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x86/fpu: Change fpu->fpregs_active users to fpu->fpstate_active
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1 /*
2 * Intel Memory Protection Keys management
3 * Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation.
4 *
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
6 * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
7 * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 *
9 * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
10 * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
11 * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
12 * more details.
13 */
14 #include <linux/debugfs.h> /* debugfs_create_u32() */
15 #include <linux/mm_types.h> /* mm_struct, vma, etc... */
16 #include <linux/pkeys.h> /* PKEY_* */
17 #include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h>
18
19 #include <asm/cpufeature.h> /* boot_cpu_has, ... */
20 #include <asm/mmu_context.h> /* vma_pkey() */
21
22 int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
23 {
24 bool need_to_set_mm_pkey = false;
25 int execute_only_pkey = mm->context.execute_only_pkey;
26 int ret;
27
28 /* Do we need to assign a pkey for mm's execute-only maps? */
29 if (execute_only_pkey == -1) {
30 /* Go allocate one to use, which might fail */
31 execute_only_pkey = mm_pkey_alloc(mm);
32 if (execute_only_pkey < 0)
33 return -1;
34 need_to_set_mm_pkey = true;
35 }
36
37 /*
38 * We do not want to go through the relatively costly
39 * dance to set PKRU if we do not need to. Check it
40 * first and assume that if the execute-only pkey is
41 * write-disabled that we do not have to set it
42 * ourselves. We need preempt off so that nobody
43 * can make fpregs inactive.
44 */
45 preempt_disable();
46 if (!need_to_set_mm_pkey &&
47 current->thread.fpu.fpstate_active &&
48 !__pkru_allows_read(read_pkru(), execute_only_pkey)) {
49 preempt_enable();
50 return execute_only_pkey;
51 }
52 preempt_enable();
53
54 /*
55 * Set up PKRU so that it denies access for everything
56 * other than execution.
57 */
58 ret = arch_set_user_pkey_access(current, execute_only_pkey,
59 PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
60 /*
61 * If the PKRU-set operation failed somehow, just return
62 * 0 and effectively disable execute-only support.
63 */
64 if (ret) {
65 mm_set_pkey_free(mm, execute_only_pkey);
66 return -1;
67 }
68
69 /* We got one, store it and use it from here on out */
70 if (need_to_set_mm_pkey)
71 mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_pkey;
72 return execute_only_pkey;
73 }
74
75 static inline bool vma_is_pkey_exec_only(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
76 {
77 /* Do this check first since the vm_flags should be hot */
78 if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC)
79 return false;
80 if (vma_pkey(vma) != vma->vm_mm->context.execute_only_pkey)
81 return false;
82
83 return true;
84 }
85
86 /*
87 * This is only called for *plain* mprotect calls.
88 */
89 int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey)
90 {
91 /*
92 * Is this an mprotect_pkey() call? If so, never
93 * override the value that came from the user.
94 */
95 if (pkey != -1)
96 return pkey;
97 /*
98 * Look for a protection-key-drive execute-only mapping
99 * which is now being given permissions that are not
100 * execute-only. Move it back to the default pkey.
101 */
102 if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) &&
103 (prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE))) {
104 return 0;
105 }
106 /*
107 * The mapping is execute-only. Go try to get the
108 * execute-only protection key. If we fail to do that,
109 * fall through as if we do not have execute-only
110 * support.
111 */
112 if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
113 pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
114 if (pkey > 0)
115 return pkey;
116 }
117 /*
118 * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to
119 * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we
120 * are working on.
121 */
122 return vma_pkey(vma);
123 }
124
125 #define PKRU_AD_KEY(pkey) (PKRU_AD_BIT << ((pkey) * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY))
126
127 /*
128 * Make the default PKRU value (at execve() time) as restrictive
129 * as possible. This ensures that any threads clone()'d early
130 * in the process's lifetime will not accidentally get access
131 * to data which is pkey-protected later on.
132 */
133 u32 init_pkru_value = PKRU_AD_KEY( 1) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 2) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 3) |
134 PKRU_AD_KEY( 4) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 5) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 6) |
135 PKRU_AD_KEY( 7) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 8) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 9) |
136 PKRU_AD_KEY(10) | PKRU_AD_KEY(11) | PKRU_AD_KEY(12) |
137 PKRU_AD_KEY(13) | PKRU_AD_KEY(14) | PKRU_AD_KEY(15);
138
139 /*
140 * Called from the FPU code when creating a fresh set of FPU
141 * registers. This is called from a very specific context where
142 * we know the FPU regstiers are safe for use and we can use PKRU
143 * directly.
144 */
145 void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void)
146 {
147 u32 init_pkru_value_snapshot = READ_ONCE(init_pkru_value);
148 /*
149 * Any write to PKRU takes it out of the XSAVE 'init
150 * state' which increases context switch cost. Avoid
151 * writing 0 when PKRU was already 0.
152 */
153 if (!init_pkru_value_snapshot && !read_pkru())
154 return;
155 /*
156 * Override the PKRU state that came from 'init_fpstate'
157 * with the baseline from the process.
158 */
159 write_pkru(init_pkru_value_snapshot);
160 }
161
162 static ssize_t init_pkru_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
163 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
164 {
165 char buf[32];
166 unsigned int len;
167
168 len = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", init_pkru_value);
169 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len);
170 }
171
172 static ssize_t init_pkru_write_file(struct file *file,
173 const char __user *user_buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
174 {
175 char buf[32];
176 ssize_t len;
177 u32 new_init_pkru;
178
179 len = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1);
180 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len))
181 return -EFAULT;
182
183 /* Make the buffer a valid string that we can not overrun */
184 buf[len] = '\0';
185 if (kstrtouint(buf, 0, &new_init_pkru))
186 return -EINVAL;
187
188 /*
189 * Don't allow insane settings that will blow the system
190 * up immediately if someone attempts to disable access
191 * or writes to pkey 0.
192 */
193 if (new_init_pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT))
194 return -EINVAL;
195
196 WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
197 return count;
198 }
199
200 static const struct file_operations fops_init_pkru = {
201 .read = init_pkru_read_file,
202 .write = init_pkru_write_file,
203 .llseek = default_llseek,
204 };
205
206 static int __init create_init_pkru_value(void)
207 {
208 debugfs_create_file("init_pkru", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR,
209 arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_init_pkru);
210 return 0;
211 }
212 late_initcall(create_init_pkru_value);
213
214 static __init int setup_init_pkru(char *opt)
215 {
216 u32 new_init_pkru;
217
218 if (kstrtouint(opt, 0, &new_init_pkru))
219 return 1;
220
221 WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
222
223 return 1;
224 }
225 __setup("init_pkru=", setup_init_pkru);