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1 Security Process
2 ================
3
4 This is a proposed security vulnerability reporting and handling
5 process for Open vSwitch. It is based on the OpenStack vulnerability
6 management process described at
7 https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Vulnerability_Management.
8
9 The OVS security team coordinates vulnerability management using the
10 ovs-security mailing list. Membership in the security team and
11 subscription to its mailing list consists of a small number of
12 trustworthy people, as determined by rough consensus of the Open
13 vSwitch committers on the ovs-committers mailing list. The Open
14 vSwitch security team should include Open vSwitch committers, to
15 ensure prompt and accurate vulnerability assessments and patch review.
16
17 We encourage everyone involved in the security process to GPG-sign
18 their emails. We additionally encourage GPG-encrypting one-on-one
19 conversations as part of the security process.
20
21
22 What is a vulnerability?
23 ------------------------
24
25 All vulnerabilities are bugs, but not every bug is a vulnerability.
26 Vulnerabilities compromise one or more of:
27
28 * Confidentiality (personal or corporate confidential data).
29 * Integrity (trustworthiness and correctness).
30 * Availability (uptime and service).
31
32 Here are some examples of vulnerabilities to which one would expect to
33 apply this process:
34
35 * A crafted packet that causes a kernel or userspace crash
36 (Availability).
37
38 * A flow translation bug that misforwards traffic in a way likely
39 to hop over security boundaries (Integrity).
40
41 * An OpenFlow protocol bug that allows a controller to read
42 arbitrary files from the file system (Confidentiality).
43
44 * Misuse of the OpenSSL library that allows bypassing certificate
45 checks (Integrity).
46
47 * A bug (memory corruption, overflow, ...) that allows one to
48 modify the behaviour of OVS through external configuration
49 interfaces such as OVSDB (Integrity).
50
51 * Privileged information is exposed to unprivileged users
52 (Confidentiality).
53
54 If in doubt, please do use the vulnerability management process. At
55 worst, the response will be to report the bug through the usual
56 channels.
57
58
59 Step 1: Reception
60 -----------------
61
62 To report an Open vSwitch vulnerability, send an email to the
63 ovs-security mailing list (see "Contact" at the end of this document).
64 A security team member should reply to the reporter acknowledging that
65 the report has been received.
66
67 Please consider reporting the information mentioned in
68 REPORTING-BUGS.md, where relevant.
69
70 Reporters may ask for a GPG key while initiating contact with the
71 security team to deliver more sensitive reports.
72
73 The Linux kernel has its own vulnerability management process:
74 https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/Documentation/SecurityBugs
75 Handling of vulnerabilities that affect both the Open vSwitch tree and
76 the upstream Linux kernel should be reported through both processes.
77 Please send your report as a single email to both the kernel and OVS
78 security teams to allow those teams to most easily coordinate among
79 themselves.
80
81
82 Step 2: Assessment
83 ------------------
84
85 The security team should discuss the vulnerability. The reporter
86 should be included in the discussion (via "CC") to an appropriate
87 degree.
88
89 The assessment should determine which Open vSwitch versions are
90 affected (e.g. every version, only the latest release, only unreleased
91 versions), the privilege required to take advantage of the
92 vulnerability (e.g. any network user, any local L2 network user, any
93 local system user, connected OpenFlow controllers), the severity of
94 the vulnerability, and how the vulnerability may be mitigated (e.g. by
95 disabling a feature).
96
97 The treatment of the vulnerability could end here if the team
98 determines that it is not a realistic vulnerability.
99
100
101 Step 3a: Document
102 ----------------
103
104 The security team develops a security advisory document. The security
105 team may, at its discretion, include the reporter (via "CC") in
106 developing the security advisory document, but in any case should
107 accept feedback from the reporter before finalizing the document.
108 When the document is final, the security team should obtain a CVE for
109 the vulnerability from a CNA (https://cve.mitre.org/cve/cna.html).
110
111 The document credits the reporter and describes the vulnerability,
112 including all of the relevant information from the assessment in step
113 2. Suitable sections for the document include:
114
115 * Title: The CVE identifier, a short description of the
116 vulnerability. The title should mention Open vSwitch.
117
118 In email, the title becomes the subject. Pre-release advisories
119 are often passed around in encrypted email, which have plaintext
120 subjects, so the title should not be too specific.
121
122 * Description: A few paragraphs describing the general
123 characteristics of the vulnerability, including the versions of
124 Open vSwitch that are vulnerable, the kind of attack that
125 exposes the vulnerability, and potential consequences of the
126 attack.
127
128 The description should re-state the CVE identifier, in case the
129 subject is lost when an advisory is sent over email.
130
131 * Mitigation: How an Open vSwitch administrator can minimize the
132 potential for exploitation of the vulnerability, before applying
133 a fix. If no mitigation is possible or recommended, explain
134 why, to reduce the chance that at-risk users believe they are
135 not at risk.
136
137 * Fix: Describe how to fix the vulnerability, perhaps in terms of
138 applying a source patch. The patch or patches themselves, if
139 included in the email, should be at the very end of the advisory
140 to reduce the risk that a reader would stop reading at this
141 point.
142
143 * Recommendation: A concise description of the security team's
144 recommendation to users.
145
146 * Acknowledgments: Thank the reporters.
147
148 * Vulnerability Check: A step-by-step procedure by which a user
149 can determine whether an installed copy of Open vSwitch is
150 vulnerable.
151
152 The procedure should clearly describe how to interpret the
153 results, including expected results in vulnerable and
154 not-vulnerable cases. Thus, procedures that produce clear and
155 easily distinguished results are preferred.
156
157 The procedure should assume as little understanding of Open
158 vSwitch as possible, to make it more likely that a competent
159 administrator who does not specialize in Open vSwitch can
160 perform it successfully.
161
162 The procedure should have minimal dependencies on tools that are
163 not widely installed.
164
165 Given a choice, the procedure should be one that takes at least
166 some work to turn into a useful exploit. For example, a
167 procedure based on "ovs-appctl" commands, which require local
168 administrator access, is preferred to one that sends test
169 packets to a machine, which only requires network connectivity.
170
171 The section should say which operating systems it is designed
172 for. If the procedure is likely to be specific to particular
173 architectures (e.g. x86-64, i386), it should state on which ones
174 it has been tested.
175
176 This section should state the risks of the procedure. For
177 example, if it can crash Open vSwitch or disrupt packet
178 forwarding, say so.
179
180 It is more useful to explain how to check an installed and
181 running Open vSwitch than one built locally from source, but if
182 it is easy to use the procedure from a sandbox environment, it
183 can be helpful to explain how to do so.
184
185 * Patch: If a patch or patches are available, and it is practical
186 to include them in the email, put them at the end. Format them
187 as described in CONTRIBUTING.md, that is, as output by "git
188 format-patch".
189
190 The patch subjects should include the version for which they are
191 suited, e.g. "[PATCH branch-2.3]" for a patch against Open
192 vSwitch 2.3.x. If there are multiple patches for multiple
193 versions of Open vSwitch, put them in separate sections with
194 clear titles.
195
196 Multiple patches for a single version of Open vSwitch, that must
197 be stacked on top of each other to fix a single vulnerability,
198 are undesirable because users are less likely to apply all of
199 them correctly and in the correct order.
200
201 Each patch should include a Vulnerability tag with the CVE
202 identifier, a Reported-by tag or tags to credit the reporters,
203 and a Signed-off-by tag to acknowledge the Developer's
204 Certificate of Origin. It should also include other appropriate
205 tags, such as Acked-by tags obtained during review.
206
207 CVE-2016-2074 is an example advisory document, available at:
208 http://openvswitch.org/pipermail/announce/2016-March/000082.html
209
210
211 Step 3b: Fix
212 ------------
213
214 Steps 3a and 3b may proceed in parallel.
215
216 The security team develops and obtains (private) reviews for patches
217 that fix the vulnerability. If necessary, the security team pulls in
218 additional developers, who must agree to maintain confidentiality.
219
220
221 Step 4: Embargoed Disclosure
222 ----------------------------
223
224 The security advisory and patches are sent to downstream stakeholders,
225 with an embargo date and time set from the time sent. Downstream
226 stakeholders are expected not to deploy or disclose patches until
227 the embargo is passed.
228
229 A disclosure date is negotiated by the security team working with the
230 bug submitter as well as vendors. However, the Open vSwitch security
231 team holds the final say when setting a disclosure date. The timeframe
232 for disclosure is from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known)
233 to a few weeks. As a basic default policy, we expect report date to
234 disclosure date to be 10 to 15 business days.
235
236 Operating system vendors are obvious downstream stakeholders. It may
237 not be necessary to be too choosy about who to include: any major Open
238 vSwitch user who is interested and can be considered trustworthy
239 enough could be included. To become a downstream stakeholder, email
240 the ovs-security mailing list.
241
242 If the vulnerability is already public, skip this step.
243
244
245 Step 5: Public Disclosure
246 -------------------------
247
248 When the embargo expires, push the (reviewed) patches to appropriate
249 branches, post the patches to the ovs-dev mailing list (noting that
250 they have already been reviewed and applied), post the security
251 advisory to appropriate mailing lists (ovs-announce, ovs-discuss), and
252 post the security advisory on the Open vSwitch webpage.
253
254 When the patch is applied to LTS (long-term support) branches, a new
255 version should be released.
256
257 The security advisory should be GPG-signed by a security team member
258 with a key that is in a public web of trust.
259
260
261 Contact
262 =======
263
264 Report security vulnerabilities to the ovs-security mailing list:
265 security@openvswitch.org
266
267 Report problems with this document to the ovs-bugs mailing list:
268 bugs@openvswitch.org
269
270 Visit http://openvswitch.org/ to learn more about Open vSwitch.