1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/export.h>
52 #include <linux/slab.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
70 #include <linux/compat.h>
74 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
75 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
76 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
77 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
79 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
80 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
82 /* number of audit rules */
85 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
88 struct audit_aux_data
{
89 struct audit_aux_data
*next
;
93 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
95 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
96 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
98 struct audit_aux_data_execve
{
99 struct audit_aux_data d
;
102 struct mm_struct
*mm
;
105 struct audit_aux_data_pids
{
106 struct audit_aux_data d
;
107 pid_t target_pid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
108 kuid_t target_auid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
109 kuid_t target_uid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
110 unsigned int target_sessionid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
111 u32 target_sid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
112 char target_comm
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
][TASK_COMM_LEN
];
116 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
{
117 struct audit_aux_data d
;
118 struct audit_cap_data fcap
;
119 unsigned int fcap_ver
;
120 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap
;
121 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap
;
124 struct audit_aux_data_capset
{
125 struct audit_aux_data d
;
127 struct audit_cap_data cap
;
130 struct audit_tree_refs
{
131 struct audit_tree_refs
*next
;
132 struct audit_chunk
*c
[31];
135 static inline int open_arg(int flags
, int mask
)
137 int n
= ACC_MODE(flags
);
138 if (flags
& (O_TRUNC
| O_CREAT
))
139 n
|= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
;
143 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int mask
)
150 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx
->arch
, n
)) {
152 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
153 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE
, n
))
155 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
156 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ
, n
))
158 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
159 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR
, n
))
162 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
163 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
164 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32
, n
))
166 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
167 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32
, n
))
169 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
170 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32
, n
))
174 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[1]);
176 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[2]);
177 case 4: /* socketcall */
178 return ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) && ctx
->argv
[0] == SYS_BIND
);
180 return mask
& AUDIT_PERM_EXEC
;
186 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int val
)
188 struct audit_names
*n
;
189 umode_t mode
= (umode_t
)val
;
194 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
195 if ((n
->ino
!= -1) &&
196 ((n
->mode
& S_IFMT
) == mode
))
204 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
205 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
206 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
207 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
208 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
209 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
210 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
213 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
214 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
218 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
222 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_chunk
*chunk
)
224 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
225 int left
= ctx
->tree_count
;
227 p
->c
[--left
] = chunk
;
228 ctx
->tree_count
= left
;
237 ctx
->tree_count
= 30;
243 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
245 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
246 ctx
->trees
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs
), GFP_KERNEL
);
252 p
->next
= ctx
->trees
;
254 ctx
->first_trees
= ctx
->trees
;
255 ctx
->tree_count
= 31;
260 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
261 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, int count
)
263 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
264 struct audit_tree_refs
*q
;
267 /* we started with empty chain */
268 p
= ctx
->first_trees
;
270 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
275 for (q
= p
; q
!= ctx
->trees
; q
= q
->next
, n
= 31) {
277 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
281 while (n
-- > ctx
->tree_count
) {
282 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
286 ctx
->tree_count
= count
;
290 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
292 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, *q
;
293 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
; p
= q
) {
299 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_tree
*tree
)
301 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
302 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
307 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
!= ctx
->trees
; p
= p
->next
) {
308 for (n
= 0; n
< 31; n
++)
309 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
314 for (n
= ctx
->tree_count
; n
< 31; n
++)
315 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
322 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid
,
323 struct audit_names
*name
,
324 struct audit_field
*f
,
325 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
327 struct audit_names
*n
;
331 rc
= audit_uid_comparator(uid
, f
->op
, name
->uid
);
337 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
338 rc
= audit_uid_comparator(uid
, f
->op
, n
->uid
);
346 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid
,
347 struct audit_names
*name
,
348 struct audit_field
*f
,
349 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
351 struct audit_names
*n
;
355 rc
= audit_gid_comparator(gid
, f
->op
, name
->gid
);
361 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
362 rc
= audit_gid_comparator(gid
, f
->op
, n
->gid
);
370 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
371 const struct cred
*cred
,
372 struct audit_field
*f
,
373 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
374 struct audit_names
*name
)
377 /* process to file object comparisons */
378 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
379 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->uid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
380 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
381 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->gid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
382 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
383 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->euid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
384 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
385 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->egid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
386 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
387 return audit_compare_uid(tsk
->loginuid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
389 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->suid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
390 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
391 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->sgid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
392 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
393 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->fsuid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
394 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
395 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->fsgid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
396 /* uid comparisons */
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID
:
398 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, tsk
->loginuid
);
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID
:
400 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->euid
);
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID
:
402 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID
:
404 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
405 /* auid comparisons */
406 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID
:
407 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, cred
->euid
);
408 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID
:
409 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
410 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID
:
411 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
412 /* euid comparisons */
413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID
:
414 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
415 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID
:
416 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
417 /* suid comparisons */
418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID
:
419 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
420 /* gid comparisons */
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID
:
422 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->egid
);
423 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID
:
424 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->sgid
);
425 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID
:
426 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
427 /* egid comparisons */
428 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID
:
429 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, cred
->sgid
);
430 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID
:
431 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
432 /* sgid comparison */
433 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID
:
434 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
436 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
442 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
443 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
446 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
447 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
448 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
450 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
451 struct audit_krule
*rule
,
452 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
453 struct audit_names
*name
,
454 enum audit_state
*state
,
457 const struct cred
*cred
;
461 cred
= rcu_dereference_check(tsk
->cred
, tsk
== current
|| task_creation
);
463 for (i
= 0; i
< rule
->field_count
; i
++) {
464 struct audit_field
*f
= &rule
->fields
[i
];
465 struct audit_names
*n
;
470 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->pid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
475 ctx
->ppid
= sys_getppid();
476 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->ppid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
480 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
483 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
486 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
489 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->fsuid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
492 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
493 if (f
->op
== Audit_equal
) {
495 result
= in_group_p(f
->gid
);
496 } else if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
) {
498 result
= !in_group_p(f
->gid
);
502 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
503 if (f
->op
== Audit_equal
) {
505 result
= in_egroup_p(f
->gid
);
506 } else if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
) {
508 result
= !in_egroup_p(f
->gid
);
512 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
515 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->fsgid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
518 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->personality
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
522 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->arch
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
526 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
)
527 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_code
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
530 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
) {
532 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_SUCCESS
);
534 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_FAILURE
);
539 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
540 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
543 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
544 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
545 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
554 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
555 audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
558 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
559 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
560 audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
569 result
= (name
->ino
== f
->val
);
571 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
572 if (audit_comparator(n
->ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
581 result
= audit_uid_comparator(name
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
583 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
584 if (audit_uid_comparator(n
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
)) {
593 result
= audit_gid_comparator(name
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
595 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
596 if (audit_gid_comparator(n
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
)) {
605 result
= audit_watch_compare(rule
->watch
, name
->ino
, name
->dev
);
609 result
= match_tree_refs(ctx
, rule
->tree
);
614 result
= audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
616 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET
:
617 result
= audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk
), f
->op
, f
->val
);
619 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
620 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
621 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
624 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
625 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
626 match for now to avoid losing information that
627 may be wanted. An error message will also be
631 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &sid
);
634 result
= security_audit_rule_match(sid
, f
->type
,
643 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
644 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
645 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
648 /* Find files that match */
650 result
= security_audit_rule_match(
651 name
->osid
, f
->type
, f
->op
,
654 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
655 if (security_audit_rule_match(n
->osid
, f
->type
,
663 /* Find ipc objects that match */
664 if (!ctx
|| ctx
->type
!= AUDIT_IPC
)
666 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx
->ipc
.osid
,
677 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->argv
[f
->type
-AUDIT_ARG0
], f
->op
, f
->val
);
679 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY
:
680 /* ignore this field for filtering */
684 result
= audit_match_perm(ctx
, f
->val
);
687 result
= audit_match_filetype(ctx
, f
->val
);
689 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE
:
690 result
= audit_field_compare(tsk
, cred
, f
, ctx
, name
);
698 if (rule
->prio
<= ctx
->prio
)
700 if (rule
->filterkey
) {
701 kfree(ctx
->filterkey
);
702 ctx
->filterkey
= kstrdup(rule
->filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
704 ctx
->prio
= rule
->prio
;
706 switch (rule
->action
) {
707 case AUDIT_NEVER
: *state
= AUDIT_DISABLED
; break;
708 case AUDIT_ALWAYS
: *state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
; break;
713 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
714 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
715 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
717 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_task(struct task_struct
*tsk
, char **key
)
719 struct audit_entry
*e
;
720 enum audit_state state
;
723 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK
], list
) {
724 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, NULL
, NULL
,
726 if (state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
727 *key
= kstrdup(e
->rule
.filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
733 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
736 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
737 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
738 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
739 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
741 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
742 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
743 struct list_head
*list
)
745 struct audit_entry
*e
;
746 enum audit_state state
;
748 if (audit_pid
&& tsk
->tgid
== audit_pid
)
749 return AUDIT_DISABLED
;
752 if (!list_empty(list
)) {
753 int word
= AUDIT_WORD(ctx
->major
);
754 int bit
= AUDIT_BIT(ctx
->major
);
756 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
757 if ((e
->rule
.mask
[word
] & bit
) == bit
&&
758 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, NULL
,
761 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
767 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
771 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
772 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
774 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
775 struct audit_names
*n
,
776 struct audit_context
*ctx
) {
778 int h
= audit_hash_ino((u32
)n
->ino
);
779 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_inode_hash
[h
];
780 struct audit_entry
*e
;
781 enum audit_state state
;
783 word
= AUDIT_WORD(ctx
->major
);
784 bit
= AUDIT_BIT(ctx
->major
);
786 if (list_empty(list
))
789 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
790 if ((e
->rule
.mask
[word
] & bit
) == bit
&&
791 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, n
, &state
, false)) {
792 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
800 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
801 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
802 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
803 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
805 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct
*tsk
, struct audit_context
*ctx
)
807 struct audit_names
*n
;
809 if (audit_pid
&& tsk
->tgid
== audit_pid
)
814 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
815 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk
, n
, ctx
))
821 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_get_context(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
825 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
829 context
->return_valid
= return_valid
;
832 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
833 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
836 * This is actually a test for:
837 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
838 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
840 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
842 if (unlikely(return_code
<= -ERESTARTSYS
) &&
843 (return_code
>= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK
) &&
844 (return_code
!= -ENOIOCTLCMD
))
845 context
->return_code
= -EINTR
;
847 context
->return_code
= return_code
;
849 if (context
->in_syscall
&& !context
->dummy
) {
850 audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT
]);
851 audit_filter_inodes(tsk
, context
);
854 tsk
->audit_context
= NULL
;
858 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context
*context
)
860 struct audit_names
*n
, *next
;
863 if (context
->put_count
+ context
->ino_count
!= context
->name_count
) {
866 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
867 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
868 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
870 context
->serial
, context
->major
, context
->in_syscall
,
871 context
->name_count
, context
->put_count
,
873 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
874 printk(KERN_ERR
"names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i
++,
875 n
->name
, n
->name
->name
?: "(null)");
882 context
->put_count
= 0;
883 context
->ino_count
= 0;
886 list_for_each_entry_safe(n
, next
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
888 if (n
->name
&& n
->name_put
)
889 final_putname(n
->name
);
893 context
->name_count
= 0;
894 path_put(&context
->pwd
);
895 context
->pwd
.dentry
= NULL
;
896 context
->pwd
.mnt
= NULL
;
899 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context
*context
)
901 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
903 while ((aux
= context
->aux
)) {
904 context
->aux
= aux
->next
;
907 while ((aux
= context
->aux_pids
)) {
908 context
->aux_pids
= aux
->next
;
913 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state
)
915 struct audit_context
*context
;
917 context
= kzalloc(sizeof(*context
), GFP_KERNEL
);
920 context
->state
= state
;
921 context
->prio
= state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
922 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->killed_trees
);
923 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->names_list
);
928 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
931 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
932 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
933 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
936 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
938 struct audit_context
*context
;
939 enum audit_state state
;
942 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled
))
943 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
945 state
= audit_filter_task(tsk
, &key
);
946 if (state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
) {
947 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk
, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
951 if (!(context
= audit_alloc_context(state
))) {
953 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
956 context
->filterkey
= key
;
958 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
959 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk
, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
963 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context
*context
)
965 audit_free_names(context
);
966 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
967 free_tree_refs(context
);
968 audit_free_aux(context
);
969 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
970 kfree(context
->sockaddr
);
974 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context
*context
, pid_t pid
,
975 kuid_t auid
, kuid_t uid
, unsigned int sessionid
,
978 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
983 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_OBJ_PID
);
987 audit_log_format(ab
, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid
,
988 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, auid
),
989 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, uid
), sessionid
);
991 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
992 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=(none)");
995 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
996 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
999 audit_log_format(ab
, " ocomm=");
1000 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, comm
);
1007 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1008 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1009 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1011 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1012 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1013 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1014 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1015 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1017 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context
*context
,
1018 struct audit_buffer
**ab
,
1021 const char __user
*p
,
1024 char arg_num_len_buf
[12];
1025 const char __user
*tmp_p
= p
;
1026 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1027 size_t arg_num_len
= snprintf(arg_num_len_buf
, 12, "%d", arg_num
) + 5;
1028 size_t len
, len_left
, to_send
;
1029 size_t max_execve_audit_len
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1030 unsigned int i
, has_cntl
= 0, too_long
= 0;
1033 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1034 len_left
= len
= strnlen_user(p
, MAX_ARG_STRLEN
) - 1;
1037 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1038 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1039 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1042 if (unlikely((len
== -1) || len
> MAX_ARG_STRLEN
- 1)) {
1044 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1048 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1050 if (len_left
> MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
)
1051 to_send
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1054 ret
= copy_from_user(buf
, tmp_p
, to_send
);
1056 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1057 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1062 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1065 buf
[to_send
] = '\0';
1066 has_cntl
= audit_string_contains_control(buf
, to_send
);
1069 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1070 * send half as much in each message
1072 max_execve_audit_len
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
/ 2;
1075 len_left
-= to_send
;
1077 } while (len_left
> 0);
1081 if (len
> max_execve_audit_len
)
1084 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1085 for (i
= 0; len_left
> 0; i
++) {
1088 if (len_left
> max_execve_audit_len
)
1089 to_send
= max_execve_audit_len
;
1093 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1094 room_left
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
- arg_num_len
- *len_sent
;
1096 room_left
-= (to_send
* 2);
1098 room_left
-= to_send
;
1099 if (room_left
< 0) {
1102 *ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EXECVE
);
1108 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1109 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1111 if ((i
== 0) && (too_long
))
1112 audit_log_format(*ab
, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num
,
1113 has_cntl
? 2*len
: len
);
1116 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1117 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1118 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1120 if (len
>= max_execve_audit_len
)
1121 ret
= copy_from_user(buf
, p
, to_send
);
1126 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1129 buf
[to_send
] = '\0';
1131 /* actually log it */
1132 audit_log_format(*ab
, " a%d", arg_num
);
1134 audit_log_format(*ab
, "[%d]", i
);
1135 audit_log_format(*ab
, "=");
1137 audit_log_n_hex(*ab
, buf
, to_send
);
1139 audit_log_string(*ab
, buf
);
1142 len_left
-= to_send
;
1143 *len_sent
+= arg_num_len
;
1145 *len_sent
+= to_send
* 2;
1147 *len_sent
+= to_send
;
1149 /* include the null we didn't log */
1153 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context
*context
,
1154 struct audit_buffer
**ab
,
1155 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*axi
)
1158 size_t len_sent
= 0;
1159 const char __user
*p
;
1162 if (axi
->mm
!= current
->mm
)
1163 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1165 p
= (const char __user
*)axi
->mm
->arg_start
;
1167 audit_log_format(*ab
, "argc=%d", axi
->argc
);
1170 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1171 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1172 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1173 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1175 buf
= kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
+ 1, GFP_KERNEL
);
1177 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1181 for (i
= 0; i
< axi
->argc
; i
++) {
1182 len
= audit_log_single_execve_arg(context
, ab
, i
,
1191 static void show_special(struct audit_context
*context
, int *call_panic
)
1193 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1196 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, context
->type
);
1200 switch (context
->type
) {
1201 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
: {
1202 int nargs
= context
->socketcall
.nargs
;
1203 audit_log_format(ab
, "nargs=%d", nargs
);
1204 for (i
= 0; i
< nargs
; i
++)
1205 audit_log_format(ab
, " a%d=%lx", i
,
1206 context
->socketcall
.args
[i
]);
1209 u32 osid
= context
->ipc
.osid
;
1211 audit_log_format(ab
, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1212 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, context
->ipc
.uid
),
1213 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, context
->ipc
.gid
),
1218 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1219 audit_log_format(ab
, " osid=%u", osid
);
1222 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1223 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1226 if (context
->ipc
.has_perm
) {
1228 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
,
1229 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM
);
1232 audit_log_format(ab
,
1233 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1234 context
->ipc
.qbytes
,
1235 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
,
1236 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
,
1237 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
);
1240 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
: {
1241 audit_log_format(ab
,
1242 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1243 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1244 context
->mq_open
.oflag
, context
->mq_open
.mode
,
1245 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_flags
,
1246 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_maxmsg
,
1247 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_msgsize
,
1248 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_curmsgs
);
1250 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
: {
1251 audit_log_format(ab
,
1252 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1253 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1254 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
,
1255 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
,
1256 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
,
1257 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_sec
,
1258 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_nsec
);
1260 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
: {
1261 audit_log_format(ab
, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1262 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
,
1263 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
);
1265 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
: {
1266 struct mq_attr
*attr
= &context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
;
1267 audit_log_format(ab
,
1268 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1270 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
,
1271 attr
->mq_flags
, attr
->mq_maxmsg
,
1272 attr
->mq_msgsize
, attr
->mq_curmsgs
);
1274 case AUDIT_CAPSET
: {
1275 audit_log_format(ab
, "pid=%d", context
->capset
.pid
);
1276 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pi", &context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
);
1277 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pp", &context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
);
1278 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pe", &context
->capset
.cap
.effective
);
1281 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context
->mmap
.fd
,
1282 context
->mmap
.flags
);
1288 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context
*context
, struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1290 int i
, call_panic
= 0;
1291 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1292 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
1293 struct audit_names
*n
;
1295 /* tsk == current */
1296 context
->personality
= tsk
->personality
;
1298 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SYSCALL
);
1300 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1301 audit_log_format(ab
, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1302 context
->arch
, context
->major
);
1303 if (context
->personality
!= PER_LINUX
)
1304 audit_log_format(ab
, " per=%lx", context
->personality
);
1305 if (context
->return_valid
)
1306 audit_log_format(ab
, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1307 (context
->return_valid
==AUDITSC_SUCCESS
)?"yes":"no",
1308 context
->return_code
);
1310 audit_log_format(ab
,
1311 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1316 context
->name_count
);
1318 audit_log_task_info(ab
, tsk
);
1319 audit_log_key(ab
, context
->filterkey
);
1322 for (aux
= context
->aux
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1324 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, aux
->type
);
1326 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1328 switch (aux
->type
) {
1330 case AUDIT_EXECVE
: {
1331 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*axi
= (void *)aux
;
1332 audit_log_execve_info(context
, &ab
, axi
);
1335 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
: {
1336 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1337 audit_log_format(ab
, "fver=%x", axs
->fcap_ver
);
1338 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fp", &axs
->fcap
.permitted
);
1339 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fi", &axs
->fcap
.inheritable
);
1340 audit_log_format(ab
, " fe=%d", axs
->fcap
.fE
);
1341 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pp", &axs
->old_pcap
.permitted
);
1342 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pi", &axs
->old_pcap
.inheritable
);
1343 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pe", &axs
->old_pcap
.effective
);
1344 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pp", &axs
->new_pcap
.permitted
);
1345 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pi", &axs
->new_pcap
.inheritable
);
1346 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pe", &axs
->new_pcap
.effective
);
1354 show_special(context
, &call_panic
);
1356 if (context
->fds
[0] >= 0) {
1357 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_FD_PAIR
);
1359 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1360 context
->fds
[0], context
->fds
[1]);
1365 if (context
->sockaddr_len
) {
1366 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SOCKADDR
);
1368 audit_log_format(ab
, "saddr=");
1369 audit_log_n_hex(ab
, (void *)context
->sockaddr
,
1370 context
->sockaddr_len
);
1375 for (aux
= context
->aux_pids
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1376 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1378 for (i
= 0; i
< axs
->pid_count
; i
++)
1379 if (audit_log_pid_context(context
, axs
->target_pid
[i
],
1380 axs
->target_auid
[i
],
1382 axs
->target_sessionid
[i
],
1384 axs
->target_comm
[i
]))
1388 if (context
->target_pid
&&
1389 audit_log_pid_context(context
, context
->target_pid
,
1390 context
->target_auid
, context
->target_uid
,
1391 context
->target_sessionid
,
1392 context
->target_sid
, context
->target_comm
))
1395 if (context
->pwd
.dentry
&& context
->pwd
.mnt
) {
1396 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_CWD
);
1398 audit_log_d_path(ab
, " cwd=", &context
->pwd
);
1404 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1407 audit_log_name(context
, n
, NULL
, i
++, &call_panic
);
1410 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1411 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EOE
);
1415 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1419 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1420 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1422 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1424 void __audit_free(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1426 struct audit_context
*context
;
1428 context
= audit_get_context(tsk
, 0, 0);
1432 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1433 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1434 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1435 * in the context of the idle thread */
1436 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1437 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1438 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1439 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1440 audit_kill_trees(&context
->killed_trees
);
1442 audit_free_context(context
);
1446 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1447 * @arch: architecture type
1448 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1449 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1450 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1451 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1452 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1454 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1455 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1456 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1457 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1458 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1459 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1462 void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch
, int major
,
1463 unsigned long a1
, unsigned long a2
,
1464 unsigned long a3
, unsigned long a4
)
1466 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1467 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
1468 enum audit_state state
;
1473 BUG_ON(context
->in_syscall
|| context
->name_count
);
1478 context
->arch
= arch
;
1479 context
->major
= major
;
1480 context
->argv
[0] = a1
;
1481 context
->argv
[1] = a2
;
1482 context
->argv
[2] = a3
;
1483 context
->argv
[3] = a4
;
1485 state
= context
->state
;
1486 context
->dummy
= !audit_n_rules
;
1487 if (!context
->dummy
&& state
== AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
) {
1489 state
= audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY
]);
1491 if (state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
)
1494 context
->serial
= 0;
1495 context
->ctime
= CURRENT_TIME
;
1496 context
->in_syscall
= 1;
1497 context
->current_state
= state
;
1502 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1503 * @success: success value of the syscall
1504 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1506 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1507 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1508 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1509 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1510 * free the names stored from getname().
1512 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success
, long return_code
)
1514 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1515 struct audit_context
*context
;
1518 success
= AUDITSC_SUCCESS
;
1520 success
= AUDITSC_FAILURE
;
1522 context
= audit_get_context(tsk
, success
, return_code
);
1526 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1527 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1529 context
->in_syscall
= 0;
1530 context
->prio
= context
->state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
1532 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1533 audit_kill_trees(&context
->killed_trees
);
1535 audit_free_names(context
);
1536 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
1537 audit_free_aux(context
);
1538 context
->aux
= NULL
;
1539 context
->aux_pids
= NULL
;
1540 context
->target_pid
= 0;
1541 context
->target_sid
= 0;
1542 context
->sockaddr_len
= 0;
1544 context
->fds
[0] = -1;
1545 if (context
->state
!= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
) {
1546 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
1547 context
->filterkey
= NULL
;
1549 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
1552 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode
*inode
)
1554 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1555 struct audit_context
*context
;
1556 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1557 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1559 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
)))
1561 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1563 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1565 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1569 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
)))
1571 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context
))) {
1572 printk(KERN_WARNING
"out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1573 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1574 audit_put_chunk(chunk
);
1575 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1578 put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
);
1582 static void handle_path(const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1584 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1585 struct audit_context
*context
;
1586 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1587 const struct dentry
*d
, *parent
;
1588 struct audit_chunk
*drop
;
1592 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1594 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1599 seq
= read_seqbegin(&rename_lock
);
1601 struct inode
*inode
= d
->d_inode
;
1602 if (inode
&& unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
))) {
1603 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1604 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1606 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
))) {
1612 parent
= d
->d_parent
;
1617 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock
, seq
) || drop
)) { /* in this order */
1620 /* just a race with rename */
1621 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1624 audit_put_chunk(drop
);
1625 if (grow_tree_refs(context
)) {
1626 /* OK, got more space */
1627 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1632 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1633 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1634 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1641 static struct audit_names
*audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context
*context
,
1644 struct audit_names
*aname
;
1646 if (context
->name_count
< AUDIT_NAMES
) {
1647 aname
= &context
->preallocated_names
[context
->name_count
];
1648 memset(aname
, 0, sizeof(*aname
));
1650 aname
= kzalloc(sizeof(*aname
), GFP_NOFS
);
1653 aname
->should_free
= true;
1656 aname
->ino
= (unsigned long)-1;
1658 list_add_tail(&aname
->list
, &context
->names_list
);
1660 context
->name_count
++;
1662 context
->ino_count
++;
1668 * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1669 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1671 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1672 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1673 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1676 __audit_reusename(const __user
char *uptr
)
1678 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1679 struct audit_names
*n
;
1681 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1684 if (n
->name
->uptr
== uptr
)
1691 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1692 * @name: name to add
1694 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1695 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1697 void __audit_getname(struct filename
*name
)
1699 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1700 struct audit_names
*n
;
1702 if (!context
->in_syscall
) {
1703 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1704 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1705 __FILE__
, __LINE__
, context
->serial
, name
);
1712 /* The filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
1713 BUG_ON(!name
->name
);
1716 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
);
1721 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1725 if (!context
->pwd
.dentry
)
1726 get_fs_pwd(current
->fs
, &context
->pwd
);
1729 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1730 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1732 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1733 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1734 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1736 void audit_putname(struct filename
*name
)
1738 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1741 if (!context
->in_syscall
) {
1742 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1743 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): final_putname(%p)\n",
1744 __FILE__
, __LINE__
, context
->serial
, name
);
1745 if (context
->name_count
) {
1746 struct audit_names
*n
;
1749 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
)
1750 printk(KERN_ERR
"name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i
++,
1751 n
->name
, n
->name
->name
?: "(null)");
1754 final_putname(name
);
1758 ++context
->put_count
;
1759 if (context
->put_count
> context
->name_count
) {
1760 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1761 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1764 context
->serial
, context
->major
,
1765 context
->in_syscall
, name
->name
,
1766 context
->name_count
, context
->put_count
);
1774 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1775 * @name: name being audited
1776 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1777 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1779 void __audit_inode(struct filename
*name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
,
1782 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1783 const struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1784 struct audit_names
*n
;
1785 bool parent
= flags
& AUDIT_INODE_PARENT
;
1787 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
1794 /* The struct filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
1795 BUG_ON(!name
->name
);
1798 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1799 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1804 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
||
1805 n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
1808 if (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
)
1813 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1814 /* does the name pointer match? */
1815 if (!n
->name
|| n
->name
->name
!= name
->name
)
1818 /* match the correct record type */
1820 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
||
1821 n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
1824 if (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
)
1830 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname(). Allocate a new
1833 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL
);
1838 n
->name_len
= n
->name
? parent_len(n
->name
->name
) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1839 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
;
1840 if (flags
& AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN
)
1843 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1844 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL
;
1846 handle_path(dentry
);
1847 audit_copy_inode(n
, dentry
, inode
);
1851 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1852 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1853 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1854 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
1856 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1857 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1858 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1859 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1860 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1861 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1862 * unsuccessful attempts.
1864 void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode
*parent
,
1865 const struct dentry
*dentry
,
1866 const unsigned char type
)
1868 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1869 const struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1870 const char *dname
= dentry
->d_name
.name
;
1871 struct audit_names
*n
, *found_parent
= NULL
, *found_child
= NULL
;
1873 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
1879 /* look for a parent entry first */
1880 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1881 if (!n
->name
|| n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
)
1884 if (n
->ino
== parent
->i_ino
&&
1885 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
->name
, n
->name_len
)) {
1891 /* is there a matching child entry? */
1892 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1893 /* can only match entries that have a name */
1894 if (!n
->name
|| n
->type
!= type
)
1897 /* if we found a parent, make sure this one is a child of it */
1898 if (found_parent
&& (n
->name
!= found_parent
->name
))
1901 if (!strcmp(dname
, n
->name
->name
) ||
1902 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
->name
,
1904 found_parent
->name_len
:
1911 if (!found_parent
) {
1912 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
1913 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
);
1916 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, parent
);
1920 found_child
= audit_alloc_name(context
, type
);
1924 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1925 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1926 * audit_free_names() */
1928 found_child
->name
= found_parent
->name
;
1929 found_child
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1930 /* don't call __putname() */
1931 found_child
->name_put
= false;
1935 audit_copy_inode(found_child
, dentry
, inode
);
1937 found_child
->ino
= (unsigned long)-1;
1939 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child
);
1942 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1943 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1944 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1945 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1947 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1949 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
1950 struct timespec
*t
, unsigned int *serial
)
1952 if (!ctx
->in_syscall
)
1955 ctx
->serial
= audit_serial();
1956 t
->tv_sec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_sec
;
1957 t
->tv_nsec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_nsec
;
1958 *serial
= ctx
->serial
;
1961 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
1966 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1967 static atomic_t session_id
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1969 static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid
)
1971 /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
1972 if (!audit_loginuid_set(current
))
1974 /* it is set, you need permission */
1975 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL
))
1977 /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
1978 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID
) && uid_valid(loginuid
))
1983 static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid
, kuid_t kloginuid
,
1984 unsigned int oldsessionid
, unsigned int sessionid
,
1987 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1988 uid_t uid
, ologinuid
, nloginuid
;
1990 uid
= from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, task_uid(current
));
1991 ologinuid
= from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, koldloginuid
);
1992 nloginuid
= from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, kloginuid
),
1994 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_LOGIN
);
1997 audit_log_format(ab
, "pid=%d uid=%u old auid=%u new auid=%u old "
1998 "ses=%u new ses=%u res=%d", current
->pid
, uid
, ologinuid
,
1999 nloginuid
, oldsessionid
, sessionid
, !rc
);
2004 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2005 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2009 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2011 int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid
)
2013 struct task_struct
*task
= current
;
2014 unsigned int sessionid
= -1;
2015 kuid_t oldloginuid
, oldsessionid
;
2018 oldloginuid
= audit_get_loginuid(current
);
2019 oldsessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
2021 rc
= audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid
);
2025 /* are we setting or clearing? */
2026 if (uid_valid(loginuid
))
2027 sessionid
= atomic_inc_return(&session_id
);
2029 task
->sessionid
= sessionid
;
2030 task
->loginuid
= loginuid
;
2032 audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid
, loginuid
, oldsessionid
, sessionid
, rc
);
2037 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2040 * @attr: queue attributes
2043 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag
, umode_t mode
, struct mq_attr
*attr
)
2045 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2048 memcpy(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, attr
, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2050 memset(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2052 context
->mq_open
.oflag
= oflag
;
2053 context
->mq_open
.mode
= mode
;
2055 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
;
2059 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2060 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2061 * @msg_len: Message length
2062 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2063 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2066 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes
, size_t msg_len
, unsigned int msg_prio
,
2067 const struct timespec
*abs_timeout
)
2069 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2070 struct timespec
*p
= &context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
;
2073 memcpy(p
, abs_timeout
, sizeof(struct timespec
));
2075 memset(p
, 0, sizeof(struct timespec
));
2077 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2078 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
= msg_len
;
2079 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
= msg_prio
;
2081 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
;
2085 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2086 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2087 * @notification: Notification event
2091 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes
, const struct sigevent
*notification
)
2093 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2096 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= notification
->sigev_signo
;
2098 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= 0;
2100 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2101 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
;
2105 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2106 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2110 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes
, struct mq_attr
*mqstat
)
2112 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2113 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2114 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
= *mqstat
;
2115 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
;
2119 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2120 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2123 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
)
2125 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2126 context
->ipc
.uid
= ipcp
->uid
;
2127 context
->ipc
.gid
= ipcp
->gid
;
2128 context
->ipc
.mode
= ipcp
->mode
;
2129 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 0;
2130 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp
, &context
->ipc
.osid
);
2131 context
->type
= AUDIT_IPC
;
2135 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2136 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2137 * @uid: msgq user id
2138 * @gid: msgq group id
2139 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2141 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2143 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
, umode_t mode
)
2145 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2147 context
->ipc
.qbytes
= qbytes
;
2148 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
= uid
;
2149 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
= gid
;
2150 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
= mode
;
2151 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 1;
2154 int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2156 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*ax
;
2157 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2159 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2163 ax
->argc
= bprm
->argc
;
2164 ax
->envc
= bprm
->envc
;
2166 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_EXECVE
;
2167 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2168 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2174 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2175 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2179 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs
, unsigned long *args
)
2181 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2183 if (nargs
<= 0 || nargs
> AUDITSC_ARGS
|| !args
)
2185 context
->type
= AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
;
2186 context
->socketcall
.nargs
= nargs
;
2187 memcpy(context
->socketcall
.args
, args
, nargs
* sizeof(unsigned long));
2192 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2193 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2194 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2197 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1
, int fd2
)
2199 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2200 context
->fds
[0] = fd1
;
2201 context
->fds
[1] = fd2
;
2205 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2206 * @len: data length in user space
2207 * @a: data address in kernel space
2209 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2211 int __audit_sockaddr(int len
, void *a
)
2213 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2215 if (!context
->sockaddr
) {
2216 void *p
= kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2219 context
->sockaddr
= p
;
2222 context
->sockaddr_len
= len
;
2223 memcpy(context
->sockaddr
, a
, len
);
2227 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct
*t
)
2229 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2231 context
->target_pid
= t
->pid
;
2232 context
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2233 context
->target_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2234 context
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2235 security_task_getsecid(t
, &context
->target_sid
);
2236 memcpy(context
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2240 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2241 * @sig: signal value
2242 * @t: task being signaled
2244 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2245 * and uid that is doing that.
2247 int __audit_signal_info(int sig
, struct task_struct
*t
)
2249 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axp
;
2250 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
2251 struct audit_context
*ctx
= tsk
->audit_context
;
2252 kuid_t uid
= current_uid(), t_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2254 if (audit_pid
&& t
->tgid
== audit_pid
) {
2255 if (sig
== SIGTERM
|| sig
== SIGHUP
|| sig
== SIGUSR1
|| sig
== SIGUSR2
) {
2256 audit_sig_pid
= tsk
->pid
;
2257 if (uid_valid(tsk
->loginuid
))
2258 audit_sig_uid
= tsk
->loginuid
;
2260 audit_sig_uid
= uid
;
2261 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &audit_sig_sid
);
2263 if (!audit_signals
|| audit_dummy_context())
2267 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2268 * in audit_context */
2269 if (!ctx
->target_pid
) {
2270 ctx
->target_pid
= t
->tgid
;
2271 ctx
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2272 ctx
->target_uid
= t_uid
;
2273 ctx
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2274 security_task_getsecid(t
, &ctx
->target_sid
);
2275 memcpy(ctx
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2279 axp
= (void *)ctx
->aux_pids
;
2280 if (!axp
|| axp
->pid_count
== AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
) {
2281 axp
= kzalloc(sizeof(*axp
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2285 axp
->d
.type
= AUDIT_OBJ_PID
;
2286 axp
->d
.next
= ctx
->aux_pids
;
2287 ctx
->aux_pids
= (void *)axp
;
2289 BUG_ON(axp
->pid_count
>= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
);
2291 axp
->target_pid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t
->tgid
;
2292 axp
->target_auid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2293 axp
->target_uid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t_uid
;
2294 axp
->target_sessionid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2295 security_task_getsecid(t
, &axp
->target_sid
[axp
->pid_count
]);
2296 memcpy(axp
->target_comm
[axp
->pid_count
], t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2303 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2304 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2305 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2306 * @old: the old credentials
2308 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2309 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2313 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2314 const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2316 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*ax
;
2317 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2318 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps
;
2319 struct dentry
*dentry
;
2321 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2325 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
;
2326 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2327 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2329 dentry
= dget(bprm
->file
->f_dentry
);
2330 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry
, &vcaps
);
2333 ax
->fcap
.permitted
= vcaps
.permitted
;
2334 ax
->fcap
.inheritable
= vcaps
.inheritable
;
2335 ax
->fcap
.fE
= !!(vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
2336 ax
->fcap_ver
= (vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
2338 ax
->old_pcap
.permitted
= old
->cap_permitted
;
2339 ax
->old_pcap
.inheritable
= old
->cap_inheritable
;
2340 ax
->old_pcap
.effective
= old
->cap_effective
;
2342 ax
->new_pcap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2343 ax
->new_pcap
.inheritable
= new->cap_inheritable
;
2344 ax
->new_pcap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2349 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2350 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2351 * @new: the new credentials
2352 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2354 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2355 * audit system if applicable
2357 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid
,
2358 const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2360 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2361 context
->capset
.pid
= pid
;
2362 context
->capset
.cap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2363 context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
= new->cap_effective
;
2364 context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2365 context
->type
= AUDIT_CAPSET
;
2368 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd
, int flags
)
2370 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2371 context
->mmap
.fd
= fd
;
2372 context
->mmap
.flags
= flags
;
2373 context
->type
= AUDIT_MMAP
;
2376 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer
*ab
)
2380 unsigned int sessionid
;
2382 auid
= audit_get_loginuid(current
);
2383 sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
2384 current_uid_gid(&uid
, &gid
);
2386 audit_log_format(ab
, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2387 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, auid
),
2388 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, uid
),
2389 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, gid
),
2391 audit_log_task_context(ab
);
2392 audit_log_format(ab
, " pid=%d comm=", current
->pid
);
2393 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, current
->comm
);
2396 static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *reason
, long signr
)
2399 audit_log_format(ab
, " reason=");
2400 audit_log_string(ab
, reason
);
2401 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld", signr
);
2404 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2405 * @signr: signal value
2407 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2408 * should record the event for investigation.
2410 void audit_core_dumps(long signr
)
2412 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2417 if (signr
== SIGQUIT
) /* don't care for those */
2420 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND
);
2423 audit_log_abend(ab
, "memory violation", signr
);
2427 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall
, long signr
, int code
)
2429 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2431 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SECCOMP
);
2435 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld", signr
);
2436 audit_log_format(ab
, " syscall=%ld", syscall
);
2437 audit_log_format(ab
, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
2438 audit_log_format(ab
, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current
));
2439 audit_log_format(ab
, " code=0x%x", code
);
2443 struct list_head
*audit_killed_trees(void)
2445 struct audit_context
*ctx
= current
->audit_context
;
2446 if (likely(!ctx
|| !ctx
->in_syscall
))
2448 return &ctx
->killed_trees
;