KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter

[mirror_ubuntu-jammy-kernel.git] / arch / x86 / kernel / cpu / bugs.c

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
 *  Copyright (C) 1994  Linus Torvalds
 *
 *  Cyrix stuff, June 1998 by:
 *      - Rafael R. Reilova (moved everything from head.S),
 *        <rreilova@ececs.uc.edu>
 *      - Channing Corn (tests & fixes),
 *      - Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup).
 */
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>

#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/vmx.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>

#include "cpu.h"

static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);

/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);

/* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */
DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);

static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);

/*
 * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ
 * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update().
 */
void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force)
{
        if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val)
                return;

        this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val);

        /*
         * When KERNEL_IBRS this MSR is written on return-to-user, unless
         * forced the update can be delayed until that time.
         */
        if (force || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS))
                wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
}

u64 spec_ctrl_current(void)
{
        return this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current);

/*
 * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
 * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
 */
u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;

/* Control conditional STIBP in switch_to() */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
/* Control conditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
/* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);

/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);

/*
 * Controls whether l1d flush based mitigations are enabled,
 * based on hw features and admin setting via boot parameter
 * defaults to false
 */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);

/* Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before KVM guest MMIO accesses */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear);

void __init check_bugs(void)
{
        identify_boot_cpu();

        /*
         * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
         * core code know.
         */
        cpu_smt_check_topology();

        if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
                pr_info("CPU: ");
                print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
        }

        /*
         * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
         * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
         * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
         */
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
                rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);

        /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
        spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
        spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
        /*
         * retbleed_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
         * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
         * spectre_v2=ibrs.
         */
        retbleed_select_mitigation();
        /*
         * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
         * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is
         * forced for UNRET.
         */
        spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
        ssb_select_mitigation();
        l1tf_select_mitigation();
        md_clear_select_mitigation();
        srbds_select_mitigation();
        l1d_flush_select_mitigation();

        arch_smt_update();

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
        /*
         * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
         *
         * - i386 is no longer supported.
         * - In order to run on anything without a TSC, we need to be
         *   compiled for a i486.
         */
        if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4)
                panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features");

        init_utsname()->machine[1] =
                '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86);
        alternative_instructions();

        fpu__init_check_bugs();
#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
        alternative_instructions();

        /*
         * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
         * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
         * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
         *
         * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
         * very little benefit for that case.
         */
        if (!direct_gbpages)
                set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
#endif
}

/*
 * NOTE: This function is *only* called for SVM.  VMX spec_ctrl handling is
 * done in vmenter.S.
 */
void
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
{
        u64 msrval, guestval = guest_spec_ctrl, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
        struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();

        if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
                if (hostval != guestval) {
                        msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
                        wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
                }
        }

        /*
         * If SSBD is not handled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL on AMD, update
         * MSR_AMD64_L2_CFG or MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if supported.
         */
        if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
            !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
                return;

        /*
         * If the host has SSBD mitigation enabled, force it in the host's
         * virtual MSR value. If its not permanently enabled, evaluate
         * current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.
         */
        if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
                hostval = SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
        else
                hostval = ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);

        /* Sanitize the guest value */
        guestval = guest_virt_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;

        if (hostval != guestval) {
                unsigned long tif;

                tif = setguest ? ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(guestval) :
                                 ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(hostval);

                speculation_ctrl_update(tif);
        }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl);

static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
{
        u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
                wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
        else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
                wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
}

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "MDS: " fmt

/* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;

static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
        [MDS_MITIGATION_OFF]    = "Vulnerable",
        [MDS_MITIGATION_FULL]   = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
        [MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
};

static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
{
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
                mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
                return;
        }

        if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
                if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
                        mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;

                static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);

                if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
                    (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
                        cpu_smt_disable(false);
        }
}

static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
{
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
                return 0;

        if (!str)
                return -EINVAL;

        if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
                mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
        else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
                mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
        else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
                mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
                mds_nosmt = true;
        }

        return 0;
}
early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "TAA: " fmt

enum taa_mitigations {
        TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
        TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
        TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
        TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
};

/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;

static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
        [TAA_MITIGATION_OFF]            = "Vulnerable",
        [TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]   = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
        [TAA_MITIGATION_VERW]           = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
        [TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED]   = "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
};

static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
{
        u64 ia32_cap;

        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
                taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
                return;
        }

        /* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
                taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
                return;
        }

        if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
                taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
                return;
        }

        /*
         * TAA mitigation via VERW is turned off if both
         * tsx_async_abort=off and mds=off are specified.
         */
        if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
            mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
                return;

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
                taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
        else
                taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;

        /*
         * VERW doesn't clear the CPU buffers when MD_CLEAR=1 and MDS_NO=1.
         * A microcode update fixes this behavior to clear CPU buffers. It also
         * adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is enumerated by the
         * ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit.
         *
         * On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode
         * update is required.
         */
        ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
        if ( (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
            !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
                taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;

        /*
         * TSX is enabled, select alternate mitigation for TAA which is
         * the same as MDS. Enable MDS static branch to clear CPU buffers.
         *
         * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
         * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
         */
        static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);

        if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
                cpu_smt_disable(false);
}

static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
                return 0;

        if (!str)
                return -EINVAL;

        if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
                taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
        } else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
                taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
        } else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
                taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
                taa_nosmt = true;
        }

        return 0;
}
early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "MMIO Stale Data: " fmt

enum mmio_mitigations {
        MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
        MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
        MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
};

/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;

static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
        [MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF]           = "Vulnerable",
        [MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]  = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
        [MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW]          = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
};

static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
{
        u64 ia32_cap;

        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
            cpu_mitigations_off()) {
                mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
                return;
        }

        if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
                return;

        ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();

        /*
         * Enable CPU buffer clear mitigation for host and VMM, if also affected
         * by MDS or TAA. Otherwise, enable mitigation for VMM only.
         */
        if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
                                              boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
                static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
        else
                static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);

        /*
         * If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can
         * be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle
         * is required irrespective of SMT state.
         */
        if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
                static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);

        /*
         * Check if the system has the right microcode.
         *
         * CPU Fill buffer clear mitigation is enumerated by either an explicit
         * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS
         * affected systems.
         */
        if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
            (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) &&
             boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) &&
             !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
                mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
        else
                mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;

        if (mmio_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
                cpu_smt_disable(false);
}

static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
                return 0;

        if (!str)
                return -EINVAL;

        if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
                mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
        } else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
                mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
        } else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
                mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
                mmio_nosmt = true;
        }

        return 0;
}
early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "" fmt

static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
{
        if (cpu_mitigations_off())
                return;

        if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
                goto out;

        /*
         * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
         * mitigation, if necessary.
         */
        if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
            boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
                mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
                mds_select_mitigation();
        }
        if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
            boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
                taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
                taa_select_mitigation();
        }
        if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
            boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
                mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
                mmio_select_mitigation();
        }
out:
        if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
                pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
        if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
                pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
        if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
                pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
}

static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
{
        mds_select_mitigation();
        taa_select_mitigation();
        mmio_select_mitigation();

        /*
         * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update
         * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
         * mitigation selection is done.
         */
        md_clear_update_mitigation();
}

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "SRBDS: " fmt

enum srbds_mitigations {
        SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
        SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
        SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
        SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF,
        SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
};

static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;

static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
        [SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF]          = "Vulnerable",
        [SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
        [SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL]         = "Mitigation: Microcode",
        [SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF]      = "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
        [SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR]   = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
};

static bool srbds_off;

void update_srbds_msr(void)
{
        u64 mcu_ctrl;

        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
                return;

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
                return;

        if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED)
                return;

        rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);

        switch (srbds_mitigation) {
        case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
        case SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF:
                mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
                break;
        case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
                mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
                break;
        default:
                break;
        }

        wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
}

static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
{
        u64 ia32_cap;

        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
                return;

        /*
         * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that
         * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected
         * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability.
         */
        ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
        if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
            !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
                srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
        else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
                srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
        else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
                srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
        else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off)
                srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;

        update_srbds_msr();
        pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
}

static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
        if (!str)
                return -EINVAL;

        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
                return 0;

        srbds_off = !strcmp(str, "off");
        return 0;
}
early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline);

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "L1D Flush : " fmt

enum l1d_flush_mitigations {
        L1D_FLUSH_OFF = 0,
        L1D_FLUSH_ON,
};

static enum l1d_flush_mitigations l1d_flush_mitigation __initdata = L1D_FLUSH_OFF;

static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void)
{
        if (!l1d_flush_mitigation || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D))
                return;

        static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
        pr_info("Conditional flush on switch_mm() enabled\n");
}

static int __init l1d_flush_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
        if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
                l1d_flush_mitigation = L1D_FLUSH_ON;

        return 0;
}
early_param("l1d_flush", l1d_flush_parse_cmdline);

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V1 : " fmt

enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
        SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE,
        SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO,
};

static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init =
        SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;

static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
        [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
        [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization",
};

/*
 * Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to
 * userspace?
 */
static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
{
        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
                return false;

        /*
         * On CPUs which are vulnerable to Meltdown, SMAP does not
         * prevent speculative access to user data in the L1 cache.
         * Consider SMAP to be non-functional as a mitigation on these
         * CPUs.
         */
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
                return false;

        return true;
}

static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
{
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
                spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
                return;
        }

        if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
                /*
                 * With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either
                 * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS
                 * value.  The mitigation is to add lfences to both code paths.
                 *
                 * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in
                 * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection.
                 *
                 * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space
                 * address in GS.  That makes an attack harder, but still
                 * possible if there's no SMAP protection.
                 */
                if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE) ||
                    !smap_works_speculatively()) {
                        /*
                         * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or
                         * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation
                         * is serializing.
                         *
                         * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE to
                         * stop speculation through swapgs.
                         */
                        if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS) &&
                            !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
                                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER);

                        /*
                         * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs)
                         * paths, to prevent user entry from speculatively
                         * skipping swapgs.
                         */
                        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL);
                }
        }

        pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
}

static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
{
        spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
        return 0;
}
early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);

static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
        SPECTRE_V2_NONE;

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "RETBleed: " fmt

enum retbleed_mitigation {
        RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
        RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET,
        RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB,
        RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS,
        RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS,
};

enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
        RETBLEED_CMD_OFF,
        RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO,
        RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET,
        RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB,
};

const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
        [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE]      = "Vulnerable",
        [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET]     = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk",
        [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB]      = "Mitigation: IBPB",
        [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS]      = "Mitigation: IBRS",
        [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS]     = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
};

static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
        RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init =
        RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;

static int __ro_after_init retbleed_nosmt = false;

static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
        if (!str)
                return -EINVAL;

        while (str) {
                char *next = strchr(str, ',');
                if (next) {
                        *next = 0;
                        next++;
                }

                if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
                        retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF;
                } else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) {
                        retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
                } else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) {
                        retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET;
                } else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) {
                        retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB;
                } else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) {
                        retbleed_nosmt = true;
                } else {
                        pr_err("Ignoring unknown retbleed option (%s).", str);
                }

                str = next;
        }

        return 0;
}
early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline);

#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler; falling back to IBPB!\n"
#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"

static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
{
        bool mitigate_smt = false;

        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off())
                return;

        switch (retbleed_cmd) {
        case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF:
                return;

        case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET:
                retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
                break;

        case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB:
                retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
                break;

        case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
        default:
                if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
                    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
                        retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;

                /*
                 * The Intel mitigation (IBRS or eIBRS) was already selected in
                 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation().  'retbleed_mitigation' will
                 * be set accordingly below.
                 */

                break;
        }

        switch (retbleed_mitigation) {
        case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET:

                if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ||
                    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) {
                        pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG);
                        retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
                        goto retbleed_force_ibpb;
                }

                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);

                if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
                    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
                        pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG);

                mitigate_smt = true;
                break;

        case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
retbleed_force_ibpb:
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
                mitigate_smt = true;
                break;

        default:
                break;
        }

        if (mitigate_smt && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) &&
            (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
                cpu_smt_disable(false);

        /*
         * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
         * retbleed= cmdline option.
         */
        if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
                switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
                case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
                        retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS;
                        break;
                case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
                case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
                case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
                        retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS;
                        break;
                default:
                        pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
                }
        }

        pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
}

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt

static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;

#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;

bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
{
        if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
                return true;

        pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n");
        spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
        return false;
}

static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
{
        return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "";
}
#else
static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
#endif

#define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"

#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
{
        if (new_state)
                return;

        /* Unprivileged eBPF is enabled */

        switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
        case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
                pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
                break;
        case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
                if (sched_smt_active())
                        pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
                break;
        default:
                break;
        }
}
#endif

static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
{
        int len = strlen(opt);

        return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
}

/* The kernel command line selection for spectre v2 */
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
        SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
        SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
        SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
        SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
        SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
        SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,
        SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,
        SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
        SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,
        SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,
};

enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE,
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO,
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE,
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL,
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB,
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP,
        SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB,
};

static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = {
        [SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE]                  = "User space: Vulnerable",
        [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT]                = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection",
        [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED]      = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP always-on protection",
        [SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL]                 = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl",
        [SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP]               = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via seccomp and prctl",
};

static const struct {
        const char                      *option;
        enum spectre_v2_user_cmd        cmd;
        bool                            secure;
} v2_user_options[] __initconst = {
        { "auto",               SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO,               false },
        { "off",                SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE,               false },
        { "on",                 SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE,              true  },
        { "prctl",              SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL,              false },
        { "prctl,ibpb",         SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB,         false },
        { "seccomp",            SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP,            false },
        { "seccomp,ibpb",       SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB,       false },
};

static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
{
        if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
                pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason);
}

static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd;

static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
{
        char arg[20];
        int ret, i;

        switch (spectre_v2_cmd) {
        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
                return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
                return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE;
        default:
                break;
        }

        ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
                                  arg, sizeof(arg));
        if (ret < 0)
                return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;

        for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
                if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
                        spec_v2_user_print_cond(v2_user_options[i].option,
                                                v2_user_options[i].secure);
                        return v2_user_options[i].cmd;
                }
        }

        pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
        return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
}

static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
        return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
               mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
               mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
               mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
}

static void __init
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
{
        enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
        bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
        enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;

        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
                return;

        if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED ||
            cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
                smt_possible = false;

        cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline();
        switch (cmd) {
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
                goto set_mode;
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
                mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
                break;
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
                mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
                break;
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
                if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
                        mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
                else
                        mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
                break;
        }

        /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);

                spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
                switch (cmd) {
                case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
                case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
                case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
                        static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
                        spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
                        break;
                case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
                case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
                case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
                        static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
                        break;
                default:
                        break;
                }

                pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
                        static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ?
                        "always-on" : "conditional");
        }

        /*
         * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
         * STIBP is not required.
         */
        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
            !smt_possible ||
            spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
                return;

        /*
         * At this point, an STIBP mode other than "off" has been set.
         * If STIBP support is not being forced, check if STIBP always-on
         * is preferred.
         */
        if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT &&
            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON))
                mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;

        if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) {
                if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT &&
                    mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
                        pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation'\n");
                mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
        }

        spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode;

set_mode:
        pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[mode]);
}

static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
        [SPECTRE_V2_NONE]                       = "Vulnerable",
        [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE]                  = "Mitigation: Retpolines",
        [SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE]                     = "Mitigation: LFENCE",
        [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS]                      = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
        [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE]               = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
        [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE]            = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
        [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS]                       = "Mitigation: IBRS",
};

static const struct {
        const char *option;
        enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
        bool secure;
} mitigation_options[] __initconst = {
        { "off",                SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,              false },
        { "on",                 SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,             true  },
        { "retpoline",          SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,         false },
        { "retpoline,amd",      SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,  false },
        { "retpoline,lfence",   SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,  false },
        { "retpoline,generic",  SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
        { "eibrs",              SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,             false },
        { "eibrs,lfence",       SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,      false },
        { "eibrs,retpoline",    SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,   false },
        { "auto",               SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,              false },
        { "ibrs",               SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,              false },
};

static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
{
        if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
                pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
}

static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
{
        enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
        char arg[20];
        int ret, i;

        if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
            cpu_mitigations_off())
                return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;

        ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
        if (ret < 0)
                return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;

        for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
                if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
                        continue;
                cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
                break;
        }

        if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
                pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
                return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
        }

        if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
             cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
             cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC ||
             cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
             cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
            !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
                pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
                       mitigation_options[i].option);
                return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
        }

        if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS ||
             cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
             cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
            !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
                pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
                       mitigation_options[i].option);
                return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
        }

        if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
             cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE) &&
            !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
                pr_err("%s selected, but CPU doesn't have a serializing LFENCE. Switching to AUTO select\n",
                       mitigation_options[i].option);
                return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
        }

        if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
                pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n",
                       mitigation_options[i].option);
                return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
        }

        if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
                pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
                       mitigation_options[i].option);
                return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
        }

        if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
                pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n",
                       mitigation_options[i].option);
                return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
        }

        spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option,
                           mitigation_options[i].secure);
        return cmd;
}

static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
{
        if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
                pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
                return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
        }

        return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
}

static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
        enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
        enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;

        /*
         * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
         * then nothing to do.
         */
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
            (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
                return;

        switch (cmd) {
        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
                return;

        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
                if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
                        mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
                        break;
                }

                if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
                    retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF &&
                    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
                    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
                        mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
                        break;
                }

                mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
                break;

        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE:
                pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG);
                mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE;
                break;

        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
                mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
                break;

        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
                mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
                break;

        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS:
                mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
                break;

        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
                mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
                break;

        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE:
                mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
                break;

        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
                mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
                break;
        }

        if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
                pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);

        if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
                x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
                write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
        }

        switch (mode) {
        case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
        case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
                break;

        case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS);
                break;

        case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
        case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
                fallthrough;

        case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
        case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
                break;
        }

        spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
        pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);

        /*
         * If Spectre v2 protection has been enabled, fill the RSB during a
         * context switch.  In general there are two types of RSB attacks
         * across context switches, for which the CALLs/RETs may be unbalanced.
         *
         * 1) RSB underflow
         *
         *    Some Intel parts have "bottomless RSB".  When the RSB is empty,
         *    speculated return targets may come from the branch predictor,
         *    which could have a user-poisoned BTB or BHB entry.
         *
         *    AMD has it even worse: *all* returns are speculated from the BTB,
         *    regardless of the state of the RSB.
         *
         *    When IBRS or eIBRS is enabled, the "user -> kernel" attack
         *    scenario is mitigated by the IBRS branch prediction isolation
         *    properties, so the RSB buffer filling wouldn't be necessary to
         *    protect against this type of attack.
         *
         *    The "user -> user" attack scenario is mitigated by RSB filling.
         *
         * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
         *
         *    If the 'next' in-kernel return stack is shorter than 'prev',
         *    'next' could be tricked into speculating with a user-poisoned RSB
         *    entry.
         *
         *    The "user -> kernel" attack scenario is mitigated by SMEP and
         *    eIBRS.
         *
         *    The "user -> user" scenario, also known as SpectreBHB, requires
         *    RSB clearing.
         *
         * So to mitigate all cases, unconditionally fill RSB on context
         * switches.
         *
         * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD?
         */
        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
        pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");

        /*
         * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks
         * after vmexit:
         *
         * 1) RSB underflow
         *
         * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
         *
         * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing
         * the RSB.
         *
         * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch
         * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared
         * because of #2.  Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike
         * user-space-poisoned RSB entries.
         *
         * eIBRS, on the other hand, has RSB-poisoning protections, so it
         * doesn't need RSB clearing after vmexit.
         */
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) ||
            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS))
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);

        /*
         * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware.  IBRS
         * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
         * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
         * enabled.
         *
         * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
         * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
         * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
         * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
         */
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
                pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
        }

        /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
        spectre_v2_cmd = cmd;
}

static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
{
        u64 val = spec_ctrl_current() | (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP);
        write_spec_ctrl_current(val, true);
}

/* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */
static void update_stibp_strict(void)
{
        u64 mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;

        if (sched_smt_active())
                mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;

        if (mask == x86_spec_ctrl_base)
                return;

        pr_info("Update user space SMT mitigation: STIBP %s\n",
                mask & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ? "always-on" : "off");
        x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
        on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
}

/* Update the static key controlling the evaluation of TIF_SPEC_IB */
static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
{
        if (sched_smt_active())
                static_branch_enable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
        else
                static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
}

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt

/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
{
        u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();

        /*
         * Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
         * affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
         *
         * The other variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so
         * clearing the buffers on idle just to prevent the Store Buffer
         * repartitioning leak would be a window dressing exercise.
         */
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
                return;

        if (sched_smt_active()) {
                static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
        } else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
                   (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
                static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
        }
}

#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"

void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
{
        mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);

        if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
            spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
                pr_warn_once(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);

        switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
                break;
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
                update_stibp_strict();
                break;
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
                update_indir_branch_cond();
                break;
        }

        switch (mds_mitigation) {
        case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
        case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
                if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
                        pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
                update_mds_branch_idle();
                break;
        case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
                break;
        }

        switch (taa_mitigation) {
        case TAA_MITIGATION_VERW:
        case TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
                if (sched_smt_active())
                        pr_warn_once(TAA_MSG_SMT);
                break;
        case TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED:
        case TAA_MITIGATION_OFF:
                break;
        }

        switch (mmio_mitigation) {
        case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
        case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
                if (sched_smt_active())
                        pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
                break;
        case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
                break;
        }

        mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
}

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt

static enum ssb_mitigation ssb_mode __ro_after_init = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;

/* The kernel command line selection */
enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
        SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE,
        SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO,
        SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON,
        SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL,
        SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP,
};

static const char * const ssb_strings[] = {
        [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE]        = "Vulnerable",
        [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE]     = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled",
        [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL]       = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl",
        [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP]     = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp",
};

static const struct {
        const char *option;
        enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
} ssb_mitigation_options[]  __initconst = {
        { "auto",       SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO },    /* Platform decides */
        { "on",         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON },      /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
        { "off",        SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE },    /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
        { "prctl",      SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL },   /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl */
        { "seccomp",    SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl and seccomp */
};

static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
{
        enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
        char arg[20];
        int ret, i;

        if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
            cpu_mitigations_off()) {
                return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
        } else {
                ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
                                          arg, sizeof(arg));
                if (ret < 0)
                        return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;

                for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
                        if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
                                continue;

                        cmd = ssb_mitigation_options[i].cmd;
                        break;
                }

                if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
                        pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
                        return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
                }
        }

        return cmd;
}

static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
{
        enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
        enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;

        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
                return mode;

        cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS) &&
            (cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE ||
             cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO))
                return mode;

        switch (cmd) {
        case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
        case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP:
                /*
                 * Choose prctl+seccomp as the default mode if seccomp is
                 * enabled.
                 */
                if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
                        mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP;
                else
                        mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
                break;
        case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
                mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
                break;
        case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
                mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
                break;
        case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE:
                break;
        }

        /*
         * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
         *  - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
         *  - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
         *  - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
         */
        if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
                /*
                 * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD may
                 * use a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
                 */
                if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
                    !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
                        x86_amd_ssb_disable();
                } else {
                        x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
                        write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
                }
        }

        return mode;
}

static void ssb_select_mitigation(void)
{
        ssb_mode = __ssb_select_mitigation();

        if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
                pr_info("%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
}

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Speculation prctl: " fmt

static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
        /* Force the update of the real TIF bits */
        set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE);

        /*
         * Immediately update the speculation control MSRs for the current
         * task, but for a non-current task delay setting the CPU
         * mitigation until it is scheduled next.
         *
         * This can only happen for SECCOMP mitigation. For PRCTL it's
         * always the current task.
         */
        if (tsk == current)
                speculation_ctrl_update_current();
}

static int l1d_flush_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
{

        if (!static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush))
                return -EPERM;

        switch (ctrl) {
        case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
                set_ti_thread_flag(&task->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH);
                return 0;
        case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
                clear_ti_thread_flag(&task->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH);
                return 0;
        default:
                return -ERANGE;
        }
}

static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
{
        if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL &&
            ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
                return -ENXIO;

        switch (ctrl) {
        case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
                /* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */
                if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
                        return -EPERM;
                task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
                task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
                task_update_spec_tif(task);
                break;
        case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
                task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
                task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
                task_update_spec_tif(task);
                break;
        case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
                task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
                task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
                task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
                task_update_spec_tif(task);
                break;
        case PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC:
                if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
                        return -EPERM;
                task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
                task_set_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
                task_update_spec_tif(task);
                break;
        default:
                return -ERANGE;
        }
        return 0;
}

static bool is_spec_ib_user_controlled(void)
{
        return spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
                spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
                spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
                spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
}

static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
{
        switch (ctrl) {
        case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
                if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
                    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
                        return 0;

                /*
                 * With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction
                 * code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead,
                 * unconditionally run the instruction. However, STIBP and IBPB
                 * are independent and either can be set to conditionally
                 * enabled regardless of the mode of the other.
                 *
                 * If either is set to conditional, allow the task flag to be
                 * updated, unless it was force-disabled by a previous prctl
                 * call. Currently, this is possible on an AMD CPU which has the
                 * feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON. In this case, if the
                 * kernel is booted with 'spectre_v2_user=seccomp', then
                 * spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP and
                 * spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED.
                 */
                if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled() ||
                    task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
                        return -EPERM;

                task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
                task_update_spec_tif(task);
                break;
        case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
        case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
                /*
                 * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when
                 * mitigation is force disabled.
                 */
                if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
                    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
                        return -EPERM;

                if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled())
                        return 0;

                task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
                if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
                        task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task);
                task_update_spec_tif(task);
                break;
        default:
                return -ERANGE;
        }
        return 0;
}

int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
                             unsigned long ctrl)
{
        switch (which) {
        case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
                return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
        case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
                return ib_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
        case PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH:
                return l1d_flush_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
        default:
                return -ENODEV;
        }
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
{
        if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
                ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
        if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
            spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP)
                ib_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
}
#endif

static int l1d_flush_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
{
        if (!static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush))
                return PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;

        if (test_ti_thread_flag(&task->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH))
                return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
        else
                return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
}

static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
{
        switch (ssb_mode) {
        case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
                return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
        case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP:
        case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
                if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
                        return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
                if (task_spec_ssb_noexec(task))
                        return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC;
                if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
                        return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
                return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
        default:
                if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
                        return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
                return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
        }
}

static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
{
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
                return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;

        if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
            spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
                return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
        else if (is_spec_ib_user_controlled()) {
                if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
                        return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
                if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
                        return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
                return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
        } else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
            spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
            spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
                return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
        else
                return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
}

int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
{
        switch (which) {
        case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
                return ssb_prctl_get(task);
        case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
                return ib_prctl_get(task);
        case PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH:
                return l1d_flush_prctl_get(task);
        default:
                return -ENODEV;
        }
}

void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
{
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
                write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);

        if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
                x86_amd_ssb_disable();
}

bool itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "L1TF: " fmt

/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
#endif
enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);

/*
 * These CPUs all support 44bits physical address space internally in the
 * cache but CPUID can report a smaller number of physical address bits.
 *
 * The L1TF mitigation uses the top most address bit for the inversion of
 * non present PTEs. When the installed memory reaches into the top most
 * address bit due to memory holes, which has been observed on machines
 * which report 36bits physical address bits and have 32G RAM installed,
 * then the mitigation range check in l1tf_select_mitigation() triggers.
 * This is a false positive because the mitigation is still possible due to
 * the fact that the cache uses 44bit internally. Use the cache bits
 * instead of the reported physical bits and adjust them on the affected
 * machines to 44bit if the reported bits are less than 44.
 */
static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
        if (c->x86 != 6)
                return;

        switch (c->x86_model) {
        case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:
        case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:
        case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE:
        case INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE:
        case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL:
        case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L:
        case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G:
        case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL:
        case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G:
        case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L:
        case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE:
        case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L:
        case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE:
                if (c->x86_cache_bits < 44)
                        c->x86_cache_bits = 44;
                break;
        }
}

static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
{
        u64 half_pa;

        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
                return;

        if (cpu_mitigations_off())
                l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
        else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
                l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;

        override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);

        switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
        case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
        case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
        case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
                break;
        case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
        case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
                cpu_smt_disable(false);
                break;
        case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
                cpu_smt_disable(true);
                break;
        }

#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 2
        pr_warn("Kernel not compiled for PAE. No mitigation for L1TF\n");
        return;
#endif

        half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
        if (l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF &&
                        e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
                pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
                pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
                                half_pa);
                pr_info("However, doing so will make a part of your RAM unusable.\n");
                pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
                return;
        }

        setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV);
}

static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str)
{
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
                return 0;

        if (!str)
                return -EINVAL;

        if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
                l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
        else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nowarn"))
                l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN;
        else if (!strcmp(str, "flush"))
                l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
        else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nosmt"))
                l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
        else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
                l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL;
        else if (!strcmp(str, "full,force"))
                l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE;

        return 0;
}
early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);

#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt

#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS

#define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"

#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
static const char * const l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
        [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO]                = "auto",
        [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER]               = "vulnerable",
        [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND]                = "conditional cache flushes",
        [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS]              = "cache flushes",
        [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED]        = "EPT disabled",
        [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED]        = "flush not necessary"
};

static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
{
        if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
                return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);

        if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
            (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
             sched_smt_active())) {
                return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
                               l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
        }

        return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
                       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
                       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}

static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
{
        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL) ||
            !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX))
                return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Mitigation: VMX unsupported\n");
        else if (!(cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_VMXE))
                return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Mitigation: VMX disabled\n");
        else if (itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation)
                return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages\n");
        else
                return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Vulnerable\n");
}
#else
static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
{
        return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
}

static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
{
        return sprintf(buf, "Processor vulnerable\n");
}
#endif

static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
{
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
                return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
                               mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
        }

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY)) {
                return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
                               (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ? "vulnerable" :
                                sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled"));
        }

        return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
                       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}

static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
{
        if ((taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED) ||
            (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF))
                return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
                return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
                               taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
        }

        return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation],
                       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}

static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
{
        if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
                return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
                return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
                                  mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
        }

        return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation],
                          sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}

static char *stibp_state(void)
{
        if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
                return "";

        switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
                return ", STIBP: disabled";
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
                return ", STIBP: forced";
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
                return ", STIBP: always-on";
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
        case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
                if (static_key_enabled(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
                        return ", STIBP: conditional";
        }
        return "";
}

static char *ibpb_state(void)
{
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
                if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb))
                        return ", IBPB: always-on";
                if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb))
                        return ", IBPB: conditional";
                return ", IBPB: disabled";
        }
        return "";
}

static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
{
        if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE)
                return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: LFENCE\n");

        if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
                return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS with unprivileged eBPF\n");

        if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
            spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
                return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n");

        return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
                       spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
                       ibpb_state(),
                       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
                       stibp_state(),
                       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
                       spectre_v2_module_string());
}

static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
{
        return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
}

static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
{
        if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET) {
            if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
                boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
                    return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n");

            return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n",
                           retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation],
                           !sched_smt_active() ? "disabled" :
                           spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
                           spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ?
                           "enabled with STIBP protection" : "vulnerable");
        }

        return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
}

static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
                               char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
                return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");

        switch (bug) {
        case X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN:
                if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
                        return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");

                if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_XEN_PV))
                        return sprintf(buf, "Unknown (XEN PV detected, hypervisor mitigation required)\n");

                break;

        case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
                return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);

        case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
                return spectre_v2_show_state(buf);

        case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
                return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);

        case X86_BUG_L1TF:
                if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
                        return l1tf_show_state(buf);
                break;

        case X86_BUG_MDS:
                return mds_show_state(buf);

        case X86_BUG_TAA:
                return tsx_async_abort_show_state(buf);

        case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
                return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);

        case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
                return srbds_show_state(buf);

        case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
                return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);

        case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
                return retbleed_show_state(buf);

        default:
                break;
        }

        return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}

ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
        return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
}

ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
        return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
}

ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
        return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
}

ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
        return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
}

ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
        return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
}

ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
        return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
}

ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
        return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_TAA);
}

ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
        return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
}

ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
        return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
}

ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
        return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
}

ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
        return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
}
#endif