2 * Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter --
3 * Jitter RNG standalone code.
5 * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2015 - 2020
10 * See https://www.chronox.de/jent.html
15 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
16 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
18 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
19 * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
20 * including the disclaimer of warranties.
21 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
22 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
23 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
24 * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
25 * products derived from this software without specific prior
28 * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
29 * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are
30 * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
31 * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
32 * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
34 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
35 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
36 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
37 * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
38 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
39 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
40 * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
41 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
42 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
43 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
44 * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
49 * This Jitterentropy RNG is based on the jitterentropy library
50 * version 2.2.0 provided at https://www.chronox.de/jent.html
54 #error "The CPU Jitter random number generator must not be compiled with optimizations. See documentation. Use the compiler switch -O0 for compiling jitterentropy.c."
57 typedef unsigned long long __u64
;
58 typedef long long __s64
;
59 typedef unsigned int __u32
;
60 #define NULL ((void *) 0)
62 /* The entropy pool */
64 /* all data values that are vital to maintain the security
65 * of the RNG are marked as SENSITIVE. A user must not
66 * access that information while the RNG executes its loops to
67 * calculate the next random value. */
68 __u64 data
; /* SENSITIVE Actual random number */
69 __u64 old_data
; /* SENSITIVE Previous random number */
70 __u64 prev_time
; /* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */
71 #define DATA_SIZE_BITS ((sizeof(__u64)) * 8)
72 __u64 last_delta
; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */
73 __s64 last_delta2
; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */
74 unsigned int osr
; /* Oversample rate */
75 #define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64
76 #define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32
77 #define JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS 128
78 #define JENT_MEMORY_SIZE (JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS*JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE)
79 unsigned char *mem
; /* Memory access location with size of
80 * memblocks * memblocksize */
81 unsigned int memlocation
; /* Pointer to byte in *mem */
82 unsigned int memblocks
; /* Number of memory blocks in *mem */
83 unsigned int memblocksize
; /* Size of one memory block in bytes */
84 unsigned int memaccessloops
; /* Number of memory accesses per random
87 /* Repetition Count Test */
88 int rct_count
; /* Number of stuck values */
90 /* Adaptive Proportion Test for a significance level of 2^-30 */
91 #define JENT_APT_CUTOFF 325 /* Taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.2 */
92 #define JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE 512 /* Data window size */
93 /* LSB of time stamp to process */
94 #define JENT_APT_LSB 16
95 #define JENT_APT_WORD_MASK (JENT_APT_LSB - 1)
96 unsigned int apt_observations
; /* Number of collected observations */
97 unsigned int apt_count
; /* APT counter */
98 unsigned int apt_base
; /* APT base reference */
99 unsigned int apt_base_set
:1; /* APT base reference set? */
101 unsigned int health_failure
:1; /* Permanent health failure */
104 /* Flags that can be used to initialize the RNG */
105 #define JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS (1<<2) /* Disable memory access for more
106 * entropy, saves MEMORY_SIZE RAM for
107 * entropy collector */
109 /* -- error codes for init function -- */
110 #define JENT_ENOTIME 1 /* Timer service not available */
111 #define JENT_ECOARSETIME 2 /* Timer too coarse for RNG */
112 #define JENT_ENOMONOTONIC 3 /* Timer is not monotonic increasing */
113 #define JENT_EVARVAR 5 /* Timer does not produce variations of
114 * variations (2nd derivation of time is
116 #define JENT_ESTUCK 8 /* Too many stuck results during init. */
117 #define JENT_EHEALTH 9 /* Health test failed during initialization */
118 #define JENT_ERCT 10 /* RCT failed during initialization */
121 * The output n bits can receive more than n bits of min entropy, of course,
122 * but the fixed output of the conditioning function can only asymptotically
123 * approach the output size bits of min entropy, not attain that bound. Random
124 * maps will tend to have output collisions, which reduces the creditable
125 * output entropy (that is what SP 800-90B Section 3.1.5.1.2 attempts to bound).
127 * The value "64" is justified in Appendix A.4 of the current 90C draft,
128 * and aligns with NIST's in "epsilon" definition in this document, which is
129 * that a string can be considered "full entropy" if you can bound the min
130 * entropy in each bit of output to at least 1-epsilon, where epsilon is
131 * required to be <= 2^(-32).
133 #define JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR 64
135 #include <linux/fips.h>
136 #include "jitterentropy.h"
138 /***************************************************************************
139 * Adaptive Proportion Test
141 * This test complies with SP800-90B section 4.4.2.
142 ***************************************************************************/
145 * Reset the APT counter
147 * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
149 static void jent_apt_reset(struct rand_data
*ec
, unsigned int delta_masked
)
151 /* Reset APT counter */
153 ec
->apt_base
= delta_masked
;
154 ec
->apt_observations
= 0;
158 * Insert a new entropy event into APT
160 * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
161 * @delta_masked [in] Masked time delta to process
163 static void jent_apt_insert(struct rand_data
*ec
, unsigned int delta_masked
)
165 /* Initialize the base reference */
166 if (!ec
->apt_base_set
) {
167 ec
->apt_base
= delta_masked
;
168 ec
->apt_base_set
= 1;
172 if (delta_masked
== ec
->apt_base
) {
175 if (ec
->apt_count
>= JENT_APT_CUTOFF
)
176 ec
->health_failure
= 1;
179 ec
->apt_observations
++;
181 if (ec
->apt_observations
>= JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE
)
182 jent_apt_reset(ec
, delta_masked
);
185 /***************************************************************************
186 * Stuck Test and its use as Repetition Count Test
188 * The Jitter RNG uses an enhanced version of the Repetition Count Test
189 * (RCT) specified in SP800-90B section 4.4.1. Instead of counting identical
190 * back-to-back values, the input to the RCT is the counting of the stuck
191 * values during the generation of one Jitter RNG output block.
193 * The RCT is applied with an alpha of 2^{-30} compliant to FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8.
195 * During the counting operation, the Jitter RNG always calculates the RCT
196 * cut-off value of C. If that value exceeds the allowed cut-off value,
197 * the Jitter RNG output block will be calculated completely but discarded at
198 * the end. The caller of the Jitter RNG is informed with an error code.
199 ***************************************************************************/
202 * Repetition Count Test as defined in SP800-90B section 4.4.1
204 * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
205 * @stuck [in] Indicator whether the value is stuck
207 static void jent_rct_insert(struct rand_data
*ec
, int stuck
)
210 * If we have a count less than zero, a previous RCT round identified
211 * a failure. We will not overwrite it.
213 if (ec
->rct_count
< 0)
220 * The cutoff value is based on the following consideration:
221 * alpha = 2^-30 as recommended in FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8.
222 * In addition, we require an entropy value H of 1/OSR as this
223 * is the minimum entropy required to provide full entropy.
224 * Note, we collect 64 * OSR deltas for inserting them into
225 * the entropy pool which should then have (close to) 64 bits
228 * Note, ec->rct_count (which equals to value B in the pseudo
229 * code of SP800-90B section 4.4.1) starts with zero. Hence
230 * we need to subtract one from the cutoff value as calculated
231 * following SP800-90B.
233 if ((unsigned int)ec
->rct_count
>= (31 * ec
->osr
)) {
235 ec
->health_failure
= 1;
243 * Is there an RCT health test failure?
245 * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
248 * 0 No health test failure
249 * 1 Permanent health test failure
251 static int jent_rct_failure(struct rand_data
*ec
)
253 if (ec
->rct_count
< 0)
258 static inline __u64
jent_delta(__u64 prev
, __u64 next
)
260 #define JENT_UINT64_MAX (__u64)(~((__u64) 0))
261 return (prev
< next
) ? (next
- prev
) :
262 (JENT_UINT64_MAX
- prev
+ 1 + next
);
266 * Stuck test by checking the:
267 * 1st derivative of the jitter measurement (time delta)
268 * 2nd derivative of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas)
269 * 3rd derivative of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time deltas)
271 * All values must always be non-zero.
273 * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
274 * @current_delta [in] Jitter time delta
277 * 0 jitter measurement not stuck (good bit)
278 * 1 jitter measurement stuck (reject bit)
280 static int jent_stuck(struct rand_data
*ec
, __u64 current_delta
)
282 __u64 delta2
= jent_delta(ec
->last_delta
, current_delta
);
283 __u64 delta3
= jent_delta(ec
->last_delta2
, delta2
);
285 ec
->last_delta
= current_delta
;
286 ec
->last_delta2
= delta2
;
289 * Insert the result of the comparison of two back-to-back time
292 jent_apt_insert(ec
, current_delta
);
294 if (!current_delta
|| !delta2
|| !delta3
) {
295 /* RCT with a stuck bit */
296 jent_rct_insert(ec
, 1);
300 /* RCT with a non-stuck bit */
301 jent_rct_insert(ec
, 0);
307 * Report any health test failures
309 * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
312 * 0 No health test failure
313 * 1 Permanent health test failure
315 static int jent_health_failure(struct rand_data
*ec
)
317 return ec
->health_failure
;
320 /***************************************************************************
322 ***************************************************************************/
325 * Update of the loop count used for the next round of
326 * an entropy collection.
329 * @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL
330 * @bits is the number of low bits of the timer to consider
331 * @min is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at
332 * the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value
334 * @return Newly calculated loop counter
336 static __u64
jent_loop_shuffle(struct rand_data
*ec
,
337 unsigned int bits
, unsigned int min
)
342 unsigned int mask
= (1<<bits
) - 1;
344 jent_get_nstime(&time
);
346 * Mix the current state of the random number into the shuffle
347 * calculation to balance that shuffle a bit more.
352 * We fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many
353 * bits of the time stamp are included as possible.
355 for (i
= 0; ((DATA_SIZE_BITS
+ bits
- 1) / bits
) > i
; i
++) {
356 shuffle
^= time
& mask
;
361 * We add a lower boundary value to ensure we have a minimum
364 return (shuffle
+ (1<<min
));
368 * CPU Jitter noise source -- this is the noise source based on the CPU
369 * execution time jitter
371 * This function injects the individual bits of the time value into the
372 * entropy pool using an LFSR.
374 * The code is deliberately inefficient with respect to the bit shifting
375 * and shall stay that way. This function is the root cause why the code
376 * shall be compiled without optimization. This function not only acts as
377 * folding operation, but this function's execution is used to measure
378 * the CPU execution time jitter. Any change to the loop in this function
379 * implies that careful retesting must be done.
381 * @ec [in] entropy collector struct
382 * @time [in] time stamp to be injected
383 * @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as
384 * number of loops to perform the folding
385 * @stuck [in] Is the time stamp identified as stuck?
390 * @return Number of loops the folding operation is performed
392 static void jent_lfsr_time(struct rand_data
*ec
, __u64 time
, __u64 loop_cnt
,
398 #define MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 4
399 #define MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 0
400 __u64 fold_loop_cnt
=
401 jent_loop_shuffle(ec
, MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT
, MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT
);
404 * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not
405 * needed during runtime
408 fold_loop_cnt
= loop_cnt
;
409 for (j
= 0; j
< fold_loop_cnt
; j
++) {
411 for (i
= 1; (DATA_SIZE_BITS
) >= i
; i
++) {
412 __u64 tmp
= time
<< (DATA_SIZE_BITS
- i
);
414 tmp
= tmp
>> (DATA_SIZE_BITS
- 1);
417 * Fibonacci LSFR with polynomial of
418 * x^64 + x^61 + x^56 + x^31 + x^28 + x^23 + 1 which is
419 * primitive according to
420 * http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~ezivkovm/publications/primpol1.pdf
421 * (the shift values are the polynomial values minus one
422 * due to counting bits from 0 to 63). As the current
423 * position is always the LSB, the polynomial only needs
424 * to shift data in from the left without wrap.
426 tmp
^= ((new >> 63) & 1);
427 tmp
^= ((new >> 60) & 1);
428 tmp
^= ((new >> 55) & 1);
429 tmp
^= ((new >> 30) & 1);
430 tmp
^= ((new >> 27) & 1);
431 tmp
^= ((new >> 22) & 1);
438 * If the time stamp is stuck, do not finally insert the value into
439 * the entropy pool. Although this operation should not do any harm
440 * even when the time stamp has no entropy, SP800-90B requires that
441 * any conditioning operation (SP800-90B considers the LFSR to be a
442 * conditioning operation) to have an identical amount of input
443 * data according to section 3.1.5.
450 * Memory Access noise source -- this is a noise source based on variations in
451 * memory access times
453 * This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing
454 * variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be
455 * added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1
456 * caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing.
458 * The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is usually
459 * slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add minimal
460 * variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, significant
461 * variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to the CPU any more
462 * and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is necessary for accesses.
463 * L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider range of wait states. However,
464 * to reliably access either L3 or memory, the ec->mem memory must be quite
465 * large which is usually not desirable.
467 * @ec [in] Reference to the entropy collector with the memory access data -- if
468 * the reference to the memory block to be accessed is NULL, this noise
470 * @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value
471 * number of loops to perform the LFSR
473 static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_data
*ec
, __u64 loop_cnt
)
475 unsigned int wrap
= 0;
477 #define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7
478 #define MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT 0
480 jent_loop_shuffle(ec
, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT
, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT
);
482 if (NULL
== ec
|| NULL
== ec
->mem
)
484 wrap
= ec
->memblocksize
* ec
->memblocks
;
487 * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not
488 * needed during runtime
491 acc_loop_cnt
= loop_cnt
;
493 for (i
= 0; i
< (ec
->memaccessloops
+ acc_loop_cnt
); i
++) {
494 unsigned char *tmpval
= ec
->mem
+ ec
->memlocation
;
496 * memory access: just add 1 to one byte,
497 * wrap at 255 -- memory access implies read
498 * from and write to memory location
500 *tmpval
= (*tmpval
+ 1) & 0xff;
502 * Addition of memblocksize - 1 to pointer
503 * with wrap around logic to ensure that every
504 * memory location is hit evenly
506 ec
->memlocation
= ec
->memlocation
+ ec
->memblocksize
- 1;
507 ec
->memlocation
= ec
->memlocation
% wrap
;
511 /***************************************************************************
512 * Start of entropy processing logic
513 ***************************************************************************/
515 * This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and
516 * use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is injected into the
519 * WARNING: ensure that ->prev_time is primed before using the output
520 * of this function! This can be done by calling this function
521 * and not using its result.
523 * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
525 * @return result of stuck test
527 static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data
*ec
)
530 __u64 current_delta
= 0;
533 /* Invoke one noise source before time measurement to add variations */
534 jent_memaccess(ec
, 0);
537 * Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous
538 * invocation to measure the timing variations
540 jent_get_nstime(&time
);
541 current_delta
= jent_delta(ec
->prev_time
, time
);
542 ec
->prev_time
= time
;
544 /* Check whether we have a stuck measurement. */
545 stuck
= jent_stuck(ec
, current_delta
);
547 /* Now call the next noise sources which also injects the data */
548 jent_lfsr_time(ec
, current_delta
, 0, stuck
);
554 * Generator of one 64 bit random number
555 * Function fills rand_data->data
557 * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
559 static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data
*ec
)
561 unsigned int k
= 0, safety_factor
= 0;
564 safety_factor
= JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR
;
566 /* priming of the ->prev_time value */
567 jent_measure_jitter(ec
);
569 while (!jent_health_failure(ec
)) {
570 /* If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement */
571 if (jent_measure_jitter(ec
))
575 * We multiply the loop value with ->osr to obtain the
576 * oversampling rate requested by the caller
578 if (++k
>= ((DATA_SIZE_BITS
+ safety_factor
) * ec
->osr
))
584 * Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller.
586 * This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate
587 * as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic
588 * creates 64 bit per invocation.
590 * This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact
591 * size specified by the caller.
593 * @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
594 * @data [in] pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must already
596 * @len [in] size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random
599 * @return 0 when request is fulfilled or an error
601 * The following error codes can occur:
602 * -1 entropy_collector is NULL
606 int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data
*ec
, unsigned char *data
,
609 unsigned char *p
= data
;
617 jent_gen_entropy(ec
);
619 if (jent_health_failure(ec
)) {
622 if (jent_rct_failure(ec
))
628 * Re-initialize the noise source
630 * If the health test fails, the Jitter RNG remains
631 * in failure state and will return a health failure
632 * during next invocation.
634 if (jent_entropy_init())
637 /* Set APT to initial state */
638 jent_apt_reset(ec
, 0);
639 ec
->apt_base_set
= 0;
641 /* Set RCT to initial state */
644 /* Re-enable Jitter RNG */
645 ec
->health_failure
= 0;
648 * Return the health test failure status to the
649 * caller as the generated value is not appropriate.
654 if ((DATA_SIZE_BITS
/ 8) < len
)
655 tocopy
= (DATA_SIZE_BITS
/ 8);
658 jent_memcpy(p
, &ec
->data
, tocopy
);
667 /***************************************************************************
668 * Initialization logic
669 ***************************************************************************/
671 struct rand_data
*jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr
,
674 struct rand_data
*entropy_collector
;
676 entropy_collector
= jent_zalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data
));
677 if (!entropy_collector
)
680 if (!(flags
& JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS
)) {
681 /* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory
684 entropy_collector
->mem
= jent_zalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE
);
685 if (!entropy_collector
->mem
) {
686 jent_zfree(entropy_collector
);
689 entropy_collector
->memblocksize
= JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE
;
690 entropy_collector
->memblocks
= JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS
;
691 entropy_collector
->memaccessloops
= JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS
;
694 /* verify and set the oversampling rate */
696 osr
= 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */
697 entropy_collector
->osr
= osr
;
699 /* fill the data pad with non-zero values */
700 jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector
);
702 return entropy_collector
;
705 void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data
*entropy_collector
)
707 jent_zfree(entropy_collector
->mem
);
708 entropy_collector
->mem
= NULL
;
709 jent_zfree(entropy_collector
);
712 int jent_entropy_init(void)
717 unsigned int nonstuck
= 0;
718 int time_backwards
= 0;
721 struct rand_data ec
= { 0 };
723 /* Required for RCT */
726 /* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is
727 * that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These
728 * loop counts may show some slight skew and we produce
731 * Moreover, only old systems show potentially problematic
732 * jitter entropy that could potentially be caught here. But
733 * the RNG is intended for hardware that is available or widely
734 * used, but not old systems that are long out of favor. Thus,
735 * no statistical tests.
739 * We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or
740 * check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the
741 * following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution
745 * TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. 100 is
746 * definitely too little.
748 * SP800-90B requires at least 1024 initial test cycles.
750 #define TESTLOOPCOUNT 1024
751 #define CLEARCACHE 100
752 for (i
= 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT
+ CLEARCACHE
) > i
; i
++) {
756 unsigned int lowdelta
= 0;
759 /* Invoke core entropy collection logic */
760 jent_get_nstime(&time
);
762 jent_lfsr_time(&ec
, time
, 0, 0);
763 jent_get_nstime(&time2
);
765 /* test whether timer works */
768 delta
= jent_delta(time
, time2
);
770 * test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide
771 * delta even when called shortly after each other -- this
772 * implies that we also have a high resolution timer
775 return JENT_ECOARSETIME
;
777 stuck
= jent_stuck(&ec
, delta
);
780 * up to here we did not modify any variable that will be
781 * evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we
782 * already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction,
783 * etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case
795 * Ensure that the APT succeeded.
797 * With the check below that count_stuck must be less
798 * than 10% of the overall generated raw entropy values
799 * it is guaranteed that the APT is invoked at
800 * floor((TESTLOOPCOUNT * 0.9) / 64) == 14 times.
802 if ((nonstuck
% JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE
) == 0) {
804 delta
& JENT_APT_WORD_MASK
);
805 if (jent_health_failure(&ec
))
811 if (jent_rct_failure(&ec
))
814 /* test whether we have an increasing timer */
818 /* use 32 bit value to ensure compilation on 32 bit arches */
819 lowdelta
= time2
- time
;
820 if (!(lowdelta
% 100))
824 * ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary
825 * for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check
826 * only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime
829 if (delta
> old_delta
)
830 delta_sum
+= (delta
- old_delta
);
832 delta_sum
+= (old_delta
- delta
);
837 * we allow up to three times the time running backwards.
838 * CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus,
839 * if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it
840 * should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being
841 * performed during our test run.
843 if (time_backwards
> 3)
844 return JENT_ENOMONOTONIC
;
847 * Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger
848 * than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation
849 * implied with 1 is preserved
851 if ((delta_sum
) <= 1)
855 * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at
856 * least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments
857 * in multiples of 100, but not always
859 if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT
/10 * 9) < count_mod
)
860 return JENT_ECOARSETIME
;
863 * If we have more than 90% stuck results, then this Jitter RNG is
864 * likely to not work well.
866 if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT
/10 * 9) < count_stuck
)