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KVM: mmu: extract spte.h and spte.c
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1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /*
3 * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
4 *
5 * Macros and functions to access KVM PTEs (also known as SPTEs)
6 *
7 * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
8 * Copyright 2020 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
9 */
10
11
12 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
13 #include "mmu.h"
14 #include "mmu_internal.h"
15 #include "x86.h"
16 #include "spte.h"
17
18 #include <asm/e820/api.h>
19
20 u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask;
21 u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */
22 u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;
23 u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;
24 u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask;
25 u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value;
26 u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_access_mask;
27 u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;
28 u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_mask;
29 u64 __read_mostly shadow_acc_track_mask;
30
31 u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
32 u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask;
33
34 u8 __read_mostly shadow_phys_bits;
35
36 static u64 generation_mmio_spte_mask(u64 gen)
37 {
38 u64 mask;
39
40 WARN_ON(gen & ~MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK);
41 BUILD_BUG_ON((MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK | MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK) & SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK);
42
43 mask = (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_START) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK;
44 mask |= (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_START) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK;
45 return mask;
46 }
47
48 u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)
49 {
50 u64 gen = kvm_vcpu_memslots(vcpu)->generation & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK;
51 u64 mask = generation_mmio_spte_mask(gen);
52 u64 gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
53
54 access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask;
55 mask |= shadow_mmio_value | access;
56 mask |= gpa | shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
57 mask |= (gpa & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask)
58 << shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len;
59
60 return mask;
61 }
62
63 static bool kvm_is_mmio_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
64 {
65 if (pfn_valid(pfn))
66 return !is_zero_pfn(pfn) && PageReserved(pfn_to_page(pfn)) &&
67 /*
68 * Some reserved pages, such as those from NVDIMM
69 * DAX devices, are not for MMIO, and can be mapped
70 * with cached memory type for better performance.
71 * However, the above check misconceives those pages
72 * as MMIO, and results in KVM mapping them with UC
73 * memory type, which would hurt the performance.
74 * Therefore, we check the host memory type in addition
75 * and only treat UC/UC-/WC pages as MMIO.
76 */
77 (!pat_enabled() || pat_pfn_immune_to_uc_mtrr(pfn));
78
79 return !e820__mapped_raw_any(pfn_to_hpa(pfn),
80 pfn_to_hpa(pfn + 1) - 1,
81 E820_TYPE_RAM);
82 }
83
84 int make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int pte_access, int level,
85 gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, u64 old_spte, bool speculative,
86 bool can_unsync, bool host_writable, bool ad_disabled,
87 u64 *new_spte)
88 {
89 u64 spte = 0;
90 int ret = 0;
91
92 if (ad_disabled)
93 spte |= SPTE_AD_DISABLED_MASK;
94 else if (kvm_vcpu_ad_need_write_protect(vcpu))
95 spte |= SPTE_AD_WRPROT_ONLY_MASK;
96
97 /*
98 * For the EPT case, shadow_present_mask is 0 if hardware
99 * supports exec-only page table entries. In that case,
100 * ACC_USER_MASK and shadow_user_mask are used to represent
101 * read access. See FNAME(gpte_access) in paging_tmpl.h.
102 */
103 spte |= shadow_present_mask;
104 if (!speculative)
105 spte |= spte_shadow_accessed_mask(spte);
106
107 if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K && (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK) &&
108 is_nx_huge_page_enabled()) {
109 pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK;
110 }
111
112 if (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK)
113 spte |= shadow_x_mask;
114 else
115 spte |= shadow_nx_mask;
116
117 if (pte_access & ACC_USER_MASK)
118 spte |= shadow_user_mask;
119
120 if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
121 spte |= PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
122 if (tdp_enabled)
123 spte |= kvm_x86_ops.get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn,
124 kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn));
125
126 if (host_writable)
127 spte |= SPTE_HOST_WRITEABLE;
128 else
129 pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
130
131 if (!kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn))
132 spte |= shadow_me_mask;
133
134 spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
135
136 if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) {
137 spte |= PT_WRITABLE_MASK | SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE;
138
139 /*
140 * Optimization: for pte sync, if spte was writable the hash
141 * lookup is unnecessary (and expensive). Write protection
142 * is responsibility of mmu_get_page / kvm_sync_page.
143 * Same reasoning can be applied to dirty page accounting.
144 */
145 if (!can_unsync && is_writable_pte(old_spte))
146 goto out;
147
148 if (mmu_need_write_protect(vcpu, gfn, can_unsync)) {
149 pgprintk("%s: found shadow page for %llx, marking ro\n",
150 __func__, gfn);
151 ret |= SET_SPTE_WRITE_PROTECTED_PT;
152 pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
153 spte &= ~(PT_WRITABLE_MASK | SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE);
154 }
155 }
156
157 if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK)
158 spte |= spte_shadow_dirty_mask(spte);
159
160 if (speculative)
161 spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(spte);
162
163 out:
164 *new_spte = spte;
165 return ret;
166 }
167
168 u64 make_nonleaf_spte(u64 *child_pt, bool ad_disabled)
169 {
170 u64 spte;
171
172 spte = __pa(child_pt) | shadow_present_mask | PT_WRITABLE_MASK |
173 shadow_user_mask | shadow_x_mask | shadow_me_mask;
174
175 if (ad_disabled)
176 spte |= SPTE_AD_DISABLED_MASK;
177 else
178 spte |= shadow_accessed_mask;
179
180 return spte;
181 }
182
183 u64 kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(u64 old_spte, kvm_pfn_t new_pfn)
184 {
185 u64 new_spte;
186
187 new_spte = old_spte & ~PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK;
188 new_spte |= (u64)new_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
189
190 new_spte &= ~PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
191 new_spte &= ~SPTE_HOST_WRITEABLE;
192
193 new_spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(new_spte);
194
195 return new_spte;
196 }
197
198 static u8 kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(void)
199 {
200 /*
201 * boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits is reduced when MKTME or SME are detected
202 * in CPU detection code, but the processor treats those reduced bits as
203 * 'keyID' thus they are not reserved bits. Therefore KVM needs to look at
204 * the physical address bits reported by CPUID.
205 */
206 if (likely(boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008))
207 return cpuid_eax(0x80000008) & 0xff;
208
209 /*
210 * Quite weird to have VMX or SVM but not MAXPHYADDR; probably a VM with
211 * custom CPUID. Proceed with whatever the kernel found since these features
212 * aren't virtualizable (SME/SEV also require CPUIDs higher than 0x80000008).
213 */
214 return boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
215 }
216
217 u64 mark_spte_for_access_track(u64 spte)
218 {
219 if (spte_ad_enabled(spte))
220 return spte & ~shadow_accessed_mask;
221
222 if (is_access_track_spte(spte))
223 return spte;
224
225 /*
226 * Making an Access Tracking PTE will result in removal of write access
227 * from the PTE. So, verify that we will be able to restore the write
228 * access in the fast page fault path later on.
229 */
230 WARN_ONCE((spte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK) &&
231 !spte_can_locklessly_be_made_writable(spte),
232 "kvm: Writable SPTE is not locklessly dirty-trackable\n");
233
234 WARN_ONCE(spte & (shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_mask <<
235 shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_shift),
236 "kvm: Access Tracking saved bit locations are not zero\n");
237
238 spte |= (spte & shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_mask) <<
239 shadow_acc_track_saved_bits_shift;
240 spte &= ~shadow_acc_track_mask;
241
242 return spte;
243 }
244
245 void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_value, u64 access_mask)
246 {
247 BUG_ON((u64)(unsigned)access_mask != access_mask);
248 WARN_ON(mmio_value & (shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask << shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len));
249 WARN_ON(mmio_value & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask);
250 shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value | SPTE_MMIO_MASK;
251 shadow_mmio_access_mask = access_mask;
252 }
253 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask);
254
255 /*
256 * Sets the shadow PTE masks used by the MMU.
257 *
258 * Assumptions:
259 * - Setting either @accessed_mask or @dirty_mask requires setting both
260 * - At least one of @accessed_mask or @acc_track_mask must be set
261 */
262 void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask,
263 u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask, u64 p_mask,
264 u64 acc_track_mask, u64 me_mask)
265 {
266 BUG_ON(!dirty_mask != !accessed_mask);
267 BUG_ON(!accessed_mask && !acc_track_mask);
268 BUG_ON(acc_track_mask & SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK);
269
270 shadow_user_mask = user_mask;
271 shadow_accessed_mask = accessed_mask;
272 shadow_dirty_mask = dirty_mask;
273 shadow_nx_mask = nx_mask;
274 shadow_x_mask = x_mask;
275 shadow_present_mask = p_mask;
276 shadow_acc_track_mask = acc_track_mask;
277 shadow_me_mask = me_mask;
278 }
279 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes);
280
281 void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void)
282 {
283 u8 low_phys_bits;
284
285 shadow_user_mask = 0;
286 shadow_accessed_mask = 0;
287 shadow_dirty_mask = 0;
288 shadow_nx_mask = 0;
289 shadow_x_mask = 0;
290 shadow_present_mask = 0;
291 shadow_acc_track_mask = 0;
292
293 shadow_phys_bits = kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits();
294
295 /*
296 * If the CPU has 46 or less physical address bits, then set an
297 * appropriate mask to guard against L1TF attacks. Otherwise, it is
298 * assumed that the CPU is not vulnerable to L1TF.
299 *
300 * Some Intel CPUs address the L1 cache using more PA bits than are
301 * reported by CPUID. Use the PA width of the L1 cache when possible
302 * to achieve more effective mitigation, e.g. if system RAM overlaps
303 * the most significant bits of legal physical address space.
304 */
305 shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask = 0;
306 low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
307 if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) &&
308 !WARN_ON_ONCE(boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits >=
309 52 - shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len)) {
310 low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits
311 - shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len;
312 shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask =
313 rsvd_bits(low_phys_bits, boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits - 1);
314 }
315
316 shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask =
317 GENMASK_ULL(low_phys_bits - 1, PAGE_SHIFT);
318 }