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1 | /* | |
2 | * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module | |
3 | * | |
4 | * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. | |
5 | * | |
6 | * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> | |
7 | * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> | |
8 | * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> | |
9 | * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> | |
10 | * | |
11 | * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. | |
12 | * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> | |
13 | * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. | |
14 | * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> | |
15 | * | |
16 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
17 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, | |
18 | * as published by the Free Software Foundation. | |
19 | */ | |
20 | ||
21 | #include <linux/config.h> | |
22 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
23 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
25 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | |
26 | #include <linux/errno.h> | |
27 | #include <linux/sched.h> | |
28 | #include <linux/security.h> | |
29 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | |
30 | #include <linux/capability.h> | |
31 | #include <linux/unistd.h> | |
32 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
33 | #include <linux/mman.h> | |
34 | #include <linux/slab.h> | |
35 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> | |
36 | #include <linux/swap.h> | |
37 | #include <linux/smp_lock.h> | |
38 | #include <linux/spinlock.h> | |
39 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> | |
40 | #include <linux/file.h> | |
41 | #include <linux/namei.h> | |
42 | #include <linux/mount.h> | |
43 | #include <linux/ext2_fs.h> | |
44 | #include <linux/proc_fs.h> | |
45 | #include <linux/kd.h> | |
46 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> | |
47 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> | |
48 | #include <linux/tty.h> | |
49 | #include <net/icmp.h> | |
50 | #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */ | |
51 | #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ | |
52 | #include <asm/uaccess.h> | |
53 | #include <asm/semaphore.h> | |
54 | #include <asm/ioctls.h> | |
55 | #include <linux/bitops.h> | |
56 | #include <linux/interrupt.h> | |
57 | #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ | |
58 | #include <linux/netlink.h> | |
59 | #include <linux/tcp.h> | |
60 | #include <linux/udp.h> | |
61 | #include <linux/quota.h> | |
62 | #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */ | |
63 | #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */ | |
64 | #include <linux/parser.h> | |
65 | #include <linux/nfs_mount.h> | |
66 | #include <net/ipv6.h> | |
67 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> | |
68 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
69 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> | |
70 | #include <linux/audit.h> | |
71 | #include <linux/string.h> | |
72 | ||
73 | #include "avc.h" | |
74 | #include "objsec.h" | |
75 | #include "netif.h" | |
76 | ||
77 | #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" | |
78 | #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX | |
79 | ||
80 | extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; | |
81 | extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); | |
82 | ||
83 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP | |
84 | int selinux_enforcing = 0; | |
85 | ||
86 | static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) | |
87 | { | |
88 | selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0); | |
89 | return 1; | |
90 | } | |
91 | __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); | |
92 | #endif | |
93 | ||
94 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM | |
95 | int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; | |
96 | ||
97 | static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) | |
98 | { | |
99 | selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); | |
100 | return 1; | |
101 | } | |
102 | __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); | |
103 | #endif | |
104 | ||
105 | /* Original (dummy) security module. */ | |
106 | static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL; | |
107 | ||
108 | /* Minimal support for a secondary security module, | |
109 | just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules. | |
110 | The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary | |
111 | module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */ | |
112 | static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL; | |
113 | ||
114 | /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized | |
115 | before the policy was loaded. */ | |
116 | static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head); | |
117 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock); | |
118 | ||
119 | /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */ | |
120 | ||
121 | static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task) | |
122 | { | |
123 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
124 | ||
125 | tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
126 | if (!tsec) | |
127 | return -ENOMEM; | |
128 | ||
129 | tsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
130 | tsec->task = task; | |
131 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
132 | task->security = tsec; | |
133 | ||
134 | return 0; | |
135 | } | |
136 | ||
137 | static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task) | |
138 | { | |
139 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security; | |
140 | ||
141 | if (!tsec || tsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
142 | return; | |
143 | ||
144 | task->security = NULL; | |
145 | kfree(tsec); | |
146 | } | |
147 | ||
148 | static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) | |
149 | { | |
150 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
151 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
152 | ||
153 | isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
154 | if (!isec) | |
155 | return -ENOMEM; | |
156 | ||
157 | init_MUTEX(&isec->sem); | |
158 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); | |
159 | isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
160 | isec->inode = inode; | |
161 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
162 | isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; | |
163 | if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
164 | isec->task_sid = tsec->sid; | |
165 | else | |
166 | isec->task_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
167 | inode->i_security = isec; | |
168 | ||
169 | return 0; | |
170 | } | |
171 | ||
172 | static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) | |
173 | { | |
174 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
175 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
176 | ||
177 | if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
178 | return; | |
179 | ||
180 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
181 | if (!list_empty(&isec->list)) | |
182 | list_del_init(&isec->list); | |
183 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
184 | ||
185 | inode->i_security = NULL; | |
186 | kfree(isec); | |
187 | } | |
188 | ||
189 | static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file) | |
190 | { | |
191 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
192 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; | |
193 | ||
194 | fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_ATOMIC); | |
195 | if (!fsec) | |
196 | return -ENOMEM; | |
197 | ||
198 | fsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
199 | fsec->file = file; | |
200 | if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) { | |
201 | fsec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
202 | fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid; | |
203 | } else { | |
204 | fsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
205 | fsec->fown_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
206 | } | |
207 | file->f_security = fsec; | |
208 | ||
209 | return 0; | |
210 | } | |
211 | ||
212 | static void file_free_security(struct file *file) | |
213 | { | |
214 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; | |
215 | ||
216 | if (!fsec || fsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
217 | return; | |
218 | ||
219 | file->f_security = NULL; | |
220 | kfree(fsec); | |
221 | } | |
222 | ||
223 | static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
224 | { | |
225 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
226 | ||
227 | sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
228 | if (!sbsec) | |
229 | return -ENOMEM; | |
230 | ||
231 | init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem); | |
232 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list); | |
233 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); | |
234 | spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
235 | sbsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
236 | sbsec->sb = sb; | |
237 | sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
238 | sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; | |
239 | sb->s_security = sbsec; | |
240 | ||
241 | return 0; | |
242 | } | |
243 | ||
244 | static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
245 | { | |
246 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
247 | ||
248 | if (!sbsec || sbsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
249 | return; | |
250 | ||
251 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
252 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list)) | |
253 | list_del_init(&sbsec->list); | |
254 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
255 | ||
256 | sb->s_security = NULL; | |
257 | kfree(sbsec); | |
258 | } | |
259 | ||
260 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK | |
261 | static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) | |
262 | { | |
263 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; | |
264 | ||
265 | if (family != PF_UNIX) | |
266 | return 0; | |
267 | ||
268 | ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority); | |
269 | if (!ssec) | |
270 | return -ENOMEM; | |
271 | ||
272 | ssec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
273 | ssec->sk = sk; | |
274 | ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
275 | sk->sk_security = ssec; | |
276 | ||
277 | return 0; | |
278 | } | |
279 | ||
280 | static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) | |
281 | { | |
282 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security; | |
283 | ||
284 | if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX || ssec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
285 | return; | |
286 | ||
287 | sk->sk_security = NULL; | |
288 | kfree(ssec); | |
289 | } | |
290 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ | |
291 | ||
292 | /* The security server must be initialized before | |
293 | any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */ | |
294 | extern int ss_initialized; | |
295 | ||
296 | /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */ | |
297 | ||
298 | static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = { | |
299 | "uses xattr", | |
300 | "uses transition SIDs", | |
301 | "uses task SIDs", | |
302 | "uses genfs_contexts", | |
303 | "not configured for labeling", | |
304 | "uses mountpoint labeling", | |
305 | }; | |
306 | ||
307 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); | |
308 | ||
309 | static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode) | |
310 | { | |
311 | return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); | |
312 | } | |
313 | ||
314 | enum { | |
315 | Opt_context = 1, | |
316 | Opt_fscontext = 2, | |
317 | Opt_defcontext = 4, | |
318 | }; | |
319 | ||
320 | static match_table_t tokens = { | |
321 | {Opt_context, "context=%s"}, | |
322 | {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"}, | |
323 | {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"}, | |
324 | }; | |
325 | ||
326 | #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n" | |
327 | ||
328 | static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |
329 | { | |
330 | char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL; | |
331 | const char *name; | |
332 | u32 sid; | |
333 | int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0; | |
334 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
335 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
336 | ||
337 | if (!data) | |
338 | goto out; | |
339 | ||
340 | name = sb->s_type->name; | |
341 | ||
342 | if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) { | |
343 | ||
344 | /* NFS we understand. */ | |
345 | if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) { | |
346 | struct nfs_mount_data *d = data; | |
347 | ||
348 | if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION) | |
349 | goto out; | |
350 | ||
351 | if (d->context[0]) { | |
352 | context = d->context; | |
353 | seen |= Opt_context; | |
354 | } | |
355 | } else | |
356 | goto out; | |
357 | ||
358 | } else { | |
359 | /* Standard string-based options. */ | |
360 | char *p, *options = data; | |
361 | ||
362 | while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) { | |
363 | int token; | |
364 | substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; | |
365 | ||
366 | if (!*p) | |
367 | continue; | |
368 | ||
369 | token = match_token(p, tokens, args); | |
370 | ||
371 | switch (token) { | |
372 | case Opt_context: | |
373 | if (seen) { | |
374 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
375 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
376 | goto out_free; | |
377 | } | |
378 | context = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
379 | if (!context) { | |
380 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
381 | goto out_free; | |
382 | } | |
383 | if (!alloc) | |
384 | alloc = 1; | |
385 | seen |= Opt_context; | |
386 | break; | |
387 | ||
388 | case Opt_fscontext: | |
389 | if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) { | |
390 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
391 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
392 | goto out_free; | |
393 | } | |
394 | context = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
395 | if (!context) { | |
396 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
397 | goto out_free; | |
398 | } | |
399 | if (!alloc) | |
400 | alloc = 1; | |
401 | seen |= Opt_fscontext; | |
402 | break; | |
403 | ||
404 | case Opt_defcontext: | |
405 | if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { | |
406 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
407 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: " | |
408 | "defcontext option is invalid " | |
409 | "for this filesystem type\n"); | |
410 | goto out_free; | |
411 | } | |
412 | if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) { | |
413 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
414 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); | |
415 | goto out_free; | |
416 | } | |
417 | defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); | |
418 | if (!defcontext) { | |
419 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
420 | goto out_free; | |
421 | } | |
422 | if (!alloc) | |
423 | alloc = 1; | |
424 | seen |= Opt_defcontext; | |
425 | break; | |
426 | ||
427 | default: | |
428 | rc = -EINVAL; | |
429 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount " | |
430 | "option\n"); | |
431 | goto out_free; | |
432 | ||
433 | } | |
434 | } | |
435 | } | |
436 | ||
437 | if (!seen) | |
438 | goto out; | |
439 | ||
440 | if (context) { | |
441 | rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid); | |
442 | if (rc) { | |
443 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" | |
444 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", | |
445 | context, sb->s_id, name, rc); | |
446 | goto out_free; | |
447 | } | |
448 | ||
449 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
450 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); | |
451 | if (rc) | |
452 | goto out_free; | |
453 | ||
454 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
455 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); | |
456 | if (rc) | |
457 | goto out_free; | |
458 | ||
459 | sbsec->sid = sid; | |
460 | ||
461 | if (seen & Opt_context) | |
462 | sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; | |
463 | } | |
464 | ||
465 | if (defcontext) { | |
466 | rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid); | |
467 | if (rc) { | |
468 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" | |
469 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", | |
470 | defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc); | |
471 | goto out_free; | |
472 | } | |
473 | ||
474 | if (sid == sbsec->def_sid) | |
475 | goto out_free; | |
476 | ||
477 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
478 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); | |
479 | if (rc) | |
480 | goto out_free; | |
481 | ||
482 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
483 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); | |
484 | if (rc) | |
485 | goto out_free; | |
486 | ||
487 | sbsec->def_sid = sid; | |
488 | } | |
489 | ||
490 | out_free: | |
491 | if (alloc) { | |
492 | kfree(context); | |
493 | kfree(defcontext); | |
494 | } | |
495 | out: | |
496 | return rc; | |
497 | } | |
498 | ||
499 | static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |
500 | { | |
501 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
502 | struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; | |
503 | struct inode *inode = root->d_inode; | |
504 | int rc = 0; | |
505 | ||
506 | down(&sbsec->sem); | |
507 | if (sbsec->initialized) | |
508 | goto out; | |
509 | ||
510 | if (!ss_initialized) { | |
511 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, | |
512 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security | |
513 | server is ready to handle calls. */ | |
514 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
515 | if (list_empty(&sbsec->list)) | |
516 | list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head); | |
517 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
518 | goto out; | |
519 | } | |
520 | ||
521 | /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ | |
522 | rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); | |
523 | if (rc) { | |
524 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", | |
525 | __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc); | |
526 | goto out; | |
527 | } | |
528 | ||
529 | rc = try_context_mount(sb, data); | |
530 | if (rc) | |
531 | goto out; | |
532 | ||
533 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { | |
534 | /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no | |
535 | error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on | |
536 | the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be | |
537 | the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have | |
538 | assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ | |
539 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { | |
540 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " | |
541 | "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | |
542 | rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
543 | goto out; | |
544 | } | |
545 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); | |
546 | if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { | |
547 | if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) | |
548 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " | |
549 | "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", | |
550 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | |
551 | else | |
552 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " | |
553 | "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, | |
554 | sb->s_type->name, -rc); | |
555 | goto out; | |
556 | } | |
557 | } | |
558 | ||
559 | if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) | |
560 | sbsec->proc = 1; | |
561 | ||
562 | sbsec->initialized = 1; | |
563 | ||
564 | if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) { | |
565 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", | |
566 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); | |
567 | } | |
568 | else { | |
569 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", | |
570 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, | |
571 | labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); | |
572 | } | |
573 | ||
574 | /* Initialize the root inode. */ | |
575 | rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root); | |
576 | ||
577 | /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. | |
578 | inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created | |
579 | during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly | |
580 | populates itself. */ | |
581 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
582 | next_inode: | |
583 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { | |
584 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = | |
585 | list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next, | |
586 | struct inode_security_struct, list); | |
587 | struct inode *inode = isec->inode; | |
588 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
589 | inode = igrab(inode); | |
590 | if (inode) { | |
591 | if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode)) | |
592 | inode_doinit(inode); | |
593 | iput(inode); | |
594 | } | |
595 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
596 | list_del_init(&isec->list); | |
597 | goto next_inode; | |
598 | } | |
599 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
600 | out: | |
601 | up(&sbsec->sem); | |
602 | return rc; | |
603 | } | |
604 | ||
605 | static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) | |
606 | { | |
607 | switch (mode & S_IFMT) { | |
608 | case S_IFSOCK: | |
609 | return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE; | |
610 | case S_IFLNK: | |
611 | return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE; | |
612 | case S_IFREG: | |
613 | return SECCLASS_FILE; | |
614 | case S_IFBLK: | |
615 | return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE; | |
616 | case S_IFDIR: | |
617 | return SECCLASS_DIR; | |
618 | case S_IFCHR: | |
619 | return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; | |
620 | case S_IFIFO: | |
621 | return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE; | |
622 | ||
623 | } | |
624 | ||
625 | return SECCLASS_FILE; | |
626 | } | |
627 | ||
628 | static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol) | |
629 | { | |
630 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP); | |
631 | } | |
632 | ||
633 | static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) | |
634 | { | |
635 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP); | |
636 | } | |
637 | ||
638 | static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) | |
639 | { | |
640 | switch (family) { | |
641 | case PF_UNIX: | |
642 | switch (type) { | |
643 | case SOCK_STREAM: | |
644 | case SOCK_SEQPACKET: | |
645 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; | |
646 | case SOCK_DGRAM: | |
647 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; | |
648 | } | |
649 | break; | |
650 | case PF_INET: | |
651 | case PF_INET6: | |
652 | switch (type) { | |
653 | case SOCK_STREAM: | |
654 | if (default_protocol_stream(protocol)) | |
655 | return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET; | |
656 | else | |
657 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; | |
658 | case SOCK_DGRAM: | |
659 | if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol)) | |
660 | return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; | |
661 | else | |
662 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; | |
663 | default: | |
664 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; | |
665 | } | |
666 | break; | |
667 | case PF_NETLINK: | |
668 | switch (protocol) { | |
669 | case NETLINK_ROUTE: | |
670 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; | |
671 | case NETLINK_FIREWALL: | |
672 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET; | |
673 | case NETLINK_INET_DIAG: | |
674 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; | |
675 | case NETLINK_NFLOG: | |
676 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET; | |
677 | case NETLINK_XFRM: | |
678 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; | |
679 | case NETLINK_SELINUX: | |
680 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; | |
681 | case NETLINK_AUDIT: | |
682 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; | |
683 | case NETLINK_IP6_FW: | |
684 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET; | |
685 | case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: | |
686 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; | |
687 | case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: | |
688 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; | |
689 | default: | |
690 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; | |
691 | } | |
692 | case PF_PACKET: | |
693 | return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET; | |
694 | case PF_KEY: | |
695 | return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET; | |
696 | } | |
697 | ||
698 | return SECCLASS_SOCKET; | |
699 | } | |
700 | ||
701 | #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS | |
702 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, | |
703 | u16 tclass, | |
704 | u32 *sid) | |
705 | { | |
706 | int buflen, rc; | |
707 | char *buffer, *path, *end; | |
708 | ||
709 | buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); | |
710 | if (!buffer) | |
711 | return -ENOMEM; | |
712 | ||
713 | buflen = PAGE_SIZE; | |
714 | end = buffer+buflen; | |
715 | *--end = '\0'; | |
716 | buflen--; | |
717 | path = end-1; | |
718 | *path = '/'; | |
719 | while (de && de != de->parent) { | |
720 | buflen -= de->namelen + 1; | |
721 | if (buflen < 0) | |
722 | break; | |
723 | end -= de->namelen; | |
724 | memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen); | |
725 | *--end = '/'; | |
726 | path = end; | |
727 | de = de->parent; | |
728 | } | |
729 | rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); | |
730 | free_page((unsigned long)buffer); | |
731 | return rc; | |
732 | } | |
733 | #else | |
734 | static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, | |
735 | u16 tclass, | |
736 | u32 *sid) | |
737 | { | |
738 | return -EINVAL; | |
739 | } | |
740 | #endif | |
741 | ||
742 | /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ | |
743 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) | |
744 | { | |
745 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; | |
746 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
747 | u32 sid; | |
748 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
749 | #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 | |
750 | char *context = NULL; | |
751 | unsigned len = 0; | |
752 | int rc = 0; | |
753 | int hold_sem = 0; | |
754 | ||
755 | if (isec->initialized) | |
756 | goto out; | |
757 | ||
758 | down(&isec->sem); | |
759 | hold_sem = 1; | |
760 | if (isec->initialized) | |
761 | goto out; | |
762 | ||
763 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
764 | if (!sbsec->initialized) { | |
765 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, | |
766 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security | |
767 | server is ready to handle calls. */ | |
768 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
769 | if (list_empty(&isec->list)) | |
770 | list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); | |
771 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); | |
772 | goto out; | |
773 | } | |
774 | ||
775 | switch (sbsec->behavior) { | |
776 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: | |
777 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { | |
778 | isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid; | |
779 | break; | |
780 | } | |
781 | ||
782 | /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. | |
783 | Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */ | |
784 | if (opt_dentry) { | |
785 | /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */ | |
786 | dentry = dget(opt_dentry); | |
787 | } else { | |
788 | /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */ | |
789 | dentry = d_find_alias(inode); | |
790 | } | |
791 | if (!dentry) { | |
792 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s " | |
793 | "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id, | |
794 | inode->i_ino); | |
795 | goto out; | |
796 | } | |
797 | ||
798 | len = INITCONTEXTLEN; | |
799 | context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
800 | if (!context) { | |
801 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
802 | dput(dentry); | |
803 | goto out; | |
804 | } | |
805 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | |
806 | context, len); | |
807 | if (rc == -ERANGE) { | |
808 | /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ | |
809 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | |
810 | NULL, 0); | |
811 | if (rc < 0) { | |
812 | dput(dentry); | |
813 | goto out; | |
814 | } | |
815 | kfree(context); | |
816 | len = rc; | |
817 | context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
818 | if (!context) { | |
819 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
820 | dput(dentry); | |
821 | goto out; | |
822 | } | |
823 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, | |
824 | XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, | |
825 | context, len); | |
826 | } | |
827 | dput(dentry); | |
828 | if (rc < 0) { | |
829 | if (rc != -ENODATA) { | |
830 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned " | |
831 | "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, | |
832 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); | |
833 | kfree(context); | |
834 | goto out; | |
835 | } | |
836 | /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ | |
837 | sid = sbsec->def_sid; | |
838 | rc = 0; | |
839 | } else { | |
840 | rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid, | |
841 | sbsec->def_sid); | |
842 | if (rc) { | |
843 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) " | |
844 | "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", | |
845 | __FUNCTION__, context, -rc, | |
846 | inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); | |
847 | kfree(context); | |
848 | /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ | |
849 | rc = 0; | |
850 | break; | |
851 | } | |
852 | } | |
853 | kfree(context); | |
854 | isec->sid = sid; | |
855 | break; | |
856 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: | |
857 | isec->sid = isec->task_sid; | |
858 | break; | |
859 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: | |
860 | /* Default to the fs SID. */ | |
861 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; | |
862 | ||
863 | /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ | |
864 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
865 | rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, | |
866 | sbsec->sid, | |
867 | isec->sclass, | |
868 | &sid); | |
869 | if (rc) | |
870 | goto out; | |
871 | isec->sid = sid; | |
872 | break; | |
873 | default: | |
874 | /* Default to the fs SID. */ | |
875 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; | |
876 | ||
877 | if (sbsec->proc) { | |
878 | struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode); | |
879 | if (proci->pde) { | |
880 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
881 | rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde, | |
882 | isec->sclass, | |
883 | &sid); | |
884 | if (rc) | |
885 | goto out; | |
886 | isec->sid = sid; | |
887 | } | |
888 | } | |
889 | break; | |
890 | } | |
891 | ||
892 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
893 | ||
894 | out: | |
895 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) | |
896 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
897 | ||
898 | if (hold_sem) | |
899 | up(&isec->sem); | |
900 | return rc; | |
901 | } | |
902 | ||
903 | /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */ | |
904 | static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) | |
905 | { | |
906 | u32 perm = 0; | |
907 | ||
908 | switch (sig) { | |
909 | case SIGCHLD: | |
910 | /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */ | |
911 | perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD; | |
912 | break; | |
913 | case SIGKILL: | |
914 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ | |
915 | perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL; | |
916 | break; | |
917 | case SIGSTOP: | |
918 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ | |
919 | perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP; | |
920 | break; | |
921 | default: | |
922 | /* All other signals. */ | |
923 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL; | |
924 | break; | |
925 | } | |
926 | ||
927 | return perm; | |
928 | } | |
929 | ||
930 | /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks, | |
931 | fork check, ptrace check, etc. */ | |
932 | static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1, | |
933 | struct task_struct *tsk2, | |
934 | u32 perms) | |
935 | { | |
936 | struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2; | |
937 | ||
938 | tsec1 = tsk1->security; | |
939 | tsec2 = tsk2->security; | |
940 | return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid, | |
941 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); | |
942 | } | |
943 | ||
944 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ | |
945 | static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
946 | int cap) | |
947 | { | |
948 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
949 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
950 | ||
951 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
952 | ||
953 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP); | |
954 | ad.tsk = tsk; | |
955 | ad.u.cap = cap; | |
956 | ||
957 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, | |
958 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad); | |
959 | } | |
960 | ||
961 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */ | |
962 | static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
963 | u32 perms) | |
964 | { | |
965 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
966 | ||
967 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
968 | ||
969 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, | |
970 | SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL); | |
971 | } | |
972 | ||
973 | /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode. | |
974 | The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit | |
975 | data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */ | |
976 | static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
977 | struct inode *inode, | |
978 | u32 perms, | |
979 | struct avc_audit_data *adp) | |
980 | { | |
981 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
982 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
983 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
984 | ||
985 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
986 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
987 | ||
988 | if (!adp) { | |
989 | adp = &ad; | |
990 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
991 | ad.u.fs.inode = inode; | |
992 | } | |
993 | ||
994 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); | |
995 | } | |
996 | ||
997 | /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing | |
998 | the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the | |
999 | pathname if needed. */ | |
1000 | static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1001 | struct vfsmount *mnt, | |
1002 | struct dentry *dentry, | |
1003 | u32 av) | |
1004 | { | |
1005 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
1006 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1007 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1008 | ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt; | |
1009 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1010 | return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad); | |
1011 | } | |
1012 | ||
1013 | /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to | |
1014 | access an inode in a given way. Check access to the | |
1015 | descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to | |
1016 | check a particular permission to the file. | |
1017 | Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it | |
1018 | has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then | |
1019 | access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases | |
1020 | where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ | |
1021 | static inline int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1022 | struct file *file, | |
1023 | u32 av) | |
1024 | { | |
1025 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; | |
1026 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; | |
1027 | struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt; | |
1028 | struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry; | |
1029 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
1030 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1031 | int rc; | |
1032 | ||
1033 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1034 | ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt; | |
1035 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1036 | ||
1037 | if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) { | |
1038 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid, | |
1039 | SECCLASS_FD, | |
1040 | FD__USE, | |
1041 | &ad); | |
1042 | if (rc) | |
1043 | return rc; | |
1044 | } | |
1045 | ||
1046 | /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ | |
1047 | if (av) | |
1048 | return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad); | |
1049 | ||
1050 | return 0; | |
1051 | } | |
1052 | ||
1053 | /* Check whether a task can create a file. */ | |
1054 | static int may_create(struct inode *dir, | |
1055 | struct dentry *dentry, | |
1056 | u16 tclass) | |
1057 | { | |
1058 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1059 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; | |
1060 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
1061 | u32 newsid; | |
1062 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1063 | int rc; | |
1064 | ||
1065 | tsec = current->security; | |
1066 | dsec = dir->i_security; | |
1067 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; | |
1068 | ||
1069 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1070 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1071 | ||
1072 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, | |
1073 | DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, | |
1074 | &ad); | |
1075 | if (rc) | |
1076 | return rc; | |
1077 | ||
1078 | if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { | |
1079 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; | |
1080 | } else { | |
1081 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass, | |
1082 | &newsid); | |
1083 | if (rc) | |
1084 | return rc; | |
1085 | } | |
1086 | ||
1087 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); | |
1088 | if (rc) | |
1089 | return rc; | |
1090 | ||
1091 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid, | |
1092 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
1093 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
1094 | } | |
1095 | ||
1096 | #define MAY_LINK 0 | |
1097 | #define MAY_UNLINK 1 | |
1098 | #define MAY_RMDIR 2 | |
1099 | ||
1100 | /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */ | |
1101 | static int may_link(struct inode *dir, | |
1102 | struct dentry *dentry, | |
1103 | int kind) | |
1104 | ||
1105 | { | |
1106 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1107 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; | |
1108 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1109 | u32 av; | |
1110 | int rc; | |
1111 | ||
1112 | tsec = current->security; | |
1113 | dsec = dir->i_security; | |
1114 | isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security; | |
1115 | ||
1116 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1117 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
1118 | ||
1119 | av = DIR__SEARCH; | |
1120 | av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); | |
1121 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); | |
1122 | if (rc) | |
1123 | return rc; | |
1124 | ||
1125 | switch (kind) { | |
1126 | case MAY_LINK: | |
1127 | av = FILE__LINK; | |
1128 | break; | |
1129 | case MAY_UNLINK: | |
1130 | av = FILE__UNLINK; | |
1131 | break; | |
1132 | case MAY_RMDIR: | |
1133 | av = DIR__RMDIR; | |
1134 | break; | |
1135 | default: | |
1136 | printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind); | |
1137 | return 0; | |
1138 | } | |
1139 | ||
1140 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); | |
1141 | return rc; | |
1142 | } | |
1143 | ||
1144 | static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, | |
1145 | struct dentry *old_dentry, | |
1146 | struct inode *new_dir, | |
1147 | struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
1148 | { | |
1149 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1150 | struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; | |
1151 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1152 | u32 av; | |
1153 | int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; | |
1154 | int rc; | |
1155 | ||
1156 | tsec = current->security; | |
1157 | old_dsec = old_dir->i_security; | |
1158 | old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security; | |
1159 | old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); | |
1160 | new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; | |
1161 | ||
1162 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1163 | ||
1164 | ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry; | |
1165 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, | |
1166 | DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); | |
1167 | if (rc) | |
1168 | return rc; | |
1169 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid, | |
1170 | old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); | |
1171 | if (rc) | |
1172 | return rc; | |
1173 | if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { | |
1174 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid, | |
1175 | old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); | |
1176 | if (rc) | |
1177 | return rc; | |
1178 | } | |
1179 | ||
1180 | ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry; | |
1181 | av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; | |
1182 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) | |
1183 | av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; | |
1184 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); | |
1185 | if (rc) | |
1186 | return rc; | |
1187 | if (new_dentry->d_inode) { | |
1188 | new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security; | |
1189 | new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); | |
1190 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid, | |
1191 | new_isec->sclass, | |
1192 | (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); | |
1193 | if (rc) | |
1194 | return rc; | |
1195 | } | |
1196 | ||
1197 | return 0; | |
1198 | } | |
1199 | ||
1200 | /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */ | |
1201 | static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
1202 | struct super_block *sb, | |
1203 | u32 perms, | |
1204 | struct avc_audit_data *ad) | |
1205 | { | |
1206 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1207 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
1208 | ||
1209 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
1210 | sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
1211 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
1212 | perms, ad); | |
1213 | } | |
1214 | ||
1215 | /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ | |
1216 | static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) | |
1217 | { | |
1218 | u32 av = 0; | |
1219 | ||
1220 | if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) { | |
1221 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) | |
1222 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; | |
1223 | if (mask & MAY_READ) | |
1224 | av |= FILE__READ; | |
1225 | ||
1226 | if (mask & MAY_APPEND) | |
1227 | av |= FILE__APPEND; | |
1228 | else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) | |
1229 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
1230 | ||
1231 | } else { | |
1232 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) | |
1233 | av |= DIR__SEARCH; | |
1234 | if (mask & MAY_WRITE) | |
1235 | av |= DIR__WRITE; | |
1236 | if (mask & MAY_READ) | |
1237 | av |= DIR__READ; | |
1238 | } | |
1239 | ||
1240 | return av; | |
1241 | } | |
1242 | ||
1243 | /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ | |
1244 | static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) | |
1245 | { | |
1246 | u32 av = 0; | |
1247 | ||
1248 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) | |
1249 | av |= FILE__READ; | |
1250 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { | |
1251 | if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND) | |
1252 | av |= FILE__APPEND; | |
1253 | else | |
1254 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
1255 | } | |
1256 | ||
1257 | return av; | |
1258 | } | |
1259 | ||
1260 | /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */ | |
1261 | static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid) | |
1262 | { | |
1263 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
1264 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
1265 | ||
1266 | if (!sbsec->initialized) { | |
1267 | /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ | |
1268 | return 0; | |
1269 | } | |
1270 | ||
1271 | down(&isec->sem); | |
1272 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); | |
1273 | isec->sid = sid; | |
1274 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
1275 | up(&isec->sem); | |
1276 | return 0; | |
1277 | } | |
1278 | ||
1279 | /* Hook functions begin here. */ | |
1280 | ||
1281 | static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) | |
1282 | { | |
1283 | struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security; | |
1284 | struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security; | |
1285 | int rc; | |
1286 | ||
1287 | rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child); | |
1288 | if (rc) | |
1289 | return rc; | |
1290 | ||
1291 | rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE); | |
1292 | /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */ | |
1293 | if (!rc) | |
1294 | csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid; | |
1295 | return rc; | |
1296 | } | |
1297 | ||
1298 | static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
1299 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1300 | { | |
1301 | int error; | |
1302 | ||
1303 | error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP); | |
1304 | if (error) | |
1305 | return error; | |
1306 | ||
1307 | return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); | |
1308 | } | |
1309 | ||
1310 | static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
1311 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1312 | { | |
1313 | int error; | |
1314 | ||
1315 | error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); | |
1316 | if (error) | |
1317 | return error; | |
1318 | ||
1319 | return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP); | |
1320 | } | |
1321 | ||
1322 | static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
1323 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1324 | { | |
1325 | secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); | |
1326 | } | |
1327 | ||
1328 | static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) | |
1329 | { | |
1330 | int rc; | |
1331 | ||
1332 | rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap); | |
1333 | if (rc) | |
1334 | return rc; | |
1335 | ||
1336 | return task_has_capability(tsk,cap); | |
1337 | } | |
1338 | ||
1339 | static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) | |
1340 | { | |
1341 | int error = 0; | |
1342 | u32 av; | |
1343 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1344 | u32 tsid; | |
1345 | int rc; | |
1346 | ||
1347 | rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op); | |
1348 | if (rc) | |
1349 | return rc; | |
1350 | ||
1351 | tsec = current->security; | |
1352 | ||
1353 | rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ? | |
1354 | SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid); | |
1355 | if (rc) { | |
1356 | /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */ | |
1357 | tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL; | |
1358 | } | |
1359 | ||
1360 | /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating | |
1361 | * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */ | |
1362 | if(op == 001) { | |
1363 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid, | |
1364 | SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL); | |
1365 | } else { | |
1366 | av = 0; | |
1367 | if (op & 004) | |
1368 | av |= FILE__READ; | |
1369 | if (op & 002) | |
1370 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
1371 | if (av) | |
1372 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid, | |
1373 | SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL); | |
1374 | } | |
1375 | ||
1376 | return error; | |
1377 | } | |
1378 | ||
1379 | static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) | |
1380 | { | |
1381 | int rc = 0; | |
1382 | ||
1383 | if (!sb) | |
1384 | return 0; | |
1385 | ||
1386 | switch (cmds) { | |
1387 | case Q_SYNC: | |
1388 | case Q_QUOTAON: | |
1389 | case Q_QUOTAOFF: | |
1390 | case Q_SETINFO: | |
1391 | case Q_SETQUOTA: | |
1392 | rc = superblock_has_perm(current, | |
1393 | sb, | |
1394 | FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL); | |
1395 | break; | |
1396 | case Q_GETFMT: | |
1397 | case Q_GETINFO: | |
1398 | case Q_GETQUOTA: | |
1399 | rc = superblock_has_perm(current, | |
1400 | sb, | |
1401 | FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL); | |
1402 | break; | |
1403 | default: | |
1404 | rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */ | |
1405 | break; | |
1406 | } | |
1407 | return rc; | |
1408 | } | |
1409 | ||
1410 | static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) | |
1411 | { | |
1412 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON); | |
1413 | } | |
1414 | ||
1415 | static int selinux_syslog(int type) | |
1416 | { | |
1417 | int rc; | |
1418 | ||
1419 | rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type); | |
1420 | if (rc) | |
1421 | return rc; | |
1422 | ||
1423 | switch (type) { | |
1424 | case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */ | |
1425 | case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */ | |
1426 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ); | |
1427 | break; | |
1428 | case 6: /* Disable logging to console */ | |
1429 | case 7: /* Enable logging to console */ | |
1430 | case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */ | |
1431 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE); | |
1432 | break; | |
1433 | case 0: /* Close log */ | |
1434 | case 1: /* Open log */ | |
1435 | case 2: /* Read from log */ | |
1436 | case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */ | |
1437 | case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */ | |
1438 | default: | |
1439 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD); | |
1440 | break; | |
1441 | } | |
1442 | return rc; | |
1443 | } | |
1444 | ||
1445 | /* | |
1446 | * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual | |
1447 | * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to | |
1448 | * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. | |
1449 | * | |
1450 | * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0 | |
1451 | * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if | |
1452 | * the capability is granted. | |
1453 | * | |
1454 | * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all | |
1455 | * processes that allocate mappings. | |
1456 | */ | |
1457 | static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages) | |
1458 | { | |
1459 | int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; | |
1460 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
1461 | ||
1462 | rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); | |
1463 | if (rc == 0) | |
1464 | rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, | |
1465 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, | |
1466 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), | |
1467 | NULL); | |
1468 | ||
1469 | if (rc == 0) | |
1470 | cap_sys_admin = 1; | |
1471 | ||
1472 | return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin); | |
1473 | } | |
1474 | ||
1475 | /* binprm security operations */ | |
1476 | ||
1477 | static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1478 | { | |
1479 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1480 | ||
1481 | bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1482 | if (!bsec) | |
1483 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1484 | ||
1485 | bsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
1486 | bsec->bprm = bprm; | |
1487 | bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
1488 | bsec->set = 0; | |
1489 | ||
1490 | bprm->security = bsec; | |
1491 | return 0; | |
1492 | } | |
1493 | ||
1494 | static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1495 | { | |
1496 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1497 | struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode; | |
1498 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
1499 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1500 | u32 newsid; | |
1501 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1502 | int rc; | |
1503 | ||
1504 | rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm); | |
1505 | if (rc) | |
1506 | return rc; | |
1507 | ||
1508 | bsec = bprm->security; | |
1509 | ||
1510 | if (bsec->set) | |
1511 | return 0; | |
1512 | ||
1513 | tsec = current->security; | |
1514 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
1515 | ||
1516 | /* Default to the current task SID. */ | |
1517 | bsec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
1518 | ||
1519 | /* Reset create SID on execve. */ | |
1520 | tsec->create_sid = 0; | |
1521 | ||
1522 | if (tsec->exec_sid) { | |
1523 | newsid = tsec->exec_sid; | |
1524 | /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ | |
1525 | tsec->exec_sid = 0; | |
1526 | } else { | |
1527 | /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ | |
1528 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid, | |
1529 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid); | |
1530 | if (rc) | |
1531 | return rc; | |
1532 | } | |
1533 | ||
1534 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); | |
1535 | ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt; | |
1536 | ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry; | |
1537 | ||
1538 | if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) | |
1539 | newsid = tsec->sid; | |
1540 | ||
1541 | if (tsec->sid == newsid) { | |
1542 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, | |
1543 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); | |
1544 | if (rc) | |
1545 | return rc; | |
1546 | } else { | |
1547 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ | |
1548 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, | |
1549 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); | |
1550 | if (rc) | |
1551 | return rc; | |
1552 | ||
1553 | rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid, | |
1554 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); | |
1555 | if (rc) | |
1556 | return rc; | |
1557 | ||
1558 | /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ | |
1559 | current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; | |
1560 | ||
1561 | /* Set the security field to the new SID. */ | |
1562 | bsec->sid = newsid; | |
1563 | } | |
1564 | ||
1565 | bsec->set = 1; | |
1566 | return 0; | |
1567 | } | |
1568 | ||
1569 | static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1570 | { | |
1571 | return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm); | |
1572 | } | |
1573 | ||
1574 | ||
1575 | static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1576 | { | |
1577 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
1578 | int atsecure = 0; | |
1579 | ||
1580 | if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) { | |
1581 | /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless | |
1582 | the noatsecure permission is granted between | |
1583 | the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ | |
1584 | atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, | |
1585 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1586 | PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); | |
1587 | } | |
1588 | ||
1589 | return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm)); | |
1590 | } | |
1591 | ||
1592 | static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1593 | { | |
1594 | kfree(bprm->security); | |
1595 | bprm->security = NULL; | |
1596 | } | |
1597 | ||
1598 | extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount; | |
1599 | extern struct dentry *selinux_null; | |
1600 | ||
1601 | /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ | |
1602 | static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files) | |
1603 | { | |
1604 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1605 | struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; | |
1606 | struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty; | |
1607 | struct fdtable *fdt; | |
1608 | long j = -1; | |
1609 | ||
1610 | if (tty) { | |
1611 | file_list_lock(); | |
1612 | file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list); | |
1613 | if (file) { | |
1614 | /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. | |
1615 | Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather | |
1616 | than using file_has_perm, as this particular open | |
1617 | file may belong to another process and we are only | |
1618 | interested in the inode-based check here. */ | |
1619 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; | |
1620 | if (inode_has_perm(current, inode, | |
1621 | FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) { | |
1622 | /* Reset controlling tty. */ | |
1623 | current->signal->tty = NULL; | |
1624 | current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0; | |
1625 | } | |
1626 | } | |
1627 | file_list_unlock(); | |
1628 | } | |
1629 | ||
1630 | /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ | |
1631 | ||
1632 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1633 | ||
1634 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); | |
1635 | for (;;) { | |
1636 | unsigned long set, i; | |
1637 | int fd; | |
1638 | ||
1639 | j++; | |
1640 | i = j * __NFDBITS; | |
1641 | fdt = files_fdtable(files); | |
1642 | if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset) | |
1643 | break; | |
1644 | set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j]; | |
1645 | if (!set) | |
1646 | continue; | |
1647 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); | |
1648 | for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) { | |
1649 | if (set & 1) { | |
1650 | file = fget(i); | |
1651 | if (!file) | |
1652 | continue; | |
1653 | if (file_has_perm(current, | |
1654 | file, | |
1655 | file_to_av(file))) { | |
1656 | sys_close(i); | |
1657 | fd = get_unused_fd(); | |
1658 | if (fd != i) { | |
1659 | if (fd >= 0) | |
1660 | put_unused_fd(fd); | |
1661 | fput(file); | |
1662 | continue; | |
1663 | } | |
1664 | if (devnull) { | |
1665 | rcuref_inc(&devnull->f_count); | |
1666 | } else { | |
1667 | devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR); | |
1668 | if (!devnull) { | |
1669 | put_unused_fd(fd); | |
1670 | fput(file); | |
1671 | continue; | |
1672 | } | |
1673 | } | |
1674 | fd_install(fd, devnull); | |
1675 | } | |
1676 | fput(file); | |
1677 | } | |
1678 | } | |
1679 | spin_lock(&files->file_lock); | |
1680 | ||
1681 | } | |
1682 | spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); | |
1683 | } | |
1684 | ||
1685 | static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) | |
1686 | { | |
1687 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1688 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1689 | u32 sid; | |
1690 | int rc; | |
1691 | ||
1692 | secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe); | |
1693 | ||
1694 | tsec = current->security; | |
1695 | ||
1696 | bsec = bprm->security; | |
1697 | sid = bsec->sid; | |
1698 | ||
1699 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid; | |
1700 | bsec->unsafe = 0; | |
1701 | if (tsec->sid != sid) { | |
1702 | /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID | |
1703 | unchanged and kill. */ | |
1704 | if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { | |
1705 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1706 | PROCESS__SHARE, NULL); | |
1707 | if (rc) { | |
1708 | bsec->unsafe = 1; | |
1709 | return; | |
1710 | } | |
1711 | } | |
1712 | ||
1713 | /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. | |
1714 | Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */ | |
1715 | if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { | |
1716 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, | |
1717 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, | |
1718 | NULL); | |
1719 | if (rc) { | |
1720 | bsec->unsafe = 1; | |
1721 | return; | |
1722 | } | |
1723 | } | |
1724 | tsec->sid = sid; | |
1725 | } | |
1726 | } | |
1727 | ||
1728 | /* | |
1729 | * called after apply_creds without the task lock held | |
1730 | */ | |
1731 | static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1732 | { | |
1733 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1734 | struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; | |
1735 | struct itimerval itimer; | |
1736 | struct bprm_security_struct *bsec; | |
1737 | int rc, i; | |
1738 | ||
1739 | tsec = current->security; | |
1740 | bsec = bprm->security; | |
1741 | ||
1742 | if (bsec->unsafe) { | |
1743 | force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current); | |
1744 | return; | |
1745 | } | |
1746 | if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid) | |
1747 | return; | |
1748 | ||
1749 | /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ | |
1750 | flush_unauthorized_files(current->files); | |
1751 | ||
1752 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state | |
1753 | from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid | |
1754 | subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock | |
1755 | signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has | |
1756 | been updated so that any kill done after the flush | |
1757 | will be checked against the new SID. */ | |
1758 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1759 | PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); | |
1760 | if (rc) { | |
1761 | memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer); | |
1762 | for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) | |
1763 | do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL); | |
1764 | flush_signals(current); | |
1765 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); | |
1766 | flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); | |
1767 | sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); | |
1768 | recalc_sigpending(); | |
1769 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); | |
1770 | } | |
1771 | ||
1772 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits | |
1773 | from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to | |
1774 | the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init | |
1775 | task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits | |
1776 | (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit | |
1777 | check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into | |
1778 | the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher | |
1779 | than the default soft limit for cases where the default | |
1780 | is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or | |
1781 | RLIMIT_STACK.*/ | |
1782 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
1783 | PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); | |
1784 | if (rc) { | |
1785 | for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { | |
1786 | rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; | |
1787 | initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i; | |
1788 | rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur); | |
1789 | } | |
1790 | if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) { | |
1791 | /* | |
1792 | * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations | |
1793 | * to be refigured. | |
1794 | */ | |
1795 | current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1); | |
1796 | } | |
1797 | } | |
1798 | ||
1799 | /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can | |
1800 | recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */ | |
1801 | wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit); | |
1802 | } | |
1803 | ||
1804 | /* superblock security operations */ | |
1805 | ||
1806 | static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
1807 | { | |
1808 | return superblock_alloc_security(sb); | |
1809 | } | |
1810 | ||
1811 | static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
1812 | { | |
1813 | superblock_free_security(sb); | |
1814 | } | |
1815 | ||
1816 | static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen) | |
1817 | { | |
1818 | if (plen > olen) | |
1819 | return 0; | |
1820 | ||
1821 | return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen); | |
1822 | } | |
1823 | ||
1824 | static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len) | |
1825 | { | |
1826 | return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) || | |
1827 | match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) || | |
1828 | match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len)); | |
1829 | } | |
1830 | ||
1831 | static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len) | |
1832 | { | |
1833 | if (!*first) { | |
1834 | **to = ','; | |
1835 | *to += 1; | |
1836 | } | |
1837 | else | |
1838 | *first = 0; | |
1839 | memcpy(*to, from, len); | |
1840 | *to += len; | |
1841 | } | |
1842 | ||
1843 | static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy) | |
1844 | { | |
1845 | int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0; | |
1846 | char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end; | |
1847 | char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec; | |
1848 | ||
1849 | in_curr = orig; | |
1850 | sec_curr = copy; | |
1851 | ||
1852 | /* Binary mount data: just copy */ | |
1853 | if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) { | |
1854 | copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr); | |
1855 | goto out; | |
1856 | } | |
1857 | ||
1858 | nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); | |
1859 | if (!nosec) { | |
1860 | rc = -ENOMEM; | |
1861 | goto out; | |
1862 | } | |
1863 | ||
1864 | nosec_save = nosec; | |
1865 | fnosec = fsec = 1; | |
1866 | in_save = in_end = orig; | |
1867 | ||
1868 | do { | |
1869 | if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') { | |
1870 | int len = in_end - in_curr; | |
1871 | ||
1872 | if (selinux_option(in_curr, len)) | |
1873 | take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len); | |
1874 | else | |
1875 | take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len); | |
1876 | ||
1877 | in_curr = in_end + 1; | |
1878 | } | |
1879 | } while (*in_end++); | |
1880 | ||
1881 | strcpy(in_save, nosec_save); | |
1882 | free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save); | |
1883 | out: | |
1884 | return rc; | |
1885 | } | |
1886 | ||
1887 | static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) | |
1888 | { | |
1889 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1890 | int rc; | |
1891 | ||
1892 | rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data); | |
1893 | if (rc) | |
1894 | return rc; | |
1895 | ||
1896 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1897 | ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root; | |
1898 | return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); | |
1899 | } | |
1900 | ||
1901 | static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb) | |
1902 | { | |
1903 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
1904 | ||
1905 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
1906 | ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root; | |
1907 | return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); | |
1908 | } | |
1909 | ||
1910 | static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name, | |
1911 | struct nameidata *nd, | |
1912 | char * type, | |
1913 | unsigned long flags, | |
1914 | void * data) | |
1915 | { | |
1916 | int rc; | |
1917 | ||
1918 | rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data); | |
1919 | if (rc) | |
1920 | return rc; | |
1921 | ||
1922 | if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) | |
1923 | return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb, | |
1924 | FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL); | |
1925 | else | |
1926 | return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry, | |
1927 | FILE__MOUNTON); | |
1928 | } | |
1929 | ||
1930 | static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) | |
1931 | { | |
1932 | int rc; | |
1933 | ||
1934 | rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags); | |
1935 | if (rc) | |
1936 | return rc; | |
1937 | ||
1938 | return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb, | |
1939 | FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL); | |
1940 | } | |
1941 | ||
1942 | /* inode security operations */ | |
1943 | ||
1944 | static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) | |
1945 | { | |
1946 | return inode_alloc_security(inode); | |
1947 | } | |
1948 | ||
1949 | static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) | |
1950 | { | |
1951 | inode_free_security(inode); | |
1952 | } | |
1953 | ||
1954 | static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, | |
1955 | char **name, void **value, | |
1956 | size_t *len) | |
1957 | { | |
1958 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
1959 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; | |
1960 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
1961 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
1962 | u32 newsid, clen; | |
1963 | int rc; | |
1964 | char *namep = NULL, *context; | |
1965 | ||
1966 | tsec = current->security; | |
1967 | dsec = dir->i_security; | |
1968 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; | |
1969 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
1970 | ||
1971 | if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { | |
1972 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; | |
1973 | } else { | |
1974 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, | |
1975 | inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), | |
1976 | &newsid); | |
1977 | if (rc) { | |
1978 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: " | |
1979 | "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s " | |
1980 | "ino=%ld)\n", | |
1981 | __FUNCTION__, | |
1982 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); | |
1983 | return rc; | |
1984 | } | |
1985 | } | |
1986 | ||
1987 | inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid); | |
1988 | ||
1989 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) | |
1990 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
1991 | ||
1992 | if (name) { | |
1993 | namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1994 | if (!namep) | |
1995 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1996 | *name = namep; | |
1997 | } | |
1998 | ||
1999 | if (value && len) { | |
2000 | rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen); | |
2001 | if (rc) { | |
2002 | kfree(namep); | |
2003 | return rc; | |
2004 | } | |
2005 | *value = context; | |
2006 | *len = clen; | |
2007 | } | |
2008 | ||
2009 | return 0; | |
2010 | } | |
2011 | ||
2012 | static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask) | |
2013 | { | |
2014 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); | |
2015 | } | |
2016 | ||
2017 | static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
2018 | { | |
2019 | int rc; | |
2020 | ||
2021 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry); | |
2022 | if (rc) | |
2023 | return rc; | |
2024 | return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); | |
2025 | } | |
2026 | ||
2027 | static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) | |
2028 | { | |
2029 | int rc; | |
2030 | ||
2031 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry); | |
2032 | if (rc) | |
2033 | return rc; | |
2034 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); | |
2035 | } | |
2036 | ||
2037 | static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) | |
2038 | { | |
2039 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE); | |
2040 | } | |
2041 | ||
2042 | static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask) | |
2043 | { | |
2044 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR); | |
2045 | } | |
2046 | ||
2047 | static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) | |
2048 | { | |
2049 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR); | |
2050 | } | |
2051 | ||
2052 | static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) | |
2053 | { | |
2054 | int rc; | |
2055 | ||
2056 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev); | |
2057 | if (rc) | |
2058 | return rc; | |
2059 | ||
2060 | return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); | |
2061 | } | |
2062 | ||
2063 | static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, | |
2064 | struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) | |
2065 | { | |
2066 | return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry); | |
2067 | } | |
2068 | ||
2069 | static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) | |
2070 | { | |
2071 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); | |
2072 | } | |
2073 | ||
2074 | static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata) | |
2075 | { | |
2076 | int rc; | |
2077 | ||
2078 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata); | |
2079 | if (rc) | |
2080 | return rc; | |
2081 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); | |
2082 | } | |
2083 | ||
2084 | static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, | |
2085 | struct nameidata *nd) | |
2086 | { | |
2087 | int rc; | |
2088 | ||
2089 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd); | |
2090 | if (rc) | |
2091 | return rc; | |
2092 | ||
2093 | if (!mask) { | |
2094 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ | |
2095 | return 0; | |
2096 | } | |
2097 | ||
2098 | return inode_has_perm(current, inode, | |
2099 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL); | |
2100 | } | |
2101 | ||
2102 | static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) | |
2103 | { | |
2104 | int rc; | |
2105 | ||
2106 | rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr); | |
2107 | if (rc) | |
2108 | return rc; | |
2109 | ||
2110 | if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) | |
2111 | return 0; | |
2112 | ||
2113 | if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | | |
2114 | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET)) | |
2115 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2116 | ||
2117 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE); | |
2118 | } | |
2119 | ||
2120 | static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) | |
2121 | { | |
2122 | return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2123 | } | |
2124 | ||
2125 | static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
2126 | { | |
2127 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; | |
2128 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
2129 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2130 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
2131 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
2132 | u32 newsid; | |
2133 | int rc = 0; | |
2134 | ||
2135 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { | |
2136 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
2137 | sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) && | |
2138 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { | |
2139 | /* A different attribute in the security namespace. | |
2140 | Restrict to administrator. */ | |
2141 | return -EPERM; | |
2142 | } | |
2143 | ||
2144 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the | |
2145 | ordinary setattr permission. */ | |
2146 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2147 | } | |
2148 | ||
2149 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
2150 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) | |
2151 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2152 | ||
2153 | if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) | |
2154 | return -EPERM; | |
2155 | ||
2156 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS); | |
2157 | ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry; | |
2158 | ||
2159 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, | |
2160 | FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); | |
2161 | if (rc) | |
2162 | return rc; | |
2163 | ||
2164 | rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); | |
2165 | if (rc) | |
2166 | return rc; | |
2167 | ||
2168 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass, | |
2169 | FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); | |
2170 | if (rc) | |
2171 | return rc; | |
2172 | ||
2173 | rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid, | |
2174 | isec->sclass); | |
2175 | if (rc) | |
2176 | return rc; | |
2177 | ||
2178 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, | |
2179 | sbsec->sid, | |
2180 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, | |
2181 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, | |
2182 | &ad); | |
2183 | } | |
2184 | ||
2185 | static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, | |
2186 | void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
2187 | { | |
2188 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
2189 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2190 | u32 newsid; | |
2191 | int rc; | |
2192 | ||
2193 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { | |
2194 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */ | |
2195 | return; | |
2196 | } | |
2197 | ||
2198 | rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); | |
2199 | if (rc) { | |
2200 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context " | |
2201 | "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc); | |
2202 | return; | |
2203 | } | |
2204 | ||
2205 | isec->sid = newsid; | |
2206 | return; | |
2207 | } | |
2208 | ||
2209 | static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) | |
2210 | { | |
2211 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2212 | } | |
2213 | ||
2214 | static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry) | |
2215 | { | |
2216 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2217 | } | |
2218 | ||
2219 | static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) | |
2220 | { | |
2221 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { | |
2222 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
2223 | sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) && | |
2224 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { | |
2225 | /* A different attribute in the security namespace. | |
2226 | Restrict to administrator. */ | |
2227 | return -EPERM; | |
2228 | } | |
2229 | ||
2230 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the | |
2231 | ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate | |
2232 | permission for removexattr. */ | |
2233 | return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2234 | } | |
2235 | ||
2236 | /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. | |
2237 | You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ | |
2238 | return -EACCES; | |
2239 | } | |
2240 | ||
2241 | /* | |
2242 | * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the | |
2243 | * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to | |
2244 | * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user. | |
2245 | * | |
2246 | * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. | |
2247 | */ | |
2248 | static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) | |
2249 | { | |
2250 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2251 | char *context; | |
2252 | unsigned len; | |
2253 | int rc; | |
2254 | ||
2255 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) { | |
2256 | rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2257 | goto out; | |
2258 | } | |
2259 | ||
2260 | rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len); | |
2261 | if (rc) | |
2262 | goto out; | |
2263 | ||
2264 | /* Probe for required buffer size */ | |
2265 | if (!buffer || !size) { | |
2266 | rc = len; | |
2267 | goto out_free; | |
2268 | } | |
2269 | ||
2270 | if (size < len) { | |
2271 | rc = -ERANGE; | |
2272 | goto out_free; | |
2273 | } | |
2274 | ||
2275 | if (err > 0) { | |
2276 | if ((len == err) && !(memcmp(context, buffer, len))) { | |
2277 | /* Don't need to canonicalize value */ | |
2278 | rc = err; | |
2279 | goto out_free; | |
2280 | } | |
2281 | memset(buffer, 0, size); | |
2282 | } | |
2283 | memcpy(buffer, context, len); | |
2284 | rc = len; | |
2285 | out_free: | |
2286 | kfree(context); | |
2287 | out: | |
2288 | return rc; | |
2289 | } | |
2290 | ||
2291 | static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, | |
2292 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
2293 | { | |
2294 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2295 | u32 newsid; | |
2296 | int rc; | |
2297 | ||
2298 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) | |
2299 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2300 | ||
2301 | if (!value || !size) | |
2302 | return -EACCES; | |
2303 | ||
2304 | rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid); | |
2305 | if (rc) | |
2306 | return rc; | |
2307 | ||
2308 | isec->sid = newsid; | |
2309 | return 0; | |
2310 | } | |
2311 | ||
2312 | static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) | |
2313 | { | |
2314 | const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); | |
2315 | if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) | |
2316 | memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len); | |
2317 | return len; | |
2318 | } | |
2319 | ||
2320 | /* file security operations */ | |
2321 | ||
2322 | static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) | |
2323 | { | |
2324 | struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; | |
2325 | ||
2326 | if (!mask) { | |
2327 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ | |
2328 | return 0; | |
2329 | } | |
2330 | ||
2331 | /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ | |
2332 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) | |
2333 | mask |= MAY_APPEND; | |
2334 | ||
2335 | return file_has_perm(current, file, | |
2336 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); | |
2337 | } | |
2338 | ||
2339 | static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) | |
2340 | { | |
2341 | return file_alloc_security(file); | |
2342 | } | |
2343 | ||
2344 | static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file) | |
2345 | { | |
2346 | file_free_security(file); | |
2347 | } | |
2348 | ||
2349 | static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, | |
2350 | unsigned long arg) | |
2351 | { | |
2352 | int error = 0; | |
2353 | ||
2354 | switch (cmd) { | |
2355 | case FIONREAD: | |
2356 | /* fall through */ | |
2357 | case FIBMAP: | |
2358 | /* fall through */ | |
2359 | case FIGETBSZ: | |
2360 | /* fall through */ | |
2361 | case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS: | |
2362 | /* fall through */ | |
2363 | case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION: | |
2364 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR); | |
2365 | break; | |
2366 | ||
2367 | case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS: | |
2368 | /* fall through */ | |
2369 | case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION: | |
2370 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR); | |
2371 | break; | |
2372 | ||
2373 | /* sys_ioctl() checks */ | |
2374 | case FIONBIO: | |
2375 | /* fall through */ | |
2376 | case FIOASYNC: | |
2377 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0); | |
2378 | break; | |
2379 | ||
2380 | case KDSKBENT: | |
2381 | case KDSKBSENT: | |
2382 | error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG); | |
2383 | break; | |
2384 | ||
2385 | /* default case assumes that the command will go | |
2386 | * to the file's ioctl() function. | |
2387 | */ | |
2388 | default: | |
2389 | error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL); | |
2390 | ||
2391 | } | |
2392 | return error; | |
2393 | } | |
2394 | ||
2395 | static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) | |
2396 | { | |
2397 | #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32 | |
2398 | if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { | |
2399 | /* | |
2400 | * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a | |
2401 | * private file mapping that will also be writable. | |
2402 | * This has an additional check. | |
2403 | */ | |
2404 | int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM); | |
2405 | if (rc) | |
2406 | return rc; | |
2407 | } | |
2408 | #endif | |
2409 | ||
2410 | if (file) { | |
2411 | /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ | |
2412 | u32 av = FILE__READ; | |
2413 | ||
2414 | /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ | |
2415 | if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) | |
2416 | av |= FILE__WRITE; | |
2417 | ||
2418 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) | |
2419 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; | |
2420 | ||
2421 | return file_has_perm(current, file, av); | |
2422 | } | |
2423 | return 0; | |
2424 | } | |
2425 | ||
2426 | static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, | |
2427 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) | |
2428 | { | |
2429 | int rc; | |
2430 | ||
2431 | rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags); | |
2432 | if (rc) | |
2433 | return rc; | |
2434 | ||
2435 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) | |
2436 | prot = reqprot; | |
2437 | ||
2438 | return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, | |
2439 | (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); | |
2440 | } | |
2441 | ||
2442 | static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, | |
2443 | unsigned long reqprot, | |
2444 | unsigned long prot) | |
2445 | { | |
2446 | int rc; | |
2447 | ||
2448 | rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); | |
2449 | if (rc) | |
2450 | return rc; | |
2451 | ||
2452 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) | |
2453 | prot = reqprot; | |
2454 | ||
2455 | #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32 | |
2456 | if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && | |
2457 | (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && | |
2458 | vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk)) { | |
2459 | /* | |
2460 | * We are making an executable mapping in the brk region. | |
2461 | * This has an additional execheap check. | |
2462 | */ | |
2463 | rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECHEAP); | |
2464 | if (rc) | |
2465 | return rc; | |
2466 | } | |
2467 | if (vma->vm_file != NULL && vma->anon_vma != NULL && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { | |
2468 | /* | |
2469 | * We are making executable a file mapping that has | |
2470 | * had some COW done. Since pages might have been written, | |
2471 | * check ability to execute the possibly modified content. | |
2472 | * This typically should only occur for text relocations. | |
2473 | */ | |
2474 | int rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD); | |
2475 | if (rc) | |
2476 | return rc; | |
2477 | } | |
2478 | if (!vma->vm_file && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && | |
2479 | vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && | |
2480 | vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) { | |
2481 | /* Attempt to make the process stack executable. | |
2482 | * This has an additional execstack check. | |
2483 | */ | |
2484 | rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK); | |
2485 | if (rc) | |
2486 | return rc; | |
2487 | } | |
2488 | #endif | |
2489 | ||
2490 | return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); | |
2491 | } | |
2492 | ||
2493 | static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) | |
2494 | { | |
2495 | return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK); | |
2496 | } | |
2497 | ||
2498 | static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, | |
2499 | unsigned long arg) | |
2500 | { | |
2501 | int err = 0; | |
2502 | ||
2503 | switch (cmd) { | |
2504 | case F_SETFL: | |
2505 | if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) { | |
2506 | err = -EINVAL; | |
2507 | break; | |
2508 | } | |
2509 | ||
2510 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) { | |
2511 | err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE); | |
2512 | break; | |
2513 | } | |
2514 | /* fall through */ | |
2515 | case F_SETOWN: | |
2516 | case F_SETSIG: | |
2517 | case F_GETFL: | |
2518 | case F_GETOWN: | |
2519 | case F_GETSIG: | |
2520 | /* Just check FD__USE permission */ | |
2521 | err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0); | |
2522 | break; | |
2523 | case F_GETLK: | |
2524 | case F_SETLK: | |
2525 | case F_SETLKW: | |
2526 | #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 | |
2527 | case F_GETLK64: | |
2528 | case F_SETLK64: | |
2529 | case F_SETLKW64: | |
2530 | #endif | |
2531 | if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) { | |
2532 | err = -EINVAL; | |
2533 | break; | |
2534 | } | |
2535 | err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK); | |
2536 | break; | |
2537 | } | |
2538 | ||
2539 | return err; | |
2540 | } | |
2541 | ||
2542 | static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) | |
2543 | { | |
2544 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2545 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; | |
2546 | ||
2547 | tsec = current->security; | |
2548 | fsec = file->f_security; | |
2549 | fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid; | |
2550 | ||
2551 | return 0; | |
2552 | } | |
2553 | ||
2554 | static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
2555 | struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) | |
2556 | { | |
2557 | struct file *file; | |
2558 | u32 perm; | |
2559 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2560 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; | |
2561 | ||
2562 | /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ | |
2563 | file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner)); | |
2564 | ||
2565 | tsec = tsk->security; | |
2566 | fsec = file->f_security; | |
2567 | ||
2568 | if (!signum) | |
2569 | perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */ | |
2570 | else | |
2571 | perm = signal_to_av(signum); | |
2572 | ||
2573 | return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid, | |
2574 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); | |
2575 | } | |
2576 | ||
2577 | static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) | |
2578 | { | |
2579 | return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file)); | |
2580 | } | |
2581 | ||
2582 | /* task security operations */ | |
2583 | ||
2584 | static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) | |
2585 | { | |
2586 | int rc; | |
2587 | ||
2588 | rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags); | |
2589 | if (rc) | |
2590 | return rc; | |
2591 | ||
2592 | return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK); | |
2593 | } | |
2594 | ||
2595 | static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
2596 | { | |
2597 | struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2; | |
2598 | int rc; | |
2599 | ||
2600 | tsec1 = current->security; | |
2601 | ||
2602 | rc = task_alloc_security(tsk); | |
2603 | if (rc) | |
2604 | return rc; | |
2605 | tsec2 = tsk->security; | |
2606 | ||
2607 | tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid; | |
2608 | tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid; | |
2609 | ||
2610 | /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */ | |
2611 | tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid; | |
2612 | tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid; | |
2613 | ||
2614 | /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any. | |
2615 | This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any | |
2616 | subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */ | |
2617 | tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid; | |
2618 | ||
2619 | return 0; | |
2620 | } | |
2621 | ||
2622 | static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
2623 | { | |
2624 | task_free_security(tsk); | |
2625 | } | |
2626 | ||
2627 | static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) | |
2628 | { | |
2629 | /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and | |
2630 | since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux | |
2631 | identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control | |
2632 | this operation. However, SELinux does control the use | |
2633 | of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the | |
2634 | capable hook. */ | |
2635 | return 0; | |
2636 | } | |
2637 | ||
2638 | static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) | |
2639 | { | |
2640 | return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags); | |
2641 | } | |
2642 | ||
2643 | static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags) | |
2644 | { | |
2645 | /* See the comment for setuid above. */ | |
2646 | return 0; | |
2647 | } | |
2648 | ||
2649 | static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) | |
2650 | { | |
2651 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID); | |
2652 | } | |
2653 | ||
2654 | static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) | |
2655 | { | |
2656 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID); | |
2657 | } | |
2658 | ||
2659 | static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) | |
2660 | { | |
2661 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION); | |
2662 | } | |
2663 | ||
2664 | static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info) | |
2665 | { | |
2666 | /* See the comment for setuid above. */ | |
2667 | return 0; | |
2668 | } | |
2669 | ||
2670 | static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) | |
2671 | { | |
2672 | int rc; | |
2673 | ||
2674 | rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice); | |
2675 | if (rc) | |
2676 | return rc; | |
2677 | ||
2678 | return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); | |
2679 | } | |
2680 | ||
2681 | static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) | |
2682 | { | |
2683 | struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource; | |
2684 | int rc; | |
2685 | ||
2686 | rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim); | |
2687 | if (rc) | |
2688 | return rc; | |
2689 | ||
2690 | /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether | |
2691 | lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can | |
2692 | later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit | |
2693 | upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */ | |
2694 | if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) | |
2695 | return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT); | |
2696 | ||
2697 | return 0; | |
2698 | } | |
2699 | ||
2700 | static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp) | |
2701 | { | |
2702 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); | |
2703 | } | |
2704 | ||
2705 | static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) | |
2706 | { | |
2707 | return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); | |
2708 | } | |
2709 | ||
2710 | static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig) | |
2711 | { | |
2712 | u32 perm; | |
2713 | int rc; | |
2714 | ||
2715 | rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig); | |
2716 | if (rc) | |
2717 | return rc; | |
2718 | ||
2719 | if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info))) | |
2720 | return 0; | |
2721 | ||
2722 | if (!sig) | |
2723 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ | |
2724 | else | |
2725 | perm = signal_to_av(sig); | |
2726 | ||
2727 | return task_has_perm(current, p, perm); | |
2728 | } | |
2729 | ||
2730 | static int selinux_task_prctl(int option, | |
2731 | unsigned long arg2, | |
2732 | unsigned long arg3, | |
2733 | unsigned long arg4, | |
2734 | unsigned long arg5) | |
2735 | { | |
2736 | /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require | |
2737 | any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify | |
2738 | the state of the current process. */ | |
2739 | return 0; | |
2740 | } | |
2741 | ||
2742 | static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) | |
2743 | { | |
2744 | u32 perm; | |
2745 | ||
2746 | perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal); | |
2747 | ||
2748 | return task_has_perm(p, current, perm); | |
2749 | } | |
2750 | ||
2751 | static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p) | |
2752 | { | |
2753 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2754 | ||
2755 | secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p); | |
2756 | ||
2757 | tsec = p->security; | |
2758 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid; | |
2759 | tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; | |
2760 | return; | |
2761 | } | |
2762 | ||
2763 | static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, | |
2764 | struct inode *inode) | |
2765 | { | |
2766 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security; | |
2767 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; | |
2768 | ||
2769 | isec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
2770 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
2771 | return; | |
2772 | } | |
2773 | ||
2774 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK | |
2775 | ||
2776 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ | |
2777 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad) | |
2778 | { | |
2779 | int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; | |
2780 | struct iphdr _iph, *ih; | |
2781 | ||
2782 | offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data; | |
2783 | ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph); | |
2784 | if (ih == NULL) | |
2785 | goto out; | |
2786 | ||
2787 | ihlen = ih->ihl * 4; | |
2788 | if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) | |
2789 | goto out; | |
2790 | ||
2791 | ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; | |
2792 | ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; | |
2793 | ret = 0; | |
2794 | ||
2795 | switch (ih->protocol) { | |
2796 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { | |
2797 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; | |
2798 | ||
2799 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) | |
2800 | break; | |
2801 | ||
2802 | offset += ihlen; | |
2803 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); | |
2804 | if (th == NULL) | |
2805 | break; | |
2806 | ||
2807 | ad->u.net.sport = th->source; | |
2808 | ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; | |
2809 | break; | |
2810 | } | |
2811 | ||
2812 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { | |
2813 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; | |
2814 | ||
2815 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) | |
2816 | break; | |
2817 | ||
2818 | offset += ihlen; | |
2819 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); | |
2820 | if (uh == NULL) | |
2821 | break; | |
2822 | ||
2823 | ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; | |
2824 | ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; | |
2825 | break; | |
2826 | } | |
2827 | ||
2828 | default: | |
2829 | break; | |
2830 | } | |
2831 | out: | |
2832 | return ret; | |
2833 | } | |
2834 | ||
2835 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
2836 | ||
2837 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ | |
2838 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad) | |
2839 | { | |
2840 | u8 nexthdr; | |
2841 | int ret = -EINVAL, offset; | |
2842 | struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6; | |
2843 | ||
2844 | offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data; | |
2845 | ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); | |
2846 | if (ip6 == NULL) | |
2847 | goto out; | |
2848 | ||
2849 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr); | |
2850 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr); | |
2851 | ret = 0; | |
2852 | ||
2853 | nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; | |
2854 | offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); | |
2855 | offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr); | |
2856 | if (offset < 0) | |
2857 | goto out; | |
2858 | ||
2859 | switch (nexthdr) { | |
2860 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { | |
2861 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; | |
2862 | ||
2863 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); | |
2864 | if (th == NULL) | |
2865 | break; | |
2866 | ||
2867 | ad->u.net.sport = th->source; | |
2868 | ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; | |
2869 | break; | |
2870 | } | |
2871 | ||
2872 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { | |
2873 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; | |
2874 | ||
2875 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); | |
2876 | if (uh == NULL) | |
2877 | break; | |
2878 | ||
2879 | ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; | |
2880 | ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; | |
2881 | break; | |
2882 | } | |
2883 | ||
2884 | /* includes fragments */ | |
2885 | default: | |
2886 | break; | |
2887 | } | |
2888 | out: | |
2889 | return ret; | |
2890 | } | |
2891 | ||
2892 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
2893 | ||
2894 | static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, | |
2895 | char **addrp, int *len, int src) | |
2896 | { | |
2897 | int ret = 0; | |
2898 | ||
2899 | switch (ad->u.net.family) { | |
2900 | case PF_INET: | |
2901 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad); | |
2902 | if (ret || !addrp) | |
2903 | break; | |
2904 | *len = 4; | |
2905 | *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr : | |
2906 | &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr); | |
2907 | break; | |
2908 | ||
2909 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
2910 | case PF_INET6: | |
2911 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad); | |
2912 | if (ret || !addrp) | |
2913 | break; | |
2914 | *len = 16; | |
2915 | *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr : | |
2916 | &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr); | |
2917 | break; | |
2918 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
2919 | default: | |
2920 | break; | |
2921 | } | |
2922 | ||
2923 | return ret; | |
2924 | } | |
2925 | ||
2926 | /* socket security operations */ | |
2927 | static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock, | |
2928 | u32 perms) | |
2929 | { | |
2930 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
2931 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2932 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
2933 | int err = 0; | |
2934 | ||
2935 | tsec = task->security; | |
2936 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
2937 | ||
2938 | if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) | |
2939 | goto out; | |
2940 | ||
2941 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
2942 | ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk; | |
2943 | err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); | |
2944 | ||
2945 | out: | |
2946 | return err; | |
2947 | } | |
2948 | ||
2949 | static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, | |
2950 | int protocol, int kern) | |
2951 | { | |
2952 | int err = 0; | |
2953 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2954 | ||
2955 | if (kern) | |
2956 | goto out; | |
2957 | ||
2958 | tsec = current->security; | |
2959 | err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, | |
2960 | socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, | |
2961 | protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); | |
2962 | ||
2963 | out: | |
2964 | return err; | |
2965 | } | |
2966 | ||
2967 | static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, | |
2968 | int type, int protocol, int kern) | |
2969 | { | |
2970 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
2971 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
2972 | ||
2973 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
2974 | ||
2975 | tsec = current->security; | |
2976 | isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); | |
2977 | isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid; | |
2978 | isec->initialized = 1; | |
2979 | ||
2980 | return; | |
2981 | } | |
2982 | ||
2983 | /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. | |
2984 | Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind | |
2985 | permission check between the socket and the port number. */ | |
2986 | #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0] | |
2987 | #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1] | |
2988 | ||
2989 | static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) | |
2990 | { | |
2991 | u16 family; | |
2992 | int err; | |
2993 | ||
2994 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND); | |
2995 | if (err) | |
2996 | goto out; | |
2997 | ||
2998 | /* | |
2999 | * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. | |
3000 | * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just | |
3001 | * check the first address now. | |
3002 | */ | |
3003 | family = sock->sk->sk_family; | |
3004 | if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { | |
3005 | char *addrp; | |
3006 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3007 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3008 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3009 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; | |
3010 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; | |
3011 | unsigned short snum; | |
3012 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
3013 | u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen; | |
3014 | ||
3015 | tsec = current->security; | |
3016 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3017 | ||
3018 | if (family == PF_INET) { | |
3019 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; | |
3020 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); | |
3021 | addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr); | |
3022 | addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; | |
3023 | } else { | |
3024 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; | |
3025 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); | |
3026 | addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr); | |
3027 | addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; | |
3028 | } | |
3029 | ||
3030 | if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) || | |
3031 | snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) { | |
3032 | err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, | |
3033 | sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); | |
3034 | if (err) | |
3035 | goto out; | |
3036 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3037 | ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); | |
3038 | ad.u.net.family = family; | |
3039 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, | |
3040 | isec->sclass, | |
3041 | SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); | |
3042 | if (err) | |
3043 | goto out; | |
3044 | } | |
3045 | ||
3046 | switch(isec->sclass) { | |
3047 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: | |
3048 | node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; | |
3049 | break; | |
3050 | ||
3051 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: | |
3052 | node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; | |
3053 | break; | |
3054 | ||
3055 | default: | |
3056 | node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; | |
3057 | break; | |
3058 | } | |
3059 | ||
3060 | err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid); | |
3061 | if (err) | |
3062 | goto out; | |
3063 | ||
3064 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3065 | ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); | |
3066 | ad.u.net.family = family; | |
3067 | ||
3068 | if (family == PF_INET) | |
3069 | ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; | |
3070 | else | |
3071 | ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr); | |
3072 | ||
3073 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, | |
3074 | isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); | |
3075 | if (err) | |
3076 | goto out; | |
3077 | } | |
3078 | out: | |
3079 | return err; | |
3080 | } | |
3081 | ||
3082 | static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) | |
3083 | { | |
3084 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3085 | int err; | |
3086 | ||
3087 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT); | |
3088 | if (err) | |
3089 | return err; | |
3090 | ||
3091 | /* | |
3092 | * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port. | |
3093 | */ | |
3094 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3095 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) { | |
3096 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
3097 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3098 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; | |
3099 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; | |
3100 | unsigned short snum; | |
3101 | u32 sid; | |
3102 | ||
3103 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) { | |
3104 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; | |
3105 | if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) | |
3106 | return -EINVAL; | |
3107 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); | |
3108 | } else { | |
3109 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; | |
3110 | if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) | |
3111 | return -EINVAL; | |
3112 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); | |
3113 | } | |
3114 | ||
3115 | err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, | |
3116 | sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); | |
3117 | if (err) | |
3118 | goto out; | |
3119 | ||
3120 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3121 | ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum); | |
3122 | ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; | |
3123 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, | |
3124 | TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad); | |
3125 | if (err) | |
3126 | goto out; | |
3127 | } | |
3128 | ||
3129 | out: | |
3130 | return err; | |
3131 | } | |
3132 | ||
3133 | static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) | |
3134 | { | |
3135 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN); | |
3136 | } | |
3137 | ||
3138 | static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) | |
3139 | { | |
3140 | int err; | |
3141 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3142 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec; | |
3143 | ||
3144 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT); | |
3145 | if (err) | |
3146 | return err; | |
3147 | ||
3148 | newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security; | |
3149 | ||
3150 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3151 | newisec->sclass = isec->sclass; | |
3152 | newisec->sid = isec->sid; | |
3153 | newisec->initialized = 1; | |
3154 | ||
3155 | return 0; | |
3156 | } | |
3157 | ||
3158 | static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, | |
3159 | int size) | |
3160 | { | |
3161 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE); | |
3162 | } | |
3163 | ||
3164 | static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, | |
3165 | int size, int flags) | |
3166 | { | |
3167 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ); | |
3168 | } | |
3169 | ||
3170 | static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) | |
3171 | { | |
3172 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR); | |
3173 | } | |
3174 | ||
3175 | static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) | |
3176 | { | |
3177 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR); | |
3178 | } | |
3179 | ||
3180 | static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname) | |
3181 | { | |
3182 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT); | |
3183 | } | |
3184 | ||
3185 | static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, | |
3186 | int optname) | |
3187 | { | |
3188 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT); | |
3189 | } | |
3190 | ||
3191 | static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) | |
3192 | { | |
3193 | return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); | |
3194 | } | |
3195 | ||
3196 | static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, | |
3197 | struct socket *other, | |
3198 | struct sock *newsk) | |
3199 | { | |
3200 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; | |
3201 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3202 | struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; | |
3203 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3204 | int err; | |
3205 | ||
3206 | err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk); | |
3207 | if (err) | |
3208 | return err; | |
3209 | ||
3210 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3211 | other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security; | |
3212 | ||
3213 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3214 | ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; | |
3215 | ||
3216 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid, | |
3217 | isec->sclass, | |
3218 | UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); | |
3219 | if (err) | |
3220 | return err; | |
3221 | ||
3222 | /* connecting socket */ | |
3223 | ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; | |
3224 | ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid; | |
3225 | ||
3226 | /* server child socket */ | |
3227 | ssec = newsk->sk_security; | |
3228 | ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid; | |
3229 | ||
3230 | return 0; | |
3231 | } | |
3232 | ||
3233 | static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, | |
3234 | struct socket *other) | |
3235 | { | |
3236 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3237 | struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; | |
3238 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3239 | int err; | |
3240 | ||
3241 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3242 | other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security; | |
3243 | ||
3244 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET); | |
3245 | ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; | |
3246 | ||
3247 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid, | |
3248 | isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); | |
3249 | if (err) | |
3250 | return err; | |
3251 | ||
3252 | return 0; | |
3253 | } | |
3254 | ||
3255 | static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3256 | { | |
3257 | u16 family; | |
3258 | char *addrp; | |
3259 | int len, err = 0; | |
3260 | u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0; | |
3261 | u32 sock_sid = 0; | |
3262 | u16 sock_class = 0; | |
3263 | struct socket *sock; | |
3264 | struct net_device *dev; | |
3265 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3266 | ||
3267 | family = sk->sk_family; | |
3268 | if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) | |
3269 | goto out; | |
3270 | ||
3271 | /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ | |
3272 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP)) | |
3273 | family = PF_INET; | |
3274 | ||
3275 | read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); | |
3276 | sock = sk->sk_socket; | |
3277 | if (sock) { | |
3278 | struct inode *inode; | |
3279 | inode = SOCK_INODE(sock); | |
3280 | if (inode) { | |
3281 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3282 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
3283 | sock_sid = isec->sid; | |
3284 | sock_class = isec->sclass; | |
3285 | } | |
3286 | } | |
3287 | read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); | |
3288 | if (!sock_sid) | |
3289 | goto out; | |
3290 | ||
3291 | dev = skb->dev; | |
3292 | if (!dev) | |
3293 | goto out; | |
3294 | ||
3295 | err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL); | |
3296 | if (err) | |
3297 | goto out; | |
3298 | ||
3299 | switch (sock_class) { | |
3300 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: | |
3301 | netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV; | |
3302 | node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV; | |
3303 | recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG; | |
3304 | break; | |
3305 | ||
3306 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: | |
3307 | netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV; | |
3308 | node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV; | |
3309 | recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG; | |
3310 | break; | |
3311 | ||
3312 | default: | |
3313 | netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV; | |
3314 | node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV; | |
3315 | break; | |
3316 | } | |
3317 | ||
3318 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); | |
3319 | ad.u.net.netif = dev->name; | |
3320 | ad.u.net.family = family; | |
3321 | ||
3322 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1); | |
3323 | if (err) | |
3324 | goto out; | |
3325 | ||
3326 | err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad); | |
3327 | if (err) | |
3328 | goto out; | |
3329 | ||
3330 | /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */ | |
3331 | err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid); | |
3332 | if (err) | |
3333 | goto out; | |
3334 | ||
3335 | err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad); | |
3336 | if (err) | |
3337 | goto out; | |
3338 | ||
3339 | if (recv_perm) { | |
3340 | u32 port_sid; | |
3341 | ||
3342 | /* Fixme: make this more efficient */ | |
3343 | err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, | |
3344 | sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport), | |
3345 | &port_sid); | |
3346 | if (err) | |
3347 | goto out; | |
3348 | ||
3349 | err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid, | |
3350 | sock_class, recv_perm, &ad); | |
3351 | } | |
3352 | out: | |
3353 | return err; | |
3354 | } | |
3355 | ||
3356 | static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, | |
3357 | int __user *optlen, unsigned len) | |
3358 | { | |
3359 | int err = 0; | |
3360 | char *scontext; | |
3361 | u32 scontext_len; | |
3362 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec; | |
3363 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3364 | ||
3365 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3366 | if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) { | |
3367 | err = -ENOPROTOOPT; | |
3368 | goto out; | |
3369 | } | |
3370 | ||
3371 | ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; | |
3372 | ||
3373 | err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); | |
3374 | if (err) | |
3375 | goto out; | |
3376 | ||
3377 | if (scontext_len > len) { | |
3378 | err = -ERANGE; | |
3379 | goto out_len; | |
3380 | } | |
3381 | ||
3382 | if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len)) | |
3383 | err = -EFAULT; | |
3384 | ||
3385 | out_len: | |
3386 | if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen)) | |
3387 | err = -EFAULT; | |
3388 | ||
3389 | kfree(scontext); | |
3390 | out: | |
3391 | return err; | |
3392 | } | |
3393 | ||
3394 | static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) | |
3395 | { | |
3396 | return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority); | |
3397 | } | |
3398 | ||
3399 | static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) | |
3400 | { | |
3401 | sk_free_security(sk); | |
3402 | } | |
3403 | ||
3404 | static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3405 | { | |
3406 | int err = 0; | |
3407 | u32 perm; | |
3408 | struct nlmsghdr *nlh; | |
3409 | struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket; | |
3410 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; | |
3411 | ||
3412 | if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) { | |
3413 | err = -EINVAL; | |
3414 | goto out; | |
3415 | } | |
3416 | nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data; | |
3417 | ||
3418 | err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); | |
3419 | if (err) { | |
3420 | if (err == -EINVAL) { | |
3421 | audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, | |
3422 | "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message" | |
3423 | " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n", | |
3424 | nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass); | |
3425 | if (!selinux_enforcing) | |
3426 | err = 0; | |
3427 | } | |
3428 | ||
3429 | /* Ignore */ | |
3430 | if (err == -ENOENT) | |
3431 | err = 0; | |
3432 | goto out; | |
3433 | } | |
3434 | ||
3435 | err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm); | |
3436 | out: | |
3437 | return err; | |
3438 | } | |
3439 | ||
3440 | #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER | |
3441 | ||
3442 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, | |
3443 | struct sk_buff **pskb, | |
3444 | const struct net_device *in, | |
3445 | const struct net_device *out, | |
3446 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *), | |
3447 | u16 family) | |
3448 | { | |
3449 | char *addrp; | |
3450 | int len, err = NF_ACCEPT; | |
3451 | u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0; | |
3452 | struct sock *sk; | |
3453 | struct socket *sock; | |
3454 | struct inode *inode; | |
3455 | struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb; | |
3456 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; | |
3457 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3458 | struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out; | |
3459 | ||
3460 | sk = skb->sk; | |
3461 | if (!sk) | |
3462 | goto out; | |
3463 | ||
3464 | sock = sk->sk_socket; | |
3465 | if (!sock) | |
3466 | goto out; | |
3467 | ||
3468 | inode = SOCK_INODE(sock); | |
3469 | if (!inode) | |
3470 | goto out; | |
3471 | ||
3472 | err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL); | |
3473 | if (err) | |
3474 | goto out; | |
3475 | ||
3476 | isec = inode->i_security; | |
3477 | ||
3478 | switch (isec->sclass) { | |
3479 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: | |
3480 | netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND; | |
3481 | node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND; | |
3482 | send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG; | |
3483 | break; | |
3484 | ||
3485 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: | |
3486 | netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND; | |
3487 | node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND; | |
3488 | send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG; | |
3489 | break; | |
3490 | ||
3491 | default: | |
3492 | netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND; | |
3493 | node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND; | |
3494 | break; | |
3495 | } | |
3496 | ||
3497 | ||
3498 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); | |
3499 | ad.u.net.netif = dev->name; | |
3500 | ad.u.net.family = family; | |
3501 | ||
3502 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, | |
3503 | &len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3504 | if (err != NF_ACCEPT) | |
3505 | goto out; | |
3506 | ||
3507 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, | |
3508 | netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3509 | if (err != NF_ACCEPT) | |
3510 | goto out; | |
3511 | ||
3512 | /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */ | |
3513 | err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, | |
3514 | &node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3515 | if (err != NF_ACCEPT) | |
3516 | goto out; | |
3517 | ||
3518 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, | |
3519 | node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3520 | if (err != NF_ACCEPT) | |
3521 | goto out; | |
3522 | ||
3523 | if (send_perm) { | |
3524 | u32 port_sid; | |
3525 | ||
3526 | /* Fixme: make this more efficient */ | |
3527 | err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, | |
3528 | sk->sk_type, | |
3529 | sk->sk_protocol, | |
3530 | ntohs(ad.u.net.dport), | |
3531 | &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3532 | if (err != NF_ACCEPT) | |
3533 | goto out; | |
3534 | ||
3535 | err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass, | |
3536 | send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; | |
3537 | } | |
3538 | ||
3539 | out: | |
3540 | return err; | |
3541 | } | |
3542 | ||
3543 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, | |
3544 | struct sk_buff **pskb, | |
3545 | const struct net_device *in, | |
3546 | const struct net_device *out, | |
3547 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) | |
3548 | { | |
3549 | return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET); | |
3550 | } | |
3551 | ||
3552 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
3553 | ||
3554 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, | |
3555 | struct sk_buff **pskb, | |
3556 | const struct net_device *in, | |
3557 | const struct net_device *out, | |
3558 | int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) | |
3559 | { | |
3560 | return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6); | |
3561 | } | |
3562 | ||
3563 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
3564 | ||
3565 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ | |
3566 | ||
3567 | #else | |
3568 | ||
3569 | static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3570 | { | |
3571 | return 0; | |
3572 | } | |
3573 | ||
3574 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ | |
3575 | ||
3576 | static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3577 | { | |
3578 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3579 | struct av_decision avd; | |
3580 | int err; | |
3581 | ||
3582 | err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb); | |
3583 | if (err) | |
3584 | return err; | |
3585 | ||
3586 | tsec = current->security; | |
3587 | ||
3588 | avd.allowed = 0; | |
3589 | avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, | |
3590 | SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd); | |
3591 | cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed); | |
3592 | ||
3593 | if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS) | |
3594 | err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb); | |
3595 | ||
3596 | return err; | |
3597 | } | |
3598 | ||
3599 | static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb) | |
3600 | { | |
3601 | if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) | |
3602 | return -EPERM; | |
3603 | return 0; | |
3604 | } | |
3605 | ||
3606 | static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task, | |
3607 | struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, | |
3608 | u16 sclass) | |
3609 | { | |
3610 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security; | |
3611 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3612 | ||
3613 | isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
3614 | if (!isec) | |
3615 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3616 | ||
3617 | isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
3618 | isec->sclass = sclass; | |
3619 | isec->ipc_perm = perm; | |
3620 | if (tsec) { | |
3621 | isec->sid = tsec->sid; | |
3622 | } else { | |
3623 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
3624 | } | |
3625 | perm->security = isec; | |
3626 | ||
3627 | return 0; | |
3628 | } | |
3629 | ||
3630 | static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) | |
3631 | { | |
3632 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security; | |
3633 | if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
3634 | return; | |
3635 | ||
3636 | perm->security = NULL; | |
3637 | kfree(isec); | |
3638 | } | |
3639 | ||
3640 | static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) | |
3641 | { | |
3642 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; | |
3643 | ||
3644 | msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
3645 | if (!msec) | |
3646 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3647 | ||
3648 | msec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC; | |
3649 | msec->msg = msg; | |
3650 | msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; | |
3651 | msg->security = msec; | |
3652 | ||
3653 | return 0; | |
3654 | } | |
3655 | ||
3656 | static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) | |
3657 | { | |
3658 | struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security; | |
3659 | if (!msec || msec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC) | |
3660 | return; | |
3661 | ||
3662 | msg->security = NULL; | |
3663 | kfree(msec); | |
3664 | } | |
3665 | ||
3666 | static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, | |
3667 | u32 perms) | |
3668 | { | |
3669 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3670 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3671 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3672 | ||
3673 | tsec = current->security; | |
3674 | isec = ipc_perms->security; | |
3675 | ||
3676 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3677 | ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; | |
3678 | ||
3679 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); | |
3680 | } | |
3681 | ||
3682 | static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) | |
3683 | { | |
3684 | return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg); | |
3685 | } | |
3686 | ||
3687 | static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) | |
3688 | { | |
3689 | msg_msg_free_security(msg); | |
3690 | } | |
3691 | ||
3692 | /* message queue security operations */ | |
3693 | static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) | |
3694 | { | |
3695 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3696 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3697 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3698 | int rc; | |
3699 | ||
3700 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ); | |
3701 | if (rc) | |
3702 | return rc; | |
3703 | ||
3704 | tsec = current->security; | |
3705 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; | |
3706 | ||
3707 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3708 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; | |
3709 | ||
3710 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, | |
3711 | MSGQ__CREATE, &ad); | |
3712 | if (rc) { | |
3713 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); | |
3714 | return rc; | |
3715 | } | |
3716 | return 0; | |
3717 | } | |
3718 | ||
3719 | static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq) | |
3720 | { | |
3721 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); | |
3722 | } | |
3723 | ||
3724 | static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) | |
3725 | { | |
3726 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3727 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3728 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3729 | ||
3730 | tsec = current->security; | |
3731 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; | |
3732 | ||
3733 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3734 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; | |
3735 | ||
3736 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, | |
3737 | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
3738 | } | |
3739 | ||
3740 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) | |
3741 | { | |
3742 | int err; | |
3743 | int perms; | |
3744 | ||
3745 | switch(cmd) { | |
3746 | case IPC_INFO: | |
3747 | case MSG_INFO: | |
3748 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ | |
3749 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); | |
3750 | case IPC_STAT: | |
3751 | case MSG_STAT: | |
3752 | perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE; | |
3753 | break; | |
3754 | case IPC_SET: | |
3755 | perms = MSGQ__SETATTR; | |
3756 | break; | |
3757 | case IPC_RMID: | |
3758 | perms = MSGQ__DESTROY; | |
3759 | break; | |
3760 | default: | |
3761 | return 0; | |
3762 | } | |
3763 | ||
3764 | err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms); | |
3765 | return err; | |
3766 | } | |
3767 | ||
3768 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) | |
3769 | { | |
3770 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3771 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3772 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; | |
3773 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3774 | int rc; | |
3775 | ||
3776 | tsec = current->security; | |
3777 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; | |
3778 | msec = msg->security; | |
3779 | ||
3780 | /* | |
3781 | * First time through, need to assign label to the message | |
3782 | */ | |
3783 | if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) { | |
3784 | /* | |
3785 | * Compute new sid based on current process and | |
3786 | * message queue this message will be stored in | |
3787 | */ | |
3788 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, | |
3789 | isec->sid, | |
3790 | SECCLASS_MSG, | |
3791 | &msec->sid); | |
3792 | if (rc) | |
3793 | return rc; | |
3794 | } | |
3795 | ||
3796 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3797 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; | |
3798 | ||
3799 | /* Can this process write to the queue? */ | |
3800 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, | |
3801 | MSGQ__WRITE, &ad); | |
3802 | if (!rc) | |
3803 | /* Can this process send the message */ | |
3804 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid, | |
3805 | SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad); | |
3806 | if (!rc) | |
3807 | /* Can the message be put in the queue? */ | |
3808 | rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, | |
3809 | SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad); | |
3810 | ||
3811 | return rc; | |
3812 | } | |
3813 | ||
3814 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, | |
3815 | struct task_struct *target, | |
3816 | long type, int mode) | |
3817 | { | |
3818 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3819 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3820 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; | |
3821 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3822 | int rc; | |
3823 | ||
3824 | tsec = target->security; | |
3825 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; | |
3826 | msec = msg->security; | |
3827 | ||
3828 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3829 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; | |
3830 | ||
3831 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, | |
3832 | SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad); | |
3833 | if (!rc) | |
3834 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid, | |
3835 | SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad); | |
3836 | return rc; | |
3837 | } | |
3838 | ||
3839 | /* Shared Memory security operations */ | |
3840 | static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) | |
3841 | { | |
3842 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3843 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3844 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3845 | int rc; | |
3846 | ||
3847 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM); | |
3848 | if (rc) | |
3849 | return rc; | |
3850 | ||
3851 | tsec = current->security; | |
3852 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; | |
3853 | ||
3854 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3855 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; | |
3856 | ||
3857 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, | |
3858 | SHM__CREATE, &ad); | |
3859 | if (rc) { | |
3860 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); | |
3861 | return rc; | |
3862 | } | |
3863 | return 0; | |
3864 | } | |
3865 | ||
3866 | static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) | |
3867 | { | |
3868 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); | |
3869 | } | |
3870 | ||
3871 | static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) | |
3872 | { | |
3873 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3874 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3875 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3876 | ||
3877 | tsec = current->security; | |
3878 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; | |
3879 | ||
3880 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3881 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; | |
3882 | ||
3883 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, | |
3884 | SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
3885 | } | |
3886 | ||
3887 | /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */ | |
3888 | static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) | |
3889 | { | |
3890 | int perms; | |
3891 | int err; | |
3892 | ||
3893 | switch(cmd) { | |
3894 | case IPC_INFO: | |
3895 | case SHM_INFO: | |
3896 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ | |
3897 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); | |
3898 | case IPC_STAT: | |
3899 | case SHM_STAT: | |
3900 | perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE; | |
3901 | break; | |
3902 | case IPC_SET: | |
3903 | perms = SHM__SETATTR; | |
3904 | break; | |
3905 | case SHM_LOCK: | |
3906 | case SHM_UNLOCK: | |
3907 | perms = SHM__LOCK; | |
3908 | break; | |
3909 | case IPC_RMID: | |
3910 | perms = SHM__DESTROY; | |
3911 | break; | |
3912 | default: | |
3913 | return 0; | |
3914 | } | |
3915 | ||
3916 | err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); | |
3917 | return err; | |
3918 | } | |
3919 | ||
3920 | static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, | |
3921 | char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) | |
3922 | { | |
3923 | u32 perms; | |
3924 | int rc; | |
3925 | ||
3926 | rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg); | |
3927 | if (rc) | |
3928 | return rc; | |
3929 | ||
3930 | if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) | |
3931 | perms = SHM__READ; | |
3932 | else | |
3933 | perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE; | |
3934 | ||
3935 | return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); | |
3936 | } | |
3937 | ||
3938 | /* Semaphore security operations */ | |
3939 | static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) | |
3940 | { | |
3941 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3942 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3943 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3944 | int rc; | |
3945 | ||
3946 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM); | |
3947 | if (rc) | |
3948 | return rc; | |
3949 | ||
3950 | tsec = current->security; | |
3951 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; | |
3952 | ||
3953 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3954 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; | |
3955 | ||
3956 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, | |
3957 | SEM__CREATE, &ad); | |
3958 | if (rc) { | |
3959 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); | |
3960 | return rc; | |
3961 | } | |
3962 | return 0; | |
3963 | } | |
3964 | ||
3965 | static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) | |
3966 | { | |
3967 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); | |
3968 | } | |
3969 | ||
3970 | static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) | |
3971 | { | |
3972 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
3973 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; | |
3974 | struct avc_audit_data ad; | |
3975 | ||
3976 | tsec = current->security; | |
3977 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; | |
3978 | ||
3979 | AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); | |
3980 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; | |
3981 | ||
3982 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, | |
3983 | SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); | |
3984 | } | |
3985 | ||
3986 | /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */ | |
3987 | static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) | |
3988 | { | |
3989 | int err; | |
3990 | u32 perms; | |
3991 | ||
3992 | switch(cmd) { | |
3993 | case IPC_INFO: | |
3994 | case SEM_INFO: | |
3995 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ | |
3996 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); | |
3997 | case GETPID: | |
3998 | case GETNCNT: | |
3999 | case GETZCNT: | |
4000 | perms = SEM__GETATTR; | |
4001 | break; | |
4002 | case GETVAL: | |
4003 | case GETALL: | |
4004 | perms = SEM__READ; | |
4005 | break; | |
4006 | case SETVAL: | |
4007 | case SETALL: | |
4008 | perms = SEM__WRITE; | |
4009 | break; | |
4010 | case IPC_RMID: | |
4011 | perms = SEM__DESTROY; | |
4012 | break; | |
4013 | case IPC_SET: | |
4014 | perms = SEM__SETATTR; | |
4015 | break; | |
4016 | case IPC_STAT: | |
4017 | case SEM_STAT: | |
4018 | perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE; | |
4019 | break; | |
4020 | default: | |
4021 | return 0; | |
4022 | } | |
4023 | ||
4024 | err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); | |
4025 | return err; | |
4026 | } | |
4027 | ||
4028 | static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, | |
4029 | struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) | |
4030 | { | |
4031 | u32 perms; | |
4032 | ||
4033 | if (alter) | |
4034 | perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE; | |
4035 | else | |
4036 | perms = SEM__READ; | |
4037 | ||
4038 | return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); | |
4039 | } | |
4040 | ||
4041 | static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) | |
4042 | { | |
4043 | u32 av = 0; | |
4044 | ||
4045 | av = 0; | |
4046 | if (flag & S_IRUGO) | |
4047 | av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; | |
4048 | if (flag & S_IWUGO) | |
4049 | av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; | |
4050 | ||
4051 | if (av == 0) | |
4052 | return 0; | |
4053 | ||
4054 | return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); | |
4055 | } | |
4056 | ||
4057 | /* module stacking operations */ | |
4058 | static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) | |
4059 | { | |
4060 | if (secondary_ops != original_ops) { | |
4061 | printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security " | |
4062 | "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__); | |
4063 | return -EINVAL; | |
4064 | } | |
4065 | ||
4066 | secondary_ops = ops; | |
4067 | ||
4068 | printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n", | |
4069 | __FUNCTION__, | |
4070 | name); | |
4071 | ||
4072 | return 0; | |
4073 | } | |
4074 | ||
4075 | static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) | |
4076 | { | |
4077 | if (ops != secondary_ops) { | |
4078 | printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module " | |
4079 | "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__); | |
4080 | return -EINVAL; | |
4081 | } | |
4082 | ||
4083 | secondary_ops = original_ops; | |
4084 | ||
4085 | return 0; | |
4086 | } | |
4087 | ||
4088 | static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) | |
4089 | { | |
4090 | if (inode) | |
4091 | inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); | |
4092 | } | |
4093 | ||
4094 | static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, | |
4095 | char *name, void *value, size_t size) | |
4096 | { | |
4097 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4098 | u32 sid, len; | |
4099 | char *context; | |
4100 | int error; | |
4101 | ||
4102 | if (current != p) { | |
4103 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR); | |
4104 | if (error) | |
4105 | return error; | |
4106 | } | |
4107 | ||
4108 | if (!size) | |
4109 | return -ERANGE; | |
4110 | ||
4111 | tsec = p->security; | |
4112 | ||
4113 | if (!strcmp(name, "current")) | |
4114 | sid = tsec->sid; | |
4115 | else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) | |
4116 | sid = tsec->osid; | |
4117 | else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) | |
4118 | sid = tsec->exec_sid; | |
4119 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) | |
4120 | sid = tsec->create_sid; | |
4121 | else | |
4122 | return -EINVAL; | |
4123 | ||
4124 | if (!sid) | |
4125 | return 0; | |
4126 | ||
4127 | error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len); | |
4128 | if (error) | |
4129 | return error; | |
4130 | if (len > size) { | |
4131 | kfree(context); | |
4132 | return -ERANGE; | |
4133 | } | |
4134 | memcpy(value, context, len); | |
4135 | kfree(context); | |
4136 | return len; | |
4137 | } | |
4138 | ||
4139 | static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, | |
4140 | char *name, void *value, size_t size) | |
4141 | { | |
4142 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4143 | u32 sid = 0; | |
4144 | int error; | |
4145 | char *str = value; | |
4146 | ||
4147 | if (current != p) { | |
4148 | /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own | |
4149 | security attributes. */ | |
4150 | return -EACCES; | |
4151 | } | |
4152 | ||
4153 | /* | |
4154 | * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. | |
4155 | * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the | |
4156 | * above restriction is ever removed. | |
4157 | */ | |
4158 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) | |
4159 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC); | |
4160 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) | |
4161 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE); | |
4162 | else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) | |
4163 | error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); | |
4164 | else | |
4165 | error = -EINVAL; | |
4166 | if (error) | |
4167 | return error; | |
4168 | ||
4169 | /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */ | |
4170 | if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') { | |
4171 | if (str[size-1] == '\n') { | |
4172 | str[size-1] = 0; | |
4173 | size--; | |
4174 | } | |
4175 | error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid); | |
4176 | if (error) | |
4177 | return error; | |
4178 | } | |
4179 | ||
4180 | /* Permission checking based on the specified context is | |
4181 | performed during the actual operation (execve, | |
4182 | open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the | |
4183 | operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve | |
4184 | checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The | |
4185 | operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ | |
4186 | tsec = p->security; | |
4187 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) | |
4188 | tsec->exec_sid = sid; | |
4189 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) | |
4190 | tsec->create_sid = sid; | |
4191 | else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { | |
4192 | struct av_decision avd; | |
4193 | ||
4194 | if (sid == 0) | |
4195 | return -EINVAL; | |
4196 | ||
4197 | /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ | |
4198 | if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) { | |
4199 | struct task_struct *g, *t; | |
4200 | struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm; | |
4201 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); | |
4202 | do_each_thread(g, t) | |
4203 | if (t->mm == mm && t != p) { | |
4204 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); | |
4205 | return -EPERM; | |
4206 | } | |
4207 | while_each_thread(g, t); | |
4208 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); | |
4209 | } | |
4210 | ||
4211 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ | |
4212 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
4213 | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); | |
4214 | if (error) | |
4215 | return error; | |
4216 | ||
4217 | /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. | |
4218 | Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ | |
4219 | task_lock(p); | |
4220 | if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) { | |
4221 | error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, | |
4222 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
4223 | PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd); | |
4224 | if (!error) | |
4225 | tsec->sid = sid; | |
4226 | task_unlock(p); | |
4227 | avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, | |
4228 | PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL); | |
4229 | if (error) | |
4230 | return error; | |
4231 | } else { | |
4232 | tsec->sid = sid; | |
4233 | task_unlock(p); | |
4234 | } | |
4235 | } | |
4236 | else | |
4237 | return -EINVAL; | |
4238 | ||
4239 | return size; | |
4240 | } | |
4241 | ||
4242 | static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { | |
4243 | .ptrace = selinux_ptrace, | |
4244 | .capget = selinux_capget, | |
4245 | .capset_check = selinux_capset_check, | |
4246 | .capset_set = selinux_capset_set, | |
4247 | .sysctl = selinux_sysctl, | |
4248 | .capable = selinux_capable, | |
4249 | .quotactl = selinux_quotactl, | |
4250 | .quota_on = selinux_quota_on, | |
4251 | .syslog = selinux_syslog, | |
4252 | .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory, | |
4253 | ||
4254 | .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send, | |
4255 | .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv, | |
4256 | ||
4257 | .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security, | |
4258 | .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security, | |
4259 | .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds, | |
4260 | .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds, | |
4261 | .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security, | |
4262 | .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security, | |
4263 | .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec, | |
4264 | ||
4265 | .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security, | |
4266 | .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security, | |
4267 | .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data, | |
4268 | .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount, | |
4269 | .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs, | |
4270 | .sb_mount = selinux_mount, | |
4271 | .sb_umount = selinux_umount, | |
4272 | ||
4273 | .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security, | |
4274 | .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security, | |
4275 | .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security, | |
4276 | .inode_create = selinux_inode_create, | |
4277 | .inode_link = selinux_inode_link, | |
4278 | .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink, | |
4279 | .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink, | |
4280 | .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir, | |
4281 | .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir, | |
4282 | .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod, | |
4283 | .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename, | |
4284 | .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink, | |
4285 | .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link, | |
4286 | .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission, | |
4287 | .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr, | |
4288 | .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr, | |
4289 | .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr, | |
4290 | .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr, | |
4291 | .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr, | |
4292 | .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr, | |
4293 | .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr, | |
4294 | .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity, | |
4295 | .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, | |
4296 | .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, | |
4297 | ||
4298 | .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, | |
4299 | .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, | |
4300 | .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security, | |
4301 | .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl, | |
4302 | .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap, | |
4303 | .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect, | |
4304 | .file_lock = selinux_file_lock, | |
4305 | .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl, | |
4306 | .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner, | |
4307 | .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask, | |
4308 | .file_receive = selinux_file_receive, | |
4309 | ||
4310 | .task_create = selinux_task_create, | |
4311 | .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security, | |
4312 | .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security, | |
4313 | .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid, | |
4314 | .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid, | |
4315 | .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid, | |
4316 | .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid, | |
4317 | .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid, | |
4318 | .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid, | |
4319 | .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups, | |
4320 | .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice, | |
4321 | .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit, | |
4322 | .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler, | |
4323 | .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler, | |
4324 | .task_kill = selinux_task_kill, | |
4325 | .task_wait = selinux_task_wait, | |
4326 | .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl, | |
4327 | .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init, | |
4328 | .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, | |
4329 | ||
4330 | .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, | |
4331 | ||
4332 | .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, | |
4333 | .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, | |
4334 | ||
4335 | .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security, | |
4336 | .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security, | |
4337 | .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate, | |
4338 | .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl, | |
4339 | .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd, | |
4340 | .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv, | |
4341 | ||
4342 | .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security, | |
4343 | .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security, | |
4344 | .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate, | |
4345 | .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl, | |
4346 | .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat, | |
4347 | ||
4348 | .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security, | |
4349 | .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security, | |
4350 | .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate, | |
4351 | .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl, | |
4352 | .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop, | |
4353 | ||
4354 | .register_security = selinux_register_security, | |
4355 | .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security, | |
4356 | ||
4357 | .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate, | |
4358 | ||
4359 | .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr, | |
4360 | .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr, | |
4361 | ||
4362 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK | |
4363 | .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect, | |
4364 | .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send, | |
4365 | ||
4366 | .socket_create = selinux_socket_create, | |
4367 | .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create, | |
4368 | .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind, | |
4369 | .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect, | |
4370 | .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen, | |
4371 | .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept, | |
4372 | .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg, | |
4373 | .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg, | |
4374 | .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname, | |
4375 | .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername, | |
4376 | .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt, | |
4377 | .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt, | |
4378 | .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown, | |
4379 | .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb, | |
4380 | .socket_getpeersec = selinux_socket_getpeersec, | |
4381 | .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security, | |
4382 | .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security, | |
4383 | #endif | |
4384 | }; | |
4385 | ||
4386 | static __init int selinux_init(void) | |
4387 | { | |
4388 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; | |
4389 | ||
4390 | if (!selinux_enabled) { | |
4391 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n"); | |
4392 | return 0; | |
4393 | } | |
4394 | ||
4395 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n"); | |
4396 | ||
4397 | /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ | |
4398 | if (task_alloc_security(current)) | |
4399 | panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n"); | |
4400 | tsec = current->security; | |
4401 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; | |
4402 | ||
4403 | avc_init(); | |
4404 | ||
4405 | original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops; | |
4406 | if (!secondary_ops) | |
4407 | panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n"); | |
4408 | if (register_security (&selinux_ops)) | |
4409 | panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n"); | |
4410 | ||
4411 | if (selinux_enforcing) { | |
4412 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); | |
4413 | } else { | |
4414 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); | |
4415 | } | |
4416 | return 0; | |
4417 | } | |
4418 | ||
4419 | void selinux_complete_init(void) | |
4420 | { | |
4421 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n"); | |
4422 | ||
4423 | /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */ | |
4424 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); | |
4425 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
4426 | next_sb: | |
4427 | if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) { | |
4428 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = | |
4429 | list_entry(superblock_security_head.next, | |
4430 | struct superblock_security_struct, | |
4431 | list); | |
4432 | struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb; | |
4433 | spin_lock(&sb_lock); | |
4434 | sb->s_count++; | |
4435 | spin_unlock(&sb_lock); | |
4436 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
4437 | down_read(&sb->s_umount); | |
4438 | if (sb->s_root) | |
4439 | superblock_doinit(sb, NULL); | |
4440 | drop_super(sb); | |
4441 | spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); | |
4442 | list_del_init(&sbsec->list); | |
4443 | goto next_sb; | |
4444 | } | |
4445 | spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); | |
4446 | } | |
4447 | ||
4448 | /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label | |
4449 | all processes and objects when they are created. */ | |
4450 | security_initcall(selinux_init); | |
4451 | ||
4452 | #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) | |
4453 | ||
4454 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = { | |
4455 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last, | |
4456 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, | |
4457 | .pf = PF_INET, | |
4458 | .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING, | |
4459 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, | |
4460 | }; | |
4461 | ||
4462 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
4463 | ||
4464 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = { | |
4465 | .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last, | |
4466 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, | |
4467 | .pf = PF_INET6, | |
4468 | .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING, | |
4469 | .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, | |
4470 | }; | |
4471 | ||
4472 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
4473 | ||
4474 | static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) | |
4475 | { | |
4476 | int err = 0; | |
4477 | ||
4478 | if (!selinux_enabled) | |
4479 | goto out; | |
4480 | ||
4481 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); | |
4482 | ||
4483 | err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op); | |
4484 | if (err) | |
4485 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err); | |
4486 | ||
4487 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
4488 | ||
4489 | err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op); | |
4490 | if (err) | |
4491 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err); | |
4492 | ||
4493 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
4494 | out: | |
4495 | return err; | |
4496 | } | |
4497 | ||
4498 | __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); | |
4499 | ||
4500 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE | |
4501 | static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) | |
4502 | { | |
4503 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); | |
4504 | ||
4505 | nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op); | |
4506 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) | |
4507 | nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op); | |
4508 | #endif /* IPV6 */ | |
4509 | } | |
4510 | #endif | |
4511 | ||
4512 | #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */ | |
4513 | ||
4514 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE | |
4515 | #define selinux_nf_ip_exit() | |
4516 | #endif | |
4517 | ||
4518 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */ | |
4519 | ||
4520 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE | |
4521 | int selinux_disable(void) | |
4522 | { | |
4523 | extern void exit_sel_fs(void); | |
4524 | static int selinux_disabled = 0; | |
4525 | ||
4526 | if (ss_initialized) { | |
4527 | /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */ | |
4528 | return -EINVAL; | |
4529 | } | |
4530 | ||
4531 | if (selinux_disabled) { | |
4532 | /* Only do this once. */ | |
4533 | return -EINVAL; | |
4534 | } | |
4535 | ||
4536 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); | |
4537 | ||
4538 | selinux_disabled = 1; | |
4539 | ||
4540 | /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */ | |
4541 | security_ops = secondary_ops; | |
4542 | ||
4543 | /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */ | |
4544 | selinux_nf_ip_exit(); | |
4545 | ||
4546 | /* Unregister selinuxfs. */ | |
4547 | exit_sel_fs(); | |
4548 | ||
4549 | return 0; | |
4550 | } | |
4551 | #endif | |
4552 | ||
4553 |