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x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros
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1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
2
3 #ifndef __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
4 #define __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
5
6 #include <asm/alternative.h>
7 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
8 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
9
10 /*
11 * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
12 *
13 * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
14 * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
15 *
16 * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
17 * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
18 * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
19 * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
20 * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
21 *
22 * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
23 * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
24 * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
25 */
26
27 #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
28 #define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */
29
30 /*
31 * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
32 * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
33 * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
34 */
35 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
36 mov $(nr/2), reg; \
37 771: \
38 call 772f; \
39 773: /* speculation trap */ \
40 pause; \
41 lfence; \
42 jmp 773b; \
43 772: \
44 call 774f; \
45 775: /* speculation trap */ \
46 pause; \
47 lfence; \
48 jmp 775b; \
49 774: \
50 dec reg; \
51 jnz 771b; \
52 add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
53
54 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
55
56 /*
57 * This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative. It tells
58 * objtool where the retpolines are so that it can make sense of the control
59 * flow by just reading the original instruction(s) and ignoring the
60 * alternatives.
61 */
62 .macro ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
63 .Lannotate_\@:
64 .pushsection .discard.nospec
65 .long .Lannotate_\@ - .
66 .popsection
67 .endm
68
69 /*
70 * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
71 * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
72 * invocation below less ugly.
73 */
74 .macro RETPOLINE_JMP reg:req
75 call .Ldo_rop_\@
76 .Lspec_trap_\@:
77 pause
78 lfence
79 jmp .Lspec_trap_\@
80 .Ldo_rop_\@:
81 mov \reg, (%_ASM_SP)
82 ret
83 .endm
84
85 /*
86 * This is a wrapper around RETPOLINE_JMP so the called function in reg
87 * returns to the instruction after the macro.
88 */
89 .macro RETPOLINE_CALL reg:req
90 jmp .Ldo_call_\@
91 .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@:
92 RETPOLINE_JMP \reg
93 .Ldo_call_\@:
94 call .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@
95 .endm
96
97 /*
98 * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
99 * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
100 * attack.
101 */
102 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
103 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
104 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
105 ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(jmp *\reg), \
106 __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
107 __stringify(lfence; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
108 #else
109 jmp *\reg
110 #endif
111 .endm
112
113 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
114 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
115 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
116 ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(call *\reg), \
117 __stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\
118 __stringify(lfence; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
119 #else
120 call *\reg
121 #endif
122 .endm
123
124 /*
125 * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
126 * monstrosity above, manually.
127 */
128 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
129 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
130 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
131 ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
132 __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \
133 \ftr
134 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
135 #endif
136 .endm
137
138 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
139
140 #define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
141 "999:\n\t" \
142 ".pushsection .discard.nospec\n\t" \
143 ".long 999b - .\n\t" \
144 ".popsection\n\t"
145
146 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE)
147
148 /*
149 * Since the inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC,
150 * the 64-bit one is dependent on RETPOLINE not CONFIG_RETPOLINE.
151 */
152 # define CALL_NOSPEC \
153 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
154 ALTERNATIVE( \
155 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
156 "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \
157 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
158 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
159
160 #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
161 /*
162 * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
163 * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
164 * here, anyway.
165 */
166 # define CALL_NOSPEC ALTERNATIVE("call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
167 " jmp 904f;\n" \
168 " .align 16\n" \
169 "901: call 903f;\n" \
170 "902: pause;\n" \
171 " lfence;\n" \
172 " jmp 902b;\n" \
173 " .align 16\n" \
174 "903: addl $4, %%esp;\n" \
175 " pushl %[thunk_target];\n" \
176 " ret;\n" \
177 " .align 16\n" \
178 "904: call 901b;\n", \
179 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
180
181 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
182 #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
183 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
184 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
185 #endif
186
187 /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
188 enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
189 SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
190 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL,
191 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD,
192 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
193 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
194 SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
195 };
196
197 /*
198 * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
199 * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
200 * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
201 * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
202 */
203 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
204 {
205 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
206 unsigned long loops = RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS / 2;
207
208 asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
209 ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
210 __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
211 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
212 "910:"
213 : "=&r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
214 : "r" (loops) : "memory" );
215 #endif
216 }
217 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
218 #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */