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1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
2 /*
3 * This is <linux/capability.h>
4 *
5 * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
6 * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
7 * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
8 *
9 * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
10 *
11 * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
12 */
13 #ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
14 #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
15
16 #include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
17
18
19 #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
20 #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
21
22 extern int file_caps_enabled;
23
24 typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
25 __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
26 } kernel_cap_t;
27
28 /* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
29 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
30 __u32 magic_etc;
31 kernel_cap_t permitted;
32 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
33 };
34
35 #define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
36 #define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
37
38
39 struct file;
40 struct inode;
41 struct dentry;
42 struct task_struct;
43 struct user_namespace;
44
45 extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
46 extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
47
48 /*
49 * Internal kernel functions only
50 */
51
52 #define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
53 for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
54
55 /*
56 * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
57 *
58 * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
59 * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
60 *
61 * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
62 *
63 * We could also define fsmask as follows:
64 * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
65 * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
66 */
67
68 # define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
69 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \
70 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
71 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
72 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
73 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
74
75 # define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
76
77 #if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
78 # error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
79 #else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
80
81 #define CAP_LAST_U32 ((_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) - 1)
82 #define CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1)
83
84 # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
85 # define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK }})
86 # define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
87 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
88 CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
89 # define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
90 | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
91 CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
92
93 #endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
94
95 # define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
96
97 #define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
98 #define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
99 #define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
100
101 #define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
102 do { \
103 unsigned __capi; \
104 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
105 c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
106 } \
107 } while (0)
108
109 #define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
110 do { \
111 unsigned __capi; \
112 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
113 c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
114 } \
115 } while (0)
116
117 static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
118 const kernel_cap_t b)
119 {
120 kernel_cap_t dest;
121 CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
122 return dest;
123 }
124
125 static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
126 const kernel_cap_t b)
127 {
128 kernel_cap_t dest;
129 CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
130 return dest;
131 }
132
133 static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
134 const kernel_cap_t drop)
135 {
136 kernel_cap_t dest;
137 CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
138 return dest;
139 }
140
141 static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
142 {
143 kernel_cap_t dest;
144 CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
145 return dest;
146 }
147
148 static inline bool cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
149 {
150 unsigned __capi;
151 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
152 if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
153 return false;
154 }
155 return true;
156 }
157
158 /*
159 * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
160 * return true if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
161 * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return true
162 * return false if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
163 * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return false
164 */
165 static inline bool cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
166 {
167 kernel_cap_t dest;
168 dest = cap_drop(a, set);
169 return cap_isclear(dest);
170 }
171
172 /* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
173
174 static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
175 {
176 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
177 return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
178 }
179
180 static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
181 const kernel_cap_t permitted)
182 {
183 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
184 return cap_combine(a,
185 cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
186 }
187
188 static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
189 {
190 const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
191 return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
192 }
193
194 static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
195 const kernel_cap_t permitted)
196 {
197 const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
198 return cap_combine(a,
199 cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
200 }
201
202 #ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER
203 extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
204 extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
205 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
206 extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
207 extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
208 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
209 extern bool capable(int cap);
210 extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
211 extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
212 #else
213 static inline bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
214 {
215 return true;
216 }
217 static inline bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
218 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
219 {
220 return true;
221 }
222 static inline bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
223 {
224 return true;
225 }
226 static inline bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
227 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
228 {
229 return true;
230 }
231 static inline bool capable(int cap)
232 {
233 return true;
234 }
235 static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
236 {
237 return true;
238 }
239 static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
240 {
241 return true;
242 }
243 #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
244 extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode);
245 extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
246 extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
247 extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
248
249 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
250 extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
251
252 extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size);
253
254 #endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */