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1 /*
2 * Intel Memory Protection Keys management
3 * Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation.
4 *
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
6 * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
7 * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 *
9 * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
10 * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
11 * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
12 * more details.
13 */
14 #include <linux/debugfs.h> /* debugfs_create_u32() */
15 #include <linux/mm_types.h> /* mm_struct, vma, etc... */
16 #include <linux/pkeys.h> /* PKEY_* */
17 #include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h>
18
19 #include <asm/cpufeature.h> /* boot_cpu_has, ... */
20 #include <asm/mmu_context.h> /* vma_pkey() */
21 #include <asm/fpu/internal.h> /* fpregs_active() */
22
23 int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
24 {
25 bool need_to_set_mm_pkey = false;
26 int execute_only_pkey = mm->context.execute_only_pkey;
27 int ret;
28
29 /* Do we need to assign a pkey for mm's execute-only maps? */
30 if (execute_only_pkey == -1) {
31 /* Go allocate one to use, which might fail */
32 execute_only_pkey = mm_pkey_alloc(mm);
33 if (execute_only_pkey < 0)
34 return -1;
35 need_to_set_mm_pkey = true;
36 }
37
38 /*
39 * We do not want to go through the relatively costly
40 * dance to set PKRU if we do not need to. Check it
41 * first and assume that if the execute-only pkey is
42 * write-disabled that we do not have to set it
43 * ourselves. We need preempt off so that nobody
44 * can make fpregs inactive.
45 */
46 preempt_disable();
47 if (!need_to_set_mm_pkey &&
48 fpregs_active() &&
49 !__pkru_allows_read(read_pkru(), execute_only_pkey)) {
50 preempt_enable();
51 return execute_only_pkey;
52 }
53 preempt_enable();
54
55 /*
56 * Set up PKRU so that it denies access for everything
57 * other than execution.
58 */
59 ret = arch_set_user_pkey_access(current, execute_only_pkey,
60 PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
61 /*
62 * If the PKRU-set operation failed somehow, just return
63 * 0 and effectively disable execute-only support.
64 */
65 if (ret) {
66 mm_set_pkey_free(mm, execute_only_pkey);
67 return -1;
68 }
69
70 /* We got one, store it and use it from here on out */
71 if (need_to_set_mm_pkey)
72 mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_pkey;
73 return execute_only_pkey;
74 }
75
76 static inline bool vma_is_pkey_exec_only(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
77 {
78 /* Do this check first since the vm_flags should be hot */
79 if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC)
80 return false;
81 if (vma_pkey(vma) != vma->vm_mm->context.execute_only_pkey)
82 return false;
83
84 return true;
85 }
86
87 /*
88 * This is only called for *plain* mprotect calls.
89 */
90 int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey)
91 {
92 /*
93 * Is this an mprotect_pkey() call? If so, never
94 * override the value that came from the user.
95 */
96 if (pkey != -1)
97 return pkey;
98 /*
99 * Look for a protection-key-drive execute-only mapping
100 * which is now being given permissions that are not
101 * execute-only. Move it back to the default pkey.
102 */
103 if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) &&
104 (prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE))) {
105 return 0;
106 }
107 /*
108 * The mapping is execute-only. Go try to get the
109 * execute-only protection key. If we fail to do that,
110 * fall through as if we do not have execute-only
111 * support.
112 */
113 if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
114 pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
115 if (pkey > 0)
116 return pkey;
117 }
118 /*
119 * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to
120 * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we
121 * are working on.
122 */
123 return vma_pkey(vma);
124 }
125
126 #define PKRU_AD_KEY(pkey) (PKRU_AD_BIT << ((pkey) * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY))
127
128 /*
129 * Make the default PKRU value (at execve() time) as restrictive
130 * as possible. This ensures that any threads clone()'d early
131 * in the process's lifetime will not accidentally get access
132 * to data which is pkey-protected later on.
133 */
134 u32 init_pkru_value = PKRU_AD_KEY( 1) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 2) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 3) |
135 PKRU_AD_KEY( 4) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 5) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 6) |
136 PKRU_AD_KEY( 7) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 8) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 9) |
137 PKRU_AD_KEY(10) | PKRU_AD_KEY(11) | PKRU_AD_KEY(12) |
138 PKRU_AD_KEY(13) | PKRU_AD_KEY(14) | PKRU_AD_KEY(15);
139
140 /*
141 * Called from the FPU code when creating a fresh set of FPU
142 * registers. This is called from a very specific context where
143 * we know the FPU regstiers are safe for use and we can use PKRU
144 * directly.
145 */
146 void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void)
147 {
148 u32 init_pkru_value_snapshot = READ_ONCE(init_pkru_value);
149 /*
150 * Any write to PKRU takes it out of the XSAVE 'init
151 * state' which increases context switch cost. Avoid
152 * writing 0 when PKRU was already 0.
153 */
154 if (!init_pkru_value_snapshot && !read_pkru())
155 return;
156 /*
157 * Override the PKRU state that came from 'init_fpstate'
158 * with the baseline from the process.
159 */
160 write_pkru(init_pkru_value_snapshot);
161 }
162
163 static ssize_t init_pkru_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
164 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
165 {
166 char buf[32];
167 unsigned int len;
168
169 len = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", init_pkru_value);
170 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len);
171 }
172
173 static ssize_t init_pkru_write_file(struct file *file,
174 const char __user *user_buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
175 {
176 char buf[32];
177 ssize_t len;
178 u32 new_init_pkru;
179
180 len = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1);
181 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len))
182 return -EFAULT;
183
184 /* Make the buffer a valid string that we can not overrun */
185 buf[len] = '\0';
186 if (kstrtouint(buf, 0, &new_init_pkru))
187 return -EINVAL;
188
189 /*
190 * Don't allow insane settings that will blow the system
191 * up immediately if someone attempts to disable access
192 * or writes to pkey 0.
193 */
194 if (new_init_pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT))
195 return -EINVAL;
196
197 WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
198 return count;
199 }
200
201 static const struct file_operations fops_init_pkru = {
202 .read = init_pkru_read_file,
203 .write = init_pkru_write_file,
204 .llseek = default_llseek,
205 };
206
207 static int __init create_init_pkru_value(void)
208 {
209 debugfs_create_file("init_pkru", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR,
210 arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_init_pkru);
211 return 0;
212 }
213 late_initcall(create_init_pkru_value);
214
215 static __init int setup_init_pkru(char *opt)
216 {
217 u32 new_init_pkru;
218
219 if (kstrtouint(opt, 0, &new_init_pkru))
220 return 1;
221
222 WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru);
223
224 return 1;
225 }
226 __setup("init_pkru=", setup_init_pkru);