
3374 | if (scontext_len > len) { | |
3375 | err = -ERANGE; | |
3376 | goto out_len; | |
3377 | } | |
3378 | ||
3379 | if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len)) | |
3380 | err = -EFAULT; | |
3381 | ||
3382 | out_len: | |
3383 | if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen)) | |
3384 | err = -EFAULT; | |
3385 | ||
3386 | kfree(scontext); | |
3387 | out: | |
3388 | return err; | |
3389 | } | |
3390 | ||
3391 | static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) | |
3392 | { | |
3393 | return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority); | |
3394 | } | |
3395 | ||
3396 | static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) | |
3397 | { | |
3398 | sk_free_security(sk); | |
3399 | } | |
3400 | ||
3401 | static unsigned int selinux_sk_getsid_security(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir) | |
3402 | { | |
3403 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3404 | u32 sock_sid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; | |
3405 | ||
3406 | if (!sk) | |
3407 | return selinux_no_sk_sid(fl); | |
3408 | ||
3409 | read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); | |
3410 | isec = get_sock_isec(sk); | |
3411 | ||
3412 | if (isec) | |
3413 | sock_sid = isec->sid; | |
3414 | ||
3415 | read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); | |
3416 | return sock_sid; | |
3417 | } | |
3418 | ||
3419 | static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3420 | { | |
3421 | int err = 0; | |
3422 | u32 perm; | |
3423 | struct nlmsghdr *nlh; | |
3424 | struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket; | |
3425 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3426 | ||
3427 | if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) { | |
3428 | err = -EINVAL; | |
3429 | goto out; | |
3430 | } | |
3431 | nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data; | |
3432 | ||
3433 | err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); | |
3434 | if (err) { | |
3435 | if (err == -EINVAL) { | |
3436 | audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, | |
3437 | "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message" | |
3438 | " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n", | |
3439 | nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass); | |
3440 | if (!selinux_enforcing) | |
3441 | err = 0; | |
3442 | } | |
3443 | ||
3444 | /* Ignore */ | |
3445 | if (err == -ENOENT) | |
3446 | err = 0; | |
3447 | goto out; | |
3448 | } | |
3449 | ||
3450 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm); | |
3451 | out: | |
3452 | return err; | |
3453 | } | |
3454 | ||
3455 | #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER | |
3456 | ||
3457 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, | |
3458 | struct sk_buff **pskb, | |
3459 | const struct net_device *in, | |
3460 | const struct net_device *out, | |
3461 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *), | |
3462 | u16 family) | |
3463 | { | |
3464 | char *addrp; | |
3465 | int len, err = NF_ACCEPT; | |
3466 | u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0; | |
3467 | struct sock *sk; | |
3468 | struct socket *sock; | |
3469 | struct inode *inode; | |
3470 | struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb; | |
3471 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3472 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3473 | struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out; | |
3474 | ||
3475 | sk = skb->sk; | |
3476 | if (!sk) | |
3477 | goto out; | |
3478 | ||
3479 | sock = sk->sk_socket; | |
3480 | if (!sock) | |
3481 | goto out; | |
3482 | ||
3483 | inode = SOCK_INODE(sock); | |
3484 | if (!inode) | |
3485 | goto out; | |
3486 | ||
3487 | err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL); | |
3488 | if (err) | |
3489 | goto out; | |
3490 | ||
3491 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
3492 | ||
3493 | switch (isec->sclass) { | |
3494 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: | |
3495 | netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND; | |
3496 | node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND; | |
3497 | send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG; | |
3498 | break; | |
3499 | ||
3500 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: | |
3501 | netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND; | |
3502 | node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND; | |
3503 | send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG; | |
3504 | break; | |
3505 | ||
3506 | default: | |
3507 | netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND; | |
3508 | node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND; | |
3509 | break; | |
3510 | } | |
3511 | ||
3512 | ||
3513 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); | |
3514 | ad.u.net.netif = dev->name; | |
3515 | ad.u.net.family = family; | |
3516 | ||
3517 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, | |
3518 | &len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3519 | if (err != NF_ACCEPT) | |
3520 | goto out; | |
3521 | ||
3522 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, | |
3523 | netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3524 | if (err != NF_ACCEPT) | |
3525 | goto out; | |
3526 | ||
3527 | /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */ | |
3528 | err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, | |
3529 | &node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3530 | if (err != NF_ACCEPT) | |
3531 | goto out; | |
3532 | ||
3533 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, | |
3534 | node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3535 | if (err != NF_ACCEPT) | |
3536 | goto out; | |
3537 | ||
3538 | if (send_perm) { | |
3539 | u32 port_sid; | |
3540 | ||
3541 | /* Fixme: make this more efficient */ | |
3542 | err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, | |
3543 | sk->sk_type, | |
3544 | sk->sk_protocol, | |
3545 | ntohs(ad.u.net.dport), | |
3546 | &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3547 | if (err != NF_ACCEPT) | |
3548 | goto out; | |
3549 | ||
3550 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass, | |
3551 | send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3552 | } | |
3553 | ||
3554 | if (err != NF_ACCEPT) | |
3555 | goto out; | |
3556 | ||
3557 | err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb); | |
3558 | ||
3559 | out: | |
3560 | return err; | |
3561 | } | |
3562 | ||
3563 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, | |
3564 | struct sk_buff **pskb, | |
3565 | const struct net_device *in, | |
3566 | const struct net_device *out, | |
3567 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) | |
3568 | { | |
3569 | return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET); | |
3570 | } | |
3571 | ||
3572 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
3573 | ||
3574 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, | |
3575 | struct sk_buff **pskb, | |
3576 | const struct net_device *in, | |
3577 | const struct net_device *out, | |
3578 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) | |
3579 | { | |
3580 | return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6); | |
3581 | } | |
3582 | ||
3583 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
3584 | ||
3585 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ | |
3586 | ||
3587 | #else | |
3588 | ||
3589 | static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3590 | { | |
3591 | return 0; | |
3592 | } | |
3593 | ||
3594 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ | |
3595 | ||
3596 | static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3597 | { | |
3598 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3599 | struct av_decision avd; | |
3600 | int err; | |
3601 | ||
3602 | err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb); | |
3603 | if (err) | |
3604 | return err; | |
3605 | ||
3606 | tsec = current->security; | |
3607 | ||
3608 | avd.allowed = 0; | |
3609 | avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, | |
3610 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd); | |
3611 | cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed); | |
3612 | ||
3613 | if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS) | |
3614 | err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb); | |
3615 | ||
3616 | return err; | |
3617 | } | |
3618 | ||
3619 | static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3620 | { | |
3621 | if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) | |
3622 | return -EPERM; | |
3623 | return 0; | |
3624 | } | |
3625 | ||
3626 | static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task, | |
3627 | struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, | |
3628 | u16 sclass) | |
3629 | { | |
3630 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security; | |
3631 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3632 | ||
3633 | isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
3634 | if (!isec) | |
3635 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3636 | ||
3637 | isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
3638 | isec->sclass = sclass; | |
3639 | isec->ipc_perm = perm; | |
3640 | if (tsec) { | |
3641 | isec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
3642 | } else { | |
3643 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
3644 | } | |
3645 | perm->security = isec; | |
3646 | ||
3647 | return 0; | |
3648 | } | |
3649 | ||
3650 | static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) | |
3651 | { | |
3652 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security; | |
3653 | if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
3654 | return; | |
3655 | ||
3656 | perm->security = NULL; | |
3657 | kfree(isec); | |
3658 | } | |
3659 | ||
3660 | static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) | |
3661 | { | |
3662 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; | |
3663 | ||
3664 | msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
3665 | if (!msec) | |
3666 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3667 | ||
3668 | msec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
3669 | msec->msg = msg; | |
3670 | msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
3671 | msg->security = msec; | |
3672 | ||
3673 | return 0; | |
3674 | } | |
3675 | ||
3676 | static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) | |
3677 | { | |
3678 | struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security; | |
3679 | if (!msec || msec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
3680 | return; | |
3681 | ||
3682 | msg->security = NULL; | |
3683 | kfree(msec); | |
3684 | } | |
3685 | ||
3686 | static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, | |
3687 | u32 perms) | |
3688 | { | |
3689 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3690 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3691 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3692 | ||
3693 | tsec = current->security; | |
3694 | isec = ipc_perms->security; | |
3695 | ||
3696 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3697 | ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; | |
3698 | ||
3699 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); | |
3700 | } | |
3701 | ||
3702 | static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) | |
3703 | { | |
3704 | return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg); | |
3705 | } | |
3706 | ||
3707 | static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) | |
3708 | { | |
3709 | msg_msg_free_security(msg); | |
3710 | } | |
3711 | ||
3712 | /* message queue security operations */ | |
3713 | static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) | |
3714 | { | |
3715 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3716 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3717 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3718 | int rc; | |
3719 | ||
3720 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ); | |
3721 | if (rc) | |
3722 | return rc; | |
3723 | ||
3724 | tsec = current->security; | |
3725 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; | |
3726 | ||
3727 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3728 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; | |
3729 | ||
3730 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, | |
3731 | MSGQ__CREATE, &ad); | |
3732 | if (rc) { | |
3733 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); | |
3734 | return rc; | |
3735 | } | |
3736 | return 0; | |
3737 | } | |
3738 | ||
3739 | static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq) | |
3740 | { | |
3741 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); | |
3742 | } | |
3743 | ||
3744 | static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) | |
3745 | { | |
3746 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3747 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3748 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3749 | ||
3750 | tsec = current->security; | |
3751 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; | |
3752 | ||
3753 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3754 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; | |
3755 | ||
3756 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, | |
3757 | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
3758 | } | |
3759 | ||
3760 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) | |
3761 | { | |
3762 | int err; | |
3763 | int perms; | |
3764 | ||
3765 | switch(cmd) { | |
3766 | case IPC_INFO: | |
3767 | case MSG_INFO: | |
3768 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ | |
3769 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); | |
3770 | case IPC_STAT: | |
3771 | case MSG_STAT: | |
3772 | perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE; | |
3773 | break; | |
3774 | case IPC_SET: | |
3775 | perms = MSGQ__SETATTR; | |
3776 | break; | |
3777 | case IPC_RMID: | |
3778 | perms = MSGQ__DESTROY; | |
3779 | break; | |
3780 | default: | |
3781 | return 0; | |
3782 | } | |
3783 | ||
3784 | err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms); | |
3785 | return err; | |
3786 | } | |
3787 | ||
3788 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) | |
3789 | { | |
3790 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3791 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3792 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; | |
3793 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3794 | int rc; | |
3795 | ||
3796 | tsec = current->security; | |
3797 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; | |
3798 | msec = msg->security; | |
3799 | ||
3800 | /* | |
3801 | * First time through, need to assign label to the message | |
3802 | */ | |
3803 | if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) { | |
3804 | /* | |
3805 | * Compute new sid based on current process and | |
3806 | * message queue this message will be stored in | |
3807 | */ | |
3808 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, | |
3809 | isec->sid, | |
3810 | SECCLASS_MSG, | |
3811 | &msec->sid); | |
3812 | if (rc) | |
3813 | return rc; | |
3814 | } | |
3815 | ||
3816 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3817 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; | |
3818 | ||
3819 | /* Can this process write to the queue? */ | |
3820 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, | |
3821 | MSGQ__WRITE, &ad); | |
3822 | if (!rc) | |
3823 | /* Can this process send the message */ | |
3824 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid, | |
3825 | SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad); | |
3826 | if (!rc) | |
3827 | /* Can the message be put in the queue? */ | |
3828 | rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, | |
3829 | SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad); | |
3830 | ||
3831 | return rc; | |
3832 | } | |
3833 | ||
3834 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, | |
3835 | struct task_struct *target, | |
3836 | long type, int mode) | |
3837 | { | |
3838 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3839 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3840 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; | |
3841 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3842 | int rc; | |
3843 | ||
3844 | tsec = target->security; | |
3845 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; | |
3846 | msec = msg->security; | |
3847 | ||
3848 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3849 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; | |
3850 | ||
3851 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, | |
3852 | SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad); | |
3853 | if (!rc) | |
3854 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid, | |
3855 | SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad); | |
3856 | return rc; | |
3857 | } | |
3858 | ||
3859 | /* Shared Memory security operations */ | |
3860 | static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) | |
3861 | { | |
3862 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3863 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3864 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3865 | int rc; | |
3866 | ||
3867 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM); | |
3868 | if (rc) | |
3869 | return rc; | |
3870 | ||
3871 | tsec = current->security; | |
3872 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; | |
3873 | ||
3874 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3875 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; | |
3876 | ||
3877 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, | |
3878 | SHM__CREATE, &ad); | |
3879 | if (rc) { | |
3880 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); | |
3881 | return rc; | |
3882 | } | |
3883 | return 0; | |
3884 | } | |
3885 | ||
3886 | static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) | |
3887 | { | |
3888 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); | |
3889 | } | |
3890 | ||
3891 | static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) | |
3892 | { | |
3893 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3894 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3895 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3896 | ||
3897 | tsec = current->security; | |
3898 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; | |
3899 | ||
3900 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3901 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; | |
3902 | ||
3903 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, | |
3904 | SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
3905 | } | |
3906 | ||
3907 | /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */ | |
3908 | static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) | |
3909 | { | |
3910 | int perms; | |
3911 | int err; | |
3912 | ||
3913 | switch(cmd) { | |
3914 | case IPC_INFO: | |
3915 | case SHM_INFO: | |
3916 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ | |
3917 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); | |
3918 | case IPC_STAT: | |
3919 | case SHM_STAT: | |
3920 | perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE; | |
3921 | break; | |
3922 | case IPC_SET: | |
3923 | perms = SHM__SETATTR; | |
3924 | break; | |
3925 | case SHM_LOCK: | |
3926 | case SHM_UNLOCK: | |
3927 | perms = SHM__LOCK; | |
3928 | break; | |
3929 | case IPC_RMID: | |
3930 | perms = SHM__DESTROY; | |
3931 | break; | |
3932 | default: | |
3933 | return 0; | |
3934 | } | |
3935 | ||
3936 | err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); | |
3937 | return err; | |
3938 | } | |
3939 | ||
3940 | static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, | |
3941 | char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) | |
3942 | { | |
3943 | u32 perms; | |
3944 | int rc; | |
3945 | ||
3946 | rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg); | |
3947 | if (rc) | |
3948 | return rc; | |
3949 | ||
3950 | if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) | |
3951 | perms = SHM__READ; | |
3952 | else | |
3953 | perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE; | |
3954 | ||
3955 | return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); | |
3956 | } | |
3957 | ||
3958 | /* Semaphore security operations */ | |
3959 | static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) | |
3960 | { | |
3961 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3962 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3963 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3964 | int rc; | |
3965 | ||
3966 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM); | |
3967 | if (rc) | |
3968 | return rc; | |
3969 | ||
3970 | tsec = current->security; | |
3971 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; | |
3972 | ||
3973 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3974 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; | |
3975 | ||
3976 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, | |
3977 | SEM__CREATE, &ad); | |
3978 | if (rc) { | |
3979 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); | |
3980 | return rc; | |
3981 | } | |
3982 | return 0; | |
3983 | } | |
3984 | ||
3985 | static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) | |
3986 | { | |
3987 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); | |
3988 | } | |
3989 | ||
3990 | static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) | |
3991 | { | |
3992 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3993 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3994 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3995 | ||
3996 | tsec = current->security; | |
3997 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; | |
3998 | ||
3999 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
4000 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; | |
4001 | ||
4002 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, | |
4003 | SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
4004 | } | |
4005 | ||
4006 | /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */ | |
4007 | static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) | |
4008 | { | |
4009 | int err; | |
4010 | u32 perms; | |
4011 | ||
4012 | switch(cmd) { | |
4013 | case IPC_INFO: | |
4014 | case SEM_INFO: | |
4015 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ | |
4016 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); | |
4017 | case GETPID: | |
4018 | case GETNCNT: | |
4019 | case GETZCNT: | |
4020 | perms = SEM__GETATTR; | |
4021 | break; | |
4022 | case GETVAL: | |
4023 | case GETALL: | |
4024 | perms = SEM__READ; | |
4025 | break; | |
4026 | case SETVAL: | |
4027 | case SETALL: | |
4028 | perms = SEM__WRITE; | |
4029 | break; | |
4030 | case IPC_RMID: | |
4031 | perms = SEM__DESTROY; | |
4032 | break; | |
4033 | case IPC_SET: | |
4034 | perms = SEM__SETATTR; | |
4035 | break; | |
4036 | case IPC_STAT: | |
4037 | case SEM_STAT: | |
4038 | perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE; | |
4039 | break; | |
4040 | default: | |
4041 | return 0; | |
4042 | } | |
4043 | ||
4044 | err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); | |
4045 | return err; | |
4046 | } | |
4047 | ||
4048 | static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, | |
4049 | struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) | |
4050 | { | |
4051 | u32 perms; | |
4052 | ||
4053 | if (alter) | |
4054 | perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE; | |
4055 | else | |
4056 | perms = SEM__READ; | |
4057 | ||
4058 | return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); | |
4059 | } | |
4060 | ||
4061 | static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) | |
4062 | { | |
4063 | u32 av = 0; | |
4064 | ||
4065 | av = 0; | |
4066 | if (flag & S_IRUGO) | |
4067 | av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; | |
4068 | if (flag & S_IWUGO) | |
4069 | av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; | |
4070 | ||
4071 | if (av == 0) | |
4072 | return 0; | |
4073 | ||
4074 | return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); | |
4075 | } | |
4076 | ||
4077 | /* module stacking operations */ | |
4078 | static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) | |
4079 | { | |
4080 | if (secondary_ops != original_ops) { | |
4081 | printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security " | |
4082 | "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__); | |
4083 | return -EINVAL; | |
4084 | } | |
4085 | ||
4086 | secondary_ops = ops; | |
4087 | ||
4088 | printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n", | |
4089 | __FUNCTION__, | |
4090 | name); | |
4091 | ||
4092 | return 0; | |
4093 | } | |
4094 | ||
4095 | static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) | |
4096 | { | |
4097 | if (ops != secondary_ops) { | |
4098 | printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module " | |
4099 | "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__); | |
4100 | return -EINVAL; | |
4101 | } | |
4102 | ||
4103 | secondary_ops = original_ops; | |
4104 | ||
4105 | return 0; | |
4106 | } | |
4107 | ||
4108 | static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) | |
4109 | { | |
4110 | if (inode) | |
4111 | inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); | |
4112 | } | |
4113 | ||
4114 | static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, | |
4115 | char *name, void *value, size_t size) | |
4116 | { | |
4117 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4118 | u32 sid, len; | |
4119 | char *context; | |
4120 | int error; | |
4121 | ||
4122 | if (current != p) { | |
4123 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR); | |
4124 | if (error) | |
4125 | return error; | |
4126 | } | |
4127 | ||
4128 | if (!size) | |
4129 | return -ERANGE; | |
4130 | ||
4131 | tsec = p->security; | |
4132 | ||
4133 | if (!strcmp(name, "current")) | |
4134 | sid = tsec->sid; | |
4135 | else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) | |
4136 | sid = tsec->osid; | |
4137 | else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) | |
4138 | sid = tsec->exec_sid; | |
4139 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) | |
4140 | sid = tsec->create_sid; | |
4141 | else | |
4142 | return -EINVAL; | |
4143 | ||
4144 | if (!sid) | |
4145 | return 0; | |
4146 | ||
4147 | error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len); | |
4148 | if (error) | |
4149 | return error; | |
4150 | if (len > size) { | |
4151 | kfree(context); | |
4152 | return -ERANGE; | |
4153 | } | |
4154 | memcpy(value, context, len); | |
4155 | kfree(context); | |
4156 | return len; | |
4157 | } | |
4158 | ||
4159 | static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, | |
4160 | char *name, void *value, size_t size) | |
4161 | { | |
4162 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4163 | u32 sid = 0; | |
4164 | int error; | |
4165 | char *str = value; | |
4166 | ||
4167 | if (current != p) { | |
4168 | /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own | |
4169 | security attributes. */ | |
4170 | return -EACCES; | |
4171 | } | |
4172 | ||
4173 | /* | |
4174 | * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. | |
4175 | * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the | |
4176 | * above restriction is ever removed. | |
4177 | */ | |
4178 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) | |
4179 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC); | |
4180 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) | |
4181 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE); | |
4182 | else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) | |
4183 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); | |
4184 | else | |
4185 | error = -EINVAL; | |
4186 | if (error) | |
4187 | return error; | |
4188 | ||
4189 | /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */ | |
4190 | if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') { | |
4191 | if (str[size-1] == '\n') { | |
4192 | str[size-1] = 0; | |
4193 | size--; | |
4194 | } | |
4195 | error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid); | |
4196 | if (error) | |
4197 | return error; | |
4198 | } | |
4199 | ||
4200 | /* Permission checking based on the specified context is | |
4201 | performed during the actual operation (execve, | |
4202 | open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the | |
4203 | operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve | |
4204 | checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The | |
4205 | operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ | |
4206 | tsec = p->security; | |
4207 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) | |
4208 | tsec->exec_sid = sid; | |
4209 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) | |
4210 | tsec->create_sid = sid; | |
4211 | else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { | |
4212 | struct av_decision avd; | |
4213 | ||
4214 | if (sid == 0) | |
4215 | return -EINVAL; | |
4216 | ||
4217 | /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ | |
4218 | if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) { | |
4219 | struct task_struct *g, *t; | |
4220 | struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm; | |
4221 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); | |
4222 | do_each_thread(g, t) | |
4223 | if (t->mm == mm && t != p) { | |
4224 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); | |
4225 | return -EPERM; | |
4226 | } | |
4227 | while_each_thread(g, t); | |
4228 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); | |
4229 | } | |
4230 | ||
4231 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ | |
4232 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
4233 | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); | |
4234 | if (error) | |
4235 | return error; | |
4236 | ||
4237 | /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. | |
4238 | Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ | |
4239 | task_lock(p); | |
4240 | if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) { | |
4241 | error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, | |
4242 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
4243 | PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd); | |
4244 | if (!error) | |
4245 | tsec->sid = sid; | |
4246 | task_unlock(p); | |
4247 | avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
4248 | PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL); | |
4249 | if (error) | |
4250 | return error; | |
4251 | } else { | |
4252 | tsec->sid = sid; | |
4253 | task_unlock(p); | |
4254 | } | |
4255 | } | |
4256 | else | |
4257 | return -EINVAL; | |
4258 | ||
4259 | return size; | |
4260 | } | |
4261 | ||
4262 | static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { | |
4263 | .ptrace = selinux_ptrace, | |
4264 | .capget = selinux_capget, | |
4265 | .capset_check = selinux_capset_check, | |
4266 | .capset_set = selinux_capset_set, | |
4267 | .sysctl = selinux_sysctl, | |
4268 | .capable = selinux_capable, | |
4269 | .quotactl = selinux_quotactl, | |
4270 | .quota_on = selinux_quota_on, | |
4271 | .syslog = selinux_syslog, | |
4272 | .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory, | |
4273 | ||
4274 | .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send, | |
4275 | .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv, | |
4276 | ||
4277 | .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security, | |
4278 | .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security, | |
4279 | .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds, | |
4280 | .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds, | |
4281 | .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security, | |
4282 | .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security, | |
4283 | .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec, | |
4284 | ||
4285 | .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security, | |
4286 | .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security, | |
4287 | .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data, | |
4288 | .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount, | |
4289 | .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs, | |
4290 | .sb_mount = selinux_mount, | |
4291 | .sb_umount = selinux_umount, | |
4292 | ||
4293 | .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security, | |
4294 | .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security, | |
4295 | .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security, | |
4296 | .inode_create = selinux_inode_create, | |
4297 | .inode_link = selinux_inode_link, | |
4298 | .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink, | |
4299 | .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink, | |
4300 | .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir, | |
4301 | .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir, | |
4302 | .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod, | |
4303 | .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename, | |
4304 | .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink, | |
4305 | .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link, | |
4306 | .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission, | |
4307 | .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr, | |
4308 | .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr, | |
4309 | .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr, | |
4310 | .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr, | |
4311 | .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr, | |
4312 | .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr, | |
4313 | .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr, | |
4314 | .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity, | |
4315 | .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, | |
4316 | .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, | |
4317 | ||
4318 | .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, | |
4319 | .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, | |
4320 | .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security, | |
4321 | .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl, | |
4322 | .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap, | |
4323 | .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect, | |
4324 | .file_lock = selinux_file_lock, | |
4325 | .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl, | |
4326 | .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner, | |
4327 | .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask, | |
4328 | .file_receive = selinux_file_receive, | |
4329 | ||
4330 | .task_create = selinux_task_create, | |
4331 | .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security, | |
4332 | .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security, | |
4333 | .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid, | |
4334 | .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid, | |
4335 | .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid, | |
4336 | .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid, | |
4337 | .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid, | |
4338 | .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid, | |
4339 | .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups, | |
4340 | .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice, | |
4341 | .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit, | |
4342 | .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler, | |
4343 | .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler, | |
4344 | .task_kill = selinux_task_kill, | |
4345 | .task_wait = selinux_task_wait, | |
4346 | .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl, | |
4347 | .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init, | |
4348 | .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, | |
4349 | ||
4350 | .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, | |
4351 | ||
4352 | .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, | |
4353 | .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, | |
4354 | ||
4355 | .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security, | |
4356 | .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security, | |
4357 | .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate, | |
4358 | .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl, | |
4359 | .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd, | |
4360 | .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv, | |
4361 | ||
4362 | .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security, | |
4363 | .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security, | |
4364 | .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate, | |
4365 | .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl, | |
4366 | .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat, | |
4367 | ||
4368 | .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security, | |
4369 | .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security, | |
4370 | .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate, | |
4371 | .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl, | |
4372 | .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop, | |
4373 | ||
4374 | .register_security = selinux_register_security, | |
4375 | .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security, | |
4376 | ||
4377 | .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate, | |
4378 | ||
4379 | .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr, | |
4380 | .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr, | |
4381 | ||
4382 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK | |
4383 | .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect, | |
4384 | .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send, | |
4385 | ||
4386 | .socket_create = selinux_socket_create, | |
4387 | .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create, | |
4388 | .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind, | |
4389 | .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect, | |
4390 | .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen, | |
4391 | .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept, | |
4392 | .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg, | |
4393 | .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg, | |
4394 | .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname, | |
4395 | .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername, | |
4396 | .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt, | |
4397 | .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt, | |
4398 | .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown, | |
4399 | .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb, | |
4400 | .socket_getpeersec = selinux_socket_getpeersec, | |
4401 | .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security, | |
4402 | .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security, | |
4403 | .sk_getsid = selinux_sk_getsid_security, | |
4404 | #endif | |
4405 | ||
4406 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM | |
4407 | .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc, | |
4408 | .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone, | |
4409 | .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free, | |
4410 | .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc, | |
4411 | .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free, | |
4412 | .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, | |
4413 | #endif | |
4414 | }; | |
4415 | ||
4416 | static __init int selinux_init(void) | |
4417 | { | |
4418 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4419 | ||
4420 | if (!selinux_enabled) { | |
4421 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n"); | |
4422 | return 0; | |
4423 | } | |
4424 | ||
4425 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n"); | |
4426 | ||
4427 | /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ | |
4428 | if (task_alloc_security(current)) | |
4429 | panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n"); | |
4430 | tsec = current->security; | |
4431 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; | |
4432 | ||
4433 | avc_init(); | |
4434 | ||
4435 | original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops; | |
4436 | if (!secondary_ops) | |
4437 | panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n"); | |
4438 | if (register_security (&selinux_ops)) | |
4439 | panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n"); | |
4440 | ||
4441 | if (selinux_enforcing) { | |
4442 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); | |
4443 | } else { | |
4444 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); | |
4445 | } | |
4446 | return 0; | |
4447 | } | |
4448 | ||
4449 | void selinux_complete_init(void) | |
4450 | { | |
4451 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n"); | |
4452 | ||
4453 | /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */ | |
4454 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); | |
4455 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
4456 | next_sb: | |
4457 | if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) { | |
4458 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = | |
4459 | list_entry(superblock_security_head.next, | |
4460 | struct superblock_security_struct, | |
4461 | list); | |
4462 | struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb; | |
4463 | spin_lock(&sb_lock); | |
4464 | sb->s_count++; | |
4465 | spin_unlock(&sb_lock); | |
4466 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
4467 | down_read(&sb->s_umount); | |
4468 | if (sb->s_root) | |
4469 | superblock_doinit(sb, NULL); | |
4470 | drop_super(sb); | |
4471 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
4472 | list_del_init(&sbsec->list); | |
4473 | goto next_sb; | |
4474 | } | |
4475 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
4476 | } | |
4477 | ||
4478 | /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label | |
4479 | all processes and objects when they are created. */ | |
4480 | security_initcall(selinux_init); | |
4481 | ||
4482 | #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) | |
4483 | ||
4484 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = { | |
4485 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last, | |
4486 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, | |
4487 | .pf = PF_INET, | |
4488 | .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING, | |
4489 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, | |
4490 | }; | |
4491 | ||
4492 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
4493 | ||
4494 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = { | |
4495 | .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last, | |
4496 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, | |
4497 | .pf = PF_INET6, | |
4498 | .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING, | |
4499 | .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, | |
4500 | }; | |
4501 | ||
4502 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
4503 | ||
4504 | static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) | |
4505 | { | |
4506 | int err = 0; | |
4507 | ||
4508 | if (!selinux_enabled) | |
4509 | goto out; | |
4510 | ||
4511 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); | |
4512 | ||
4513 | err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op); | |
4514 | if (err) | |
4515 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err); | |
4516 | ||
4517 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
4518 | ||
4519 | err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op); | |
4520 | if (err) | |
4521 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err); | |
4522 | ||
4523 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
4524 | ||
4525 | out: | |
4526 | return err; | |
4527 | } | |
4528 | ||
4529 | __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); | |
4530 | ||
4531 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE | |
4532 | static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) | |
4533 | { | |
4534 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); | |
4535 | ||
4536 | nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op); | |
4537 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
4538 | nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op); | |
4539 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
4540 | } | |
4541 | #endif | |
4542 | ||
4543 | #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */ | |
4544 | ||
4545 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE | |
4546 | #define selinux_nf_ip_exit() | |
4547 | #endif | |
4548 | ||
4549 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */ | |
4550 | ||
4551 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE | |
4552 | int selinux_disable(void) | |
4553 | { | |
4554 | extern void exit_sel_fs(void); | |
4555 | static int selinux_disabled = 0; | |
4556 | ||
4557 | if (ss_initialized) { | |
4558 | /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */ | |
4559 | return -EINVAL; | |
4560 | } | |
4561 | ||
4562 | if (selinux_disabled) { | |
4563 | /* Only do this once. */ | |
4564 | return -EINVAL; | |
4565 | } | |
4566 | ||
4567 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); | |
4568 | ||
4569 | selinux_disabled = 1; | |
4570 | ||
4571 | /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */ | |
4572 | security_ops = secondary_ops; | |
4573 | ||
4574 | /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */ | |
4575 | selinux_nf_ip_exit(); | |
4576 | ||
4577 | /* Unregister selinuxfs. */ | |
4578 | exit_sel_fs(); | |
4579 | ||
4580 | return 0; | |
4581 | } | |
4582 | #endif | |
4583 | ||
4584 |