1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
114 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
123 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
124 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
126 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
128 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
129 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
130 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
132 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
133 unsigned int *preasons
);
134 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
135 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
136 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
137 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
139 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
140 const char X509_version
[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT
;
142 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509
**a
, X509
**b
)
150 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a
, *b
);
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509
*x
)
156 X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0);
157 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
)
163 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
165 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
167 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
170 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
171 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
174 /* Look for exact match */
175 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
176 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
177 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
180 if (i
< sk_X509_num(certs
))
181 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
184 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
188 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
190 X509
*x
, *xtmp
, *xtmp2
, *chain_ss
= NULL
;
192 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
= ctx
->param
;
193 int depth
, i
, ok
= 0;
195 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
196 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
197 int trust
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
200 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
201 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
204 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
206 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
207 * cannot do another one.
209 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
216 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
217 * the first entry is in place
219 if (((ctx
->chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
220 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
))) {
221 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
225 CRYPTO_add(&ctx
->cert
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
226 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 1;
228 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
229 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
230 && (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
231 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
236 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
237 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
238 depth
= param
->depth
;
241 /* If we have enough, we break */
243 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
244 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
245 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
248 /* If we are self signed, we break */
249 if (cert_self_signed(x
))
252 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
254 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
) {
255 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
259 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
268 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
269 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) {
270 xtmp
= find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
272 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, xtmp
)) {
273 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
277 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
278 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, xtmp
);
279 ctx
->last_untrusted
++;
283 * reparse the full chain for the next one
291 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
294 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
295 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
301 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
303 i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
304 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1);
305 if (cert_self_signed(x
)) {
306 /* we have a self signed certificate */
307 if (sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1) {
309 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
310 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
311 * possible impersonation.
313 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
314 if ((ok
<= 0) || X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
)) {
315 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
;
316 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
317 ctx
->error_depth
= i
- 1;
326 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
327 * version so we get any trust settings.
331 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1, x
);
332 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
336 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
338 chain_ss
= sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
339 ctx
->last_untrusted
--;
342 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
345 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
347 /* If we have enough, we break */
350 /* If we are self signed, we break */
351 if (cert_self_signed(x
))
353 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
360 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
)) {
362 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
369 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
370 if ((trust
= check_trust(ctx
)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
371 /* Callback already issued */
377 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
378 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
379 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
383 if (trust
!= X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
384 && !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
)
385 && !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
)) {
387 xtmp2
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
- 1);
388 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, xtmp2
);
391 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
394 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
399 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
403 xtmp
= sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
407 ctx
->last_untrusted
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
416 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
417 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
418 * and set bad_chain == 1
420 if (trust
!= X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
&& !bad_chain
) {
421 if ((chain_ss
== NULL
) || !ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, chain_ss
)) {
422 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
>= num
)
423 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
;
425 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
;
426 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
429 sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, chain_ss
);
431 ctx
->last_untrusted
= num
;
432 ctx
->current_cert
= chain_ss
;
433 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
;
437 ctx
->error_depth
= num
- 1;
444 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
445 ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
);
450 /* Check name constraints */
452 ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
);
462 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
463 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
466 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
467 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
470 ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
);
474 err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
476 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
) {
478 ctx
->current_cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->error_depth
);
484 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
485 if (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
)
486 ok
= ctx
->verify(ctx
);
488 ok
= internal_verify(ctx
);
492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
493 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
494 ok
= v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
);
497 ok
= v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
);
502 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
503 if (!bad_chain
&& (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
))
504 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
509 /* Ensure we return an error */
512 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
516 if (chain_ss
!= NULL
)
522 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
525 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
529 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
530 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
531 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
))
537 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
539 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
542 ret
= X509_check_issued(issuer
, x
);
543 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
)
545 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
546 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK
))
550 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
551 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
552 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
555 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
557 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
559 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
561 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer
)->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
568 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
572 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
574 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
577 int i
, ok
= 0, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
579 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
580 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
582 int allow_proxy_certs
;
586 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
587 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
588 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
589 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
590 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
591 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
592 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
596 /* CRL path validation */
598 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
599 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
602 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
604 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
607 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
608 allow_proxy_certs
= 1;
609 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
612 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
613 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
++) {
615 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
616 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
617 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
618 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
;
619 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
620 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
625 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)) {
626 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
;
627 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
628 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
633 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
634 switch (must_be_ca
) {
636 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
637 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0)) {
639 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
646 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
652 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
655 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
661 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
662 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
667 if (ctx
->param
->purpose
> 0) {
668 ret
= X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0);
670 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
672 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
;
673 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
674 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
680 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
681 if ((i
> 1) && !(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
)
682 && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
683 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
+ 1))) {
684 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
685 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
686 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
691 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
692 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
695 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
696 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
697 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
699 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
700 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1 && i
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
) {
701 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
702 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
703 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
719 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
723 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
724 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
725 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
726 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
727 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
730 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
731 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
732 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
735 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
736 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
738 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
739 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
741 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
742 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
743 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
752 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
754 ctx
->error
= errcode
;
755 ctx
->current_cert
= ctx
->cert
;
756 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
757 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
760 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
*id
)
763 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id
->hosts
);
766 if (id
->peername
!= NULL
) {
767 OPENSSL_free(id
->peername
);
770 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
771 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id
->hosts
, i
);
772 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, id
->hostflags
, &id
->peername
) > 0)
778 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
780 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
781 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
*id
= vpm
->id
;
783 if (id
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, id
) <= 0) {
784 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
787 if (id
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, id
->email
, id
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
788 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
791 if (id
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, id
->ip
, id
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
792 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
798 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
802 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
804 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
805 for (i
= ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
806 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
807 ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
808 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
809 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
810 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
812 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
815 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
816 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
817 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
818 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
;
821 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
825 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
828 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
830 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
))
831 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
832 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, 0);
833 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
835 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
837 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
838 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
843 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
844 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
846 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
849 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
852 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
854 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
855 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
857 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
862 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
863 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
864 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
871 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
873 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
876 unsigned int last_reasons
;
877 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
878 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
879 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
880 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
881 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
882 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
883 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
884 last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
885 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
887 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
889 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
891 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
894 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
895 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
898 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
899 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
904 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
907 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
913 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
915 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
925 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
928 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
929 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
930 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
938 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
943 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
945 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
950 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
951 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
952 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
953 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
958 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
962 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
;
963 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
970 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
;
971 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
975 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
976 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
981 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
;
982 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
985 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
986 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
989 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
;
990 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
996 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
1001 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
1002 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
1003 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1005 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
1006 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
1007 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
1008 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
1009 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1011 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1012 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1013 reasons
= *preasons
;
1014 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
1016 if (crl_score
> best_score
) {
1018 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
1019 best_score
= crl_score
;
1020 best_reasons
= reasons
;
1026 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
1028 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
1029 *pscore
= best_score
;
1030 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
1031 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
1033 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
1036 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
1039 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1046 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1047 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1050 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1052 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
1054 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1056 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1057 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1059 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1063 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1067 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1069 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1079 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
1085 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1087 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1089 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1090 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
1092 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1093 if (!base
->crl_number
)
1095 /* Issuer names must match */
1096 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
1098 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1099 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1101 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1103 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1104 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1106 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1107 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1113 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1114 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1117 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1118 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1122 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
1124 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
1126 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1127 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1128 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1129 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1130 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1131 CRYPTO_add(&delta
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
1140 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1141 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1142 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1143 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1144 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1147 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1148 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1152 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1154 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1156 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1157 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1159 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1160 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1161 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1163 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1164 /* If no new reasons reject */
1165 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1168 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1169 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1171 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1172 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1173 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1176 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1178 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1179 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1182 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1183 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1185 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1186 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1188 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1190 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1193 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1195 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1196 /* If no new reasons reject */
1197 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1199 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1200 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1203 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1209 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1210 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1212 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1213 X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1214 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1217 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1220 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1222 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1223 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1224 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1225 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1230 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1231 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1232 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1234 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1235 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1236 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1241 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1243 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1247 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1248 * untrusted certificates.
1250 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1251 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1252 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1254 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1255 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1256 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1263 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1264 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1265 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1266 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1269 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1271 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1273 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1276 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->ctx
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1279 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1280 /* Copy verify params across */
1281 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1283 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1284 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1286 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1287 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1292 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1294 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1296 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1301 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1302 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1303 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1304 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1305 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1309 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1310 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1311 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1313 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1314 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1315 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1316 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1322 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1323 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1324 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1325 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1326 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1329 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1331 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1332 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1333 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1340 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1344 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1349 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1351 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1352 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1355 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1356 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1360 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1362 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1363 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1364 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1366 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1372 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1374 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1375 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1376 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1377 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1378 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1387 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1390 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1391 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1393 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1394 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1395 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1396 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1398 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1404 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1406 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1407 unsigned int *preasons
)
1410 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1412 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1413 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1416 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1419 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1420 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1421 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1422 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1423 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1424 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1429 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1430 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1436 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1437 * to find a delta CRL too
1440 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1441 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1444 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1446 unsigned int reasons
;
1447 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1448 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1449 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1450 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1451 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1452 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1457 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1459 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1461 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1465 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1467 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1471 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1473 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1474 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1475 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1484 /* Check CRL validity */
1485 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1487 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1488 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1489 int ok
= 0, chnum
, cnum
;
1490 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1491 chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1492 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1493 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1494 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1497 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1498 * certificate in chain.
1500 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1501 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1503 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1504 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1505 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
)) {
1506 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
;
1507 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1515 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1517 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1518 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1519 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1520 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
)) {
1521 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
;
1522 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1527 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
)) {
1528 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
;
1529 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1534 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
)) {
1535 if (check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0) {
1536 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
;
1537 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1543 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) {
1544 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1545 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1552 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
)) {
1553 ok
= check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1);
1558 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1559 ikey
= X509_get_pubkey(issuer
);
1562 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1563 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1568 rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1569 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
1571 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1575 /* Verify CRL signature */
1576 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0) {
1577 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1578 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1588 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey
);
1592 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1593 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1598 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1599 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1600 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1601 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1603 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1604 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
1605 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
;
1606 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1611 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1612 * is not removeFromCRL.
1614 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1615 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1617 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
;
1618 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1626 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1631 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1632 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1634 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1637 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1640 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1644 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1645 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1646 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1648 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1649 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
;
1650 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1656 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1657 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1658 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1661 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1662 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1663 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
1664 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1671 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1676 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1677 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1678 else if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
)
1683 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1685 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
;
1686 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1687 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1692 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
;
1693 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1694 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1698 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1700 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
;
1701 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1702 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1707 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
;
1708 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1709 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1716 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1720 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1721 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
1723 cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1725 n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
1726 ctx
->error_depth
= n
- 1;
1728 xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1730 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1733 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1738 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
;
1739 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1744 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1745 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1749 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1751 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1754 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1755 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1760 || (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
))) {
1761 if ((pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1762 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1763 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1764 ok
= (*cb
) (0, ctx
);
1767 } else if (X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1768 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1769 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1770 ok
= (*cb
) (0, ctx
);
1772 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1776 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1783 ok
= check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
);
1787 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1788 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1789 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1790 ok
= (*cb
) (1, ctx
);
1797 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1805 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1807 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1810 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1815 char buff1
[24], buff2
[24], *p
;
1816 int i
, j
, remaining
;
1819 remaining
= ctm
->length
;
1820 str
= (char *)ctm
->data
;
1822 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1823 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1824 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1825 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1827 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1828 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1829 int min_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1830 int max_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1831 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1838 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1839 int min_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1840 int max_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1841 if (remaining
< min_length
|| remaining
> max_length
)
1849 if ((*str
== 'Z') || (*str
== '-') || (*str
== '+')) {
1860 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1861 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1862 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1864 if (remaining
&& *str
== '.') {
1867 for (i
= 0; i
< 3 && remaining
; i
++, str
++, remaining
--) {
1868 if (*str
< '0' || *str
> '9')
1877 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1886 if ((*str
!= '+') && (*str
!= '-'))
1888 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1891 if (str
[1] < '0' || str
[1] > '9' || str
[2] < '0' || str
[2] > '9' ||
1892 str
[3] < '0' || str
[3] > '9' || str
[4] < '0' || str
[4] > '9')
1894 offset
= ((str
[1] - '0') * 10 + (str
[2] - '0')) * 60;
1895 offset
+= (str
[3] - '0') * 10 + (str
[4] - '0');
1899 atm
.type
= ctm
->type
;
1901 atm
.length
= sizeof(buff2
);
1902 atm
.data
= (unsigned char *)buff2
;
1904 if (X509_time_adj(&atm
, offset
* 60, cmp_time
) == NULL
)
1907 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1908 i
= (buff1
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1
[1] - '0');
1910 i
+= 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1911 j
= (buff2
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2
[1] - '0');
1920 i
= strcmp(buff1
, buff2
);
1921 if (i
== 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1927 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1929 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1932 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1934 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1937 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1938 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1947 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
1948 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1949 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1950 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1951 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1953 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1956 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1958 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1961 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1964 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1965 ktmp
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1967 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1968 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1971 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1974 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1979 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1980 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1984 /* first, populate the other certs */
1985 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
1986 ktmp2
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
1987 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
1988 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2
);
1992 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
1993 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1997 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1999 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
2000 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
2002 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
2004 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
2005 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2006 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
2007 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
2010 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2011 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
2012 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
2015 /* Issuer names must match */
2016 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
2017 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
2020 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2021 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
2022 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
2025 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
2026 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
2029 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2030 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
2031 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
2034 /* CRLs must verify */
2035 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
2036 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
2037 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
2040 /* Create new CRL */
2041 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
2042 if (!crl
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
2044 /* Set issuer name */
2045 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
2048 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer
)))
2050 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer
)))
2053 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2055 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
2059 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2060 * number to correct value too.
2063 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
2064 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
2065 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
2066 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
2070 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2072 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
2074 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
2075 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
2076 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
2078 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2079 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2081 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2082 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2085 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2086 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2091 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2093 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2099 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2105 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl
, void *argp
,
2106 CRYPTO_EX_new
*new_func
,
2107 CRYPTO_EX_dup
*dup_func
,
2108 CRYPTO_EX_free
*free_func
)
2111 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2112 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2114 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, argl
, argp
,
2115 new_func
, dup_func
, free_func
);
2118 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2120 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2123 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2125 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2128 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2133 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2138 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2140 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2143 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2145 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2148 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2153 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2157 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2160 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2162 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2165 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2167 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2170 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2175 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2180 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2182 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2185 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2190 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2192 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2195 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2197 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2201 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2202 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2203 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2204 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2205 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2206 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2207 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2211 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2212 int purpose
, int trust
)
2215 /* If purpose not set use default */
2217 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2218 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2221 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2223 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2224 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2227 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2228 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2229 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2231 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2232 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2235 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2237 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2239 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2242 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2244 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2245 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2250 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2251 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2252 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2253 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2257 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2259 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
;
2260 ctx
= (X509_STORE_CTX
*)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX
));
2262 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2265 memset(ctx
, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX
));
2269 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2273 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2277 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2278 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2282 ctx
->current_method
= 0;
2284 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2286 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
2287 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2291 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2292 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2293 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2294 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2295 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2296 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2297 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2300 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2301 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2303 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2305 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2310 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2313 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2315 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2318 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2319 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
2320 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2325 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2326 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2329 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2333 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2334 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2336 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2338 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2339 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2341 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2343 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2344 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2346 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2348 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2349 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2351 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2353 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2354 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2356 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2358 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2359 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2361 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2363 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2364 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2366 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2368 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2369 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2371 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2373 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2374 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2376 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_get1_certs
;
2378 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2379 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2381 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_get1_crls
;
2383 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2385 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2388 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2392 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2393 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2395 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2400 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2401 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2404 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2406 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2407 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2410 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2413 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2414 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2415 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2416 * pointers below after they're freed!
2418 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2419 if (ctx
->cleanup
!= NULL
) {
2421 ctx
->cleanup
= NULL
;
2423 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2424 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2425 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2428 if (ctx
->tree
!= NULL
) {
2429 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2432 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
2433 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2436 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2437 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA
));
2440 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2442 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2445 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2447 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2450 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2453 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2456 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2457 int (*verify_cb
) (int, X509_STORE_CTX
*))
2459 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2462 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2467 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2469 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2472 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2474 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2475 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2478 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2481 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2486 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2489 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2493 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509
)
2495 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509
)
2497 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME
)
2499 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE
)
2501 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE
)