1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
47 #include <linux/init.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/atomic.h>
51 #include <linux/namei.h>
53 #include <linux/export.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/mount.h>
56 #include <linux/socket.h>
57 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
58 #include <linux/audit.h>
59 #include <linux/personality.h>
60 #include <linux/time.h>
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/compiler.h>
63 #include <asm/unistd.h>
64 #include <linux/security.h>
65 #include <linux/list.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/highmem.h>
68 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
69 #include <asm/syscall.h>
70 #include <linux/capability.h>
71 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72 #include <linux/compat.h>
73 #include <linux/ctype.h>
74 #include <linux/string.h>
75 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
76 #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
77 #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
78 #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
82 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
83 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
84 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
85 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
87 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
88 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
89 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
91 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
92 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
94 /* number of audit rules */
97 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
100 struct audit_aux_data
{
101 struct audit_aux_data
*next
;
105 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
106 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
108 struct audit_aux_data_pids
{
109 struct audit_aux_data d
;
110 pid_t target_pid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
111 kuid_t target_auid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
112 kuid_t target_uid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
113 unsigned int target_sessionid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
114 struct lsmblob target_lsm
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
115 char target_comm
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
][TASK_COMM_LEN
];
119 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
{
120 struct audit_aux_data d
;
121 struct audit_cap_data fcap
;
122 unsigned int fcap_ver
;
123 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap
;
124 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap
;
127 struct audit_tree_refs
{
128 struct audit_tree_refs
*next
;
129 struct audit_chunk
*c
[31];
132 struct audit_nfcfgop_tab
{
133 enum audit_nfcfgop op
;
137 static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs
[] = {
138 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER
, "xt_register" },
139 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE
, "xt_replace" },
140 { AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER
, "xt_unregister" },
141 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER
, "nft_register_table" },
142 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_table" },
143 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER
, "nft_register_chain" },
144 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_chain" },
145 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER
, "nft_register_rule" },
146 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_rule" },
147 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER
, "nft_register_set" },
148 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_set" },
149 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER
, "nft_register_setelem" },
150 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_setelem" },
151 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER
, "nft_register_gen" },
152 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER
, "nft_register_obj" },
153 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_obj" },
154 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET
, "nft_reset_obj" },
155 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER
, "nft_register_flowtable" },
156 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER
, "nft_unregister_flowtable" },
157 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID
, "nft_invalid" },
160 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int mask
)
167 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx
->arch
, n
)) {
169 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
170 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE
, n
))
172 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
173 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ
, n
))
175 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
176 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR
, n
))
179 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
180 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
181 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32
, n
))
183 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
184 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32
, n
))
186 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
187 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32
, n
))
191 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[1]);
193 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[2]);
194 case 4: /* socketcall */
195 return ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) && ctx
->argv
[0] == SYS_BIND
);
197 return mask
& AUDIT_PERM_EXEC
;
203 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int val
)
205 struct audit_names
*n
;
206 umode_t mode
= (umode_t
)val
;
211 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
212 if ((n
->ino
!= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
) &&
213 ((n
->mode
& S_IFMT
) == mode
))
221 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
222 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
223 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
224 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
225 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
226 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
227 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
230 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
234 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
238 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_chunk
*chunk
)
240 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
241 int left
= ctx
->tree_count
;
243 p
->c
[--left
] = chunk
;
244 ctx
->tree_count
= left
;
253 ctx
->tree_count
= 30;
259 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
261 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
262 ctx
->trees
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs
), GFP_KERNEL
);
268 p
->next
= ctx
->trees
;
270 ctx
->first_trees
= ctx
->trees
;
271 ctx
->tree_count
= 31;
275 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
276 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, int count
)
278 struct audit_tree_refs
*q
;
281 /* we started with empty chain */
282 p
= ctx
->first_trees
;
284 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
289 for (q
= p
; q
!= ctx
->trees
; q
= q
->next
, n
= 31) {
291 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
295 while (n
-- > ctx
->tree_count
) {
296 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
300 ctx
->tree_count
= count
;
303 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
305 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, *q
;
306 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
; p
= q
) {
312 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_tree
*tree
)
314 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
319 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
!= ctx
->trees
; p
= p
->next
) {
320 for (n
= 0; n
< 31; n
++)
321 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
326 for (n
= ctx
->tree_count
; n
< 31; n
++)
327 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
333 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid
,
334 struct audit_names
*name
,
335 struct audit_field
*f
,
336 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
338 struct audit_names
*n
;
342 rc
= audit_uid_comparator(uid
, f
->op
, name
->uid
);
348 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
349 rc
= audit_uid_comparator(uid
, f
->op
, n
->uid
);
357 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid
,
358 struct audit_names
*name
,
359 struct audit_field
*f
,
360 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
362 struct audit_names
*n
;
366 rc
= audit_gid_comparator(gid
, f
->op
, name
->gid
);
372 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
373 rc
= audit_gid_comparator(gid
, f
->op
, n
->gid
);
381 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
382 const struct cred
*cred
,
383 struct audit_field
*f
,
384 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
385 struct audit_names
*name
)
388 /* process to file object comparisons */
389 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
390 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->uid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
392 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->gid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
393 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
394 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->euid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
395 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
396 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->egid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
398 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk
), name
, f
, ctx
);
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
400 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->suid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
402 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->sgid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
404 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->fsuid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
405 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
406 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->fsgid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
407 /* uid comparisons */
408 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID
:
409 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
,
410 audit_get_loginuid(tsk
));
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID
:
412 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->euid
);
413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID
:
414 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
415 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID
:
416 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
417 /* auid comparisons */
418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID
:
419 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk
), f
->op
,
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID
:
422 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk
), f
->op
,
424 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID
:
425 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk
), f
->op
,
427 /* euid comparisons */
428 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID
:
429 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
430 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID
:
431 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
432 /* suid comparisons */
433 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID
:
434 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
435 /* gid comparisons */
436 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID
:
437 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->egid
);
438 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID
:
439 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->sgid
);
440 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID
:
441 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
442 /* egid comparisons */
443 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID
:
444 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, cred
->sgid
);
445 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID
:
446 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
447 /* sgid comparison */
448 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID
:
449 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
451 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
457 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
458 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
461 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
462 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
463 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
465 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
466 struct audit_krule
*rule
,
467 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
468 struct audit_names
*name
,
469 enum audit_state
*state
,
472 const struct cred
*cred
;
474 struct lsmblob blob
= { };
475 unsigned int sessionid
;
477 cred
= rcu_dereference_check(tsk
->cred
, tsk
== current
|| task_creation
);
479 for (i
= 0; i
< rule
->field_count
; i
++) {
480 struct audit_field
*f
= &rule
->fields
[i
];
481 struct audit_names
*n
;
487 pid
= task_tgid_nr(tsk
);
488 result
= audit_comparator(pid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
493 ctx
->ppid
= task_ppid_nr(tsk
);
494 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->ppid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
498 result
= audit_exe_compare(tsk
, rule
->exe
);
499 if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
)
503 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
506 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
509 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
512 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->fsuid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
515 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
516 if (f
->op
== Audit_equal
) {
518 result
= groups_search(cred
->group_info
, f
->gid
);
519 } else if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
) {
521 result
= !groups_search(cred
->group_info
, f
->gid
);
525 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
526 if (f
->op
== Audit_equal
) {
528 result
= groups_search(cred
->group_info
, f
->gid
);
529 } else if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
) {
531 result
= !groups_search(cred
->group_info
, f
->gid
);
535 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
538 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->fsgid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
540 case AUDIT_SESSIONID
:
541 sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(tsk
);
542 result
= audit_comparator(sessionid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
545 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->personality
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
549 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->arch
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
553 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
!= AUDITSC_INVALID
)
554 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_code
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
557 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
!= AUDITSC_INVALID
) {
559 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_SUCCESS
);
561 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_FAILURE
);
566 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
567 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
570 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
571 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
572 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
581 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
582 audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
585 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
586 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
587 audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
596 result
= audit_comparator(name
->ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
598 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
599 if (audit_comparator(n
->ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
608 result
= audit_uid_comparator(name
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
610 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
611 if (audit_uid_comparator(n
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
)) {
620 result
= audit_gid_comparator(name
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
622 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
623 if (audit_gid_comparator(n
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
)) {
632 result
= audit_watch_compare(rule
->watch
,
635 if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
)
641 result
= match_tree_refs(ctx
, rule
->tree
);
642 if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
)
647 result
= audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk
),
650 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET
:
651 result
= audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk
), f
->op
, f
->val
);
653 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM
:
655 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->sockaddr
->ss_family
,
658 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
659 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
660 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
663 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
664 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
665 match for now to avoid losing information that
666 may be wanted. An error message will also be
670 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &blob
);
673 result
= security_audit_rule_match(&blob
,
682 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
683 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
684 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
687 /* Find files that match */
689 result
= security_audit_rule_match(
695 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
696 if (security_audit_rule_match(
706 /* Find ipc objects that match */
707 if (!ctx
|| ctx
->type
!= AUDIT_IPC
)
709 if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx
->ipc
.oblob
,
720 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->argv
[f
->type
-AUDIT_ARG0
], f
->op
, f
->val
);
722 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY
:
723 /* ignore this field for filtering */
727 result
= audit_match_perm(ctx
, f
->val
);
728 if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
)
732 result
= audit_match_filetype(ctx
, f
->val
);
733 if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
)
736 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE
:
737 result
= audit_field_compare(tsk
, cred
, f
, ctx
, name
);
745 if (rule
->prio
<= ctx
->prio
)
747 if (rule
->filterkey
) {
748 kfree(ctx
->filterkey
);
749 ctx
->filterkey
= kstrdup(rule
->filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
751 ctx
->prio
= rule
->prio
;
753 switch (rule
->action
) {
755 *state
= AUDIT_DISABLED
;
758 *state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
764 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
765 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
766 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
768 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_task(struct task_struct
*tsk
, char **key
)
770 struct audit_entry
*e
;
771 enum audit_state state
;
774 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK
], list
) {
775 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, NULL
, NULL
,
777 if (state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
778 *key
= kstrdup(e
->rule
.filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
784 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
787 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule
*rule
, unsigned long val
)
791 if (val
> 0xffffffff)
794 word
= AUDIT_WORD(val
);
795 if (word
>= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE
)
798 bit
= AUDIT_BIT(val
);
800 return rule
->mask
[word
] & bit
;
803 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
804 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
805 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
806 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
808 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
809 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
810 struct list_head
*list
)
812 struct audit_entry
*e
;
813 enum audit_state state
;
815 if (auditd_test_task(tsk
))
816 return AUDIT_DISABLED
;
819 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
820 if (audit_in_mask(&e
->rule
, ctx
->major
) &&
821 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, NULL
,
824 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
829 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
833 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
834 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
836 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
837 struct audit_names
*n
,
838 struct audit_context
*ctx
) {
839 int h
= audit_hash_ino((u32
)n
->ino
);
840 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_inode_hash
[h
];
841 struct audit_entry
*e
;
842 enum audit_state state
;
844 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
845 if (audit_in_mask(&e
->rule
, ctx
->major
) &&
846 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, n
, &state
, false)) {
847 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
854 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
855 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
856 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
857 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
859 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct
*tsk
, struct audit_context
*ctx
)
861 struct audit_names
*n
;
863 if (auditd_test_task(tsk
))
868 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
869 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk
, n
, ctx
))
875 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context
*context
)
877 kfree(context
->proctitle
.value
);
878 context
->proctitle
.value
= NULL
;
879 context
->proctitle
.len
= 0;
882 static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context
*context
)
884 if (context
->type
== AUDIT_KERN_MODULE
) {
885 kfree(context
->module
.name
);
886 context
->module
.name
= NULL
;
889 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context
*context
)
891 struct audit_names
*n
, *next
;
893 list_for_each_entry_safe(n
, next
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
900 context
->name_count
= 0;
901 path_put(&context
->pwd
);
902 context
->pwd
.dentry
= NULL
;
903 context
->pwd
.mnt
= NULL
;
906 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context
*context
)
908 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
910 while ((aux
= context
->aux
)) {
911 context
->aux
= aux
->next
;
914 while ((aux
= context
->aux_pids
)) {
915 context
->aux_pids
= aux
->next
;
920 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state
)
922 struct audit_context
*context
;
924 context
= kzalloc(sizeof(*context
), GFP_KERNEL
);
927 context
->state
= state
;
928 context
->prio
= state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
929 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->killed_trees
);
930 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->names_list
);
931 context
->fds
[0] = -1;
932 context
->return_valid
= AUDITSC_INVALID
;
937 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
940 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
941 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
942 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
945 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
947 struct audit_context
*context
;
948 enum audit_state state
;
951 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled
))
952 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
954 state
= audit_filter_task(tsk
, &key
);
955 if (!lsm_multiple_contexts() && state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
) {
956 clear_task_syscall_work(tsk
, SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
959 if (state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
)
960 clear_task_syscall_work(tsk
, SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
962 if (!(context
= audit_alloc_context(state
))) {
964 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
967 context
->filterkey
= key
;
969 audit_set_context(tsk
, context
);
970 set_task_syscall_work(tsk
, SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
974 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context
*context
)
976 audit_free_module(context
);
977 audit_free_names(context
);
978 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
979 free_tree_refs(context
);
980 audit_free_aux(context
);
981 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
982 kfree(context
->sockaddr
);
983 audit_proctitle_free(context
);
987 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context
*context
, pid_t pid
,
988 kuid_t auid
, kuid_t uid
,
989 unsigned int sessionid
,
990 struct lsmblob
*blob
, char *comm
)
992 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
995 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_OBJ_PID
);
999 audit_log_format(ab
, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid
,
1000 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, auid
),
1001 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, uid
), sessionid
);
1002 rc
= audit_log_object_context(ab
, blob
);
1003 audit_log_format(ab
, " ocomm=");
1004 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, comm
);
1010 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context
*context
,
1011 struct audit_buffer
**ab
)
1025 const char __user
*p
= (const char __user
*)current
->mm
->arg_start
;
1027 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1028 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1029 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1032 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1033 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1034 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1035 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1036 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
> 7500);
1037 len_max
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1039 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1040 buf_head
= kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
+ 1, GFP_KERNEL
);
1042 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1047 audit_log_format(*ab
, "argc=%d", context
->execve
.argc
);
1052 require_data
= true;
1057 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1058 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1059 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1060 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1061 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1062 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1063 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1065 len_full
= strnlen_user(p
, MAX_ARG_STRLEN
) - 1;
1067 /* read more data from userspace */
1069 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1070 if (buf
!= buf_head
) {
1071 memmove(buf_head
, buf
, len_buf
);
1075 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1076 len_tmp
= strncpy_from_user(&buf_head
[len_buf
], p
,
1078 if (len_tmp
== -EFAULT
) {
1079 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1080 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1082 } else if (len_tmp
== (len_max
- len_buf
)) {
1083 /* buffer is not large enough */
1084 require_data
= true;
1085 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1086 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1087 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1088 * consistent record encoding */
1090 len_full
= len_full
* 2;
1093 require_data
= false;
1095 encode
= audit_string_contains_control(
1097 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1098 if (len_full
< len_max
)
1099 len_full
= (encode
?
1100 len_tmp
* 2 : len_tmp
);
1104 buf_head
[len_buf
] = '\0';
1106 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1107 len_abuf
= (encode
? len_buf
* 2 : len_buf
+ 2);
1110 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1112 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1113 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1114 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1116 if ((sizeof(abuf
) + 8) > len_rem
) {
1119 *ab
= audit_log_start(context
,
1120 GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EXECVE
);
1125 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1127 if (require_data
|| (iter
> 0) ||
1128 ((len_abuf
+ sizeof(abuf
)) > len_rem
)) {
1130 len_tmp
+= snprintf(&abuf
[len_tmp
],
1131 sizeof(abuf
) - len_tmp
,
1135 len_tmp
+= snprintf(&abuf
[len_tmp
],
1136 sizeof(abuf
) - len_tmp
,
1137 " a%d[%d]=", arg
, iter
++);
1139 len_tmp
+= snprintf(&abuf
[len_tmp
],
1140 sizeof(abuf
) - len_tmp
,
1142 WARN_ON(len_tmp
>= sizeof(abuf
));
1143 abuf
[sizeof(abuf
) - 1] = '\0';
1145 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1146 audit_log_format(*ab
, "%s", abuf
);
1150 if (len_abuf
> len_rem
)
1151 len_tmp
= len_rem
/ 2; /* encoding */
1152 audit_log_n_hex(*ab
, buf
, len_tmp
);
1153 len_rem
-= len_tmp
* 2;
1154 len_abuf
-= len_tmp
* 2;
1156 if (len_abuf
> len_rem
)
1157 len_tmp
= len_rem
- 2; /* quotes */
1158 audit_log_n_string(*ab
, buf
, len_tmp
);
1159 len_rem
-= len_tmp
+ 2;
1160 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1161 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1162 len_abuf
-= len_tmp
;
1168 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1169 if ((len_buf
== 0) && !require_data
) {
1173 require_data
= true;
1176 } while (arg
< context
->execve
.argc
);
1178 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1184 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *prefix
,
1189 if (cap_isclear(*cap
)) {
1190 audit_log_format(ab
, " %s=0", prefix
);
1193 audit_log_format(ab
, " %s=", prefix
);
1195 audit_log_format(ab
, "%08x", cap
->cap
[CAP_LAST_U32
- i
]);
1198 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, struct audit_names
*name
)
1200 if (name
->fcap_ver
== -1) {
1201 audit_log_format(ab
, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1204 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_fp", &name
->fcap
.permitted
);
1205 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_fi", &name
->fcap
.inheritable
);
1206 audit_log_format(ab
, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1207 name
->fcap
.fE
, name
->fcap_ver
,
1208 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, name
->fcap
.rootid
));
1211 static void show_special(struct audit_context
*context
, int *call_panic
)
1213 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1216 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, context
->type
);
1220 switch (context
->type
) {
1221 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
: {
1222 int nargs
= context
->socketcall
.nargs
;
1223 audit_log_format(ab
, "nargs=%d", nargs
);
1224 for (i
= 0; i
< nargs
; i
++)
1225 audit_log_format(ab
, " a%d=%lx", i
,
1226 context
->socketcall
.args
[i
]);
1229 struct lsmblob
*oblob
= &context
->ipc
.oblob
;
1231 audit_log_format(ab
, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1232 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, context
->ipc
.uid
),
1233 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, context
->ipc
.gid
),
1235 if (audit_log_object_context(ab
, oblob
))
1237 if (context
->ipc
.has_perm
) {
1239 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
,
1240 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM
);
1243 audit_log_format(ab
,
1244 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1245 context
->ipc
.qbytes
,
1246 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
,
1247 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
,
1248 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
);
1252 audit_log_format(ab
,
1253 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1254 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1255 context
->mq_open
.oflag
, context
->mq_open
.mode
,
1256 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_flags
,
1257 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_maxmsg
,
1258 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_msgsize
,
1259 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_curmsgs
);
1261 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
:
1262 audit_log_format(ab
,
1263 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1264 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1265 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
,
1266 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
,
1267 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
,
1268 (long long) context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_sec
,
1269 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_nsec
);
1271 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
:
1272 audit_log_format(ab
, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1273 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
,
1274 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
);
1276 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
: {
1277 struct mq_attr
*attr
= &context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
;
1278 audit_log_format(ab
,
1279 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1281 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
,
1282 attr
->mq_flags
, attr
->mq_maxmsg
,
1283 attr
->mq_msgsize
, attr
->mq_curmsgs
);
1286 audit_log_format(ab
, "pid=%d", context
->capset
.pid
);
1287 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pi", &context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
);
1288 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pp", &context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
);
1289 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pe", &context
->capset
.cap
.effective
);
1290 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pa", &context
->capset
.cap
.ambient
);
1293 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context
->mmap
.fd
,
1294 context
->mmap
.flags
);
1297 audit_log_execve_info(context
, &ab
);
1299 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE
:
1300 audit_log_format(ab
, "name=");
1301 if (context
->module
.name
) {
1302 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, context
->module
.name
);
1304 audit_log_format(ab
, "(null)");
1311 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle
, int len
)
1313 char *end
= proctitle
+ len
- 1;
1314 while (end
> proctitle
&& !isprint(*end
))
1317 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1318 len
= end
- proctitle
+ 1;
1319 len
-= isprint(proctitle
[len
-1]) == 0;
1324 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1325 * @context: audit_context for the task
1326 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1327 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1328 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1329 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1331 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context
*context
, struct audit_names
*n
,
1332 const struct path
*path
, int record_num
, int *call_panic
)
1334 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1336 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_PATH
);
1340 audit_log_format(ab
, "item=%d", record_num
);
1343 audit_log_d_path(ab
, " name=", path
);
1345 switch (n
->name_len
) {
1346 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL
:
1347 /* log the full path */
1348 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=");
1349 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, n
->name
->name
);
1352 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1353 * directory component is the cwd
1355 if (context
->pwd
.dentry
&& context
->pwd
.mnt
)
1356 audit_log_d_path(ab
, " name=", &context
->pwd
);
1358 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=(null)");
1361 /* log the name's directory component */
1362 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=");
1363 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, n
->name
->name
,
1367 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=(null)");
1369 if (n
->ino
!= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
)
1370 audit_log_format(ab
, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1375 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, n
->uid
),
1376 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, n
->gid
),
1379 if (audit_log_object_context(ab
, &n
->oblob
) && call_panic
)
1382 /* log the audit_names record type */
1384 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL
:
1385 audit_log_format(ab
, " nametype=NORMAL");
1387 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
:
1388 audit_log_format(ab
, " nametype=PARENT");
1390 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE
:
1391 audit_log_format(ab
, " nametype=DELETE");
1393 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE
:
1394 audit_log_format(ab
, " nametype=CREATE");
1397 audit_log_format(ab
, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1401 audit_log_fcaps(ab
, n
);
1405 static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1409 char *msg
= "(null)";
1410 int len
= strlen(msg
);
1411 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1412 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1414 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_PROCTITLE
);
1416 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1418 audit_log_format(ab
, "proctitle=");
1421 if (!context
->proctitle
.value
) {
1422 buf
= kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN
, GFP_KERNEL
);
1425 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1426 res
= get_cmdline(current
, buf
, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN
);
1431 res
= audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf
, res
);
1436 context
->proctitle
.value
= buf
;
1437 context
->proctitle
.len
= res
;
1439 msg
= context
->proctitle
.value
;
1440 len
= context
->proctitle
.len
;
1442 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, msg
, len
);
1446 void audit_log_lsm(struct lsmblob
*blob
, bool exiting
)
1448 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1449 struct lsmcontext lsmdata
;
1450 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1451 struct lsmblob localblob
;
1456 if (!lsm_multiple_contexts())
1459 if (context
&& context
->in_syscall
&& !exiting
)
1462 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS
);
1464 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1467 security_task_getsecid(current
, &localblob
);
1468 if (!lsmblob_is_set(&localblob
))
1473 for (i
= 0; i
< LSMBLOB_ENTRIES
; i
++) {
1474 if (blob
->secid
[i
] == 0)
1476 error
= security_secid_to_secctx(blob
, &lsmdata
, i
);
1477 if (error
&& error
!= -EINVAL
) {
1478 audit_panic("error in audit_log_lsm");
1482 audit_log_format(ab
, "%ssubj_%s=%s", sep
? " " : "",
1483 security_lsm_slot_name(i
), lsmdata
.context
);
1486 security_release_secctx(&lsmdata
);
1492 static void audit_log_exit(void)
1494 int i
, call_panic
= 0;
1495 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1496 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1497 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
1498 struct audit_names
*n
;
1500 context
->personality
= current
->personality
;
1502 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SYSCALL
);
1504 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1505 audit_log_format(ab
, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1506 context
->arch
, context
->major
);
1507 if (context
->personality
!= PER_LINUX
)
1508 audit_log_format(ab
, " per=%lx", context
->personality
);
1509 if (context
->return_valid
!= AUDITSC_INVALID
)
1510 audit_log_format(ab
, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1511 (context
->return_valid
==AUDITSC_SUCCESS
)?"yes":"no",
1512 context
->return_code
);
1514 audit_log_format(ab
,
1515 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1520 context
->name_count
);
1522 audit_log_task_info(ab
);
1523 audit_log_key(ab
, context
->filterkey
);
1526 for (aux
= context
->aux
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1528 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, aux
->type
);
1530 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1532 switch (aux
->type
) {
1534 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
: {
1535 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1536 audit_log_format(ab
, "fver=%x", axs
->fcap_ver
);
1537 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fp", &axs
->fcap
.permitted
);
1538 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fi", &axs
->fcap
.inheritable
);
1539 audit_log_format(ab
, " fe=%d", axs
->fcap
.fE
);
1540 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pp", &axs
->old_pcap
.permitted
);
1541 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pi", &axs
->old_pcap
.inheritable
);
1542 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pe", &axs
->old_pcap
.effective
);
1543 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pa", &axs
->old_pcap
.ambient
);
1544 audit_log_cap(ab
, "pp", &axs
->new_pcap
.permitted
);
1545 audit_log_cap(ab
, "pi", &axs
->new_pcap
.inheritable
);
1546 audit_log_cap(ab
, "pe", &axs
->new_pcap
.effective
);
1547 audit_log_cap(ab
, "pa", &axs
->new_pcap
.ambient
);
1548 audit_log_format(ab
, " frootid=%d",
1549 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
,
1558 show_special(context
, &call_panic
);
1560 if (context
->fds
[0] >= 0) {
1561 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_FD_PAIR
);
1563 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1564 context
->fds
[0], context
->fds
[1]);
1569 if (context
->sockaddr_len
) {
1570 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SOCKADDR
);
1572 audit_log_format(ab
, "saddr=");
1573 audit_log_n_hex(ab
, (void *)context
->sockaddr
,
1574 context
->sockaddr_len
);
1579 for (aux
= context
->aux_pids
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1580 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1582 for (i
= 0; i
< axs
->pid_count
; i
++)
1583 if (audit_log_pid_context(context
, axs
->target_pid
[i
],
1584 axs
->target_auid
[i
],
1586 axs
->target_sessionid
[i
],
1587 &axs
->target_lsm
[i
],
1588 axs
->target_comm
[i
]))
1592 if (context
->target_pid
&&
1593 audit_log_pid_context(context
, context
->target_pid
,
1594 context
->target_auid
, context
->target_uid
,
1595 context
->target_sessionid
,
1596 &context
->target_lsm
, context
->target_comm
))
1599 if (context
->pwd
.dentry
&& context
->pwd
.mnt
) {
1600 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_CWD
);
1602 audit_log_d_path(ab
, "cwd=", &context
->pwd
);
1608 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1611 audit_log_name(context
, n
, NULL
, i
++, &call_panic
);
1614 audit_log_proctitle();
1615 audit_log_lsm(NULL
, true);
1617 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1618 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EOE
);
1622 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1626 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1627 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1629 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1631 void __audit_free(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1633 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
1638 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1639 audit_kill_trees(context
);
1641 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1642 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1643 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
1644 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1646 if (tsk
== current
&& !context
->dummy
&& context
->in_syscall
) {
1647 context
->return_valid
= AUDITSC_INVALID
;
1648 context
->return_code
= 0;
1650 audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
,
1651 &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT
]);
1652 audit_filter_inodes(tsk
, context
);
1653 if (context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1657 audit_set_context(tsk
, NULL
);
1658 audit_free_context(context
);
1662 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1663 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1664 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1665 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1666 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1667 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1669 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1670 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1671 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1672 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1673 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1674 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1677 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major
, unsigned long a1
, unsigned long a2
,
1678 unsigned long a3
, unsigned long a4
)
1680 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1681 enum audit_state state
;
1683 if (!audit_enabled
|| !context
)
1686 BUG_ON(context
->in_syscall
|| context
->name_count
);
1688 state
= context
->state
;
1689 if (state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
)
1692 context
->dummy
= !audit_n_rules
;
1693 if (!context
->dummy
&& state
== AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
) {
1695 if (auditd_test_task(current
))
1699 context
->arch
= syscall_get_arch(current
);
1700 context
->major
= major
;
1701 context
->argv
[0] = a1
;
1702 context
->argv
[1] = a2
;
1703 context
->argv
[2] = a3
;
1704 context
->argv
[3] = a4
;
1705 context
->serial
= 0;
1706 context
->in_syscall
= 1;
1707 context
->current_state
= state
;
1709 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context
->ctime
);
1713 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1714 * @success: success value of the syscall
1715 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1717 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1718 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1719 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1720 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1721 * free the names stored from getname().
1723 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success
, long return_code
)
1725 struct audit_context
*context
;
1727 context
= audit_context();
1731 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1732 audit_kill_trees(context
);
1734 if (!context
->dummy
&& context
->in_syscall
) {
1736 context
->return_valid
= AUDITSC_SUCCESS
;
1738 context
->return_valid
= AUDITSC_FAILURE
;
1741 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the
1742 * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the
1743 * arch specific signal handlers
1745 * This is actually a test for:
1746 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1747 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1749 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1751 if (unlikely(return_code
<= -ERESTARTSYS
) &&
1752 (return_code
>= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK
) &&
1753 (return_code
!= -ENOIOCTLCMD
))
1754 context
->return_code
= -EINTR
;
1756 context
->return_code
= return_code
;
1758 audit_filter_syscall(current
, context
,
1759 &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT
]);
1760 audit_filter_inodes(current
, context
);
1761 if (context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1765 context
->in_syscall
= 0;
1766 context
->prio
= context
->state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
1768 audit_free_module(context
);
1769 audit_free_names(context
);
1770 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
1771 audit_free_aux(context
);
1772 context
->aux
= NULL
;
1773 context
->aux_pids
= NULL
;
1774 context
->target_pid
= 0;
1775 lsmblob_init(&context
->target_lsm
, 0);
1776 context
->sockaddr_len
= 0;
1778 context
->fds
[0] = -1;
1779 if (context
->state
!= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
) {
1780 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
1781 context
->filterkey
= NULL
;
1785 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode
*inode
)
1787 struct audit_context
*context
;
1788 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1789 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1791 if (likely(!inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
))
1793 context
= audit_context();
1795 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1797 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1801 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
)))
1803 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context
))) {
1804 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1805 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1806 audit_put_chunk(chunk
);
1807 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1810 put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
);
1813 static void handle_path(const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1815 struct audit_context
*context
;
1816 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1817 const struct dentry
*d
, *parent
;
1818 struct audit_chunk
*drop
;
1822 context
= audit_context();
1824 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1829 seq
= read_seqbegin(&rename_lock
);
1831 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(d
);
1832 if (inode
&& unlikely(inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
)) {
1833 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1834 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1836 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
))) {
1842 parent
= d
->d_parent
;
1847 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock
, seq
) || drop
)) { /* in this order */
1850 /* just a race with rename */
1851 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1854 audit_put_chunk(drop
);
1855 if (grow_tree_refs(context
)) {
1856 /* OK, got more space */
1857 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1861 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1862 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1863 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1869 static struct audit_names
*audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context
*context
,
1872 struct audit_names
*aname
;
1874 if (context
->name_count
< AUDIT_NAMES
) {
1875 aname
= &context
->preallocated_names
[context
->name_count
];
1876 memset(aname
, 0, sizeof(*aname
));
1878 aname
= kzalloc(sizeof(*aname
), GFP_NOFS
);
1881 aname
->should_free
= true;
1884 aname
->ino
= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
;
1886 list_add_tail(&aname
->list
, &context
->names_list
);
1888 context
->name_count
++;
1889 if (!context
->pwd
.dentry
)
1890 get_fs_pwd(current
->fs
, &context
->pwd
);
1895 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1896 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1898 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1899 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1900 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1903 __audit_reusename(const __user
char *uptr
)
1905 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1906 struct audit_names
*n
;
1908 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1911 if (n
->name
->uptr
== uptr
) {
1920 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
1921 * @name: name to add
1923 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1924 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1926 void __audit_getname(struct filename
*name
)
1928 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1929 struct audit_names
*n
;
1931 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
1934 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
);
1939 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1944 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names
*name
,
1945 const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1947 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps
;
1953 rc
= get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry
, &caps
);
1957 name
->fcap
.permitted
= caps
.permitted
;
1958 name
->fcap
.inheritable
= caps
.inheritable
;
1959 name
->fcap
.fE
= !!(caps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
1960 name
->fcap
.rootid
= caps
.rootid
;
1961 name
->fcap_ver
= (caps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >>
1962 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
1967 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1968 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names
*name
,
1969 const struct dentry
*dentry
,
1970 struct inode
*inode
, unsigned int flags
)
1972 name
->ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1973 name
->dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_dev
;
1974 name
->mode
= inode
->i_mode
;
1975 name
->uid
= inode
->i_uid
;
1976 name
->gid
= inode
->i_gid
;
1977 name
->rdev
= inode
->i_rdev
;
1978 security_inode_getsecid(inode
, &name
->oblob
);
1979 if (flags
& AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL
) {
1980 name
->fcap_ver
= -1;
1983 audit_copy_fcaps(name
, dentry
);
1987 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1988 * @name: name being audited
1989 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1990 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1992 void __audit_inode(struct filename
*name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
,
1995 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
1996 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
1997 struct audit_names
*n
;
1998 bool parent
= flags
& AUDIT_INODE_PARENT
;
1999 struct audit_entry
*e
;
2000 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_FS
];
2003 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
2007 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
2008 for (i
= 0; i
< e
->rule
.field_count
; i
++) {
2009 struct audit_field
*f
= &e
->rule
.fields
[i
];
2011 if (f
->type
== AUDIT_FSTYPE
2012 && audit_comparator(inode
->i_sb
->s_magic
,
2014 && e
->rule
.action
== AUDIT_NEVER
) {
2026 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
2027 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
2032 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
||
2033 n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
2036 if (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
)
2041 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2043 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
2044 if (n
->ino
!= inode
->i_ino
||
2045 n
->dev
!= inode
->i_sb
->s_dev
)
2047 } else if (n
->name
) {
2048 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
2049 if (strcmp(n
->name
->name
, name
->name
))
2052 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
2055 /* match the correct record type */
2057 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
||
2058 n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
2061 if (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
)
2067 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2068 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
);
2078 n
->name_len
= n
->name
? parent_len(n
->name
->name
) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
2079 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
;
2080 if (flags
& AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN
)
2083 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
2084 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL
;
2086 handle_path(dentry
);
2087 audit_copy_inode(n
, dentry
, inode
, flags
& AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL
);
2090 void __audit_file(const struct file
*file
)
2092 __audit_inode(NULL
, file
->f_path
.dentry
, 0);
2096 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2097 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2098 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2099 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2101 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2102 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2103 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2104 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2105 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2106 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2107 * unsuccessful attempts.
2109 void __audit_inode_child(struct inode
*parent
,
2110 const struct dentry
*dentry
,
2111 const unsigned char type
)
2113 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2114 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
2115 const struct qstr
*dname
= &dentry
->d_name
;
2116 struct audit_names
*n
, *found_parent
= NULL
, *found_child
= NULL
;
2117 struct audit_entry
*e
;
2118 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_FS
];
2121 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
2125 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
2126 for (i
= 0; i
< e
->rule
.field_count
; i
++) {
2127 struct audit_field
*f
= &e
->rule
.fields
[i
];
2129 if (f
->type
== AUDIT_FSTYPE
2130 && audit_comparator(parent
->i_sb
->s_magic
,
2132 && e
->rule
.action
== AUDIT_NEVER
) {
2143 /* look for a parent entry first */
2144 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2146 (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
&&
2147 n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
))
2150 if (n
->ino
== parent
->i_ino
&& n
->dev
== parent
->i_sb
->s_dev
&&
2151 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
,
2152 n
->name
->name
, n
->name_len
)) {
2153 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
2154 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
;
2160 /* is there a matching child entry? */
2161 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2162 /* can only match entries that have a name */
2164 (n
->type
!= type
&& n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
))
2167 if (!strcmp(dname
->name
, n
->name
->name
) ||
2168 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
->name
,
2170 found_parent
->name_len
:
2172 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
2179 if (!found_parent
) {
2180 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2181 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
);
2184 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, parent
, 0);
2188 found_child
= audit_alloc_name(context
, type
);
2192 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2193 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2194 * audit_free_names() */
2196 found_child
->name
= found_parent
->name
;
2197 found_child
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
2198 found_child
->name
->refcnt
++;
2203 audit_copy_inode(found_child
, dentry
, inode
, 0);
2205 found_child
->ino
= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
;
2207 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child
);
2210 * audit_stamp_context - set the timestamp+serial in an audit context
2211 * @ctx: audit_context to set
2213 void audit_stamp_context(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
2215 /* ctx will be NULL unless lsm_multiple_contexts() is true */
2219 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx
->ctime
);
2220 ctx
->serial
= audit_serial();
2221 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
2225 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2226 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2227 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
2228 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2230 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2232 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
2233 struct timespec64
*t
, unsigned int *serial
)
2235 if (ctx
->serial
&& !ctx
->in_syscall
) {
2236 t
->tv_sec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_sec
;
2237 t
->tv_nsec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_nsec
;
2238 *serial
= ctx
->serial
;
2241 if (!ctx
->in_syscall
)
2244 ctx
->serial
= audit_serial();
2245 t
->tv_sec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_sec
;
2246 t
->tv_nsec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_nsec
;
2247 *serial
= ctx
->serial
;
2250 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
2256 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2259 * @attr: queue attributes
2262 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag
, umode_t mode
, struct mq_attr
*attr
)
2264 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2267 memcpy(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, attr
, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2269 memset(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2271 context
->mq_open
.oflag
= oflag
;
2272 context
->mq_open
.mode
= mode
;
2274 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
;
2278 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2279 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2280 * @msg_len: Message length
2281 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2282 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2285 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes
, size_t msg_len
, unsigned int msg_prio
,
2286 const struct timespec64
*abs_timeout
)
2288 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2289 struct timespec64
*p
= &context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
;
2292 memcpy(p
, abs_timeout
, sizeof(*p
));
2294 memset(p
, 0, sizeof(*p
));
2296 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2297 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
= msg_len
;
2298 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
= msg_prio
;
2300 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
;
2304 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2305 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2306 * @notification: Notification event
2310 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes
, const struct sigevent
*notification
)
2312 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2315 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= notification
->sigev_signo
;
2317 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= 0;
2319 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2320 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
;
2324 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2325 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2329 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes
, struct mq_attr
*mqstat
)
2331 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2332 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2333 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
= *mqstat
;
2334 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
;
2338 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2339 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2342 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
)
2344 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2345 context
->ipc
.uid
= ipcp
->uid
;
2346 context
->ipc
.gid
= ipcp
->gid
;
2347 context
->ipc
.mode
= ipcp
->mode
;
2348 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 0;
2349 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp
, &context
->ipc
.oblob
);
2350 context
->type
= AUDIT_IPC
;
2354 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2355 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2356 * @uid: msgq user id
2357 * @gid: msgq group id
2358 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2360 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2362 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
, umode_t mode
)
2364 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2366 context
->ipc
.qbytes
= qbytes
;
2367 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
= uid
;
2368 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
= gid
;
2369 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
= mode
;
2370 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 1;
2373 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2375 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2377 context
->type
= AUDIT_EXECVE
;
2378 context
->execve
.argc
= bprm
->argc
;
2383 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2384 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2388 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs
, unsigned long *args
)
2390 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2392 if (nargs
<= 0 || nargs
> AUDITSC_ARGS
|| !args
)
2394 context
->type
= AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
;
2395 context
->socketcall
.nargs
= nargs
;
2396 memcpy(context
->socketcall
.args
, args
, nargs
* sizeof(unsigned long));
2401 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2402 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2403 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2406 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1
, int fd2
)
2408 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2409 context
->fds
[0] = fd1
;
2410 context
->fds
[1] = fd2
;
2414 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2415 * @len: data length in user space
2416 * @a: data address in kernel space
2418 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2420 int __audit_sockaddr(int len
, void *a
)
2422 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2424 if (!context
->sockaddr
) {
2425 void *p
= kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2428 context
->sockaddr
= p
;
2431 context
->sockaddr_len
= len
;
2432 memcpy(context
->sockaddr
, a
, len
);
2436 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct
*t
)
2438 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2440 context
->target_pid
= task_tgid_nr(t
);
2441 context
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2442 context
->target_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2443 context
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2444 security_task_getsecid(t
, &context
->target_lsm
);
2445 memcpy(context
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2449 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2450 * @t: task being signaled
2452 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2453 * and uid that is doing that.
2455 int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct
*t
)
2457 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axp
;
2458 struct audit_context
*ctx
= audit_context();
2459 kuid_t t_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2461 if (!audit_signals
|| audit_dummy_context())
2464 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2465 * in audit_context */
2466 if (!ctx
->target_pid
) {
2467 ctx
->target_pid
= task_tgid_nr(t
);
2468 ctx
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2469 ctx
->target_uid
= t_uid
;
2470 ctx
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2471 security_task_getsecid(t
, &ctx
->target_lsm
);
2472 memcpy(ctx
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2476 axp
= (void *)ctx
->aux_pids
;
2477 if (!axp
|| axp
->pid_count
== AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
) {
2478 axp
= kzalloc(sizeof(*axp
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2482 axp
->d
.type
= AUDIT_OBJ_PID
;
2483 axp
->d
.next
= ctx
->aux_pids
;
2484 ctx
->aux_pids
= (void *)axp
;
2486 BUG_ON(axp
->pid_count
>= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
);
2488 axp
->target_pid
[axp
->pid_count
] = task_tgid_nr(t
);
2489 axp
->target_auid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2490 axp
->target_uid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t_uid
;
2491 axp
->target_sessionid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2492 security_task_getsecid(t
, &axp
->target_lsm
[axp
->pid_count
]);
2493 memcpy(axp
->target_comm
[axp
->pid_count
], t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2500 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2501 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2502 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2503 * @old: the old credentials
2505 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2506 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2510 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2511 const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2513 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*ax
;
2514 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2515 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps
;
2517 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2521 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
;
2522 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2523 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2525 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm
->file
->f_path
.dentry
, &vcaps
);
2527 ax
->fcap
.permitted
= vcaps
.permitted
;
2528 ax
->fcap
.inheritable
= vcaps
.inheritable
;
2529 ax
->fcap
.fE
= !!(vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
2530 ax
->fcap
.rootid
= vcaps
.rootid
;
2531 ax
->fcap_ver
= (vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
2533 ax
->old_pcap
.permitted
= old
->cap_permitted
;
2534 ax
->old_pcap
.inheritable
= old
->cap_inheritable
;
2535 ax
->old_pcap
.effective
= old
->cap_effective
;
2536 ax
->old_pcap
.ambient
= old
->cap_ambient
;
2538 ax
->new_pcap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2539 ax
->new_pcap
.inheritable
= new->cap_inheritable
;
2540 ax
->new_pcap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2541 ax
->new_pcap
.ambient
= new->cap_ambient
;
2546 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2547 * @new: the new credentials
2548 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2550 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2551 * audit system if applicable
2553 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2555 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2556 context
->capset
.pid
= task_tgid_nr(current
);
2557 context
->capset
.cap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2558 context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
= new->cap_effective
;
2559 context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2560 context
->capset
.cap
.ambient
= new->cap_ambient
;
2561 context
->type
= AUDIT_CAPSET
;
2564 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd
, int flags
)
2566 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2567 context
->mmap
.fd
= fd
;
2568 context
->mmap
.flags
= flags
;
2569 context
->type
= AUDIT_MMAP
;
2572 void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name
)
2574 struct audit_context
*context
= audit_context();
2576 context
->module
.name
= kstrdup(name
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2577 if (!context
->module
.name
)
2578 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2579 context
->type
= AUDIT_KERN_MODULE
;
2582 void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response
)
2584 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL
,
2585 AUDIT_FANOTIFY
, "resp=%u", response
);
2588 void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset
)
2590 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET
,
2591 "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
2592 (long long)offset
.tv_sec
, offset
.tv_nsec
);
2595 static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data
*ad
,
2596 const char *op
, enum audit_ntp_type type
)
2598 const struct audit_ntp_val
*val
= &ad
->vals
[type
];
2600 if (val
->newval
== val
->oldval
)
2603 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL
,
2604 "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op
, val
->oldval
, val
->newval
);
2607 void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data
*ad
)
2609 audit_log_ntp_val(ad
, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET
);
2610 audit_log_ntp_val(ad
, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ
);
2611 audit_log_ntp_val(ad
, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS
);
2612 audit_log_ntp_val(ad
, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI
);
2613 audit_log_ntp_val(ad
, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK
);
2614 audit_log_ntp_val(ad
, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST
);
2617 void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name
, u8 af
, unsigned int nentries
,
2618 enum audit_nfcfgop op
, gfp_t gfp
)
2620 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2621 char comm
[sizeof(current
->comm
)];
2623 ab
= audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp
, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG
);
2626 audit_log_format(ab
, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s",
2627 name
, af
, nentries
, audit_nfcfgs
[op
].s
);
2629 audit_log_format(ab
, " pid=%u", task_pid_nr(current
));
2630 audit_log_task_context(ab
, NULL
); /* subj= */
2631 audit_log_format(ab
, " comm=");
2632 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, get_task_comm(comm
, current
));
2635 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg
);
2637 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer
*ab
)
2641 unsigned int sessionid
;
2642 char comm
[sizeof(current
->comm
)];
2644 auid
= audit_get_loginuid(current
);
2645 sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
2646 current_uid_gid(&uid
, &gid
);
2648 audit_log_format(ab
, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2649 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, auid
),
2650 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, uid
),
2651 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, gid
),
2653 audit_log_task_context(ab
, NULL
);
2654 audit_log_format(ab
, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current
));
2655 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, get_task_comm(comm
, current
));
2656 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab
, current
->mm
);
2660 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2661 * @signr: signal value
2663 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2664 * should record the event for investigation.
2666 void audit_core_dumps(long signr
)
2668 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2673 if (signr
== SIGQUIT
) /* don't care for those */
2676 audit_stamp_context(audit_context());
2677 ab
= audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND
);
2681 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld res=1", signr
);
2682 audit_log_lsm(NULL
, true);
2687 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2688 * @syscall: syscall number
2689 * @signr: signal value
2690 * @code: the seccomp action
2692 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2693 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2694 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2695 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2696 * audit is not in use.
2698 void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall
, long signr
, int code
)
2700 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2702 ab
= audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SECCOMP
);
2706 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2707 signr
, syscall_get_arch(current
), syscall
,
2708 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current
), code
);
2712 void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names
, const char *old_names
,
2715 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2720 ab
= audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL
,
2721 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE
);
2725 audit_log_format(ab
,
2726 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
2727 names
, old_names
, res
);
2731 struct list_head
*audit_killed_trees(void)
2733 struct audit_context
*ctx
= audit_context();
2734 if (likely(!ctx
|| !ctx
->in_syscall
))
2736 return &ctx
->killed_trees
;