TODO

   1 - Versioned protocol:
   2   - Make shim and the bootloaders using it express how enlightened they
   3     are to one another, so we can stop earlier without tricks
   4   - Make EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_2 protocol and a LOAD_IMAGE protocol with
   5     LoadImage/CheckImage/StartImage.
   6 - Implement EFI_CERT_X509_SHA{256,384,512} revocation checks
   7   - It doesn't necessarily have to include timestamp checking support
   8 - Make the openssl code supply the Pkcs7Verify() API, and use the system
   9   one (instead) if it is available.
  10   - And make building it optional
  11 - Get meb30's multiple-certs patch merged
  12 - Hashing of option roms:
  13   - hash option roms and add them to MokListRT
  14   - probably belongs in MokManager
  15   - And some PCR?
  16 - Ability to specify second stage as a device path
  17   - including vendor path that means "parent of this image's path"
  18   - including vendor path that means "this image"
  19   - including path that's like Fv() to embed images.
  20 - Make all build options be able to be set in 'git config --local shim.OPTION'
  21   - Make the build dump those to stdout as well
  22 - make debuginfo paths configurable
  23 - make arch dependent names configurable
  24 - Make it easier to avoid CryptPem
  25 - Post process full path names out of __FILE__ / __BASE_FILE__ entries in
  26   the string table :/
  27 - Reproducible builds:
  28   - Make build.log an artifact of building.
  29   - KEK for Mok.  (koike expressed an interest in working on this.)
  30   - Reorder builds to take hashes of mm, fb and insert those in shim
  31     instead of ephemeral certs
  32   - Make an easy strip+implant tool for our embedded cert lists
  33 - Detection of fallback.efi boot loops
  34   - Some tablet devices seem to always boot the fallback path, ignoring
  35     boot variables, so we need to detect that.
  36   - fallback creates 2 variables, one volatile, one nonvolatile
  37   - if shim sees the nonvolatile variable but not the volatile one, it has
  38     been booted correctly after fallback has run, so it should remove the
  39     nonvolatile variable.
  40   - if fallback sees the nonvolatile variable, it is in a fallback boot
  41     loop, and should launch the next stage instead of rebooting.
  42   - This means the TPM extend chain on machines with broken BDS always
  43     looks like: shim -> fallback -> shim -> grub2 -> kernel, *except* on
  44     boots from removable media (i.e. install media without fallback),
  45     where it looks like shim -> grub2 -> kernel /once/.
  46
  47 # vim:filetype=mail:tw=74