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1 /*
2 * Intel Memory Protection Keys management
3 * Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation.
4 *
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
6 * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
7 * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 *
9 * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
10 * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
11 * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
12 * more details.
13 */
14 #include <linux/mm_types.h> /* mm_struct, vma, etc... */
15 #include <linux/pkeys.h> /* PKEY_* */
16 #include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h>
17
18 #include <asm/cpufeature.h> /* boot_cpu_has, ... */
19 #include <asm/mmu_context.h> /* vma_pkey() */
20 #include <asm/fpu/internal.h> /* fpregs_active() */
21
22 int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
23 {
24 int ret;
25
26 /*
27 * We do not want to go through the relatively costly
28 * dance to set PKRU if we do not need to. Check it
29 * first and assume that if the execute-only pkey is
30 * write-disabled that we do not have to set it
31 * ourselves. We need preempt off so that nobody
32 * can make fpregs inactive.
33 */
34 preempt_disable();
35 if (fpregs_active() &&
36 !__pkru_allows_read(read_pkru(), PKEY_DEDICATED_EXECUTE_ONLY)) {
37 preempt_enable();
38 return PKEY_DEDICATED_EXECUTE_ONLY;
39 }
40 preempt_enable();
41 ret = arch_set_user_pkey_access(current, PKEY_DEDICATED_EXECUTE_ONLY,
42 PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
43 /*
44 * If the PKRU-set operation failed somehow, just return
45 * 0 and effectively disable execute-only support.
46 */
47 if (ret)
48 return 0;
49
50 return PKEY_DEDICATED_EXECUTE_ONLY;
51 }
52
53 static inline bool vma_is_pkey_exec_only(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
54 {
55 /* Do this check first since the vm_flags should be hot */
56 if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC)
57 return false;
58 if (vma_pkey(vma) != PKEY_DEDICATED_EXECUTE_ONLY)
59 return false;
60
61 return true;
62 }
63
64 /*
65 * This is only called for *plain* mprotect calls.
66 */
67 int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey)
68 {
69 /*
70 * Is this an mprotect_pkey() call? If so, never
71 * override the value that came from the user.
72 */
73 if (pkey != -1)
74 return pkey;
75 /*
76 * Look for a protection-key-drive execute-only mapping
77 * which is now being given permissions that are not
78 * execute-only. Move it back to the default pkey.
79 */
80 if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) &&
81 (prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE))) {
82 return 0;
83 }
84 /*
85 * The mapping is execute-only. Go try to get the
86 * execute-only protection key. If we fail to do that,
87 * fall through as if we do not have execute-only
88 * support.
89 */
90 if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
91 pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
92 if (pkey > 0)
93 return pkey;
94 }
95 /*
96 * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to
97 * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we
98 * are working on.
99 */
100 return vma_pkey(vma);
101 }